Introduction Political Law = that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of governmental

organs of the State and defines the relation of the S tate with the inhabitants of its territory. (Cruz) Macariola v. Asuncion 114 S 77 (1982) F: judge associated himself a company in violation of Art 14 of Code of Commerce H: judge did not violate provision since it partake the nature of a political la w Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US, Art. 14 of this C ode must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of soverei gnty, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sov ereign. Constitutional Law = a term used to designate the law embodied in the constituti on and the legal principles growing out of the interpretation and application ma de by courts of the provisions of the constitution in specific cases. Constitution = a written instrument organizing the government, distributing its powers and safeguarding the rights of the People (Taada and Fernando) Types/ Kinds of Constitution: 1. Classification as when it is adopted a. Written Constitution = the provisions have been reduced to writing and embodi ed in one or more instruments at a particular time (1) Democratic = sprung from the authority of the people (2) Monarchical or octroved = granted by a monarch as an act of grace to his sub ject b. Unwritten Constitution = has not been committed to writing at any specific ti me but is the accumulated product of gradual political and legal development 2. Classification according to amendment process: a. Rigid = may not be amended except through a special process distinct from and more involved than the method of changing ordinary laws b. Flexible = it may be changed in the same manner and through the same body tha t enacts ordinary legislation Lawyers' League for a Better Philippines v. President Aquino (May 22, 1986) F: The legitimacy of the government and President Aquino is questioned. It is clai med that her government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to th e 1973 Constitution. H: Case is dimissed for the legitimacy of Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippin es are the judge. And the people have made the judgment: they have accepted the g overnment of Pres. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but it is fact and law a de jure gove rnment. Kinds of Gov t: 1. De jure = gov t which is exercising control and authority, but without legal ti tle 2. De facto = a gov t which has a legal title but no control or authority a. The government that gets possession and control of or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself ag ainst the will of the latter.

b. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state. c. That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and oc cupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war and which is denominated as a government of paramount force, like the 2nd Republic of the Philippines establi shed by the Japanese belligerent. ? The Arroyo gov t is legitimate bec. o Estrada is permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office considering the his economic advisers have resigned, PNP and military have withd rawn their support... (Estrada v Desierto, GR # 146710-15; Estrada v. Arroyo, GR # 146738, 3/2/2001) o Totality of Act Rule = considered the official actions that happened recogniti on of int l community and both houses has passed resolution confirming GMA s assumpt ion Effectivity of 1987 Constitution = on the date of ratification; 2/2/1987 Effectivity of statutes (Taada v. Tuvera) GR: (Art 2 of CC) Laws shall take effect after 15 days following their publicati on, unless otherwise provided by law Laws that Require Publication: 1. laws of local application and private law (grant of citizenship, change of st reets name) 2. PD s and EO s promulgated by the Pres. in the exercise of his legislative power 3. Administrative rules and regulations promulgated to enforce or implement exis ting laws. Add l req. for adm. rules: a. publication b. submission of 3 copies to the UP Law Center (take effect 15 days after submis sion) 4. Charter of cities 5. Central Bank circulars issued by Monetary Board Need not be published: 1. internal regulations (issuance of internal memorandum 2. letters of instruction issued by an administrative superiors as guidelines fo r subordinate officers How do you construe the provisions of the Constitution? (Executing vs Self-Execu ting Provisions) Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS (February 3, 1997) F: GSIS sold its share on the Manila Hotel Corporation. Filipino corporation inc reased its bid to match the bid price of a Malaysian firm invoked Filipino First policy in Sec 10 Art XII H: it was a self-executing provision A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to e nforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of t he constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.

Taada v. Angara (May 2, 1997) F: constitutionality of WTO; questioned Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12 , Article XII H: The Constitutional provisions are not self-executing; constitutional provisio ns are not static but dynamic These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing pri nciples ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by th e legislature in its enactment of laws. Domino v. Comelec (July 19,1999) F: candidate for a congressional seat claims to be a resident bec. he leased a h ouse on such district H: Domino is not a resident of Sarangani The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people s consciousness , its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have i n common use. (thus the term reclusion perpetua includes life imprisonment) ? in case of doubt, the provisions should be considered self-executing; mandator y rather than directory and prospective rather than retroactive Judicial Review Theory of Judicial Review Judicial Review = power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution BASIS: separation of the branches of the gov t 1. blending of powers 2. check and balance Requisites for Judicial Review: 1. there must be an actual case or controversy (exception: declaratory relief) 2. the constitutional question must be raised by the proper party (legal standin g or locus standi) 3. the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportuni ty 4. the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case = the decision on the constitutional question must be determinative of the case itself ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 63 Phil 139 (1936) When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries it does n ot assert superiority over other branches; it does not in reality nullify or inval idate an act of the legislature but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation as signed to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority unde r the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the ri ght which the instrument secures and guarantees to them. Appropriate proceeding for determining a constitutional question: 1.) mandamus 2.) petition for certiorari (most common) 3.) criminal case = can be raised especially if the law you allegedly violated i

s unconstitutional 4.) and civil case = generally you cannot bec. constitutional issue must be rais ed separately (but in case of jurisdiction of court = can be raised anytime) GR: The case must not raise issues which has became moot and academic EXCEPTION: court exercises its symbolic function Legal Standing (locus standi) = a proper party is one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of ? The expanded definition of judicial power now seemed to have limited the so-ca lled political question. But the political question concept even if limited by the expanded definition of judicial power i.e. Judicial Review power has not alt ogether dissolved the concept of political question. If it refers to wisdom or p ropriety, that is still a political question. TELEBAP v. Comelec (April 21, 1998) F: TELEBAP questioned the constitutionality of giving free air time to the COMEL EC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes. H: TELEBAP has no standing; GMA has 1. Taxpayer s Suit = involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending po wer. Any person who has such interest in such expenditure will have legal standi ng, even though he have not paid his tax 2. Voter s suit = affect the right to suffrage. 3. Citizen s suit = personal injury a. The injury has been personally suffered by the petitioner by reason of the il legal conduct of the government b. The said injury is traceable fairly to the challenged conduct c. The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action A means of providing guarantee to the constitutional provision of free a ccess to courts, any person is allowed to question the validity of a law under t he principle of taxpayers suit. However, a citizen will be allowed to raise a con stitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action and the inju ry is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Gonzales v. Narvasa (140835; 8/14/2000) F: Gonzales contends that when Pres. Estrada created Preparatory Commission on C onstitutional Reform (PCCR) is unconstitutional he encroached into the legislati ve power. Thus the creation of PCCR was unconstitutional. But then PCCR was alre ady dissolved because it has finished its task H: the issue is already moot & petitioner has no locus standi An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable cont roversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner (since PCCR was already dissolved) A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffere d some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (No standing as citi zen because what was encroached was legislative power. If at all, it is the Legi slative who should claim injury) A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issu e when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contra vention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, taxpayer s action is properly brough

