This article was downloaded by: [Indiana University Libraries] On: 29 May 2010 Access details: Access Details:

[subscription number 917275360] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 3741 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713445348

Ethnic conflict and the state in Sri Lanka: A possible solution?

Laksiri Fernandoa a University of Colombo,

To cite this Article Fernando, Laksiri(1997) 'Ethnic conflict and the state in Sri Lanka: A possible solution?', South Asia:

Journal of South Asian Studies, 20: 1, 83 96 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00856409708723305 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00856409708723305

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

South Asia, Vol. XX, Special Issue (1997), pp. 83-95.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE STATE IN SRI LANKA: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION?

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

Laksiri Fernando University of Colombo

HIS ESSAY ATTEMPTS TO ELUCIDATE THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ETHNIC

conflict between the majority Sinhalese (seventy-four per cent) and the minority Tamils (eighteen per cent) is primarily rooted in the nature and structure of the state and, therefore, any resolution to the conflict should be based on a profound reformation of the state system. The essay also explains that the conflict throughout decades, if not centuries, has involved and encompassed the ideological sphere of the two communities, and any settlement to the conflict will not be sustainable without a conscious effort to change the political culture of the country through education. This essay advocates the approach of universal human rights applicable to all communities which by definition transcends the extreme ethnic demands of both communities. The state as the principal rule-making body in society has direct implications on the rights that the citizens in general or a specific group of citizens - an ethnicity or minority in particular - would entertain under its domain.1 It is for this reason that the state has become the main bone of contention in the ethnic conflict not only between the Sinhalese and the Tamils but also involving the Muslims (seven per cent) in Sri Lanka. Who wields power in a state system has much to do with who gets what and how much. This includes not only the niceties written in a constitution that could guarantee the rights of the citizens but also the entire practice of the state
1

C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (New York, Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 1; G. Poggi, The State, Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Oxford, Polity Press, 1992), p. 19; K. Vasak, 'Human Rights: As a Legal Reality', in P. Alston and K. Vasak (eds), The International Dimensions of Human Rights (Paris, UNESCO, 1982).

84

SOUTH ASIA

ranging from policies of employment to the administration of justice through different layers of the state apparatus. In a multi-ethnic society, the state has to be constituted and should behave with an ethnic (and religious) impartiality if its arena is to be free from conflict. The case of contemporary Sri Lanka so far proves the opposite. Throughout years, the state has become not only a field of ethnic conflict but also its main instrument. It is, unfortunately, the armed forces of the state that act as the main representative of the Sinhalese ethnicity. This is a fact which cannot easily be ignored and denies the ethnic impartiality of the state. I
Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

The state has at best been understood in Sri Lanka to have a class character. At the extreme of this view, the state is considered a direct instrument of the bourgeoisie. The intellectual life of the country has strongly been influenced by the Marxist strand of thinking throughout decades, even a most liberal academic would entertain certain facets of this view. This view admits that the state has an ethnic bias in its policies and practices, but this is considered to be deriving from its class character.2 The argument goes, 'the bourgeoisie fan ethnic conflict to divide and rule the masses'. The origins of this divide and rule policy is seen in the colonial administration. What the political liberals, only a minuscule viewpoint indeed, on the other hand, have attempted in recent times is to emphasise that the state should be free from ethnic bias.3 They say what the state ought to be, but not what it is. Meanwhile, the conservatives ardently defend the rule of the Sinhalese as the rule of the majority and try to justify the situation by referring to the system of political democracy handed down by the British. They merely talk about the formal structures of democracy without any reference to its content, human rights, including the rights of the minority. A more realistic view of the state would remind us that the state from its origins has had a distinct ethnic character alongside its class nature.4 But this ethnic character is not static, but dynamic and changeable especially under the present circumstances. The state as the principal rule-making body in society seemed to have emerged in Sri Lanka between the third century and the first
2

See further K. Jayawardena, Ethnic and Class Conflicts in Sri Lanka (Colombo, Centre for Social Analysis, 1986). C. Amaratunga, 'Some Political and Constitutional Aspects of Devolution', In Sri Lanka Foundation Institute, Devolution Proposals: A Way Forward (Colombo, Sri Lanka Foundation Institute, 1985), pp 20-5. L. Fernando, 'Human Rights and State Formation: A Comparative Study of Burma, Cambodia and Sri Lanka' (Ph.D. thesis, The Univ. of Sydney, 1985), pp. 64-8.

