The Humanitarian Response To The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Colombia Gap Analysis of Program Implementation

UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT Master of Professional Studies Humanitarian Services Administration THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
(IDPs) IN COLOMBIA GAP ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
Prepared by: Madelen Muriel-Drew Major Advisor: Dr. Rodney Allen Associate Advisor: Dr. Patrick Obeng-Asiedu Associate Advisor: Dr. Peter Diplock
April 27, 2011
The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.
TABLE OF CONTENTS AUTHOR NOTE ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I Historic Background of Violence in Colombia CHAPTER II Displacement in Colombia and Vulnerable Groups of Displaced Persons CHAPTER III Displacement in Colombia-Procedures for Registering: The Unique Registry of Displaced Population RUPD) CHAPTER IV Gap Analysis of the Humanitarian Response in Colombia by the Government CONCLUSION LIST of FIGURES Figure 1 Politic Map of Colombia Figure 2 Indigenous groups and Ethnic Territories in Colombia Figure 3 Number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) arriving and registering in the different departments of Colombia Figure 4 Example of a Systematized Registro nico de Poblacin Desplazada RUPD Figure 5 Unique Registry of displaced Population. Translated to English Figure 6 The Scheme of organizations responsible for closing gaps in the humanitarian Response APPENDIX 1 The phases of Displacement according to the Colombian government APPENDIX 2 Acronyms REFERENCES FOOTNOTES 74 75 77 79 85 71 72 73 69 70 49 66 39 3 4 5 11 22
Author note
This material was prepared by Madelen Muriel-Drew. (Copyright 2011)
I would like to thank Dr. Rodney Allen, Dr. Peter Diplock, and Dr. Patrick Obeng-Asiedu for their comments and guidance on the elaboration of this material.
I would like to thank Mrs. Vicki Carey for the edition of this material.
Also, I would like to thank my husband, Thomas J. Drew, and my sons, Andres F. Capacho, and Joseph A. Drew for their continuing support.
I welcome all comments. I am particularly interested in identifying errors and suggestions regarding how to improve clarity about the subject of displacement in Colombia. Send comments to Madelen Muriel-Drew, madelendrew@yahoo.com
Abstract
This capstone project introduces the displacement phenomena in Colombia as a consequence of fifty years of violence. Also, it examines the characteristics of the vulnerable groups as well as the actors within the armed conflict and analyzes the government response. Upon examination of these elements, it becomes clear that registration methods, bureaucracy and, an incomplete decentralization process are probably causes limiting an adequate response by municipalities which are mainly responsible for assisting internally displaced persons.
Keywords: Internally displaced persons, guerrilla, paramilitary, violence, displacement
Introduction
Purpose The purpose of this Capstone paper is to examine the failures of the humanitarian response to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Colombia and to identify existing gaps in the provision of assistance to this population. This paper will explore the procedures employed by Accin Social, an organization established in 1997 by the Colombian government which provides humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in Colombia. Accin Social is the government agency which determines whether a person receives the status of displaced person and any humanitarian assistance. A general definition of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2010a; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2007b p. 8a; p. 4b). Additionally, being an internally displaced person may include other difficult life conditions. For example, in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Colombia, being an IDP includes conditions such as deprivation of food, water, security, shelter, and livelihood. The IDPs are forced to leave their homes, thus losing the support of their communities. During an armed conflict, the emotional and physical health of IDPs is at high risk because they are exposed to discrimination, harassment, marginalization, family separation, sexual and gender-based violence, deprivation of land, homes and other
property which makes them more vulnerable to abuses as well as prone to fleeing several times (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2009). This paper will examine the possible lack of government attention to the conditions of the lives of IDPs in Colombia. After 50 years of violence, there appears to be significant gaps in the humanitarian response to the needs of internally displaced persons. As a result, organizations such as DARA1 have examined the responses to IDPs by the government, international nongovernmental organizations (INGO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO). It has determined them to be ineffective and has shown the increased necessity for placing importance on adequate solutions for the issues which face displaced persons. In this area, this paper will explore if actual governmental programmes are effective or are not delivering these services adequately. Additionally, bureaucratic actions concerned with humanitarian responses from the governments point of view will be discussed relative to the response of former and present governments to the increase in displacement that the war on terrorism may cause due to elevated violence. Background The number of displacements during 2010 was 117,710 IDPs as measured by Accin Social or 279,768 IDPs as measured by the Consultora para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamineto (CODHES) (Accin Social, 2011; CODHES, 2011). Colombia is a country with decades of violent conflict in which the main participants are, on one side, outlawed armed
DARA is an independent organization committed to improving the quality and effectiveness of aid for vulnerable populations suffering from conflict, disasters and climate change.
groups, such as guerrillas and paramilitary groups and, on the other side, drug cartels without excluding the Colombian armed forces. Colombia has a strategic geographic location in the corner of South America having two coasts which border the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. It is rich in natural resources such as large oil and natural reserves including gold, coal, platinum, emeralds, and silver. The terrain of Colombia includes forests such as in the department of Choc, mountains and valleys, and access to jungles through the departments of Amazonia, or Putumayo. The rugged terrain, forest and jungles makes this country a paradise in which to grow illegal crops such as coca for the production of cocaine and marijuana; and to maintain drug businesses, such as the transport and delivery of illegal crops, and running of coca laboratories. Some of these drug-related activities are close to rural towns in which civilians live far away from the State presence. These geographic characteristics, where territory is shared by civilians and illegal drug businesses, are important to consider because for approximately the past fifty years a significant amount of conflict has been generated in these areas. The Colombian peoples history is marked by a series of violent events which emerged following the creation of illegal armed groups. These violent conflicts continue today. These conflicts, which began occurring at the time of the Spanish colonization in 1542, represented a dividing line between the rich and the poor highlighting a marked differentiation in the social structure of the country. The rich were people from Spain living in Colombia and the poor were usually farmers, indigenous people, descendents of Africans slaves, and/or the descendents of a mixture between these two races.
Fifty years ago, political crises in Colombia were generated by the farmers who were the poorest people and the lowest in the social structure. They protested against their oppression and marginalization within the capitalist model which was used to support the rich and oppress the poor. The result was the creation of the guerrillas, a left-wing group of farmers following the ideas of communism. Today these guerrillas are represented by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). At the same time, a right-wing group was created with its roots in the alliances created by landowners who were of the high class. This group sought protection against the guerrillas. The most notorious group that survives today is the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. As we know, war requires at least two parties or groups. The onset of many years of armed conflict in Colombia was begun by these two groups which today have added drug-dealers and urban gangs to its numbers (BBC News, 2011). The presence of the State was weak for many years, limiting it to being caught between illegal groups and the rural towns where the civilian population was. This weak presence continues today. Colombians began developing faith in the national government efforts when President Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) initiated the Plan Colombia. The Plan Colombia was created to put an end to the conflict by eliminating drug trafficking and promoting economic and social development. Strong support was presented by the United States in the form of military aid, including training, equipment and intelligence. It is important to note that the issue of coca production crosses international borders, a strong reason to prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. Additional reasons for this support included the need for peace and economic development (Veillette, 2005).
Within the conflict in Colombia, the civilian population is usually targeted for collaborating with one or the other armed group, making them vulnerable to violent attacks which can be personal, i.e. directed at specific individuals, or directed at entire towns through the use of bombs. Other violent acts against the population include attacks, disappearances, torture, forced displacement, assassination, kidnapping, extortion, and fear. To analyze the displacement in Colombia and the humanitarian aid offered, this Capstone paper has been organized into four chapters which are based on a review of the literature: Chapter I covers the history and relevant sequence of the violence in Colombia as a consequence of the armed conflict. Chapter II outlines the holistic meaning of being a displaced person today in Colombia. This chapter limits itself to the impressions of displaced persons and their experiences and observations of life now from a new environment. Chapter III focuses on the humanitarian response offered by the governmental organization Accin Social, especially focusing on the capital city of Bogot, Colombia. This chapter will answer questions such as who receive displaced persons in the cities, whether there is a registration process, what are the characteristics of the humanitarian aid offered, how long displaced persons enjoy this aid and, what happens after this humanitarian aid ends. Chapter IV focuses on specific solutions and the importance of having a coordinated response between the State, donors and NGOs including policies and regulations. This chapter uses gap analysis between what it is offered now and what should be appropriated for the specific conditions of the IDPs in Colombia. To develop this gap analysis, the
10
summary report of Protecting the Displaced in Colombia: The Role of Municipal Authorities by the University of Los Andes (COL), the Brookings Institution-University of Bern and, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the study Closer to Home. A critical analysis of Colombias proposed land law by the Lutheran World Relief, Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y La Paz (INDEPAZ) and the United Stated Office in Colombia, both wrote in 2011 was used.
11
Chapter I Historic Background of Violence in Colombia