t only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending power. ( In this case, there was no appropriation because PCCR s fund was taken from funds of Office of the Pres.) Appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative autho rization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid of the Treasury, w hile appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be sued in the payment of deb t or dues from the State to its creditors. The funds used for the PCCR were take n from the funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of th e Chief Executive s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec 25(5) of Art VI of the Const. IBP v. Zamora (141284; 8/15/2000) F: Pres. Estrada deployed the Marines to join the PNP in patrolling the metropol is. IBP assailed its constitutionality. H: IBP has no standing but SC still resolved the issue Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substant ial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direc t injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term i nterest means material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law a nd nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with sta nding in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other gro ups and the whole citizenry. The IBP has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may s uffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, not of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a resul t of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that a ny of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been viol ated by the deployment of the Marines. BAYAN v. Zamora (138570; 10/10/2000) F: petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) H: petitioners have no locus standi but SC still resolved the issue Taxpayer s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly invo lves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation Clearly, inas much as no public funs raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have not legal standing to assai l the legality of the VFA. Petitioners-legislators have no legal standing because they failed to su fficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct injury. IBP has no standing because it lacks the capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its Na tional President to commence the present action. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (128055; 4/18/2001) F: Sen. Santiago was suspended by the Sandigan for a graft case filed against he r when she was still the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. She insist ed that based on Sec 16(3), Art VI of Const, 2/3 of the members must concur H: SC can review internal matters in Congress if it infringes specific Constitut ional proscription The above constitutional provision is distinct from the preventive suspe nsion of RA 3019. The former is to discipline the members while the latter is no t being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member. When the question, however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view that unless an infri

ngement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres, the Court s hould not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two br anches of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific con stitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial int ervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive t o contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react i n the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (7/9/2002) F: Chavez wants the Public Estates Authority to reveal its dealing with Amari wi th regards to the reclamation of Manila Bay H: Chavez can bring taxpayer s suit The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer s suit because the peti tion seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are tw o constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to inform ation on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitution al provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands wor th billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law manda te PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alien ating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation. Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to th e public. In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer s suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public Agan v. PIATCO (155001; 5/5/2003) F: The repair of the NAIA was awarded to PIATCO which has no financial capabilit y to undertake the activity. Petitioners work at NAIA. They assail the validity of the agreements. H: employees have standing but the representatives of Lower House has none but d ue to the serious legal questions involved, the Court granted them standing Public interest demands that we take a more liberal view in determining whether the petitioners suing as legislators, taxpayers and citizens have locus standi to file the instant petition. In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, ru ling or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. Further, ins ofar as taxpayers suits are concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained. As such, even if strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion o f the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its address ing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. In view of the se rious legal questions involved and their impact on public interest, we resolve t o grant standing to the petitioners. Functions of Judicial Review 1. Checking (negative) = It negates the act and declares it unconstitutional 2. Legitimating (positive) = It declares an act not unconstitutional 3. Symbolic (teaching) = This is exercised even if the conditions are not met si mply because there is a need for the courts to lay down the ruled or principles which would serve as a guide for the bench and the bar for future acts of simila

r character. ? when a law is questioned by someone who has no legal standing, the case will b e dismissed and such law will remain not unconstitutional. But a person with legal standing can again question the constitutionality of such law and if in this in stance the SC has ruled that it is not unconstitutional, then if later petition wi ll be filed, the court will most probably repeat its prior ruling. Moot and Academic 1. if the relief is already granted; 2. if there is no more benefit to the parties concerned if the petition is grant ed, thus, no more need to grant the petition

JAVIER V. COMELEC (22 Sept.1986) F: petitioner questioned the proclamation of rival Pacificador by a division of the COMELEC. Javier insists that it should have been COMELEC en banc. Sol-Gen ar gued that the controversy had become moot and academic since the petitioner had b een killed apparently for political reason and that the BP had been abolished after the February 1986 Revolution. HOLDING: The abolition of BP and the disappearance of the office in dispute betwee n the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have their separate ways-cou ld be a convenient justification for dismissing the case. But there are larger is sues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the le gal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clea possible terms that this court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. The SC is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also consci ence of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must als o give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we c annot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longe r possible according to the law. But there are also times although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice dema nds that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gon e, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. ABS-CBN v. Comelec (January 28, 2000) F: ABS-CBN questioned COMELEC s prohibition of conducting exit survey. SOL-Gen arg ued that petition was already moot since the 1998 election was already finished Holding: In the symbolic function, the SC decided the issue. The objection was t hat such exit polls would give a trend. With the passage of the Fair Elections Act, that puts to rest the question on whether or not exit polls are allowabl e. The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred sp ecifically to the May 11,1998 election, its implications on the people s fundament al freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic el ections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, ex it polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue n ow will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future election. All Courts can Exercise Judicial Review BASIS: 1. (Art VIII Sec. 4 (2))SC exercises appellate jurisdiction involving constituti onality of a treaty, international or executive agreements and one of those case s is the constitutionality of any law, act, order, presidential issuances. This means that even the most inferior court have the authority to declare an act as unconstitutional. 2. the requirement of Judicial Review that we must raise it at the earliest oppo rtunity, and that if you raise it on appeal for the first time (Miranda v. Agui

rre) the Court will not discuss the constitutional question because it is a coll ateral matter.

