Copernicus Center Reports

Editorial Board: Micha Heller (editor-in-chief), Bartosz Broek, Aeddan Shaw, ukasz Kurek, Piotr Urbaczyk

Typeset by Piotr Urbaczyk

Cover illustration by Marcin Maciaszczyk

ISSN 2083-1544 www.copernicuscenter.edu.pl

Copernicus Center Reports no. 2

Krakw 2011

Table of Contents
Annual Report 2010 Research 11 Publications 39 Education(CopernicusCollege)41 Conferences 45 Calendar53

Essays JzefMyciskiPlato, Penrose, and Ellis: Ontological Platonism in the Foundations of Mathematics 59 BartoszBroekandAdamOlszewskiThe Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego75

|7

The second volume of Copernicus Center Reports pro videsasummaryoftheCentersactivitiesin2010Itwasayearof the institutions further consolidation: new projects were initi atedandnewcollaborationsestablished,featuringseveralofthe hallmarks of the Centers activity The Krakw Methodological Conferencesgarneredinternationalappealandthe2010honor ary guest of the conference was Sir Roger Penrose, who deliv eredthe2010CopernicusCenterLectureTheConferencegath eredtogetherleadingscholarsincosmologyandphilosophyof physics In 2010 the Copernicus Center Press was also estab lished,asanimprintoftheKonsorcjumAkademickiePublishing House: we have already published four monographic books, andplantopublisharoundtenbooksayearEquallyimportant areothereventsandinitiativesoftheCenter:anumberofcon ferences and seminars, often with the participation of leading researchersfromallovertheworld;theconstantdevelopmentof theCopernicusCenterWebsite;theseriesoflecturesorganized withintheCopernicusCenterCollege,andsoon However,thedatesandfigurestellonlyhalfofthestoryas thereisnoresearchinstitutionwithoutseriousresearchactivi tiesThus,wearehappytoseeagrowingbodyofresultsachieved bytheelevenresearchteamsaffiliatedwiththeCenterAllofthis

8 | Annual Report 2010 activitywouldbeimpossiblewithoutthegeneroushelpandhard workofmanyindividualsandinstitutions,whomwewouldlike tosincerelythank Inadditiontothereportingsection,weincludetwopapers One of them was written for the 2010 Krakw Methodological Conference by the late Archbishop Jzef yciski His sudden deathhasleftavoidinthePolishintellectualandspiritualland scapeFortunately,hiswritingsremain,andonemayhopethat theywillserveasasourceofinspirationandasolidpartnerin thedialoguebetweenscienceandreligion                 Bartosz Broek

Annual Report 2010

|11

Research
WithintheCopernicusCenterthereare11establishedresearch groups

I. Copernican Group Head  ProfessorMichaKokowski(InstituteoftheHistoryofSci ence,PAN) Members  ProfessorTadeuszSierotowicz(JohnPaulIIPontificalUni versity)  ProfessorJarosawWodarczyk(InstituteoftheHistoryof Science,PAN) Research fields  Copernicus (14731543) against the backdrop of his times (biographicalandhistoricalaspects)  detailedanalysisofCopernicusachievementsfromscien tificandculturalperspectives  detailedanalysisofthegenesisandreceptionofCopernicus achievements  detailed analysis of the theories formulated by the advo catesofCopernicanism(Gallileo,Kepler) Recent activities  In2009ProfessorTadeuszSierotowiczpublishedaPolish translation of Galileos Il Saggiatore Waga probiercza, OBICopernicusCenter,KrakwTarnw2009

12 | Annual Report 2010  Professor Tadeusz Sierotowicz has prepared three papers pertainingto Il Saggiatore,tobepublishedin2011  ProfessorTadeuszSierotowiczispreparingaPolishtrans lation of Galileos letters on sunspots The translation, togetherwithacommentary,willbereadyin2013  ProfessorJaroslawWodarczykcoeditedthebookmono graph: Jerzy Dobrzycki, Selected Papers on Medieval and Renaissance Astronomy (Studia Copernicana, vol XLIII), JWodarczyk,RLKremer(eds),Warszawa2010  ProfessorMichaKokowskiwastheinitiatorandthehead organizer of the conference Tajemnica grobu Mikoaja Kopernika Dialog ekspertw (The Nicholas Copernicus gravemysteryAdialogueofexperts)Theconferencetook placeonFebruary2223,2010inKrakwSeethedescrip tionintheconferencessectionofthereport  In 2010 Professor Micha Kokowski was awarded the NicholasCopernicusPrizeoftheFoundationoftheCityof Krakw(awardedeveryfiveyearsbythePolishAcademyof ArtsandSciences)forthebookmonographRne oblicza Mikoaja Kopernika. Spotkania z histori interpretacji(The Many Faces of Nicolaus Copernicus Encounters with the History of Interpretation), Warszawa: Instytut Historii NaukiPAN,Krakw:PolskaAkademiaUmiejtnoci,2009

II. Science and Religion Head   FrDrZbigniewLiana(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniversity) Members  SrDrTeresaObolevitch(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniversity)  DrJacekRodze(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniversity)

Research | 13 Research Fields  the relationship between science and religion in the 20th century(incooperationwiththePAUFides et Ratiocom mission) thequestionofsciencefaithinthelifeandworkofKarol WojtyaJohnPaulII(incooperationwiththePAUFides et Ratiocommission) historyoftherelationshipbetweensciencereligion therelationshipbetweentechnologyandreligion theproblemsoftherelationshipbetweenscienceandreli gioninRussianphilosophy epistemological and ontological questions in the context oftherelationshipbetweenscienceandreligion the problematicof symbolismin patristicthoughtandin Russianphilosophy

    

Recent activities In2010,theresearchteam,incooperationwiththeFides et RatioCommissionofthePolishAcademyofArtsandSciences, organizedthefollowinglectures:  14012010:MichaHeller,Teologia naturalna a wspczesna kosmologia (Natural Theology and the Contemporary Cosmology)  18022010: Jerzy Dadaczyski, Problem sprzecznoci w teologii. Jakiej logiki potrzebuje wspczesna teologia? (TheProblemofContradictioninTheology:WhatLogicfor ContemporaryTheology?)  18032010: Stanisaw Wszoek, Zaniedbany argument Charlesa S. Peircea (TheNeglectedArgumentofCSPeirce)

14 | Annual Report 2010  22042010: Jan Woleski, Dlaczego nie mona (?) udowo dni istnienia Boga?(WhyitisImpossible(?)toProveGods Existence?)  21102010:ZbigniewWolak,Jan Pawe II o relacjach midzy nauk i teologi (JohnPaulIIontheRelationshipBetween ScienceandTheology)  25112010: Bogdan Dembiski, Ewolucja platoskiej dok tryny idei(TheEvolutionofthePlatonicDoctrineofIdeas)  16122010: Robert Woniak, W drodze do teologii nauki (TowardstheTheologyofScience)

III. Philosophy of Physics and Cosmology Head  ProfessorMarekSzydowski(CatholicUniversityofLublin) Members  TheKrakw/LublinTeam  ProfessorMarekSzydowski(teamcoordinator,Catholic UniversityofLublin)  ProfessorMarekBiesiada(SilesianUniversity)  FrDrJacekGolbiak(CatholicUniversityofLublin)  DrAdamKrawiec(JagiellonianUniversity)  DrMonikaHere(CatholicUniversityofLublin)  FrDrPaweTambor(CatholicUniversityofLublin)  OrestHrycyna,MA(CatholicUniversityofLublin)  AleksandraKurek,MA(JagiellonianUniversity)  JakubMielczarek,MA(JagiellonianUniversity)  ukaszKukier,MA(UMCSLublin)  TheSzczecinTeam  Professor Mariusz P Dbrowski (team coordinator, SzczecinUniversity)

Research | 15  ProfessorJanuszGarecki(SzczecinUniversity)  ProfessorJerzyStelmach(SzczecinUniversity)  DrTomaszDenkiewicz(SzczecinUniversity)  AdamBalcerzak,MA(SzczecinUniversity) Research Fields  axiologyofmoderncosmology  temporalityofmoderncosmology  philosophicalassumptionsincosmology  astudyoftheboundariesofphysicsandcosmology  complex systems  conceptual foundations and philo sophicalaspects  cosmobiology  thebeginningoftheUniverseinmoderncosmology  thenotionofmultiverseinmoderncosmology  Feynmansnotionofquantumgravity Recent activities The current research of the Philosophy of Physics and CosmologygroupfocusesonfourmainsubjectareasThefirst isthestudyandelaborationofthephilosophicalaspectsofthe notionofemergenceasappliedtotheproblemsofphysicsand cosmologyThesignificanceofsuchinterdisciplinarystudiesin both science and philosophy is unquestionable It may lead to deeper understanding of the still unclear conception of philo sophicalemergenceasanexplanatorytoolinthecontextofsci entifictheoriesTheconceptofemergenceisstudiedinconnec tionwithmathematicsaswellThesecondfieldofinvestigation isdevotedtothestudyofthesociologicalaspectsofmodernsci enceTherelevanceoftheideasofLFleckinthiscontextisof special interest Thirdly, in physics an important role is played

16 | Annual Report 2010 by the socalled nonempirical criteria of theory acceptance, such as simplicity, symmetry, beauty etc The methodological andphilosophicalroleofthesecriteriahasbeenanalyzedinthe contextofphysicsandcosmologyThelastdomainoftheteams research is the study of complex systems of cosmological and physical origins Especially, the notion of dynamic complexity methodsandtheirapplicationincosmologyforimprovingthe evolutionary scenario is analyzed This leads to analyzing pro foundquestionsinthephilosophyofcomplexity Theresearchresultshavebeenpresentedinthefollowing papers:  JPietrak,MSzydowski,PTambor,Fraktale:konstrukcja czy emergencja? Cz I Fraktalne jednostki emergencji w klasycznym schemacie pojciowym, Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa,183(2010),p4364  JPietrak,MSzydowski,PTambor,Fraktale:konstrukcja czy emergencja? Cz II Emergencja fraktalna w podej ciu quasiempirycznym, Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa, 184(2010),p271302 In the research project we form a conceptual framework that enablesthecharacterisationoffractalstructuresfromthepoint ofviewofphilosophicalconceptofemergenceInthefirstpart, we present the main ideas of the philosophy of emergence as well as an attempt at capturing emergent units in the process offractalsgenerationHowever,westicktotheclassicalunder standingoftherelationinquestionInthesecondpart,dueto the demonstration of weaknesses of the classical accounts as insufficient in the specific context of mathematical structures, we show that the discourse about emergence in mathematics becomesmeaningfulandvalidthroughtheadaptationofquasi

Research | 17 empirical approach towards some issues in mathematics, an approachgroundedinthephilosophyofformalsciences  MHere,MSzydowski,PTambor,Samoorganizujcy si Wszechwiat w rnych skalach miejsce, gdzie nauka spotyka si z filozofi(TransferideiOdewolucjiwbiologii do ewolucji w astronomii i kosmologii, KUL, Lublin 1819listopada2009) We review a broad class of complex selforganizing systems existinginnatureInthecontextofthesesystemswepointout the philosophical implications for the discussion of causality, holism vs reductionism and emergence We propose a philo sophical notion of emergence with emergence investigated in scienceforthedeeperandmorepreciseformulationandunder standing of this concept We also stress the importance of the ontological question: why are selforganizing systems actually possible?  M Szydowski, P Tambor, Kosmologia wspczesna w schemacie pojciowym kolektywu badawczego i stylu mylowego Ludwika Flecka (Racjonalne kontra s  ocjologicznerekonstrukcjerozwojuwiedzy,UMCS,Lublin 1Czerwca2010) Inthispaperwetrytodistinguishthestylesofscientificthink inginthespecificsenseofLFlecksphilosophyofscienceas applied to the modern cosmology We investigate two distinct styles:thefactualandthetheoreticaloneWeshowhowimpor tantitistotakeintoconsiderationtheimpactofthesociological factorsonthescientificresearch  M Szydowski, P Tambor, Prostota modelu kosmologi cznegoazoonoWszechwiata,Roczniki Filozoficzne, 58(2010),p153180

18 | Annual Report 2010 InthispaperwecontinueourinvestigationofAkaikesimplicity criterion,whichplaysacrucialroleinESobersphilosophyof scienceWeconsiderdifferentmodelsofacceleratingUniverse whichdescribethecurrentevolutionoftheUniverseWedem onstrate that the generalized Akaike criterion (Bozdogen crite rion)identifiesaverysimplestandardcosmologicalmodelcalled LCDM(LambdaColdDarkMatterModel),whereasthestandard AkaikecriteriondoesntprovidesuchauniqueidentificationWe demonstrate that the analysis of cosmological models may be usefulinsearchingformoreadequatecriterionofthesimplicity inthecontextofthephilosophyofscience  D Ciszewska, M Szydowski, Pikno jako przykad poza empirycznego kryterium w akceptacji teorii naukowej, Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce,XLVII(2010) Itcanbesaidthatbeautyandsciencedonotshareacommon groundyetitisnotnecessarilytrueTheplaceofbeautyinsci ence is between two branches of knowledge: aesthetics and physicsThepurposeofthepaperistoshowthattheyarecon nected, permeate each other and operate together to yield sci entificresultsThescientifictheoriesandtheaesthetictheories display some similarities, not only at the construction stage, but also in their use The paper examines two aesthetic crite riasymmetryandsimplicitywhichareveryvaluabletools ofchoosingthescientifictheoryThemostimportantaspectof beautyinscienceisthefactthataestheticcriteriainfluencethe choiceofscientifictheory  TStachowiak,MSzydowski,Adifferentialalgorithmfor theLyapunovspectrum,[arXiv:10083368v2] WepresentanewalgorithmforcomputingtheLyapunovexpo nents spectrum based on a matrix differential equation This

Research | 19 approach belongs to the socalled continuous type, where the rateofexpansionofperturbationsisobtainedforalltimes,and the exponents are reached as the limit at infinity It does not involveexponentiallydivergentquantitiessothereisnoneedfor the rescaling or realigning of the solution We show the meth odsadvantagesanddrawbacksusingtheexampleofaparticle movingbetweentwocontractingwalls

IV. Mathematical Structures of the Universe Head  ProfessorAndrzejWoszczyna(JagiellonianUniversity) Members  FrProfessorMichaHeller(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniver sity)  ProfessorZdzisawGolda(JagiellonianUniversity)  DrJacekGruszczak(PedagogicalUniversity,Krakw) ProfessorWiesawSasin(WarsawTechnicalUniversity)  ProfessorAndrzejSitarz(JagiellonianUniversity  ProfessorLeszekSokoowski(JagiellonianUniversity  DrZdzisawOdrzygd(WarsawTechnicalUniversity  DrLeszekPysiak(WarsawTechnicalUniversity)  DrWojciechCzaja(JagiellonianUniversity) Research Fields  interpretational issues in the applications of noncommu tativegeometrytophysics  mathematicalformulationsofgravitationalphysics  thetheoryofstructureformationintheUniverse  computeralgebrasystemswithapplicationtogeneralrela tivity

20 | Annual Report 2010 Recent activities The publications of the members of the research team in 2010 include: Books  MHeller,To Catch the Transient Moment,secondedition, Znak,Krakw2010(inPolish);  MHeller,The Sense of Life and the Sense of the Universe. Studies in Contemporary Theology, translated by Aeddan Shaw, Karolina CzerskaShaw, Copernicus Center Press, Krakw2010 Papers  MHeller,ACommutativeFriedmanCosmologicalModel, Annalen der Physik,19(2010),p196201;  M Heller, A SelfContained Universe? [in:] The Trinity and an Entangled World. Relationality in Physical Sciences and Theology, J Polkinghorne (ed), Earmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids Michigan, Cambridge UK, 2010, pp4154;  ASitarz,AZajac,2010,Spectralactionforscalarperturba tionsofDiracoperators[arXiv:10123860];  LDabrowski,ASitarz,2010,Noncommutativecirclebun dlesandnewDiracoperators,[arXiv:10123055];  P Olczykowski, A Sitarz, 2010, On spectral action over Bieberbachmanifolds,[arXiv:10120136];  BIochum,TMasson,TSchacker,ASitarz,2010,Compact deformationandspectraltriples,[arXiv:10044190];  J Gruszczak, 2010, Smooth Beginning of the Universe, [arXiv:10113824]

Research | 21 Workshops on Noncommutative Geometry On February 912, 2011, the group met at the Diocesan Seminary in Tarnw to continue its work on noncommuta tive geometry In the event participated: Micha Ekstein, Jacek Gruszczak, Micha Heller, Tomasz Miller, Zdzisaw Odrzygd, Leszek Pysiak, Wiesaw Sasin We continued our work on the semidirectproductofgroupoidsand,inparticular,onacrossed product given by the action of the groupoid on the groupoid algebra We also studied the regular representation of such a crossed product on a bundle of Hilbert spaces All calculations and proofs have been successfully completed, and the work is readytobeedited We also initiated a new topic  the definition and prop erties of a sheave of noncommutative algebras In particu lar, we have constructed the sheaf of von Neumann algebras Moreover, Z Odzrzygd presented his work on the Kaluza Kleinmodelintermsofthegroupoidtheory,andJGruszczak presentedhisworkentitledSmoothBeginningoftheUniverse (arXiv:10113824[grqc]) There were also organized other workshops: 811 July 2000,Pasierbiec;15October2010,Warsaw;2427February2011, Warsaw;2325April2011,Warsaw Lectures Michael Heller delivered a series of lectures, Comoslogy and Creation,on2225March2010,atUniversidadInternacional MenendezPelayo,Tenerife,CanaryIslands: Lecture 1: The evolution and the structure of the Universe Abriefhistoryof20thcenturycosmologyFromthestaticworld totheexpandinguniverseGeometryoftheUniverseExploring the history of the Universe Discovery of microwave cosmic

22 | Annual Report 2010 background radiation and its cosmological significance Dark matteranddarkenergySomeopenquestions Lecture 2: The origin of the Universe BigBangandtheinitialsingularityproblemVariousattemptsto neutralizesingularitiesHawkingandPenrosesingularitytheo rems Malicious singularities The search for the final physical theoryIstheUniversesingular? Lecture 3: Creation of the Universe AbriefhistoryofthecreationconceptTimeandeternity:crea tionintimeorcreationwithtime?Theconceptofcreationand theconceptofbeginningCreationoftheUniverseandmodern cosmologyDidGodcreatetheUniverseintheBigBang?God ofthegapsstrategy

V. Philosophy and History of Physics Head  FrDrWojciechPGrygiel(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniver sity) Members  FrDrRobertJanusz(Ignatianum,Krakw)  FrDrTadeuszPabian(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniversity)  DrAndrzejKoleyski(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniversity/ UniversityofScienceandTechnology,Krakw)  FrDrukaszMcisawskiOP(JohnPaulIIPontificalUni versity) Research Fields  thehistoryof20thCenturyphysics  thephilosophicalinterpretationofphysicaltheories  theevolutionofconceptsinphysics

Research | 23 Recent Activities The activity of the research group of Philosophy and HistoryofPhysicsfocusesmainlyonthestudiesoftheontologi calstatusofphysicaltheoriesandtheirrelationtothephysical realitythattheypurporttodescribeThereseemstobenogeneral agreementamongcontemporaryphysicistsinthisregardThe prevailingattitude,however,reliesontheconceptputforward byWVOQuinewherebytheexistenceofphysicalentitiesis inabroadenedsensewarrantedbytheformalismofthetheory This approach permits the exercise of a philosophical inquiry without commitment to any a priori assumed ontology of the physical reality In conjunction to these efforts, a new interest hasemergedwithinthegroupthatpromptedstudiesinthearea ofthephilosophyofmindincooperationwiththeCopernicus CenterNeuroscienceresearchteamInparticular,philosophyof mind exercised in the context of cognitive sciences opens up possibilities to investigate classical philosophical problems of thehumanmind(eg,themindbodyproblem)inthelightofthe achievementsofcontemporarysciencesThus,anewbranchof thesocalledphilosophyinsciencefindsitsgoodfoundationsA considerableeffortofthegroupsactivitywasalsodevotedtothe studyofthephilosophicalimplicationsofBellstheoremandthe completionoftheprojectentitledExperimentalMetaphysics Selected publications  Wojciech P Grygiel, Czy czas jeszcze pynie w fizyce? Ontologia czasu a wspczesne teorie fizyczne, Logos iEthos,28(2010),pp107120  Wojciech P Grygiel, Matematycy o matematycznym pla tonizmieZapisciekawejdyskusjiLogos i Ethos,29(2010), pp726

24 | Annual Report 2010  Wojciech P Grygiel, Dlaczego kwantowanie grawitacji moe interesowa filozofa? Postpy fizyki, 61 (2010), pp211215  Wojciech P Grygiel, Jak uniesprzeczni sprzeczno umysu? Zagadnienia filozoficzne w nauce, 47 (2010), pp7088  Wojciech P Grygiel, Teoria superstrun i Lee Smolina kopotyzfizyk,Filozofia Nauki,71(2010),pp141152  Wojciech P Grygiel, The quantum world  real but not measurable [in:] Mariola KuszykBytniewska, Andrzej ukasik (ed), Filozofia przyrody wspczenie, Krakw: Universitas2010,pp131150  Tadeusz Pabjan, Krtka (pre)historia argumentu EPR, Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce,47(2010),pp5469  Tadeusz Pabjan, Problem upywajcego czasu, Postpy Fizyki,61/2(2010),pp7779  Tadeusz Pabian, Georgea FitzGeralda hipoteza kon trakcji, Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki, 55/2 (2010), pp169185

