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1. PEREZ VS.

COURT OF APPEALS 323 SCRA 613 FACTS - Primitivo Perez had been insured with the BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation since 1980 for P20,000.00. - In October 1987, an agent of Lifeman, Rodolfo Lalog, visited Perez in Quezon and convinced him to apply for additional insurance coverage of P50,000.00, to avail of the ongoing promotional discount of P400.00 if the premium were paid annually. - Primitivo B. Perez accomplished an application form for the additional insurance coverage. Virginia A. Perez, his wife, paid P2,075.00 to Lalog. The receipt issued by Lalog indicated the amount received was a "deposit." - Unfortunately, Lalog lost the application form accomplished by Perez and so on October 28, 1987, he asked the latter to fill up another application form. On November 1, 1987, Perez was made to undergo the required medical examination, which he passed. - Lalog forwarded the application for additional insurance of Perez, together with all its supporting papers, to the office of BF Lifeman Insurance Corporationn in Quezon which office was supposed to forward the papers to the Manila office. - On November 25, 1987, Perez died while he was riding a banca which capsized during a storm. - At the time of his death, his application papers for the additional insurance were still with the Quezon office. Lalog testified that when he went to follow up the papers, he found them still in the Quezon office and so he personally brought the papers to the Manila office of BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation. It was only on November 27, 1987 that said papers were received in Manila. - Without knowing that Perez died on November 25, 1987, BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation approved the application and issued the corresponding policy for the P50,000.00 on December 2, 1987 - Virginia went to Manila to claim the benefits under the insurance policies of the deceased. She was paid P40,000.00 under the first insurance policy for P20,000.00 (double indemnity in case of accident) but the insurance company refused to pay the claim under the additional policy coverage of P50,000.00, the proceeds of which amount to P150,000.00 in view of a triple indemnity rider on the insurance policy. - In its letter of January 29, 1988 to Virginia A. Perez, the insurance company maintained that the insurance for P50,000.00 had not been perfected at the time of the death of Primitivo Perez. Consequently, the insurance company refunded the amount of P2,075.00 which Virginia Perez had paid - Lifeman filed for the rescission and the declaration of nullity. Perez, on the other hand, averred that the deceased had fulfilled all his prestations under the contract and all the elements of a valid contract are present. - RTC ruled in favor of Perez. CA reversed. ISSUE Whether or not there was a perfected additional insurance contract. HELD Insurance is a contract whereby, for a stipulated consideration, one party undertakes to compensate the other for loss on a specified subject by specified perils. A contract, on the other hand, is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other to give something or to render some service. Consent must be manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. When Primitivo filed an application for insurance, paid P2,075.00 and submitted the results of his medical examination, his application was subject to the acceptance of private respondent BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation. The perfection of the contract of insurance between the deceased and respondent corporation was further conditioned upon compliance with the following requisites stated in the application form: "there shall be no contract of insurance unless and until a policy is issued on this application and that the said policy shall not take effect until the premium has been paid and the policy delivered to and accepted by me/us in person while I/We, am/are in good health." The assent of private respondent BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation therefore was not given when it merely received the application form and all the requisite supporting papers of the applicant. Its assent was given when it issues a corresponding policy to the applicant. Under the abovementioned provision, it is only when the applicant pays the premium and receives and accepts the policy while he is in good health that the contract of insurance is deemed to have been perfected. It is not disputed, however, that when Primitivo died on November 25, 1987, his application papers for additional insurance coverage were still with the branch office of respondent corporation in Gumaca and it was only two days later, or on November 27, 1987, when Lalog personally delivered the application papers to the head office in Manila. Consequently, there was absolutely no way the acceptance of the application could have been communicated to the applicant for the latter to accept inasmuch as the applicant at the time was already dead.