YNOT V. IAC (20 Mar. 1987) F: law prohibit the transportation of carabao; Ynot was charged under such law b ut trial court refused to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity Holding: This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming mo ty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless prevented from reso lving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the Highest Tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the constitution "to review, revise, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final orders and judgments of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitution lity of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases ma y be made in the first instance by these lower courts. Brokenshire Memorial Hospital vs. Minister of Labor (7 February 1990) F: hospital questioned the constitutionality of wage orders before the NLRC HOLDING: The SC is vested by the Constitution with the power to ultimately declar e a law unconstitutional. Without such declaration, the assailed legislation rem ains operative and can be the source of rights and duties, especially so in the case at bar. The RD is plainly without the authority to declare an order or law uncon stitutional and his duty is merely to enforce the law which stands valid, unless otherwise declared by the SC to be unconstitutional. The SC declares the questi oned Wage Orders constitutional, there being no provision in the 1973, Freedom n or 1987 \constitutions violated by the said Wage Orders, which are without doubt for the benefit of labor. Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality ARTICLE 7, NEW CIVIL CODE: When the courts declare a law to be inconsiste nt with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. ( traditional view) 1. Orthodox or Logical View = An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers n o rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative, as if it had not been passed at all 2. Unorthodox, Modern or Realistic View = certain legal effect of the statute pr ior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB (1971) F: while the debt was existing, EO # 32 (Debt Moratorium Law) was issued. Thus i t took 15 years before the loan can be collected. This law was subsequently decl ared unconstitutional. HOLDING: (Orthodox view) Sucha view has support in logic. It may not howeverbe suffi ciently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of n ullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary,in an appropriat e case, declare its invalidity, it isentitled to obedience and respect. Parties ma y have acted under it andmay have changedtheir positions. It is now accepted as a doctrinethat prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must bereckoned with. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unco nstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot jus tly be ignored. The past cannot just be erased by a new judicial declaration. Th e effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in

various aspects with respect to particular relations, individual or corporate, a nd particular conduct, private and official. FLORES V. DRILON (22June 1993) F: RA 7227, "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," provides automatic app ointment of the Olongapo City mayor as the chairman and chief executive officer of t he Subic authority. Whether this violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts H: the appointment is unconstitutional; SC applied unorthodox view saying that w hen the law was in effect, all legal acts committed under it are valid His acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be co nsidered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful office r, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they i nvolve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised under a color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was want of power in the electing or ap pointing body, or by reason of some defect being unknown to the public or under col or of an election; or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional la w, before the same is adjudged to be such." Aldovino v. Alunan III (March 9, 1994) F: EO 120 reorganized the then Ministry of Tourism. Such order was subsequently declared unconstitutional H: this case used the orthodox view because no rights were violated; all promoti ons, removal and demotions were declared invalid Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unc onstitutionality which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the co urts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a tota l nullity. Plainly, it was as if petitioners and intervenors were never served t heir termination orders and, consequently, were never separated from the service . Political Question vs. Justiciable Question Political Question = connotes a question of policy = those question which under the constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereing capacity; or in regard to which full discretion ary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the g ov t Judicial power (expanded definition) Sec 1 Art 8 = include question involving gr ave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction OPOSA VS. FACTORAN (1993) F: minors prayed for the cancellation of all existing timber license agreements (TLA s) in the country H: TLAs were cancelled; introduced intergenerational responsibility The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology which for the first time in our nation s cons titutional history is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. (Sec 16 Art 11) Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano (July 15, 1999) F: Pagpalain alleged that ILO-PHILS was not a legitimate labor organization due to its failure to comply with the requirements for registration under the Labor Code. This was upheld before by the SC. ILO-PHILS dismissed the claim stating th at such requirement was already dispensed with by Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997. H: Department Order is constitutional This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exis

t for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be vio lative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function o f our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacun ae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itse lf the task of legislating. Progressive and Protection Technology applied and interpreted the then e xisting Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Since book V of the Omnibus Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9, no longer requires a l ocal or chapter to submit books of accounts as a prerequisite for registration, the doctrines enunciated in the above-mentioned cases, with respect to books of account, are already pass and therefore, no longer applicable. The Philippines as a State State = a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a d efinite portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing a g overnment to which a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience (CIR vs . Campos Rueda) Elements of a State: 1.) Territory = Fixed portion of the face of the earth inhabited by the people o f the state 2.) People = adequate number for self-sufficiency; of both sexes for perpetuity 3.) Government = Agency or instrumentality through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed and realized a. governmental or constituent function = involves exercise of sovereignty and t herefore compulsory b. proprietary or ministrant = exercise of proprietary functions and thus consid ered as optional 4.) Sovereignty = Supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a state by which that state is governed a. effect of change of sovereignty = political laws are abrogated; municipal law s remain in force CIR vs. Campos Rueda (Oct. 29, 1971) F: Testator was a resident of Tangier, Morocco. Exemption was denied bec. Tangie r is a mere principality, not a foreign country within the meaning of said provision H: It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a s tate, it is required that it be a politically organized sovereign community indep endent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. It is thu sasovereign personwiththe people composing it viewed as an organizedcorporate society under a government with the legal competence to exactobedience to its commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutua l defense and mutual safety, and to promotethe general welfare. Territory - The Archipelago Doctrine ART I: National Territory: The national territory comprises the Philipp ine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consist ing of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial s ea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardle ss of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Phil ippines. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides: 1. Contiguous Zone of 12 nautical miles from the baseline (territorial sea) 2. Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles from the baseline

o although it is not part of the territory, exclusive economic benefit is reserv ed for the country. o any act performed or to be committed by any country or state is allowable unle ss it involves a question of economics. Straight Baseline Method: Imaginary straight lines are drawn joining the outermost point of outerm ost islands of the archipelago, enclosing an area the ratio of which should not be more than 9:1 (water to land); provided that the drawing of baselines shall n ot depart, to any appreciable extent, from the general configuration of the arch ipelago. Uses of the Baseline 1.) Determine what is internal water (all waters inside the baseline, whether or no t more than 12 miles from the shore). 2.) Determine the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Different Meanings of the Word People under the Constitution: 1) Inhabitants (Art II, Sec 15&16; Art III, Sec 2; Art XIII, Sec 1) 2) Citizens (Preamble; Art II Sec 1 & 4; Art III Sec 7) 3) Electors (Art VI, Sec 2; Art VII, Sec 4; Art XVIII, Sec 25) Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board (9/30/1963) F: Foreigners were arrested pending investigation that they committed economic s abotage by hoarding US dollars. They contend that the can only be arrested when the order for deportation was issued, not when investigation is still pending be c. discretion to arrest pending investigation is only vested with the Pres. H: arrest was invalid; EO 398 authorizing deportation board to arrest pending in vestigation is undue delegation of President s discretionary power thus void (refe r to people as inhabitants in Art III, Sec 2) Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an indi vidual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determ ine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the stat ute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, convey s the intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the pe rson issuing the same. In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of ar rest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegate d, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would ser ve as a curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then a d elegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberties of the people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation. Citizenship Sec. 1, Art IV: The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of thi s Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippin e citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

