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CASE DOCTRINES AND ADDITIONAL NOTES CRIMINAL LAW II (Culled from Florenz Regalado s Conspectus and Ortega s Notes)

Article 114. TREASON > The details of the testimony on the acts testified by witnesses need not be ide ntical (People vs. Abad) > The two-witness rule is not required to prove adherence to the enemy (People vs. Alitagtag) > Treason absorbs crimes committed in the furtherance thereof (People vs. Villanue va) > Righteous Action, as when the collaborator also helped save some guerrillas fro m death at the hands of the invader is illogical and baseless (People vs. Victori a) > Defense of Suspended Allegiance by reason of change of sovereignty was untenabl e since a citizen owes an absolute allegiance to his country (Laurel vs. Misa) > An assemblage even without an armed public uprising is sufficient. Article 115. CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT TREASON. > Separately punished only if Treason was not committed. > N/A two-witness rule ARTICLE 116. MISPRISION OF TREASON. > Felony by omission. Mere silence is punishable even without attempt to conceal . (ACTUAL EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY is the BASIS) > N/A two-witness rule ARTICLE 120. CORRESPONDENCE WITH HOSTILE COUNTRY. > Express Prohibition by Government of Correspondence is a mala prohibitum there fore punishable even if contained innocent matters. > N/A two-witness rule ARTICLE 121. FLIGHT TO ENEMY S COUNTRY. > Express Prohibition by Competent Authority is a mala prohibitum therefore puni shable for whatever purpose of the offender. Mere Attempt consummates crime. ARTICLE 124. ARBITRARY DETENTION. > A private person can be liable and punished if he acted in conspiracy with publ ic officers. (People vs. Camerino) > Mistake of Fact, Good Faith, acted without culpable negligence are valid defens es, even if it turns out that the person was innocent. (People vs. Ancheta) > No legal ground, without intent to deliver to judicial authorities. (Arbitrary Detention) > No Legal ground, with intent to turn over to judicial authorities (Unlawful Ar rest) > Legal Ground with intent to deliver to judicial authorities but unreasonably d elays (Undue Delay under 125) > No intent to detain, but unlawfully prevented for an appreciable length of tim e from free movement (Coercion) > Victim is a woman and detained with lewd designs from the outset (abduction) > Offenses cannot be complexed. > Psychological and not only physical restraint is sufficient for the crime of ar bitrary detention, as when victim was permitted to take meals outside of detenti on but was too terrorized not to return. (People vs. Oliva) ARTICLE 125. DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AU THORITIES. > Provision applies to arrests without warrant and it is lawful. > Delivery refers to filing of complaint; Judicial Authority refers to courts of justice not the public prosecutor (Sayo et al. vs. Chief of Police) > Failure to deliver the arrestee does not make detention illegal, it just makes

the arresting officer criminally liable (People vs. Mabong) > Article applies to special laws. (.. or their equivalent , referring to penalty ca tegories) > The hours during which the courts are closed and no deliver can be made are not to be counted (People vs. Acasio) > Arrested person may be detained beyond stated periods if he demands preliminar y investigation (Sec. 7 Rule 112 Rev. Rules Crim. Pro.) > Art. 125 made applicable to security guards employed by a company who arrested and delayed the turnover of public officers whom they held in custody (People v s. Sali) ARTICLE 126. DELAYING RELEASE. > Order of release may be given verbally. (People vs. Misa) ARTILCE 127. EXPULSION. > Only Chief Executive can order deportation. ARTICLE 128. VIOLATION OF DOMICILE. > Implied objection, where entry was effected through an opening not intended fo r that purpose. (first mode liable) > If Offender is a private individual, trespass to dwelling is committed > A public officer entering another s dwelling to prevent some serious harm to him self or the dwelling s occupants or a third person or entry into taverns and other public houses absolves a person from criminal liability. ARTICLE 129. SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED AND ABUSE IN THE SERVICE OF TH OSE LEGALLY OBTAINED. > Perjury and others crime separate. > If a private individual conspired he is liable under this article. (US vs. Pon te) ARTICLE 130. SEARCHING DOMICILE WITHOUT WITNESSES. > Applicable in searches with a warrant or valid warrantless searches; also wher e there is consent of owner, or incidental to a lawful arrest. ARTICLE 131. PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION AND DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS. > Public Officers vs. 153- Private Individuals > This cannot be committed by a person who is a participant in the meeting (People vs. Calera)- <Unjust Vexation, proper crime here> ARTICLE 132. INTERRUPTION OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP > Public Officers vs. 153- Private Individuals > Customarily observed and authorized by authorities of a religion. > There must actually be a religious ceremony. If the offense was committed only in a meeting or a rally of a sect it would be punishable under Art. 131 (People v s. Reyes) ARTICLE 133. OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS. > Public Officer/Private Individuals > A public rally by itself conducted by a religious group is not religious ceremo ny. (People vs. Mandoriao, Jr.) > If acts committed in a place devoted to religious worship, unnecessary that a religious ceremony is conducted. ARTICLE 134. REBELLION OR INSURRECTION. ARTICLE 134-A. COUP D ETAT. > Both crimes can be committed in peace or war time > An armed public uprising by a substantial number of rebels is generally requir ed. > Rebellion cannot be complexed with but absorbs acts committed in the furtheranc