ETHNIC CONFLICT

85

century BC. Archaeological evidence directs us to believe the said timeframe although the Pali chronicles written in the sixth century CE relate the origins of the state to the arrival of King Vijaya in the sixth century BC from somewhere in north India. Before the formation of the state, the indigenous peoples in the country, the possible predecessors of the present day Veddas, seemed to have lived in small groups organised as families, clans or tribes. In addition to hunting and gathering, more advanced groups were engaged in slash and burn dry rice cultivation but there was no particular need for the state to emerge. The state, it is reasonable to assume, is not a natural part of human existence but a particular creation based on particular needs and socio-economic development. It is possible to argue that the state emerged during the transformation of the mode of production from dry-rice cultivation to wet-rice cultivation, which required organised irrigation, land settlement and even labour control. The nature of this hydraulic state was undoubtedly authoritarian. Apart from the socio-economic transformation, there was a clear ethnic factor involved in the formation of the states in the country. What is apparent is that people in Lanka, like in many other countries, tended to live in ethnic groupings and to form their state institutions through ethnic mobilisation. The numerous river valleys, where the states emerged and thrived, had been a whirlpool of various ethno-linguistic groups for centuries. There had been migration flows of peoples between the subcontinent and the island, and elsewhere. The inscriptions dating between the third century and first century BC reveal some names of these groups as Kaboja, Milaka, Dameda, Muridi, Meraya and Jhavaka.5 One intriguing factor is the clear absence of any mention of the Sinhalese as a distinct ethnic group or tribe during this time. Leslie Gunawardana, a leading Sri Lankan historian, has advanced the thesis that the Sinhala ethnicity has been a later formation encompassing various sub-groups taking the process of dynasty -* kingdom -* people. What is very clear from this analysis is the role of the state in the formation of the Sinhalese ethnicity.6 The formation of ethnicities in Sri Lanka or elsewhere is not a much studied subject. The most ancient human remains found in Sri Lanka, Balangoda Man, dates back thirty thousand years. It would be futile to speculate about the ethnic identity of the initial inhabitants of the country.
5 6 S. Paranavitana, Inscriptions of Ceylon, Vol. 1 (Colombo, Department of Archaeology, 1970), p. ixxix. R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, 'The People of the Lion: The Sinhala Identity and Ideology in History and Historiography', Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities, Vol. 1 (1979).

