ARANETA v.

DINGLASAN 1st Emergency Power Cases Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of CA No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all E0s passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased. ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased. HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal. Rodriguez vs Gella 2nd Emergency Powers Cases Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate EO. 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were pursuant to CA 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed HB 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid. HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law." Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest. People vs. Vera [GR 45685, 16 November 1937] First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result Facts: The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al." (Criminal case 42649) of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of the Suprme Court. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in the said criminal case was filed with the CFI on 15 October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on

certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his

motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937. Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case. Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA 166 SCRA 533

POEA: Cases under the Jurisdiction of POEA

Facts:

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund.

The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.

The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.

Issue:

Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction

Held:

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen."

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.

But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices." US vs Ang Tang Ho Delegation of Power Admin Bodies

On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. Ynot vs IAC - A case Digest Station Commander, Integrated National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo & the Regional Director, Bureau of Animal Industry, Region IV- respondents Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ISSUE: Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not. FACTS: Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. Petitioner raised the issue of EOs constituitonality and filed case in the lower court. However, the court sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions: 1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright

2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent and impartial court.

3. Measure should have not been presumed

4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President.

HELD:

Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications:

1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as theres no exigency showing to justify the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President 2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destrcution 3. Case involved roving commission and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of police power 4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and was immedeiately condemned and punish Tablarin v Gutierrez Ponente : Feliciano Nature : Petition for review on certiorari Petitioners

: Teresita Tablarin, et al, on their behalf and in behalf of applicants foradmission into Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-1988 and future yearswho have not yet taken or successfully hurdled the NMAT Respondents : Hon. Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez (RTC Branch XXXVII, Manila), Sec.Lourdes Quisumbing, in her capacity as Chair of the Board of Medical Education andthe Center for Educational Measurement (CEM)FACTS- 1959: RA 2382, or the Medical Act of 1959 was enacted. This was later amendedby RAs 4224 and 5946.~ Sec. 1 Objectives This Act provides for and shall govern (a) thestandardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination forregistration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of thepractice of medicine in the Philippines.~ RA 2382, as amended by RA 5946, created a Board of Medical Education,comprising of:1. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or duly authorizedrepresentative Chairman2. Secretary of Health or duly authorized representative3. Director of Higher Education or duly authorized representative4. Chairman of Medical Board or duly authorized representative5. A representative of the Philippine Medical Association6. The Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines7. A representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools8. A representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges~ Functions of the board are in Section 5 (as emphasized in the case):(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognizedcollege of medicinexxx(f) To accept applicants for certification for admission to a medical school andkeep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicantsthe amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Educationxxx(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules andregulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions.~ Section 7 prescribes minimum requirements for applicants to medicalschools:- not convicted of any crime of moral turpitude, and submits the following 1. Record of completion of BA/BS degree2. Certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from BME

3. Certificate of good moral character, by 2 former professors4. Birth certificate1985: Minister of Education, Culture and Sports issues MECS Order No. 52,establishing the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a standardized test foradmission into medical schools. No applicant would be issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA) without having taken and passed the NMAT.- March 5, 1987: Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory judgment and prohibitionwith a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, to stopthe enforcement of MECS Order No. 52 requiring the NMAT for admission intomedical