VI. History of Mathematics: People-Ideas-Philosphical Aspects Head  Professor Wiesaw Wjcik (Institute of the History of Sci ence,PAN) Members  ProfesorRomanDuda(WrocawUniversity)  ProfessorGraynaRosiska(InstituteoftheHistoryofSci ence,PAN)  Professor Krzysztof Malanka (Institute of the History of Sci nce,PAN) e

Research | 25  ProfessorZbigniewKrl(InstituteofPhilosophyandSocio logy,PAN)  Professor Jerzy Dadaczyski (John Paul II Pontifical Uni       versity) DrZdzisawPogoda(JagiellonianUniversity) DrStanisawDomoradzki(UniversityofRzeszow) DrZofiaPawlikowskaBroek DrGabrielaTeresaBesler(SilesianUniversity) DrAndrzejBrzoza(SilesianTechnicalUniversity) DrPaweTurkowski(UniversityofRzeszw)

Research Fields      historyofPolishmathematics conceptionsoftheunityofmathematics philosophicalfoundationsofmathematics thechangeabilityofthenotionofmathematics the evolution and meaning of the mathematical basic concepts  ancient, modern and contemporary mathematics: differ encesandtheirphilosophicalsources

Recent activities Intheacademicyear2009/2010sixseminarsoftheresearch teamtookplaceThefollowingpaperswerepresented:  Metodologiczny status historii matematyki Cz I (MethodologicalstatusofthehistoryofmathematicsPartI), Professor Wiesaw Wjcik, Krakw, Instytut Matematyki iInformatykiUJ,ojasiewiczaStr6,16October2009  Dedekind, Cantor, Kronecker, Professor Jerzy Miodu szewski, Katowice, Wydzia Nauk Spoecznych Uniwer sytetulskiego,BankowaStr11,20November2009

26 | Annual Report 2010  Metodologiczny status historii matematyki Cz II (Methodological status of the history of mathematics), Professor Wiesaw Wjcik, Krakw, Instytut Matematyki iInformatykiUJ,ojasiewiczaStr6,18December2009  HistoriamatematykinaKongresieHistoriiNaukiwBuda peszcie (wrzesie 2009) (History of mathematics at the CongressoftheHistoryofScienceinBudapest,September 2009),DrZdzisawPogodaandDrStanisawDomoradzki, Krakw,InstytutMatematykiiInformatykiUJ,ojasiewicza Str6,26February2010  Teoria idei w kontekcie platoskiej filozofii matematyki (TheoryofideasinthecontextofthePlatonicphilosophy of mathematics), Professor Bogdan Dembiski, Katowice, Wydzia Nauk Spoecznych Uniwersytetu lskiego, Ban kowaStr11,19March2010  Komputery w matematyce Dowody wspomagane kom puterowo (Computers in mathematics Computerassi stedproofs),ProfessorKMalanka,Krakw,InstytutMate matykiiInformatykiUJ,ojasiewiczaStr6,17June2010

VII. Neurobiology Head  ProfessorJerzyVetulani(PolishAcademyofScience) Members  Professor Dominika Dudek (Collegium Medicum of the JagiellonianUniversity)  ProfessorJanuszRybakowski(MedicalUniversity,Pozna)

Research | 27 Research Fields  Researchconnectedwithexperimentalworkonthefunc tioning of the human brain as well as the question of its interpretation and methodological connection with neu robiology Recent Activities  An informal discussion group, Trapez, has been estab lishedThemeetingsofthegroupareheldonceamonth The participants are: Professor J Vetulani, Professor I Nalepa, Professor J Silberring, B Kaszkur, K Bielawski, Fr G Babiarz, rev Dr W Grygiel, Dr M Siwek, Professor DDudekThediscussionsaredevotedtotheproblemsof neurobiologyinitsrelationswithotherdisciplines,suchas thehumanities,andtheneuroscientificunderstandingof humanbehaviour(eg,aggression,morality,etc)  During the Congress of the Polish Psychiatric Society in Pozna (2326062010) there was organized a special session under the patronage of the Copernicus Center, Science in Search of the SoulThelecturesweredelivered by:ProfessorJerzyVetulani,ProfessorJanuszRybakowski, Professor Jerzy Aleksandrowicz, Professor Dominika Dudek  DuringThe Brain WeekinKrakwthemembersofthegroup delivered the following lectures: Professor Jerzy Vetulani, Can the scalpel help to heal the soul? The Perspective of Psychiatry from a Biological Point of View; Professor DominikaDudek,PsychotherapyandNeuroscience(both inPolish)Thelecturesweresubsequentlypublishedinthe Wszechwiatmonthly

28 | Annual Report 2010  ProfessorJerzyVetulanipublishedabookmonographMzg fascynacje, problem, tajemnice (Brain  Fascinations, Problems, Mysteries), Wydawnictwo Homini, 2010 The goal of the papers included in the book is to popularize neuroscienceandtrytoshowthatthebigquestionsposed byphilosophers,theologians,ethiciansandpsychologists maybeaddressedbyneuroscience  Professor Jerzy Vetulani delivered a number of popular lectures  Within the cooperation between Klinika Psychiatrii Doro sychinPozna,KatedraPsychiatriiinWrocawandKlinika Psychiatrii Dorosych in Krakow, a research project TRES DEPwascarriedoutTheprojectsgoalistoassesstherisk of bipolar disorder in patients with treatmentresistant depressionThedirectorsoftheproject,ProfessorsJanusz RybakowskiandDominikaDudekarethemembersofthe NeuroscienceresearchteamSomeofthepaperspublished within the project were affiliated with the Copernicus Center:AKiejna,TPawowski,DDudek,Dojko,MSiwek, RRocze,JKRybakowski,TheutilityofMoodDisorder Questionnaireforthedetectionofbipolardiathesisintreat mentresistantdepression,Journal of Affective Disorders, 124(2010),pp270274;DDudek,JKRyba owski,MSiwek, k T Pawowski, D ojko, R Rocze, A Kiejna, Risk factors of treatment resistance in major depression, Journal of Affective Disorders,126(2010),pp268271

VIII. Methodology and Philosophy of Science Head  ProfessorWojciechZauski(JagiellonianUniversity)

Research | 29 Members  ProfessorBartoszBroek(JagiellonianUniversity)  FrDrZbigniewLiana(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniversity)  FrProfessorAdamOlszewski(JohnPaulIIPontificalUni ver ity) s  ProfessorAnnaBroek(WarsawUniversity) Research Fields  classical philosophy of science (Vienna Circle, Popper, Kuhn,Lakatos)  methodologyofbiosciences  methodsinsocialsciences Recent activities Thecurrentresearchincludesofthegroupisconcentrated on:  thenotionofthemathematicalsubjectinthephilosophy ofmathematicsofKant,Hilbert,FregeandBrouwer;  thelogicofnonfoundationism;  thephilosophyofKRPopper;  theapplicationsofgametheoryinphilosophy;  thephilosophyofsocialsciences Therewerepublished:  a monograph by Bartosz Broek, The Double Truth Con troversy. An Analytical Essay, Copernicus Center Press, Krakw2010;  several papers in Polish and English: Broek, B and A Olszewski (2010): Kilka uwag o kryterium Quinea (Some Remarks on Quines Criterion), Filozofia Nauki; A Olszewski, Intuicjonizm vs Platonizm Na przykadzie

30 | Annual Report 2010 lematu Koeniga (Intuitionism and Platonism On the ExampleofKoenigsLemma)[in:]IBondeckaKrzykowska, J Pogonowski (eds), wiaty matematyki. Tworzenie czy odkrywanie?,Pozna:WydawnictwoNaukoweUAM2010, pp 261274; A Olszewski, Uwagi o Rajmundzie Lullusie, jegodzieleilogicetreci(RemarksonRLullus,hiswork andthemateriallogic),Logos i Ethos,28(2010),p89106

IX. Analytical Metaphysics Head  ProfessorTomaszPlacek(JagiellonianUniversity) Members  ProfessorAndrzejWroski(JagiellonianUniversity  ProfessorTomaszBigaj(WarsawUniversity)  DrJerzyGoosz(JagiellonianUniversity)  DrLeszekWroski(JagiellonianUniversity)  JacekWawer,MA(JagiellonianUniversity) Research Fields  causalitytheoriesintheclassicalandprobabilisticversions  determinisminnaturedeterminismofscientifictheories  possibleworlds structures in connection to spacetime structures  metaphysicalimplicationsofsomephysicalresultssuchas Bellstheorems Recent activities  Theyear2010broughtanewimpetustothefunctioning ofthegroupasitreceivedaMNiSWgrantTechnically,thegrant istosupportPolishphilosophersparticipatinginaprogramme

Research | 31 of the European Foundation of Science called Philosophy of Science:AEuropeanPerspectiveTomaszPlacekisamember oftheprogrammessteeringcommitteeandrepresentsPoland initThegranthaspermittedtheyoungermembersofthegroup toworkfulltimeontheirresearchIthasalsoallowedmembers ofthegrouptoparticipateininternationalconferencesorwork shops, where they presented their results, or exchanged ideas withotherresearchers  The core of the group consists of three research ers, Professor Tomasz Placek, Dr Leszek Wroski and Jacek Wawer, MA Additionally, there are about five PhD students or advanced undergraduate students who regularly come to the groupsmeetings  In2010thegroupheldregularFridaymeetings,ofthree kindsFirst,therehasbeenareadinggroupthatdiscussedmain papersintheprojectofbranchingspacetimes(anddidproofs presented in these papers) The aim of the reading group is to acquiremathematicalandphilosophicalsophisticationneeded to work in this field The second team attempts an analysis of Belltype theorems in a framework that is both stochastic and modal The novelty of this project lies exactly in the combina tion of stochasticity and modality I estimate the project will come to fruition in summer 2011 Finally, the third team inves tigatesaspecificprojectofdiagnosingBellstheorem,initiated byHoferSzaboetalThisworkisalmostcomplete,asTPlacek andLWroskihavejustfinishedapaperwhichprovesthatthe mentionedprojectismathematicallyincorrect  Apart from the collaborative work, the group mem bers individually pursue their own projects Jacek Wawer has justsubmitted toSynthese apaper(jointlywith AMalpass)on Ockhamiststenselogics,defendinganotionthatthereisadis tinguishedfuturehistory(ie,theydefendthesocalledThinRed

32 | Annual Report 2010 Line doctrine) Leszek Wroski continues his investigations of commoncausesandrelatednotions,whichwerethetopicofhis doctoraldissertationTomaszPlacekhasrecentlypublishedhis construction of semantics for modal languages that uses pos sible continuations rather than possible worlds He also devel oped an argument showing counterintuitive consequences of analyzingthepresentinmodalterms  Thehighlightofthegroupsactivityin2010wasawork shopCausesandTenses:FormalPerspectives,whichthegroup organized in September 1011 The workshop was sponsored jointlybytheCopernicusCenterandDepartmentofPhilosophy of the Jagiellonian University, and was generally assessed as very successful The workshops underlying idea was to bring together researchers doing probabilistic causation (analyzed formally)withresearchersoftenses,analyzedfromeitheralogi calormetaphysicalperspectiveTheemphasiswasonsmalldata structures for analyzing causes and indeterminism, common causationandcausalcompletability,andnewtechniquesforthe problemoffuturecontingentsTheeventgathereddistinguished speakers: Nuel Belnap (Pittsburgh), Fabrice Correia (Geneva), Thomas Mller (Utrecht) and Mikls Rdei (London) The jour nal Erkenntnis has agreed to put together a special issue com prisingpapersreadatthisworkshopThisissuewillbeeditedby TPlacek,JWawerandLWroski  In 2010 the group members published the following papers that funded or partly funded through the MNiSW grant administeredbytheCopernicusCenter:  TPlacek:Possibilitieswithoutpossibleworlds/histories, Journal of Philosophical Logic(2010),DOI:101007/s10992 0109159x;

Research | 33  TPlacekandNBelnap:Indeterminismisamodalnotion: branching spacetimes and Earmans pruning, Synthese (2010),DOI:101007/s1122901098468;  TPlacek:Alocusfornow,[in:]DDieks,WJGonzalez, S Hartmann, T Uebel and M Weber (eds), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation: New Trends and Old Ones Reconsidered,Dordrecht:Springer,pp39941; In 2010 the members of the group participated in the fol lowingconferencesandworkshops:  BIRTHAPostgraduateConferenceonBranchingTimeand Indeterminacy,BristolAugust2010,participated:TPlacek, L Wroski and J Wawer T Placek and J Wawer read papers,TPlacekwasaninvitedspeaker;  ESFworkshopPointsofContactbetweenthePhilosophy ofPhysicsandthePhilosophyofBiology:Probability,Laws andNaturalKinds,LondonSchoolofEconomics,London, UK,December1315,participated:TPlacek,LWroski

X. Polish Philosohy of Nature in the First Half of the 20th Century Head  Fr Professor Janusz Mczka (John Paul II Pontifical Uni versity) Members  DrPawePolak(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniversity)  DrAndrzejKoleyski(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniversity)  AnnaMadej,MA(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniversity)  MagorzataStawarz,MA(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniversity)

34 | Annual Report 2010 Research Fields  basicideasofthePolishphilosophyofscienceinthefirst halfofthe20thcentury  the main representatives of the Polish philosophy of sci enceinthefirsthalfofthe20thcentury  thepeculiarityofthePolishphilosophyofscienceagainst thebackdropofinternationalphilosophyofscience  preparation of prewar manuscripts concerning the phi losophyofscience Recent activities In 2010, there were held four meetings of the research group:  12 January 2010: Dr Pawe Polak presented his paper Perspektywy bada nad histori polskiej filozofii przy rody(ThePerspectivesontheResearchontheHistoryof thePolishPhilosophyofNature)Heconcentratedonthe following two issues: 1) the reception of the evolutionary theoryinPoland;and2)thedebateconcerningDarwinism atthebreakof19thand20thcenturies  19March2010:DrPawePolakpresentedtheprojectofdevel opingaVirtualLibraryandtheArchiveoftheCopernicus Center The goal of the project would be to collect and makeaccessibleonlinevariousresourcesconnectedtothe historyofscienceandphilosophyinPolandAnnaMadej, MA, read her paper on Problematyka celowoci w przy rodzie oywionej w ujciu J. Metallmanna (The Problem ofTeleologyinNatureAccordingtoJMetallmann),based on an unpublished manuscript of Metallmann The pres entation was followed by adiscussionwhich highlighted

Research | 35 the peculiar character of the principle of teleology in Metallmannsholisticphilosophyofnature  21June2010:themeetingwasdevotedtothereviewofthe workoftheresearchgroup  1December2010:themeetingwasdevotedtotheproject ofpublishinganumberofunpublishedpapersbyMarian Smoluchowski

XI. Biological Foundations of Law and Ethics Head  ProfessorBartoszBroek(JagiellonianUniversity) Members  ProfessorJerzyStelmach(JagiellonianUniversity)  ProfessorWojciechZauski(JagiellonianUniversity)  MarcinGorazda,MA(JohnPaulIIPontificalUniversity)  ukaszKurek,MA(JagiellonianUniversity)  RadosawZyzik,MA(JagiellonianUniversity)  JakubKabza,MA(JagiellonianUniversity)  AeddanShaw,MA(TischnerEuropeanUniversity) Research Fields        ethicsandneurosciences lawandneurosciences theconceptofnormativity conceptualschemesinlawandethics theevolutionarymodelofethicsandlaw evolutionarytheoryinsocialsciences themethodologyofsocialsciences

36 | Annual Report 2010 Recent activities ThegroupmeetsonceaweekThemeetingsofthegroup are documented at the Biolawgy blog: www.biolawgy.wordpress. com.Themaindirectionsofcurrentresearchinclude:  naturalism and antinaturalism in philosophy and in the normativesciences;  neuroscienceandthelaw:thefoundationsofprivateand criminal law against the background of neuroscientific theories;  ontology of rules and the problem of normativity  the insightsfromtheevolutionarytheoryandneuroscience In2010,themembersofthegrouppublishedabookmon ograph:  JStelmach,BBroek,WZauski,MSoniewicka,Paradoksy bioetyki prawniczej(ParadoxesofLegalBioethics),Wolters KluwerPolska,Warszawa2010 IncollaborationwiththeDepartmentforthePhilosophyof LawandLegalEthicsoftheJagiellonianUniversitytwocollec tionsofessayswerealsopublished:  JStelmach,MSoniewicka,WZauski(eds),Studies in the Philosophy of Law IV: Legal Philosophy and the Challenges of Biosciences,JagiellonianUniversityPress,Krakw2010;  J Stelmach, M Soniewicka, B Broek (eds), Studies in the Philosophy of Law V: Law and Biology, Jagiellonian UniversityPress,Krakw2010 Themembersoftheteampublishedthefollowingpapers pertainingtothebiologicalfoundationsoflawandethics:  B Broek, R Zyzik, Reguy prawne z perspektywy Docieka filozoficznych(LegalRulesfromthePerspective

Research | 37 of Philosophical Investigations), Ruch Prawniczy, Ekono miczny i Socjologiczny,LXXII/2(2010),p113132  B Broek, Normatywno prawa Szkic teorii, Logos  iEthos28(2010),p2966 BBroek,TheNotionofthePersoninBioethicalDebates, Studies in the Philosophy of Law IV,JagiellonianUniversity Press,Krakw2010,p8596 B Broek, Some Remarks on the Naturalization of Law, Studies in the Philosophy of Law V,JagiellonianUniversity Press,Krakw2010,p7382 WZauski,GeneticEnhancementandHumanAutonomy, [in:]MFernndezBarreraetal(ed)Law and Technology: Looking into the Future Selected Essays,EuropeanPress AcademicPublishing,Florence,Italy2010,p255270 WZauski,HumanNatureAfterDarwin,[in:]JStelmach, MSoniewicka,WZauski(eds),Studies in the Philosophy of Law IV: Legal Philosophy and the Challenges of Biosciences, JagiellonianUniversityPress,Krakw2010,pp7784 A Giza, W Zauski, Ethical Problems of Hematopoietic StemCellTransplantation,[in:]JStelmach,MSoniewicka, WZauski(eds),Studies in the Philosophy of Law IV: Legal

Philosophy and the Challenges of Biosciences,Jagiellonian UniversityPress,Krakw2010,pp165171  JStelmach,SixCausesoftheDisputeOverLegalBioethics, [in:] J Stelmach, B Broek, M Soniewicka (eds), Studies in the Philosophy of Law V: Law and Biology,Jagiellonian UniversityPress,Krakw2010,pp918  Radosaw Zyzik, Neurolaw A New Paradigm in Legal Philosophy?, in: J Stelmach, B Broek, M Soniewicka (eds),StudiesinthePhilosophyofLawV:LawandBiology, JagiellonianUniversityPress:Krakw2010,pp125134

38 | Annual Report 2010 ThreePhDdissertationswerealsosubmitted:  ukasz Kurek, Wina w prawie karnym a problem wolnej woli w wietle neurofilozofii(GuiltinCriminalLawAndthe ProblemofFreeWillintheLightofNeurophilosophy)  Radosaw Zyzik, Antropologiczne zaoenia teorii owiadcze woli z perspektywy neurokognitywnej (The AnthropologicalAssumptionsoftheTheoryofTheMeeting oftheMindsfromaNeurocognitivePerspective)  MarcinGorazada,Obrona antynaturalizmu(InDefenceof Antinaturalism)

|39

Publications
Copernicus Center Reports #1 In2010thefirstvolumeoftheCopernicus Center Reports was published The volume consists of two parts The first is Annual Report 2009,arecordofresearch,publishing,education andconferenceactivitiesoftheCopernicusCenterin2009The second,Essays,comprisesthreepapers:MHeller,The Struggle for Meaning, W Zauski, Human Nature after Darwin, and A Pelczar,Stanisaw Zaremba

Copernicus Center Press In 2010 the Copernicus Center Press was inaugurated In itsinauguralyear,twobookswerepublished:  Bartosz Broek, The Double Truth Controversy. An Analytical Essay,Krakw2010,ISBN9788362259014 Theprincipalsourceofthedoubletruthcontroversyisthecon demnationof1277issuedbythebishopofParis,StephanTempier Intheintroductiontothedocument,Tempiercondemnsthose philosopherswhoclaimthattherearethingstrueaccordingto theCatholicfaithbutfalseonthebasisofnaturalreasonThere is little doubt that Tempier thought of Siger of Brabant and BoethiusofDaciaThereareseveralproblemsinvolvedhere,the firstbeingwhetheranyonehasactuallyeveradvocateddouble truth The second follows on the heels of the first since, if so, what does the theory of duplex veritas amount to? Finally, is it rationaltoupholdaviewthatembracesdoubletruth?Thisbook attemptstoanswerthesequestionsviaanexegesisofhistorical

40 | Annual Report 2010 textsandbytheapplicationofsomemodernlogicaltechniques to medieval theories The resulting picture is that of complex andinterestingaccountsoftherelationshipbetweenfaithand reason, enabling an indepth reflection on the contemporary discussionsoftheissue  Michael Heller, The Sense of Life and the Sense of the Universe,Krakw2010,ISBN9788362259021 Questions concerning the sense of man and the sense of the universe are closely related In fact, they constitute one Big QuestionManisgeneticallyconnectedtotheuniverseandthe origins of man have their roots in the history of the universe Iftheuniversehassensethenitmostprobablyembracesman sinceheisapartor,evenmore,anelementofthestructureof the universe Would it be possible for man to have a senseful existenceinasenselessuniverse?