? The Hague Convention of 1930: If there is conflict of nationalization law, it is for each country to determine who are its citizens Modes of Acquiring Citizenship: 1) by birth a. jus sanguinis = acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relationship b. jus soli = acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place of birth 2) naturalization = the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native born citizen Laws regarding citizenship: 1. treaty of 1898 (Treaty of Paris) 2. Phil. Bill 0f 1902 = introduced jus sanguinis or blood for Phil. citizenship 3. 1935 Constitution a. born here of foreign parents, who, before the adoption ad been elected to public office b. those whose mothers are Filipino and upon reaching the Phil citizenship 4. 1973 and 1987 Consti = child is Filipino if either his e

relationship as basis of the constitution, h age of majority, elect mother or father is on

Election of Phil Citizenship: Procedure: 1. election is expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by the party concern ed before any official authorized to administer oaths 2. statement is filed with the Civil Registry 3. statement is accompanied with an Oath of Allegiance to the Constitution and t he Gov t of the Phil When to elect: Within 3 years from reaching the age of majority, except when the re is justifiable reason for delay (age of majority here is 21 years old, not 18 since RA 6809 lowering the age of majority, was not yet enacted) SITUATION: A, Filipino woman, marries an American in 1961. A became an American citizen because of marriage. In 1962, C was born in US. When C turns 21 in 1983, can he elect Phil. citizenship? ANS: Yes, in electing Phil. citizenship 1. the person s mother was a Filipino at the time of the marriage to the alien fat her, even if she subsequently lost her citizenship by virtue of marriage 2. the person be a child of that marriage SITUATION: What if C was born after 1/17/1973? ANS: C would not even be a Filipino. Under the 1973 Constitution, the mo ther must be a Filipino at the time of birth -- unlike 1935 Constitution where t he mother is a Filipino at the time of marriage. Tecson v. Comelec [161434; 3/3/2004) F: Fernando Poe was born before his parents got married. His Father was a Filipi no but his mother was a foreigner. FPJ was born under 1935 Const. Is marriage ne cessary for a child to acquire the citizenship of his father? H: marriage is not neccessary; FPJ is a natural born Filipino Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the c itizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line wi th the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.

The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that th e 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year o f birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing nei ther conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizen s of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. The re utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions wh ere there clearly are none provided. Co v. Electoral Tribunal (July 30, 1991) F: His Chinese father was naturalized when he was still a minor. His mother is a Filipino. He did not elect Phil. citizenship but he passed CPA board, voted, an d worked at Central Bank. Is he a natural-born Filipino? H: Co is a natural-born Filipino citizen We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an in formal process. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The p rivate respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has es tablished his life here in the Philippines. It was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship fo r him. In Re: Ching (October 1, 1991) F: His father is Chinese while his mother is a Filipino. He did not elect Phil. citizenship upon reaching majority. Passed the bar but was not allowed to take a n oath on the ground that he is a foreigner. Ching was born under 1935 Const. H: Ching is a foreigner The 1935 Constitution and CA No. 625 did not prescribe a time period wit hin which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made...Jurisprudence dictates that this must be done within a reasonable time after attaining the age o f majority. It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable peri od after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has rul ed that 3 years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himsel f a Filipino. The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of maj ority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship i s clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing upon reachi ng the age of majority. Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. VALLES vs. COMELEC (137000; 8/9/2000) F: Lopez was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and alien mother. Sh e won as governor. Valles contends that Lopez renounced her Phil citizenship whe n she applied for ACR in 1988, thus it is of no moment if she renounced her Aust ralian citizenship in 1992. She did not reacquire her Phil citizenship when Lope z elected Filipino citizenship H: Lopez is a Filipino The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate a gainst her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively resul t in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of regist ration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one's citize nship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificat e of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship b

efore she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. Natural-Born Citizens Art. IV, Sec. 2: Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philipp ines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Ph ilippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Categories of Phil. citizenship: 1. Natural-born 2. not natural-born Requisites to be considered a natural-born: 1. a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth; and 2. he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citiz enship ? Thus a child who became a Filipino by deriving the citizenship of his foreign parents who were naturalized CANNOT BE considered a natural born Who must be Natural-born c. President Art VII, Sec 2 d. Vice-President Art, VII, Sec. 3 e. Members of Congress Art. VI, Secs. 3 & 6 f. Justices of SC and lower collegiate courts Art. VIII, Sec. 8 g. Ombudsman and deputies Art. XI, Sec. 8 h. Constitutional Commission members Art IX-B, Sec. 1(1); Art IX-C, Sec. 1(1), A rt. IX-D, Sec 1(1) i. Central Monetary Authority members Art XII, Sec. 20 j. Commission on Human Rights members Art XIII, Secs. 17(2) ? 1935 Constitution = no definition of who are natural born. ? 1973 Constitution = there is for the first time that definition - those who di d not perform any act to perfect or acquire their citizenship. The language is " those who from birth are citizens without performing an act. ? 1987 Constitution = expanded it to include those children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father and who elected Phil citiz enship at the age of majority. SITATION: A child is born in 1936 must elect in 1957. Is that child at 1957 a na tural-born when he elected Phil citizenship? A: We don t know that. There is no definition yet. Assume its 1974 now. Since the definition of natural-born in the 1973 Constitution is that he must be a citizen from birth without having to do anything to perfect his citiz enship, that child who elected Filipino. citizenship in 1957 is not a natural bo rn in 1974. But if that question is again asked in 1988, or after 1987 Constitution took effect, that child is already considered natural born. Even those children born before January 17, 1973 who performed an act to acquire or perfect their ci tizenship are also considered natural born. So the determination is made on the point in time the question is asked. Naturalized Citizens (CA 473; 6/17/1939) Modes of Naturalization: 1. Direct act of congress; 2. Naturalization proceedings a. judicial

