ARCABA vs BATOCAEL , G.R. No.

146683 DIGEST FACTS: Fransisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became owners of a lot. After the death of his wife, Fransisco, with the latter having no children to take care of him after retirement, asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, his couin Luzviminda Paghacian, and herein petition Cirila Arcaba, then a widow to take care of his house and the store inside. A few months before his death, Fransisco executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in which he ceded a portion of his lot, together with his house to Cirila, who accepted the donation. A few years after Fransiscos death, respondents herein filed a complaint against petitioner to declare void the deed on donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, Fransiscos nephews and nieces and intestate heirs, alleged that Cirila was the commonlaw wife of Fransisco and the donation is void pursuant to Article 87 of the Family code to wit: Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents nullifying the donation pursuant to Art. 87 of the Family Code, as evidenced by witness testimony and documents bearing the signature of Cirila Comille. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this case. (YES) RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. According to the Court, human reason would lead to the conclusion that Cirila was Francisco's common-law spouse. Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time and the possibility that the two consummated their relationship could be established from Leticia Bellosillo's testimony that Cirila and Francisco slept in the same bedroom. The Court also considered the fact that Cirila signed some documents using Francisco's surname clearly indicating that she saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law and it is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Their public conduct, therefore, indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. AYALA INVESTMENT vs. CA, GR No. 118305 DIGEST FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan from petitioner with respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive President of PBM as a surety or accommodator. PBM failed to pay the loan. Consequently, Ayala filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay Ayala. Private respondents subsequently filed a case of injunction against petitioners to enjoin the auction sale on the ground that, inter alia, the loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The trial court issued a TRO to prevent petitioner from proceeding with the sale of the properties at public auction. Ayala filed a certiorari before the CA assailing the order of the lower court. CA consequently issued a TRO enjoining the lower court from enforcing its order. Trial on the merits proceeded and the trial court rendered the sale on execution null and void. CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. ISSUE: WON the obligation incurred by respondent husband redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership of the private respondent. RULING: (A)If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the

husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. (B)On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. WONG vs. IAC, GR No. 70082 DIGEST FACTS: Romatio Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children but most of the time living separately. During their marriage, Romario bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using money borrowed from an officemate. In June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned pieces of jewelry. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued a check which was, however, dishonored due to lack of funds. Subsequently, spouses Anita and Ricky filed an action to collect the sum of money against Katrina and Romarico. The reply and counterclaim was only in behalf of Katrina. The trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs and a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction. Romarico consequently filed an action for annulment of the decision and the writ of execution. ISSUE: WON the debt of Katrina without the knowledge of her husband can be satisfied from the conjugal property (NO) RULING: No. The spouses have been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family. The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations since she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor did they redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, petitioners may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively. CARLOS vs. ABELARDO, GR No. 146504 SPOUSES ROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs. CA, GR No. 145222 GO vs. YAMANE, GR No.160762 SABALONES vs. CA, 230 SCRA 79 GUIANG vs. CA, GR. No. 125170 JADER-MANALO vs. CAMAISA, GR. No. 147978 TARROSA vs. DE LEON, GR. No. 186053 DAEL vs. IAC, GR. No. 68873 DIGEST FACTS: Cesario Cabutihan was married to Bienvenida Durana and produced the ff. legitimate children: Nonilon, Carmencita, Romulo, Lermo, and Bienvenido, intervenors herein. A year after Bienvenida died, Cesario married Victorina Durana, the sister of Bienvenida. Their marriage did not produce any legitimate children; however, Victorinas heirs were the children of her two sisters and a brother namely: Bienvenida Durana,