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce Copernicus Center, in cooperation with Center for Interdisciplinary Studies (OBI) and Biblos Publishing House, continuestopublishZagadnienia Filozoficzne w NauceIn2010 the46thvolumeofthisperiodicalwaspublished

Studia Copernicana Studia Copernicana is a series of book monographs and collections of essays published by the Institute for the History of Science of the Polish Academy of Sciences in cooperation with Copernicus Center In 2010 the following was published: JerzyDobrzycki,Selected Papers on Medieval and Renaissance Astronomy,edbyJWodarczykandRLKremer

|41

Education (Copernicus College)

Science and the Big Questions In 2009/2010 academic year, the Copernicus Center, in cooperationwiththeUniversityofInformationTechnologyand ManagementinRzeszwandTischnerEuropeanUnviersityin Krakworganized14openlectures(inPolish)withintheseries Science and the Big Questions The lectures were transmitted onlineattheCenterswebpageThelistofdeliveredlecturesis asfollows: 1 ZLiana,,,Filozofianauki#3(Philosophyofscience#3) 2 J Vetulani, ,,Neurobiologia dokonywania wyboru moral nego(Neurobiologyofmoralchoice) 3 MSzafraski,Neuroscienceafilozofia(Neuroscienceand philosophy) 4 DDudek,Psychoterapiawwietleneuroscience(Psycho therapyinlightofneuroscience) 5 WGrygiel,Filozofujcyfizycy(Philosophisingphysicists) 6 T Pabian, Mechanika kwantowa a granice czasu i prze strze i (Quantum mechanics and the limits of time and n space) 7 MHeller,Czywszechwiatwyjaniasiwszechwiatem? (Canweexplainuniversewiththeuniverseitself?) 8 S Wszoek, Czy nauka eliminuje metafizyk? (Does sci enceeliminatemetaphysics?)

42 | Annual Report 2010 9 AKoleyski,Emergencjanowamodaczykonieczno? (Emergencenewfashionornecessity?) 10MHeller,Naukaawiara(Scienceandfaith) 11 P Koteja, ,,Eksperymentalne badanie darwinowskiej teorii ewolucji (Experimental studies of the Darwinian evolu tionarytheory) 12 PPolak,Recepcjateoriiewolucji(Receptionoftheevolu tionarytheory) 13 J Mczka, Nauka polska a wielkie pytania (wybrane aspekty)(Polishscienceandthebigquestions) 14T Placek, ,,Nierwnoci Bella: metafizyka eksperyment alna?(Bellsinequalities:experimentalmetaphysics?)

Science and Religion In 2010/2011 academic year, the Copernicus Center, in cooperationwiththeUniversityofInformationTechnologyand ManagementinRzeszwandTischnerEuropeanUniversityin Krakworganized21openlectures(inPolish),withintheseries Science and Religion The lectures were transmitted online at theCenterswebpageThelistoflecturesisasfollows: 1 Micha Heller: Pierwsze konflikty miedzy rozumem i reli gi(Firstconflictsbetweenscienceandreligion) 2 TeresaObolevitch:Rozumawiarawpierwszychwiekach chrzecijastwa(Reasonandfaithintheearlychristianity) 3 ZbigniewLiana:Wczesnoredniowieczneprbyzmagania sizproblememrozumuwobrbiewiary(Earlymedieval attemptsatthereconciliationoffaithandreason)

Education (Copernicus College) | 43 4 Bartosz Broek: Wielka Scholastyka Rozum w opozycji do wiary (The great scholasticism: faith in opposition to reason) 5 WodzimierzSkoczny:Rozumawiarawrenesansie(Faith andreasoninrenaissance) 6 Janusz Mczka: Czternastowieczne kontrowersje wok relacjinaukiiwiary(Faithandreasoninthe14thcentury) 7 Zbigniew Liana: Okultyzm a nauka przed Owieceniem (OccultismandsciencebeforeEnlightement) 8 JanuszMczka:KopernikaproblemyzInkwizycj(Coper nicusandtheInquisition) 9 Wodzimierz Skoczny: Sprawa Galileusza (The case of Galileo) 10WojciechGrygiel:Powstanienaukiateologia(Theemer genceofscienceandtheology) 11 Dyskusja na temat: Rozum a wiara  konflikt czy wsp istnienie? (Panel discussion: Faith and reason: conflict or coexistence?) 12 TadeuszPabjan:Naukaapocztkinowoytnegomaterial izmu(Scienceandthebeginningofmodernmaterialism) 13 TadeuszPabjan:Fizykoteologia(Physicotheology) 14 Bartosz Broek: Nauka i wiara Aspekty metodologiczne (Scienceandfaith:methodologicalaspects) 15 StanisawWszoek:Racjonalnowiary(Therationalityof faith)

44 | Annual Report 2010 16Teresa Obolevich: Recepcja ewolucjonizmu w kulturze rosyjskiej (The reception of evolutionary theory in the Russianculture) 17 Wodzimierz Skoczny: Nauki przyrodnicze w pogldach teologw:JHNewmanaiSWilbeforcea(Scienceinthe thoughtoftheologians:JHNewmanandSWilbeforce) 18 Wojciech Grygiel: Relacja nauka  religia w myli WerneraHeisenberga(Scienceandreligioninthethought ofWernerHeisengerg) 19JerzyVetulani:Neurobiologiaireligia(Neuroscienceand religion) 20Andrzej Koleyski: Nauka i humanizm: wpyw nau kowego obrazu wiata na rozwj duchowy czowieka w myli Erwina Schrdingera (Science and Humanism: the influence of the scientific worldview on the spiritual developmentofmanaccordingtoErwinSchrdinger) 21 Dyskusja panelowa: Nauka i Religia  przestrze dialogu (Paneldiscussion:Scienceandreligionthespaceofdia logue)

|45

Conferences
I. Copernicus Center Colloquium #2 (Krakw, 16 January 2010) DuringthesecondCopernicusCenterColloquium,thefol lowingpaperswerepresented: 1 Adam Olszewski, ,,Uwagi filozoficzne o twierdzeniu owachlarzu(PhilosophicalRemarksontheFanTheorem) 2 Wojciech Grygiel, ,,Stephena Hawkinga ontologia teorii fizycznych (Stephen Hawkings Ontology of Physical Theories) 3 PawePolak,,,Perspektywybadanadhistoripolskiejfilo zofiiprzyrody(PerspectivesforResearchontheHistoryof thePolishPhilosophyofNature) AreportoftheactivitiesoftheCopernicusCenterwasalso presented

II. The Nicholas Copernicus grave mystery. A dialogue of experts (Krakw, 2223 February 2010) TheconferencewascoorganizedbytheEuropeanSociety fortheHistoryofScience,theHistoryofScienceCommission of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences, the Philosophy of NaturalSciencesCommissionofthePolishInstituteofArtsand Sciences, History of Science Institute of the Polish Academy of Science, Tischner European Unviersity in Krakw, and the CopernicusCenter The goal of the conference was to discuss the controver siesrelatedwiththediscoveryoftheNicolausCopernicusgrave

46 | Annual Report 2010 and the identification of his remains The participants of the conferencewerethescientistsbothpartakinginthesearch,and criticisingthisundertaking During the conference, the following papers were pre sented(inPolish,or,whenindicated,inEnglish): 1 Jerzy Sikorski Miejsce pochwku Mikoaja Kopernika w katedrze fromborskiej w wietle wspczesnej praktyki (ThelocationofNicholasCopernicusburialinthelightof thecontemporarypractice) 2 Krzysztof Mikulski, Joanna Jendrzejewska, and Anna Stachowska Przodkowie i najblisi krewni Mikoaja Kopernika oraz ich eskie potomstwo (Ancestors and close relatives of Nicholas Copernicus and their female descendants) 3 Tomasz Wcawowicz Krypta biskupia we fromborskiej archikatedrzePytaniabadawcze(Thebishopscryptinthe FromborkArchcathedralResearchquestions) 4 Wojciech Branicki, Tomasz Kupiec, Analiza markerw DNAjdrowegowszcztkachzgrobu13/05(Theanalysis ofnuclearDNAmarkersintheremainsfrom13/05grave) 5 TomaszKupiec,WojciechBranicki,Zastosowanieanalizy mtDNAdoidentyfikacjiszcztkwludzkichzgrobu13/05 (TheapplicationofthemtDNAanalysistotheidentification ofhumanremainsfrom13/05grave) 6 Arkadiusz Sotysiak, Mylenie magiczne w interpretacji archeologicznejPrzykady,prbaklasyfikacji,perspektywy (Magical thinking in an archaeological interpretation Examples,anattemptofclassification,perspectives)

Conferences | 47 7 Jarosaw Bednarek Puapka typologii antropologicznej (Atrapofanthropologicaltypology) 8 TomaszKozowski,Refleksjeantropologanadidentyfikacj szcztkw kostnych znalezionych w Katedrze we FromborkujakonalecychdoMikoajaKopernikaPrba krytycznego spojrzenia (Reflections of an anthropolo gist on the identification of bone remains found in the Frombork Cathedral as those of Nicholas Copernicus An attemptatacriticalinterpretation) 9 Bronisaw Modziejewski, Wydolno metod rekonstruk cji wygldu twarzy w wietle wspczesnej antropologii sdowej (The efficiency of the reconstruction methods of face appearance in the light of contemporary forensic anthropology) 10JzefFlik,SzesnastowieczneportretyMikoajaKopernika (The16thcenturyportraitsofNicholasCopernicus) 11 Tomasz Grzybowski, Statystyczna i filogenetyczna inter pretacja wynikw bada mitochondrialnego DNA dom niemanych szcztkw Mikoaja Kopernika z archikatedry fromborskiej (A statistical and philogenetic interpreta tionofresearchresultsofmtDNAoftheallegedremainsof NicholasCopernicusfromFromborkcathedral) 12 PeterGwozdz,CopernicusYDNAisHaplogroupR1b1b2a1 (inEnglish) 13Adam Walanus, Datowanie radiowglowe, a sprawa grobuKopernika(Radiocarbondatingandthecaseofthe Copernicusgrave) 14 LidiaSmentek,LostORfound?(inEnglish)

48 | Annual Report 2010 15 Micha Kokowski, Procedura identyfikacji szcztkw nr13/05jakoszcztkwKopernikawwietleracjonalnoci uzasadniania i retoryki perswazji (A procedure of identi ficationofremainsno13/05asCopernicus,inthelightof rationalityofjustificationandrhetoricsofpersuasion)

III. 14th Krakw Methodological Conference. Road to Reality with Roger Penrose (Warszawa 17-18 May, Krakw 20-21 May 2010) The conference was coorganized by the Mathematical Institute of the Polish Academy of Science, Polish Academy of ArtsandSciences,JagiellonianUniversity,CenterforAdvanced Studies of the Warsaw University of Technology, and the CopernicusCenter Thefirstpartoftheconference,devotedtoPenrosesmath ematics and physics, was held in the Institute of Mathematics PolishAcademyofSciencesinWarsawon1718May2010and the second part, held in the Jagiellonian University in Krakow on 2021 May 2010, was devoted to Penroses physics and phi losophy ThegoaloftheconferencewasnotonlytostudyPenroses originalcontributionstomathematics,physicsandphilosophy, but also to critically assess his ideas and continue his line of research The honorary guest of the conference was Sir Roger Penrose During the conference, the following papers were pre sented(inEnglish): In Warszawa: 1 SirRogerPenrose,DynamicalEquationsfortheBigBang 2 AndrzejTrautman,Therudimentsoftwistortheory

Conferences | 49 3 AbhayAshtekar,TheManyFacesofBlackHoles 4 NickWoodhouse,TwistorsandSpecialFunctions 5 Iwo BiaynickiBirula, Can homodyne principle help to understandquantummeasurement? 6 ArturEkert,Lessreality,moresecurity? 7 JerzyKijowski,Quasilocalenergyofgravitationalfield 8 GiuseppeMarmo,GeometryandQuantumMechanics 9 Dominique Lambert, The mathematical road towards Biology:speedwayorHolzweg? 10MarekKu,Quanglementandidenticalparticles 11 Micha Heller, General Relativity and von Neumann Algebras 12 ShahnMajid,ALietheoryoffinitesimplegroups In Krakw: 13 Simon Saunders, Natural necessity: mathematics and structuralrealism 14JamesLadyman,Threeclaimsaboutsymmetriesinphys icsfromTheRoadtoReality 15 Shahn Majid, Quantum Born reciprocity and the cosmo logicalconstant 16Jzef yciski, Plato, Penrose and Ellis: Ontological PlatonisminFoundationsofMathematics 17 RomanDuda,Deeprootsofmathematics 18 BogdanDembiskiPeriideonlogikos

50 | Annual Report 2010 19 Krzysztof Wjtowicz, Can empirical facts become math ematicaltruths 20Stanisaw Krajewski, Penroses metalogical argument is unsound 21 Donald LyndenBell, Machs Principle within General Relativity 22GordonMcCabe,Thenonuniqueuniverse 23Leszek Sokoowski, On the abuse of gravity theories in cosmology 24Wojciech Grygiel, Hawking and Penrose  one physics, twophilosophies? On May 20, 2010, in Auditorium Maximum of the Jagiellonian University in Krakw, Sir Roger Penrose delivered the first Copernicus Center Lecture entitled Aeons before the BigBang

IV. Causes and Tenses: Formal Perspectives (Krakw, September 10-11 2010) The international seminar Causes and Tenses: Formal PerspectiveswasheldonSeptember1011,2010Itwascoorgan izedbytheCopernicusCenterandtheFacultyofPhilosophyof theJagillonianUniversityThehonorarychairmanofthesemi narwasNuelBelnapofPittsburghUniversity The underlying idea was to bring together researchers conducting probabilistic causation (analyzed formally) with researchers of tenses, analyzed from either a logical or meta physicalperspectiveTheemphasiswasonsmalldatastructures for analyzing causes and indeterminism, common causation

Conferences | 51 andcausalcompletability,andnewtechniquesfortheproblem offuturecontingents During the conference, the following papers were pre sented(inEnglish): 1 Mikls Rdei and Zaln Gyenis, Characterizing common causeclosedprobabilityspaces 2 Micha Marczyk and Leszek Wroski, Remarks on the notionofcausalclosednessofclassicalprobabilityspaces 3 Nuel Belnap, How caseintensional semantics prevents theslingshotfromhittingitstarget 4 Thomas Mller, Small data structures for representing indeterminism 5 FabriceCorreia,Aclassicaltempomodallogicforfuture contingents 6 JacekWawer,HowtoSurviveontheThinRedLine? 7 TomaszPlacek,Ontheassertionproblem

V. Game Theory and the Law (Krakw, 9 October 2010) TheinternationalseminarGameTheoryandtheLawwas coorganized by the Copernicus Center and the Department for the Philosophy of Law and Legal Ethics of the Jagiellonian UniversityinKrakw The papers were presented by: Bartosz Broek, Bart Du Laing, Arthur Dyevre, Mariusz Golecki, Eunate Mayor, Tomasz Pietrzykowski,AleksandraSamonek,GiovanniSartor,Wojciech Zauski

52 | Annual Report 2010 VI. The Existence of God: Theism, Agnosticism, Atheism (Krakw, 3December 2010) TheconferencewascoorganizedbytheQueenofPoland Saint Hedwigs Foundation, the Copernicus Center, and the PontificalUniversityofJohnPaulII During the conference, the following papers were pre sented(inpolish): 1 JanWoleski,DowodynaistnienieBogailogika(Proofs ofGodsExistenceandLogic) 2 Marek Porwolik, Ojca Bocheskiego formalizacje czwartejdrogiwTomaszazAkwinu(FatherBocheskis FormalizationsofAquinasFourthVia) 3 JanHartman,Kosztownafikcja(ACostlyFiction) 4 Mieszko Taasiewicz, Agnostycyzm a wiara Kilka uwag metodologicznoapologetycznych (Agnosticism and FaithSomeMethodologicalApologeticRemarks) 5 DamianWsek,AspektyjzykowesporuoistnienieBoga (LinguisticAspectsoftheControversyOverGodsExistence) Attheendoftheconference,apaneldiscussionWhosGot ProofAndWhosGotReasonwasheld

|53

Calendar
6 January 2010 -Alectureinmethodology(Science and the Big Questions)wasdeliveredbyFrDrZbigniewLiana 13 January 2010 -Thefirstlectureinneuroscience(Science and the Big Questions)wasdeliveredbyProfessorJerzyVetulani 14 January 2010 -MichaelHellerdeliversalecture,,Teologianatu ralnaawspczesnakosmologia(Naturaltheologyandcontem porarycosmology)atthemeetingofFides et RatioComission 16 January 2010 -CopernicusCenterColloquium#3 20 January 2010 -Thesecondlectureinneuroscience(Science and the Big Questions)wasdeliveredbyMarcinSzafraski 27 January 2010 -Thethirdlectureinneuroscience(Science and the Big Questions)wasdeliveredbyProfessorDominikaDudek 22-23 February 2010 -ConferenceThe Nicholas Copernicus grave mystery. A dialogue of experts 25-26 February 2010 - Conference The State in Micro and MacroscaleunderthepatronageofCopernicusCenter,atwhich Michael Heller delivers a lecture ,,Granice metody naukowej (Thelimitsofscientificmethod) 3 March 2010 -Alectureinquantummechanics(Science and the Big Questions)wasdeliveredbyFrDrTadeuszPabian

54 | Annual Report 2010 10 March 2010 -MichaelHellerdeliversalecture,,Czywszechwiat wyjaniasiwszechwiatem?(Canweexplaintheuniversewith theuniverseitself?)(Science and the Big Questions) 17 March 2010 - A lecture in metaphysics (Science and the Big Questions)wasdeliveredbyFrProfessorStanisawWszoek 24 March 2010 - A lecture in emergence (Science and the Big Questions)wasdeliveredbyDrAndrzejKoleyski 28 April 2010 -MichaelHellerdeliversalecture,,NaukaiWiara (ScienceandFaith)(Science and the Big Questions) 5 May 2010 -Thefirstlectureinevolutionarytheory(Science and the Big Questions)wasdeliveredbyProfessorPaweKoteja 12 May 2010 -Thesecondlectureinevolutionarytheory(Science and the Big Questions)wasdeliveredbyDrPawePolak 17-18, 20-21 May 2010 -14thKrakwMethodologicalConference 18 May 2010 -deathofProfessorAndrzejPelczar,agreatmathe matician,rectoroftheJagiellonianUniversityfrom1990to1993, thePresidentoftheCounciloftheCopernicusCenter 2 June 2010 -AlectureinBellsinequalities(Science and the Big Questions)isdeliveredbyProfessorTomaszPlacek 10-11 September 2010 -ConferenceCauses and Tenses: Formal Perspectives 6 October 2010 - A lecture entitled ,,Pierwsze konflikty midzy nauk a religi (First Conflicts Between Science and Religion) wasdeliveredbyMichaelHeller(Science and Religion)

Calendar | 55 9 October 2010 -SeminarGame Theory and the Law 13 October 2010 -Alectureentitled,,Rozumawiarawpierwszych wiekachchrzecijastwa(ReasonandFaithinEarlyChristianity) wasdeliveredbySrDrTeresaObolevitch(Science and Religion) 20 October 2010 - A lecture entitled ,,Wczesnoredniowieczne prbyzmaganiasizproblememrozumuwobrbiewiary(Early Medieval Attempts at the Reconciliation of Faith and Reason) wasdeliveredbyFrDrZbigniewLiana(Science and Religion) 27 October 2010 - A lecture entitled ,,Wielka Scholastyka Rozumwopozycjidowiary(TheGreatScholasticism:Faithin OppositiontoReason)wasdeliveredbyProfessorBartoszBroek (Science and Religion) 3 November 2010 - A lecture entitled ,,Rozum a wiara w rene sansie (Faith and Reason in Renaissance) was delivered by FrDrWodzimierzSkoczny(Science and Religion) 10 November 2010 -Alectureentitled,,Czternastowiecznekon trowersje wok relacji nauki i wiary (Faith and Reason in the 14th Century) was delivered by Fr Professor Janusz Mczka (Science and Religion) 17 November 2010 -AlectureentitledOkultyzmanaukaprzed Owieceniem (Occultism and Science Before Enlightement wasdeliveredbyFrDrZbigniewLiana(Science and Religion) 24 November 2010 - A lecture entitled ,,Kopernika problemy zInkwizycj(CopernicusandtheInquisition)wasdeliveredby FrProfessorJanuszMczka(Science and Religion)