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

86

SOUTH ASIA

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

They can best be called indigenous peoples. The argument, who first inhabited Sri Lanka, Sinhalese or Tamils?, is equally a futile exercise. Ethnicities of both the Sinhalese and Tamil, with a developed language and a culture are much later developments. The groups who could be identified before that era can best be called proto-ethnicities. They were of both an indigenous and a non-indigenous nature. While the Sinhalese ethnicity seems to have evolved in the country with probably the dominance of certain migrant groups from northern India, the formation of the Tamil ethnicity must have primarily been a south Indian phenomenon. However, it is important to note the proximity between Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu. It must well be the case that the Tamil ethnicity evolved overlapping and over-flowing into certain parts of the northern Sri Lanka from historical times. The ethnic state formation in ancient and mediaeval Sri Lanka did not take a linear progression but a cyclical form. At least two major periods or cycles are evident. From around the fifth to the tenth century, there was a process of ethno-cultural integration in the country. This was the first cycle. The spread of Buddhism and the development of the Sinhalese language were major factors in this process. In the formation of the Sinhalese ethnicity, many of the Tamil groups and their linguistic and cultural elements seem to have been absorbed and assimilated into the process. The Sinhalese identity in fact was an umbrella term to call all the inhabitants of the country. It has been argued, that: 'The inscriptions of the period do not show a separate Tamil cultural element in the country'.7 Nevertheless, there were references to Tamil villages in the northwest of the island. By the tenth century, there had been a clear Sinhalese ethnic state in the country. This was the ideal, and was the experience that the Sinhalese nationalists tried to emulate after independence in 1948. It is clear that the Sinhalese ethnic and cultural integration took place with a degree of coercion and suppression of the Tamils, their religion and culture. When relating the story of king Dutugamunu's military campaign to unite the country, the Mahavamsa written in the sixth century, records that the Tamils were slain in large numbers and they were likened to beasts.8 Racism in Sri Lanka cannot be completely of modern origin. Roots of racism were present in the early history of the island in attitudes towards the indigenous inhabitants and the Tamils. It is equally possible that similar attitudes prevailed among the Tamils towards the Sinhalese and others. In ancient inscriptions, indigenous peoples, Yakkas and Nagas, were called non-human.

S. Kiribamune, 'Tamils in Ancient and Medieval Sri Lanka: The Historical Roots of Ethnic Identity', Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. 4, no. 1 (1986), p. 14. Ibid., p. 12.

ETHNIC CONFLICT

87

Pulindas or hill tribes constituted a major source of slaves. There are references to other groups in inscriptions, whom they called barbarians.9 The second cycle of ethnic state formation was mainly a process of polarisation between the Sinhalese and the Tamil kingdoms after the twelfth century. This occurred after two centuries of south Indian occupation in the northern parts of the country in the tenth and the eleventh centuries. There was the emergence of a relatively autonomous Jaffna kingdom since this period, which remained side by side with the Sinhalese kingdoms until the advent of Western colonialism in the sixteenth century.10 The capitals of the Sinhalese kingdoms were pushed back or shifted to the southwestern and central regions of the country. It was during this period that a clear and separate Tamil cultural identity developed in the country. It is partly the existence and experience of the Jaffna kingdom that have given inspiration to the struggle for a Tamil Eelam since 1983. However, in the process of the establishment of a Tamil ethnic state, the Jaffna kingdom, there were obvious atrocities committed against the religion and culture of the Sinhalese people and other minority groups, as happened against the Tamils in the formation of the Sinhalese ethnic states. It is my view that ethnic states by nature are inimical to human rights, including the rights of ethnicities to enjoy their cultural, religious and language rights in peace and harmony. To elucidate that argument the history of ethnic state formation in the past was revisited. However, it should be noted that the ethnic states in the past were loosely knit entities and as a result there was much more flexibility than at present for the people to live in ethnic peace. As Leslie Gunawardana and other scholars have explained, there were periods of 'cosmopolitan culture' in the country when the Sinhalese and the Tamil communities interacted with a spirit of multi-culturalism.11 However, these situations emerged when the states were relatively free from exclusive ethnic identities. II The objective of Sinhala nationalism since independence in 1948, and even before, was to recreate an ethnic state on the basis of an imagined state of ancient Sinhala kingdoms. This effort marked the origins of the current ethnic conflict in the country. As a result, there had been a gradual but a clear
9
10

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

11

D. M. D. Wickremasinghe (ed.), Epigraphia Zeylanica, Lithic and Other Inscriptions of Ceylon, Vol. I (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1912), p. 37. S. Pathmanathan, The Kingdom of Jaffna (Colombo, Rajendran Press, 1978). Gunawardana, op. cit., p. 23.