e of the rebellious movement. (People vs. Hernandez; Enrile vs. Salazar) > Offenses committed for personal reasons or other motives are punished separatel y even if committed simultaneously with the rebellious acts (People vs. Oliva) > Illegal Possession of firearm in furtherance of rebellion under PD 1866 is dist inct from the crime of rebellion under the RPC. Therefore violation of PD 1866 b eing malum prohibitum, invalidates the defenses of good faith and absence of cri minal intent. (People vs. de Gracia) > A crime under the RPC cannot be absorbed by a statutory offense, therefore char ging one of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion is proper . (People vs. Tiozon). > No crime of misprision of rebellion (US vs. Ravidas) *Misprision is only to trea son! > Concealment by the offender of the rebellious activities may make him an acces sory. ARTICLE 137. DISLOYALTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES. > No Crime under this article if principal crime is treason. ARTICLE 139. SEDITION. > Arms not necessary as long as there is tumultuous public uprising. > Sedition does not absorb murder committed by reason or in furtherance of the se ditious activities. (People vs. Cabrera) MAJOR CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER. 1. Treason: Conspiracy and proposal (Art. 115), Misprision of Treason (Art. 116) <No Crime of Inciting to Treason> 2. Rebellion: Conspiracy and Proposal (Art. 136), Disloyalty of Public Officers (Art. 137), inciting (Art. 138) 3. Coup d etat: Conspiracy and proposal (Art. 136) 4. Sedition: Conspiracy (Art. 141), Inciting (Art. 142) > BASIC RULE: Conspiracy, proposal and inciting are punishable only if major crim es are NOT COMMITTED. Otherwise they are absorbed and offenders will be principal by inducement. > Acts or words of incitement must have been premeditated, otherwise if they wer e only spontaneous the crime will be tumultuous disturbance as an outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition (Art.153) > The assemblage of persons present must not have been called for the purpose of listening to such incitement, otherwise the crime will be illegal assembly (Art . 146). > Misprision of Treason and disloyalty of public officers can be prosecuted inde pendently. > In re: Sedition, Knowingly conceal such evil practices <Art. 142> principal not accessory! ARTICLE 143. ACTS TENDING TO PREVENT THE MEETING OF THE CONGRESS AND SIMILAR BOD IES. ARTICLE 144. DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS. > No public uprising involved. > Force producing physical injuries, or Fraud involving falsification. Said offe nses are complexed as necessary means employed. ARTICLE 146. ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES. > Assembly was for the purpose of committing offenses other than treason, rebell ion, sedition or assault. Presumption is that there are persons armed otherwise it will be covered by Public Disorder (Art. 153) or unlawful utterances (Art. 15 4[2]) ARTICLE 148. DIRECT ASSAULT. FIRST FORM: (Force/Intimidation + Objectives of Rebellion/Sedition ng Public Uprisi

