Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
A-
Kokoki
KK)
VII
Aircraft Divisioa
February 1947
f>
Kokuki KK)
VII
Aircraft Division
Date of Survey:
November 1945
Date of Publication:
February 1947
APR
^'^'
This report was written primarily for the use of the JJnited States Strategic in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conchisions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as hmited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the ligiit of further studies conducted by the Survey.
Bombing Survey
II
FOREWORD
cstiihlished
The United States Sti'iitcgic Bombing was by the Secretary of War on 3 Novemtlie late
to conan impartial and expert study of the effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to ])e used in connection with air attacks on Jjipan and to estabIts
(hict
President
Roosevelt.
mission was
evaluatmg the importance and potenpower as an instrument of military strategy for planning the future development of the United States armed forces and for determming future economic policies with respect to the national defense. A summary report and some
lish a basis for tialities of air
Survey in Germany have been published. 15 August 1945, President Truman requested that the Survey conduct a similar study of the
the
On
types of air attack in the war against submitting reports in duplicate to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the N avy. The officers of the Sm-vey during its Japanese phase were:
effects of all
Japan,
and 500 (uihsted men. 'i'iie was drawn from the Army to the extent of 00 perceni, and from the Navy to Ww extent of 40 percent. Both the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all possil)l(^ assistance in furnishing men, sui)j)lies, transport, and information. The Suivey operated from headquarters established in 'i'okyo early in September 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and with niol)ile teams operating hi other parts of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution, engagement by engagement, and campaign by campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on Japan's econoiiiy and war production, plant l)y plant, and industry by industry. In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strategic plans and the background of her entry into the war, the internal discussions and negotiations leadcivilians,
350
officers,
among
of
the civilian
PaulH.
Nitze,
the
Japanese
the
Hemy
and the
efl'ects of
Jr.,
for
300
atomic bombs. Separate reports will be issued covering each phase of the study. The Survey mterrogated more than 700 Japanese military, government, and industrial officials. It also recovered and translated many documents which not only have been useful to the Survey, but also will furnish data valuable for other studies. Arrangements have been made to tm-n over the Survey's files to the Central InteUigence group, through which they will be available for further examination and distribution.
Ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Hitachi Aircraft Co. (Corporation Report No. VII) The Corporation and Its Importance in the Aircraft Industry The Air Attacks Production Statistics Evaluation of Pre-attack Intelligence Appendix A. Planned, Actual, and Capacity Production Facing Hitachi Chiba (Plant Report No. VII-1) Hitachi Tachikawa (Plant Report No. 11-2)
=,
6 6 8
p. 8
47
t-
THE CORPORATION AND
Introduction
ITS
The
lli(!i(lii
prodnccf of bolli cn^rincs iiiul iiirfViiiiics, oixTiilcd Fioin Jiiniiiiry 1041 iiiilil (lie end of (lie 5 pliiiits. war till' coiiipniiy produced 1:5, 571 aircrnfl ciifiincs
of 14 (ypcs, rcpi-cscntiiif;-
produced
period.
aircraft
airci'aft
l.(i pcrcculof all ('iii;iii("S Japanese manufacturers during- that, The airframes division produced 1,783 of 4 types, or 2.(3 percent of Japanese producetl from January 1941 llirougli
1
l)y
August 1945.
The cori)()ration prinei|)ally was concei'ucd with the i)roduction of small engines for training aii'craft, and also the assembly of trainer aircraft.
Toward
to
tlie
made
bring
Ilitaciii
combat
aircraft
al)ru])t
both
in
and combat aircraft engines, but the ending of the wai- found production of a relatively experimental status (Table 1).
1.
T.\BLE
AIRFRAMES
Scliiiiicll
cslalilisJicd olliccs at
the ('liilm
jjluiiL
for
lisiiing
tho purpose of aiding plant engineers in estabmass ])r(i(liietion assenibly line (celiniciues.
ideas
The
located in Tokyo.
Tii<;
The
ceived,
advanced by Seliniidt wei-(^ \v(^ll reand sections of the Cliiba i)laiil were
n(>\v airci'aft.
Due
end of
agencies,
(ieiieral
suj)crvision
of
the
com])any
and the
raj)id
Since the company ])roduce(l equijnuent for both the services, the Army and Navy each had uispectors and supervisors working with the company. Ciovernmeut insix'ctors ])erformed routine
was handled by the board of directors through the vaiious department heads (Fig. 2). The resjjonsibility for j)ro(luction of airframes and engines was placed on the particular dejjartmental chief and the efficiency of any department was attributa])le to management Ijy the individual
in
not and acceptance duties but any time. Hitachi's earnest efforts to fulfill contracts removed all necessity for government operation, and no special interest was shown exec])! by the Army in 1945 for till' development of the Ha-51 engine antl bj' Xaval interest in develophig the Cliiba plant
inspection
did
charge of the dej)artment. Materials required by the five plants A^ere com-
puted by the department heads at meetings held with the directoi-s. Previous to the meetings,
individual plant managers supplied the depart-
ment
ticular plants.
largest plants,
to
assemble Frances.
directors of
The plant managers of the two Chiba and Tachikawa, were also the company.
DEPARTMENTALORGANIZATION CHART
BOARDOF DIRECTORS
AIRFRAME
ENGINE
MACHINE TOOL
INSPECTION
MATERIAL
FINANCE
PERSONNEL
GENERAL AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT
TECHNICAL RESEARCH
LABORATOFTC
Within
tlu-
fompany,
tlu'
the largest engine pioducer and the Chiba plant The Omori the largest producer of airframes.
chat\gcd to two r2-hour shifts and worked until May 1945 on that basis. In May it reverted
shift
system
The engine
divi-
from late 1942, had berime a "feeder" plant for Chiba engine production, and production at Omori was rechiced to tlie complete assembly of only one engine, the Temjiu o. The Ilaneda plant had been engaged in the production of trainers (tyi)es 'A. 14, and 9.'!) u]) to At that time il loo became a feeder late 1944. for Chiba and concentrated on the assend)ly ])lant of parts for the trainer A6M5K (Zeke) and for the
plant,
1
Februaiy 1944. From February until July 1944 two 10-hour shifts were used and from
until
1945 the addition of student to convert to three 8-hour shifts. From May 1945 until the end of the wai' the plant reverted back to a singh
May
"
8-hour
shift.
fighter
A6M5
(Zeke).
the
single-shift
To
to
aid in the
assembly of airframes
Chiba
basis at
all
times.
Haneda plant transferred many workers new company plant in November 1944. Similarly, the Omoii jilant had sent many trained
plant, the
tills
The
dispersal
program
Aircraft Co. began plans for exten-
The Hitachi
sive dispersal in
Decend)er 1944.
of the
Initial govern-
ment
Kawasaki plant always remained purely a casting foundry supplying Tachikawa, Chiba, and Omori until it was destroyed by B-29s in an area
Tiie
company
assuuKMl the
the dispi'rsal.
activities.
The plant produced both ahuninum and magnesium alk\y cylinder heads,
attack on
1.5
April 1945.
own
The
tw(
reduction gear housings, crankcases, and casingsfor distributors, oil and fuel pumps, and carburetors.