2. WHITE GOLD MARINE SERVICES VS. PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORP. GR no. 154514 July 28, 2005 FACTS White Gold Marine Services, Inc. procured a protection and indemnity coverage for its vessels from The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Limited through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation. White Gold was issued a Certificate of Entry and Acceptance. Pioneer also issued receipts evidencing payments for the coverage. When White Gold failed to fully pay its accounts, Steamship Mutual refused to renew the coverage. Steamship Mutual thereafter filed a case against White Gold for collection of sum of money to recover the latters unpaid balance. White Gold on the other hand, filed a complaint before the Insurance Commission claiming that Steamship Mutual violated Sections 186 and 187, while Pioneer violated Sections 299, to 301 of the Insurance Code. The Insurance Commission dismissed the complaint. It said that there was no need for Steamship Mutual to secure a license because it was not engaged in the insurance business. It explained that Steamship Mutual was a Protection and Indemnity Club. Likewise, Pioneer need not obtain another license as insurance agent and/or a broker for Steamship Mutual because Steamship Mutual was not engaged in the insurance business. Moreover, Pioneer was already licensed; hence, a separate license solely as agent/broker of Steamship Mutual was already superfluous. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Insurance Commissioner. In its decision, the appellate court distinguished between P & I Clubs vis--vis conventional insurance. The appellate court also held that Pioneer merely acted as a collection agent of Steamship Mutual. ISSUES Whether or not Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd. Is engaged in an insurance business. Whether or not Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. needs a license to operate as the insurance agent/broker of Steamship Mutual? RULING The test to determine if a contract is an insurance contract or not, depends on the nature of the promise, the act required to be performed, and the exact nature of the agreement in the light of the occurrence, contingency, or circumstances under which the performance becomes requisite. It is not by what it is called. Basically, an insurance contract is a contract of indemnity. In it, one undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. In particular, a marine insurance undertakes to indemnify the assured against marine losses, such as the losses incident to a marine adventure. Section 99 of the Insurance Code enumerates the coverage of marine insurance. A P & I Club is a form of insurance against third party liability, where the third party is anyone other than the P & I Club and the members. By definition then, Steamship Mutual as a P & I Club is a mutual insurance association engaged in the marine insurance business. The records reveal Steamship Mutual is doing business in the country albeit without the requisite certificate of authority mandated by Section 187 of the Insurance Code. It maintains a resident agent in the Philippines to solicit insurance and to collect payments in its behalf. We note that Steamship Mutual even renewed its P & I Club cover until it was cancelled due to no-payment of the calls. Thus, to continue doing business here, Steamship Mutual or through its agent Pioneer, must secure a license from the Insurance Commission. Since a contract of insurance involves public interest, regulation by the State is necessary. Thus, no insurer or insurance company is allowed to engage in the insurance business without a license or a certificate of authority from the Insurance Commission.

On the second issue, Pioneer is the resident agent of Steamship Mutual as evidenced by the certificate of registration issued by the Insurance Commission. It has been licensed to do or transact insurance business by virtue of the certificate of authority issued by the same agency. However, a Certification from the Commission states that Pioneer does not have a separate license to be an agent/broker of Steamship Mutual. Although Pioneer is already licensed as an insurance company, it needs a separate license to act as insurance agent for Steamship Mutual. 3. ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION VS. PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY G.R. No. 166245, 9 April 2008 FACTS: Respondent insurance company entered into a Creditor GroupLife Policy agreement with Eternal Gardens Memorial. Under said policy, the clients of Eternal who purchased burial lots from it on installment basis would be insured by Philamlife. The amount of insurance coverage depended upon the existing balance of the purchased burial lots. The policy was to be effective for a period of one year, renewable on a yearly basis. As required under the said policy, Eternal submitted a list of all new lot purchasers, including the application of each purchase rand their corresponding unpaid balances. Included in this list is a certain John Chuang. When Chuang died, Eternal sent a letter, together with the pertinent papers, to Philamlife which served as an insurance claim for Chuangs death. Philamlife required that Eternal submit certain documents relative to its insurance claim for Chuangs death. Eternal transmitted said documents which Philamlife was able to received. However, after more than one year, Philamlife did not anymore reply to Eternals insurance claim. This prompted Eternal to demand the insurance claims. However, Philamlife denied the said claim, prompting Eternal to file a case before the RTC of Makati. ISSUE: Whether or not Philamlife assumed the risk of loss without approving the application. HELD: YES. An insurance contract covering the lot purchaser is created and the same is effective, valid, and binding until terminated by Philamlife by disapproving the insurance application. The second sentence of Creditor Group Life Policy No. P-1920 on the Effective Date of Benefit is in the nature of a resolutory condition which would lead to the cessation of the insurance contract. Moreover, the mere inaction of the insurer on the insurance application must not work to prejudice the insured; It cannot be interpreted as a termination of the insurance contract. The termination of the insurance contract by the insurer must be explicit and unambiguous. More often than not, insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion containing technical terms and conditions of the industry, confusing if at all understandable to laypersons, that are imposed on those who wish to avail of insurance. As such, insurance contracts are imbued with public interest that must be considered whenever the rights and obligations of the insurer and the insured are to be delineated. Hence, in order to protect the interest of insurance applicants, insurance companies must be obligated to act with haste upon insurance applications, to either deny or approve the same, or otherwise be bound to honor the application as a valid, binding, and effective insurance contract.

4. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD. VS. CARPONIA T. EBRADO G.R. No. L-44059, 28 October 1977 80 SCRA 181 FACTS: Buenaventura Ebrado was issued by petitioner company an insurance policy wherein he designated Carponia, his common-law wife, as his revocable beneficiary. When Buenaventura died, Carponia filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds of the policy in the total amount of P11,745.73. Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado, Buenaventuras legal wife, likewise filed her claim as the widow of the deceased insured. She asserts that she is the one entitled to the insurance proceeds, not the common-law wife, Carponia. ISSUE: Whether or not a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married man can claim the proceeds thereof in case of death of the latter HELD: NO. When not otherwise specifically provided for by the Insurance Law, the contract of life insurance is governed by the general rules of the civil law regulating contracts. And under Article 2012 of the same Code, any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make a donation to him. Commonlaw spouses are, definitely, barred from receiving donations from each other. In essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil donation insofar as the beneficiary is concerned. Both are founded upon the same consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a donee, because from the premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance. As a consequence, the proscription in Article 739 of the new Civil Code should equally operate in life insurance contracts. The mandate of Article 2012 cannot be laid aside: any person who cannot receive a donation cannot be named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of the person who cannot make the donation. Under American law, a policy of life insurance is considered as a testament and in construing it, the courts will, so far as possible treat it as a will and determine the effect of a clause designating the beneficiary by rules under which wins are interpreted. ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed. Carponia T. Ebrado is hereby declared disqualified to be the beneficiary of the late Buenaventura C. Ebrado in his life insurance policy. As a consequence, the proceeds of the policy are hereby held payable to the estate of the deceased insured. Costs against Carponia T. Ebrado

5. PHILAMLIFE VS. ANSALDO 234 SCRA 509 FACTS - Ramon M. Paterno sent a letter-complaint to the Insurance Commissioner alleging certain problems encountered by agents, supervisors, managers and public consumers of the Philamlife as a result of certain practices by said company. - Commissioner requested petitioner Rodrigo de los Reyes, in his capacity as Philamlife's president, to comment on respondent Paterno's letter. - The complaint prays that provisions on charges and fees stated in the Contract of Agency executed between Philamlife and its agents, as well as the implementing provisions as published in the agents' handbook, agency bulletins and circulars, be declared as null and void. He also asked that the amounts of such charges and fees already deducted and collected by Philamlife in connection therewith be reimbursed to the agents, with interest at the prevailing rate reckoned from the date when they were deducted - Manuel Ortega, Philamlife's Senior Assistant Vice-President and Executive Assistant to the President, asked that the Commissioner first rule on the questions of the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner over the subject matter of the letters-complaint and the legal standing of Paterno. - Insurance Commissioner set the case for hearing and sent subpoena to the officers of Philamlife. Ortega filed a motion to quash the subpoena alleging that the Insurance company has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that there is no complaint sufficient in form and contents has been filed. - The motion to quash was denied. ISSUE Whether or not the insurance commissioner had jurisdiction over the legality of the Contract of Agency between Philamlife and its agents.

HELD No, it does not have jurisdiction. The general regulatory authority of the Insurance Commissioner is described in Section 414 of the Insurance Code, to wit: "The Insurance Commissioner shall have the duty to see that all laws relating to insurance, insurance companies and other insurance matters, mutual benefit associations and trusts for charitable uses are faithfully executed and to perform the duties imposed upon him by this Code, . . . ." On the other hand, Section 415 provides: "In addition to the administrative sanctions provided elsewhere in this Code, the Insurance Commissioner is hereby authorized, at his discretion, to impose upon insurance companies, their directors and/or officers and/or agents, for any willful failure or refusal to comply with, or violation of any provision of this Code, or any order, instruction, regulation or ruling of the Insurance Commissioner, or any commission of irregularities, and/or conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner as may be determined by the Insurance Commissioner, the following: a) fines not in excess of five hundred pesos a day; and b) suspension, or after due hearing, removal of directors and/or officers and/or agents." A plain reading of the above-quoted provisions show that the Insurance Commissioner has the authority to regulate the business of insurance, which is defined as follows: "(2) The term 'doing an insurance business' or 'transacting an insurance business,' within the meaning of this Code, shall include (a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract; (b) making, or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely incidental of the surety; (c) doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of an insurance business within the meaning of this Code; (d) doing or proposing to do any business in substance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this Code. (Insurance Code, Sec. 2 [2]) Since the contract of agency entered into between Philamlife and its agents is not included within the meaning of an insurance business, Section 2 of the Insurance Code cannot be invoked to give jurisdiction over the same to the Insurance Commissioner. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

