Why President Obama Lost the Goodwill of Palestinians, Egyptians, Moroccans, and Others

By Abdelmajid Hajji

There are multiple reasons which explain Barrack Obamas continuing fall from the graces of the peoples of the middle-East (and not just the Arabs). While, some of these relate to Americas general standing in the world as a supreme global power since at least the Second World War --translating as far as the Middle East is concerned into sustained interest in the regions oil fields and an ideological stance to nurture and protect the state of Israel-others, the most direct and critical, are very much specific to President Obamas persona and performance. Recent polls, for example the Arab American Institutes Arab Attiutde-2011 (http://www.aaiusa.org/pages/opinion-polls/), corroborate what nearly all now hold as fact: Obamas severely whittled fortunes at home are more than matched in the MENA region, albeit for different considerations some of which interestingly feed on each other. Ever since his investiture, and especially after the Cairo speech to the Arab and Islamic worlds on 4 June, 2009, in which he pledged a new beginning for the hitherto turbulent relations between the West and the Islamic East, Obama ascended to a level of acceptance in the region bordering on adoption. Alas, the adulation was short-lived: hardly a year had passed before doubt about his ability and sincerity began to reverberate in the region, eventually turning to disappointment before settling into outright rejection. The much heralded Cairo moment is now under the threat of being completely wiped off by an equally emblematic episode: Obamas hovering menace to veto Palestinian statehood.

The downward spiraling of Obamas reputation in the region may be elucidated by three situations and the manner in which he handled them, or rather, he was manhandled by them. There was first Obamas unfortunate foray into resolving the Palestinian question, epitomized by his address on 19 May, 2011 where he asked Israel to go back to negotiate with the Palestinians on the basis of the pre-1967 borders, along with the rebuff of Benjamin Netanyahu in a reaction speech a few days later. Then, there was Obamas muddy stance towards the Arab uprisings, as exemplified by the clumsy statements he issued during the Egyptian revolt, not to mention his no-show with regard to the Tunisian revolution. The third reason is none other than Obamas successive failures to deal with the economic situation in his country, with direct and depressing consequences for a region very much within the loop of international and US commerce. As many in North Africa and the Middle-East regard the financial woes of Europe as a byproduct of the US economic quandary, Americas responsibility for preventing a probable melt-down of European markets, and by ricochet Arab ones, is insistently invoked. Obama is arguably one of the least lucky American presidents; having had to assume ownership, by dint of his office, of a deep and brooding economic downturn. Yet, the mishaps enumerated above were all his doing. Ultimately they became his undoing; not so much because of their intrinsic complexity, but because Obama, while mindful of the full range of implications of these circumstances, stood uncharacteristically still while they ravaged his legacy. Predictably, the star system in which he was initially thrust by the people of the Arab region turned a year or so after into a drama of unfulfilled promises and sliding fortunes.

Grand Speeches are Less Suited for Untried Ideas As in an ancient play, there was spectacular unity of time in the dramatic sparring between Obama and Netanyahu over the subject of borders between Israel and the future Palestinian state. The borders, Obama stressed, ought to be "based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps. The serious tone and the clear injunction were hitherto unmatched; certainly no previous American president had ventured as far. Was Obama playing to the Muslim gallery he courted in Cairo and Istanbul? Or, was he simply airing in public a truism known to every negotiator involved in the peace process, including the members of the Quartet? In any case, the reactions to the speech were swift, and to Obamas reputation, corrosive. First, there were murmurs of approval from Arabs and Palestinians, in reality more over the form than substance. But these were rendered irrelevant by the roaring, cavernous voice of Israels enfant terrible, Benjamin Netanyahu; who deemed the pre-1967 borders indefensible and the entire speech a betrayal. He had made it undiplomatically clear to Secretary Clinton a few hours before the Presidents speech that he expected her administration to not go beyond a reaffirmation of the 1984 Bush/US commitment to Israel (which absolves Israel of the need to roll back to the pre-1967, in light of new realities on the ground.). Netanyahu was irate and visibly wounded; and wanted the whole world to take stock of the situation. Still in revenge mood three days later (May 24, 2011), Netanyahu addressed a joint session of US Congress. In a carefully crafted speech he pertly allowed it to be known that he neither needs nor trusts the American administration (for him, a very different entity from the American people). His anger towards Obama could not be contained. Congratulating America on the demise of Ossama Bin Laden, Netanyahu theatrically changed his tone, and as though he just remembered that Obama was still the president of the land, sang in a rare mixture of