Tiie Hitachi Aircraft Co. reached
peak employ-
unde'iground and se^miunderground locations anc used school builelings to a great extent (USSBS Aircraft Division, Reports VII-1 and VH-2).
ment
1
i
iu
September
were
1944.
to disperse to build
|)eo|)!e
employed,
Tachikawa,
hope that
to
thesi
although
adjacent
the
already
and
thai
the
Kawasaki foundry
Feltruary
(fig. 3).
From
time
tnitil
Chiba conliiuied
bombed plants, would not lie bombed again. The Kawasaki fotuidry at first planned to continue production in buildings near
the'
plant,
hu
the increasing
this policy
tempo
of air attacks
on the
Kawa
From
Fel)ruary
1945 until
tiie
air raids
at all ])lants.
management te) abandor some of the sitef selee'ted by tiie Tachikawa engine plant. Like other aircraft companies, the Hitachi Co
saki see'tion forced the
and
to ])lan to utilize
There ai)|)eare(l to l>e no set company policy on the use of single <>v nniltiple shifts of employees at the various plants. Policy eliangcd at each
location.
stressed
chiei
pioblein in completing
dispersal plan.
Manj
The
to
I
.November 1943 and then changed two 12-hour shifts when govei'mnent orders for lie lia ]3Ko and na-26 engines increased heavily at that time. In September 1944 the plant management again r'hanged the system to thice shifts of 8 hours each and continued on lli.-it basis until
(11 hvjin-s) until
spre'ael throughout the' e'oimtry-l by drayage e'om|)anie's that were side, abande)neel forced to use' true'ks and oxcarts for otlu-r purposes Particularly in the Oami in the' summe'r of 1945.
countless machines
anel
be'
see'ii
e)n
siele
re)aels
on
railwaj;
sielings,
lielativcly
sle)w
progre-ss of
the Oami,
attribu'{^
Ye)ke>ta,
and Yasliima
e'onditions at
(uniU'l syste'Uis
was
the end
Tiie
division.
f)f (lie
war.
Labor
dilVeicnt
The airframe
shift
gle
9-hour
systems for each division worked on a sinbasis until October 1944 llien
said to
be'
under
llieir
less
mental
sli'iiin
work
(hie to !ilerls
less
Offii'iiils
of the
company found
of disporsal
it
ilifiicult
to
estimate
ihiction,
tlio ('(foct
due to
llic fact
that air
a complete production l)reak-down in the event the assembly building of the main plant was hit.
same
Coupled with the air attacks against other period. compani(>s upon whom Hitachi was dependent for supplies, an assessment of relative loss due to
dispersal
of 15
The Omori works at Kawasaki was damaged by Twentieth Air Force urban area attacks, namely, the Tokyo attack of 23 May and the Yokohama strike of 28 May. The latter damaged
twice
figure
ajiproxi-
mation."
The Oami tuimel system, chief dispersal site of was an extremely elaborate and well-planned unit. The entire excavated
the Chiha air-frame plant,
contained an area of 483,720 square feet. It was approximately 40-percent completed, and the tunnels and semiunderground shops well-l)uill promised to become one of the blotter dispersal
site
approximately 1,191,485 square feet of the plant. Like Haneda, the Omori plant had moved to nearby buildings, and production in the main j)lant was not greatly influenced. Hitachi's Kawasaki foundry was almost completely destroyed by the Twentieth Air Force double attack of 15 April, against the Tokyo south ui'ban area and the Kawasaki urban area. From February until the end of the war the Tokyo-Chiba area was under attack many times, interrupting pi'oduction because of the necessity
of
plants
in
the Empire.
the
woi-kers
leaving
their
jobs
for
air-raid
The Vasliima undergrouml factoi-y, one of the plaimed dispersal sites of the Tachikawa plant,
was
to contain 248,500 square feet,
it
shelters.
which would
have made
Chiba caused a loss of many man-hours at the Chiba plant. In addition, since most of the dispersed shops of the Hitachi Co. were in the cities
of
Tokyo
or Chiba, the attacks against the subof these cities often damag(>d Hitachi's
urban areas
dispersal locations.
PRODUCTION STATISTICS
Peak airframe production was reached in June 1944 when 95 aircraft (88 Willows and 7 Zeke trainers) were produced. This represented lOOi
percent of capacity for that
liiuhly
iiiilnstrialized
Tokyo-Chiba
region,
month
(Fig. 4
andi
appendix A).
production
to the
to
loss.
tiie
Damage
Maximum
most
serious blow
company (USSBS Aircraft Division, Report Vll-2) since Tachikawa was its principal engine producer. The attacks against this plant on 17 February and
operative.
when 575 engines were produced, of which the Ha-23 (Tempu series) engines represented abouti
55 percent of the total (Fig 5 and appendix A).
The Airframe Division The Haneda plant was the original site for the company's airframe production, and produced the K2Y2 Type 3 primary trainer fi-oni May 1939 to October 1940 (never more than 7 a month), the K5Y1 Type 93 trainer (Willow) from December
1940 to
24 April 1945 rendered the plant completely inPhysical damage to the plant was
ii|)pnixiruiil('ly
50 percent.
The
by
ing,
tiie
Cliiba i)lant
was only
superficially damageil
three attacks
to the plant
made
against
it.
Physical
damage
was
negligible, only
one buildAir-
November 1944
(peak production 88
in
a guardhouse, being
damaged (USSBS
craft Division,
The Haneda |)lant was damaged only once, in the Xavy strike against the Ilaneda airfield on 17 February, and damage was negligible. Attacks
against the area, however, were so intense that machines and assembly lines were removed to .small buildings within the plant eonipoiind. This form of dispersal was efreet<(l in order to |)revent
June 1944), and the KOWl Type 14 trainer from April to August 1943, ]3eak production being 15 in May. AYillow ])roduetion was sus])ended from December 1942 through April 1943. During 1944, however, emphasis began to be placed on produe-, tion at Chil)a, and Haneda ])roduction gradually became the fabiieation of sections which were shipped to the Chiba |)laiit for fiiud assembly. The Chiba plant was engaged from May 1944 to
^m
AUGUST 1945
HITACHI AIRCRAFT
COMPANY
^r^^j9*3rv^.
VlI-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pasje
10
Attack Data Effects of Bombing Evaluation of Pre-attack Intelligence Vulnerability Appendix A. Map of Plant, with Bomb Plot Facing page Appendix B. Organization of Plant Appendix C. Flow Chart, Airframes Facing page Appendix D. Flow Chart, Engines Appendix E. Employment Statistics _. Appendix F. Orders vs. Receipts, Raw Materials Appendix G. Orders vs. Receipts, Components Appendix H. Suppliers of Raw Materials and Components Appendix 1. Planned, Cajjacity, and Actual Production Statistics. Appendix -T. Analysis of Air Attack Damage Appendix K-1 Dispersal Program, Engines
.
20 20 35 35 36 37 38 39 40
41
41
42
42 43 43 44 45 46
K-2. Dispersal Program, Airframes K-3. Dispersal Map No. I K-4. DispersalMapNo.il
ITS
and largest of the 4 plants of K), the Hitachi Aircraft Co. (Hitachi Kokuki produced both engines and airframes. It began production in April 1942. The plant contained 41 buildings, with a floor area of approximately 2,209,838 square feet (Appendix A). It was encased in the assembly of the A6M5K Zeke trainer, the Tempu 11, Tempii 21, and Tempu 31 engines, and planned to assemble the bomber
PlYl (Frances) and the fighter A6M5 (Zeke). The Chiba plant was located on reclaimed land about 2 miles south of the city of Chiba, on Tokyo
Bay.