In the last twenty years, violence has led to more than 70,000 assassinations in Colombia (ABColombia, 2009). With an increase in drug traffickers and urban gangs driven by poverty and violence, assassinations continue to increase. Diverse studies suggest that cultural factors related to societys characteristics may be closely related to the violence (Cotte, 2007). However, the most notorious acts of violence continue to be armed conflict against the civilian population, waged, for the most part, by paramilitary and guerrilla forces. This chapter will examine this violence in Colombia and its relationship to forced displacement. Historic background of illegal armed groups in Colombia The actions of guerrilla groups began between 1948 and 1960 as an attempt to gain power for the people. The intensifying conflict compromised the safety of the civilian population prompting the first migration of the civilian population (Cabrera, 2007). In response to the need for safer places to live and better economic opportunities the population began to shift to the cities. As Cabrera pointed out, the cycles of violence were closely related to violent actions [terror] which obligated many farmers to abandon complete extensions of land because of their anti-communist ideas but, also, because economic and politic interests. These migrations happened in the last 30 years and the circumstances of violence, since this period, in Colombia,
12
affected the economic process of the victims and, in diverse manners, their well being2 (Cabrera, 2007 p. 13). The guerrillas did not initially emerge as a result of frustration of the farmers. However, as they became familiar with the ideas of Communism in Cuba led by Fidel Castro, the possibility of a new system emerged. In Cuba, guerrilla groups followed both Castros ideas and Communism. The previous disagreements between the main political parties in Colombia offered a ripe environment for guerrilla groups to emerge, encouraged by political disparities and the support of Castro and the former Soviet Union (Cabrera, 2007). Today, this relationship does not exist as clearly as before, however, the Partido Comunista Colombiano (Colombian Communist Party) appears to continue to have a relationship with Cuba, although this relationship has been denied by the party (Cabrera, 2007). The creation of the guerilla forces initially was bolstered by the assassination of Jorge Elicer Gaitn3 in 1948. This assassination created a psycho-social motivation that caused people
Original in Spanish: Los ciclos rodeados de violencia y muy relacionados con acciones de terror obligaron a muchos campesinos a abandonar regiones completas con argumentos anticomunistas y evidentes intereses econmicos y polticos, stas migraciones ocurrieron en los ltimos 30 aos y las circunstancias de violencia desde ste periodo en Colombia afectaron en diversas formas los procesos de insercin econmica de sus protagonistas (Cabrera, 2007) pg. 13
2
Jorge E. Gaitan was born Jan. 26, 1902 in Bogot and died April 9, 1948. He was a political leader who was considered a champion of the Colombian people and was revered as a martyr after his assassination. Gaitn studied law at the National University of Colombia, Bogot, and continued his studies in Rome. There he was greatly influenced by Benito Mussolini, paying careful attention to his techniques for arousing and organizing the populace. Returning to Colombia, he organized a National Union). His short-lived party called Union Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria (Left Revolutionary maiden speech as a congressman was a polemic attack on the plantations owned by the United Fruit Company ( q.v.). He served as mayor of Bogot (1936) and minister of education (1940). In 1946, as the leader of the more radical factions of Liberals, he ran for the office of president in opposition to the official Liberal Party candidate Gabriel Turbay. That split among the Liberals gave the victory to the Conservative Party candidate Mariano Ospina Prez. It was expected that Gaitn would be elected president in the next election, but he was killed by an assassin in 1948 during the International
3
13
to react with violence leading to the so-called Bogotazo4. The second phase of the development of the guerillas began in 1954. This phase had limited success but represented the first attempts by Pedro Antonio Marin, the famous Tiro Fijo to create illegal forces. The last phase was initiated in 1960, when Tiro Fijo formally established the guerrilla group Autodefensas de Marquetalia. The creation of this group acted as inspiration for other guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Forced Armed of Colombia (FARC), the Peoples Army, Ejrcito de Liberacin Nacional (ELN), and the Ejrcito popular de Liberacin (EPL) (Cabrera, 2007). These three prominent guerilla groups located themselves in the mountains and rural areas within Colombian. During the 1970s, other guerrilla groups were created such as, the Movement 19 de Abril, or M-19. This group was defeated through peace talks. However, some of its members became active in politics, e.g. Antonio Navarro Wolf5, the governor for the department of Nario, in the southeast area of Colombia (Cabrera, 2007). Following the creation and organization of these illegal armed groups, a new presence was added to the conflict in the form of drug dealers who continue to shake the countrys
Conference of American States meeting in Bogot. This murder led to a major popular uprising known as the bogotazo and exacerbated a period of civil unrest called La Violencia Originally retrieved from the web site of Bio true story: http://www.biography.com/articles/Jorge-Elicer-Gaitn-39091
4
The poor of the city, who saw him as a savior, went berserk, rioting in the streets, looting and murdering. This riot is known as the Bogotazo or Bogot attack. When the dust settled the next day, 3,000 were dead. Much of the city had been burned to the ground. Tragically, the worst was yet to come: the Bogotazo kicked off the period in Colombia known as La Violencia, or the time of violence, in which hundreds of thousands of ordinary Colombians would die Retrieved from: http://latinamericanhistory.about.com/od/thehistoryofcolombia/p/bogotazo.htm 5 To read an interview translated from Spanish to English by Clifton Ross to the ex-M-19 guerrilla member, Antonio Navarro Wolf, see: http://upsidedownworld.org/main/colombia-archives-61/1408colombia-interview-with-antonio-navarro-wolf
14
stability to the present day. The business of growing crops and the production of cocaine and marijuana continue to be illegal and have a very strong impact in the country. Following the demobilization of the paramilitary forces, new narco-paramilitary forces re-organized in 29 of 32 departments with major control of cocaine production and smuggling. This reorganization led to extreme violence within Colombia (BBC News, 2010). The beginning of guerrilla groups can be found in the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, such as the Peoples Army. These groups were originally represented by farmers who fled the partisan violence to so-called independent republics in departments of Cundinamarca, southern Tolima, and Huila. These departments were heavily attacked by the military in the 1960s forcing the separatists to flee again to the eastern plains and the Colombian Amazonia, where the FARC was organized with a strong popular support. This represents a major reason for them to sustain the armed struggle against the government for about 50 years (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (iDMC) & the Norwegian refugee Council (NRC), 2009). The introduction of coca crops as an alternative income source was a major financial factor which influenced the formation of guerrilla forces (iDMC & NRC, 2009). The lack of better access to markets, climate risks and socio-economic hardship were issues that led farmers to engage in other farming options. Others, such as the urban poor and landless peasants from the central highlands, came to the guerrilla-controlled areas to clear the forest and begin small business of coca farming. The FARC became involved in coca cultivation by taxing the cultivation of coca and offering quasi-state services, e.g. health, education and justice in exchange for the taxes which created a state within a state (iDMC & NRC, 2009). The tax revenues represented the first
15
economic boost for FARCs income. This helped them gain control of up to 40% of Colombian territory thus warning many other land-owning elites of their presence. The FARC also expanded its power through other activities such as guerrilla activity which began kidnapping drugtraffickers and land owners. Another guerrilla group in Colombia is the National Liberation Army (Ejrcito de Liberacin Nacional ELN). This group is comprised chiefly of students, union members and people from the urban middle-class. It emerged in response to the political and economic limitations created by the National Front. This paramilitary groups main course of violence is attacking and destroying infrastructure owned and managed by multi-national corporations, especially in areas bordering the neighboring country of Venezuela. This group is reportedly comprised of approximately 3,000 fighters. They use kidnapping civilians and extorting oil companies as sources of income (iDCM & NRC, 2009). Paramilitary groups originated in the 1950s with the basic objective of fighting guerrillas (iDMC & NRC, 2009). Sources indicate that the origin of the paramilitary was the government. In fact, these civilian auxiliary forces, as these paramilitary groups were known, were legalized in 1965 and were considered legitimate until the 1980s. the paramilitary groups have roots as far back as the violence of the 1950s as an integral part of the armys counter-insurgency strategy. In response to intense international scrutiny of the human rights record of both the army and the government, civilian auxiliary forces were legalized in 1965 and 1968 and further strengthened in the late 1970s and especially the early 1980s (iDMC & NRC, 2009 p. 14). After 1980, critics in the areas of human rights violations by the international community documented incidences of torture and/or disappearance of political prisoners leading the army leadership to
16
camouflage any relationship with the paramilitary or the government of the President Julio Cesar Turbay (1978-1982) (iDMC & NRC, 2009). In 1985, President Belisario Betancourts government offered peace dialogues with the guerrillas. The FARC-EP responded with the founding of the political party, Union Patriotica, which resulted in paramilitary groups retaliating by assassinating up to 3,000 members of this political party and its presidential candidates. This act fuelled deep-rooted doubts among the guerrillas about any possibility of resolving the conflict through political channels. It is
important to mention that the Union Patriotica had a program that called for land distribution, social benefits and political power for poor and landless peasants (iDMC & NRC, 2009). The paramilitary has been useful in providing an effective method for targeting civilians perceived as guerrilla supporters as well as delivering the cruelest bloody war in the country. However, the paramilitary forces have also become the center of an alliance between the landowning elites and large foreign corporations located in the country, using the States weakness in defending their interests as justification. Additionally, paramilitary groups have attacked companies which abuse natural resources by bombing their structures, e.g. Cao Limn-Coveas oil pipeline which has oil fields located at the borders with Venezuela and the Atlantic coast. This pipeline has been attacked over 900 times in its 16 years of operation with negative economic consequences to companies involved in this project, including American and local companies. Other companies working in the exploitation of African Palm, hydroelectric power, timber, and mines also have been targeted by the paramilitary and guerrillas. These groups have been denounced as perpetrators of brutality in massacres and torturers of kidnapped civilians and foreign companies officials. The relationship
17
between attacks on civilians, displacement, and the presence of companies in the most productive and richest land is explained in that these illegal acts seek to separate the guerrillas from the perceived popular support base and gain control over land, natural resources and strategic roads (iDMC & NRC, 2009 p. 14). Organizations such as the Office of the Public Advocate of Colombia have focused on paramilitary groups because of their high rate of violations of the International Humanitarian Law. Stories about their bloody terrorist acts have been documented. In 2002, for example, in the department of Tolima alone, there were 133 assassinations, five massacres, 33 forced disappearances and, 7 acts of extreme cruelty to victims. Other human rights organizations have data indicating that between 1988 and 2003, the paramilitary was responsible for at least 12,398 extrajudicial executions, 1,339 acts of torture and 2,121 forced disappearances (iDMC & NRC, 2009 p. 15). Information provided by another NGO highlights that, by 2005, the paramilitary was holding 509 people hostage (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Paramilitary activities have also been known as social cleansing which is the assassination of people of whom they disapprove such as drug addicts, homosexuals, prostitutes, the homeless, and trade union leaders. The paramilitary has been known to assassinate within their own groups as is mentioned by an ex-paramilitary, i.e. I learned how hard it was because I remember what they did to one of our group, a young girl of fourteen who did not show up for practice and she was wrapped in burlap bags, tied up with barbed wire and burned alive. I remember her screaming and trying to get out of the bags, and with each stretch, her skin got hurt with the barbed wire. We had to set fire to the girl. We were about fifty completing the [paramilitary training] course. We were just following orders (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 22).
18
Today, the State has a controversial Justice and Peace Law (JPL) signed in 2005 which seeks to reduce jail terms for eligible paramilitary fighters in exchange for information about their involvement in crimes (BBC News, 2011). But, this law is controversial and unclear because victims active participation in the JPL is denied, and its enforcement is being hindered by the continuing armed conflict. It causes intimidation and violence in rural and urban areas for those who decide to testify (International Crises Group (ICG), 2008). The JPL was one of the States attempts to fix a situation related to paramilitary groups which had become out of control. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated in 1999 that the State has played an important role in the development of the paramilitary groups and has not adequately combated those groups. The State is thus responsible, in a global sense, for the existence of the paramilitary and therefore faces responsibility for the actions carried out by those groups (iDMC & NRC, 2009 p. 15). By 2004, President Uribe stressed the necessity of increasing control, pointing out that it cannot be possible to have a country threatened by guerrillas or defended by paramilitary groups (BBC News, 2004). It represented the governments position against illegal armed groups in an attempt to solve the countrys most prevalent problem. The history of Colombia provides the background for the violence seen today. Between 1980 and 1990, drug trafficking and illegal armed groups caused the country to experience violence and assassination of government officials, civilians and politicians. In 1985, for example, eleven judges and 90 other people were killed after the guerrilla group Movement April 19th M-19 forced its way into the Palace of Justice, in the capital city of Bogot, assassinating about 100 persons (Filipovic, 2010). Yet, the assassination of Pablo Escobar in 1993, one of the top narco-traffickers in Colombia, was not sufficient impetus to seize control against the war on drug-trafficking. New
19
drug cartels continued to emerge, e.g. in the north of the department of Valle del Cauca. The best efforts to fight the drug industry were developed in 1999 when President Andres Pastrana (19982002) signed the Plan Colombia as an attempt to fight both drug trafficking and rebels. To date, the Plan Colombia has cost approximately USD $7 billion. It is a continuing pact that also allows the United States to use Colombian military bases and airports for U.S. missions (Alsema, 2010). Between 2002 and 2010, President Alvaro Uribe was elected and served for two presidential terms. Uribes term of office as President of Colombia generated great controversy for Colombians, neighboring countries, and the international community. This controversy
stemmed from his decisions in the areas of fighting terrorism, the issue of humanitarian crises and violations of human rights. Following Uribes election, a right-wing coalition was voted in. It represented a hardline program to restore government authority throughout the country after the failure of peace negotiations between the previous administration and the main guerrilla group (FARC). During a previous administration, a FARC member, Ricardo Palmera, was captured and jailed for 35 years. The right-wing Autodefensas de Colombia (AUC), a paramilitary group characterized by its cruel methods, began peace talks with Uribes government. In 2005, another group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), a left-wing rebel group, also began peace talks with the Colombian government in this time, these were arrangement outside of the Colombian territory, in the island of Cuba. However, the government and military have not been exempt from corruption and infiltration by illegal groups and drug dealers. In 2006, for example, under Uribes
20
administration, a court in Colombia investigated the relationship between high-ranking politicians from the department of Sucre (northeast) and right-wing paramilitary. Another relative success was accomplished in 2007, when the government allowed the release of dozens of jailed FARC members in the hope that the rebels would reciprocate by releasing hostages. However, FARCs response was that they would only free hostages if the government pulled back troops and set up a demilitarized zone (BBC News, 2011). For both armed groups, guerrillas and paramilitary, the intention of creating political parties has lost significance due to the violent methods which they have favored. These methods e.g. massacres of civilians, assassinations, kidnapping, torture, extortion, forced confinement and forced recruitment are not compatible with the original philosophies of their groups which were to seek political and social equity. For these groups, drug production and trafficking are a strong motivation to keep fighting and have resulted in the undermining of popular support in areas under their control. Today, coca producers are indifferent to the guerrillas original beliefs because they are making livings from the drug crops. Landless peasants can be hired to pick coca leaves to be sold to both left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary. .the lucrative returns from drugs and kidnapping now dominate the rebels agenda, and have largely replaced ideological motivations (BBC News, 2011). These transactions promote violence because armed groups routinely seek revenge on populations who have stayed in an area controlled by the enemy, forcing displacement and human right violations (iDMC & NRC, 2009). Uribes government made important shifts in war strategy. The most relevant of these changes was made in the democratic security policy. This policy continues with Uribes
successor, President Juan Manuel Santos, elected for 2010-2014. The Democratic Security Policy is a flagship program which promises changes based on attacking illegal armed groups
21
and gaining control of strategic corridors that have been taken by these groups and/or drug dealers (Poltica de Consolidacin de la Seguridad Democrtica (PCSD), 2007). This resolution may be help to decrease the number of drug dealers and illegal armed groups. However, from the standpoint of displaced persons, it does not seem to deal with the humanitarian crisis involving vulnerable communities which are usually blockaded or isolated. These communities then find it difficult or impossible to access basic services such as health care, education, housing or sanitation. The short supply of food, for example, increases risks of malnutrition and illness. Services for displaced persons are usually precarious or non-existent, worsened by factors of conditions of poverty and unemployment. This democratic security policy has focused its energies on designing and implementing political and economic reform and fiscally austere policies (ICG, 2003).
22
Chapter II Displacement in Colombia and Vulnerable Groups of Displaced Persons