grudge and condescension: Congratulations, Mr. President: You got Bin Laden. It was like a guest sitting around a well-provided dinner table, and as he proceeded to compliment his host he singled out for praise bottled mineral water. Obama, it was implied, should forever be grateful for his only victory up to then; a victory very much courtesy of the daring Seals and, anyway, in the works from well before Obama inherited the title of Commander in Chief. The sight and sound of sustained applause from a powerful but deferent audience cast a mantle of humiliation on Obama, more so as the politics in America at the time clearly pointed out to the fact that much of the clapping had little to do with the music there. Never before did Obama look the part of a One-Time President that so many of his opponents on the right were determined that he should become. This was not the first slap to his foreign policy; a major blow had previously been dealt by the same Netanyahu when he rejected Obamas call for a freeze on the settlements, universally regarded as a key obstacle that must be neutralized if the peace process is to move forward. Netanyahus speech of the century was gauged prophetically by many critics in Israel as well as in the Palestinian territories as an escalation that would force the Palestinians to search for novel ways to break the stalemate, specifically seeking the recognition of Palestine as a full state from the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 2011. It did not help Obama, in the eyes of Netanyahu and his supporters, that he reaffirmed in his address his and the USs unshakeable support for the state of Israel, going as far as reassuring the Israelis that the Palestinian state he is calling would have to be not imposed on Israel and certainly non-militarized. The incessant reiteration of support did nothing to dislodge Obamas reputation as an enemy of the state of Israel (how much of it is the result of run of the mill differences and how much is determined by the religion of the Presidents father is best left to individual judgment). On the other hand, if Obamas show of solidarity with the Jewish state was by way of sugaring the pill and wheedling the Israelis into a

generous mood that will lead them to hand over as much territory to the Palestinians as possible, then certainly no Arab was won by the act. Al-Jazeera, without a reference to any context, had since had a field day of this debacle. For some time now, this widely watched channel has been playing over and over again video gap fillers between its programs showing Obama reaffirming, in an august mood, the unshakeable commitment of the US to the state of Israel. If this was not enough to alienate the most ardent Arab supporter, this statement always comes bundled with another risqu video statement, taken from an address by Obama to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The statement, augmented by subtitles in Arabic, slams the Fatah-Hamas agreement in the works, destined to put Palestinian internal differences behind and end a damaging split, as a development that poses an enormous obstacle to peace. The two video statements, reinforcing widespread belief in the American unconditional support of the state of Israel, no doubt ended up estranging untold numbers of Arabs, whose quasi-tribal culture places a very high premium on peace among brothers. A great leader and a greater speaker, Obama still could not fathom the true impact of his statements on a people so receptive to the magic of words. Werent they instantly conquered by his recitation of the communal greeting, assalamo-Alaikom in that packed university auditorium in Cairo? Thousand of Arab supporters of Obama were embarrassed by Obamas humiliation on the hand of Netanyahu, the portion of his speech proclaiming unshakeable support to the State of Israel, and by the standing ovation of the members of the Congress to the Israeli speaker, which was decoded as an ominous sign of more negativity from the US Congress to Arab issues in the future. Weak at home and at variance with the promises he made to the whole world from the pulpits of Cairo, Istanbul, and the Nobel Prize Committee in Stockholm, Obama did the only thing available to him: i.e.; threaten to veto the proposition for a Palestinian State. If used, the announced veto should spell further disaster for Obamas image

in the region and certainly for Americas prestige in the world, as most countries had already announced their support for Palestinian statehood. Obamas supporters find it difficult to accept that the veto would be in total contradiction to what Obama has always believed in and clearly stated; namely, a Palestinian state is not only inevitable but it is the implementation of long overdue justice.

The Arab Spring Exposes Obamas Allergies The Obama address that angered Netanyahu and further shackled the Palestinian was interestingly crafted for another purpose: to salute Arab expressions of self determination and mark the recent overthrow of some of the regions most asphyxiating dictators. As it did with its portion on the Palestinian issue, the speech annoyed; this time not because it touched nerves, but because it was annoyingly empty. It is widely known that the peoples of the Middle East and North-Africa took to their televisions and computers on December 2010 and they are still transfixed by them. As they followed in the early weeks the drama of the ebb and flow of emotions in the streets, they were also hoping to witness something else: the unequivocal support of leader of the world to their rightful pursuits. In a world saturated and shrunk by new and traditional media, Arab youth in the streets distinguished between those who voiced support for their cause and those who placed a bet against them; those who waltzed around as they issued vague statements and those who prevaricated. Obama and his administration seemed unable or unwilling to utter the right words with regard the Egyptian revolution. To make matters worse, the time difference between Washington and Cairo rendered the vague and guarded words of Obama from the previous night so woefully inadequate the following morning as protesters in Bahrain or Tahrir Square gasped for support.