3,
Frances.
The
physical
construction of the
plant
1941 and
Construction of the plant began in February was completed in April 1942 (Photos 1, 2, and 4). The period from April 1942 to July
1944 was devoted to organizing the plant, training employees, setting up machine shops, installing production lines, and to manufacturing small parts for the Oniori plant, another Hitachi plant located
in
was financed by the Hitachi Holding Co. All products of the Chiba plant were produced Production of the A6M0K Zeke for the Navy. trainer began in August 1944 (Photo 5), that of the A6M5 Zeke fighter was planned for August 1945, and that of the PlYl bomber (Frances) for Production of the Tempu 21 FebruaiT 1946. engine began in July 1944, of the Tempu 31 in
November
1944, of the
Tempu
11
in April 1945,
the
Tokyo suburbs.
The
first
aircraft
was
and the first engines, Tempu were completed in August 1944. The ])lant was divided roughly in half, the northern part used for engine, and the southern part for airframe assembly, with a combined floor area of This figure excludes an 1,671,735 square feet. office, dining hall, repair shop, and a projected store room, machine shop, and sheet-metal shop which were the initial 1)uildings of a new addition being constructed for the assembly of Frances. The entire area south of buildings 16 and 23 was to be devoted to work on this aircraft, and new land was to be reclaimed at the southwest corner of the plant on which to construct additional buildings. It iiad lieen planned to begin asseml)ly of Frances in February 1946, but this did not allow for the effects of air attack and dispersal.
and of the Tsu 11 in May 1945. In the case of the Tsu 11, Chiba served as a modification center where the Italian Campini type jet unit was produced and fitted to Hatsukaze 1 engines sent in by the Navy, the resulting engine being redesignated Tsu 11 (Photos 6, 7, and 8).
1
Note. The Tsu 11 engine was intended for the Oka 22 (Baka) suicide plane, which differed from Oka 11 in that it was jet-propelled instead of rocket-propelled.
Plant organization and operation
The
also
ciiief of
an
executive
the
eor|joration.
Immediate responsibility at the ])lant fell upon Yusaku Fukada, head of the airframe factory, and
Hiroshi Moroi,
jjendix B).
cliicr
of
The Hitachi Cori)oration received instructions from the Naval Air Board in November 1938 to
and began the search for a In Novemb(>r 1940, it was decided to reclaim tiie land south of Chiba, and a contract was made between the Hitachi corporaActual work intion and the Chiba citv office.
expand their
facilities,
new
Both divisions of the ])lant were organizetl for mass production. The airframe division in particular was modeled after the Nakajinui plant at The front, center, and rear fuselage Koiztmii. assemblies were ])laeed on a wooden-rail system aliout 4 feet above the floor, and were staged along
the rail until they rolled off completely assembled
and ready
to
10
t^^^i
Photo
CHIBA
administration building.
7ia.;:i7-47
:i
11
Photo
CHIBA
of the buildings of
tfie
administration building.
that
12
mm
jlS^
11.
Photo
CHIBA
PLANT. Newly
at
13
Photo
CHIBA
PLANT. Interior
test cells.
14
Photo
auxiliary fin necessary to reduce flutter in the tail section caused by the addition
manufactured by the Chiba plant showing the installation of an of after cockpit and the added
15
Photo 6
CHIBA
PLANT. Photograph
the
Tsu
1 1
of additional impeller ring added to Ha-11 engine for conversion to Oka 22 (Baka) suicide plane.
l6
photo
CHIBA
of the Campini type turbine that was added to the to construct the Tsu 1 1.
Ha-11 engine
in order
17
Photo 8
CHIBA
PLANT. General
1 1
engine.
18
PRODUCTION
ZEKE TRAINER
S STRATEGIC
90WBIWG SUHVEY
CO.
HrTACHI
noURE
January 1945, when a rate of 126 units per month was attained.
Rebuilding and repair of airplanes and/or engines
Continued
144 tons (577 M64 GP's).
X AN^
tail.
No
engines
M'su
tion.
1 1
rebuildiuo;
or
repairing
of
airphines
or
of
was done
at Cliiha.
The produetion
engines, however, was in reality a modificaHa-11 engines which had originally ))e<m
ND
HE-iiuniber
in
HE-number
hits.
of
HE-number
of
UXB
None.
The Chiha
work or
j)lant
EFFECTS OF
The
air attacks
BOMBING
3
research.
ATTACK DATA
Intelligence data:
attacks,
only
strike
by Navy Chiba on
atUwk
.
Direct.
1
minute.
feet.
16,500
27.
1945 spilled over onto the plant hut resulted almost no damage. In the Twentieth Air Force B-29 raid of lU June, 3,000 square feet of the office building of the airframe division (Photos 9 and 10), li.OOO s(iuiii-e feet of an airframe disin
May
TEMPU
II
a TSU
II
TEMPU
PLANNED
PLANNED
31
a
APRIL
ACTUAL
PRODUCTION
1945
SEPTEMBER
ACTUAL
PRODUCTION
HPU T^MPU
Tl
II II
(S (GOVI
T^U
II
(ACTllAL PROOUCt'lON)
PUNNED
TO
J^i
M iCHANIOAL
\/
/\
a3.sTH*Ttaic
HrrACHI
u.fTW*Te4H:
OMiiw u>vm
CO.
HfTACHI
As none of the direct attacks on tlio main plant wore very effective', the practical value of the precautions cannot be accurately judged, but it seems im])robable that miK'h could have been accomj)iished in the event of an accurate and effective
attack
oji
Secondary
effects
trans-
This
the
main
Interruptions to supplies
plant.
o1
Altiiough physical
ings,
damage
negligible, interruptions,
supply from
were
serious
obstacle
jjroduction.
The Tokyo industrial area, which included C'hil)a, was a target foi' frequent attaclcs and the j)lant was warned whenever Allied air and naval forces
were
in the vicinity.
Nakajima. Propeller receipts from Sumitomo were also seriously reduced due to attacks on the Sumitomo plant at Kanzaki.
instruments of all types waf seriously curtailed in July, while special steel tubmg, bars, and light alloy metals of all ty])es; were in extremely critical shortage because of
of
The supply
As
attacks
against
Sumitomo's Amagasaki
plant,
the!
of'
was the
Whenever planes W(>re i'ej)orted in tiie was warned, and workers left in large numbers and were slow in returning. If the homes of workers were destroyed
increase in absenteeism.
sources of su])i)ly were'l unsuccessful since small factories were affected by area raids and demands of other manufacturers'!
to find
Kobe. Attempts
new
j:
damages.
Ii
22
AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
ATTACK OF 8 MAY,
100
RECUPERATIOf^
ATTACK OF TJULY'
80
60
40
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
120
100
80
60
40
MONTHLY DUE
MAN-HOUR
TO ALERTS
LOSS
700000
600000
500000
400000
300000
200000
100000
Photo 9
CHIBA
PLANT. Photograph
of
bomb
crater
in the attack of 10
June 1945.
25
Photo 10
a direct hit
1945. Damage occurred from by a 500-pound bomb. This was the only serious damage to the plant by the attack and did not influence production since the building was used as a guard station.