56 | Annual Report 2010 1 December 2010 - A lecture entitled Sprawa Galileusza (The Case of Galileo) was delivered by Fr Dr Wodzimierz Skoczny (Science and Religion) 3 December 2010 - Conference The Existence of God: Theism, Agnosticism, Atheism 8 December 2010 - A lecture entitled Powstanie nauki a teolo gia(TheEmergenceofScienceandTheology)wasdeliveredby FrDrWojciechGrygiel(Science and Religion) 15 December 2010 -apaneldiscussion,,Rozumawiarakonflikt czywspistnienie?(FaithandReason:ConflictorCoexistence?) washeldinRzeszw(Science and Religion)

Essays

|59

Plato, Penrose, and Ellis: Ontological Platonism in the Foundations of Mathematics

Jzef M. yciski 1. Introduction Contemporary debates concerning the foundations of mathematics imply new versions of mathematical Platonism and suggest that forthcoming changes in metamathematical philosophycouldprovidebreakthroughdiscoveriesinmodern physics bringing insights more wonderful () than those we havebeenblessedwithinthe20thcentury1Iwouldliketoillus tratethisrenewalofPlatosinfluenceinthephilosophyofmath ematics by bringing to our attention the new nonequivalent ideas developed by Roger Penrose and George FR Ellis The differencesbetweenthesetwoauthorsmayturnouttobeheu ristically inspiring when the search for the physical Theory of Everythingsuggestsimportantepistemologicaltransformations in contemporary science In an attempt to overcome them, in his polemic with Nancy Cartwright, Penrose does not exclude thatthephysicistsultimategoalofacompletelyunifiedpicture isanindeedunattainabledream2 The essence of Roger Penroses ontological Platonism is expressed in the acknowledgement of the objective existence of mathematical objects As he argues, the Mandelbrot set was notinventedbymathematiciansbutonlydiscoveredinasimi larwaytothediscoveryoftheplanetNeptuneInsuchclaims, theobjectiveexistenceseemstobethemostimportantexpres
1 RogerPenrose,The Road to Reality. A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe,AKnopf,NewYork2005,p1045FurthercitedasRR 2 ResponsebyRPenrose,[in:]The Large, the Small and the Human Mind, CambridgeUniversityPress2000,p180

60 | Jzef M. yciski sion Penrose, together with another famous representative of relativisticcosmology,GeorgeFEllis,arguesthattobemeans to have a causal effect in the world of physical particles and forces3KarlGiberson,consideringthestrongontologicalcom mitmentoftheauthorofThe Road to Reality,expresseshiscon viction that such a commitment makes Penrose Platos great estlivingchampionTheauthorswhorejectmetamathematical Platonismandtrytoemphasizetheroleofpragmaticfactorsin the foundations of mathematics counter argue that Penroses biggestmistakeistobeahardcorePlatonist Thedifferencesintheappraisalofthephilosophicalideas expoundedbytheauthorofThe Road to Realityaresodeepthat, on the one hand, he is criticized as a religious fanatic4 who denies the novel ideas of the New Atheism, on the other his Emperors New MindisregardedasaclassicexpositionofNew Ageideology5Theradicaldifferenceinthesesimilarappraisals demonstratehowimportantandcomplicatedthephilosophical issuesareintheambitiousattemptundertakenbyourauthorto understand the foundations of mathematics and to determine theontologicalstructureoftheworldofnature 2. Three Worlds Ontology  In a style analogous to the classical Karl Raimund Poppersarguments,Penrosedistinguishesthreelevelsofonto logical existence Their nature is to be appropriately: Platonic mathematical, physical, and mentalconscious They cannot be reduced to each other, since the importance of algorithmic
3 GFREllis,OntheNatureofEmergentReality,[in:]The ReEmergence of Emergence,PClayton,PDavies(ed),OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford2006, p85 4 RichardHenderson,Mistakes 5 BenBest,FAWolf

Plato, Penrose, and Ellis: Ontological Platonism... | 61 reasoning, so important for reductionist arguments, must be questionedifonerecognizestheepistemologicalsignificanceof Gdels incompleteness theorem In his critique of metamath ematicalformalism,whichseemedjustifiedinthephilosophyof mathematicsintheepochwhenayoungBertrandRussellpre paredPrincipia MathematicatogetherwithAlfredNWhitehead, Penrose declares: I believe that the Gdelian case is, at root, reallyaverypowerfulone,eventhoughsomepeopleseemmost reluctanttotakeitonboard6Consequently,hedoesnotbelieve thattheentiredomainofhumanlogiccouldbeinterpretedalgo rithmicallyFollowingJohnSearlescritique,inwhichonetries recursively to interpret human understanding, Penrose argues that the standpoint of strong AI seems to drive one into an extremeformofdualism,sinceitsuggeststhattheveryreality ofalgorithmsformthesubstanceofhumanthoughts,feelings, andconsciousperceptions7 Consistently,theauthorofThe Road to Realitydisagrees alsowiththeviewsofHawkingexpressedinhisfamouspaperIs the end of physics in sight?Heisconvincedthattheimportant discoveries both in physics and in biology will be provided by scienceinourcenturyTheimportanceofthesediscoverieswill be great, because the standard laws of physics in their present form cannot be relevant for the most important problems of contemporarybiology8Thephysicsofthe21stcenturycanbring groundbreakingdiscoveriesthatwillallowustofindanswersto many questions now believed to pertain to the realm of mys teryAnessentialchangeinthecognitiveperspectivemay,inhis view, lead to the overcoming of the present impasse in super
6 ResponsebyRPenrose,p175 7 RPenroseThe Emperors New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics,OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork1989,p21 8 ResponsebyRPenrose,p182

62 | Jzef M. yciski string physics and to the development of radically different approachesInparticular,hebelievesthatthefuturefundamen taltheorythatlaysclaimtoanykindofcompletenessmustalso havetheintellectualpotentialtoexplainthenatureofconscious mentality9Computationalfunctionalismclaimsthatitismerely computationalactivity(ofanunspecifiedactivity)thatgivesrise to conscious mentality He does not agree with this view and saysthatdespitehispersonalinclinationtowardsPlatonismin the foundations of mathematics, he does not accept the claim that21stcenturyphysicswouldbeabletoprovidesolutionstothe greatphilosophicalproblemsThelattermaybeclassified,with John Barrow, as the socalled prospective problems They are relatedtopropertiesthatcanbeneitherenumeratednorcalcu lated;theycannotbeidentifiednorgeneratedbyasequenceof logicalsteps10 Beauty,simplicity,truthareexamplesofprospectiveprop ertiesTheycannotbeexhaustedinthemathematicizeddescrip tionswhichthenaturalsciencescanprovideNoprogrammeor formulacangenerateallofwhatconstitutesbeautyorugliness However,inPenrosesworksontheroleofmathematicsinsci enceorontheobjectivestatusoftherelationsitstudies,there oftenappearreferencestocategoriessuchasbeauty,mysteryor themiraculousconnectionbetweenmathematicsandphysics11 Theprospectivepropertiesof thingscannotbe forced into the framework of any logical Theory of Everything A nonpoetic accountoftheworldcannotbecomplete12Thefurtherdevelop mentofourknowledgewillnotautomaticallyovercomecogni
9 RR,p1033 10 JohnBarrow,op. cit,p271 11 AsanexampleofmostprofoundmysteryPenrosementionsspacetime singularitiesinblackholesRR,p1045 12 Ibidem,p272

Plato, Penrose, and Ellis: Ontological Platonism... | 63 tivedifficultieswhoseimportancewasindicatedforexampleby KurtGdel  WhentryingtoanswerthequestionofWhatisreality?,in hisphilosophicalinterpretationofthehierarchyofcosmicstruc tures,PenrosedescribesthephysicalWorld2asemergingoutof thetimelessworldofmathematics,theWorld1Thedeeperwe understandthelawsofphysics,themorewearedrivenintothis world of mathematics and mathematical concepts Its mental imagewefindinWorld3Eachworldcouldbedescribedasits ownspecifickindofexistenceThisspecificitycannot,however, be interpreted in terms of ontological isolation, because there areseveralimportantquestionswhichrequirereferencetomore thanoneworldintheprocessofdiachronicgrowthofscience Here important questions emerge: How does mentality come aboutinthephysicalstructureswithwhichitisassociated?How shouldquantumtheoryberelatedtothemindbodyproblem?It seems impossible to answer such questions without reference totheemergence,supervenience,downwardcausalityThevery conceptofemergenceremains,however,semanticallyfuzzy;it seemstoimplytheirreducibilityoftheworld3tothelowerlevels of the world 2 and 1 The essence of this irreducibility brings manyproblemsdiscussed,amongotherauthors,byGFREllis whenhereferstotheBiblicaltermsofGodskenosisandtriesto explain some phenomena regarded by Penrose as mysterious onesBothauthorsrefertoPlatosontology,theirunderstanding ofPlatonismprofoundlydiffersandcanbesubjectedtorational appraisal PenroseattributesthePlatonicstructurenotonlytoobjects ofmathematicsthatexpresstheabsoluteTruth,butalsotothe other Platonic absolutes of Beauty and Morality He claims, however,thatthewholeissueofMoralityisultimatelydepend ent upon the World of Mentality Each of the three worlds:

64 | Jzef M. yciski Platonicmathematical,physical,andmentalhasitsownkind of reality, but the Platonic world may be the most primitive of thethree,primitiveinthesenseofontologicalprimordialityIn hisexpositionoftheessenceofPlatostheoryofideas,WDRoss claims:theessenceofthetheoryofIdeaslayin()recognition ofthefactthatthereisaclassofentities,forwhichthebestname is probably universals, that are entirely different from sensi ble things (Ross, 1952, p 225) To eliminate the psychological undertones in which ideas are always understood as a prod uct of the reflection of a particular mind, many authors prefer terminology in which the word idea is replaced by the word formRCCrossandADWoozleyjustifysuchterminological preferenceswhentheyrefertoPlatosontologyastotheTheory ofFormsTheyarguethattheEnglishwordformkeepsnearto themeaningoftheGreekwords,andisalsofreefrommislead ingassociationsofthewordidea(Cross,Woozley,1978,p82) Different versions of the theory of Forms are proposed in different writings by Plato Their interpretations by particu lar historians of philosophy also differ deeply I would refer to the expression of Parmenides 132 D, where the Forms are pre sentedasitwerepatternsfixedinthenatureofthingsAsimilar understandingofFormsispresentedinPhilebusAccordingto thisexposition,Formsareparadigmsandpatternsbywhichall sensibleparticularsaregivennamesandidentifiedasmuchas particulars participate in these Forms (Sayre, 1983) In his com menttotheparadigmaticroleoftheForms,PeterGeachrefersto thestandardyardastoillustrationofselfpredictionOneshould heredistinguishbetweenauniversalpatternofthestandardyard anditsphysicalparticularactualizationThecognitiveproblem of our generation is that fascinated by particulars we do not appreciate enough the role of universals in the physical struc tureoftheuniverseOnlytheuniversallanguageofmathemat

Plato, Penrose, and Ellis: Ontological Platonism... | 65 icshelpsusbeopentothisstructureoftheworldthatmanifests itselfthroughthelawsofnatureThedifferencesinopinionsin theinterpretationofPlatopointoutthatbothPenroseandEllis couldseektheirownunderstandingofthePlatonicformsinthe context of contemporary science The essence of this attitude canbeexpressedbytheacknowledgementthatinourphysical world of changing parameters and fluent appearances there is astablefactor,apatternfixedinthenatureofparticularobjects and of evolving systems Plato describes these factors calling themreal,completelyreal,ortrulyexistentInthelanguage ofcontemporaryphilosophythesetrulyexistentconstituentsof the world are called universals Some universals could refer to the nonphysical aspects of reality, eg, to the existential, aes theticorethicaldimensionofhumanlifeTheproblemremains howtointerpretindetailtheroleofPlatonicformsincontem poraryscientifictheories 3. Ellis ontological pluralism InanalternativeversionofPlatonism,GFREllis,akinto Penroseinhiscosmologicalresearch,distinguishesfivelevelsof reality,irreducibletooneanotherTheyareconstituted,respec tively,by: World 1:Theworldofphysicalobjects,ofenergy,particles,etc World 2:Theworldofindividualandsocialconsciousnessit comprisesmentalprocesses,ideas,emotions,sociallegislation andconventions World 3: The world of possibilities understood in Aristotelian senseSomeofthesepossibilitiesactuallyexist;theyconstitute thephysicalworld1 World 4: The Platonic world of abstract relations and struc tureseg,rationalandirrationalnumbers,spinors,symmetry

66 | Jzef M. yciski groups,supervectorspaces,theMandelbrotset,variationprinci ples,Hilbertspaces,Diracsequation,etc13Intheiressencethey areindependentbothfrommentalprocessesofhumanbeings (World2)andfromtheirparticularactualizationsincoursebooks orinphysicalobjects(World1)PythagorasTheoremwouldstill tobevalidevenifanuclearcatastrophedestroyedallthecourse booksexplainingitandkilledallthecreaturesthatunderstand whattherightangledtriangleinEuclideangeometryis Apartfrommathematicalforms,EllisincludesinWorld4 bothuniversalformulasofthelawsofnatureandthecontents of concepts playing a fundamental role in contemporary sci enceHeisalsoinclinedtoplaceinWorld4aestheticformsthat arethebasisforourperceptionofbeautyatthelevelofWorld2 Referringtotheresearchpracticeofcontemporaryphysics,Ellis observesthatwhileforprimitivemanWorld1objectswerepar ticularly important, for scientists a fundamental role is played by the objects of World 4 The simplest assumption would be that they are creations of human mind produced by generali zationofthepreviouslyappliedstudyprocedures,laterproved extremely useful in describing new types of phenomena dis coveredinnatureEllisdoesnotagreewithsuchaninterpreta tionand,togetherwithPenrose14,emphasizesthattheworldof mathematicalrelationsconstitutesthefundamentalstructureof theworld Metaworld 0: The Word of God, underlying reality of worlds 14 It interacts with all other worlds but remains transcend
13 Natures,p337 14 EllisquotesespeciallytwoworksbyPenrose:Shadows of the Mind,Oxford University Press, Oxford 1989, and The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997 His views are also akin to the philosophy presented by Eugene Wigner in a classic paper The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences, Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics,13(1960)1

Plato, Penrose, and Ellis: Ontological Platonism... | 67 enttothemThedeepestonticjustificationofalltheprocesses andobjectsfromworlds14issituatedatthislevelThisisthe world that allows us to understand the reality of reason, value, andmeaningIntheologytheonticbasisofthisrealityiscalled GodInvariousphilosophicalsystems,however,differentterms areused:fromthetranscendentcausetounmovedmovertothe highestgoodandbeauty In looking for an ontological justification for World 4 as well as for Worlds 13, Ellis declares the necessity of accepting the reality of Metaworld 0 Without referring to its reality, it is impossibletoanswermanyquestionsformulatedatthelevelof otherworldsInparticular,thereferencetoWorld0constitutes the axiological and ethical dimension of events, while the ref erence to individual human thought, ie World 2, remains the mostimportantforepistemologicalaspectsInitsphylogenetic development,theHomo sapiensspeciesfirstbecamefascinated withWorld1Theconcernaboutstones,bows,carsandbanks playedaveryimportantroleintheevolutionarystruggleforsur vivalWorld2,constitutedbyindividualthought,ledtoconsid erations that would not necessarily have to facilitate the strug gle for survival Admiration for Mozarts music or excessively intensereflectiononinfinitesets,asinthecaseofGeorgCantor, couldhaveevenputsurvivalatriskOurgenerationtravelledthe blindalleysofthisworldbyescapingintovirtualrealityandinto the world of intense sensations which lead to addictions Our futuredevelopmentdependsontheuseofpotentialitieshidden inWorld3andfromthefurtherdiscoveryofthePlatonicstruc tureofWorld4 TheonticreasonforthispluralistontologyisthatGodcor respondstotherealityofWorld0Hisontologicalkenosisliber atesusfromanambitioussearchforperfectstructuresbyintro ducing the mark of incompleteness into ontology, like Gdels

68 | Jzef M. yciski incompletenesstheoremintroducesitintorichlogicalsystems Anascenttotheheightsofthought,combinedwithasearchfor the ultimate reason of rationality found in nature, leads to the discoveryofGodssubtlepresenceineverythingthatexistsAt the level of His presence we reach the ultimate conditions of meaningandofthesenseofexistentialfulfilmentintherational, pluralistuniverse InEllisarguments,theemergenceofhigherlevelsofreal ityfromlesscomplicatedlowerstructuresisbasedonnonlinear relations between components The new emerging properties, whichdonotoccurattheearlierprocessofevolutionarydevel opment,emergethenfromthelowerlevelstructuresandshould beexplainedbyreferencetotheconceptofsupervenienceand downwarddeterminationInthisframework,thenonphysical realityofinformationandenddirectedprocesseshasphysical effectsintheworldofforcesandparticles;consequentlyitmust berecognizedasreal15  Along with the traditional questions of the cause or reasonfortheexistenceofaccidentalphysicalobjectsofWorld1, thedevelopmentofknowledgebringsmanynewquestions,in which new variants of the classical dilemma of Leibniz recur: Why is there something rather than nothing? The questions thataremoresignificanttoEllistoagreatextentthankstohis interest in theoretical physics  and which Leibnizs formula tionincludesare:Whythereareuniversallawsinnature,while it might well be an uncoordinated chaos, impossible to grasp eitherbymathematicalformulasoranygeneralconcepts?How canweexplaintherationalityofnatureexpressedinthevalidity ofvariationalprinciples?Howarewetounderstandenigmatic
15 GFREllis,TrueComplexityanditsAssociatedOntology,[in:]JBarrow, CLHarper(eds),Science and Ultimate Reality From Quantum to Cosmos, CambridgeUniversityPress2003

Plato, Penrose, and Ellis: Ontological Platonism... | 69 coincidencedescribedbytheanthropicprincipleofphysi cal parameters, without which the emergence of protein life formswouldbeimpossible16?Whatcanexplainthecongruence ofmathematicsfromWorld4withtheobjectsofWorld1;they are, in fact, two entirely different worlds, and there are no rea sonswhytwistors andspinors should allowfor the conditions occurringatthelevelofstonesorchairs?Thosequestionscon cerningtheultimatereasonthatconstitutesboththeexistence oftheworldandourknowledgeofit,leadingtotherecognition of God as the factor that renders the processes and objects of Worlds14freeofcontradiction 4. Mystery or kenosis? InhisargumentEllis,toamuchgreaterdegreethanPenrose, refers to the role of religious experience Where Penrose falls silentandspeaksofanunspecifiedroleofmystery,Ellisturnsto biblicalconceptsinwhichtheessenceofGodsinfluenceonthe worldisexpressedinthesocalledkenosis,theselfabasementof Godanactionremotefromvictorioustriumphalismandbear ing a mark of subtle goodness, solidarity and humility of God cooperatingwithman Kenosis, underlying the basis of deep ethics, according toEllis,denotesunlimitedlove,expressedintheacceptanceof sufferingandselfsacrificetorevealhumanspiritualgenerosity Inhumanlife,itsclassicalexamplecouldbefoundinthelifeof MahatmaGandhiorMotherTheresaofCalcuttaInthekenotic perspective, the rise of human spirituality could be explained through a slow evolutionary process underlying the historical
16 TheissueisdiscussedbyEllisinhispaperTheTheologyoftheAnthropic Principle,[in:]Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature,RJRussellet al(ed),VaticanCityState:VaticanObservatory1993,pp367405

70 | Jzef M. yciski emergence of complexity; ethics constitutes the highest level inthehierarchyofstructuresthatemergeincosmicevolution Some critics of such interpretations try to reject cognitive real isminscience,ethicsandphilosophyofreligionTheydefend a radical opinion that Platos ontology in Penroses arguments is equally valid as creationist science It is impossible to sup portsuchanappraisalinthecontextofcontemporaryscientific investigationsCreationistscienceimpliespseudoexplanations inconsistent with the research practice of contemporary biol ogyandphysicsPenrosesontologicalproposalsaregenerated byanattempttodiscoverimplicitpresumptionsunderlyingthe research practice of contemporary mathematics The authors whodonotlikeontologicalPlatonismproposedbyPenroseand Ellis, try to propose cognitive irrealism as an explanatory alter native The consistent denial of cognitive realism brings how everrejectionofexplanatoryvaluesofallphilosophicaltheories, among them the theories that call scientific realism into ques tion Whenexplainingtheprocessofevolutionarygrowth,Ellis distinguishes upward and downward interactions in the hier archy of structures The flow of information between different levels of structures is essential to the distinction between the topdown(iedownward)andbottomup(upward)interactions intheevolutionaryprocessThestudyofthisrelationisenabled bythefactthatpropertiesabsentatthelowerlevelsofstructural complexityemergeatthehigherlevels;theiremergenceisnot liabletoreductionistexplanationreferringtotheircomponents, as this type of explanation includes only bottomup interac tionsGRFEllisbelievesthatthetraditionalreductionismcould beregardedasasymptomoffundamentalism,theformerbeing anattempttoreducehumanpersonality,morality,culturetothe