Forced displacement has been dramatic in Colombia, accentuated by humanitarian crises causing massive and constant human hardship and suffering (ICG, 2003). This chapter will explore the relationship between violence as a consequence of the armed conflict and forced displacement. It will also explore how displacement is experienced by particularly vulnerable groups of people. Violence and displacement The non-governmental organization CODHES indicates that between 1999 and 2010, there is an average per year of 280,231 of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Colombia and, the governmental organization Accin Social indicates for the same period of years, an average per year of 289,845 IDPs in Colombia and registered in the department where IDPs arrive (Accin Social, 2011, CODHES, 2011). Extremely difficult conditions existed for displaced persons, particularly lack of food, medicine and gasoline. These conditions were worsened by the lack of freedom of movement caused by the presence of armed groups or government armed forces located in the affected areas. The governmental organization Accin Social which leads the States response to IDPs, through the Comisin de Seguimiento a la Poltica Pblica sobre el Desplazamiento Forzado, (June, 2008), has indicated that the FARC and the guerrilla National Liberation Army (ELN) have been responsible for 23% of internal displacement, and that the paramilitary groups for least than 12%. On the other hand, a survey developed by the Civil Society Follow-Up
23
Commission, a non-governmental institution, indicated that by 2008, guerrillas were responsible for 33% of displacement, and paramilitary groups for 37%. The differences in these numbers may be due to the fact that displaced persons may feel more comfortable sharing their experiences with non-governmental organizations. There may be concern on the part of the IDPs regarding retaliation from paramilitary groups due to the apparent relationship between these armed groups and politicians, landowners, and high class society (iDMC & NRC, 2009). Many Colombians are forced to leave their homes as a consequence of the violence generated by fighting between guerrillas, paramilitary, drug dealers and the Colombian armed forces. Forced displacement is also cause by illegal groups against the inhabitants of rural areas because these rural lands are appropriated for growing cocaine, becoming drug running corridors, housing cocaine production laboratories or by bombing towns because the residents are presumably friendly with the enemy (ICG, 2033). A dramatic situation occurs during a conflict, when inhabitants of villages and hamlets cannot escape the violence and find themselves trapped in the fight, under siege from, or blockaded by armed groups (ICG, 2003 p. 1). The Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES, 2010), Consolidation of What?: a report on displacement, armed conflict and human rights in Colombia in 20106, reveals that in 2010, about 56,000 families (280,041 persons, presuming a family of 5) were forcefully displaced from their lands as a consequence of internal armed conflict. The report also
The document Consolidation of What?: a report on displacement, armed conflict and human rights in Colombia in 2010 by CODHES is located in this web site link http://www.codhes.org/images/stories/pdf/bolet%C3%ADn%2077.pdf (Spanish), or an overview in English, by the Inter Press Service News Agency, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54519
24
highlights that 32.7% (91,573 persons) forced to displace were originally from the areas where the Integrated Action Policy was being implemented. The Integrated Action Policy was designed to combine military, antinarcotics and development actions in areas where there were armed groups, particularly guerrillas. This policy was designed to reestablishing the National governments control over the area and has been heavily supported by the U.S. government until today. The report states that of the 100 municipalities with the highest rates of forced displacement, 44 of them are located within the consolidation areas. In 2010, CODHES registered 6 massive displacements that affected 2,684 persons within the consolidation zones along with some individual displacements. The report by CODHES states that the armed conflict continues to be the leading cause of forced displacement. The next leading cause is displacement due to intimidation and threats by armed groups, particularly those linked to economic projects such as mining and production of bio-fuels, both of which are increasing in Colombia (Inter Press Service (IPS), 2011).
25
Civil Society Monitoring Commission (2008) In 2008, the national survey of displaced persons was developed by the Civil Society Monitoring Commission, a government office. This survey listed the causes of internal displacement and the percentage of IDPs displaced by each cause (iDMC & NRC, 2009 p. 19). These causes and percentages are as follows: Direct threats from illegal groups, including guerrilla and new illegal groups - 43.7 % Massacres - 11.7% Assassinations of family members - 11% Direct combat between parties in an armed conflict - 10.5% Assassinations of neighbors or friends - 7.4% Indirect threats - 6.5% Forced recruitment - 3.5% From the same source, this commission indicated that displaced persons identified the guerrilla group, FARC, as the largest agent of displacement with 32.8% and paramilitary groups causing 22.6% displacement.
26
The following data indicates armed groups causing displacement: 32.6% of IDPs indicated that only paramilitary groups were responsible for their displacement. 24.8% FARC 14.7% a non-identified guerrilla group 12.5% did not know 10.9% identified more than one of the above
Although armed violence is a strong factor in creating IDPs, it is important to note other factors which can lead to displacement. These factors can include anti-personnel mines, unemployment, precarious social services, large economic projects, illicit crop cultivation, and aerial spraying. The groups most vulnerable to displacement Usually, rural areas are where most fighting takes place. These rural areas in Colombia are long extensions of land with forests, mountains, diverse weather conditions, and inaccessible jungles. The populations of these areas include farmers and their families and other indigenous communities such as Afro-Colombians. Within these groups there are other subgroups which are heavily affected by the conflict, such as women and children. Internally displaced persons hold numbers of different jobs, such as public workers, politicians, union leaders, journalists and human rights activists. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has indicated that
27
between 1988 and 2002, guerrillas and paramilitary assassinated 2,789 public workers and politicians (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2003). Worldwide, the definition of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (UNHCR, 2007; Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2010 p. 4, p. 8). In Colombia, the legal definition for displaced persons is provided by the Constitutional Court Law T-688, 2007, article 1 Law 387 of 1997. It includes definitions for preventing forced displacement, increasing protection, and consolidating and stabilizing socio-economic factors for displaced people. The Colombian constitution also describes displaced persons as all those who have been forced to migrate within the national territory, abandoning his/her residence or economic activities because his/her life, physical integrity, security or personal freedom is vulnerable or is under threat because one or more of the following conditions: internal armed conflict, violent attacks and interior stress, general violence, massive violations to human rights, violations to international humanitarian law or other circumstances created from the situations above mentioned that could alter drastically the public order7 (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2010 Note: unofficial translation).
Original Spanish language versin:"Es desplazado toda persona que se ha visto forzada a migrar dentro del territorio nacional, abandonando su localidad de residencia o actividades econmicas habituales, porque su vida, su integridad fsica, su seguridad o libertad personales han sido vulneradas o se encuentran directamente amenazadas, con ocasin de cualquiera de las siguientes situaciones: Conflicto
28
Armed conflict and indigenous populations Indigenous populations include 84 ethnic or indigenous groups accounting for a population of 1,378,884 inhabitants and representing 3.3% of the national population. Indigenous communities are found in the countrys 32 departments. In 25 of them there is a clear presence of indigenous communities that live for the most part in resguardos8, in 214 municipalities and in 12 departmental jurisdictions. Although this population is spread throughout the country, it is mainly concentrated in the departments of La Guajira, Cauca, Nario and Crdoba which accounts for 60 per cent of Colombias indigenous inhabitants. Departments with a high percent of indigenous inhabitants in comparison to the total population are Guaina, (61.5 per cent), Vaups (58.1 per cent), La Guajira (42.4 per cent), Amazonas (39.8 per cent) and Vichada (39.6 per cent) (United Nations, 2008) . It is important to point out that Colombias indigenous populations prefer to stay within their territories even during fighting. For indigenous communities, their land is sacred and represents value, culture, forms of subsistence, etc. For these reasons they feel a strong desire to stay although they may be exposing themselves to combat or threats. Indigenous populations in Colombia are characterized by different cultural traits in the areas of linguistic characteristics, social and political organization, economic and productive relations, and management of and interaction with the environment. They have 64 different
armado interno, disturbios y tensiones interiores, violencia generalizada, violaciones masivas de los Derechos Humanos, infracciones al Derecho Internacional Humanitario u otras circunstancias emanadas de las situaciones anteriores que puedan alterar o alteren drsticamente el orden pblico. (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2010). 8 A resguardo is a territory usually owned by Indigenous or Afro-Colombians
29
languages belonging to 14 linguistic families and diverse forms of social organization based on kinship and community relations (United Nations, 2008). Closely related to the conflict, these groups as well as Afro-Colombian communities are very vulnerable during fighting because their homes are located on land needed by illegal groups and drug dealers to grow cocaine. This is because they have guaranteed access routes and, in general, can be used as a means of expanding their dominance. The UNHCR points out that about one million indigenous people living in Colombia have been victims of forced displacement or threats due to the conflict (Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR)/UNHCR, 2008). Additional data gathered by a governmental organization and CODHES indicated that between January, 2000 and June, 2002, either some 3.75 or some 1.75 per cent of Colombias indigenous population were forced to leave their homes (ICG, 2003 p. 5). In Colombia, indigenous populations are one of the most vulnerable within the displaced group being highlighted with the possibility of extinction.9 (United Nations, 2010 p. 1, an unofficial translation). Almost 34 indigenous communities are in danger of extinction, especially the community of Aw which has been deeply affected by armed conflict. Armed groups invaded the Aw territory forcing them to leave. During 2009, the Aws were victims of massacres, assassinations, abductions, displacement, confinement, forced recruitment and threats.
La situacin de los derechos humanos de los pueblos indgenas en Colombia continua siendo sumamente grave, crtica y profundamente preocupante, a pesar del reconocimiento constitucional de stos derechos. The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues visited Colombia between July 5 and 9, 2010. Organization web site in English language: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/
30
The
National
Indigenous
Organization
of
Colombia
(ONIC)
criticized the indifferent position and response by the Colombian government for the needs of the indigenous populations during a previous displacement (Organizacin Nacional Indgena de Colombia (ONIC), 2010). Data from the government indicated that between January and August, 2010, the number of assassinations totaled 40, which increased 51% when compared to 2009. However, the number of assassinations was 83% because the government data missed 39% of indigenous assassinations from the community called Nasa. Information provided by the Colombian government, through its government organizations, the Organizacin Nacional Indgena de Colombia (ONIC), seems to be full of bias and uncertainty when reporting about indigenous populations. Through the ONIC, the UNHCR highlights that bias in data may reflect a lack of coordination between organizations and programs. This may be especially true for the Guarantee Program, which includes programs ordered by the Constitutional Court to protect the rights of indigenous people relative to human rights violations, armed conflict and forced displacement. Although this program appears to be ready to be implemented the government has shown other priorities as has been pointed out by the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Human Rights (Organizacin Nacional Indgena de Colombia, 2010). Armed conflict and Afro-Colombian population The non-governmental organization CODHES points out that unsustainable exploitation of natural resources in Colombia such as growing African palm, mine extraction, and bio-fuels by international and/or national companies is occurring and that these activities are promoting displacement. A banana corporation, for example, ignores the communitys rights on their land.
31
Since early December, hundreds of private contractors of multinational banana corporation Banacol have illegally invaded and occupied Afro-Colombian peace communities in the Curvarad river basin in order to clear the land for banana cultivation. Their actions have been supported and assisted by local paramilitaries, army soldiers and municipal governments (Felt, 2009, no page number indicated). Data concerning this development indicates that between 1999 and 2007, 380,000 farming families were removed from about 5.5 million hectares. For the years between 2005 and 2009, this number totaled 994,000 hectares and 198,800 families (CODHES, 2010). Organizations supporting Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations, as well as many organizations such as the United Nations10, have openly published information regarding the discrimination and marginalization these groups suffer. This is particularly true for indigenous populations, to the extent that today they are in danger of extinction (ABColombia, 2009). Their marginalization and discrimination are evident in how the land is taken by illegal groups or companies. An additional and very important issue is the lack of mechanisms to legalize the ownership of their land such as identification cards and property titles. This situation is described in the testimony of the communitys legal representative of COCOMOPOCA, the Peoples Peasant Organization of Alto Atrato in the department of Choc. He says that we are fighting hard for our rights to live peacefully and productively on our lands. It has been 15 years since our rights to these ancestral territories was recognized in the Colombian constitution but we are still struggling to get the land title. In the meantime we have to face illegal logging and
10
http://www.un.org/en/events/tenstories/08/colombia.shtml
32
mining companies causing environmental devastation. Our lives and our livelihoods are constantly at risk as well as defending ourselves from violence (ABColombia, 2009 p. 22). Armed conflict and women Displaced women represented 52% of the total displaced population in 2009, with families that include an average of 5.2 children (iDMC & NRC, 2009 p. 23). Unfortunately, under armed conflict conditions, displaced women become victims of three kinds of violence, i.e. direct target of violence, sexual violence, and as a member (mother, sister, daughter, friend, girlfriend or wife) of a family and circle of friends that is broken by violence (UNDP, 2003). Women are used as a means of forcing families to flee their homes, abandoning their land, and allowing others to take it as their own. Additionally, women are used as a means for threatening terror within communities in which military control is to be imposed and/or to seek revenge on adversaries or for exploiting them as sexual slaves. Other women vulnerable to displacement are those working as human rights defenders within Colombia (Amnesty International, 2008). Women who are displaced have distinct characteristics. Usually they have lost their husbands as a result of the conflict and must flee their rural homes with their children abandoning their livestock and possessions. Rural women generally have only a few years, if any, schooling, and their main livelihood is growing crops or livestock on farms, thus are left with little means of support when displaced. During armed conflict, both Colombian armed forces and illegal groups have been identified as being responsible for sexual abuse against women living in conflict areas. Sexual abuse includes rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, and forced abortion (ABColombia,
33
2009). According to the 2007 OHCHR11 report, only 96 of these cases have been reported as victims of sexual crimes. For the balance, there were claims of insufficient evidence, impossibility of identifying the perpetrator or that, for authorities, rape was considered a minor crime. Monica Girardo, for example, used to work with victims of political violence. While she was visiting a woman whose husband was assassinated by the paramilitary, three men from the group Black Eagles, a new paramilitary group, came to interrogate her and then sexually abused her. They also warned her that she had to move in 15 days. After she reported this to a number of different organizations, the response was that the Justice and Peace process would not take on any cases that had occurred after the paramilitary demobilization (ABColombia, 2009 p. 23). It is important to note here that the Colombian government points out that there are no paramilitaries because they have been eradicated. In fact, there are new groups that do not call themselves paramilitary, but continue to attack people who favor guerrillas or the government which is a form of paramilitary activity. A positive outcome of the displacement of women is that prior roles such as community leaders and supporters of womens organizations such as the National Network of Women, provide positive means for more successful relocation. Women tend to be more successful than men in guaranteeing the survival of the family and finding jobs in new settings (ICG, 2003 p. 5). The National Network of Women and many other organizations offer training and support for
11
Acronym for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
34
men and women in issues of gender equality and training in leadership and community development.
Armed conflict and young people Children and the young are another vulnerable group, especially for those children whose families continue to live in high risk areas with the presence of illegal armed groups. As members of families in rural areas their opportunities in the long term are limited as a consequence of poverty, lack of education, and lack of income, with few or no job opportunities. These factors make them very vulnerable for recruitment by illegal armed forces. Usually, children and the young find the idea of joining illegal armed forces attractive, especially because these groups offer a salary. Forced recruitment is also common because refusal to join could mean death for the recruits. This situation occurred in the department of Putumayo in southeast Colombia., Two children, aged 15 and 16, and an 18-year-old man, were forced to walk along a narrow path. In the darkness they were forced to stand at the edge of the path and hold hands. Then each one was shot through the heart. The killings in Filadelfia, department of Caldas, on April 11, 2007, were reportedly carried out by paramilitaries or on January 16, 2008, two boys aged 12 and 14 were killed, allegedly by the FARC, in the municipality of La Hormiga, Department of Putumayo. Their families homes were then burned down. The killings were apparently in reprisal for the boys refusal to join the FARC (Amnesty International, 2008 p. 49). The 2007 report of the UN Secretary General about children and armed conflict highlighted the efforts made by the Colombian government through the Colombian Family
35