CHIBA PLANT. Damaged building destroyed during the air attack of 10 June
26
Photo 11
defense force.
inadequate.
be completely
719637-47
27
Photo
number of
28
Photo
13 CHIBA PLANT.-
-Photograph of abandoned machinery resulting from the hurried dispersal program of the Chiba plant. Oami area of Chiba Peninsula.
29
Photo 14
to tunnels
Nos. 4 and
of the
Oami
tunnel system.
30
Photo 15
CHIBA
PLANT. Photograph
of the
Oami
tunnel system.
71i7 47
(i
31
Photo 16
CHIBA
PLANT. One
of
in the
Oami
area.
the ventilator
32
Photo 17
CHIBA
PLANT. Photograph
of a dispersal
site in
the heavily
wooded
This particular site, the Miyazaka factory, was one of several dispersal divisions that were located in forests. Natural coverage from the trees and the technique of building the shops without destroying any of the forest
increased the effectiveness of the location.
33
Photo 18
CHIBA
PLANT. Photograph
at
Miyazaka.
34
Beginning
u])()ii
in Ajiril
194'),
The
(lirics
l.'i,
('liil)a
plant cniharkcd
a very
<"x((!n-
])la)it
major
^i\^ dispersal
program in liic i'all of 1944 (Appiu)K-1, K-2, K-3, and K-4; photos 13, 14,
17,
16,
18).
The
initial
oi'dcr
to
dis])crs(',
was received
in
dis-
but it was hoped that this loss could be completely overcome by Decem})er 1945. Table Xo. 1 below lists the percentag(! of jiroduction loss by months.
contributing factor in production
selected several
city
above-ground locations
mol)ilized
vac'ant,
foi'
in
the
of
(^hiba.
Table
Three school buildings were used: the Chil)a High school, the Cliiba Commercial School, and Tokyo Imperial University (engineering Secondly, two abandoned buildings branch). were converted to wing and fuselage assembly
Girls'
shops.
In addition, the
district.
company
built a
number
in the
of tinuiels
an<Usemi-underground buildings
of
Oami
Officiiils
schools
foi-
i)riniary
Eight
made
In addition,
south of Cluba and a location, "Chichi])u," similar to Oami was selected for tunnels and semiunder-
ground shops. Although installations were not complete at any of the locations chosen by the company, officials did not iinticipate anj^ difficulties in o])tain-
ing an adecjuate supply of labor or that bottlenecks woidd develop in power supply or transportation. Afauv laborers were already at work in the new ])lants and morale was high since at Oami, Chichibu, Miyazaki, Aradate and Someya, the largest dispersal sites, workers were relatively safe
fi'om
KO OF
BUILDINS
CO
o
< I
> z <
O <u
1
O
1
z"
o on o
_J
< N Z <
< z LU
< Q
LLl
1 a:
DIAGRAMMATIC
PRODUCTION
FLOW
CHART
APPENDIX
Employment, airframe
division,
!:
China
plant,
Men
WiS
Students
Total
Nonproductive
Total
New
hired
March
April
772
2,231
6
137 134
777
641
777
2,
450
1,193
2,368
2,311
076
3(W
May
June
July
.
2,177
_
1.992
2,311
508 76
164
2,633
2.671
153
153
2,786
2.
2,786
2,824
8?4
315
321
August
Scptorabcr
2,804 2,977
3,431
182 192
2,986
3,
2,986
3,
175
169
2,286 2,629
2,721
883
1,002 944
1,044
169
483
61
October
200
251
3,631
3,
3,631
3,
Novonihcr
3,414
665
066
373
102
December
I
3,760
Hi
;
274
4,034
2,990
4.034
JatMmry February
3,
838
867
147
290
4,
4, 4,
134
3,
149
985
1,065
1,
4,
134
245 377
2, .596
3,
4,
,S.
486
533
1.49(1
353
3,288
3,
4, 3,53
Mareh
April
-M ly
680
455
225 689
4,680
7,274
7,
6y
.14
85
7,274
4, .585
2,
286
661
1.57
,1,
1,469
1,8.55
325
348 809
931
931
1,
7,335
7,
7, 7,
4.281
5, ,587
3, 0,54
2,
335
June
July
---
\ SMS
4. i|4(l 4,
.
(Ml
014
481
7, liOl
1.451
200
100
4,719
4, 4,
2.
2, 2, 2,
7. 2110
7.
16
August September
October.,.
732
1.437
772 676
328
438
195
KKI
114
4.748
4. .368
1,435 1.465
1,304 1.296
7,114
6,
7,
(h.
249
491
UKl
993
4,798
5, 5,
993
November
December
ys.i.i
4,!ll
.i.
1,574 1,613
7,868
8.
274
2, ,594
7,
868
442
.152
412
321
420
2,
901
8,321
January
..
5. 32,') 5.
!i,
1.3.56
1,779 1.879
8,460
5, ,571
.5,
2,889
2. 8,55
2, 2,
8. 46(1 8,
8, 8, 8, 8,
361
February.-.
337
110
1,651
8,767
8,
912
848
751
102
March
April
2,200
2,
2,
795
6,110
5.
.5.
6S5 898
30
61
4. 1131
360
397
8,746
8.
4,791)
625
2,874
22 26
4.628 4.359
1.438
1,403
2, .544
8,610 8,306
5,740
a.
2,870
2,690
610
2,544
616
8,306
Employment, engine
division,
Men
Wis
Women
Students
Productive
Nonproductive
Total
March
.\l>ril
...
661
9.59
393
704
668
111
30
31
989 966
1.
222
128
7
May
June
July
Aueu.^t
935
1.051
678
797
38 39 58
089
1.049
796 978
489
1.088
1.
185
1.212
1.384
1,270
1,477 1,478
270
216
18
September October
.
93
103
121
1.375
1,421
117 156
November. December
January February..
1,642
1,691
1,566
126
1,245
206
laa
1,758
141
1,899
1.322
1,824
577 734
711
1,
1.899
2. .5.58
6:iO
2,312
158
March
April
1,985
2.696
4. IK)9
1,341
163
2,403
606
May
Jime
July...
..
732
950
4.52
217
233
541
62:1
1,,599
4.071
4. 3. 4. 4.
204 444
12 4
2,%9
2,721
2,
4,152
3,
1,,W0 1,026
1,924 1,470
152
714
714
AUKUSt September.
October
993
4,300
4,313
4,
300 313
623 775
1,061
302
10
101
640
643
2, 2,
4. 64(1 4,
NovemberDecember..
4.
643
3,129
677
1,077
4.883
2,(198
4,883
244
ima
January February.
.
3,
336
,581
1, 1,
186 186
5.
102
3,
397
1.705
1.9I>2
2.
6.
,5,
102
440 84
21
3,628
3, 5:S6
700
5.514
5. .565
.5.
3, 5,52 3, 3, 3,
514
March
.\ [)ril
.
. .
562 447
468
1,467
1,
376 332
519
189
,5,
3,
186
574
207
1.875
1.9ft3
5,
5,
293
May
June
July
-.
1,,598
1,
.5.
482
35
43
7
442
531
(197
6.316
.5.158
3,290
3,
2,026
1,829
6,
316
1,697
329
,5,158
40
APPENDIX
F
(.tons),
APPENDIX H
Raw
Nippon
Seitetsu
material
KK Yahoto-Kojo.
-..