Plato, Penrose, and Ellis: Ontological Platonism... | 71 levelofphysicalbiologicalphenomena17Theholisticapproach to investigating the topdown influence on the whole evolv ingsystemisstillcriticizedbythosephysicistswhosecognitive attentionisabsorbedbythefunctioningofstrictlydeterministic laws 5. Overcoming ontological pluralism? Tosettletheargumentofwhetherwemustdistinguishin theontologicalstructureoftheuniversefivemutuallyirreduci blelevels(Ellis),oronlythreelevels(Penrose,Popper),itwouldbe necessarytopreciselydefinetheconceptsofemergence,conti nuity,supervenience,reducibilityIncontemporaryphilosophy those concepts assume deeply varying senses Therefore, set tingasidethedifferencesbetweenthem,commonelementsin differentversionsofPlatonisminunderstandingofthefounda tionsofmathematicsshouldbenotedTheyindicatethat: 1 The effectiveness of contemporary mathematics in describing natural processes cannot be reduced to the levelofitspragmaticapplicationsThereisthebasiclevel of ontological structures that makes it possible to explain thiseffectivenessrationallyTheconviction,however,that the future development of physics will lead to solving all the difficult problems, is an expression of cognitive opti mism John Ellis from CERN, who provocatively called a future theory of unification in physics the Theory of Everything,regretstodaythathedidnotcallitaTheoryof Nothing,whichwouldspareusthenaiveideologicalcom mentsmadeaboutitWhen,atthelevelofmetaphors,the difference between everything and nothing has been
17 GFREllis,OntheNatureofEmergentReality,[in:]The ReEmergence, p 104

72 | Jzef M. yciski obliterated,onecaneasilyjustifyanystatementFromzero anythingcanbeinferredThisisthedirectionthatGeorge Ellissargumenttakeswhenhestressesthatthepresentlack of answers to fundamental questions results from insuf ficientlyadvancedlevelofresearchthatwillbeovercome after some future discoveries He emphasizes: no future scientific advances will change the present situation Some, ethical, aesthetic and metaphysical issues, lie out sideofcognitivecompetenceofscienceandtheywouldbe neversolvedscientifically18 2 There is no universally accepted version of mathematical Platonismthatwouldallowaunified,generallyrecognized version of philosophy of God At the level of philosophy ofmathematicsitisdifficulttojustifytheconceptofGod as a person; however, various interpretations of Platos views are a normal phenomenon in hermeneutics As a result,interpretationsclaimingtherealityofPlatonicforms are admissible, while their identification with God of the Christiantheismistreatedwithreserve 3 The future development of research on the Theory of Everything may provide answers to many questions con cerning the ontological status of mathematical objects It should not be expected, however, that the 21st century wouldgiveadefinitiveanswertonumerousproblemsthat wewerenotcapableofsolvingduringtheprevioustwenty centuries The clear perception of certain questions does notimplytheirdefinitivesettlement 4 In studies that aim to overcome the present limitations, it is essential to go beyond the current language barriers
18 EMolB,p256

Plato, Penrose, and Ellis: Ontological Platonism... | 73 Thisisbeingdonebydevelopingthenewterminologyin noncommutative geometry, defining various concepts of emergence, specifying the relations obtaining between supervenience and subvenience, taking into account the downwardcausationinevolutionaryprocesses 5 EarlierequivalentstotheproposalsbyPenroseandElliscan befoundinphilosophicaltheoriesofmanyotherauthors In Poland Jan ukasiewicz, among others, a wellknown representative of the Polish School of Logic, argued that the reality of ideal mathematical structures independ entofhumanexperiencecouldberegardedasanexpres sionofGodspresenceinnature(ukasiewicz,1937)Inhis approach, the Penrosian objective mathematical objects aredescribedasafieldofformalstructures,universalrela tions, rational interdependencies; this reality in various philosophicalschoolsispresentedasthematrixoftheuni verse,thefieldofrationality,theformalfield,theLogos,the Absolute,etc 6 Regardless of our terminological preferences, on the one handinthisformalstructurewefindabasiclevelofphysi calrealitywheretheamazingeffectivenessofmathematics canbeexplainedOntheotherhand,inthisformalconstit uentofnaturewefindthefactorwhichinspiresouraston ishment and directs our attention towards the theologi cal and philosophical aspects of nature Theologians and scientists must not be in conflict but, following different methodologicalrules,theycouldlookforanintegralvision ofnature

|75

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego

Bartosz Broek Adam Olszewski 1. Kant for dummies  TextbookaccountsofKantsphilosophyofmathematics runroughlyasfollowsKantsgrandcriticalprojectstemsfrom the observation that is seems prima facie impossible to recon ciletwoparticularfactsOntheonehand,wehavetheprofound intuition, confirmed by numerous great thinkers, that math ematicalknowledgeisuniversalandnecessary(thesameholds forpureNewtonianphysics,somemoralpreceptsetc)Onthe otherhand,asHumebrilliantlypointedout,thereisnothingin oursensual,empiricalexperiencethatwouldvalidatetheclaims of universality and necessity which are attributed to math ematical,moralorphysicalstatementsOnthecontrary,ifone assumestheLockeanconceptionofhumanmindastabula rasa, thereisalmostnoescapefromtheconclusionthatmathematics, physics and morality are collections of contingent, unjustified thesesAlmost,aswecanalwaysclaimwithLockeandHume himself,thatmathematicalthesesareanalytic,andarethussafe guardedfromtheHumeanlikeattack(thesamestrategycannot beappliedtophysicsandmorality,ofcourse)However,tosay that a mathematical statement, such as 2 + 7 = 9, or a topo logicalspaceisnormalifandonlyifanytwodisjointclosedsub sets can be separated by a function, are analytic, amounts to declaringthemtautological,trueongroundsoftheirmeaning or,speakingloosely,conveyingnoinformationThisistrouble some:isFermatslasttheoremtautologicalordevoidofmean ing if its proof required so much effort and imagination? The

76 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski dilemmawefaceisthefollowing:eithermathematicaltruthsare universal and necessary but analytical, or they are purely con tingent  Kants famous solution to this dilemma lies in acknowl edging that, apart from analytic a priori and synthetic a poste riori judgements, there are also synthetic a priori judgements They are possible  and here is the crux of Kants argumenta tionbecausetheknowingsubjectorthetranscendentalego isnotapassiverecipientoftheempiricaldata;itactivelyfilters themthroughitstranscendentalstructuresInotherwords,any act of cognition is a fusion of what comes from the noumena (thethingsinthemselves)andfromthetranscendentalego(the subject)AccordingtoKant,thestructureofthetranscendental ego includes pure intuitions of time and space, the categories and the regulative ideas Mathematical theses are justified on thegroundsofpureintuitionThus,theyaresynthetica priori: theyaresyntheticastheyexpandourknowledge,andtheyare a prioriastheyarenotbasedonsensualexperiencebutonthe pureintuitionsofspaceandtimeInaway,mathematicalstate mentsaredescriptionsofspaceandtime,whenspaceandtime arenotaspectsoftheworldwhichisindependentofthesubject, butaretheelementsofthesubjectitself  Kants mathematical subject is the transcendental ego What does it mean? The term transcendental was used by medieval thinkers to refer to some properties that were predi catedofeveryentityThusbonum,pulchrum,ens,unum,verum were transcendentalia Later, Wolff altered the understanding oftranscendentalEventhoughhestilluseditinitsontological meaning, he also employed it in epistemology: transcenden talisanypropertythatcanbeascribedtoeachandeveryactof cognition It is in this meaning that Kant uses transcendental Transcendentalconditionsofcognition,suchastheintuitions

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 77 ofspaceandtime,orthecategories,aretheconditionsofeach and every act of cognition Cognition is impossible outside of thestructureofthetranscendentalegoThetranscendentalego itselfisnotsomethingwecancomprehendAsKantputsit:
space itself, however, together with time, and, with both, all appearances, are not things, but rather nothing but representa tions,andtheycannotexistatalloutsideourmind;andeventhe inner and sensible intuition of our mind (as an object of con sciousness),thedeterminationofwhichthroughthesuccession ofdifferentstatesisrepresentedintime,isnottherealselfasit existsinitself,orthetranscendentalsubject,butonlyanappear anceofthistousunknownbeing,whichwasgiventosensibility The existence of this inner appearance, as a thing thus existing initself,cannotbeadmitted,becauseitsconditionistime,which cannotbeadeterminationofanythinginitself1

Therefore Kant claims that the transcendental ego cannot be given as an object of experience It follows that the transcen dental subject cannot  for logical reasons  be studied with thetoolsofferedbypsychologyItisnotthepsychologicalself, butratherwhatsotospeakliesbeneathitThequestionis, therefore,howcanonedistilthefeaturesofthetranscendental ego,howtoinvestigateit,whenex definitioneanyempiri calmethodfailsinthisrespect?  Kant makes a tripartite distinction between the types of cognitionorthetypesoftheprinciplesofcognition:
we will call the principles whose application stays wholly and completelywithinthelimitsofpossibleexperienceimmanent,but thosethatwouldflybeyondtheseboundariestranscendentprin
1 I Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by P Guyer and AW Wood, CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge1998,A492Thisistheeditionwe shall quote below by identifying the section of the Critique to which the quotedpassagebelongs

78 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski

ciplesButbythelatterIdonotunderstandthetranscendentaluse ormisuseofcategories,whichisameremistakeofthefacultyof judgementwhenitisnotproperlycheckedbycriticism,andthus doesnotattendenoughtotheboundariesoftheterritoryinwhich alone the pure understanding is allowed its play; rather, I mean principlesthatactuallyinciteustoteardownallthoseboundary postsandtolayclaimtoawhollynewterritorythatrecognizesno demarcations anywhere Hence transcendental and transcend ent are not the same The principles of pure understanding we presentedaboveshouldbeonlyofempiricalandnotoftranscen dentaluse,ie,ofausethatreachesoutbeyondtheboundaries ofexperienceButaprinciplethattakesawaytheselimits,which indeedbidsustooverstepthem,iscalledtranscendentIfourcri tiquecansucceedindiscoveringtheillusioninthesesupposed principles,thenthoseprinciplesthatareofmerelyempiricaluse canbecalled,inoppositiontothem,immanentprinciplesofpure understanding2

Thus,KantdistinguishesbetweenthreekindsofcognitionOne can speak of immanent cognition, ie one that stays within the limits of possible experience Still, there is transcendent cognition, which reaches beyond those limits; as such, it is ungrounded:itbringsnoknowledge,butillusionofknowledge Further,thereshouldbedistinguishedtranscendentalcognition, onethatpertainstothedeterminationofthelimitsofpossible experience This mode of thinking is fully admissible Indeed, theentireenterpriseoftheCritique of Pure Reasonconsistsof transcendental argumentation; it is, as Kant puts it, occupied notsomuchwithobjectsbutratherwithoura prioriconceptsof objectsingeneral3  ThemethodKantutilizesinordertouncoverourapriori concepts is that of transcendental deduction It follows, boldly
2 B252253 3 B25

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 79 speaking, a general scheme of reasoning which can be recon structedas: (1)Peoplehaveacertainexperience(eg,mathematical) (2)Cisthenecessaryconditionfortheexperiencetooccur (eg,theutilizationofthepureintuitionsoftimeandspace isnecessaryforthemathematicalexperiencetoemerge) Therefore:(3)C(eg,thereexistpureintuitionsoftimeand space) Fromaformalpointofviewtheargumentcanbereconstructed inmodallogicLetEstandfortheexperiencesinquestionandC for the necessary condition thereof The argument has the fol lowingform:  (1)E   (premise)  (2)E   (from(1),byintroduction)  (3)E C  (premise)  (4)C  (from(2)and(3)bymodus ponens)  (5)C   (from(4)by elimination) It is common, however, to reconstruct transcendental argu mentsinaslightlydifferentform:  (1*)E   (premise)  (2*)E   (from(1*),byA A)  (3*)C E (premise)  (4*)C  (from(2*)and(3*)bymodus tollens)  (5*)C   (from(4*)byelimination) Logicallythedifferencebetweenthetwoformulationsisunim portant,as(3)and(3*)areequivalent:  (6)(E C) (C E)4

4 Itisnoteworthythatthisequivalenceisvalidinclassicallogic,butnotin intuitionisticlogicHowever,eveninlightofKantianphilosophy,itisnot troublesome, as for Kant transcendental reasoning is not constructive (unlikethemathematicalreasoning)

80 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski  ThisisaroughsketchofKantsmethodSuchageneral perspectiveisinstructive,butfailstoaccountforsomeessential andintriguingaspectsofKantsphilosophyofmathematics 2. The Euclidean paradigm  ItisourthesisthatKantsconceptionofthemathematical subjectisinmanyrespectstailoredtofitEuclideangeom etry In order to substantiate this thesis we shall focus on two simple examples from Euclids Elements First, however, let us have a look at the conceptual foundations of Euclidean geom etry  As it is well known, Euclid distinguishes between axi oms, postulates and definitions It is crucial to realize that the Euclidean understanding of these terms differs substantially fromtheircontemporarymeaningMoreover,evenamongthe Ancientwriters,therewasnoagreementastothesedistinctions A good illustration of this fact may be found in Proclus com mentaryonEuclidsElementsProclusidentifiesthreedifferent waysofdistinguishingbetweenaxiomsandpostulatesFirst,he saysthat
theydifferfromoneanotherinthesamewayastheoremsaredis tinguishedfromproblemsFor,asintheoremsweproposetosee anddeterminewhatfollowsonthepremises,whileinproblems wearetoldtofindanddosomething,inlikemannerinaxioms suchthingsareassumedasaremanifestinthemselvesandeasily apprehended by our untaught notions, while in the postulates weassumesuchthingsasareeasytofindandeffect(ourunder standingsufferingnostrainintheirassumption),andwerequire nocomplicationofmachinery5

5 Procli Diadochi in primum Elementorum Euclidis librum Commentarii, GFriedlein(ed),Teubner,Leipzig1873,178:12179:8;quotedafterthetrans

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 81 Thus,onthisreading,axiomsareselfevident,whilepostulates areverysimple,easilyprovabletheoremsThesecondstanceis asfollows:

Others again will say that postulates are peculiar to geometrical subjectmatter, while axioms are common to all investigation whichisconcernedwithquantityandmagnitudeThusitisthe geometer who knows that all right angles are equal and how to produceinastraightlineanylimitedstraightline,whereasitisa commonnotionthatthingswhichareequaltothesamethingare alsoequaltooneanother,anditisemployedbythearithmetician andanyscientificpersonwhoadaptsthegeneralstatementtohis ownsubject6

Theideais,then,thatpostulatesaredomainspecific(theyper taintogeometryonly),whileaxiomsaregenerallyvalidFinally, there is a view that Proclus attributes to Aristotle: everything which is confirmed by a sort of demonstration will be a postu lateandwhatisincapableofproofwillbeanaxiom7Itiscom monly accepted that Proclus misrepresents Aristotles thought here As Thomas Heat rightly observes, Aristotle distinguished between axioms (or common notions), postulates, hypotheses anddefinitions8InPosterior Analytics,theStagiriteclaimsthat every demonstrative science must start with indemonstrable, selfevidentprinciplesSomeofthem(axioms)arecommonto all sciences There are also principles characteristic of particu lar disciplines Among them one should distinguish between hypothesesandpostulatesHypothesesarepropositionswhich a teacher assumes without proof, although they are a matter
lationinThe Thirteen Books of Euclids Elements,translatedbyTLHeath, CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge1908 6 Ibidem,182:614 7 Ibidem,181:21182:13 8 The Thirteen Books of Euclids Elements..., op. cit,p117ff

82 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski ofproofPostulatesarelikewisepropositions,butsuchthatare usuallycontrarytotheopinionofthelearnerFinally,definitions arenotpropositions,astheydonotasserttheexistenceornon existenceofanything9HeathbelievesthatitistheAristotelian conceptual scheme that characterizes best the Euclids use of thetermsinvolved  Be that as it may, there is no doubt that Euclids utiliza tionofthenotionsofaxiomsandpostulatesisdifferentfromour understandingthereofTosubstantiatethisthesis,itisenough to have a closer look at Euclids axioms and postulates them selvesTheaxiomsinclude: 1 Thingswhichareequaltothesamethingarealsoequalto oneanother 2 Ifequalsbeaddedtoequals,thewholesareequal 3 If equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal 4 Thingswhichcoincidewithoneanotherareequaltoone another 5 Thewholeisgreaterthanthepart Thepostulatesare: 1 Todrawastraightlinefromanypointtoanypoint 2 Toproduceafinitestraightlinecontinuouslyinastraight line 3 Todescribeacirclewithanycentreanddistance 4 Thatallrightanglesareequaltooneanother 5 Thatisastraightlinefallingontwostraightlinesmakesthe interioranglesonthesamesidelessthantworightangles, thestraightlines,ifproducedindefinitely,willmeetonthat side on which the angles are less than two right angles10
9 CfPosterior Analytics,I6,74b5;I1076a3177q4 10 CfThe Thirteen Books of Euclids Elements, op. cit.

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 83 It is interesting to compare the Euclidean understanding of axioms and postulates with Kants treatment of axioms Kant says:
[axioms] are synthetic a priori principles, insofar as they are immediately certain Now one concept cannot be synthetically yet immediately combined with another, since for us to be able togobeyondconceptsathird,mediatingcognitionisnecessary Now, since philosophy is merely rational cognition in accord ance with concepts, no principle is to be encountered in it that deserves the name of axiom Mathematics, on the contrary, is capable of axioms, eg, that three points always lie in a plane, because by means of the construction of concepts in the intui tionoftheobjectitcanconnectpredicatesofthelattera prioriand immediatelyAsyntheticprinciple,onthecontrary,eg,theprop ositionthateverythingthathappenshasitscause,canneverbe immediatelycertainfrommereconcepts,becauseImustalways lookaroundforsomethirdthing,namelytheconditionoftime determination in an experience, and I could never directly cog nizesuchaprincipleimmediatelyfromconceptsalone11

This passage encapsulates a conception of axioms that differs from the Aristotelian view Similarly to Aristotle, Kant believes axioms to be selfevident or certain statements However, he claimsunliketheStagiritethataxiomsaredomainspecific: they are characteristic of mathematics alone In other words, axioms are not propositions which apply to different fields of knowledgeKantsjustificationforthisthesisrestsonhisgeneral viewofcognitionForajudgementtobeselfevident,itmustbe basedonimmediateintuitionItfollowsthatonlymathematical truths, which are grounded on the pure intuitions of time and space,aredeservingofthelabelaxiomOnewouldbemistaken, however,toclaimthatKantsrenderingofaxiomsissimilarto
11 B761762

84 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski ourunderstandingofthetermContemporaneously,axiomsare considered arbitrarily chosen propositions which serve as the startingpoints of a deductive chain which leads to the estab lishment of new theorems Such a modern deductive concep tion of mathematical proof is alien to the Kantian philosophy Kantnotes:
Onlyapoidicticproof,insofarasitisintuitive,canbecalledadem onstrationExperiencemaywellteachuswhatis,butnotthatit couldnotbeotherwiseHenceempiricalgroundsofproofcannot yieldapoidicticproofFroma priori concepts,however,intuitive certainty,ieselfevidence,canneverarise()Thusonlymath ematicscontainsdemonstrations,sinceitdoesnotderivecogni tionfromconcepts,butfromtheirconstruction,iefromtheintu itionthatcanbegivena prioricorrespondingtotheconcepts12

Theessentialideabehindthequotedpassageisthatmathemati cal demonstrations proceed through construction rather than a chain of arguments In order to see what this conception amounts to, let us come back to Euclids geometry and have a lookattwoexamples  ThefirstpropositionofbookIofElementsreads:Tocon structanequilateraltriangleonagivenfinitestraightlineThe proofofthispropositionisasfollows(seeFig1)LetABbethe givenfinitestraightlineThegoalistoconstructanequilateral triangleonthestraightlineABWebeginbydescribingthecircle BCD with centre A and radius AB Next, we describe the circle ACEwithcentreBandradiusBA(inbothcasesweusePostulate3, Todescribeacirclewithanycentreandradius)Consequently, wejointhestraightlinesCAandCBfromthepointCatwhich thecirclescutoneanothertothepointsAandB(here,weuse Postulate2:Todrawastraightlinefromanypointtoanypoint) Now,sincethepointAisthecentreofthecircleCDB,therefore
12 B763

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 85 AC equals AB Moreover, since the point B is the centre of the circleCAE,thereforeBCequalsBA(here,thedefinitionIDef15 isutilized:Acircleisaplanefigurecontainedbyonelinesuch thatallthestraightlinesfallinguponitfromonepointamong those lying within the figure equal one another) Since AC wasprovedequaltoAB,thereforeeachofthestraightlinesAC andBCequalsABAndthingswhichequalthesamethingalso equaloneanother,thereforeACalsoequalsBC(bythecommon notionCN1:Thingswhichequalthesamethingalsoequalone another)ThereforethethreestraightlinesAC,AB,andBCequal oneanotherandthusthetriangleABCisequilateral,andithas beenconstructedonthegivenfinitestraightlineAB(bydefini tionIDef20:Oftrilateralfigures,anequilateraltriangleisthat whichhasitsthreesidesequal,anisoscelestrianglethatwhich hastwoofitssidesaloneequal,andascalenetrianglethatwhich hasitsthreesidesunequal)

Fig1TheconstructionofEuclidspropositionI1

 Another example is Proposition 32 of the Book 1 of Elements:Inanytriangle,ifoneofthesidesisproduced,then theexteriorangleequalsthesumofthetwointeriorandoppo site angles, and the sum of the three interior angles of the tri angle equals two right angles The proof runs as follows (See Fig 2): Let ABC be a triangle, and let one side of it BC be pro ducedtoDTheexteriorangleACDequalsthesumofthetwo interiorandoppositeanglesCABandABC,andthesumofthe

