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Mark B. Stewart
This paper estimates the employment effects of the introduction of the UK National Minimum
Wage in April 1999 and subsequent upratings in 2000 and 2001. It uses a difference-in-dif-
ferences estimator based on position in the wage distribution. For the upratings an adjusted
estimator is also introduced to allow for the possible differential response to the change in the
macro employment trend. No significant adverse employment effects are found for any of these
events for any of the estimators for any demographic group.
* The author is grateful to the ESRC for financial support (under award R000223440). The LFS data
were provided via the Data Archive.
1
For a description and discussion of these models in the context of minimum wages see, for
example, Brown (1999, section 2), Card and Krueger (1995, chapter 11) and Dickens et al. (1999,
section 2).
2
See Brown (1999) for a survey to that date, Stewart (2003) for a description of more recent
evidence.
3
The youth rate (for those aged 18–21 inclusive) was initially set at £3.00/hour and then increased to
£3.20 in June 2000 and £3.50 in October 2001. (There was also a development rate for adults in the first
6 months of a new job with accredited training at £3.20/hour, although it was not greatly used.)
4
Additional advantages are that other evidence suggests both a very high compliance rate and a lack
of spillover effects onto the wages of higher paid workers; see Dickens and Manning (2002) on latter.
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[ M A R C H 2004 ] THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS . . . C111
wage workers whose wages would have had to be raised to comply with the new
minimum – the group directly affected. Their subsequent employment is com-
pared with a similar group from slightly further up the wage distribution, who act
as the control group.
1. Estimation Approach
Consider first the evaluation of the introduction. The subsequent employment
probabilities of employees whose wages would have had to be raised to comply with
the new minimum (i.e. those initially below the minimum) can be compared with
that of a group from higher up the wage distribution. However direct comparison
of the two groups would not be appropriate to identify any causal effect since, even
in the absence of a minimum wage, those at the bottom end of the wage distri-
bution have lower subsequent employment probabilities than those from higher
up. This makes the difference-in-differences approach a natural one to take.5 The
difference between the two groups in a period affected by the minimum wage can
be compared with the equivalent difference in an earlier period when no mini-
mum wage was in place.
Let the binary indicator e0it denote the employment status of individual i in time
period t in the absence of a minimum wage. Define two groups of employees,
indexed by g: those in group g ¼ 1 are affected by the minimum wage introduction
because their wages are initially below the minimum, while those in group g ¼ 2
are not directly affected because their wages are already above the minimum. In
addition, suppose that a minimum wage is introduced at t* and that for observa-
tions prior to t* no minimum wage is in place. The simplest form of the estimator
would use just two time periods: t1 and t2 such that t1 + 1 < t* £ t2 + 1. Compari-
sons across g and t are used to estimate the counterfactual employment proba-
bilities. Suppose that:
Pðe0itþ1 ¼ 1je0it ¼ 1Þ ¼ ag þ ct : ð1Þ
The first component is a group-specific effect fixed over time, the second a
macro time effect common across groups. A key identifying assumption is that
there are no interactions in the absence of the minimum, i.e. parallel growth paths
across the groups. This is tested below.
Define a ‘treatment’ interaction: Dit ¼ 1 if individual i is affected by the intro-
duction of the minimum wage, i.e. i is in group g ¼ 1 and t + 1 ‡ t*; Dit ¼ 0
otherwise. If there is a homogeneous impact in group 1 and no impact in group 2,
then the difference-in-differences estimator (given by double differencing the
sample means) consistently estimates this impact. The estimator is also given by
OLS estimation of a linear equation with group and time effects and with Dit as the
sole interaction term. This can also be augmented by additional control variables:
Pðeitþ1 ¼ 1jeit ¼ 1Þ ¼ x 0it b þ hDit þ ag þ ct : ð2Þ
5
See Meyer (1995), Angrist and Kreuger (1999) and Blundell and Dias (2000) for good discussions
of this type of estimator.
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The formulation easily incorporates additional groups and time periods. Group
g ¼ 1, those below the minimum, remains as the ‘treatment’ group and group
g ¼ 2, those slightly above the minimum, as the ‘control’ or ‘comparison’ group.
The latter is defined here as those between the age-specific minimum and 10%
above.6
Table 1
Estimated Effects of the Introduction of the National Minimum Wage
on the Probability of Subsequent Employment
(Difference-in-differences estimates, matched Labour Force Survey data)
Wage variable Controls? Adult men Young men Adult women Young women
WU No 0.020 (0.68) 0.012 (0.15) )0.006 (0.32) 0.067 (0.79)
WA No 0.015 (0.49) 0.059 (0.72) 0.011 (0.60) 0.079 (0.86)
WU Yes 0.014 (0.93) 0.073 (0.88) )0.010 (0.93) 0.119 (1.15)
WA Yes 0.011 (0.74) 0.155 (1.36) 0.006 (0.51) 0.065 (0.78)
Notes:
Wage variables: WU ¼ wage based on usual hours, WA ¼ wage based on actual hours.
Control variables as listed in Stewart (2003).
Data from March 1997 to March 2000 inclusive, from 13 Quarterly Labour Force Surveys. Sample
size ¼ 54,165, made up of 26,312 men (1,087 young) and 27,853 women (942 young).
Absolute ‘robust’ t-ratios on model coefficients in parentheses.
6
The robustness of the results to varying this latter threshold is examined in Stewart (2003).