Kawasaki Jukogyo KK Daido Seiko KK Toshiba Kokan KK Sumitomo Kinzoku-Kogyo KK Sumitomo Denki-Kogyo KK
and wire.
Amagasaki, (Hyogo-Ken)
Shinaya-cho, Kanohana-Ku, Osaka
Do.
Light
alloyed
materiiils,
propeller,
governor,
and
generator.
Nippon Kokan
KK KK KK Fukagawa-Kojo.. Nippon Tanko KK KK Kobe Seikosha Akano-Kojo... KK Kobe Seikosho Chofu-Kojo__ KK Kobe Seikosho Nagoya-Kojo Furukawa Denki-Kogyo KK Tokyo Seiko, KK Hitachi Kokuki KK Kawasaki-Kojo....
Mitsubishi Seiki Mitsubishi Seiko
.
Special steel pipe. Special steel bar. Special steel forged parts.
_
Do. Do.
Light alloyed bar, pipr, extruded, and forged parts. Light alloyed bar and pipe. Light alloyed bar, pipe, extruded, and forged iarts.
Cable.
Chofu-machi. Shimonoseki (Yamaguchi-Ken) Koonji-cho, Kita-Ku, Nagoya. -.. Nikko. Koitsu-gun, Tochigi-Ken Kawasaki (Kanagawa-Ken) Fujimi-cho Kawasaki (Kanagawa-Ken)
Kisaya7i, (Chiba-Ken).__
__
Daini Kaigim Kokyusho Kyushu Hikoki IJainippon Kika; Kogyo KK_ K K Tokyo Keiki Seisakusho Yokokawa Denki Seisakusho
-..
KK
KK
Naka-machi, Chikugushi-gun, Fukuoka Aoto-machi. Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo Higashikonagawa, Kamata-Ku, Tokyo. Musashino Kitataina-gun, Tokyo Omori. Oniori-Ku Tokyo Nakashima, Kawasaki (Kanagawa-Ken)
Wheel. Oleo-pneumatic shock abstjrber. Vacuum pump and inertia starter. Magneto and electric tacliometers. Tach indicator and press gage.
Carburetor.
APPENDIX
Planned capacity, and actual production
statistics,
.-
APPENDIX
J
AIRFRAME DIVISION
Area
\V('U]K)I1
Machine
tools
Buildings
(square feet)
8
111
May 45
.luiic 4:)
Cal. 50
ri()ii-iiiiiinil
--
None
:i.
HE
oiju
Office building.
rias plaiU damaged
3,(K)0
.
1,(XXI
Dispersed
pliinl, in
Dispersed plant in
Chihn area damaged (Prefeetural Clirls' High School). Chitia area damaged (Tokyo Imperial University) ....
2,100 5,000
1.1
50
ENGINE DIVISION
10 .Time 45
50n-pound
HE.
July 45
IB
Dispersed plant damaged (Chiba Oirls' Normal School)... Dispersed plant damaged (Municipal Oirls' High School) Dispersed plant damaged (Prefeetural Technical School)
5,800
850
4,000
APPENDIX
K-1
Area
No.
Dispersal location
Type
of building
(square
feet)
Products
Number Number of
machine
tools
Degree
of
of
em-
Began production
ployees
progress (percent)
Map
No.
iMay
1945
A
B
Converted school.
....do ....do
....do.
4.
455
Small parts
of light alleys.
23
79
89
100
((April 1945)..-.
jMay
3, 4fi5
1945
Rocker arms
Testing
27
100
{(April 1945)....
(May
1945.
primary
6.
930
655
39
115
l(
100
April 1945)
1945
100
jMay
primary
3,
D
E F
Anegasaki,
school.
18
55
1( April 1945)....
,May
...do
....do.;
13, 3'20
1945:
1945)...
101
407
100
((March
jjuly 1945
4.
995
620
Gears
Finishing
30
119
100
'.(June 1945)
do do
do...
10,
100
,May
. .
1945
H
I
Normal
school (boys)
8,910
Masterrodsandcams
Link rods
Finishing
52
240
100
((April 1945)....
JAprill945
Normal school
Miyazaki
(girls).
5,
175
38
151
100
((March
1945)...
March
J
1945
1945)...
do do
-.
3,600
21,330
20
120
100
((March (August
1945....
K
L
*I
Owada
Someya
Aradate.
Mia?.aki_
Assembly and
ning.
test
run-
15
600
450
80
((June 1945)
[June 1945..
158
Forest plant
35, 100
100
do
17,820
Castmg
Cylinder barrels and heat
treatment.
Jigs
63
102
100
[August 1945....
do
.do.
ITndergi'ound (tunnel)
42,300
26, 730
10,
116
376
70
{(April 1945)....
[August 1945....
145
Nitona.,
and
tools..
450
30
Chichibu A.
665
((April 1946)...-
596
15 15
2,500
(October 1945).
ChiehibuB. Chichibu C.
(Buried)
53,
370
Hut
27,900
600
400
do
.do.
Note. Month
in parentheses
43
APPENDIX K-2
Dispersal -program, airframe division, Chiba Plant
No.
Dispersal location
Building type
Area
(sq. ft.)
production
Semiunderground.
Oanii,
133, 100
113,800
May
1945
Underground
N'islii-Cliiba
I
120,200 116,820
Constructed building.
73,
310
Dairokuten
rhiha,
girls'
-do
high school.
.d(i_
5,230
20,950
7,370
[The Department
gineering
I
of
EnTokyo,
of
..-do.
17,460
Imperial University.
CHIBA
PLANT
I
CO
45
CHIBA
PLANT
C HO SH
U S STRATEGIC BOMBING
SURVEY
CHIBA PLANT
APPENDIX K-4
46
No. VII-2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
in
48
51
55
56 56
A.
C.
Map
of Plant,
With
Bomb
Plot
Facing
p.
58 59
B. Flow Chart
Employment
.
Statistics
Materials and Suppliers E. Orders and Receipts of Materials and Parts F. Planned, Capacity, and Actual Production
60 60
61
62
47
ITS
The Tacliikaun
of
plniit
(T;icliika\va Scisakuslio)
tho
Hitachi
Aiivral't
Corporation
at
(Hitachi
TACHIKAWA PRODUCTS PERIOD OF PRODUCTION
Yamato, about 19 miles west of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, and a few miles north of the city of Tachikawa. The plant area embraced approximately 10,460,000 square feet, and the 67 buildings contained a total
Kokuki
K) was located
ENGINE DESIGNATION
of approximately
area.
flooi'
expanded to a[)i)roximately 4 times its original size, the floor area increasing from the original 429,000 square feet through successive additions of shops and offices (Appendix A). When the Hitachi Aiicraft Corporation was formed in 1939, the Tachikawa plant was one of those taken ovei- from the Hitachi Manufacturing Co. (Hitachi Seis^d^usllo). The Tachikawa plant had been engaged in making small radial engiut's for Army aiicraft, and in the new company it
contimied in the same ca|Dacity. In 1942. Tachikawa. undertook production of larger engines of the l.OOO-liorsepowcr class, ami in 1945 produced a few of the 2,.500-horsepower class (photos 1
and
2).
The Tachikawa
manufacturing plant of the company, producing approximately 2.50 engines each month in 1944, representing about -^O percent of the Hitachi
output.