86 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski threeinterioranglesofthetriangleABC,BCA,andCABequals tworightanglesNow,wedrawCEthroughthepointCparallel tothestraightlineAB(onthebasisofpropositionI31)SinceAB isparalleltoCE,andACfallsuponthem,thereforethealternate anglesBACandACEequaloneanother(propositionI29)Again, sinceABisparalleltoCE,andthestraightlineBDfallsuponthem, thereforetheexteriorangleECDequalstheinteriorandopposite angleABC(propositionI29)ButtheangleACEwasalsoproved equaltotheangleBACThereforethewholeangleACDequals thesumofthetwointeriorandoppositeanglesBACandABC Add the angle ACB to each Then the sum of the angles ACD andACBequalsthesumofthethreeanglesABC,BCA,andCAB (commonnotionCN2)ButthesumoftheanglesACDandACB equals two right angles Therefore the sum of the angles ABC, BCA,andCABalsoequalstworightangles(propositionI13and commonnotionCN1)Thereforeinanytriangle,ifoneofthe sidesisproduced,thentheexteriorangleequalsthesumofthe twointeriorandoppositeangles,andthesumofthethreeinte rioranglesofthetriangleequalstworightangles

Fig2TheconstructionofEuclidspropositionI32

The surprising fact about these two proofs is that  on thebasisEuclidspostulatesandthemodernlogicaloneitis impossibletodeducethemInparticular,itisoftenpointedout that the proof of Proposition I1 is lacking: Euclids postulates givenoguaranteethatthepointCexists,iethatthetwocircles

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 87 in fact intersect The proof of the Theorem I32, in turn, refers to the propositions I13, which refers to I11, which is based on I1Thus,thedeficienciesoftheproofofI1underminealsothe validityoftheproofofI32  This problem has generated a substantial literature13 In an intriguing essay, The Method of Analysis, Jaakko Hintikka and Unto Remes provide an interpretation of some treaties of Pappus14 They point out that for the Ancient mathemati cianprovingageometricaltheoremlittleresembleddeduction, understood as moving from a proposition to a proposition via logicallyvalidtransformations:
Onourview,intheoreticalanalysisoneanalysesthecomplexesof geometricalobjectstheirinterrelationsandinterdependencies involvedintheproofofthedesiredtheorem,notthedeductive stepswhichwouldtakeusfromthepremisestothetheorem() Thestepsoftheanalysisdonottakeusfromonepropositionto another,nomatterwhatthedirectionoftherelationofthelogical consequence us which obtains between them, but from a geo metrical object of a number of geometrical objects to another one15

Thus, Hintikka and Remes observe that geometrical analysis requiresanextensivereferencetothegeometricalobjectsthem selves Moreover, this usually involves a number of auxiliary constructions:
()ananalysiscansucceedonlyifbesidesassumingthetruthof the desired theorem we have carried out a sufficient number of
13 LiteratureonEuclids 14 JHintikka,URemes,The Method of Analysis: Its Geometrical Origin And Its General Significance, Springer, Dordrecht 1974 The authors analyse Pappus conception of analysis to be found in Pappus, Collectionis quae supersunt,FHultsch(ed),vol3,Weidmann,Berlin187678 15 JHintikka,URemes,The Method of Analysis, op. cit.,p32

88 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski

auxiliaryconstructionsinthefigureintermsofwhichtheproof istobecarriedoutInprinciplethesemaybecarriedoutinthe courseoftheanalysis,too,buttheycanalwaysbeaccomplished before it This indispensability of constructions in analysis is a reflection of the fact that in elementary geometry an auxiliary construction () which goes beyond the ekthesis or the setting outofthetheoremintermsofafigure,mustoftenbeassumedto havebeencarriedoutbeforeatheoremcanbeprovedHence,a proofcannotbefoundbemeansofanalysiswithoutsuchauxil iaryconstructions16

This shows that in the Euclidean paradigm, pictures (such as foundinFig1andFig2)areessential parts ofthegeometrical proof In other words, the validity of the proposition I1 hangs togetherwiththefactthatoneseesthatthetwocirclesdointer sect at point C This observation forces us to analyse in detail Kantsconceptsofintuitionandconstruction 3. Intuition and construction  ThebasicideabehindKantsconceptionofmathematical cognitionisaswehavealreadyobservedthatmathematics is based on the pure intuitions of space and time In an often quotedpassage,Kantobserves:
Giveaphilosophertheconceptofatriangle,andlethimtrytofind outinhiswayhowthesumofitsanglesmightberelatedtoaright angle He has nothing but the concept of a figure enclosed by threestraightlines,andinittheconceptofequallymanyangles Nowhemayreflectonthisconceptaslongashewants,yethewill neverproduceanythingnewHecananalyseandmakedistinct the concept of a straight line, or of an angle, or of the number three,buthewillnotcomeuponanyotherpropertiesthatdonot already lie in these concepts But now let the geometer take up
16 Ibidem,p2

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 89

thisquestionHebeginsatoncetoconstructatriangleSincehe knows that two right angles together are exactly equal to all of the adjacent angles that can be draw at one point on a straight line,heextendsonesideofhistriangle,andobtainstwoadjacent anglesthattogetherareequaltotworightonesNowhedivides theexternaloneoftheseanglesbydrawingalineparalleltothe opposite side of the triangle, and sees that here there arises an externaladjacentanglewhichisequaltoaninternalone,etcIn suchaway,throughachainofinferencesthatisalwaysguided byintuition,hearrivesatafullyilluminatingandatthesametime generalsolutionofthequestion17

ItiseasytorealizethatKantdescribesheretheproofoftheprop osition32ofBook1ofEuclidsElementsAlongtheway,heclaims thatmathematicalknowledgecannotbegainedbyrecourseto concepts The analysis of pure concepts cannot lead us to the establishmentofanymathematicaltheoreminordertoprove anything, we need to construct our concepts, and for the con structionweneedintuition  What is, then, intuition, and what is construction? All modes of cognition are deemed by Kant representations Now, amongrepresentationsheplacesperceptiones,whicharerep resentations with consciousness Perceptions can be further divided into sensations (sensationes) and cognitions (cogni tiones)Theformerareperceptionsthatrefertothesubjectas amodificationofitsstate;thelatterareobjectiveperceptions: intuitionsorconcepts[Intuition]isimmediatelyrelatedtothe objectandissingular;[concept]ismediate,bymeansofamark, which can be common to several things A concept which is pure,onethathasitsoriginsolelyintheunderstanding(notin apureimageofsensibility),iscallednotionOnecanalsospeak

17 B744

90 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski ofideas,ieconceptsmadeupofnotions,whichgoesbeyond thepossibilityofexperience18  Thisclassificationishighlyinterestingformanyreasons Firstandforemost,itillustrateswhatare,accordingtoKant,the basickindsofcognitionInhistreatmentofcognitionhegoes beyond his predecessors  Descartes, Leibniz and the British empiricistsForDescartesandhisfollowers,cognition(orthink ing) can be modelled as an analogue of seeing ideas with the mindseyeMoreover,thetermideareferredtoanythingwhat is an object of cognition, from figures and numbers, through theimpressionsofphysicalobjects,topainandotheremotions and feelings19 In Kants conception, our mental machinery is much more complex Although there exists an umbrella term foralltheobjectsofperception(representationes),thereareclear functionaldivisionswithinthisoverarchingcategoryFromour perspective,themostimportantisthedistinctionbetweentwo kindsofcognitiones,ieobjectiveperceptions:intuitions,which are singular, concrete and direct, and concepts, which simul taneouslyrefertoanumberofobjectsbymeansofacommon mark,andassuchareuniversalandindirect  ThecrucialelementofKantsphilosophyofmathematics isthatmathematicalcognitionmust bebasedonintuitionsHe takes two different routes to substantiate this thesis: the meta physical and the transcendental expositions The metaphysi cal exposition beginswithacharacterizationofspaceandtime, whichisfollowedbythedescriptionofthenatureofmathemati cal judgements This line of reasoning belongs to what Kant deemstranscendentalaesthetics,andconsistsofthefollowing stepsFirst,spaceandtimearenotempiricalconcepts,forany
18 A320/B377 19 Cf I Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy, Cambridge UniversityPress,Cambridge1975,p27

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 91 empirical cognition assumes space and time as the reference frameworkInorderforcertainsensationstoberelatedtosome thingoutsideme()therepresentationofspacemustalreadybe theirground20Similarly,simultaneityorsuccessionwouldnot themselves come into perception if the representation of time didnotgroundthema priori21Secondly,bothspaceandtime are a priori: it is impossible to represent that there is no space or time; they cannot be removed from our cognition Thirdly, if so, space and time must be grounds for a priori and certain judgements,suchasthatonlyonestraightlineliesbetweentwo points22Fourth,neitherspacenortimearediscursive:theyare notconceptsthatrelatetothingsingeneralTheyarepure,con crete intuitions, as one can represent only one space and one time Different spaces always result from a delineation of the one concrete space (pure intuition); similarly, different times areonlypartsofoneandthesametime23Finally,onecanrep resentspaceandtimeonlyasgiveninfinitemagnitudes  Thus,inthemetaphysicalexpositionKantconsidersfirst the nature of space and time and identifies a number of their features: they are nonempirical, a priori, concrete pure intui tionsTherefore,thejudgementsthatrelatetothem,suchasthe geometrical propositions, must be a priori, certain and univer salThisdirectionofinferenceisreversedinthetranscendental expositionKantsays:
Iunderstandbyatranscendentalexpositiontheexplanationofa conceptasaprinciplefromwhichinsightintothepossibilityof othersynthetica priori cognitionscanbegainedForthisaimit is required 1) that such cognitions actually flow from the given
20 21 22 23 A23/B38 B46 B39 B47

92 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski

concept,and2)thatthesecognitionsareonlypossibleunderthe presuppositionofagivenwayofexplainingthisconcepts24

Inotherwords,Kantsstrategyhereis:toassumethatgeometry isasciencethatdeterminesthepropertiesofspacesynthetically yet a priori25, and ask: what then must the representation of spacebeforsuchacognitionofittobepossible?26Hisanswer isthatspacemustbeanintuition(togroundthesyntheticityof thegeometricaljudgements),andonethatisa priori(toground the aprioricity of the geometrical propositions) This leads to theconclusionthatspacehasitsseatmerelyinthesubject,as itsformalconstitutionofbeingaffectedbyobjectsandthereby acquiringimmediaterepresentation,ie,intuition,ofthem,thus onlyastheformofoutersenseingeneral27Asimilarlineofrea soningappliestotime28  The transcendental exposition hangs together with the soundness of the assumption that mathematical propositions arenecessaryanduniversal(ie,a priori),andyetsyntheticKant devotesmuchattentiontothisproblemInhisIntroduction to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason he observes thathisclaimsarecontrarytoalongtraditionwhichtakesmath ematicaljudgementstobeanalyticHisfamousdefenceofthe syntheticityofpuremathematicsbeginsbygrantingthatmath ematical propositions are always a priori judgements and are neverempirical,becausetheycarrynecessitywiththem,which cannot be derived from experience29 He proceeds to observe

24 25 26 27 28 29

B40 Ibidem Ibidem B41 B4849 B15

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 93 that the proposition 7+5=12 cannot be thought of as merely analyticThereasonhegivesisthefollowing:
Theconceptoftwelveisbynomeansalreadythoughtmerelyby mythinkingofthatunificationofsevenandfive,andnomatter howlongIanalysemyconceptofsuchapossiblesumIwillstill not find twelve in it One must go beyond these concepts, seek ingassistanceintheintuitionthatcorrespondstooneofthetwo, onesfivefingers,say,or()fivepoints,andoneafteranotheradd theunitsofthefivegivenintheintuitiontotheconceptofseven () The arithmetical proposition is therefore always synthetic () Just as little is any principle of pure geometry analytic That thestraightlinebetweentwopointsistheshortestisasynthetic propositionFormyconceptofthestraightcontainsnothingof quantity,butonlyaqualityTheconceptoftheshortestisthere fore entirely additional to it, and cannot be extracted out of the concept of the straight line by any analysis Help must here be gottenfromintuition,bymeansofwhichalonethesynthesisis possible30

Thus, Kants argument is that mathematical propositions are syntheticastheyrequirerepresentationintheintuitionofspace tochecktheirvalidityWhenoneaddsseventofive,oneneeds topicturethisunion;similarly,tocheckwhetherthestraightline istheshortestlinethatconnectstwopoints,oneneedstoimag inethisline(andperhapssomeotherlinesconnectingthegiven points)ThisshowsthatKantfollowstheEuclideanparadigmat the deepest possible level: mathematics  both geometry and arithmeticcannotdispensewithpicturesButthepicturesin questionarenotempiricalobjectsassuchobjectsfailtosecure thecertaintyanduniversalityofmathematicalpropositionsThe pictures are representations in pure intuition of space Space

30 B1516

94 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski serves here as the environment for a priori constructions of mathematicalconceptsMoreprecisely:
Toconstructaconceptmeanstoexhibita prioritheintuitioncor responding to it For the construction of a concept, therefore, a nonempiricalintuitionisrequired,whichconsequently,asintu ition, is an individual object, but that must nevertheless, as the construction of a concept (of a general representation), express intherepresentationuniversalvalidityforallpossibleintuitions that belong under the same concept Thus I construct a trian glebyexhibitinganobjectcorrespondingtothisconcept,either through mere imagination, in pure intuition, or on paper, in empiricalintuition,butinbothcasescompletelya priori,without havinghadtoborrowthepatternforitfromanyexperienceThe individual drawn figure is empirical, and nevertheless serves to expresstheconceptwithoutdamagetoitsuniversality,forinthe caseofthisempiricalintuitionwehavetakenaccountonlyofthe action of constructing the concept, to which many determina tions,eg,thoseofthemagnitudeofthesidesandtheangles,are entirely indifferent, and thus we have abstracted from these dif ferences,whichdonotaltertheconceptofthetriangle31

Thequotedpassagetouchesuponthemostcontroversialaspect of Kants philosophy of mathematics As Kant puts it, math ematical cognition considers the universal in the particular, indeedevenintheindividual(A714,B742)Somehow,itispos sibletojustifytheuniversal propositionsofmathematicsandto substantiatetheircertainty,byrecoursetointuition,whichis,ex definitione,concreteandindividualInotherwords,anintuitive constructionofaparticular,concretetrianglemayserveasthe basisforformulatingpropositionspertainingtoeachandevery triangle This is a place where Kants philosophy of mathemat ics meets the philosophers old friend  the problem of one
31 A71314,B74142

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 95 and many How is it possible that one concept (say, of a trian gle)referstoanumberofconcretethings?Moreover,whatisthe foundation for claiming that each and every instantiation of a mathematicalconceptexhibitssomenecessaryfeaturesofthis concept?Howtodistinguishbetweenthenecessaryandcontin gentfeaturesofaconcreteobject(eg,agiventriangle)?These questionslieattheheartofthecontroversiessurroundingKants conceptionofmathematics 4. Kants tertius homo: between intuitions and concepts  The most important objection against the picture of mathematical cognition sketched above is phrased by Philip Kitcherinthefollowingwords:
Theinadequacyofpureintuition()stemsimmediatelyfromthe ideathatwecan,oninspection,determinetheexactnatureofa figure, whether physical or drawn in thought () The problem lies with the picture behind Kants theory That picture presents the mind bringing forth its creations and the naive eye of the mind scanning those creations and detecting their properties withabsoluteaccuracy32

Thus,accordingtoKitcher,thereisamysterious aspecttoKants conception of mathematics It is a mystery how concrete rep resentationsinintuitionarerelatedtoconcepts,whichareuni versalTobesure,intuitiverepresentationsareinstantiationsof concepts; however, one may ask what this instantiation boils downtoInotherwords,oneisdealingherewiththeoldprob lemoftherelationshipbetweenuniversalsandparticularsInhis dialogue,Parmenides,Platofamouslyobservedthatinorderto saythatthereisaresemblancebetweenanabstractideaanda
32 PKitcher,The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge,OxfordUniversityPress, Oxford1985,p4950

96 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski concretesensualobject,oneneedsathirdmanortertius homo, ie an independent standard, in virtue of which the similarity between the idea and the concrete object may be predicated KitchersworryisthatforKantthesimilarityinquestion,iethe resemblance between a concept (say, of a triangle) and a con creteobject(atriangle)giveninintuition,isdeterminedwiththe useofamysteriousfacultyofmind(anaiveeye)whichiscapa ble of detecting the essential properties of intuitive construc tionswithabsoluteaccuracyMoreover,theworrygrowsbigger oncewetakeintoaccountthefactthatitistheconcreteintuitive representations that are the ultimate foundations of our math ematicaljudgementsandproofsThepassagefromaconcept toitsinstantiationinintuitioniscrucialinbothdirectionsOn theonehand,itservestoidentifyconcreteobjectsastriangles, cubes,etcOntheother,itisrequiredtoestablishrelationships betweenconceptsandthustoprovetheoremsThesyntheticity ofthemathematicalknowledgeandtheverypossibilityofdoing mathematicshangstogetherwithit  Kitchers worry is legitimate, but it fails to acknowledge whatKantexplicitlysaysInthesecondpartofthefragmentof The Critique of Pure Reason quotedabove(A714)onereads:
Theindividualdrawnfigureisempirical,andneverthelessserves toexpresstheconceptwithoutdamagetoitsuniversality,forin thecaseofthisempiricalintuitionwehavetakenaccountonlyof theactionofconstructingtheconcept,towhichmanydetermi nations,eg,thoseofthemagnitudeofthesidesandtheangles, areentirelyindifferent

Here,Kantspeaksoftheroleoftheactionofconstructingthe concept;itisinthisactionorprocedurethattheessentialprop erties which bind together a concept and its representation in intuitionaretobefoundKantsthirdman isthisprocedure:

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 97

Nowitisclearthattheremustbeathirdthing,whichmuststand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter This mediating representation must be pure(withoutanythingempirical)andyetintellectualontheone hand,andsensibleontheotherSucharepresentationisthetran scendentalschema33

Kantviewedthetheoryofschemataasthemostdifficult,yetone of the most importantparts of the Critique34 Indeed, the expo sition of the conception of schemata is very dense: it takes a littlemorethanonepercentoftheentiretreatiseInfaceofthat, CharlesSandersPeircefamouslynoted:
[Kants] doctrine of the schemata can only have been an after thought,anadditiontohissystemafteritwassubstantiallycom pleteForiftheschematahadbeenconsideredearlyenough,they wouldhaveovergrownhiswholework35

Bethatasitmay,theconceptionoftheschemataarecentralnot onlytoKantsphilosophyofmathematics,buttohisentirecriti calprojectWhat,then,isaschema?Kantclaimsthatschemata arepurelyformalconditionsofsensibility,towhichtheuseof conceptsofunderstandingisrestrictedThus,everyconcepthas acorrespondingschemaSchemataareproductofpureimagi nation,butofaspecialkind,distinguishablefromimages:

() If I place five points in a row,      , this is an image of the numberfiveOnthecontrary,ifIonlythinkanumberingeneral,
33 A183/B177 34 Kants gesammelte Schriften, Georg Reimer, Berlin 1900, 18, 68587; quoted after KF Jrgensen, Kants Schematism and the Foundations of Mathematics,PhDDissertation,Roskilde2005,availableonline 35 CS Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol 18, Harvard UniversityPress:Cambridge,Mass,CHartshorne,PWeiss,andABurks (ed,),volI,p35;quotedafterKFJrgensen,Kants Schematism..., op.cit.