6. SPOUSES CHA VS. COURT OF APPEALS GR NO. 124520, August 18, 1997

FACTS Spouses Cha, as lessees, entered into a lease contract with CKS Development Corporation, as lessor, with a stipulation that "The LESSEE shall not insure against fire the chattels, merchandise, textiles, goods and effects placed at any stall or store or space in the leased premises without first obtaining the written consent and approval of the LESSOR. If the LESSEE obtain(s) the insurance thereof without the consent of the LESSOR then the policy is deemed assigned and transferred to the LESSOR for its own benefit" Notwithstanding the above stipulation in the lease contract, the Cha spouses insured against loss by fire their merchandise inside the leased premises for P500,000.00 with the United Insurance Co., Inc. without the written consent of CKS. On the day that the lease contract was to expire, fire broke out inside the leased premises. When CKS learned of the insurance earlier procured by the Cha spouses (without its consent), it wrote the insurer a demand letter asking that the proceeds of the insurance contract be paid directly to CKS, based on its lease contract with the Cha spouses. United refused to pay CKS. The latter filed a complaint against the Cha spouses and United. ISSUE Whether the stipulation in the lease contract, that any fire insurance policy obtained by the lessee over their merchandise inside the leased premises is deemed assigned or transferred to the lessor if said policy is obtained without the prior written consent of the latter, is valid. HELD NO. It is basic in the law on contracts that the stipulations contained in a contract cannot be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Section 18 of the Insurance Code provides that "No contract or policy of insurance on property shall be enforceable except for the benefit of some person having an insurable interest in the property insured." A non-life insurance policy such

as the fire insurance policy taken by the spouses over their merchandise is primarily a contract of indemnity. Insurable interest in the property insured must exist at the time the insurance takes effect and at the time the loss occurs. Herein, it cannot be denied that CKS has no insurable interest in the goods and merchandise inside the leased premises under the provisions of Section 17 of the Insurance Code which provides that "The measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured might be damnified by loss of injury thereof." Therefore, CKS cannot, under the Insurance Code be validly a beneficiary of the fire insurance policy taken by the spouses over their merchandise. This insurable interest over said merchandise remains with the insured, the Cha spouses. The automatic assignment of the policy to CKS under the provision of the lease contract previously quoted is void for being contrary to law and/or public policy.

7. GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY VS. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. L-31845 April 30, 1979 FACTS On March 14 1957, Ngo Hing, a duly authorized agent of the Great Pacific life Assurance Company filed an application with the company for the for a 20 year endowment policy in the amount of P 50,000.00 on the life of his one-year old daughter, Helen Go. He supplied the necessary information to which Mondragon, the Branch Manager of Pacific Life in Cebu, typewrote it in the application form and was signed by Ngo Hing. A binding deposit receipt was issued to Ngo Hing upon his payment of the assurance premium. Mondragon received a letter of disapproval from the insurance company. It stated that the 20 year endowment plan is not applicable for minors below 7 years old but would consider the application for a different kind of policy which is Juvenile Triple Action plan. The disapproval of the application was not communicated to Ngo Hing. When Helen Go died of influenza with the complication of Bronchopneumonia on May 28, 1957, Ngo Hing sought for the payment of proceeds from the insurance company. He was denied from getting any proceeds. He then filed an action against the insurance company for the recovery of the same. The trial court ruled for Ngo Hing and was affirmed in the Court of Appeals stating further the return of the premium paid. ISSUE Whether the binding deposit receipt constituted a temporary contract of life insurance in question HELD xxx the binding deposit receipt in question is merely an acknowledgment, on behalf of the company, that the latters branch office had received from the applicant the insurance premium and had accepted the application subject for the processing by the insurance company; and that the latter will either approve or reject the same on the basis of whether or not the applicant is insurable on the standard rates. Since petitioner Pacific Life disapproved the insurance application of respondent Ngo Hing, the binding deposit receipt in question had never become in force at any time. As held by this Court, where an agreement is made between the applicant and the agent, no liability shall attach until the principal approves the risk and receipt is given by the agent. The acceptance is merely conditional, and is subordinated to the act of the company is approving or rejecting the application. Thus, in life insurance, a binding slip or binding receipt does not insure by itself.