But it was more an issue of policy than time zones. Less than ten days before the ouster of Mubarak, while many in the American administration were convinced that Mubaraks days were numbered (because it was what the streets wanted), Obama was still gently asking Mubarak to honor his promises of "better democracy" and "greater economic opportunity" for his people. Likewise, about the same time, Secretary Hilary Clinton affirmed through CNN that the Egyptian people may want to use the upcoming elections in Egypt to dispose of Mubarak if that was what they desired; as though she did not know how elections have always been conducted in single-party Egypt. When a few days later Obama and his aides moved to using the oft-repeated statement about of the need for a peaceful transition in Egypt; it not only rang anachronistic, given the recent Tunisian closure and the demise of Ben Alis regime; but, for many in Tahrir Square, the gist of the statement was tantamount to interference with their movement. The breakdown of Americas stance vis--vis the Arab uprisings discloses a geopolitical reading of the region not devoid of contradictions. The United States was almost certainly surprised by the quick denouement of events in Tunisia, as indeed was this countrys former colonial master, France. When the events there became compelling enough for the US to take a stand, the US administration resorted to the technique of downgrading Tunisias geopolitical stature as a pretext for not being overly concerned with the events in Tunisia, even if that meant sacrificing their ally, President Ben Ali (the technique was in the end fairly expedient in view of the ongoing military predicament in both Iraq and Afghanistan). With regard to Egypt, it was legitimate to assume that the US would be forthright in its moral and material support of the uprising, for at least two reasons. First, the Tunisian revolution was still on everyones mind and Egyptians were determined to replicate it. Second, for years and over Mubaraks objections, the US has nurtured and emboldened numerous supporters of

democracy in Egypt; consequently, not being there for them during the final push would therefore constitute a historic let-down by Obamas administration. Egypts uprisings presented Obama with a geopolitical nut of the most hallucinating type. First, there were the obvious vexing considerations in case chaos takes over: Egypts demographic size (80 million, most of them badly urbanized and impoverished), its closeness to apprehensive Israel and frail Jordan, its contiguousness to splintering Sudan and unstable post-Kaddafis Libya, the Muslim brotherhood poised to take over, the security of international commerce passing through the vital waterway of Suez, etc. However real these concerns, I believe Obamas wavering support of the Egyptian and other Arab uprisings must have another explanation. It is Obamas adoption, stock and barrel, of the framing of the Middle-East and North Africa as initially conceived and elaborated in Israel and later repackaged by conservative foreign policy think tanks given free reign during the Bush era. Israels interpretive framework of the region, and the US gradual adoption of it, caused all attention and planning, including that of Gulf allies, to be focused on a putative colossal threat from Iran; both nuclear (heads were described as already poised to strike Tel-Aviv and nearby European cities), and ideological (fiery Shia rhetoric will engulf the region, from Bahrain to Beirut). This reading dovetailed with another plank of American foreign relations discourse since at least 9/11; namely, the primacy of the war on terrorism. From this perspective, Islam (Sunni and Shia strands alike) was posited as a problem, if not a major threat. Accordingly, if Shia Islam had produced one enemy for the US (Iranian Mullahs with fingers on nuclear launchers) and another for Israel (Hezbollah in South Lebanon), Sunni Islam had also given each of these allies an enemy: Sunni Hamas in Gaza for Israel; and, for America, Al Qaida and the rest of the Muslim radicals, waiting to pounce on friendly regimes and install their crippling caliphates. Needless to say, the threat of Islamic radicals taking over in the countries affected by revolutionary change did not materialize. On the contrary, the opposite is likely to

take place: Erdogan-style Islamic groups have of late been actively seeking the support and endorsement of the very West they always decried, with some impatient ones publicizing the visit of US officials to their offices as a badge of good behavior which they will sport as they seek legitimate power. The Israel frame, we have seen, befuddled Obama; although from time to time he tried overtly to extricate himself from its most paranoiac angles. Israel itself was tricked by its extreme appraisal of the Middle East. Iran turned out to be less malignant than the moderate Palestinians in the West Bank, who unilaterally called for an independent; or Syria, which threatens to expose Israel to the unknown from the East in the event of a probable demise of the Assad regime. Traditionally friendly Turkey, with whose military the Israelis IDF organized joint military exercises for years, is now threatening to dispatch warships (what an affront!) to escort aid convoys to the Gaza of Hamas. Obamas performance with regard to the events in the region was far from being an unmitigated failure; and that is attributable, I would argue, to Obamas residual moral capital in the region. Obamas Address to the Arab Spring which included a less than veiled warning to the Arab autocrats, as well as his support, albeit vague, to the democracy movements in the region did in fact accomplish a non-negligible outcome: US-flag burning and anti-US/imperialist slogans were noticeably absent from the boiling Arab streets, even if these were packed with Islamists of all hues. There was another outcome of an entirely different order from this episode: Al Hurra, a tiny US-financed and managed television channel broadcast in Arabic throughout the Middle-East, succeeded to shed its image as a US propaganda tool and palpably increased its dismally minute share of viewers (less than 2% in the most hospitable markets, up to the uprisings). Not intimidated by the biggies (Al-Jazeera, Al Arabia, and BBC-Arabic) and neck and neck with them at the game of fanning the flames of Arab revolutions, the channel rediscovered its original mission of providing comfort to

Arab youth as they sought to yank their destiny from the founding generals and postindependence demagogues. This public relations success story, however, has one discordant note for Obama; Al Hurra was George W. Bushs brainchild, and it was he who suffered the slings of its critics when they outnumbered its actual viewers.