b. Administrative (RA 9139) Judicial Process CA Law473 Administrative Process RA 9139: Qualifications Administrative Naturalization of 2000 1.) AGE: (ARC-PEN)age of majority in the country (18 years old) 2.) RESIDENCE: 10 years, 5 years if: a. born in the Phil b. married to a Filipino woman (if husband is Filipino, alien wife only needs an adm. proceeding) c. held office in the Gov t d. been engaged as a teaching in the Phil (in a public or private school not est ablished for the exclusive instruction of persons of a particular nationality or race) or in any of the branches of education or industry from a period of not l ess that 2 years e. made a useful invention or industry 3.) CHARACTER: a. good moral character b. believes in the principles underlying the Phil Const c. must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Phil in his relation with the constituted gov t as well as the community in which he is living 4.) PROPERTY: own real estate in the Phil worth not less than P5,000 or must hav e some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation 5.) EDUCATION: a. petitioner = speak and write Filipino or English and any Phil. dialect b. children = study in Phil. schools, not solely for the foreigners and for the grade schools must teach Phil. government and Constitution. 6.) Not otherwise disqualified by law 1. AGE: age of majority at the time of filing (18 yrs old) 2. RESIDENCE: born and residing here since birth 3. CHARACTER: good moral character 4. PROPERTY: have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation (this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of th eir citizenship) 5. EDUCATION: received primary and secondary education here and his minor childr en are enrolled in Phil schools 6. able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippi nes; and 7. must have mingled with the Filipinos composition of Spcl. Committee on Naturalization: Chair: Sol-Gen Members: Sec. of Foreign Affairs or rep. NatPersons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of a) l Security Adviser Disqualifications group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governme nts; b) Persons defending or teaching the propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; d) Persons convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire t o learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;

g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United State and the Philippine s are at war during the period of such war; and. h) Citizens or subject of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof a. file a Procedure Declaration of Intention before the Sol-Gen at least one year before f iling the petition for naturalization b. file the Petition for Naturalization before the RTC c. the Petition and order of trial should be published 6 months prior to the act ual hearing d. actual residence in the Phil during the entire period e. hearing of the petition f. promulgation of the decision g. hearing after 2 years. During the 2-year probationary period the applicant ha s: (a) not left the Philippines, (b) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession , (c) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government pro mulgated rules, (d) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or co ntrary to any Government announced policies. h. Oath of allegiance before the RTC and issuance of Certificate of Naturalizati on 1.) File a petition before the Special Committee on Naturalization. Pay a proces sing fee of P40,000 2.) The petition shall be published and posted for 3 consecutive weeks. 3.) copies will be furnished to DFA, Bureau of Immigration, civil registrar, NBI and within 30 days submit to the committee whether or not the petitioner has an y record 4.) 60 days after receipt of report from other agencies, committee shall intervi ew applicant 5.) committee will approve or deny the petition 6.) Applicant must pay P100,000 within 30 days from approval 7.) Take an oath of allegiance and certificate of naturalization will be issued 8.) Bureau of Immigration shall forward a copy of the oath to the proper local c ivil registrar and cancel petitioner s ACR Sec 3, Art IV: Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner pr ovided by law. Loss of Citizenship 1. naturalization in a foreign country 2. express renunciation of citizenship or 3. taking an oath of allegiance to another country upon reaching the age of majo rity 4. render service in the armed forces of another country unless there is a defen sive or offensive pact 5. denaturalization Cases on Losing Phil Citizenship through Naturalization in a Foreign Country: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC (June 23, 1989) F: During martial law, Frivaldo went to the US and was naturalized as US Citizen . He subsequently came back and ran for governor. He pleaded that his naturaliza tion was only forced upon him. H: Frivaldo is not a Fil citizen Frivaldo's feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result o f his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected o

utright. There were many other Filipinos in the US similarly situated as Frivaldo , and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary -- nor do they claim to have been coerced -- to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. If petitioner really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacqui re Philippine citizenship, he should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA 63, as amended, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direc t act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation Frivaldo claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims t hat by actively participating in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of US. Such laws do not concern us here. It should be o bvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in he Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Frivaldo v. Comelec ( June 28, 1996) F: Frivaldo s repatriation was completed one day after he won as governor H: The repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his appl ication. It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are sett led exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REM EDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Com mittee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo having already renounced his American citizenship was, may be prejudice d for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law making body intended right and justice to prevail. Republic v. De la Rosa ( June 6, 1994) F: Frivaldo s naturalization proceeding was railroaded to be on time for the deadl ine of filing certificate of candidacy H: Frivaldo is not a Filipino citizen Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thr u naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow t he procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide fo r himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or m erely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who w as formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Ph ilippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien. Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC (Aug. 1, 1989) F: Labo married an Australian and was naturalized as Australian citizen. He won as mayor and contended that he did not lost his Phil citizenship at most, he has dual citizenship H: Labo is NOT a Fil citizen There is no claim of finding that petitioner automatically ceased to be a F ilipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he w as naturalized as such through a formal and positive process. He formally took the oath of allegiance and/or the affirmation of allegiance to Australia Even if it be assumed that petitioner's naturalization was annulled after f inding that his marriage to such Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. That is a matter b etween him and his adopted country.

Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec (July 3, 1992) F: Labo elected Phil citizenship and contends that he is now a Fil. citizen H: Labo remains not a Filipino citizen Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterat e, he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election do es not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office. Cases on Losing Phil Citizenship through express Renunciation or Expatriation: Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago (January 24, 1989) F: Willie Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport but he was subsequently naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Subsequent to his naturalization, he still used his Portuguese passport in his business dealings H: Yu expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citiz enship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his pri or status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passp ort and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had beco me a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portugu ese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citiz enship. Aznar vs. Comelec (May 25, 1990) F: Lito Osmea has Filipino parents yet he holds an Alien Certificate of Registrat ion as US citizen H: No sufficient evidence to prove that Osmea s not a Filipino In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by natur alization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osm ea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinab ove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizen s and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the l aws of the United States does not concern Us here. Reacquisition of Citizenship: Modes of Reacquiring Citizenship: 1) Repatriation = the acquisition or restoration of one s original citizenship. Me re taking the oath of allegiance and registration with the civil registry. Cover age: a) desertion of the armed forces; b) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII c) service in the armed forces of the US at any other time; d) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and e) political and economic necessity 2) Naturalization = an abbreviated process though since residency is reduced to 6 months and there is no need to file a Declaration of Intent (also refer to RA 9139: Adm Naturalization Law of 2000) 3) Direct Act of Congress 4) RA 9225: Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 = they will re -acquire their Fil citizenship a) Coverage: former natural-born Filipino who lost their citizenship through nat