Welfare Institute (ICBF) in order to change the destiny of children within conflict areas. Options outlined include supporting youth in avoiding recruitment and reintegrating children already in illegal groups back into their communities. In 2007 these groups included about 3,326 children being re-integrated to society (UN General Assembly Security Council, 2007). However, abuse to children continues. The Ombudsman office indicated that in the department of Cauca, a demobilized child from the FARC was used by the military as an informant and was killed during a war attack. In the town of Urrau, department of Choc, two children aged 8 and 11 were forced by the military to carry materiel for them (UN General Assembly Security Council, 2007). Violence also occurs in rural schools. The schools are used by both illegal and armed forces to add pressure to this conflict. They visit schools and recruit children for their groups. Following these visits, it is reported that they landmine the territory around schools or abandon explosives. For example, there is a school in the town of Guacamayal, department of Caldas, which is still surrounded by landmines12. In the town of Puerto Caicedo, Putumayo, a school was occupied by members of the national army forces. In 2007 in the town of La Joya, department of Putumayo tanks were placed at the entrance of the school as a military checkpoint (UN General Assembly Security Council, 2007). Other issues related to illegal groups visiting schools have been rape, sexual violence, and exploitation. This is a major concern because these acts are perpetrated by both Colombian armed forces and illegal groups, according to the same report. The Office of the High
12
This
is
video
in
YouTube
about
the
landmines
in
Colombia.
Please
see:
Landmines:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AlhxLSbmQO8
36
Commissioner for Human Rights, in this report, has complained about forced abortion and other degrading treatments against young girls. In 2006, 7 and 11 year old girls from the town of Florida, Valle del Cauca were sexually abused by a soldier enlisted in the military. (UN General Assembly Security Council, 2007). Children who are members of families that are being displaced are prevented for going to school or receiving adequate medical assistance. As displaced persons in Colombia, they do not receive the basic necessities of life as do permanently established citizens. Studies have been completed based on data provided by the government and the Civil Monitoring Commission (Comisin De Seguimiento de la Sociedad Civil or CSSC). The CSSC is a group whose main objective is to support the Constitutional Courts oversight of the governments response to IDPs. These assessments were completed in 2008 and again in June, 2010. The respondents were IDPs registered in the Unique Registry for Displaced Population (RUPD). The data collected indicated that a high percent of IDPs have access to education (80% of registered IDPs), food (about 50% of registered IDPs), and health care (about 90%). This access is lower in the areas of housing (15%), income generation (10%), and emergency support (17%). These data and the following graph are from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (iDMC & NRC, 2010 p. 5). This graph indicates that availability of food is also an issue of concern to approximately 50% of the IDPs. An intrinsic issue is that these services are provided for those IDPs registered in the RUPD, however for those who do not register there not options for accessing the services are provided. According to Accin Social, between 2008 and 2010, 202,262 IDPs arrived from
37
other places. Similarly, CODHES indicated for the same period of time, 316,173 IDPs arrived from other places (Accin Social, 2011; CODHES, 2011).
Graph about the IDPs Enjoyment of Rights according the Colombian government:
Source: http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/4BCA7DF31521CC16C12577F5002CED98/$file/ Colombia_Overview_Dec2010.pdf pg. 6
Based in the graph and the percentages, there is more to do in meeting the needs of IDPs. In 2009, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the governments ineffective response to internal displacement is generating an unconstitutional state of affairs because the government lacks accountability for real solutions to displacement. On the other hand, the government has reported that its response to the plight of IDPs has continued to improve. It does point out that there continues to be significant gaps in response in areas issues such as emergency humanitarian assistance, housing, land rights, and livelihood opportunities.
38
39
Chapter III Displacement in Colombia-Procedures for Registering: The Unique Registry of Displaced Population (RUPD)
Data collected by both CODHES and Accin Social illustrate the pattern of displacement between 1999 and 2010. According to CODHES, 2008 was the year representing the most displaced persons registered within the different departments of Colombia with more than 380,000 IDPs13 (iDMC & NRC, 2009). However, the governmental organization Accin Social data indicates that 2002 was the year with most registrations (463,779). (Figure 3, p. 75 Accin Social, 2011a; CODHES, 2011b). The patterns of displacement are described by areas, or hotspots, to which the IDPs arrive and the kind of displacement, i.e. individual (drop-by-drop) or massive. Hotspot areas are the Pacific Coast, including the departments of Choc, Valle del Cauca, Cauca and Nario; the Northwest coast, including the departments of Csar, Magdalena, and Bolvar; the central Andean area, including the departments of Antioqua, Tolima, and Cundinamarca; and finally, the departments included in the Amazonia such as, Meta, Caquet, and Putumayo. Massive displacements are not too common and are characterized by the displacement of entire towns. These displacements occur particularly after armed conflict occurs in the area which forces the entire population to leave. Individual or family displacements are more
13
Data retrieved from : http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/3706-colombia-violence-displaced-morethan-380000-in-2008-codhes.html
40
common. In 2008, 89% of displacements were individual or family while mass displacement accounted for 11% of the total in the same year (iDMC & NRC, 2009). Individual displacement is generally from rural areas to urban areas. The highest number of inhabitants leaving rural areas was from the department of Antioquia with the displacement of 88,340 inhabitants in 2000. Collection of statistical data available on both CODHES and Accin Social websites indicates that the pattern of rural to urban displacement occurred most for IDPs arriving in the city of Bogot. According to CODHES, between 1999 and 2010, Bogot had received the most IDPs with a total of 467,820 new inhabitants. This represents approximately 14% of the 3,362,779 IDPs registering in receiving departments. By comparison, for the same period of time, 1999-2010, Accin Social indicates that Bogot was receptor for 530,821 IDPs from their total of 3,387,340 registered IDPs (Accin Social, 2011a, CODHES, 2011b). Although displacement continues today, the results of established programs seem to be inadequate for helping IDPs find relief for their precarious life conditions. The Unique Registry of Displaced Population (RUPD) Data about displacement is collected through the Central Registry for the Displaced Population or Registro nico de la Poblacin Desplazada (RUPD from its Spanish acronym). The RUPD14 was created by the Colombian government and ordered by Law 387 of 1997. The objective of this law is to have up-to-date quality information relative to the number of IDPs in order to create policies to target their specific needs (Acnur, Accin Social, no year indicated).
14
The RUPD is a technical tool for an on time and efficient answer to the forced displacement as a consequence of violence. The RUPD was created by the Colombian government through the Integral Attention to the Displaced Population offices (SNAIPD) and is coordinated by the Presidential Agency for the Social Accin and the International Cooperation (Accin Social)
41
The process begins when a person considers him/herself displaced, visits a government agency, and files a report about the facts that precipitated the forced displacement. This process must be begun within one year of the events15. Following an official assessment to verify the truth of the report and within two weeks of filing the report, the applicant is assigned an RUPD number. This RUPD number allows the applicant to claim benefits such as immediate assistance for basic needs including food, housing, healthcare, and basic education for children of school age. These benefits are only available for three months and another three months in case of extreme need. The only situation in which a displaced person would be able to access immediate aid is in the event of an emergency. It seems unclear whether an emergency must be the consequence of violence, a requirement for registering in the RUPD, or if the emergency could be also be caused by a natural disaster such as the flooding which occurred in 2010 displacing thousands of persons. The emergency condition is a unique one which actually accelerates the process and allows the applicant to receive humanitarian aid immediately after making the declaration which, otherwise, could take up to fifteen days for non-emergency requests (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The process of applying for and receiving an RUPD number requires that the displaced person appear at the Assistance and Orientation Units for the Displaced Population (Unidades de Atencin y Orientacin-UAOs). This process takes considerable time because UAO centers are not usually centrally located. Public transportation is usually required to access a UAO center
15
The Decree 2569 of 2000 (article 8). The law establishes that the filling has to be made in person.
42
and may discourage displaced persons from accessing the RUPD registration and benefits. As a representative of Human Rights Watch indicated we visited one (UAO) office in Soacha, a municipality just outside the city limits of Bogot that receives a significant number of displaced persons. As a result of the effort to establish such offices, an official with the International Organization for Migration told us, there arent the enormous lines that there were before (Human Rights Watch, 2005 p. 33). This situation was also highlighted by the Colombian Constitutional Court through Sentence T 025 of 2004 which considers that the policies that target IDPs have not succeeded in their purpose of mitigating the needs of IDPs arriving in cities that require humanitarian aid. This is relevant information in as much as it directly concerns the governments handling of IDP needs in many areas, including planning its response, budgeting, and evaluating the citys capacity to respond. The city of Bogot, for example, should be especially concerned about the accuracy of the data collected through the RUPD because it is a hotspot to which IDPs arrive. More effective strategies should be in place to make it easier for IDPs to register with the municipality instead of locating themselves in the poverty areas which surround this large city. It is important that the city of Bogot have clear understanding that most of the IDPs arriving are from the countryside, and are usually illiterate. Therefore these IDPs may not know how to make a declaration or request assistance from public officers (UniAndes et al., 2008). On the other hand, some IDPs avoid registering and obtaining benefits because they find a job or establish themselves with family members or friends. However, Human Rights Watch has noted that another reason that an IDP may avoid registering with the RUPD is the fear that
43
harm would come to them if they provided their personal information, addresses, or names of family members. Mdecins sans Frontires (MSF) explained to Human Rights Watch that MSF has also found that some of the people who know about the [health] benefits available for them fear providing information on their own whereabouts. In order for an internally displaced person to qualify for benefits the government requires the confirmation of a persons identity both with the municipality of current residence and with the area from which they have fled. For those who have escaped persecution, authorizing the government to conduct a process of verification raises serious concerns. If the details of a persons whereabouts were to fall into the wrong hands, it might endanger them. Thus, free preventive health care eludes thousands of displaced people who are wary of compromising their whereabouts to access medical treatment (Human Rights Watch. 2005 p. 37). Consequently, many IDPs avoid registering through the RUPD and prefer to register with non-governmental organizations such as CODHES or international non-governmental organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Colombia. Registering with a non-governmental organization may lower the numbers of RUPD-registered IDPs and also reduce eligible IDPs from claiming benefits required by law. It also increases the stress on cities slums and reduces their ability to alleviate poverty.
Humanitarian Assistance The policy providing assistance to IDPs dates back to 1995 when President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) established an assistance program. However, it was not until 1997 when Law 387 went into effect through the National Department of Planning (Departamento Nacional
44
de Planeacin) and the National Program of Integral Attention to the Displaced Population Due to Violence was enacted. Through this program, being a displaced person was defined and the need for preventive measures and assistance for returning and resettlement were delineated. Improvements in the humanitarian response included the creation of the governmental organization the Social Solidarity Network (RSS), today Accin Social. Additionally, international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or ACNUR began working with local organization to set up the Joint Technical Unit (JTU) which would improve the performance and effectiveness of operations (ICG, 2003). However, the impetus for an adequate humanitarian response has not been fulfilled based on original expectations. Uribes administration has placed considerable emphasis on establishing security and democratic authority of the national government throughout Colombia (ICG, 2003). This priority is based on the principle that displacement can be prevented and that IDPs should return to their original locations. This return is only possible if the citizens vulnerability to the violence is reduced while safeguarding their rights (ICG, 2003). Humanitarian assistance during Uribes administration included compensation payments for the loss of family members and property in attacks. It also included reconstruction of property; provision of food and housing programs; increased military and police presence in about 260 municipalities; and programs for women and children. By 2006, Uribes administration estimated that about 30,000 families or 150,000 individuals would return to their homelands. These returns were stimulated by the provision of housing subsidies, income
generating projects, vocational training, and land titles, with participation of private enterprise and NGOs (ICG, 2003). Yet displacement continues today and established programs seem not to be sufficient in assisting IDPs for finding relief in their precarious life conditions
45
An example of humanitarian response in Bogot The Capital District of Bogot is the largest city in Colombia. According to the census completed by DANE16 in 2005, the city has approximately 6,840,116 inhabitants and the metropolitan area has a population of 1,121,138 (DANE, 2006). Because Bogot has been one of the primary arrival cities for IDPs it will be cited as an example of the conditions of displacement. Bogot has become a primary city of arrival for IDPs because of its reputation as a relatively safe city and because it is the largest city in the country thus providing more opportunities to make a living. Bogot thus experiences unique concerns because of the large number of IDPs. Displacement has been recorded through many different agencies, i.e. local, nongovernmental, governmental, international non-governmental and religious, especially the Catholic Church. The two agencies in Colombia, which have locations in Bogot, and are involved with IDPs are the governmental agency Accin Social and the non-governmental agency CODHES. Both agencies have their own methods of collecting statistical data. Because the governmental agencies are usually criticized in Colombia due to their bureaucracy and corruption, data from both agencies have been included for comparison. Data indicate that between 1999 and 2010, the number of IDPs registered in the Capital District of Bogot according to Accin Social was 530,821, and according to CODHES was 467,820 (See Figure 3 p. 75 Accin Social, 2011a, CODHES, 2011b). Using the statistical data,
16
DANE is the Spanish acronym for National Statistical Administrative Department, a main governmental institution for collection and analysis of statistical data that is also in charge of developing, analyzing, and publishing data collected through the CENSUS.
46
Bogot has been identified as one of the primary receiving cities with lower levels of expulsion. This could be attributed to its urban characteristics and also to the presence of urban fringe municipalities such as Funza, Mosquera, and Facatativ. These communities also represent better places for IDPs to begin a new life at lower costs, according to Nubia Ruiz, PhD, teacher in the Institute of Urban Studies (IEU) of the National University in Colombia (Universidad de los Andes, the Brookings Institution, the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees, & Accin Social., 2008, & Tafur, F., (2011). UniAndes et al. (2008) points out the importance of local governments or municipalities in ultimately implementing policies ordered by the national government. This study develops three case studies for the cities of Antioquia, Bogot, and Santa Marta, Colombia, and its conclusions are used here to explain the role of the Capital District of Bogot in protecting IDPs. Data regarding the displaced population arriving in Bogot is also collected through the Unified Comprehensive Plan (Planes Integrales nicos-PIU). The PIU is the major program designed to monitor the response to the obligations stipulated by Decree 250 of 2005 by the Colombian government to local governments. These responses are well established in Medellin and Bogot, and partially established in Santa Marta. The PIU is a program or plan of action to assists IDPs and includes agreements, decrees, ordinances and sub-programs as well as stipulations for allocation of specific funds to attend to the needs of IDPs. In Bogot, data collection is usually made through one of four governmental offices established for the registry of IDPs arriving in Bogot, including the previously mentioned UAOs.
47
The UAOs17 in Bogot are offices that, in addition to registering IDPs, introduce them to the process of accessing the services provided by the municipality. According to the study developed by UniAndes et al., and review of information provided by the municipality of Bogot, there are only four offices or UAOs throughout the city. Because of their locations, they are difficult for IDPs to access. Furthermore, UAOs are also vulnerable to limited public funding which is reflected in the quality and quantity of humanitarian assistance they can provide. Demographic data collected through this municipal program indicates that 68% of IDPs were unemployed, 16% were working in areas such as construction, informal sales, domestic services, among others, 6% were working as home labor and 2% had day jobs. Also, according to this study, 83% of IDPs come from rural areas which increase their difficulty in being assimilated into the urban labor market thus worsening their living conditions in the city. This study also indicates that the primary reasons for displacement are direct threats, i.e. 62% of forced recruitment, 9% of situations related to murder, 9% situations of fear, and 8% situations of tension caused by guerrillas, paramilitary groups or both (UniAndes et al., 2008). The humanitarian response of the city of Bogot was tested in 2010 when more than 1,000 families of IDPs located themselves at the Tercer Milenio Park, a giant park located in the center of the city. This park was invaded illegally for about four months and IDPs would not consider leaving until the government satisfied their request for humanitarian assistance. This request was supported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Colombian government offered a package of humanitarian aid which included $493USD per
17
Web site powered by the city of Bogot : http://www.bogota.gov.co/portel/libreria/php/frame_detalle_scv.php?h_id=23792
48
family, sustainable work, safety, the right to dignified living, and relocation to the countryside should they wish to return (Brockner, 2009). The IDPs presence in the park raised issues concerned with health, due to the possibility that other IDPs would be attracted to this area. This possibility was an issue also in the same year when the city was overwhelmed by 1,200 families displaced from the department of Tolima. These increased numbers were critical for a city that is unable to take care of more refugees and demands (Wecker, 2009). Health concerns were raised particularly after health inspectors from the district Emergency Committee examined the IDPs medical conditions and discovered 131 people showing symptoms of the H1N1 virus, three people found infected with HIV and others who were infected with tuberculosis and cancer. All of these IDPs were voluntarily removed from the Park (Wecker, 2009). To mitigate the health and sanitary issues at the Park, the municipality located a permanent mobile hospital for children. Within this hospital, the city supplied diapers, nutritional supplements, cleaning supplements, and awareness conferences to avoid spreading viruses. It also supplied potable water through tanks and the installation of 20 portable bathrooms (The City of Bogot, 2009). Successes like this are not rare in the Capital District of Bogot where displaced persons demand attention through negotiating with the government for real solutions and for accountability of the benefits they are guaranteed under the current law.
49
Chapter IV Gap Analysis of the Humanitarian Response in Colombia by the Government