88

SOUTH ASIA

alienation of minorities from the state system. First, in 1949, nearly a million Tamils of Indian origin who worked in the tea plantations were denied the citizenship of the new state and eventually disenfranchised. Even before independence, the Sinhalese farmers were preferred in selection to the Tamils in the agricultural colonisation schemes in the Eastern Province. This was possible since the Ministry of Agriculture had been transferred to the elected representatives under a dominion arrangement in 1931. A Sinhala only Board of Ministers was formed in 1936. This was to exclude the Tamils from power sharing. What perhaps encouraged the Sinhalese to consolidate its political power was certain intransigent demands on the part of the Tamils. Instead of asking for a balance or proportional representation and constitutional guarantees, the Tamil politicians in the 1930s asked for fifty to fifty representation to the Legislative Council. This kind of parity was considered a threat to the Sinhalese interests. While the Tamils were popularly considered a privileged group under the British administration it was felt, that a kind of affirmative action would be necessary to uplift the conditions of the Sinhalese. The Sinhalese also felt a sort of a minority complex in the Indian subcontinent considering the prevalence of over fifty million Tamil speakers in Tamil Nadu itself. A major turning point in this process of Sinhalese consolidation of state power was in 1956 when 'Sinhalese only' was made the official language and in 'twenty-four hours'. This policy tremendously disadvantaged not only the Tamils and Muslims but also the Burghers, the descendants of European settlers or their off-spring of mixed marriages. The official language before that time was English. Another major contributory factor associated with the discrimination against minorities was the economic policy. Beginning in 1956, economic policies of the governments moved towards a command economic structure. By 1975, around sixty-five per cent of the economy was directly in the state sector. While the power holders of the state continued an archaic patron-client policy in allocating jobs, resources, government loans, contracts and export-import licenses anyone who was outside the pale was disadvantaged. A major burden of the situation was felt by the minorities. While there had been considerable primary accumulation of capital in the hands of the Tamil businessmen, their further progress was retarded because of their lack of state power or power sharing. A struggle for an independent state or a reasonable share of state power was the logical outcome. The picture of an exclusive Sinhalese state became categorically clear by 1983, when Tamil representatives were forced to leave the National Assembly, the main legislative body of the state. The indubitable dominance of the Sinhalese ethnicity in the state and their imposition of Sinhala Buddhist rights in detriment to the rights of the minorities were responsible for this

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

ETHNIC CONFLICT

89

development. This was similar to what occurred in some other Asian countries where the majority ethnicity took over the complete state power into its own hands after the process of decolonisation. A comparable situation occurred in Burma where the Burman ethnicity consolidated its state and economic power to the great disadvantage of the ethnic minorities of Karen, Shan, Chin. The nature of the state in Sri Lanka between 1956 and 1987 can clearly be characterised as an ethnic one. It was not fascist, in the sense that minorities were completely annihilated. But they were coerced. Coercion came through both structural and direct violence. The years 1956, 1958, 1978, 1981 and 1983 were major landmarks of ethnic violence against the minorities. As a result, the minorities were relegated to a subordinate position in society and polity. A balancing factor to the ethnic nature of the state was its parliamentary character, which nevertheless became restrictive under the presidential system of government since 1978. Under an ostensible democracy, however, certain concessions had to be made to the minorities for electoral gain. These mechanisms fortunately balanced against the state, which otherwise moved towards a fascist one. The ideology of the ethnic state was not geared directly to deny the rights of the members of the minority communities as individuals. But to deny their rights as a group, as a minority or an ethnicity. This denial of group rights of minorities was caricatured in the following argument by an ardent advocate of the Sinhalese only official language policy, L. H. Mettananda, in 1956: One may...concede that in a Tamil-speaking district, a Ceylon Tamil may write to a local body in Tamil and receive a reply in Tamil. [However,] the minority cannot claim as a fundamental human right the right to communicate with the government in their own language, (emphasis added).12 The advocate added referring to minority rights that, Such a theme has no place in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by [the] U.N.O. Obviously, the arguments against the rights of minorities were based on utter ignorance or a distorted knowledge of UN human rights. Both constitutions of the First Republic (1972) and the Second Republic (1978) incorporated a bill of fundamental rights of individuals. However, only
12

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

Ceylon Daily News, 16 May 1956.