Obamas Jobless Reign Saps Morale and Remittances With a brooding recession in the United States, and Europe teetering dangerously to the point of almost losing a limb (Greece), the badly affected Middle-East is now vigorously questioning the solvency and dependability of its biggest Western ally and trading partner. The proliferating uprisings in the Arab region are sucking whatever moisture remaining in the dehydrated economies. Many of the slogans carried by demonstrators in Arab cities are clearly of an economic nature: housing, jobs, better pay, education, basic infrastructure, etc. Instead of squaring it with their populations, the regimes have resorted to masking the hard times through helping themselves to the cash dumps of yesteryears. Panic-driven, this measure cannot be sustained. The revolutions and the youth movements in every village and city in the region have become mired in a flood of strikes and quite often selfish grievances with choking effect. Forget about the Islamists taking over, and brace for the unknown effects of states bankruptcies and catastrophic public sector collapse. The peoples in the countries that succeeded their revolutions (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya), in those where soft change is underway (Morocco, Jordan and hopefully Bahrain), and in those where radical change is imminent (Yemen and Syria) have already began asking for economic assistance and mostly the assurance of long-term stability that only strong economic leadership can provide. President Obama is unlikely to step in and provide that anytime soon, if ever. His hamstrung power to maneuver out of this recession is negatively affecting his

fortunes with both the financial class as well as ordinary Arab citizens who have traditionally had rewarding connections to the United States, through tourism, education, or family ties. Europe and the United States are aching, and there is no better barometer to measure this hurt than immigrants and future migrants. As birds inform about drought, pollution, and other ecological disasters on their migratory path, so do Arab youths in the United States who of late have been sending messages of stress to their families instead of remittances. Unemployment and a weak dollar have obliterated the cash transfers to the families back home, causing palpable suffering and increasing the amount of worry about the future of sons and daughters now unable to afford a bi-yearly trip home. While some skilled immigrants are seeking more clement economic climes; others have already completed the return journey. Even prospective Arab students are being forewarned not to count on the largesse of Uncle Sam in the US; therefore they are not rushing out. For those already there, the following story of a Moroccan man is not atypical. Omar, a retired teacher from Morocco, visited his two sons in Florida in the summer of 2010 (one had just been laid off by a government agency; the other was employed by a European Multinational). He had previously visited them as struggling yet happy students during the last quarter of the Clinton reign, about ten years ago. How did the two experiences compare for him? I saw two completely different Americas, he replied; The last time around, I had to disburse from the little money I took with me from Morocco the price of two tires for my sons immobilized car so he could move around. Will Obama put the economy on wheels for his unemployed son? Never, and I hope I will never have to go back there another time, he countered, his reflective eyes indicating he had witnessed terrible things and signs.

Obama has just lost the support of the Omar; and judging by what constitutes the stuff of conversations in Middle-Eastern cafes these days (hanging Palestinian statehood, perceived US support of Arab strongmen, bleak economic prospects, etc.) many more will revoke the blank check of goodwill they drew for him three years ago.

An Afterthought and a Conclusion Writing about a charismatic leader in a politically charged moment in history, as the USArab relationship since 9/11 through the Arab Spring has been, one can easily succumb to a major pitfall in the great-man theory, which consists in exclusively attaching to the person of the President all the triumphs and tribulations emanating from his office. Indeed, much like a hero in a fiction piece, Obama has been credited in the sections above with the lead and decisive role for the best of times as well as the worst of times in US-Arab relationships. True, other agents usually play important roles as they gravitate around the lead man. This piece has alluded here and there to the agency of the domestic political opponents of Obama in aggravating and accelerating Obamas woes; although the failings of the Arab supporters as they precipitously shouted victory at the first sight of this man and yelled betrayal at his first misstep are also to blame. Nonetheless, as a great man with great assets and capabilities to impact his immediate and distant surroundings, Obamas loss of appeal and relevance to the Arab world, coming on the heels of a spectacular ascent to the front seat of the world (the darling presidential candidate of the entire world, Nobel-Prize laureate, the enchanter of Cairo and Istanbul, etc.), ought to be fundamentally his responsibility. Dr. Abdelmajid Hajji is professor of Media and International Communication at Moulay Ismail University and Al-Akhawayn University, Morocco (Email: hajjiglorioso@gmail.com)