The weakness of Colombias legal framework is largely in its implementation. Although Colombian law provides municipal authorities with a legal framework for their actions, they could and should play a more important role; however, this has proven difficult. Both the lack of resources and the lack of political will in the municipalities have been cited as causes for the lack of implementation. But the problem faced by Colombian municipalities may partly reflect weaknesses in efforts to decentralize political power in the country (UniAndes et al., 2008 p. 2). One of the main challenges of the humanitarian response in Colombia is closing the gap between its advanced legal and public policy framework for displaced persons and the implementation of this policy (UniAndes et al., 2008). Jean-Noel Wetterwald, a representative from UNHCR, describes the importance of overcoming barriers to effective humanitarian response in Colombia by suggesting that barriers be used as starting points for involved parties to generating solutions (UniAndes et al., 2008). The issue of displacement in Colombia is multidimensional which necessitates the collection and sharing of information (UniAndes et al., 2008). This chapter explores the role of the municipalities in the humanitarian response. It also explores the obstacles and gaps to an effective humanitarian response along with present and future issues regarding the importance of a coordinated response from the National government to the municipalities.
50
The government response to internal displacement in Colombia is generally divided into two phases which occurred before and after 2004. In 2004 the Constitutional Court of Colombia responded to the crisis of IDPs by declaring the government response ineffective and unconstitutional. At that time, the Constitutional Court was convened because the National government was not overcoming institutional barriers or managing financial resources in dealing with the humanitarian response (iDMC & NRC, 2010). Institutional barriers to effective humanitarian response included issues at both administrative and bureaucratic levels involving insufficient human resources or skilled workers. This lack of personnel limited the response from the National government to municipalities and local administrators. Also impeding the effectiveness of the response was the lack of action plans, goals, timelines, and procedures. Further impediments to improving the humanitarian response were the lack of adequate implementation of programs, assessment of interventions, monitoring, and information systems and networks (iDMC & NRC, 2008). The ambiguous relationship between the municipalities and the National government The process of decentralization started in the 1980s and was included in the Constitution in 1991. Initially, decentralization was defined as a means of consolidating democracy, developing a participatory democracy, and increasing governability. The Colombian territory is divided into districts, departments, municipalities, and indigenous territories. They receive financial support from the National government so they can maintain autonomous responsibility for their governance, administration of resources, establishment and maintenance of municipal departments, and performance of their duties in running the municipality.
51
At the department level they must coordinate and complement municipal actions, as well as guarantee reciprocal communication on local and national situations (UniAndes et al., 2008 p. 20). Other functions of the department include leading and coordinating administrative actions of the department and delegating national services in the territory; presenting development programs to the department and, promoting the development of economic, social, and cultural activities, and other functions. At the municipal level, town councils and the mayor prepare a socio-economic development plan which is developed following the goals of the municipality and the budget required for each of the projects. Mayors are the prime police authority in the municipality and are responsible for adequately delivering functions and services. Mayors are considered to have more responsibility than the governors. This may be due to the fact that the mayors are responsible for allocating municipal expenses according to the investment and development plans presented to the municipal council (UniAndes et al., 2008 p. 20). According to El Tiempo.com, by 2008, the National government did not know the exact number of municipalities within its territory. Data indicated that Colombia was a country with 32 departments and the Capital District of Bogot. The Ministry of Interior reported approximately 1,101 municipalities18. As a decentralized country, the National government had delegated administrative autonomy to departments. These departments are led by governors who are
18
In 2008 and according to other governmental offices such as the National Registry the number is 1,102 and for the National Planning offices the number is 1,099. Retrieved from the Colombian newspaper EL Tiempo, ElTiempo.com, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-4111251
52
responsible for keeping coordinating and complementing efforts among the municipalities within their departments. The municipalities are governed by mayors. Chief among the responsibilities of the mayors is to provide communication with other municipalities and the department involving local and national situations. The mayor is also responsible for implementing the municipalitys programs in health, education, etc. To close the gap at the municipal level, municipalities need a better legal framework to define decentralization and the responsibilities of the National government, departments and municipalities. Presently it is not clear what the municipalities responsibilities and tasks are or when a person is no longer considered internally displaced. This more structured framework will bring stability in administration of the budget and resources necessary to properly fulfill the governments requirements. Also, this framework will enhance accountability, the IDPs participation in the process, and delegate the same importance to governments and municipalities. For municipalities, it may also close structural and legal gaps while allowing them to maintain their autonomy for use of resources and development of their programs. It is essential to minimize the risks of corruption and/or power abuse with appropriate supervision (UniAndes et al., 2008). Another institution providing services for IDPs is the Public Ministry. This organization, led by the Solicitor General and the Ombudsman, is responsible for protecting human rights, the public interests, and monitoring the official conduct of all those who perform civil services. The Ombudsman has additional responsibilities such as watching over and ensuring the protection of human rights (UniAndes et al., 2008). At a lower administrative level, local legal representatives
53
are responsible for taking statements from IDPs in order to grant or deny registration in the RUPD. After the registration in the RUPD, local administrators send the information collected to the local headquarters of Accin Social (UniAndes et al., 2008). The municipalities can contact the National government only through the office of the governor of their department. However, this relationship breaks down due to the lack of clarity in the division of responsibilities that each one has. The result is that, because of the lack of coordination between national and local authorities and/or departmental governors, the provision of humanitarian support to IDPs is left to the National government. To close this gap, it is necessary to allow more flexibility for municipal authorities to be able to decide what their priorities are at the local level. Modifying Law 38719 might represent a big step in changing the responsibilities of the National government, departmental government, and municipalities, as well as allowing participation of the municipalities in the National Council for Comprehensive Assistance to People Displaced by Violence (CNAIPD).
Phases of assistance to IDPs The National government has defined three phases of assistance to IDPs. These include prevention, emergency humanitarian assistance and, the socioeconomic stabilization (UniAndes et al., 2008), (see Appendix 1, The phases of Displacement according to the Colombian
19
The Law 387 is considered the most advance law in assisting and protecting IDPs. For more information see:
http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=468e1150d&query=law%20387%20%20for%20displacement%20in%20colombia
54
government for details). These phases define the National governments response to displacement which starts with the National government, extends to the Departments, and ends at the level of the local municipalities which are ultimately responsible for implementing programs and managing resources. The level of responsibility of the municipalities throughout the process of displacement is vital and requires attention. Municipalities today are responding to IDPs in a number of ways. Accin Social is a governmental organization which leads the response to IDPs. This organization was originally Social Solidarity Network (RSS) and its responsibilities include the national coordination of the Unified Comprehensive Plan (PIU). This is the plan which develops standardized and coordinated mechanisms for IDPs assistance. However, the PIUs are not adequately regulated by a legal framework and thus lack definition for their function. Additionally, budgetary allocations are inadequate for their effective functioning (UniAndes et al., 2008). Another important role for Accin Social takes place during the second phase of response to an IDP, the Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (EHA) phase. Accin Social is entirely responsible for financing and allocating resources to households in proportion to their size and composition. Accin Social is not responsible for the implementation of these programs. The program implementation is the responsibility of different organizations and local authorities. One of the problems that Accin Social faces is the lack of coordination in the delivery of humanitarian assistance kits to IDPs. In 2005, for example, the National Department of Planning (DNP) indicated that the IDPs who were not receiving assistance under the EHA varied between 2% for the delivery of basics kits, 65% for the delivery of sanitary kits and, 72% for temporary
55
accommodations. This is generally a result of a lack of commitment by the national institutions and territorial institutions responsible for providing services to IDPs (UniAndes et al., 2008). This overloads the responsibilities of Accin Social which then has to assume the responsibilities of local authorities and finance part of its expenses through cash resources and advances. During the EHA phase, the Assistance and Orientation Units for the Displaced Population (UAOs) play an important role. These institutions work as a bridge between local and national institutions, and facilitate access to the EHA kits for IDPs. Municipalities are directly responsible for the UAOs relative to financing their structure, services, and naming a coordinator (UniAndes et al., 2008). UAOs are local institutions and not dependent on the National government. UAOs are financed totally by local authorities. If there are not resources for UAOs, Accin Social intervenes financing the infrastructure and training their officials. The problems facing municipalities include the structure and coordination of responses which arise from an incomplete decentralization process. The National government demands results from the municipalities response to IDPs but it does not provide the necessary resources for adequately providing the services. This poor response may also be caused by the poor design and implementation process of some components of the national IDPs policy such as the Victims Law (UniAndes et al., 2008). Another constraint in the implementation process is the lack of personnel especially in high risk areas and an incomplete or ineffective methodology for data collection for statistical analysis. These are major complaints of the municipalities. This is an issue which directly affects final data collection. These data are used by the Central Registry for the Displaced Population (RUPD). The lack of clarity about relationships between the central and the
56
municipal levels, scarcity of financial resources, housing and socioeconomic stabilization continue to be barriers for municipalities in their response at this time (UniAndes et al., 2008). Although the Colombian legislation concerning forced displacement as a consequence of violence is one of the most complete in international law, its implementation on the ground continues to be limited (UniAndes et al., 2008). Law 387 of 1997 includes Laws, Decrees and Policies that focus on IDPs while the national legislature defines the Governments obligations to manage the displacement phenomena through the three phases previously described. Lack of necessary data regarding displaced persons Following are descriptions of the obstacles to closing the gaps in humanitarian response by municipalities. Data collection is crucial for an adequate humanitarian response because ultimately, it is necessary to know the identity and number of IDPs, their health conditions, needs, and other relevant information. To improve the collection of data through the RUPD, the national system provided for displaced persons, it is necessary to improve the declaration and validation process. Presently this process takes fifteen working days, or perhaps more, to declare a person as displaced. This timeline is considered too slow. The data collected is only used by National government offices due to security concerns. Thus, local authorities do not have access to this information. To close this gap, it is necessary that local authorities have access to the collected data while protecting the anonymity of the IDPs. Related to this, the system also lacks information regarding previous assistance requested by the applicant and/or other necessary information e.g. from which municipality are you coming? The reason seems to be that it is too expensive to produce new questionnaires or modify those already in use (UniAndes et al., 2008).
57
Another gap caused by lack of information-sharing for providing support is that some IDPs receive most of the governmental assistance available while the most vulnerable do not receive any support. To close this gap, it is necessary to have more flexibility and sharing of information among organizations, beginning with Accin Social. Allowing municipalities to access information may help resolve issues such as identifying who should be the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid. Budgetary issues and financial limitations The first step towards decentralization in the 1980s was the institution of popular election of mayors which was then followed by the fiscal reform of 1986. This reform mandated that 50% of the Value Added Tax be shared with local governments in accordance with their populations. Until 2002, the Value Added Tax represented increases from 0.5% of the GDP in 1982 to 3.1% of the GDP in 2002. The reform mandated that 22% of the GDP be transferred by the National government to territorial governments. Distribution of funds was designated so that 60 percent of resources are assigned in direct proportion to the number of inhabitants with unsatisfied basic needs and to the relative level of poverty of the population of the respective municipality, and the remainder of funds are distributed in relation to the population, fiscal and administrative efficiency and the progress demonstrated on indicators of quality of life (UniAndes et al., 2008 p. 19). Another source of funding came from the transfer of current revenues through the Fiscal Year Budget and the Law of Appropriations in accordance with the National Development Plan. Funds were also distributed through the General Participation System which had mandated use for financial services provided by the territorial institutions at a departmental, district, or municipal levels. These funds were assigned for providing health and education services. Other
58
transfers to municipalities originated from tax revenues such as property taxes, industrial and commercial taxes (ICA), road and traffic taxes, and parks and reforestation taxes but each mayors was given discretion as to how to impose and collect these taxes. The Conpes20 is the office that determines the amount of national budget available for programs for IDPs through Law 387 of 1997 created by the CNAIP. Its main function is to formulate policies related to IDPs and provide assistance to local institutions. At the local level, these institutions, such as the Committees for Integrated Attention to People Displaced by Violence, have responsibility for monitoring compliance with the laws which have been integrated by municipal mayors and/or governors. It is the responsibility of these leaders to create territorial committees and to report cases of displacement to central authorities. This provides the first step for communication and coordination between local and central authorities. The mayors have greater responsibility than governors regarding IDPs. This is because the mayors are obligated by Article 7 of Law 387 to call to action local and municipal Committees for Integrated Attention for IDPs in cases of forced displacement. This article also defines the consequences for misconduct related to this order when the mayors do not comply with this duty. Another organization created by Law 387 is the SNAIPD, a system led by Accin Social which integrates organizations responsible for providing assistance to IDPs. Other offices such as the Ministry of the Interior and Justice (MIJ) share responsibility for coordination and
20
The National Council for Economic and Social Policy (Conpes, acronym of the Spanish name) was created in 1958 and its main objective is to advise the National government in issues related to economic and social development. The Conpes includes all institutions from the National government in charge of economic and social development (UniAndes et al., 2008).
59