90

SOUTH ASIA

the rights of the Sinhalese were accepted as a group. This acceptance of the so-called rights of the Sinhalese as a group was explicit in the articles on Official Language and State Religion. Ill When Tamil youth took up arms in the late 1970s, it was done against the Sinhalese ethnic state to assert the rights of the Tamil people to selfdetermination. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed in May 1976 under the leadership of Velupillai Prabakaran.13 There were other groups formed during the same period with different political persuasion and leadership. As a group closer to the LTTE correctly declared, The root of the matter is that the Tamil people are questioning the validity of the political structure of the country.14 What they questioned was the unitary character of the state which undermined any autonomy to the Tamil people in addition to the Sinhalese ethnic control of the state system. The unitary character of the state was an arbitrary one which was imposed by the British in 1883. As Jeyaratnam Wilson very strongly argued, For convenience of the imperial ruler, Ceylon was consolidated into a centralised unitary entity. With its many 'races' and religions, such an entity could be held together under the supervision of an outsider such as a neutral imperial power, but once the imperial power withdrew, the primordial concepts of 'race', language and religion of distinct groups began to reassert themselves.15 To be sure, before 1883 Sri Lanka had never been a centralised unitary state even during the worst forms of ethnic states. There was always room for regional autonomy. The structure of the state was in the form a Mandala, composed of a core (manda) and an enclosing element (la).16 The state was a galactic structure of a central planet surrounded by differentiated satellites. When Anuradhapura was the capital, there were four main divisions in the state: the capital territory or Rajaratta; the south-western territory or
13 14

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

15 16

LTTE, Diary of Combat 1975-1984 (Jaffna, 1985), p. 10. 'Recent History of the Oppression of the Tamil Speaking People of Sri Lanka,' EROS (Apr. 1985). A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka (C. Hurst, London, 1988), pp. 21-2. For the concept of Mandala state see S. J. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976), p. 112.

ETHNIC CONFLICT

91

Dakkinadesa; the south-eastern territory or Rohana; and the hills or Malaya. While Malaya, the areas of indigenous peoples or Veddas were completely left out from the central administration, other areas entertained relative autonomy. In addition, clusters of villages were governed by village councils (Gam Sabha) on matters related to local affairs. According to inscriptions, these clusters included Demala Gam or Tamil villages. When the British unified the state system under a central administration, obviously, the purpose was different. It was to develop capitalism and abolish feudalism. As the commission which demarcated the new state administration argued, the country has had a tradition of 'contempt for the rights of inferiors, and abominable spirit of caste'. Therefore, the assimilation under one legal and administrative system was considered desirable to break the caste system and allow the mobility of labour, especially in the Kandyan areas. By 'maintaining separate governments]' it was further argued that the influence of the chiefs will be 'upheld to the prejudice, in some instances, of the people'.17 While the British introduced a system of civil rights, yet partial, what was terribly neglected were the social and cultural rights of different communities and political rights of all. In the context of the nineteenth century, there was no recognition of minority or cultural rights in the liberal philosophy. What was allowed instead was communal representation to the Legislative Council which proved to be divisive in practice. The first proposal for federalism in the country came from S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1926, father of the current president, who was assassinated in 1959. The idea was not only to allow cultural diversity in the country but to avoid uneven development in education, society and economy. If major regions were allowed autonomous decision making powers, it was believed that local leaders would work for the betterment of the people. Federalism became a major Tamil demand after independence, in 1949, with the formation of the Federal (or Tamil State) Party by S.J.V. Chelvanayagam. It was to assert a degree of independence for the Tamil people from the central government that federalism was proposed. In the eyes of the Sinhalese, the demand was always equated with separatism. Even during the heights of Sinhalese nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, there were some efforts for ethnic accommodation. The proposals for accommodation were in the form of decentralisation and devolution of power. But these ventures unfortunately failed due to power rivalries between the two major parties: the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP). To be popular among the majority Sinhalese, the party in the
17

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

G. C. Mendis (ed.), The Colebrook-Cameron Papers: Documents on British Colonial Policy in Ceylon, 1796-1833 (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1956), p. 52.