colleges- April 20, 1987: Judge Gutierrez dismissed the petition, and the NMAT wasconducted as scheduled on April 27, 1987- Petitioners elevated the issue to the SC, raised the issue of whether or not apreliminary injunction may be issued to stop the conduction of the NMAT pendingthe case. SC said that the case of unconstitutionality must be strong enough for thecourt to issue such an injunction.ISSUES1. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together with MECS Order No. 52, unconstitutional?2. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together with MECS Order No. 52, and undue delegation of legislative power?3. Is the NMAT an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable admission requirement?4. Is the MECS Order No. 52 a violation of equal protection?RATIO 1: To prove the unconstitutionality of an order or statute, a petitioner must demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the assailed order or statute collideswith the Constitutional provisions. - Petitioner invokes Sec. 11, 13, and 17 of Art II (State Policies) and Sec. 3 and 5 (3)of Art XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports), but theCourt held that the petitioners did not present even a prima facie case for Sec. 11,13 and 17.- The Court also held that Sec. 3 and Sec. 5 (3) of Art. XIV, in the context of professional education, should be to say that the State should take appropriatesteps to make quality education accessible to all who qualify under fair, reasonableand equitable admission and academic requirements.RATIO 2: The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power must beapplied with circumspection in respect of statutes that deal with subjects that arecomplex and technical. - Citing the decision in Pangasinan Transport Co., Inc. v. The Public ServiceCommission penned by Justice Laurel, the Court held that there was a constantlygrowing tendency towards the delegation of legislative power due to the growing

complexities of modern society, and that there was an accompanying trend of acceptance by the courts.- Citing Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta, the Court also held that the standards setfor subordinate legislation may be explicit or implied. In the case of an impliedstandard, it can be deduced from the policy and purpose of the act considered as awhole. In the case of the Medical Act, the standards are set by the Acts objectives,considering Sec. 5 (a) and Sec. 7 of the same Act, and taking into consideration thebody of the Act itself.RATIO 3a: The Supreme Court cannot rule on the desirability or wisdom of a piece of legislation or administrative regulation.

- The Court held that they cannot rule on the petitioners argument that the NMAT isan unnecessary requirement for admission into medical schools on top of all of theother existing requirements. This is a question of the wisdom of having the NMAT assuch an additional requirement, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Court todecide.RATIO 3b: The valid exercise of police power shall include the regulation of accessto medical schools. - The Court held that the important State interest in limiting access to medicalschools is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in medical practitioners. The NMAT, as an additionalrequirement for admission, is a tool to help upgrade the selection process of thoseseeking to enter medical schools.RATIO 4: Administrative measures may remain flexible to meet circumstances asthey change. - The Court held that the portion of the MECS order allowing the Board of MedicalEducation to determine the NMAT cutoff score every year is not a violation of equalprotection. Far from being arbitrary and capricious, different cutoff scores fordifferent school years may be dictated by the changing circumstances andconditions surrounding the medical industry. Thus, the clause allows the Board of Medical Education some flexibility needed to meet such changing circumstances. Pelaez vs Auditor General Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test

From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the

"recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.

HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative. Tobias v. Abalos G.R.No. L-114785 PONENTE: BIDIN, J. FACTS: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite 08 December 1994

was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no. ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1) HELD/RULING: For the purposes of discussion, lets breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution. Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the one-title-one-subject rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec). Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional. Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section. The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Mariano v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 118627 07 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS: Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen. ISSUES: 1. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions 2. Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution 3. Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law HELD/RULING: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself. Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.

2.

Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. 3. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 119976, Sept. 18, 1995

 DOMICILE: a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent RESIDENCE: implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. RESIDENCE FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. ELEMENTS OF CHANGE OF DOMICILE: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, providing information that she is a resident of seven months in the constituency where she seeks to be elected immediately preceding the election. Subsequently, private respondent Montejo filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency (must have been a resident for not less than one year). Petitioner thus amended her COC, changing seven months to since childhood. This amendment was refused admittance for reason that it was filed out of time, so Petitioner filed her amended COC with COMELEC in division.

The COMELEC in division found the petition for disqualification meritorious and struck off the amended as well as original COCs. In ruling thus, COMELEC in division found that when petitioner chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections

HELD:

Meaning of Residence

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:

Residence vs. Domicile

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a

fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs. Teves reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

Did Petitioner satisfy the residency requirement?

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes

material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided.

Did Petitioner abandon her domicile of origin (Tacloban, Leyte)?

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places"

flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).

How Domicile is Lost/Acquired

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKASNUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for

congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

Held: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile.

Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.