implementation by local and national authorities. The National Development Plan has recognized failures in the SNAIPD system particularly in the area of poor communication which leads to lack of coordination and implementation between local institutions and central offices. Municipalities mayors have identified both budget and financial constraints as the biggest obstacles in assisting IDPs. This is due primarily to the fact that there is not a correlation between the increased amount of responsibilities and the allocation of resources. Municipalities face the dilemma of how to use these limited resources, e.g. sharing resources between IDPs or disabled and/or poor inhabitants which may leave only a small amount of funding for IDPs. To close the gap of financial limitations and limit corruption, the national government should have a stated and supervised use of international funds channeled to these municipalities. The government should also incentivize municipalities through a system of rewarding those that demonstrate authentic and clear administration of resources in assisting IDPs. Governments must, thus, respond to the necessity of technical support, especially in issues of housing and income generation as well as joint financing of infrastructure projects and capacity building towards municipalities.
The lack of capability at the municipal level The consequences for lack of capability are evident in an inefficient implementation of programs and lack of knowledge of the particular IDPs needs. This lack of capability is identified by how municipalities visualize and finally implement IDP programs. Programs for IDPs do not represent a high priority at the municipal level. There is a high turnover of municipal workers assigned to assist the displaced, partly due to lack of interest. This makes it more
60
difficult to maintain consistency of information and, indirectly, this lack of interest extends to poorer conditions in facilities. Facilities for IDPs are usually precarious, lacking telephones, computers, office equipment, and privacy for attending to medical issues. To close this gap, it is necessary to increase funding and training for local officials in matters of humanitarian assistance, administration, and ethics. Gaps relative to land and safe return An important issue relative to IDPs and the State is to determine legally when the condition of internal displacement ends (UniAndes et al., 2008, pp. 9-13). Today, stunted rural development and human suffering are affected by poverty, lack of access and lack of ownership of the land. The Colombian government continues to accept the support of the United States which has invested more than USD $6 billion in support of policies developed for mitigating the above issues of rural land (Lutheran World Relief et al., 2011). President Santos also has proposed a new land policy bill which has generated controversy because of the lack of acknowledgement of the humanitarian crisis. This bill has been presented to the Colombian Congress and seeks to provide reparation to victims of the violence through restitution of 2 million hectares of land to IDPs. The bill points out that 1.2 million hectares of returnable land will come from usurped lands that are now in the hands of third parties (Lutheran World Relief et al., 2011 p. 2). This bill only includes restitution or reparation for IDPs registered between 1991 and 2010 leaving out thousands of other IDPs from the 1980s and 2011. These IDPs will be unable to seek reparations. The proposed bill also excludes the Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities which are among the most vulnerable groups. This bill does not have the mechanisms to guarantee the right of previous
61
consultation21 which means that by excluding them the bill fails to recognize grave human rights violations against these groups and the effects of forced displacement from ancestral lands on their livelihoods (Lutheran World Relief et al., 2011 p. 4). Regarding safety issues for returning, the proposed bill does not articulate protection measures for families returning to land restored under the law. There have been many deaths and threats against those who lead or represent IDPs in land restoration. In 2010, for example, after the Minister of Agriculture restored 34 farms back to IDPs, Hernando Perez, an IDP leader, was assassinated. In March 2010, Rogelio Martinez was murdered on his farm after he returned from an initial displacement in 2000 (Lutheran World Relief et al., 2011). The issue of safe return must also consider that donor governments should stop funding programs in Colombia that encourage returns that are not voluntary and that lack evaluations of safety and dignity as is required by international standards. The Human Rights Watch organization made a request directly to the U.S. Agency for International Development and its Internally Displaced Persons Program as well as the projects it funds to stop including as a condition of its support the IDPs return to their original homes if the area for relocation has not been deemed safe for living. (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The bill also lacks a complementary package within the restitution of land which would provide support for IDPs in the form of compensation for losses of property, livestock, crops and other assets owned by IDPs prior to displacement. Integral reparation in this area would aid in a
21
Previous consultation is the right that Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities have over decision-making regarding policy measures, development projects, infrastructure development or any activities to be carried out within their territories. It seeks to guarantee and protect their cultural, social and economic identity and guarantee their rights to participation (International Labor Organization 169). The right of previous consultation was declared a fundamental and constitutional right by the Colombian Constitutional Court in 1994 (Lutheran World Relief et al., 2011 p. 3).
62
successful and sustainable return to rural livelihoods. The absence of this integral reparation leaves families with few, if any, resources to begin anew in a rural setting. The bill also lacks other mechanisms or articles regarding the formalization of land titles and is not specific as to how victims recognized by law are compensated, e.g. the return of stolen assets (Lutheran World
Relief et al., 2011).
The reality regarding reparation of land and safe return today should be considered relative to the reality of the armed conflict and the needs of the IDPs. In order to repair these gaps, the Colombian government and U.S. policy-makers supporting solutions to this issue should consider reviewing the proposed bill according to the requests of the Colombias Constitutional Court ruling on internal displacement, land rights and reparations. Review should also take place regarding the guidelines developed by the National Commission for Reparations and Restitution. Another suggestion for closing the gap in the area of land reparation is to strengthen the system of land registry which also studies and includes requests made by victims organizations, Afro-Colombian councils and indigenous organizations without limiting their participation in the process (Lutheran World Relief et al., 2011). For safe return, the government must first guarantee zones cleared of illegal armed groups, threats, intimidation, and violence. Then the government must support the most vulnerable victims, particularly ethnic groups and women, through integral reparation for crimes committed against them that are related to their displacement. These groups should also be included in programs for rural development with equal rights to access credit for small farmers. It is strongly recommended that agricultural extension services for returnees and sustainable provincial development plans which generate income be bolstered for the returnees.
63
Additionally, stronger, independent rural communities would be developed if small farmers maintained title to their land and control over it and its production. The investigations carried out by Lutheran World Relief, the Institute of Studies for Development and Peace (INDEPAZ) and the U.S. Office on Colombia (USOC) note the active participation of USAID as a supporter and leader of initiative in this area (Lutheran World Relief et al., 2011). It has been suggested that the Attorney Generals Office should create a unit in charge of investigating and prosecuting forced displacement and land usurpation. In general, the government must overcome its difficulty in providing the conditions for a return that would give people a real chance to rebuild and improve their lives. The State should overcome lack of funds, corruption, security problems, and the lack of coordination between the municipal, departmental and national governments. This lack of coordination is exemplified in that Accin Social delivers income-generating kits with seeds and tools for three months at the municipal level. Health and school services must be provided, but the municipalities provision of services is lacking in these areas due to lack of funds and social infrastructure (ICG, 2003). Safe return is closely linked to the governments effort to decrease the armed conflict which has endured as an eight-year military campaign started by President ribe which focused on attacking the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Lutheran World Relief et al., 2011). Currently, the campaign against one of the main participants in approximately 50 years of armed conflict has generated positive results. For example, the National government has expanded its presence in several of the formerly heavily conflict-ridden regions. Nevertheless, the reality is that the insurgents are adapting to military pressure using guerrilla warfare tactics, aggressive recruitment among rural populations, increasing involvement in drug
64
trafficking and alliances with other armed groups (such as the ELN) and drug-trafficking organizations. To close the gap in security policy, President Santos should increase the countrys law enforcement and military capability against illegal armed groups. Institutions must strengthen and expand the rule of law, protect human rights in all areas, reduce poverty, and create better channels of communication for political negotiations with the illegal participants of the armed conflict. This should lead to a successful conflict resolution. The new government must be clear that, in Colombia, there is not a post-conflict phase and that Colombia needs an integrated conflict resolution strategy which will positively decrease displacement and will motivate IDPs to return to the countryside voluntarily. The International Crisis Group (ICG) has suggested that to close the gap in security policy, the new government should keep the military pressure on FARC while responding to the new operations of the illegal groups. To this end, military intelligence, operational capacity and regional security participation must be improved. Neighboring countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela should open channels for bilateral cooperation in order to cut off supply routes. Additionally, cities will require more attention to the increasing violence due to the creation of new illegal armed groups in the cities (NIAGs). This protection in urban and rural areas must be constant and cover vulnerable groups such as the indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities that usually stay in their territories even during armed conflict (ICG, 2010).
65
Concerns regarding housing and socioeconomic stabilization programs Housing continues to be a problem due to the historic limitation of housing for the numbers of IDPs arriving in the municipalities. In the area of legislation, the lowland regulation (Planes de Ordenamiento Territorial) has defined areas surrounding the urban (periurban) areas as non-residential areas which prohibit the provision of housing for IDPs. In some cases, municipalities are able to provide land but IDPs do not have the resources to cover financial costs for buildings and public services. Municipalities lack socioeconomic stabilization due to lack of development of productive sectors offering IDPs job opportunities. This lack of job opportunities may be due to the fact that municipalities located far from the main cities may still be experiencing continued violence or that the IDPs do not have the literacy level required for the available jobs. To close these gaps, it is necessary that the government analyze the subsidies at the national and territorial levels ensuring that they meet the present needs for land and housing. This would be a beginning in enhancing the integration of IDPs into the labor sector. Additionally, increasing training through educational systems such as the National Learning Service (SENA) and importantly, decreasing discrimination against displaced persons will also enhance labor opportunities. An important issue requested to the State is to make a legal determination as to when the condition of internal displacement ends (UniAndes et al., 2008 pp. 9-13).
66
Conclusion
In conclusion, there are key issues regarding internally displaced persons in Colombia which are not yet resolved. As mentioned before, the Constitutional Court has made great stridest in its rulings which provide a framework for treatment provided to IDPs and other vulnerable groups. However, there are groups of IDPs that are technically excluded from humanitarian aid because their displacement occurred for reasons other than violence or conflict, e.g. eradication of illicit drug crops and aerial fumigations. It is necessary to continue to explore the issues related to humanitarian response as well as providing services to IDPs. Issues such as collection and analysis of data and statistics, when and where a displaced person may apply for and/or register for humanitarian aid, and when the condition of displacement ends are all areas which continue to need improvement. Although the report mentioned above presents important information regarding closing the gaps in humanitarian assistance as developed by mayors and local administrators, the issue of corruption in public offices should be analyzed as a barrier to effective program implementation. Municipalities have a right to data regarding IDPs which is presently not shared by State agencies. It continues to be a great concern for local administrators as to how to divide limited resources among the poor and the IDPs. Another concern regarding the humanitarian response in Colombia is the continuing necessity for coordination and sharing of information between governmental and nongovernmental organizations which would allow for better control of the amount of resources offered and identification of the beneficiaries. Coordinating these efforts would also decrease negative feelings towards the displaced population. There is a perception that IDPs use their situation as a pretense in order to obtain privileges that they do not deserve thus increasing
67
discrimination against them. This, in turn, is negatively reflected in the IDPs ability to secure jobs and/or places to live Finally, it is the authors opinion that too many organizations and systems have been created to assist IDPs. Through this study, the following agencies have been found to have some input or impact on IDPs: the Constitutional Court of Colombia, Accin Social, Conpes, CNAIPD, DNP, Ministry of Interior and Justice, the Ombudsman Office, the PIUs, RUP, RUPD, SNAIPD, UAOs, UAIDs, UTs, as governmental offices and agencies, INGOs, and local NGOs. With so many agencies involved there may be duplication saturation of services and lack of coordination and communication. As an example, governmental organizations take on
responsibility for IDPs programs expecting that other governmental organizations will continue them or run other complementary programs creating a fragmented response. For example, During the EHA phase, Accin Social is the entity responsible for financing the programs but it is not accountable for implementation, because the implementation of EHA programs is under the authority of a number of different actors as a group, in conjunction with local authorities (UniAndes et al., 2008 pg. 22). In contrast, a more organized approach may include a single organization which has entire responsibility for the program in all its phases. There are other situations in which municipalities may not be aware of their responsibilities to IDPs or do not have adequate resources to implement IDPs programs. A case in point is the creation of PIUs. The objective of the PIU is to develop standardized planning mechanisms for IDPs assistance, However, the implementation of the programs for which the National Plan is responsible is not being carried out. Here, the problem of implementation extends to municipalities which may not even have a PIU and may not even be aware that they are obligated by law to design and implement a PIU. On the other hand, even though a
68
municipality may have formulated and implemented a PIU, weaknesses in the development plan may continue to persist. Better communication and monitoring from Accin Social is thus required to develop realistic applications (UniAndes et al., 2008).
69
Figure #1 Political Map of Colombia
Source: International Crises Group, 2008. Correcting Course: Victims and the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia. Latin America report N.29-30. Appendix A. p. 28
70
Figure 2 Indigenous groups and ethnic territories in Colombia Ethnographic Region Region North Ethnic groups in territories Wayu, arhuaco, wiwa, kogui, kankuamo, chimilas,yukos, zen Region Northwest Zen, embera kato, embera chami, embera waunan, tule, kune, eperara, siiaprara Region Center east Uwa, motiln bar, guahibo, sicuani, piapoco, cuiba, and macahuan Region Southwest Waunan, paez, guambianos yanaconas, awa, pastos, ingas, quillacinga, kamitza, siona, kofan, eperara, siapirara, embera Region Center west Region East Embera Chami, Pijao Sikuani, piapoco, piaroa, salivas, curripaco, puinave, guayabero, tucano, desano, kubeo, miniti paranmatapi, yukuna, tikuna,
coreguaje, muinane, tanimuca, cocama, witoto, inga, paez, andoque, cuiba, saliva, nukak mak Source: DANE Census 2005. Information located in the Revista Virtual DANE:
http://www.dane.gov.co/revista_ib/html_r1/articulo8_r1.htm
71
Figure 3 Number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) arriving and registering in the different departments of Colombia
YEAR STATISTICAL DATA PROVIDED BY CODHES STATISTICAL DATA PROVIDED BY ACCION SOCIAL
1999
8,909
93,274
2000
317,375
372,848
2001
342,243
430,282
2002
412,553
463,779
2003
207,607
264,344
2004
287,581
244,641
2005
310,237
276,945
2006
221,638
297,967
2007
305,966
336,473
2008
380,863
304,524
2009
287,889
184,553
2010
279,768
117,710
Source: http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/EstadisticasDesplazados/ and