Army and
at
all
there were
members
the
of the
Army
present
times in
capacity of
material
No other and acceptance inspectors. the officials were connected with plant in any way, and the plant was never subsidized or supported, in any of its activities, by govcrmnent fiiumcial aid. Although concerned only with the production
govei-nment
of radial aircraft engines,
the
Tachikawa plant
since
1939 had assembled some seven different types, ranging from 300 horsepower to 2,500 horse-
power. At the enxl of the war it was producing three engines in quantity (Ha-13K0, 450 horse-
power; Ha-31-15, 880 horsepowei-; and Ha-33-62, 1,250 horsepower) and conducting hurried experiments on the new Armv engine designated Ha-5
(Fig. 1).
Photo No.
1.
Ha-112
in
assembly shop,
Photo No.
2.
Ha-51
50
2,S00,OOQ
2,000,000
1,500,000
oO I<o oQ O
or a.
Z>
<
to
0^
Q. I-
Q.
<
O
Z
o o o ? = " o
=>
o o
( I
>
o
I
52
^^^
FIGURE 5
40
FIGURE 6
MAMJJASONOJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONO 1945
'
1943
1944
FIGURE 7
FIGURE 8
ENGINE (HA33M0D.62)-IE50HP
MAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND
1943
ASONO
1944
1945
1944
1945
320
a
< o < X
at
< _J
Q_
I X o < o o cr
CL _i
or
<
or LU CL
EFFECTS OF
The
air attacks
BOMBING
(lie
(laniago sustained
to
in
lie
17
l"'(l)i
iiaiv
attack
was estimated
be
about
MOO, ()()().
The 24
it
Located in an area that abounded with small aircraft plants, Army arsenals, and small manufacturing plants, the Tachikawa. plant was attacked
only
twice.
No
was
repairs were
tiiougiil
l)e
tlie
lor
rejjair
cdidd
better
vaiious
The
plant
was
severely
carrier
undergi'ound (bspersai
list
of air-i'aid
damage
1.
is
siiown
lost
in '{'able 1.
Tachikawa Aircraft main plants; the 24 April attack by the Twentieth Air Force produced very heavy damage to the main plant (photo 3). The plant was approximately 50-percent deMusashi
and
stfoyed
as
Table
Alan-hours
dut
result
of
the
air
attacks.
The
assembly shop, heat-treatment shop, and the jig and tool-making shoi)s were rendered inopei'ative, thus com]detely curtailing any further production unless exhaustive repairs were made.
The number
of man-hoiu's required
to
re])air
Countermeasures
As
a coiinti'rnu'asiiii' in
(()inl)atiiig: llio
iiu-nacc
ol'
coiitiiuK'cl b()nil)iiigs,
coniplelcd, weie in operation (Fig. II). few i)uildings at the Tachikawa plant wei'c to be retained and the other sites selected were in the geneial vicinity of the plant. t)fiicials estimated iccovery from dispersal would be accomfull
.\
percent
every de{)artment of the plant divided into four known as (1) the (luard Section (2) the Fire Brigade (>) the Repair Section and (4) the (ias anil Relief Section, each jierforming functions
\>y llieir lilies.
plished in
4 and 5).
The
Tokyo area
as inilicaled
In addition, a "I'nil
INTELLIGENCE CHECK
Data was not
of
I
Air Defense Corjjs" was organized in each oflice and shop whose function was similar to the Special Air Defense Corps, hut whose responsibility was
limited to the immediate area of their respective
iixailable
be
lighter
engines
War Department Military Intelligence Service ((i-2) did not estimate montlily producsince
shops.
In addition to these defense ])arties, the |)lant provided air-raid shelters in the ])lant compi)und
for personnel of the plant.
After the
initial
air
poorly
icjected
made
of
wood
Estimates based on production of the Un :'>\-\r) engines when checked against actual ])roductiou were found to be high in most cases. Although little was known about Tachikawa's
tion rat(>s of trainer engines.
incom])lete
iid'ormation
of
covei'cd
|)io(luclion
of the
Ha-42
or
to
Ha-33-62 engines,
the (>nd of the war
investigation subsequent
and
Incomplete recoi'ds at the ])lant did not reveal nund)er of man-houi's lost because of alerts, but the plant manager estimated that from February until June, appro.ximately 20 percent of the employees' time was lost because of this reason. Absenteeism because of alerts ran extremely high, about SO jjci'cent from .Fuly until August 1945.
llie
1
has shown the former had been produced in July, August, September, October, and November 194:i, and the latter was in production at the rate of 10 i)er month when the war ended.
VULNERABILITY
The |)lan( was proved vulnerable not oidy to duccl attack, which put it out of action, but also to shortages in supplies due to attacks on supi)liers,
of
Dispersal
Receiving oi'dei's in the fall of H!44 from the Hitachi main olHce to disperse the activities of the
various shops and assembly lines, the Tachikawa
idaiit
alerts causing
absenteeism ami
loss
The
many
early as
began to move some sections of the plant as December 1944. At the end of the con-
Hict all sites for dispersal except the Yashinia undergroimd. factory, which was approximately 2U
and industrial facilities was a further invitation to attack, and the early start and high degree of completion of the dispersal l)rogram i-eflccts the management's realization of
aircraft
this.
56
DISPERSAL LOCATIONS
719637
47 (Face
p.
56)
Photo No.
4.
Machine
No.
4 at
Yokota
(dispersal location
of Tachikawa plant).
to
Yokota tunnels
(dispersal location ol
lachikawa
plant).
57
EXPERIMENTAL SHOP
HEAT TREATMENT SHOP MACHINE SHOP
DINING
O
o
HALL
PRESSING.WPING a
WwTINS SHOP
BOILER
P.'^OM
ENGINE TESrmo
BLOCKS
U. S.
HITACHI AIRCRAFT
20,615
COMPANY
APPENDIX A
TACHIKAWA PLANT
719637
47 (Fac
p.
58)
APPENDIX C
Employment
stalistics,
Tachikatca
f)lant,
April 1943-Aiigii>:t
Year
ci
rt
S s
00
^
1
;c
iM
g i S g I: 5 c ri
at:
-f
-r
tC
-r
'-i
o cc
I-
Si ic
31
w ^ ^ O
CI
M 3 ^
cy
'
g 8 8 S n 00-5x1-
gO
Oi
00 -<
O lO 'T 31 O N O O
r-.
ss
o o O o ^ o O Q 00 OC m o o
-t"
r<N II-
o O lo :C <c o ^ ^ C^ O
<M
CC
o " 30 o a: - -^ cs o o
I'-.o
M
-H
O O O O O C O ^ O C ^ 31
1-*
"O
O O
35
-r
-f
"*
TP OS CC
Q O f3 C X 00 O -f
c CO M ec CO ^ M ^ O CO o CO (N O (C
'-C
^^ cs
o o o o o O X CO X W ^ X
to rt~
^ O M
<Xi
OJ
>ra
CO
CO
C O lO O O Q CO -C f O CO CO CS X O 35
O' -f
co'
I-'
c"
(M*
co"
ro"
cf
c: o o o oi O CO O CO ^ O C ? X O
o o X O
35
CO
CO
--
:d CO
O -^ X in O O o tM CO -H IC
"<*
31
^^
IN
o Sx O
c;
O O
to CO CO
CD
o lO o -^ o O o lO o C "O o I- lO M tP l~ rf ^ M CO (N
s
lO iM O O -H 31 ^ CI w O ^ o o
"3"
(>)
u^
ffi
CO *T
Q O O lO 31
-X) T*Tj-
-O t-
^
lO
-H
lO o O -O o ^ I- r- rV O I- " c c^ I- -r
O O ^ O O
-J*
CO
I*
CO
II-
I-
CO
C CO . 1^ >o o O 1C tC o ^' ^ ^
c
2
S!