7
The real wage variables (April 1999 prices) are constructed using the Retail Price Index (all items).
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measure for those higher up the wage distribution. Results for both are presented
in Table 1.8
The first two rows of Table 1 give linear difference-in-differences estimates
without additional control variables. Absolute ‘robust’ t-ratios are given in paren-
theses. The estimates are insignificantly different from zero for both wage variables
for all four demographic groups. In addition seven of the eight estimates are also
positive. The model with control variables uses a logit form.9 Table 1 presents
estimates of the ‘marginal effect’ of the dummy variable of interest. These are
probability difference-in-differences. These estimates are also insignificantly dif-
ferent from zero for both wage variables for all four demographic groups. For the
wage variable based on actual hours, the estimate is also positive for all four
demographic groups. For the wage based on usual hours it is positive for three
of the groups. Only for adult women and using this latter wage variable is there
a negative (although insignificant) effect. The absolute t-ratio in this case is less
than 1.10
An important identifying assumption here is that there are no interaction terms
in the absence of the minimum wage. An advantage of the UK introduction for this
approach is that it was preceded by a period with no minimum, allowing this
assumption to be tested. Estimation of the model using only the period without a
minimum and with a full set of interaction terms added finds them to be indi-
vidually and jointly insignificant. In addition the macro employment trend in the
period surrounding the minimum wage’s introduction was similar to that in this
pre-introduction phase, adding support to the assumption that there would have
been no interactions in this later period if the minimum wage had not been
introduced.
8
Both show significantly greater wage growth for the ‘treatment’ group than the ‘control’ group.
Specifically, a wage growth equation using the equivalent estimator gives a significant positive effect.
9
Separate models are estimated for men and women and the main effects and intercept are allowed
to vary within these across the two age groups.
10
These findings are robust to an extensive range of specification modifications, to the use of a ‘wage
gap’ estimator and to the use of NES or BHPS data in place of the LFS (Stewart, 2003).
11
3-month moving average of ONS series MGSU: employment rate for all of working age, from LFS.
12
The comparison period for the estimator is a moving 12-month window (t, t + 1) such that t is
before the uprating and t + 1 after. The limits are 12 months before the uprating and 12 months after.
The start limit for the first uprating and end limit for the second are shown as vertical dashed lines in
Figure 1.
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The estimator may therefore require some modification to evaluate the effects
of these upratings. A generalised specification needs to allow the macro effects to
have a differential impact across the groups. Following Blundell and Dias (2000),
the specification may be generalised to:
Pðe0itþ1 ¼ 1je0it ¼ 1Þ ¼ ag þ kg ct : ð3Þ
where the kg term allows for the differential impact of the macro effects across the
groups. Under this assumption the difference-in-differences estimator provides a
consistent estimator not of h, but of plim ^ hDID ¼ h þ ðk1 k2 Þðct2 ct1 Þ, and the
second term may be non-zero. (Note however that if the c-terms are the same for t1
and t2, the estimator remains consistent despite differential impact across the
groups.) Bell et al. (1999), to evaluate the New Deal programme for unemployed
youth using an older age group as control group, propose finding a second time
period, over which a similar macro trend has occurred13 and removing the bias by
taking a further time difference. If a suitable period can be found, this
‘differential-trend-adjusted’ difference-in-differences estimator will provide a
consistent estimator of h.
For the evaluation of the impact of the minimum wage on employment, the
problem is the lack of a suitable earlier time period. For the period for which
suitable individual-level data is available, there is not an earlier time interval with
macro employment trends to match those in the interval being investigated (see
Figure 1). An alternative is to adjust for differential trends by differencing in the
group dimension rather than the time dimension. Suppose instead that we can
find groups g ¼ 3 and g ¼ 4 so that the differences in their responsiveness to the
13
They suggest an earlier period at a similar point in the previous cycle.
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macro trend is the same as that between the original two groups, i.e.
k3 ) k4 ¼ k1 ) k2 This too would provide a consistent estimator. The two new
groups need to be such that, in the absence of a minimum wage, their employment
trends would differ from each other by the same amount as the original treatment
and control groups. This assumption then replaces the more restrictive one that
employment trends are the same in the absence of the minimum.
14
For this estimator results could only be obtained for the adult groups. For youths, even if the whole
of the rest of the wage distribution is used for group g ¼ 4 the median is not high enough to match.
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Table 2
Estimated Effects of the 2000 and 2001 Minimum Wage Upratings
on the Probability of Subsequent Employment
(Difference-in-differences estimates, matched Labour Force Survey data)
Notes:
Wage variables: WU ¼ wage based on usual hours, WA ¼ wage based on actual hours.
Control variables as used in Table 1.
Sample sizes: for 2000 uprating: 24,098 adult men, 25,809 adult women, 1,973 youths; for 2001 uprating:
17,316 adult men, 18,565 adult women, 1,406 youths (these are for the wage based on usual hours,
slightly smaller for wage based on actual hours).
Absolute ‘robust’ t-ratios on model coefficients in parentheses.
5. Conclusions
This paper estimates the impact of the 1999 UK introduction of a minimum wage,
after a period without a minimum, and of the upratings in 2000 and 2001, on the
probability of subsequent employment among those whose wages would have had
to be raised to comply with the new minimum, using a difference-in-differences
approach. No significant adverse effect on employment is found for either the
introduction or the upratings for any of the demographic groups considered.
University of Warwick
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