98 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski

whichcouldbefiveorahundred,thisthinkingismoretherepre sentationofamethodforrepresentingamultitude(eg,athou sand),inaccordancewithacertainconceptthantheimageitself, whichinthiscaseIcouldsurveyandcomparewiththeconcept only with difficulty Now this representation of a general proce dureoftheimaginationforprovidingconceptwithitsimageis whatIcalltheschemaforthisconcept36

It is clear that, for Kant, schemata are procedures, ie general, nonsingularrulesorsetsofsuchruleswhoseapplicationena blesonetoconstructobjectscorrespondingtoagivenconcept Thus,RobertHannaismistaken,whenheclaimsthataschema is a quasiobjective exemplary or paradigmatic instance of a concept,producedbythepureimagination,suchthatitencodes therelevantconceptualcontentorconceptualinformationina specificallyspatialortemporalform37Ifitwereso,Kantsdoc trine of the schematism would be susceptible to a variation of Kitchersobjection:onewouldneedtopositaspecialfacultyof mind capable of producing such exemplary representations ofaconcept,andanadditionalfacultythatwouldbecapableof comparingagivenintuitiveobjectwiththeexemplarMoreover, inmanyifnotmostcasessuchexemplaryrepresentations seemnottoexistLetusaskthefollowingquestion:whatwould be an exemplary representation of a triangle? It is impossible tothinkofoneIfanytrianglegivenintheintuitionisparadig matic,thenevery suchrepresentationisKantrealizesthiswhen hesays:
Noimageatallwouldeverbeadequatetotheconceptofatriangle in general For it would never attain the universality of the con cept,whichmakesitholdforalltriangles,whetherrightangled,
36 A140/B179 37 R Hanna, Mathematics for Humans: Kants Philosophy of Arithmetics Revisited,European Journal of Philosophy,10(2002),p346

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 99

acuteangled, and so on, but would always be limited to only a part of this sphere The schema of the triangle can never exist anywherebutinthought,anditsignifiesaruleofsynthesisofthe imaginationwithrespecttopurefiguresinspace38

The application of such a rule of synthesis, ie of a schema, is ofteninvokedbyKantForexample,hesays:
We say that we cognize the object if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition But this is impossible if the intuition could not have been produced through a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule that makes the reproduc tion of the manifold necessary a priori and a concept in which this manifold is unified possible Thus we think of a triangle as anobjectbybeingconsciousofthecompositionofthreestraight linesinaccordancewitharuleaccordingtowhichsuchanintui tioncanalwaysbeexhibited39

The resulting picture is that of a schema as a universal, non concrete rule, existing in thought, being a counterpart of a concept,andoperatingfullynecessarilyanda prioriLisaShabel rightly observes that it is the Euclidean paradigm that consti tutesaninterpretivemodelforthefunctionofatranscendental schema40 Euclids postulates, such as To draw a straight line from any point to any point or To describe a circle with any centreanddistance,mayindeedbeconsideredrulesofthumb orauxiliarytoolsthatareusefulintheprocessofconstruction Butitistheprocessofconstructionoftherelevantfiguresthat is essential to the process of proving propositions Such con structions are procedures tout court: any of Euclids proofs is, ineffect,adescriptionofaprocessofconstructionwhichaims
38 A140/B180 39 A105 40 L Shabel, Mathematics in Kants Critical Philosophy, Routledge, London 2003,p109

100 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski at justifying the proposition at hand Now, following a proce duremeansfollowingasetofrulesRecalltheproofofEuclids propositionI32:Inanytriangle,ifoneofthesidesisproduced, then the exterior angle equals the sum of the two interior and oppositeangles,andthesumofthethreeinterioranglesofthe triangleequalstworightanglesOnebeginsherebyconstruct ingatriangleABC,andthenproducingonesideofit,BC,toD Then,oneinspectstheangleACDandobserves thatitequalsthe sum of the two interior and opposite angles CAB and ABC, as wellasthatthesumofthethreeinterioranglesofthetriangle ABC,BCA,andCABequalstworightanglesFurtheronedraws the line CE through the point C parallel to the straight line AB, andsoonItisclearthattoproceedwithsuchaproofmeansto followasetofinstructionsorrulesMoreover,theresultingpic ture,eitheronpaperorinimagination,isalwaysofaconcrete geometricalobjectYet,theconclusion,ietheprovedproposi tion,isfullyuniversalTheuniversalityinquestionisguaranteed by the character of the rules used in the process of construc tionObservethattheserulesarenotfullydeterminate:theydo notrequiretodrawalineofsomepreciselength,oratriangleof somefullydeterminedangles(eg,arightangledtriangle)  In light of the above we cannot agree with Shabel who claimsthatinthecaseofmathematicalconcepts()schemata are strictly redundant: no third thing is needed to mediate between a mathematical concept and the objects that instanti ate it since mathematical concepts come equipped with deter minate conditions on and procedures for their construction41 On the one hand, this view clearly contradicts Kants explicit statements,aswhenhesaysgiveaphilosophertheconceptof
41 L Shabel, Kants Philosophy of Mathematics, [in:] The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, P Guyer (ed), Cambridge UniversityPress,Cambridge2006,p111

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 101 atriangle,andlethimtrytofindoutinhiswayhowthesumof itsanglesmightberelatedtoarightangleHehasnothingbut theconceptofafigureenclosedbythreestraightlines,andin ittheconceptofequallymanyangles42Ontheother,Shabels interpretationwouldleaddirectlytotherecurrenceofKitchers objection:iftherewerenoschemacoupledwiththemathemati calconceptsoriftheywereredundanttheconceptswould apply directly to their instantiations in the intuition But then onewouldneedtopostulatetheexistenceofaspecialfacultyof mindcapableofgraspingtheessentialpropertiesofaconcrete object, ones that correspond to the properties constituting the concept  TheabovediscussioncentredaroundKantsviewofthe geometricalpracticeThethesisweembracetogetherwitha number of contemporary interpreters of Kant43  is that Kant takesEuclideangeometryashisparadigmofwhatmathematics amountstoTothis,therecorrespondshisdoctrineofthesche mata which mediate between general concepts and concrete geometricalobjectsgivenintheintuitionThenextquestionis howthisconceptionfaresvis a visthedisciplinesofarithmetic andalgebra44
42 A716/B744 43 Eg,LisaShabel,MichaelFriedman,KFJrgensen 44 In the above outline of Kants doctrine of schemata we have left out a number of important problems Eg, there is a heated debate as to the exactnatureofmathematicalintuitioninKant(seetheexchangebetween HintikkaandParsonsandsomecommentators)Oneshouldalsobearin mindthatthedoctrineofschematismiscentralnotonlytoKantsphiloso phyofmathematics,buttohisentirecriticalprojectEg,hedistinguishes betweendifferentkindsofschemata(empirical,geometrical,transcenden tal),andspeaksoftheschemataofmagnitude,substance,cause,commu nity(reciprocity),possibility,actuality,necessity,relation,etcSee,eg,the paperscollectedinKants Philosophy of Mathematics.Modern Essays,CJ Posy(ed),KluwerAcademicPublishers,Dordrecht1992

102 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski 5. Arithmetic and algebra  In his influential paper of 1941, Kants Theory of Mathematical and Philosophical Reasoning, CD Broad com plains that Kants conception of mathematics was evidently madeupprimarilytodealwithgeometry,andwasthenextended forciblytodealwitharithmeticandalgebra45Thisviewishighly plausible once we realize what happens when we represent a number or an algebraic variable or formula in the intuition of space (and time) There seems to be no clear intuitive repre sentationsofagivennumber,say7Whenonespeaksofgeo metrical figures, one may say that to a concept of a triangle there correspond infinitely many concrete representations in the intuition The number 7, however, seems to be a concept with no clear instantiations (surely, one can see or construct in the intuition seven apples, seven strokes, seven chairs, etc, butthesearenotpurerepresentationsofthenumberseven)The case is even worse with algebra When one contemplates the formulaa+b=c,thereisnoimmediatewayofrepresentingitin theintuition,apartfromimaginingthefivesymbols:a,+,b,=, andcandputtingthemtogetherThereseemstobenowayto derive synthetic a priori algebraic judgements There are, how ever, a number of assumptions standing behind Broads pessi misticviewofKantsphilosophyofarithmeticandalgebraThe firstisthatarithmeticpertainstonumberswhichhavenothing todowithspace:theyarenotspatialobjectsThesecondtreats algebraasakindofgeneralizationoforabstractionfromarith metic:algebraistsonlyreplaceconcretenumberswithsymbolic variables to establish fully abstract relationships between arbi

45 CDBroad,KantsTheoryofMathematicalandPhilosophicalReasoning, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,42(1941),p5

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 103 trary quantitiesItseems,however,thatKantwouldrejectboth theseassumptions  Let us begin with arithmetic Kant is quite explicit as to theroleoftheintuitionofspaceinthearithmeticalpracticeIn thealreadyquotedpassagehenotes:
Theconceptoftwelveisbynomeansalreadythoughtmerelyby mythinkingofthatunificationofsevenandfive,andnomatter howlongIanalysemyconceptofsuchapossiblesumIwillstill not find twelve in it One must go beyond these concepts, seek ingassistanceintheintuitionthatcorrespondstooneofthetwo, onesfivefingers,say,or()fivepoints,andoneafteranotheradd theunitsofthefivegivenintheintuitiontotheconceptofseven ()Thearithmeticalpropositionisthereforealwayssynthetic46

Thusunderstood,therepresentationofnumbersrequiresboth spaceandtimeThisclaimmaystrikeusasunintuitiveHowever, oneneedstobearinmindthatKanthadadifferentmathemati cal background than we have In particular, it is argued that, likeingeometry,inarithmetichefollowedtheGreektradition Daniel Sutherland gives the following rough exposition of the Greekconceptofnumber:
TheGreektermfornumber,arithmos,haddifferentsensesThe thinnestsenseseemstohavebeennothingmorethanaparticular collectionofthings,suchasthenumberofsheepinaparticular fieldorthenumberofshoesinmycloset,inroughlythewaywe think of a particular set This notion of arithmos presupposes a choiceofunit,suchasashoeorpairsofshoesAnotherclosely relatedsenseofarithmoswasthenumberthatresultedfromenu meratingthemembersofacollection,whichissometimescalled thecountingnumberofthecountedcollectionIt,too,presup posesthechoiceofaunit,whichisoftencalledacountingcon ceptThereisalsoafurtherconceptionofnumberapartfroma
46 B1516

104 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski

kindofthing,onethatisbasedoncollectionsofpureunitsThe motiveforpureunitsmayarisefromthedesireforageneralrep resentationofnumberapartfromanykindofthingcountedThe close connection of arithmos to particular collections of things andthenotionofnumberasacollectionofunitswereinfluential intothenineteenthcentury47

There are two ideas pertaining to numbers which are worth noticing here Firstly, the entire body of Greek mathematics is visual: both the geometrical figures and numbers are objects of grasping, which process is referred to with the verb noein Initially, noein meant to see (physical objects), but later its semantic field was enriched to include such operations as to imagine, to grasp or to think In a recent study, Reviel Netz scrutinizesthevarioususesofnoeinbyGreekmathematicians, pointingoutthepivotalroleofthisverbinthewritingsofEuclid, ArchimedesorPappus48Forexample,Euclid,whenpresenting a proof for a proposition, asks us to conceive of, imagine or construeapoint,oraline,oratriangle(inmanyofsuchcases the verb noein is utilized) Secondly, the concept of a number presupposesthenotionofaunitandthepossibilityofidentify ingsuchunitswithinamanifoldoneconceivesAristotlenotes, forexample,thatpluralityisasifitwereagenusofarithmos;for arithmosisapluralitymeasurablebytheoneAndinsomesense theoneandarithmosareopposed,notascontraries,but()as somerelativethingsare;fortheoneinsofarasitisameasureis opposedtoarithmosinsofarasarithmos ismeasurable49

47 DSutherland,ArithmeticfromKanttoFrege:Numbers,PureUnits,and theLimitsofConceptualRepresentation,Philosophy,83(2008),p139 48 R Netz, Imagination and Layered Ontology in Greek Mathematics, Configurations,17(2009),pp1950 49 Iota,(I)6,1057a26

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 105  Kant holds an analogous view, as evidenced in the fol lowingpassage:
() the pure schema of magnitude (quantitas), as a concept of the understanding, is number, a representation which summa rizesthesuccessiveadditionofonetoone(homogeneous)Thus number is nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the manifoldofahomogeneousintuitioningeneral,becauseIgen eratetimeitselfintheapprehensionoftheintuition50

Inorderforarithmetictowork,Kantpostulates,asinthecaseof geometry,theexistenceofrelevantschemataInparticular,the schemacorrespondingtotheconceptofanumberisthe schema of magnitudeTheschemaworksinsuchawaythat,givensome unit, it synthesizes, by successive addition of one to one, the partsofamanifold,whicharequalitativelyidentical,butnumer icallydifferentThus,itispossibletorepresentagivennumber (say,7)asamanifoldofsevendots,orstrokes,etcThiswouldbe impossible, however, if arithmetic operated merely at the level ofconcepts,becauseaccordingtomereconceptsoftheunder standing,itisacontradictiontothinkoftwothingsoutsideof each other that are nevertheless fully identical in respect of all theirinnerdeterminations(ofqualityandquantity);itisalways oneandthesamethingthoughttwice(numericallyone)51  Italsofollowsthatfortheschemaofmagnitudetowork, onerequiresboth theintuitionsofspaceandtimeKantnotes:
Time, as you correctly notice, has no influence on the proper ties of numbers (as pure determinations of magnitude) () The science of numbers, notwithstanding the succession that every constructofmagnituderequires,isapurelyintellectualsynthesis, whichwerepresenttoourselvesinthoughtButinsofarasspecific
50 A1423/B182 51 Kants gesammelte Schriften..., op. cit.,20,280;quotedafterKFJrgensen, Kants Schematism..., op. cit.

106 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski

magnitudes(quanta)aretobedeterminedinaccordancewiththis science;andthisgraspingmustbesubjectedtotheconditionof time52

FregeaccusedKantofformulatingatheoryofarithmeticthatis incapableofaccountingforourabilitytouselargenumbers,as itisimpossibleforsuchanumberas170,034tobegiveninthe intuitionHowever,KantsviewistheexactoppositionofFreges Henotes:

The arithmetical proposition is therefore always synthetic; one becomesallthemoredistinctlyawareofthatifonetakessome what larger numbers, for it is then clear that, twist and turn our conceptsaswewill,withoutgettinghelpfromintuitionwecould never find the sum by means of the mere analysis of our con cepts53

Theinterpretationofthissurprisingclaimthatwewouldliketo offeristhefollowingOntheonehand,Kantrepeatedlystresses thatitisimpossibletoconceiveofthemathematicalpracticeas based solely on concepts Mathematics must be synthetic On the other hand, one should notice that the essential feature of theschemaofthemagnitudeisthatitmayoperatewithdiffer ent unitsLetusconsiderthepassingoftime:wecanmeasure itbyseconds,minutes,hours,days,months,years,decades,etc Whileoperatingwiththeschemaofmagnitude,wemaychoose the appropriate unit, and in this way obtain some synthesis of the manifold of the passing time, which leads to the under standing of the given chronology of events In connection to this,Kantobserves:

52 Kants gesammelte Schriften..., op. cit.,10,55657,quotedafterKFJrgensen, Kants Schematism..., op. cit. 53 B16

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 107

Now pure synthesis, generally represented, yields the pure con cept of the understanding By this synthesis, however, I under stand that which rests on a ground of synthetic unity a priori; thusourcounting(asisespeciallynoticeableinthecaseoflarger numbers) is a synthesis in accordance with concepts, since it takesplaceinaccordancewithacommongroundofunity(eg, the decade) Under this concept, therefore, the synthesis of the manifoldbecomesnecessary54

Now, let us ask what happens when one intends to add two large numbers, say 170,034 to 140,032 It is impossible to rep resentthosenumbersinintuitionwhen1isourunitofchoice However, we may begin with a different unit, say 10000: this manoeuvre reduces the problem to adding 17 to 14, which, in turn, leads to the conclusion that the result of addition has 31 units (of 10000) Next, we may take advantage of the unit 1 (or 10),andfinallyarrivetotheconclusionthattheresultofadding 170034to140032is310066  LetusturnnowtoalgebraInourexpositionoftheKantian conception of algebraic practice we shall follow an interpreta tionofLisaShabel55Kantspeaksofalgebraintwopassagesof theCritique of Pure ReasonThefirstreads:
Butmathematicsdoesnotmerelyconstructmagnitudes(quanta), asingeometry,butalsomeremagnitude(quantitatem),asinalge bra,whereitentirelyabstractsfromtheconstitutionoftheobject thatistobethoughtinaccordancewithsuchaconceptofmagni tudeInthiscaseitchoosesacertainnotationforallconstruction ofmagnitudesingeneral(numbers),aswellasaddition,subtrac tion,extractionofroots,etcand,afterithasalsodesignatedthe general concept of quantities in accordance with their different relations, it then exhibits all the procedure through which mag
54 B104 55 LShabel,KantontheSymbolicConstructionofMathematicalConcepts, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science29(1998),pp589621

108 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski

nitudeisgeneratedandalteredinaccordancewithcertainrules in intuition; where one magnitude is to be divided by another, it places their symbols together in accordance with the form of notation for division, and thereby achieves by a symbolic con structionequallywellwhatgeometrydoesbyanostensiveorgeo metrical construction (of the objects themselves), which discur sivecognitioncouldneverachievebymeansofmereconcepts56

Andtheotheris:
Eventhewayalgebraistsproceedwiththeirequations,fromwhich bymeansofreductiontheybringforththetruthtogetherwiththe proof,isnotageometricalconstruction,butitisstillacharacter isticconstruction,inwhichonedisplaysbysignsinintuitionthe concepts,especiallyofrelationsofquantities,and,withouteven regardingtheheuristic,securesallinferencesagainstmistakesby placingeachofthembeforeoneseyes57

Theobviousproblemwiththisconceptionisthefollowing:Kant seemstoclaimthatinalgebraoneoperateswithsymbolic con structions,aswhenhesaysthatanalgebraistplacesthesymbols together in accordance with the form of notation for division, and thereby achieves by a symbolic construction equally well what geometry does by an ostensive or geometrical construc tion In other words, it seems that, in algebra, one constructs theequationa+b=cbyexhibitingthesymbolsa, +, b, =and c in intuition and by manipulating them gets a result Such a reading,favouredbyHintikkaandParsons,58istroublesomeIt isdifficulttounderstandhowsuchamanipulationofpuresym bols can yield any comprehensible result Moreover, this inter pretationmakestheentireKantianconceptionofmathematics incoherent:thereisnoclearconnectionbetweengeometryand
56 A717/B745 57 A734/B762 58 CftheirpapersinKants Philosophy of Mathematics. Modern Essays, op.cit.

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 109 arithmeticontheoneside,andalgebraontheother,apartfrom averygeneralsimilaritythatalltheirobjectsareconstructedin pureintuition  A somewhat different interpretation is proposed by Michael Friedmann, who claims that for Kant arithmetic cor responds to the theory of numerical magnitudes in Euclids Elements (booksVIIIX),andalgebratotheEuclideantheoryof ratioandproportion(BookV)Heclaimsfurtherthatthereisa close relationship between arithmetic and algebraic construc tions:
There are actually two distinguishable, although closely related, aspectstosymbolicconstructionOntheonehand,infindingthe magnitude of anything we will employ the successive progres sionunderlyingthenumberseries:eitherbygeneratingawhole numberorfractioninafinitenumberofstepsorbygenerating aninfiniteapproximationtoanirrationalnumberOntheother hand,however,successiveiterationisalsoemployedinthemere manipulationofsignsinalgebraicformulas:suchoperationofa calculusisalsoaniterative,stepbystepprocedure59

Thus,Friedmannassumesthatalgebraisacertaingeneralization ofarithmetic  Lisa Shabel firmly disagrees with the above presented interpretations She believes that they misidentify important presuppositionsofKantstheoryofalgebraFirstly,forKantalge braisnot generalizedarithmeticSecondly,Shabelcriticizesalso theclaimKantspeaksofsymbolicconstructionasanecessary elementofamathematicalprooforequationsolvingShesays:
This supposition implies that the arbitrary marks chosen to express a mathematical relationship algebraically in the form of anequationarenecessarilyinvolvedinthesolutionofthatequa
59 M Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,Mass1992,pp119120

110 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski

tion,justasthefiguresofthegeometerare,forKant,necessarily involvedinthedemonstrationofageometrictheoremMoreover, itimpliesthatthesinglesymbolchosentoconstructanalgebraic conceptinintuition,sayx,issomehowabletorevealmoreabout thatconceptthanthephilosophersdiscursiveandunconstructed concept, which Kant assures us is incapable of leading to syn theticmathematicaljudgements60

Shabel further claims that in order to provide a satisfactory interpretationofKantsconceptionofarithmetic,oneneedsto consider the mathematical practice of his time To do so, she reviews the mathematical textbooks of Christian Wolff, used by Kant when he taught mathematics in Koenigsberg It turns outthatWolffdoesnotconsideralgebraasascienceofitsown; rather,itisamethodusedboth inarithmeticandgeometryasan aidThisunderstandingofalgebrafollowstheCartesianideaof constructing equationsOnShabelsreconstruction,themethod worksasfollows: (1) One distinguishes the given or known magnitudes of the (geometrical or arithmetical) problem from those that are unknown by symbolizing the former by the first letters of thealphabet,andthelatterbythelast (2) Onefindsasmanyequationsasthereareunknownmagni tudessought;theequationsrelatetheknownandunknown magnitudesaccordingtothegivenconditionsoftheprob lem (3) The equations are transformed, or solved simultaneously, sothatallunknownmagnitudesareexpressedalgebraically intermsofknownmagnitudes (4) The final solution of a geometrical problem solved alge braically amounts to the geometrical construction of the
60 LShabel,KantontheSymbolicConstructionofMathematicalConcepts, op. cit.,p598