."^
REPORTS
21
llildcslii-ini,
Ger-
many
22 23
Metallgussgesellschaft
24
2.5
\n
European War
Luftsehiffbau, Zeppelin
26 27 28 29
on Bodonsee, Germany Wieland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany Rudolph Hautcnbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Solingen,
Germany
Deutsche
Metallwerke,
*2
*3
The United States Strategic Bonil)ing Survey: Summary Report (European Wan The Ihiited States Strategic Bonil>ing Survey: Overall
Germany
Vereinigte
Heddernheim,
Germany
30
The
Bombing on
the
Germany
War Economy
G, Duren Wittenau-Berlin
AIRCRAFT DIVISION
(By Division and Branch)
*4
5
Aircraft Division Industry Report Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Report)
32 33
34
Airframes Branch
35
G
.lunkers Aircraft
Germany
7 8
9
Erla Maschinenwerke
A T G
Maschinenbau,
Area Studies Division Rejiort Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Hamburg A Detailed Study of the EflFects of Area Bombing on ^\'up]5ertal .\ Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Dusseldorf A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Solingen .\ Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on
37
38
Germany
10
11
12 13 14
Gothaer Waggonfaljrik, A G, Gotlia, Germany Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant. Bremen. Germany (Over-all Report Messerschmitt A G, Part A Augsburg, Germany Part B [Appendices I, II, III Dornier Works, Friedriclishafen & Mmiich. Germany Gerhard Fieseler Werke G m b H, Kassel, German \Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Neu|
39
Remscheid Detailed Study of the Effects of ,\rea Bombing on Darmstadt A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Lubeck A Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Berlin, .\ugsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dortmund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen
CIVILIAN
*40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
DEFENSE DIVISION
stadt, Austria
Civilian Defense Division Cologne Field Report Bonn Field Report Hanover Field Report
Final Report
I,
G m
Hamburg
b H, Bruns-
Bad Oldesloe
Germany
Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke
G m
Text Vol
;
II,
Exhibits
b H, Taucha,
Reception Areas
Bavaria,
Germany
Germany
Bavarian Niotor Works Inc, Eisenach
&
Durrerhof,
Germanv
18 19
EQUIPMENT DIVISION
Electrical
Bayerische
Motorenwerke A
G (BMW)
Munich,
*48 49
Germany
Henschel Flugmotorenwei'ke, Kassel, Germany
Light Metal Branch
Branch
Brown Boveri
et Cie,
Mannheim
Kafertal,
Germany
20
I.
;\himinum
II,
Magnesium
*50
63
Abrasives Branch
*51
Submarine branch
92 93
52
The ficrinaii Abrasive Industrv Maver and .Schmidt, Offenbacli on Main, Gernianv
Anti-Friction Branch
Augslnirg-X'^urnberg
G,
Augs-
Germany
*53
94 95 96
97 98 99 100
Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Deutschewerke A. G, Kiel, Germany Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenl)au, Bremen, Ger-
many
Friedrich
Krupp Germaniawerft,
Kiel,
Germany
*54 *55 56 57 58
Machine Tools it Macliinery as ('ai)ital Eiiuiijment Machine Tool Industry in Germany Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Ciermany Naxos Union, Krankfort on Main, Germany
Howaldtswerke A. G, Hamburg, Germany Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany
Ordnance Branch
*101 102
G Magdeburg,
A
G,
Germany
103 104 105 106
107 108
Bt)chumer
Henschel
Verein
fuer
Gusstahlfabrikation
62
63
64
()4a
Bochum, Germany
Bombing Accm-acv, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the ETO Descrii)tion of R.\F Bombing The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Logistics
& Sohn, Kassel, Germany Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany Hermann Goering Werkc, Braunschweig, Hallendorf,
Germany
Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany
MORALE DIVISION
*64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale
"(Vol. I
OIL DIVISION
*109
&
II)
Medical Branch
*().')
*110
*111
The
in
Effect of
Germany
Appendix Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and .let Projjellants, War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial Report #1) Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Ger-
MUNITIONS DIVISION
*66 67 68 69 70
71
many
The German
78
Ministerial Report on Chemicals
Oil
Oil Industrv, Ministerial
Report
Team
Sections A.
C &
IJ
Gutehotfnungshuette, Otterhausen, (iermany Fricdrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany Xcuiikirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger-
Branch
115
Aminoniakwerke Merseburg
many
Reichswerke Hermann
Goering
many
116 117
2 Appendices
A
G m
b H, Leuna, Ger-
G,
Hallendorf
Germany
72 73 74 75 76
.\ugust
Friedrich Ivrupp
many
Dortnuind Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund,
lis
119
A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany G, Leutzkendorf, Germany Ludwigshafen-Opiiau Works of I G Farbenindustrie A G, I.udwigshafen, Germany Ruhruel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, GerBraunkohle Benzin
Wintershall
Germany Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Ciermany Bochumer Verein fuer Ciusstahlfabrikation A G, Bochum, Germany
Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch
G,
Harburg
Hamburg, Germany
120
121
Hamburg, Germany
*77
*7S 79 80
81
122
123 124 125
Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Wilhelnisburg Refinery, Haml)urg, Germany Gewerkscliaft Victor, Castro|)-Rauxel, Germanv, Vol,
I
&
Vol. II
G. Unterturkheim, Germany Daimler Benz Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris
.\
G,
HamHamVol.
I
Germany
82 83
84 85 86
G, Harburg Refinery,
Oil Plant
burg, (iermany
Germany
Auto I'nion A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, (iermany Henschel & Sohn, Ka.ssel, (Jermany Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, (iermany Voigtlander, Mascliinenfabrik A G, Plauen Ciermanv
,
&
Vol. II
Rubber Branch
126 127 128 129
87 88 89 90
91
V'olkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Bussing XA(i, Brunswick, Germany Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Ger-
Deutsche
Dunlop
Gummi
Co.,
Hanau on Main,
Germany
Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germanv Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant Ministerial Rei)ort on German Rubber Industry
many
Friedrich
(jerman_\-
64
Propellanls Branch
130
131
l';iokti()clioniischewcrko, Munich, Germany Srh<K'iiol)eck Explosivp PlanI, Lifjiioso Sprongsloff
184 1S5
ISCi
Plant,
\ icior.