uralization in the foreign country (whether it was lost before or after this Act ) b) Procedure: take an oath of allegiance c) derivative citizenship to minor unmarried child of applicant Effect: of RA 9225: They will enjoy full civil and political rights but with ff. conditions: 1. those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must comply with RA 9189 or The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other laws 2. those seeking elective public office must make a sworn renunciation of all fo reign citizenship 3. those appointed to any public office must renounce the oath of allegiance the y took from another country 4. those intending to practice their profession must apply for license 5. the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office cannot be e xercised by those who: a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or b. are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the arm ed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens ? Bec. of RA 9225, the ruling on Frivaldo, Labo were already abrogated (do not c onfuse this w/ RA 9255 which allowed illegitimate children to use the surname of their fathers) Bengson v. HRET (142840; 5/7/2001) F: Bengson served US Marine Corps thus lost his citizenship. He re-acquired it t hough repatriation H: Repatriated Filipinos are also considered natural-born Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This m eans that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to hi s prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was o riginally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he w ill be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. Dual Allegiance Sec 5, Art IV: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual allegiance, that's how the Constitution is phrased. But in the LGC it refers to dual citizenship. Dual allegiance is what is prevented under the C onstitution not dual citizenship. Mercado v. Manzano (135083; 5/26/1999) F: Edu Manzano is a Filipino born in the US. Since Sec 40 of LGC prohibits candi dates with dual citizenship, he could not seat as vice mayor H: the phrase dual citizenship refers to dual allegiance The following classes of citizens of the Philippines may posses dual cit izenship: 1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which foll ow the principle of jus soli; 2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; 3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter s country the former are co nsidered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renou nced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, b y some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is in

voluntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual s volition. For candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the fil ing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to ter minate their status as person with dual citizenship. By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time for swear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereb y terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of vie w of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively r enounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, p rivate respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his Ame rican citizenship The filing of such COC sufficed to renounce his American citize nship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen . (the oath of allegiance contained therein is enough) By declaring in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a Filipino citiz en; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively re pudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. Sovereignty Sovereign Immunity(Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty) Sec 3, Art XVI: The State may not be sued without its consent.

Basis: 1. There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on whic h the right depends. However, it may be sued if it gives consent, whether expres s or implied 2. practicality: to allow suits against the state will lessen governmental effic iency since it will divert the state s time and resources Republic vs. Villasor (November 28, 1973) F: RTC judge garnished AFP funds deposited with the Phil. Veterans Bank H: it cannot be garnished since it is still considered public property Public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if th e consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudge d. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action `only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' a nd that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since govern ment funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishm ent to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public poli cy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropria tion as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. Money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. When is a Suit against the State (1) When the Republic is sued by name;

(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; (3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is su ch that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. TEST: if it will require affirmative action on the part of the State in form of: 1. appropriating funds to satisfy the judgment; or 2. it would mean loss of government property. Begosa vs. Chairman, Phil. Veterans Administration (April 30, 1970) F: Bank refused to release a retired army s pension H: this is not a suit against the state since the money was already appropriated It is well settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of proper ty, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capac ity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionar y had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (July 10, 1991) F: Cojuangco asks the gov t the let him examine the books of San Miguel since his shares have been sequestered by the PCGG H: this is not a suit against the state bec. it does not require appropriation o f money or loss of gov t property No, the doctrine of state immunity cannot apply here. For one thing, the petition filed by respondent Cojuangco, Jr., before t he Sandiganbayan demanded no affirmative performance by the State in its politic al capacity which would otherwise call for the application of immunity from suit . Suits against Government Agency: 1. Incorporated (GOCC w/ or without a special charter) = has a charter of its ow n that invest it with a separate juridical personality (ex. SSS, UP, PNB, City o f Manila, municipal corp) a. test of suability: found in its charter; SUABLE if its charter says so, regar dless of the function it is performing 2. Unincorporated (Not a GOCC) = no separate juridical personality but is merged in the general machinery of the gov t (ex. DOJ, Gov t Printing Office) a. no charter to consult; any suit filed against it is necessary an action again st the Phil gov t b. determine the nature of functions: SUABLE if proprietary; NOT SUABLE if gover nmental c. If the proprietary and non-governmental function is taken as an incident to i ts governmental function, immunity is not lost Suits against Public Officers: 1. Immunity applies if the official acted within the scope of his authority 2. Immunity does not apply on unauthorized acts of gov t officials a. when the act was ultra vires, or showed bad faith, malice or gross ne gligence b. public official was sued in his personal capacity M.H. Wylie vs. Rarang (May 28, 1992) F: Wylie supervised the publication of the "Plan of theDay"(POD) which was publish ed daily by the US Naval Base Station. It carried an article that Auring is corr upt. Since there is only one Auring in the office, Rarang then sued Wylie for li bel. H: Wylie is liable. The general rule is that public officials can be held personal ly liable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official dutie s where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.

Indeed, the imputation of theft in the POD dated Feb. 3, 1978 is a defam ation against the character and reputation of private respondent. Petitioner Wyli e himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name "Auring" if the article were published. The petitioners , however, are negligent because under their direction they issued the publicatio n without deleting the name. Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be p art of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private responde nt. U.S. vs. Reyes (March 1, 1993) F: Montoya married an American serviceman. After buying items at the US Navy Exc hange, she was searched thoroughly at the parking place before being allowed to leave. She was the only person searched thus she sued Bradford, an American and the activity exchange manager at the said JUSMAG Headquarters. H: The case falls within the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. The rule is that, if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appro priation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, this must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally include d. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unautho rized acts of government officials or officers by one whose rights has been invade d or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of State from suit. It is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her private or p ersonal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official functions, that is, outside the NEX-JUSMAG. Republic vs. Sandoval (March 19, 1993) F: heirs of the deceased of the Mendiola Massacre sued the military officers and personnel involved in the incident based on Pres. Aquino s pronouncement that the victims should be compensated H: This is not a suit against the State ; public officials have acted beyond the scope of their authority While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. Although the military officers and personnel , then party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the inci dent occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded th eir authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the p olice and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. B lg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. Vidad vs. Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental (October 18, 1993) F: public school teachers held a strike. They were administratively charged by D ECS. Teachers then went to court and filed a petition for injunction which was g ranted by the RTC. Teachers asked for damages since DECS officials acted in bad faith and malice when they refused to release their benefits. H: RTC has no jurisdiction Public officials are certainly not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising from acts done in bad faith; in these and similar cases, the public officials may not be said to have acted within the scope of their offici al authority, and no longer are they protected by the mantle of immunity for off icial actions. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogat e unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Court cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question w hich is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal; hence, in the ins tant case, it behooves the court to suspend its action on the cases before it pe