http://www.codhes.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=39&Itemid=51
From the same source:

Years Government organization Accin Social Non-government organizations CODHES
Total IDPs registered in Bogot
1999-2010
530,821
467,820
Total
IDPs
registered
in
1999-2010
3,387,340
3,362,779
Colombia
72
Figure 4 Example of a systematized Registro nico de Poblacin Desplazada RUPD or Unique Registry of Displaced Population. Translated to English in Figure 6
Source:
Accin
Social,
2007.
Retrieved
from:
http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/documentos/Guia_Consulta_Web.pdf
73
Figure 5 Registro nico de Poblacin Desplazada RUPD or Unique Registry of Displaced Population (Translated to English)
Reason for displacement Reason for displacement and registration year Reason for displacement and year of leaving Reason for displacement and year of arriving
Sex
Sex according reason for displacement
Sex according reason for displacement and registration year
Sex according the reason for displacement and year of leaving
Sex according the reason for displacement and year of arriving
Age
Age according reason for displacement
Age according reason for displacement and registration year
Age according the reason for displacement and year of leaving
Age according the reason for displacement and year of arriving
Ethnic group
Ethnic group according reason for displacement
Ethnic group according reason for displacement and registration year
Ethnic group according the reason for displacement and year of leaving
Ethnic group according the reason for displacement and year of arriving
Incapacity/handicap
Incapacity according reason for displacement
Incapacity according reason for displacement and registration year
Incapacity according the reason for displacement and year of leaving
Incapacity according the reason for displacement and year of arriving
Academic level
Academic level according reason for displacement
Academic level according reason for displacement and registration year
Academic level according the reason for displacement and year of leaving
Academic level according the reason for displacement and year of arriving
Civil status
Civil status according reason for displacement
Civil status according reason for displacement and registration year
Civil status according the reason for displacement and year of leaving
Civil status according the reason for displacement and year of arriving
Source: Accin Social, 2007. Retrieved from: http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/documentos/Guia_Consulta_Web.pdf
74
Figure 6 The scheme of organizations responsible for closing gaps in the humanitarian response in Colombia Holistic approach for closing gaps in humanitarian response in Colombia Holistic approach for closing gaps in humanitarian response in Colombia
NGOs CHURCH
Colombian through stakeholders.
government institutions,
INGOs
Departments
Municipalities
Local administrators
75
Appendix 1
Phases of Displacement according to the Colombian government The Colombian government, through the Law 387 and its subsequent mandates establish that local authorities should be involved in the three phases of assistance for IDPs. The phases are: The Prevention phase. During this phase, the authorities have a duty to evaluate situations that can lead to displacement and to reduce their incidence by establishing working groups to prevent and anticipate displacement risks. On other words, they have the responsibility of leading potential victims of displacement and to request military protection from the national government in zones at risk of violence. In this regard, allocation of police or soldiers is a States duty. The Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Phase (EHA). During this phase, both local committees and the central institutions of the state, should offer the IDPs food, lodging and health services among others, during the three months of displacement, period of time that can be extended according the needs for housing. Is in this phase when the government through Accin Social takes the lead and the entire responsabilities for financing the programmes, but IT IS NOT ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR OPERATIONS. The implementation of EHA programmes is responsibility of a number of actors as a group with local authorities. Socioeconomic stabilization or last phase. During this phase, IDPs should be able to re-start their lives with the economic support whether in their municipality of origin or in some other municipality. The big challenges for municipalities in supporting IDPs through this phase, is in offering channels to overcome poverty and vulnerability which overcomes after losing assets and the displacement itself. IDPs must find ways to generate income and stop their dependency on humanitarian aid. The objective of this phase is especially to promote the productive capacity of displaced victims, through income generation programmes, provision of credit, technical support, education, and provision of health, shelter, technical training, and land allocation. In this phase other governmental organizations are also in charge, these are the Colombian Institute for the
76
Rural Development (INCODER), the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Accin Social, the National Learning Service (SENA), the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Housing and the Environment, and the Social Protection Ministry. International organizations (INGOs) also intervene through the three phases, the UNHCR, for example, support the government organizations in assisting IDPs (UniAndes et al., 2008) p. 22.
77
Appendix 2
Acronyms
AUC
Auto defensas Unidas de Colombia or United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
CODHES CNAIPD
Consultora para los derechos humanos y el desplazamiento Consejo Nacional para la Atencin Integral a la Poblacin Desplazada por la Violencia or National Council for Comprehensive Assistance to People Displaced by Violence
DARA ELN FARC
An international organization Ejrcito de Liberacin Nacional or National Freedom Army Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
IASC ICRC iDMC INDEPAZ
Inter-Agency Standing Committe International Committe of the Red Cross Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Instituto de Desarrollo y Paz or Institute of Studies for development and Peace
IDPs INGOs ICG JPL JTU NGOs NRC OHCHR ONIC
Internally Displaced Persons International non-governmental organizations International Crisis Group Justice and Peace Law Joint Technical Unit Non-governmental organizations Norwegian Refugee Council Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Organizacin Nacional Indgena or National Organization for Indigenous Affairs
PIU
Planes Integrales nicos or Unified Comprehensive Plan
78
RUPD
Registro nico de Poblacin desplazada or Central Registry for the Displaced Populatin
UAO
Unidades de Atencin y Orientacin or Assistance and Orientation Units for the Displaced Population
UNDP UNHCR (ACNUR)
United Nations Development Programme United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
79
References
ABColombia, (2009). Fit for Purpose: How to make UK policy on Colombia more effective .Retrieved from: http://www.abcolombia.org.uk/downloads/Fit_for_Purpose_17.03.09.pdf Accin Social, (2011). General Report by Departments or Municipalities. Retrieved from: http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/EstadisticasDesplazados/ This reference is in Spanish. In this link, you must access to Seleccione and then, Dpto de Recepcion or statistical data related to the number of IDPs arriving to each one of the departments listed. Accin Social, (2011) a. Reportes generales poblacin desplazada. http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/EstadisticasDesplazados/ Accin Social, (2010). Mapa de Cooperacin Internacional. Retrieved from: http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/new_mapa/main.asp Acnur, Accin Social. ABC Registro nico de Poblacin Desplazada Services Manual. Retrieved from: http://www.vertice.gov.co/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=l8rB9rdxd6o%3D&tabid=79&mid=410 ACNUR/UNHCR, (2008). La Poblacin Indgena est siendo devastada por el desplazamiento forzado. Retrieved from: http://www.acnur.org/index.php?id_pag=7855 Alselma, A., (2010). Plan Colombia not mentioned in US 2011 budget proposal. Colombia Reports. Retrieved from: http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/7975-plan-colombiaunmentioned-in-us-2011-budget-proposal.html Amnista International, 2004. Colombia: cuerpos marcados, crmenes silenciados: violencia sexual Contra las mujeres en el marco del conflict armado. Retrieved from: http://elistas.egrupos.net/cgibin/eGruposDMime.cgi?K9D9K9Q8L8xumopxCudnuwjeqywkluCSSTTCvthCnoqdyqlhhyCSXQbgb7 Amnesty International (2008). Leave us in Peace! Targeting civilians in Colombians Internal Armed Conflict. ISBN: 978-0-86210-442-9. Retrieved from: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR23/023/2008/en/65b11bee-a04b-11dd-81c4792550e655ec/amr230232008eng.pdf Arquidicesis de Cali (2010). El Da Internacional de las Poblaciones Indgenas. Newspaper: La Voz Catlica. Ed. 124, August, 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.arquidiocesiscali.org/edicion.shtml?apc=pb--;1;-;-;&x=6965 BBC News, (2011). Q&A: Colombias Civil Conflict. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12447532 BBC News, (2011). Colombia Country Profile. Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1212798.stm#facts BBC News, (2004). Uribe defends security policies. Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4021213.stm
80
Brockner, E. (2009). Colombias Internally Displaced: out of Tercer Milenio Park, Problems remain. Americas Society and Council of the Americas. Retrieved from: http://www.americasquarterly.org/colombia-internally-displaced Bruderlein, C., Dakkakj, M. (2009). Measuring Performance versus Impact: Evaluation Practices and their Implication on Governance and Accountability of Humanitarian NGOs. Retrieved from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1497645 Cabrera, L., (2007). Los desplazados en el conflicto armado colombiano Avance de investigacin. Colombia. ISBN: 1909-2016. Retrieved from: http://virtual.usc.edu.co/hernandodevis/images/stories/pdf/losdesplazadosenelconflicto.pdf Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos (ILSA), and Coordinacin Nacional de Desplazados (CND), (2008). Forced Displacement in Colombia. Restore to Repair. A video-documentary produced by El Retorno. Col. Retrieved from: http://youtu.be/oGk11EAbtX4 Citation: COHRE et al, 2008 C o n s u l t o r a p a r a l o s D e r e c h o s H u m a n o s y e l D e s p l a z a m i e n t o (CODHES), (2011). Consolidacin de qu? Retrieved from: http://www.codhes.org/images/stories/pdf/bolet%C3%ADn%2077.pdf CODHES, (2011). Departamentos de llegada. Retrieved by both, http://www.codhes.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=39&Itemid=50 and http://www.codhes.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=39&Itemid=51 This reference is in Spanish. In this link you must access CIFRAS and then, Departamentos de llegada (1999-2010). CODHES, (2010). Salto estratgico o salto al vaco ? Boletn informative de la Consultora para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento #76. Col. Retrieved from: http://www.codhes.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details &gid=145&Itemid=50 CODHES, (2010). Conferencia Regional Humanitaria sobre proteccin de personas desplazadas y refugiadas. Quito, Ecuador. Retrieved from: http://www.codhes.org/images/stories/pdf/bolet%C3%ADn%20informativo%202.pdf
CODHES, (2008). Vctimas emergentes. Desplazamiento, derechos humanos y conflict armado. Retrieved from: http://www.nrc.org.co/docs/codhesinforman75Abril2009.pdf CODHES, (2006). Nmero de Personas Desplazadas por Departamento de Llegada por trimestres 2005. Monitoreo poblacin desplazada-SISDHES
Corte Constitucional de Colombia (2010). Court laws about displacement. Retrieved from: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/tematico.php?todos=%25&sql=desplazados&cam po=%2F&pg=0&vs=0
81
Cotte, A., (2010). Poverty, Armed Conflict and Human Rights: An Analysis of the objective causes of violence in Colombia. La Salle University, Col. Pgs: 1-50 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadstica (DANE), (2006). Colombia. Proyecciones de Poblacin Municipales por rea 2005-2009. This data is based in the Census 2005. Retrieved from: http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=16&id=497 &Itemid=995 Felt, M. (2009). Multinational Banana Corporation Displaces Afro-Colombian Peace Communities. Retrieved from: http://upsidedownworld.org/main/colombia-archives-61/2895-multinationalbanana-corporation-displaces-afro-colombian-peace-communitiesFilipovic, C., (2010). Civilian deaths in Palace of Justice siege are crimes against humanity:Court. ColombiaReports. Retrieved from: http://colombiareports.com/colombia -news/news/11898-court-rulescivilian -deaths -crimes -against -humanity-i n-palace -of-justice-siege.html Human Rights Watch, (2005). Colombia: Displaced and Discarded. The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Bogot and Cartagena. Vol. 17 No. 4(B). Retrieved from: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/10/13/colombia-displaced-and-discarded-0 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), (2009). Internal Displacement in Armed Conflict Facing Up The Challenges. Retreived from: http://www.scribd.com/doc/22459086/Internal-displacement-in-armed-conflict-facing-up-to-thechallenges#source:facebook Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2010). Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4790cbc02.html [accessed 27 September 2010] Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2010). International Humanitarian Norms & Principles Guidance Materials. Workshop for Humanitarian Coordinators. Retrieved from: http://oneresponse.info/Coordination/leadership/publicdocuments/HUMANITARIAN%20DIPLO MACY%20WORKSHOP%20GUIDANCE%20MATERIALS.pdf Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (iDMC), (2009). Colombia: New displacement continues, response still ineffective. A profile of the internal displacement situation. Retrieved from: http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/2012A691A4755669C12575E8005D3605/ $file/Colombia_Overview_Jul09.pdf
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre ( iDMC), & Norwegian Refugee Council, NRC. (2010). Internal displacement: global overview of trends and developments in 2009 . Retrieved from http://www.internal displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/8980F134C9CF437 3C1257725006167DA/$file/Global_Overview_2009.pdf