92

SOUTH ASIA

opposition always opposed any concession to the Tamils proposed by the governing party. This has been a major obstacle to the resolution of the ethnic conflict throughout. It is still not clear whether the situation has decisively changed. Except for its extreme militarised character, the Eelam movement led by the LTTE which emerged in the late 1970s was in the form of a 'liberation struggle'. The militancy of the movement was appreciated by many radical groups inside and outside the country. The movement was fairly disciplined. It involved itself in a war with the state but not with the people. The movement in fact formulated its demands and aspirations in a more general manner, applicable to the country as whole. As a group ideologically closer to the LTTE argued, The national question, as indeed the more general condition of wretchedness of the country as a whole, cannot be solved within the framework of the 1978 constitution. Firstly, the Tamils demand a most radical re-structuring of the principles of state power, secondly the nation as a whole and the Tamils in particular as its most oppressed section demand the right to breathe freely again, the restitution of democracy and the abolition of the present conditions of oppression.18 During the period, there was a general and overall deterioration of democracy and human rights in the country. Human rights which were heavily suppressed were related to trade unions, student organisations, opposition parties and the media. As a result, freedom of expression, the press and many other civil and political rights were curtailed. What became true was the prophesy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 'if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law'. In fact, there was a parallel rebellion by Sinhalese youth in the south. In my opinion, however, there was a considerable political deterioration of the Eelam movement in the late 1980s. A war against the state turned into a war against the people as well. The year 1985 marked the Anuradhapura massacre of the Sinhalese villagers. Since then, there had been a constant pattern of attacks and human rights violations by the militants against civilians who were living in Tamil areas. The victims included not only the Sinhalese but the minority Muslims as well. There was also a bloody internecine war between different factions of the Eelam movement leading to hundreds of killings. The objective of the Eelam movement, now solely led by the LTTE, appeared to be to carve out an exclusive Tamil ethnic state. The LTTE in fact
18

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

EROS (Apr. 1985).

ETHNIC CONFLICT

93

ran a mini-state in Jaffna between 1989 and 1995 and still controls certain areas in the northern Province. There were arguments in the 1970s whether a separate Tamil state would be a viable one. The idea was ridiculed by a Tamil leftist leader, N. Shanmugathasan, calling it a 'postal-state'. The argument was that a separate state would not be economically viable and would not manage anything beyond a postal system. This argument was incorrect. The problem about the Jaffna mini-state was not its economic unviability, but its structure and nature. Far from being the realisation of the right of the Tamil people for democratic self-determination, the state which was created was oppressive both internally and externally. The experience in Jaffna has fairly demonstrated that the creation of a Tamil ethnic state against the Sinhalese ethnic state would open a vicious cycle from which both communities would not be able to extricate themselves for centuries. In this context, it is important to reformulate the concept of self-determination as the right of democratic self-determination to avoid any deviation from democracy and human rights in its practice.

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

rv
In the case of Sri Lanka the rights of three peoples are involved in respect of self-determination: the Sinhalese, the Tamils and the Muslims. In addition, there are other minorities, religious and ethnic, whose rights need to be protected. The differences between these peoples are not racial but ethnic. They are different in language, religion and culture, but not in physical traits or colour. Both the Sinhalese and the Tamils are extremely mixed peoples. The idea that the Sinhalese are Aryans, racially different to the Dravidian Tamils, is a myth created for ideological reasons. Equally obnoxious is the view that Tamils are a pure Dravidian race. The terminology of Arya and Dravida denotes linguistic differences between the two language groups and not racial ones. The notion that the Sri Lankan state is the exclusive right of the Sinhalese people is unacceptable to any human rights standard. The rights, including self-determination, are often claimed on the basis of history and not humanity. Claims of rights and claims of human rights are not necessarily the same. The basis of human rights claims are common humanity, human dignity and equality. Both the Sinhalese and the Tamils can claim a right of selfdetermination on the basis of history. However, there had never been a Muslim state in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, the Muslim community constitutes a people with a distinct religion, and a culture associated with it. Their historical origins are also different from the other two communities.