> To constitute direct assault against an agent of a person in authority the viol ence, intimidation or resistance employed by the offender must be serious. (US vs . Tabiana) > If the victim is a person in authority the degree of force employed against him is immaterial as the mere laying of hands on him is sufficient (US vs. Gumban) > In all forms of assault, resistance or disobedience, it is required that (a) th e accused knew the identity of the victim and (b) the victim was then acting in the due and lawful performance of his duties, or the reason for the attack again st him was his performance of such official duties. (People vs. Rellin) > If both are accused and victim are public officers, NO DIRECT ASSAULT, because it presupposes that the accused was not discharging his official duties during the attack. Offense may be coercion or physical injuries <II Viada 246> > Attack was on the occasion of the performance by victim of his official duties, motive is immaterial. (US vs. Garcia) > If the cause of the direct assault was the past performance by the victim of hi s official duties which the accused resented, the accused is guilty of direct as sault even if he attacked the victim while both were going out to fight (Justo v s. CA) > Direct assault is committed even if several days had transpired between the vic tim s performance of his official duty and the assault, as where the judge was att acked by the offender by reason of a contempt order he issued for the incarcerat ion of the latter several days before the offense (People vs. Torrecarion) > If motive will not be established, as when a judge was boxed out while it is st anding on a railway station, crime will be physical injuries (People vs. Saiel) > If a school teacher was slapped by the accused not while she was performing her school functions nor by reason thereof, but in the presence of her pupils, the crime was held to be slander by deed (People vs. Gamo) > If direct assault was committed with slight physical injuries and the victim is a person in authority, they will be separate crimes; but if the victim is an ag ent of a person in authority, the slight physical injuries will be absorbed in t he direct assault (People vs. Acierto) > If the public officer was acting with abuse of his official functions, he is de emed to be acting in a private capacity and if he is attacked, there would be no crime of direct assault. Thus, where two councillors fought in the session hall , there could be no direct assault if the cause of the fight was a private matte r. (People vs. Yosoya) ARTICLE 149. INDIRECT ASSAULT. > Whether or not there is request or order from the he latter. (Said person is considered an agent of a > If the agent of a person in authority is attacked aid, and the latter was also attacked, the offender ies or coercion depending on the acts committed. person in authority to aid t person in authority) and a third person comes to is liable for physical injur

ARTICLE 153. TUMULTS AND OTHER DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC ORDER. > There can be separate crimes of physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and tumultuous disturbance caused by the firing of a submachine gun. (People vs. Bac olod) > An accused could also be liable for the complex crime of assault and tumultuous disturbance if the latter offense was committed on the same occasion and by the same means of attacking some election inspectors. (Villanueva vs. Ortiz) ARTICLE 154. UNLAWFUL USE OF MEANS OF PUBLICATION AND UNLAWFUL UTTERANCES. > Paragraph 2, should be distinguished from inciting to sedition as the latter re quires offender at the same time to incite the people to rise publicly against t he government. (People vs. Arrogante) ARTICLE 156. DELIVERY OF PRISONERS FROM JAIL. > Conspirators are liable under the article, but the warden or jail custodian of prisoners is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoners (Alberto vs. dela