nding the final action in the administrative proceedings Lansang v. CA (February 23, 2000) F: Blind operated a kiosks at Rizal Park through a verbal agreement by the forme r chair of the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). Iglesia signed a con sent but now contend he was tricked into signing it H: Lansang is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his persona l capacity. However, there is no evidence of such abuse of authority. Thus, no n eed to pay damages to GABI. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed aga inst public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction o f the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itse lf to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to p ay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his offi cial capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. Calub v. CA (115634; 4/27/2000) F: petitioners are DENR employees. They impounded the vehicles of private respon dent for carrying lumber without a license. PR thus filed a replevin suit agains t them contending the DENR failed to follow its procedure. RTC & CA sided with P R. H: seizure was lawful; this is a suit against the State Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its c onsent.. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect , a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable . However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith an d without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for w hich the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the d ischarge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and fu nctions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority . There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the pet itioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper w ithout the State s consent. Suits against Foreign State: 1. other states can claim immunity because of incorporation of generally accepte d principles of international law into our Constitution a. if the contract want entered in their proprietary capacity = foreign state ca n be sued 2. diplomatic immunity = immune because of agreement (like the Vienna Convention ) NOT bec. he represents his state a. Consular Officers = only immune as to their official acts b. Ambassadors and Head of State = they are immune as to all acts; thus if they commit murder, they cannot be charged here c. only diplomats are immune, ordinary embassy employees are not 3. International Organizations = they are immune if: a. it is provided for by their agreements b. they are created for non-political purpose Southeast Asian Fisheries Development (SEAFDEC) vs. Acosta (September 2, 1993) F: SEAFDEC employees sued their employer for being wrongfully terminated. SEAFDE C is an international inter-government organization, composed of various Southea

st Asian countries H: SEAFDEC is immune bec. of the agreement SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. The pur pose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries developmen t in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the member governments of the C enter, hereinafter called the 'Members', and through collaboration with internat ional organizations and governments external to the Center. (Agreement Establish ing the SEAFDEC, Art. 1; . . .) Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom fro m control of the state in whose territory its office is located. How is Consent Given 1.) express = can only be given by a law enacted by Congress; thus, an executiv e issuance is not enough a. ACT 3038: the gov t consents to be sued for any money claim arising from contra ct, express or implied IF the party first presents his claim to the COA. Jurisdi ction is the RTC where the claimant resides. If the decision is adverse to the g ov t, the decision shall be forwarded to the Pres. who will include it on the annu al budget b. CA 327, amended by PD 1415: 2.) implied = State can be sued even without its consent a. when the State initiates the litigation b. when the State enters into a business contract c. if it is inequitable for the government to claim immunity (ex. is when the go v t expropriates property but failed to pay the owner) Republic vs. Purisima (Aug. 31, 1977) F: Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc filed a civil case for breach of contract again st Rice & Corn Administration H: Rice & Corn Adm. is immune; the consent to be sued to be effective must come f rom the state through a statute, not through any agreement made by counsel for the Ri ce & Corn Administration. Court has no jurisdiction to pass onthe meritsof a claim against any offic e or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless co nsent be shown. What is more, the position of the Republic has been forfeited wi th the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the Constitution: ' The Stat e may not be sued without its consent.' Apparently, respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract betwe en the private respondent Yellow Ball Freight and defendant Rice & Corn Administra tion which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract withi n the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through uly enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice & Corn Administratio n agreed to had no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority. Republic vs. Feliciano (March 12, 1987) F: the land owned by Feliciano was included as part of the land expropriated by gov t for settlement purposes. This was based on Pres. Magsaysay s proclamation. H: State is till immune; consent of the Republic cannot be derived from a procla mation which is not a legislative act. The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled j urisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consente d to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory la nguage too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant c ase. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read f rom the Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation "subject to pri vate rights, if any there be."

We do not agree. No such consent can be drawn from the language of the P roclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation estab lished by Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity o f the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, wi ll not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreove r, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sue d must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be ma de by an act of the legislative body. Veterans Manpower & Protective Services, Inc. vs. CA (Sept. 25, 1992) F: VMPSI is a security agency whose license was not renewed by PADPAO bec. it wa s guilty of cut-throat competition. Thus it sued PADPAO. H: This is a suit against the state without its consent; the memorandum was not a valid consent The PC Chief and the PC-SUSIA being instrumentalities of the national gover nment exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said of ficial and agency may not be sued without the Government's consent. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authorit y, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. In the instant ca se, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and the PADPAO did n ot constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued; it was intended to profess ionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly a governmental function. The e xecution of said agreement is incidental to the purpose of RA 5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and operation of private detective watchmen or s ecurity guard agencies. The correct test for the application of state immunity is n ot the conclusion of the contract by the State but the legal nature of the act. Department of Agriculture (DA) vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) (N ovember 11, 1993) F: DA paid the Sultan Security Agency for the security guards it provided yet th e security guards were not paid. H: This is a suit against the state (a suit against unincorporated gov t agency) Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done in its prop rietary capacity. In this case, DA has not assumed a capacity apart from its being a gover nmental entity when it entered into the contract Express Consent: Money Claims Arising from Contract Sayson vs. Singson (19 December 1973) F: Singson, owner of Singkier Motor Service, won the bidding with P40T overprice d supplies. District engr. was charged of malversation. Now, Singkier filed a ma ndamus to get the balance of his contract H: Mandamus is not the proper remedy Mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim again st the State but an ordinary action for specific performance. Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers fo r payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained b y the Court except with the consent of the State. In other words, respondent Singson should have filed his claim with the G AO, under the provisions of CA 327 which prescribes the conditions under which m oney claims against the State may be filed. Express Consent: Incorporation of Government Owned and/or Controlled Corporation s

NHA V. Heirs of Guivelondo (154411; 6/19/2003) F: NHA expropriated the land of the respondents. While the negotiation for the a mount of just compensation was ongoing, NHA decided not to continue with the pro ject because of the land s high price, rendering it impossible to implement the so cialized housing project. RTC did not agree and garnished NHA s bank account H: NHA must continue with the expropriation; NHA s funds can be garnished However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from ga rnishment. This is so because when the government enters into commercial busines s, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corpor ation. Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate ag ency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment. This doctrine was applied to suits filed against the Philippine Virginia Tobacc o Administration; the National Shipyard & Steel Corporation; the Manila Hotel Co mpany; and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation Implied Consent: Government Enters Into Business Contracts United States of America vs. Ruiz (22 May 1985) F: Eligio de Guzman & Co., bid for the repair of US Naval base. Its bid was reje cted because of its previous unsatisfactory performance. It then sued the member s of the Engineering Command. H: the case is covered by state immunity It is necessary to distinguish between sovereign and governmental acts (j ure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts Jure gestionis). The r esult is that STATE IMMUNITY NOW EXTENDS ONLY TO ACTS JURE IMPERIL The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the pro ceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its comm ercial activities and economic affairs. Stated differently, A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE T ACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS. IT DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE CONTRACT RELATES TO THE EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN F UNCTIONS. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which i s devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a func tion of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedic ated to commercial or business purposes. USA vs. Guinto (26 February 1990) F: US Air Force conducted a bid for its barber shop. The winner sued saying he m ade a bid for 4 facilities but only 3 are awarded H: this is not a suit against the state bec. the barbershop is open to the publi c The barbering services concessions granted by the US are commercial enterpris es operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed Forces nor are they facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for growing needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure, etc. And all for a fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires was even sent abroad to improve his tonsorial business, presumably for the benefit o f his customers. No less significantly, if not more so, all the barbershop conce ssionaires are, under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to the US Government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions grant ed to them in their respective areas. This being the case, the petitioners canno t plead any immunity from the complaint.