94

SOUTH ASIA

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

The right of self-determination primarily derives as a freedom from oppression or colonialism, a political right for independence. It is also an internal political right of a people, in a multi-ethnic society, to ensure a range of other rights with necessary political mechanisms - autonomy, federalism or devolution of power - for its achievement. What exactly is the suitable political structure for the achievement of internal self-determination is a debatable topic among scholars and peoples. The solutions may differ from case to case, and time to time. What might be of paramount importance would be the opinion of the peoples themselves. These opinions can be judged through democratic processes: referendum or election. As a human right, the right of self-determination, internal or external, should ensure democracy. Otherwise, the exercise of that right may go against a range of other human rights finally jeopardising the self-determination itself. Attempts to create exclusive ethnic states hamper rather than facilitate the right of democratic self-determination. Violent and endless ethnic conflicts in many parts of the world are due to this predicament. Since 1987, there has been a relative loosening up of the Sri Lankan state system towards ethnic accommodation as a result of both internal and external pressures. Since then a relatively autonomous Provincial Council system, akin to Indian federalism, has been created. Although slow in its implementation, language policy has been changed conferring Tamil an official language status; English the status of a national language. The remaining Indian-origin Tamil plantation workers, who were stateless for good many years, have been given full citizenship. While these measures undoubtedly marked a progress towards ethnic reconciliation, they were 'too little too late' in the eyes of the Tamil militants, especially the LTTE. There are new hopes in the country, though the war is continuing, of a possible solution to the ethnic conflict with the introduction of 'Devolution Proposals' and 'Draft Constitutional Reforms' by the current government.19 The new proposals go a long way towards achieving federalism, moving away from the unitary state system. Many ambiguities of power sharing in the present Provincial Council system have been avoided for a Regional Council system. The powers of the central government and regional governments are fairly demarcated. 'Regional councils will exercise exclusive legislative and executive competence within the devolved sphere'. These will include control over the region's education, land settlement and public service which in fact were some of the central demands of the Tamils throughout the years.

19

Sri Lanka Foundation Institute, Devolution Proposals. See Appendix for the text of proposals.

ETHNIC CONFLICT

95

There are other merits of having federalism. The centralised economic policies have proved to be lethargic in stimulating economic development in the country. Regions in the future can be the relevant zones of economic development utilising local resources and attracting foreign investment. A major weakness of the current proposals, however, is their exclusive focus on the constitution. The proposals cannot, therefore, be called a political package for a peace process. To re-start political negotiations with the LTTE, or to ensure a peace process, proposals are necessary in order to outline a strategy through which a step-by-step settlement might be achieved. Breaking the cycle of war has become problematic as a result of the lack of peace proposals. The task of ethnic reconciliation will involve not only the re-structuring of the state but also changing its character - ethnic and oppressive. The ethnic question, as a major human rights problem, is linked to other human rights problems: discrimination, mistreatment, disappearances, torture and nonrecognition of civilian rights in general. Democratisation of state structures, and functions, and education of state functionaries at all levels on human rights will constitute major tasks. Given the long standing history of the ethnic conflict no solution will be possible or sustainable without a public education program for ethnic reconciliation and for human rights. 'Since wars begin in the minds, it is in the minds of men [and women] that the defences of peace must be constructed.'20

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

20

Preamble to the UNESCO Constitution.

Downloaded By: [Indiana University Libraries] At: 19:47 29 May 2010

96 SOUTH ASIA