Soledad Durana, and Federico Durana Sr.Oppositors are all children of her three siblings. The other heirs of Victorina are the petitioners and the intervenors, who were all children of Bienvenida Durana. Oppositors contend that they are entitled to 2/3 of Victorinas estate considering that their predecessors-in-interest are the brother and sister of Victorina Durana; while the remaining 1/3 should devolve to the petitioner and the intervenors who represent their mother, Bienvenida, also the sister of Victorina. During the 2nd marriage of Cesario and Victorina, they were engaged in a copra business and public transportation business, with Victorina managing the former. After Cesario died, Victorina and the private respondents entered into an extra-judicial settlement of his estate. Parts of the properties adjudicated to Victorina were the copra business and some vehicles of the transportation business. Subsequently, however, the vehicles were transferred to the private respondents by virtue of a deed of sale. Carmencita Cabutihan, private respondent herein, filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Victorina Durana, wherein she also prayed for her appointment as adminitratrix. Petitioners opposed, asking that the letters of administration be issued to Lucilda Dael, petitioner herein. The court below appointed Amado Zoleta as special administrator of the estate of Victorina. An inventory and supplementary inventory were filed by the special administrator covering other real properties of the estate of Victorina, consisting of the undivided shares in the inheritance of Cesario from his parents. The properties adjudicated to Victorina in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Cesario were included in the inventory. Respondents moved for the disapproval of said inventories claiming that the properties listed were either acquired during the first marriage of Cesario or were merely the fruits of the properties of said first union or otherwise acquired through the funds thereof. Trial court rendered a decision ruling that Victorina had no paraphernal properties brought or contributed to her marriage with Cesario Cabutihan; that the copra business was formed during the first marriage; that Victorina used the same facilities, credit and capital in managing the business; and that the main source of income if Cesario and Victorina was the copra business. The trial court ruled that Victorinas estate only extended of her share in the inheritance of Cesario and disapproved both inventories and annulled the extrajudicial settlement and deed of sale. Respondent court affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: WON the copra business, as well as the properties listed in the inventories as acquired during the second marriage are assets of the conjugal partnership of the first marriage between Cesario and Bienvenida. RULING: No. When Bienvenida Durana died on May 2, 1957, the first conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved. That conjugal partnership was then converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership. It was also at this point in time that the inheritance was transmitted to the heirs of Bienvenida. Thus, her heirs, Cesario, Nonilon, Carmencita Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido, acquired respective and definite rights over-one-half (1/2) of the conjugal partnership property which pertained to Bienvinida. Whatever fruits or income may thereafter be derived from the properties, including the copra business, would no longer be conjugal but would belong in part to the heirs in proportion to their respective shares. The fruits and income of the other half of the property of the conjugal partnership would exclusively belong to Cesario. The marriage of Cesario and Victorina on April 6, 1952 also produced the corresponding legal consequences. From that moment on, the fruits or income of the separate properties of the spouses would be conjugal, including those acquired through their industry. Hence, the fruits and income of Cesario's share in the inheritance from Bienvenida and of his conjugal share in the property of the first conjugal partnership would form part of the conjugal partnership properties of the second marriage. The fruits and income derived or acquired through these lastmentioned properties would likewise be conjugal in nature DE OCAMPO vs. DELIZO, GR. No. L-32820 DIGEST FACTS: These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages, contracted by one Nicolas Delizo, the first of which farted for 18 years, the second for 46 years. The action for partition was instituted by the children of the first marriage against their father and second wife. The father died less than a month after the action had been instituted and was substituted by his children of the second marriage. The lower court distributed the properties as follows: (1) 1/2 pro indiviso to the 3 children of the first marriage; (2) 1/4 pro indiviso to the surviving spouse, and 1/4 pro indiviso into thirteen parts to the children of both marriages, nine of whom were begotten during the second marriage. The court of Appeals affirmed with certain modifications the trial court's decision holding that the properties, except certain parcels of land were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage.

From this adverse decision, the present petition for review was interposed, petitioners-appellants contending, among others, that 67 hectares of the property located at Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva Ecija could not have belonged to the first marriage because they were then homesteads or public lands and it was only during the second marriage that the requirements of the law were complied with resulting in the confirmation, registration and issuance of a Torrens title over said properties to their father and his second wife. ISSUE: WON the Caanawan properties acquired as homestead were the conjugal properties of the first marriage RULING: The fact that the parcels of land were acquired as homesteads during the period of the first marriage does not necessarily mean that they should be considered as properties of the first marriage. Being homesteads, they were part of the public domain, unless it is shown that the requirements of the Homestead Law to warrant the grant of a patent to the homesteader have been complied with prior to the death of the first wife. Under Act 926, the right of the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law. One of the most important requirements is that the "person filing the application shall prove by two credible witnesses that the has resided upon and cultivated the land for the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing the application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated or encumbered . . ." (Sec. 3, Act 926). Prior to the fulfillment of such requirement the applicant has no complete equitable estate over the homestead which he can sell and convey, mortgage or lease. Until a homestead right is established and registered under Section 3 of Act 926, there is only an inchoate right to the property and it has not ceased to be a part of the public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation as such. Conversely, when a "homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to a patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable owner thereof." The decisive factor in determining whether a parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first marriage, is not necessarily the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent. Where the capital of the first and second marriage or the contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of the properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership (Art. 1431, now Art. 189, Civil Code). CHING vs. CA, GR. No. 124642 DIGEST FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Company (PBM) obtained loans from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) with Alfredo Ching, Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua executed a continuing guaranty binding them jointly and severally. PBM defaulted in all its loans. Consequently ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with writ of preliminary attachment against PBM. In its application for attachment, ABC averred that the defendants (guarantors) are guilty of fraud in incurring obligations and falsely represented themselves to be in financial position to pay their obligation upon maturity and that they have removed or disposed of their properties or about to do so, with intent of defrauding their creditors. After an ex-parte (one-sided) hearing, the RTC ruled in favor of Ching denying ABCs petition decreeing that the grounds alleged in the application are all conclusions of fact and law. On motion for reconsideration, however, RTC reconsidered its previous order and granted ABCs application. RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment and summons were served on the defendants except Chung Kiat Hua who was missing in action. In the meantime, the deputy sheriff of the RTC levied on attachment 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching. Encarnation Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a motion to set aside the attachment. She alleged among others that the shares of stock levied by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorop was incorporated. Furthermore, the indebtedness of Alfredo as a guaranty did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. CA ruled in favor of ABC contending that the burden of proof lied on the Chings to prove the source of money used to acquire the shares of stock. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: WON the burden of proof lies in the spouses to prove that the property levied was their conjugal property RULING: SC ruled in favor of Ching and held that Art. 160 of the NCC provides that all properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proven otherwise. It is not even necessary to prove the source of funds used to acquire the property. As long as the properties wre acquired during the marriage, they enjoy the presumption of conjugality.

The contention of private respondent that the petitioner-husband, in executing a continuing guaranty and surety agreement, was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business is also untenable. As held in Ayala vs. CA, the signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. For the conjugal partnership to be liable for the husbands exclusive liability, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the benefit of the family which in this case the respondents failed to prove that the conjugal partnership benefited in anyway by the husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and surety agreement.