F: the cook was dismissed for pouring urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. H: this is not a suit against the state bec. the restaurant is open to the publi c The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the d ismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prospe r even if it be established that they were acting as agents of the US when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the US Govern ment itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the emp loyment with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. F: an employee of the Base was busted for using drugs. He sued his arrestors for being liable of his dismissal H: this is a suit against the state The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Spec ial Investigation and were charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guil ty of such acts. It cannot be for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified a gainst the complainants. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their princip al, which has not given its consent to be sued. Implied Consent: Inequitable to Claim Immunity EPG Construction v. Vigilar (131544; 3/16/2001) F: Contractors, based on the verbal order of DPWH Undersecretary, undertake addi tional constructions. COA refused to pay them. H: they must be paid based on quantum meruit; State cannot claim Royal Prerogati ve of Dishonesty because it will perpetuate injustice The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instr ument of perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if th e rule of law were to be maintained. Implied Consent: Government Initiates a Complaint; Open to Counterclaim Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Company, 95 Phil. 905 (30 September 1954) F: Froilan bought a ship from the Shipping Commission and mortgaged it for the b alance. Froilan failed to pay thus the ship was seized and given to Pan Oriental . Pres. ordered Shipping Commission to return the ship, but Pan Oriental refused H: the State can be sued bec. by filing its complaintinintervention, the Governmen t in effect waived its right of nonsuability The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The State as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its p rivileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter auto matically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims a nd other defenses he might have against the state. Scope of Consent: Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution of judgment against it. Such execution will require another waiver, because the power of th e court ends when the judgment is rendered since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment, unless such disburse ment is covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. But funds belonging to incorporated government corporations are not exem pt from garnishment.

Money in the hands of government agency (engaged in governmental functio ns), even if due to a third party, is not liable to creditors of the third party through garnishment. Scope of Consent: Under Act No. 3083 Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego, 31 SCRA 616 (18 February 1970) F: the land was expropriated in 1940 but was only paid in 1958. A compromise agr eement was made thus RTC issued a writ of execution on the DPWH s bank account H: the writ of execution is void The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by priva te parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "onl y up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and th at the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishments to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriat ion as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. Scope of Consent: Under a Charter 1. LGU = if found to be liable, the local legislative council must still appropr iate the funds 2. GOCC = consent is valid from the filing of the case up to the execution of th e judgment Reason why GOCC with original charters can be sued: Consent to be sued only come s in the form of a law. A Congressional act provided such GOCC s with a separate p ersonality thus any suit against it is no longer a suit against the State. The funds of GOCC s can be executed, even if the money has the characteris tics of public funds, because the money there is not from the public treasury PNB vs. CIR, 81 SCRA 314 (1978) F: court garnished the deposit of People's Homesite and Housing Corp. (PHHC) in favor of United Homesite Employees and Laborers Assoc H: it can be garnished because PHHC had a juridical existence enabling it to sue and be sued The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be a ccepted in the sense that the PHHC was a governmentowned entity. It does not foll ow though that they were exempt from garnishment. Garnishment was the proper rem edy for the prevailing party which could proceed against the funds of a corporat e entity even if owned and controlled by the government. When the gov't enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign cap acity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particul ar business thru the instrumentality of a corp., the gov't divests itself pro ha c vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corp. subject to the rule s of law governing private corporations. Scope of Consent: Execution Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLR C) September 18, 1996 F: an ADB employee sued the bank for illegally dismissing him H: ADB is immune from suit bec. this case does not fall under the exceptions The stipulations of both ADB s Charter and Headquarters Agreement should b e able, to establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guaran tee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, th e ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form. The Bank's officers, on

this part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their offi cial capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunit ies and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by t he Philippine government which must be respected. Republic vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) (October 17, 1996) F: PNEI was taken over by Asset Privatization Trust. Creditors and employees sue d APT which is handling PNEI for recovery of their money H: APT can be sued but only liable to the extent of the amount of assets it took over Proclamation No. 50, creating APT which has been mandated to "take titl e to and possession of, conserve, provisionally manage and dispose of assets" th at have been identified for privatization or disposition, clearly provides that said instrumentality, among other things, can "sue and be sued." This provision indubitably shows that APT can be haled to court. Suability vs. Liability Determined on is liable if or absence ofapplicable express BUTimplied the dama Liability in thefrom thecommitted through aagents)law Suability (Quasi-delictsofinceptionby spcl.action to the rendition of judgment 2180CC: State Scope: only good presence evidence andthe special agent or NOT when basis it acts of consent ge is caused by an official to whom the task done properly pertains 2176 CC appl ies i Art 2180 CC is for liability and not suability i Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the compet ence to sue and be sued o BUT: not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental f unctions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were actin g in proprietary capacity Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands 34 Phil. 311 (21 Match 1916) F: gov t ambulance collided with a motorcycle. The cause was the negligence of the ambulance driver H: The State is liable only for the acts of its agents, officers and employees w hen they act as special agents In a damage case, the responsibility of the State is limited to that act whic h it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or co mmission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives r ise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputabl e to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who could be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs. Firme, 195 SCRA 692 (08 April 1991) F: a passenger jeepney collided with a gov t owned gravel and sand truck H: the Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable becau se their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, th ey are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of gove rnmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, t he State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the ca se comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cann ot recover. GOVERNMENT Government = is that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are neces sary to enable men to live in a social state on which are imposed upon the peopl

e forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribin g them. (US vs. Dorr) Government of the Philippines = Refers to the corporate government entit y through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philipp ines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barang ay subdivisions, or other forms of local government. (Adm Code of 1987, Section 2 (1)) ?? ?? ?? ??

1 Constitutional Law 1 Review Emily Zen Chua Carolyn