Cruz) > Bribery shall be a separate crime. > If the prisoner is detained for the crime of treason, parricide, murder or an attempt against the President s life it has been suggested that those who delivere d him from jail are accessories to those crimes. > When a guard who was off duty took out a prisoner from jail for 5 hours replaci ng him in his cell another prisoner, guard is liable under the article (People vs . Del Barrio) ARTICLE 157.EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE ARTICLE 158. EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE ON THE OCCASION OF DISORDERS, CONFLA GRATIONS, EARTHQUAKES, OR OTHER CALAMITIES. ARTICLE 159. OTHER CASES OF EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE. > There is no evasion of service of sentence if the escapee is (a) only a detenti on prisoner, (b) is a youthful offender committed to a rehabilitation center, (c ) is a deportee who violates the deportation order. (US vs. Loo Hoe) > Article 157. Applicable to Destierro (People vs. Abilong) > Article 158. Imprisonment. N/A Destierro > Article 159. Applicable to Destierro > Accused was forced by some detainees to leave the jail, but he returned thereaf ter. There was no mutiny. (People vs. Padilla) > Violation under Art. 159 is substantive if penalty remitted is 6 years or less since a penalty is imposed therein (People vs. Martin) ARTICLE 160. QUASI-RECIDIVISM > The offense committed while the accused is serving sentence must be a felony, n ot a crime punished by a special law. With regard to the offense of which the ac cused was already sentenced by final judgment, it does not matter whether it was also a felony or a crime punished by a special law. (People vs. Peralta) > Quasi-recidivism can also be committed while offender was at large after escapi ng from the penal institution (People vs. Maternal) or while he was in the act of escaping therefrom (People vs. Tiongson) ARTICLE 161. COUNTERFEITING THE GREAT SEAL OF THE GOVT. OF THE PHILIPPINES, FORG ING THE SIGNATURE OR STAMP OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE. ARTICLE 162. USING FORGED SIGNATURE OR COUNTERFEIT SEAL OR STAMP. > If the document is one supposedly signed by the President in a private capacit y the crime would be falsification and not forgery under the Article 161. ARTICLE 166-169. FORGING TREASURY OR BANK NOTES, OBLIGATIONS AND SECURITIES; IMP ORTING AND UTTERING FALSE OR FORGED NOTES, OBLIGATIONS AND SECURITIES. > A Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket has been declared to be a governmental obligation (People vs. Balmores) > Intent to use illegally possessed counterfeit notes and instruments of credit may be determined from the volume or number of said notes and the acts of the ac cused taken in connection therewith. > No impossible crime here, as it deals with crimes against persons and property only. > Where the accused encashed a treasury warrant, which is a governmental obligati on, but he did so by posing and signing as the payee thereof, the crime is falsi fication and not forgery (People vs. Samson) <Art. 171 Par. 2> ARTICLE 171. FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER, EMPLOYEE OR NOTARY OR ECCLESIASTIC MINISTER. > In imitating or counterfeiting there must be some similarity or resemblance bet ween the original and the counterfeit (US vs. Lampa) > Voting in place of a registered voter, an example of violation under par. 2 (Peo ple vs. Abubakar) > Paragraph 4: Making false statements in an application form for patrolman examination (Civil S

ervice Form No. 2), under oath as required constitutes perjury not falsification (People vs. Cruz) No such legal obligation in the preparation of the formation papers of a corporat ion to state the truth, so there is no falsification (People vs. Quasha) There was no legal obligation to disclose the fact of a previous conviction in th e personal data form submitted by the offender to the police department since th at form was not an official document, hence no falsification was committed. (Peopl e vs. Poserio) There is a legal obligation to disclose the truth in entries made in a residence certificate, hence the accused was liable for falsification. (People vs. Po Giok To) NBI personal data sheet is an official document (People vs. Uy) > Where force was employed to compel another to execute a contract, the offender is not liable for falsification as such compulsion does not make it a false inst rument, but only a voidable one. (US vs. Milla) > Falsification can be committed by imprudence, either by a private individual (P eople vs. Baas) or by a public officer (People vs. Castillo) > The person in possession of a falsified document is presumed to have falsified the same, especially so if he had the opportunity and the motive to do so. (Peopl e vs. Manansala) > What is required to be true is an assertion of fact by the accused; hence where the declarant stated that she was eligible for the public position, an inaccuracy therein could not hold her liable for falsification as she was actually express ing only an opinion. (People vs. Yanza) Similar to the case of claimant of land ( People vs. San Jose). > Making alterations or corrections in a document to make it speak the truth, eve n if unilaterally done, cannot be falsification as the essence of this offense i s to make the document tell a lie. (US vs. San Mateo) ARTICLE 172. FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. > Damage or intent to cause damage is an essential element. Damage to honor is su fficient. (People vs. Marasigan) > No crime of estafa thru falsification of a private document. > Falsification is not a continuing offense and is consummated when the document is actually falsified, regardless of whether or not it was thereafter put to ill egal use. (Alfelor et al vs. Intia) > Damage is not required if the falsified document is introduced as evidence in a judicial proceeding. Damage is an element only when the document is introduced in a proceeding or transaction other than judicial. (People vs. Prudente) ?? ?? ?? ??