Meerbeek-Hamburg, Germany
(lewcrkscliaft
Wciko G
132
Triiisdorf,
ni
I)
FI,
l$u(i Siilzcnioii,
Gcrniaiiv
Plants of Dynaniil
(!,
Vornial,
Clausfliiil,
Caslrop-Rauxel, Germany Klockner Humboldt Deutz, I'lm, (!(rrmany Ruhroel Ilydrogenat ion Plant, Bot tro[)-Boy, Germany
Germany
133
191
(! ni
Deutsche Sprongchcniic
H, Kraiburg,
Germany
192 193
194
N'eukirclien I'lisenwerke A (!, Neiikirchen, Germany Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, (iermany Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg. Germany Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany Fire Raids on German Cities I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Germany, Vol I
&
195 196 197 198 199
Vol II
Kriegseilberielite which together Herniaini Giiering Works. comprise the Food and Agriculture. above report 134a Industrial Sales Outjiut and Profluctivity
in Marshalling ^'ard, LHm, Germany I G Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen, Germany C'hemische- Werke, Heuls, (iermany Gremberg Marshalling Y'ard, Gremberg, CU'nnany Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germany
Roundhouse
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION
*200
134b Physical Damage Division Report (ETC) 135 Villacouhlay Airdrome, Paris, France I3fi Railroad Reijair Yards Malines, Belgium 137 RailroafI Rei>air Yards, Louvain, Belgium 138 Railroad Re])air Yards, Hasselt, Belgium 139 Railroad Rei)air Yards, Namur, Belgium 140 SuJ)marine Pens, Brest, France Po\vder Plant, Angouleme, France 141 142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France 143 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium 144 Fort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France 145 Gnome et Rhone, TJmoges, France 14fi Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France 147 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans, France Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Germany Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France
201 202
Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Transportation Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in Regensburg, Nurnberg, and Munich Divisions German Locomotive Industry During the War German Military Railroad Traffic
The
203 204
UTILITIES DIVISION
205 206 207 208
Electric L'tilities Industry Rejjort to 10 in Vol I "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 11 to 20 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 21 liheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G
1
German
Pacific
War
War)
V Weapons
in
London
in
Summary Report
The
Effects of
(Pacific
Germany
Switching Station, Brau-
*2 *3
Japan's Struggle to
End
the
War
Nagasaki
Germany
Brauweilcr Transformer
weiler,
&
CIVILIAN STUDIES
Civilian
Germany
Germany
4 5 *6 7
Defense Division
Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany Railway Bridge, Eller, Germany Gustloff-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany Henschell & Sohn G m b H, Kassel, Germany Area Survey at Pirmaseiis, Germany Hanomag, Hanover, Germany Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany
MAN
GmbH,
m
Germany
Heiterblick, Ger-
many A T G Maschinenbau G
8
9
b H, Mockau, Germany Erla Maschinenwerke Mockati, Germany Bayerischc Motorenwerke, Dnrrerhof, Germany Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha,
GmbH,
*10
*11
Germany
Submarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamljurg, Germany
Multi-Storied Structures, Hamliurg, Germany Continental Gunirniwerke, -Hanover, Germany Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany Animoniawerke, Merseburg, Leuna, GernianxBrown Hoveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany Adam Opel A G, Russelsheini, Germany Daimler-Benz A G, ITnterturkheiin, CJermany Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany
Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo. Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and .\llied Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Kyoto, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Kobe, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Osaka, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan No. 1 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan
Medical Division
*12
*13
The
Effects of
Bombing
o:i
ices in Jajian
The
and Medical
Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany
Morale Division
*14
The
Effects of Strategic
65
ECONOMIC STUDIES
Aircraft Division
*33
*lo *16
*34
Jukogyo
it
KK)
Nissan Automobile Company Corporation Report A^o. AT/// (Nissan Jidosha KK) (Engines) .\rmy Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots Corporation Report Xo. XIX (Airframes & Engines)
*35
(Airframes
Engines')
XX
*17
(Xakajima Hikok
(Airframes
it
KK)
*36
Engines)
*18
War Economy
Capital Goods,
The Japanese Construction Industry Japanese Electrical Equipment The Japanese Machine Building Industry
Electric
*20
Power
Division
Kokuki KK)
*40
*41
*21
Sumitomo Metal
The The
Civilian
Supplies Division
uf Living
*22
*23
Hitachi .\ircraft Com])any Corporation Report Xo. VII (Hitachi Kokuki KK) (Airframes it Engines) Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. Corporation Report Xo. VIII
and
I'tili-
KK)
Japanese
War
Production Industries
Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing C'omi)any Corporation Report Xo. IX (Xippon Cakki Seizo KK)
(Propellers)
*47 *48
Japanese Army Ordnance Japanese Naval Shipbuilfiing Jajjanese Motor Vehicle Industry Japanese Merchant Sbi])building
Oil
*25
Tachikawa
.\ircraft
Company
X
49 50
51
Chemicals Chemicals
in in
XI
52
War War
Appendix
*27
*53
The
*28
Ishikawajima
(Ishikawajima Kaisha)
(fJngines)
Koku
Kogyo
Kabushiki
Bombing on Japan's War (Including Appendix A: IT. S. Economic Analysis and Comijarison; Intelligence on Japan .\]jpendix B; Gross Natimial Product on Japan and Its Components; .Appendix C: Statistical Sources).
Effects of Strategic
Economy
*29
Transportation Division
*54
.lapanese Transportation,
1941-
*.30
Kyushu
XV
Urban Areas Division
*55
''SG
*31
Economy
XVI
*57 *58 59 60
(Summary Report)
Effects of Air Attack on
I'rban
Complex Tokyo-
(Components)
*32
Mitaka
X \' 1
Kawasaki- Yokohama Effects of Air .\ttack on Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on
tne City of
Xagoya
66
MILITARY STUDIES
Military Analysis Division
S7
Hcpurl of Ships
I'.iiiiibanlnient
88
(il
lieporl
of Ships
in
he
War
89
closure' J),
Againsl Japan
(i'J
(i.'i
I'liwer
\\'eai)iins
ami Tactics
1)4
The
Army
Firing lieporls of Ships lioinbardmenl Survey Party fEiiclosure K), IJfects of Surfac<^ Bombardments on Japanese War Potential
Lofrislics
()5
Physical
tin
Damage
(
Control
(id
()7
Stratenie Air Operations of \'ery Heavy Bomin the War Against Jajian (Twentietli Air Force) World War Air ()])crations in China, Bnrina, India
liardnienl
Honjl Allack: ib
Japan
(a
Uei>ort on
91
loiglil
'ities)
II
(iS
The
Air Trans])ort
Command
in
the
War
Against
Japan
(19
92 93
94
70
71
The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Jajjan The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War
Against Japan
95
in
l')ffecls of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on Jal)anese Targets (a lieporl on Xine Incidents; Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Jai)ancse Targ'Us (a Report on Five Incidents) Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Five
The
the
War
Against Japan 96
I
(a
in
Japan (Summary
The
and
97
G-2
Division
II)
Camjiaigns of the Pacific W ar The Rednction of Wake Island The Allied Campaign Against Rabanl The American Campaign Against Wotj'e, Maloelap,
Mille, and Jahiit (V'ols. I, II and III) The Rednction of Trnk The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party Foreword, Introduction, Conolu,sions, and General
99 100
101
Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japajiese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report Evaluation of Photograi)hic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part II, Airfields pA'aluation of Photograjihic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part III, Computed
Bomb
Plotting
Summary
80
81
82 83
Re|)ort of Ships Bombardment Survey Party closure A), Kamaishi Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party closure B), Hamamatsu Area Report, of Shijjs Bombardment Survey Party closure C), Hitachi Area
(En(En(En-
102 103
104
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part V, Camouflage pjvaluation of PhotograiJhic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics Flvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part \'III, Beach Intelligence Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part X, Roaits and Railroads Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis
Report Report
of Ships of Ships
closure D),
Hakodate Area
105
84
85 86
closure E), 5luroran Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure F). Shimizu Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima-
*106
'107
108
Saki Areas
67
U. S.