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 111 magnitude represented by the symbol for the unknown quantitysoughtforintheproblemThesameholds,mutatis mutandis,forarithmeticalproblems61 Now,thequestionishowthisallfitsintotheKantianframework ShabelstressesthatKantmakesadistinctionbetweenamagni tude(quantum)andameremagnitude(quantitas),asevidenced atthebeginningofthefragmentA717/B745quotedaboveThe difference betweenthemmaybeillustratedwith the following example:whenIconstructagiventriangleintheintuition,Icon structacertainquantum,egtheareaofthetriangleHowever, the area may also be represented as straight line segment: in this case we abstract from the constitution of the object and depictameremagnitudeNow,accordingtoShabel,theletters of algebra symbolize such straight line segments, which stand for mere magnitudes (quantitates) For instance, the algebraic expression ab symbolizes the construction of the quotient of themagnitudessymbolizedbyaandb;thatis,absymbolizes thegeometricalconstructionofthefourthproportionalxsuch that b:a::unit:x The algebraic expression is shorthand for the sometimestediousgeometricconstructionoftheobjectsthem selves,inthiscasethestraightlinesegmentsa,b,andx62  Onthisreading,thesymbolsa, b, x,orarenotobjects constructed in the intuition; rather, they are shorthands for a performableconstructionIfso,onemustaskwhyisKantsaying thatwhatalgebraistdoesisstillacharacteristicconstruction,in whichonedisplaysbysignsinintuitiontheconcepts,especially ofrelationsofquantities,and,withoutevenregardingtheheu ristic,securesallinferencesagainstmistakesbyplacingeachof thembeforeoneseyesShabel'sansweristhatincaseofalge braKantspeaksofadifferentkindof'construction':
61 Ibidem,p602603 62 Ibidem,p614

112 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski

The sort of construction that, for Kant, justifies a mathematical demonstrationanddistinguishesmathematicalfromphilosophi calreasoningispure,schematic,and ostensiveIntheparticular casethatalgebraisappliedtothesolutionofageometricorarith meticproblem,suchaconstructionmightbesymbolized forthe sakeof(algebraic)argument,ratherthanactuallycarriedoutThe possibilityofitsbeingcarriedout,bytheimaginationinaccord ancewitha priori conceptsandcertainrules,iswhatallowssuch asymbolicconstructiontostandinforitsostensivereferent,the objectitself63

Thus, Shabel claims that the pure symbolic representation of certain relations is not a construction sensu stricto However, eachandeverysuchsymbolicconstructionmayatwillbesub stitutedwithaproper(spatialorspatiotemporal)construction itsstandsfor 6. Corollaries: Infinity, Axiomatic Systems, Decidability  The above presentation of Kants philosophy of mathe maticsmakesitpossibletodrawthreephilosophicalcorollaries, concerninginfinity,axiomaticsystemsanddecidability  First, as regards the notion of infinity, Kant has several thingstosayFirst,hespeaksoftheinfinityofspaceandtime:
Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude Now one must,tobesure,thinkofeveryconceptasarepresentationthatis containedinaninfinitesetofdifferentpossiblerepresentations (astheircommonmark),whichthuscontainstheseunderitself; butnoconcept,assuch,canbethoughtasifitcontainedaninfi nitesetofrepresentationswithinitselfNeverthelessspaceisso thought(forallthepartsofspace,eventoinfinity,aresimultane

63 Ibidem,p616617

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 113

ous)Thereforetheoriginalrepresentationofspaceisana priori intuition,notaconcept64 The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limita tions of a single time grounding it The original representation time must therefore be given as unlimited But where the parts themselves and every magnitude of an object can be determi nately represented only through limitation, there the entire rep resentation cannot be given through concepts, for they con tain only partial representations, but immediate intuition must groundthem65

TheinterestingaspectofthefirstpassageisthatKantspeaksof spaceasaninfinitegiven magnitudeItseems,therefore,that hesuggeststhatspaceisanactual infinityInotherwords,one maydrawtheconclusionthatKantbelievesinthepossibilityof representing the actually infinite in ones intuition On closer reading,however,thisinterpretationmustberejectedObserve, firstly, that the quoted passages underline that any representa tion of space and time is a limitation of a larger space or time Thus, Kant is not describing here a visio infinitatis, or a direct perceptionoftheactualinfinityRather,hepointsoutthatany representation of space and time presupposes that there is a larger space or time Put differently: he speaks of a potential infinitySecondly,Kantstressesthatinfinitycannotbecompre hendedthroughconceptsalone,sincenoconcept,assuch,can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself and the entire representation cannot be given throughconcepts,fortheycontainonlypartialrepresentations, but immediate intuition must ground them Finally, one may ask,howtoexplainKantsreferencetospaceasinfinitegiven
64 B40 65 B48

114 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski magnitude The answer is fairly simple: the term magnitude Kantusesisnotquantum(someconcretemagnitude),butquan titas (mere magnitude) Therefore, he does not treat space and timeasconcreteobjectswhichareinfinite;rather,hespeaksofa certainaspectthereofInrelationtoconcretemagnitudesKants says:Amagnitudeisinfiniteifnonegreaterthanit(ie,greater than the multiple c of a given unit contained in it) is possible Nownomultiplicityisthegreatest,becauseoneormoreunits can always be added to it Therefore an infinite given magni tude()isimpossible66Atthesametimeheclaimsthatthetrue transcendentalconceptofinfinityis,thatthesuccessivesynthe sisofunitsinmeasuringaquantum,canneverbecompleted67 This may be interpreted as positing that a quantitas of a quan tumisinfiniteiftheschemaofmagnitudefailstodeterminethe quantum On this reading, space and time are infinite for one cannevermeasurethemwiththeuseoftheschemaofmagni tudeItdoesnotmean,however,thatspaceortimeareinfinites in actu:weneverrepresenttheminintuitionasactuallyinfinite Spaceandtimeareonlypotentiallyinfinite,andonemayforma conceptofpotentialinfinityonlybecausetheschemaofmagni tudefailstomeasurespace(ortime)  Our second philosophical corollary concerns Kants understandingofaxiomsandtheroleofaxiomaticsystemsvis a vishisconceptionofmathematicsAswehavealreadyobserved, Kant claims that there are axioms in mathematics, understood asselfevidentstatementsbasedonthepureintuitionofspace The interesting question reads, what is the role of the Kantian axioms?First,itisimportanttonotice,thatKantproclaimsthe existenceofaxiomsingeometry,butrejectsarithmeticalaxioms Axioms,accordingtohim,mustbebothsyntheticandgeneral
66 A430/B458 67 A432/B460

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 115 Inarithmetic,however,thegeneralclaimsareanalytic:forthat equals added to or subtracted from equals give an equal are analyticpropositions,sinceIamimmediatelyconsciousofthe identity of one generation of a magnitude with the other; but axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions68 The syn theticpropositionsofarithmetic,ontheotherhand,arenotgen eral:
7 + 5 = 12 is not an analytic proposition For I do not think the number12eitherintherepresentationof7norinthatof5norin therepresentationofthecombinationofthetwo()Althoughit issynthetic,however,itisstillonlyasingularpropositionInsofar asitisonlythesynthesisofthatwhichishomogeneous(ofunits) that is at issue here, the synthesis here can take place only in a singleway,eventhoughthesubsequentuseofthesenumbersis generalIfIsay:Withthreelines,twoofwhichtakentogetherare greaterthanthethird,atrianglecanbedrawn,thenIhavehere themerefunctionoftheproductiveimagination,whichdrawsthe linesgreaterorsmaller,thusallowingthemtoabutatanyarbitrary angleThenumber7,onthecontrary,ispossibleinonlyasingle way,andlikewisethenumberI2,whichisgeneratedthroughthe synthesisoftheformerwith5Suchpropositionsmusttherefore notbecalledaxioms(forotherwisetherewouldbeinfinitelymany ofthem)butrathernumericalformulas69

Thus,Kantbelievesaxiomsarecharacteristicofgeometryonly  Moreover, the role of axioms as elements of deductive systems is entirely alien to Kants conception of mathematics Forhim,aproofisalwaysaconstruction,notatransformation offormulaeaccordingtosomelogicalrulesofinference70Apart fromembracingtheEuclideanparadigmofmathematics,there isadeeperreasonforthisAsMichaelFriedmannobserves,the
68 A164/B205 69 A164/B205 70 CfB763

116 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski AristotelianlogicKantutilizesismonadic;assuch,itisnotsuf ficienttorepresentinfinitemathematicalstructuresSuchinfi nite structures, in modern logic, are represented by the use of nestedsequencesofuniversalandexistentialquantifiersusing polyadiclogicThesesamerepresentations,fromKantspointof view, are instead made possible by the iterative application of constructivefunctionsintheproductiveimagination71  Tosumup:inKantsviewthereexistaxiomsofgeometry, but not of arithmetic They are synthetic a priori propositions, whicharegeneral,ietheypertaintoaclassofrepresentations, andnotasingularrepresentationHowever,theroleofaxioms isseverelylimitedTobesure,thereareinferences inmathemat ics,notonlyconstructionsButinconnectiontothisKantcom ments:
Forasitwasfoundthatallmathematicalinferences(Schlsse)pro ceedinaccordancewiththeprincipleofcontradiction(),itwas supposed that the fundamental propositions of the science can themselvesbeknowntobetruethroughthatprincipleThisisan erroneousviewForthoughasyntheticpropositioncanindeedbe discernedinaccordancewiththeprincipleofcontradiction,this canonlybeifanothersyntheticpropositionispresupposed,and ifitcanthenbeapprehendedasfollowingfromthisotherpropo sition;itcanneverbesodiscernedinandbyitself72

Thus, on Kants view, mathematical reasoning, even if some times proceeds by inferences based in the principle of contra diction, is always ultimately based on synthetic propositions (notnecessarilyaxioms!),which,inturn,arejustifiedbyacon structioninpureintuition

71 MFriedmann,KantonGeometryandSpatialIntuition,manuscriptavail ableonline,p7 72 B14

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 117  Finally, let us tackle the problem of decidability In an oftenquotedpassageKantsays:
It is not as extraordinary as it initially seems that a science can demandandexpectclearandcertainsolutionstoallthequestions belonging within it (quaestiones domesticae), even if up to this time they still have not been found Besides transcendental phi losophy,therearetwopuresciencesofreason,onewithmerely speculative, the other with practical content: pure mathematics andpuremorals73

The justification for the decidability of all mathematics flows from the assumptions of Kants conception Out of their very nature, mathematical object are schematisable and thus con structible within the finite amount of time Therefore, it is in principle possible to completely determine every mathemati calobjectand,whatfollows,todeterminethetruthvalueofany mathematicalproposition  ThereisoneproblemwiththisconclusionAccordingto somecommentators,Kantdistinguishesbetweentheconstruc tionofamathematicalobjectandthepostulateofitsexistence74 On this reading, one may postulate the existence of anything thatislogicallyconsistent,butmayconstructonlywhatiscon structibleinthepureintuitionsofspaceandtimeItfollows,inter alia,thatcontrarytotheclaimsofBertrandRussellandothers Kantsphilosophyofmathematicsisnotincompatiblewiththe developmentofnonEuclideangeometries:theymaybetreated aspostulated,buttheycannotbesubjecttoconstructionItfol lowsalsothatonecandistinguishbetweentwokindsofmath ematics: the constructible and fully decidable, and the merely postulated, unconstructible and undecidable This interpreta
73 A480,B508 74 CfRMurawski,Filozofia matematyki. Zarys dziejw,2ndedition,Wydawni ctwoNaukowePWN,Warszawa2001,p54

118 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski tionisdefensible,butwithtwoprovisaFirst,italterstheKantian understandingofmathematicsasthescienceestablishingsyn thetic propositions Second, it cannot be expressed in the con ceptual scheme available to Kant One may say that Euclidean geometry, as well as a bunch of nonEuclidean geometries, are sets of propositions depicting possible structures of space, and it is the Euclidean conception that is picked out by pure intuitionHowever,Kanthasnonotionofpossibilityonwhich bothEuclideanandnonEuclideangeometriesarepossible() Kantsconceptionoflogicisnotthatofmodernquantification theory, and he can have no notion like our of all logically pos siblestructures75 7. The mathematical subject extracted  TheabovesketchedKantianphilosophyofmathematics mayserveasthebasisfordescribinghisconceptionofthemath ematical subject, ie a subject that is capable of doing math ematics: proving theorems, carrying out calculations, solving equations, etc More exactly, the following description aims at identifyingtheminimalrequirementsthatsuchasubjectmust meet OurdescriptionoftheKantianmathematicalsubjectcon sistsofthefollowingtheses: (KS_1) The mathematical subject is transcendental. As we have observed above, the term transcendental refers to thenecessaryconditionsofeverypossiblecognitionMoreover, Kant points out that the inner and sensible intuition of our mind()isnottherealselfasitexistsinitself,orthetranscen dental subject, but only an appearance of this to us unknown
75 M Friedmann, Kants Theory of Geometry, [in:] Kants Philosophy of Mathematics. Modern Essays, op. cit,p206,207

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 119 being,whichwasgiventosensibilityTheexistenceofthisinner appearance,asathingthusexistinginitself,cannotbeadmitted, becauseitsconditionistime,whichcannotbeadetermination ofanythinginitself76Toputitdifferently,thetranscendental egocannotbegivenasanobjectofcognitionThisopensupthe waytovariousinterpretationsofthisnotionThethinnestread ing,ratherunKantian,identifiesthetranscendentalsubjectwith the set of propositions describing the necessary requirements foranyactofcognitiontoemergeOnthisminimalinterpreta tionKantsmathematicalsubjectisnosubjectatall:speakingof thetranscendentalegoisonlyafacon de parler,disguisingthe realgoalofKantsprojectAmoresubstantialreadingistotreat thetranscendentalsubjectasafiction:itbringstogetherallthe cognitivecapabilitiesofthepossibleempiricalsubjectsInother words, the transcendental ego does not exist, but is a theoreti cal construction of a subject that is capable of perceiving eve rythingthatany empiricalsubjectcanperceiveFinally,onthe strongest interpretation the transcendental subject does exist inthesphereofnoumena,andtheparticularactsofcognition aremanifestationsofitsactivityThetextualevidenceprovides afoundationforboththesecondandthirdinterpretationsKant explicitlyclaimsthattheexistenceofthetranscendentalsubject cannotbeadmittedatthelevelofthetheoretical(pure)reason However, he also claims that this existence can be postulated within the practical reason Irrespective of which of the inter pretationwechoose(thesecondorthethird),theimportantfact tounderlineisthatthetranscendentalsubjectiscapableofevery possiblemathematicalcognitionitstandsvis a vistheentire bodyofthepossiblemathematicalknowledgeInthis,itdiffers fromanyconcrete,empiricalsubject,whicheg,duetotime limitationscannothavecompletemathematicalknowledge
76 A492

120 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski (KS_2) The structure of the mathematical subject includes pure intuitions of space and time. Kants philosophy of mathematics follows the Euclidean para digm, in which the whole of mathematics is ultimately based on spatial relationships In order to secure the aprioricity and syntheticity of the mathematical propositions, Kant posits that nonempirical space and time are elements of the structure of the transcendental ego He claims, further, that geometry is groundedontheintuitionofspace,whilearithmeticisfounded on both space and time Thus, one may say that the proposi tions of mathematics are descriptions of the spatiotemporal structureofthetranscendentalsubjectInthisway,Kantrejects three claims: that mathematics is ultimately based on our sen sualexperience;thatitisfullyanalytic(ordevoidofmeaning); andthatitgraspssomekindofplatonicentities (KS_3) The mathematical subject is capable of perceiving mathematical objects in the pure intuitions of space and time. Thenotionofperceivingweuseheremaywellbesubstituted withseeingorimaginingThus,wewouldliketomakeabold claimthataccordingtoKantthecognitionofthemathematical objectsinpureintuitionisnotdiscursiveordialecticalRather, itresemblesseeingInthis,Kantfollowsalongtraditionwhich beginswiththeutilizationoftheGreekwordnoeintorefertothe process of mathematical cognition In consequence, the per ceived mathematical objects are always concrete and singular Oneneverseesatriangleingeneral,butalwaysaconcretetri angle;oneneverperceivesnumberornumberseveningeneral, butalwayssevenobjects,identifiedwiththeuseoftheschemaof magnitude(withtheassumptionofanarbitraryunit)Moreover, itfollowsthatmathematicalcognitionisalwayssubstantive:one nevercontemplatessignsorsymbolsdevoidofmeaningAtthe

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 121 fundamental level mathematical practice has meaning  it is notafreeplayofsymbols (KS_4) The mathematical subject constructs mathematical objects in pure intuition with the use of a priori rules or procedures, which are called schemata. This is the key element of Kants conception of mathemat ics The transcendental subject not only perceives mathemati cal objects, but actively constructs them This construction is ruleguided: in order to construct a triangle one follows a set of instructions which prescribe drawing a figure consisting of three lines in which any two lines taken together are greater than the third Such an instruction, or schema in Kants terms, servesanimportantfunctionItisgeneral(itdoesnotexhibitthe featuresofaconcreteobject),yetitsutilizationleadstoasingular constructionInthisway,aschemaisanintermediatebetween concrete representations in the intuition and generally appli cable concepts Schemata are not only general, they are also a priori:theyarefunctionsofpurereasonItisnoteworthythatthe conception of schemata exhibits the practical aspect of Kants philosophyofmathematicsMathematics,inasense,isaresult ofacertainpractice:thepracticeofconstructingobjectsinpure intuitionaccordingtotherulesoftheappropriateschemata (KS_5) The mathematical subject is capable of forming universal concepts, which correspond to a multitude of concrete objects. For Kant, knowledge is conceptual Thus, mathematical knowl edgemustbeexpressibleinconceptsTheproblemisthatcon ceptsareuniversal,ietheycorrespondtomanyobjectssimul taneously, while at the fundamental level one perceives con crete,singularmathematicalobjectsThepossibilityofforming universalconceptsonthegroundsofsingularrepresentationsis

122 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski conditionedontheexistenceofschemataToputitdifferently: toeveryconcept(say,ofatriangle)thereisconnectedaschema or a set of instructions that enables one to construct a particu lar instantiation of the given concept As the schemata do not determinefullythefeaturesoftheconcreteobject,theyencode theinformationastowhatisconceptuallyessentialinasingular intuitiveconstruction (KS_6) The mathematical subject can link together concepts to form propositions in the general form S is P. For Kant, who in logic follows in the footsteps of Aristotle, the most general form of a proposition is S is P Thus, in order to form a proposition one needs to link together two concepts, denotedbythepredicatelettersS andPToframesuchalinking, oneneedstoconstructvia theappropriateschemataboth concepts in the intuition and see whether they are related in thewayrepresentedbytheS is Pproposition (KS_7) The mathematical subject is capable of making logical inferences. Naturally, once propositions are formed, the transcendental subject may use them in logical inferences However, the role of logical operations in Kants philosophy of mathematics is significantlylimited,especiallywhencomparedtomorerecent conceptionsFirstly,thelogicKantusesisveryweakitis,in essence,thesyllogisticlogicofAristotleWhatfollows,andsec ondly,mathematiciansmakelogicalinferences,butitisnotthe basicmodeofmathematicalreasoningSuchaprimarymodeis constructioninintuition(wherenologicisused),whilelogical inferences,whosepremisesarealwaysbasedonsomeintuitive constructions,playonlyasecondaryorsubsidiaryroleIncon sequence,axiomsareoflittlesignificanceinKantsphilosophy

The Mathematics of the Transcendental Ego | 123 ofmathematicsInparticular,theideaofanaxiomaticsystemis alientothespiritoftheCritique of Pure Reason (KS_8) The mathematical subject can decide any mathematical problem. Giventhestructureofthetranscendentalego,andinparticular the fundamental role of pure constructions in solving mathe maticalproblems,therearenoundecidablequestionsinmath ematicsTheKantianmathematicalsubjectis,inprinciple,capa bleofdeterminingthetruthvalueofanymathematicalproposi tionOneneedstobearinmind,however,thatthisistrueofthe transcendentalsubject,notanempiricalone (KS_9) The mathematical subject is capable of denoting mathematical constructions with symbols. On Kants conception of algebra, one may denote any mathe maticalobject(construction)withasymbolItmustbestressed, however,thattherearenosymbolicconstructionssensu stricto The algebraists manipulation of symbolic formulae does not resembleaconstructionofamathematicalobjectinpureintui tion Rather, symbols are shorthands for full mathematical constructionsTheymayfacilitatethemathematicalargument; however,behindanysymbolicexpressiontherealwaysstandsa fullblooded,executablemathematicalconstruction (KS_10) The mathematical subject is capable of forming the notion of the potential infinity, but not of the actual infinity. AccordingtoKant,onecannotspeakofactualinfinity,asitisnot possibletoconstructaninfiniteobjectintheintuitionHowever, itispossibletoformthenotionofpotentialinfinityInthiscase, we are referring not to some particular possible construction, butrathertothefailureoftheschemaofmagnitudetomeasure thequantitas ofspaceandtimeThus,Kanttreatspotentialinfin ityasinfinity,asitmaybeunderstoodastheimpossibilityof

124 | Bartosz Broek and Adam Olszewski ascribingsomefinitenumberofunitstothepureintuitionsof spaceandtime

The Nicolaus Copernicus Grave Mystery conference, Krakw 2223 February2010Photo:AdamWalanus

Michael Heller delivers a lecture within the Science and the Big Questionsseries,Krakw,10March2010Photo:AdamWalanus

The Road to Reality with Roger Penrose, 14th Krakw Methodological Conference,Krakw,2021May2010Photo:AdamWalanus

Sir Roger Penrose delivers 2010 Copernicus Center Lecture, Aeons Before the Big BangPhoto:AdamWalanus

The 2010 Copernicus Center Lecture, Krakw, 20 May 2010 Photo: AdamWalanus

TheNicolaus Copernicus Grave Mysteryconferenceposter

The2010CopernicusCenterLectureposter