82
Internal displacement Monitoring Centre (iDMC), & Norwegian Refugee Council, NRC, (2010). Colombia, government response improves but still fails to meet needs of growing IDP population. Retrieved from: http://www.internal displacement.org/802570 8F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/4BCA7DF31521CC 16C12577F5002CED98/$file/Colombia_Overview_Dec2010.pdf International Crises Group (ICG), (2010). Improving Security Policy in Colombia. Latin America Briefing N. 23, Bogot/Brussels. Retrieved from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin america/colombia/B23%20Improving%20Security%20Policy%20in%20Col ombia.ashx ICG, (2008). Correcting couse: Victims and the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia. Latin America Report No.29.Retrieved from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin america/colombia/recting_course___victims_and_the_justice_and_peace_ law_in_colombia.ashx
ICG, (2003). Colombias humanitarian crisis.ICG Latin America report N.4 Bogot/Brussels. Retrieved from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin america/colombia/004 -colombias-humanitarian-crisis.ashx
Inter Press Service (IPS), (2011). Colombia: world leader in forced displacement. Retrieved from: http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54519 Lutheran World Relief, Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz, & U.S. Office on Colombia, (2011). Closer to home. A critical analysis of Colombias Proposed Land Law. Retrieved from: http://www.usofficeoncolombia.org/docs/closer-to-home-2011-02.pdf Martnez, H., (2011).Colombia: World Leader in Forced Displacement. Inter Press Service (IPS). Retrieved from: http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54519 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, (2007). Poltica de Consolidacin de la Seguridad Democrtica (PCSD). Retrieved from: http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Min defensa/Documentos/d escargas/Documentos_Home/Politica_de_Consolidacion_de_la_Seguridad _Democratica.pdf Moro, B., (2009). Implementing humanitarian reform in Colombia. Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN). Issue #45. Retrieved from: http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3055 Organizacin Nacional Indgena de Colombia , (2010). Gobierno colombiano no reconoce la grave situacin de los derechos humanos de los pueblos indgenas en medio del conflict a rmado de Colombia en el 15 periodo de sesiones del Consejo de Derechos Humanos. Retrieved from: http://www.onic.org.co/
83
Tafur, F, (2011). Sobrepoblacin Urbana: Un Colapso Anunciado. National University Newspaper # 132. Retrieved from: http://www.unperiodico.unal.edu.co/en/dper/article/sobrepoblacion urbana-un-colapso-anunciado/ The city of Bogot, (2009). Bogot supports displacement victim attention process. Retrieved http://www.bogota.gov.co/portel/libreria/php/x_frame_detalle.php?id=36448 from:
Uribe, A. (2009). Statement by H.E. Mr. Alvaro Uribe Velez President of the Republic of Colombia. 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. New York, USA. Retrieved from: http://www.colombiaun.org/english/discursos/GA-64/1.%20General%20Debate/GA%2064STATMENT%20MR.%20PRESIDENT%20%2023-09-09.html United Nations, (2010). Foro Permanente sobre Cuestiones Indgenas de la Organizacin de las Naciones Unidas concluye visita a Colombia. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/Colombia_press_release_2010_es.pdf United Nations, (2008). International Convention on the elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Retrieved from: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/rapporteur/docs/PR_11jan10_en.doc
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), (2007). Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: Part 1: Foundations of IDP Protection (call). Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/47949f912.pdf UNHCR, (2007)b. Handbook for the Protection of IDPs Global Protection Clusted. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4c2355229&query=number%20of%20IDPs %20in%20the%20world%20today
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), (2003). El Conflicto, callejn con Salida. Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano para Colombia. ISBN: 958-97196-7-8 Retrieved from: http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/5626.pdf United Nations General Assembly Security Council (2007). Report of the UN Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict. Report A/62/609S/2007/757. Retrieved from: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilena me/EGUA-7BBTF3-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf Universidad de Los Andes (UniAndes), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Accin Social, & The Brookling Institution University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, (2008). Protecting the displaced in Colombia: The role of municipal authorities. Summary report. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4b0d30c49&query=co lombia
84
Veillette, C., (2005). Plan Colombia: A Progress Report. CRS Report for Congress. Retrieved from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32774.pdf Wecker, K. (2009).Colombia needs refugee camps to deal with displacement: Bogota. Retrieved from: http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/5154-bogota-expecting-1200-displacedfamilies-this-weekend.html
85
Footnotes
1. DARA is an independent organization committed to improving the quality and effectiveness of aid for vulnerable populations suffering from conflict, disasters and climate change . 2. Original in Spanish: Los ciclos rodeados de violencia y muy relacionados con acciones de terror obligaron a muchos campesinos a abandonar regiones completas con argumentos anticomunistas y evidentes intereses econmicos y polticos, stas migraciones ocurrieron en los ltimos 30 aos y las circunstancias de violencia desde ste periodo en Colombia afectaron en diversas formas los procesos de insercin econmica de sus protagonistas (Cabrera, 2007) pg. 13. 3. Jorge E. Gaitan was born Jan. 26, 1902 in Bogot and died April 9, 1948. He was a political leader who was considered a champion of the Colombian people and was revered as a martyr after his assassination. Gaitn studied law at the National University of Colombia, Bogot, and continued his studies in Rome. There he was greatly influenced by Benito Mussolini, paying careful attention to his techniques for arousing and organizing the populace. Returning to Colombia, he organized a short-lived party called Union Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria (Left Revolutionary National Union). His maiden speech as a congressman was a polemic attack on the plantations owned by the United Fruit Company ( q.v.). He served as mayor of Bogot (1936) and minister of education (1940). In 1946, as the leader of the more radical factions of Liberals, he ran for the office of president in opposition to the official Liberal Party candidate Gabriel Turbay. That split among the Liberals gave the victory to the Conservative Party candidate Mariano Ospina Prez. It was expected that Gaitn would be elected president in the next election, but he was killed by an assassin in 1948 during the International Conference of American States meeting in Bogot. This murder led to a major popular uprising known as the bogotazo and exacerbated a period of civil unrest called La Violencia Originally retrieved from the web site of Bio true story: http://www.biography.com/articles/Jorge-Elicer-Gaitn-39091 4. The poor of the city, who saw him as a savior, went berserk, rioting in the streets, looting and murdering. This riot is known as the Bogotazo or Bogot attack. When the dust settled the next day, 3,000 were dead. Much of the city had been burned to the ground. Tragically, the worst was yet to come: the Bogotazo kicked off the period in Colombia known as La Violencia, or the time of violence, in which hundreds of thousands of ordinary Colombians would die Retrieved from: http://latinamericanhistory.about.com/od/thehistoryofcolombia/p/bogotazo.htm 5. To read an interview translated from Spanish to English by Clifton Ross to the ex-M-19 guerrilla member, Antonio Navarro Wolf, see: http://upsidedownworld.org/main/colombiaarchives-61/1408-colombia-interview-with-antonio-navarro-wolf 6. The document Consolidation of What?: a report on displacement, armed conflict and human rights in Colombia in 2010 by CODHES is located in this web site link http://www.codhes.org/images/stories/pdf/bolet%C3%ADn%2077.pdf (Spanish), or an
86
overview in English, by the Inter Press Service News Agency, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54519 7. Original Spanish language versin:"Es desplazado toda persona que se ha visto forzada a migrar dentro del territorio nacional, abandonando su localidad de residencia o actividades econmicas habituales, porque su vida, su integridad fsica, su seguridad o libertad personales han sido vulneradas o se encuentran directamente amenazadas, con ocasin de cualquiera de las siguientes situaciones: Conflicto armado interno, disturbios y tensiones interiores, violencia generalizada, violaciones masivas de los Derechos Humanos, infracciones al Derecho Internacional Humanitario u otras circunstancias emanadas de las situaciones anteriores que puedan alterar o alteren drsticamente el orden pblico. (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2010). 8. A resguardo is a territory usually owned by Indigenous or Afro-Colombians 9. La situacin de los derechos humanos de los pueblos indgenas en Colombia continua siendo sumamente grave, crtica y profundamente preocupante, a pesar del reconocimiento constitucional de stos derechos. The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues visited Colombia between July 5 and 9, 2010. Organization web site in English language: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/ 10. http://www.un.org/en/events/tenstories/08/colombia.shtml 11. Acronym for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 12. Data retrieved from: http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/3706-colombiaviolence-displaced-more-than-380000-in-2008-codhes.html 13. The RUPD is a technical tool for an on time and efficient answer to the forced displacement as a consequence of violence. The RUPD was created by the Colombian government through the Integral Attention to the Displaced Population offices (SNAIPD) and is coordinated by the Presidential Agency for the Social Accin and the International Cooperation (Accin Social). 14. The Decree 2569 of 2000 (article 8). The law establishes that the filling has to be made in person. 15. DANE is the Spanish acronym for National Statistical Administrative Department, a main governmental institution for collection and analysis of statistical data that is also in charge of developing, analyzing, and publishing data collected through the CENSUS 16. Web site powered by the city of Bogot: http://www.bogota.gov.co/portel/libreria/php/frame_detalle_scv.php?h_id=23792
17. In 2008 and according to other governmental offices such as the National Registry the number is 1,102 and for the National Planning offices the number is 1,099. Retrieved from the Colombian newspaper EL Tiempo, ElTiempo.com, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-4111251 18. The Law 387 is considered the most advance law in assisting and protecting IDPs. For more
87
information see: http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=468e1150d&query=law%20387%20%20for%20displac ement%20in%20colombia 19. Previous consultation is the right that Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities have over decision-making regarding policy measures, development projects, infrastructure development or any activities to be carried out within their territories. It seeks to guarantee and protect their cultural, social and economic identity and guarantee their rights to participation (International Labor Organization 169). The right of previous consultation was declared a fundamental and constitutional right by the Colombian Constitutional Court in 1994 (Lutheran World Relief et al., 2011) pg 3. 20. The National Council for Economic and Social Policy (Conpes, acronym of the Spanish name) was created in 1958 and its main objective is to advise the National government in issues related to economic and social development. The Conpes includes all institutions from the National government in charge of economic and social development (UniAndes, 2008).
88
This page is intentionally left in blank

The Humanitarian Response To The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Colombia Gap Analysis of Program Implementation

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

The Humanitarian Response To The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Colombia Gap Analysis of Program Implementation

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT Master of Professional Studies Humanitarian Services Administration THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

(IDPs) IN COLOMBIA GAP ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

April 27, 2011

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

This material was prepared by Madelen Muriel-Drew. (Copyright 2011)

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

Keywords: Internally displaced persons, guerrilla, paramilitary, violence, displacement

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

Chapter I Historic Background of Violence in Colombia

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

Chapter II Displacement in Colombia and Vulnerable Groups of Displaced Persons

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

Source: http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/4BCA7DF31521CC16C12577F5002CED98/$file/ Colombia_Overview_Dec2010.pdf pg. 6

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

Data retrieved from : http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/3706-colombia-violence-displaced-morethan-380000-in-2008-codhes.html

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

Web site powered by the city of Bogot : http://www.bogota.gov.co/portel/libreria/php/frame_detalle_scv.php?h_id=23792

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

Chapter IV Gap Analysis of the Humanitarian Response in Colombia by the Government

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.

The Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia.