CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part I: The Economic Effects of a Korea-U.S. FTA Conclusions and Implications for Further Research and Policy Excerpt from Economic Effects of a Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement* Kozo Kiyota and Robert M. Stern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Comments on the Kiyota-Stern Study Jeffrey J. Schott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Implications of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: A General Equilibrium Approach Renan Zhuang and Won W. Koo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Part II: Dynamic Effects of an FTA The Payoff to South Korea From Globalization Gary Hufbauer and Agustn Cornejo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 How Financial Multilateralism Can Increase Sustainable Output, Employment, and Income in the Pacific Region Douglas H. Brooks and David Roland-Holst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Part III: Scope for Dynamic Effects in Koreas Economy Dynamic Consequences of a Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Foreign Direct Investment Arthur Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Is A Free Trade Agreement a Royal Road to Prosperity? Demystifying Trade Regionalism Sungjoon Cho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Regional Integration and a Free Trade Agreement Among China, Japan, and Korea Hee-joon Kang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Comment: Scope for Dynamic Effects in Koreas Economy Choi Nakgyoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Part IV: Conference Discussion and Conclusions Summary of Proceedings Bernard K. Gordon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
* Volume 4 in KEI Special Studies Series, published by Korea Economic Institute of America

Static and Dynamic Consequences of a KORUS FTA

29

THE PAYOFF TO SOUTH KOREA FROM GLOBALIZATION

* Gary Hufbauer and Agustn Cornejo CONTENTS
I. Introduction II. Payoff from Past Globalization III. Future Gains IV. Conclusion

* Gary Hufbauer and Agustn Cornejo are with the Peterson Institute for International Economics. This paper draws heavily from previous research of Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer for Payoff to America from Global Integration in Bergsten (2005).

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The Korea Economic Institute

I. Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, eight multilateral bargains under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), coupled with the fall of the Soviet Union, have delivered considerable trade liberalization around the globe. In addition, many nations including South Korea have slashed their barriers and opened their markets unilaterally or through preferential trade agreements. Widespread opening has contributed to the best half century of world economic growth since the time of Jesus Christ (Maddison 2003, table 8b). Dramatic improvements in communications and transportation technology have of course made a major contribution as well. While it is difficult to disentangle the effects of policy from the effects of technology, credible estimates give approximately equal weight to these two forces of world economic integration (Yi 2003). This article summarizes the economic payoff to South Korea from its postwar trade opening (reflecting the combined force of policy and technology) and estimates the potential future gains from more policy opening going forward. To quantify these gains, we survey different methodologies as well as educated guesses available in the literature. Despite their differences, the methods cited may bracket a range that is quite likely to contain the true value of gains. Taken together they suggest that South Korea has enjoyed very substantial past gains and may reap large future payoffs from expanded commercial ties with the global economy. We calculate that trade opening since World War II has added between $90 billion and $100 billion to the South Korean economy, around $2,000 per capita additional income. Our speculative estimates of potential additional gains from removing the rest of trade and investment barriers between South Korea and its economic partners range from $57 billion to $76 billion, around $1,200 to $1,600 per capita.1 Because trade opening permanently raises national income, these gains are enjoyed annually.

II. Payoff from Past Globalization Trade and Growth Regressions

The first approach draws on a study designed to identify economic attributes and policies that have the strongest effect on per capita income growth (OECD 2003,

1. Our estimates of potential future gains should be viewed as the gains from wholesale reforms that would move the current trading system to complete liberalization. Ongoing negotiations, such as the WTO Doha Development Round and for various free trade agreements, are not that ambitious.

Static and Dynamic Consequences of a KORUS FTA

31

chapter 2).2 The OECD study calculates a coefficient of 0.2 for advanced countries for the positive effect on per capita income from a higher long-term level of trade exposure (merchandise exports plus imports).3 According to this coefficient, a 10 percent rise in a countrys long-term trade exposure (imports plus exports) results in a 2 percent increase in the level of annual per capita output, holding everything else equal. Armed with this estimate, we can calculate the effect of increased trade on GDP and per capita income in South Korea. However, the OECD estimate is based on a sample heavily biased toward developed countries, while South Korea was a developing country until recent decades. As a result, the OECD estimate is quite likely lower than the coefficient relevant for most developing countries, and for this reason we do not apply the 0.2 coefficient to decadal changes in South Korean trade exposure. Cline (2004) summarizes the econometric estimates of the long-term elasticity of output per capita to the merchandise ratio. He finds estimates that are much higher than suggested by the OECD, as they range between 0.14 and 1.44. Accordingly, we apply a low middle of the road coefficient (0.3) in recognition that South Korea was still a developing country during several decades of the period under consideration.4 With this approach, Table 1 shows the evolution of South Korean trade exposure (merchandise trade), together with the calculated payoff in terms of higher income levels.5 The eventual increase in per capita income is expressed in 2000 dollars, calculated as a result of rising trade exposure during each decade. The sum of this

2. Among the attributes and policies: physical and human capital, inflation (level and volatility), taxes, government spending, research and development spending, financial sophistication, and trade exposure. 3. The question of causality (i.e., whether faster output growth increases trade or vice versa) and the possibility that omitted variables explain the statistical connection between trade and growth have bedeviled this line of inquiry (Berg and Krueger 2003; Hallak and Levinsohn 2004). Frankel and Romer (1999) used instrumental variables derived from a gravity model to make a strong case that trade causes growth. Berg and Krueger (2003) survey the literature and summarize the pros and cons; they conclude that the literature shows that openness is fairly robustly a cause of growth although there is substantial uncertainty surrounding these estimates. 4. Cline (2004) confirms that 0.5 corresponds to the simple average of the central values of the estimates available in the literature. 5. Since the Second World War, many key variables that determine income levels, such as the size of the workforce, the share of manufacturing value added, and labor productivity, have changed dramatically. For this reason, we break the full period down into several subperiods and then perform intermediate calculations to calculate total postwar gains. The intermediate results that appear in the tables do not reflect gains realized solely during that subperiod. Most of the structural changes set in motion by trade openness take a decade or longer to mature in terms of greater productivity and higher income. Thus, our subperiod figures are an estimation of annual gains that will eventually result from liberalization that occurred in the subperiod. We then add up subperiods to arrive at a final cumulative figure of annual gains caused by opening.

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The Korea Economic Institute

Table 1: Growth Regressions: Benefits of Increased Trade Exposure for South Korea Time period 1959 196069 197079 198089 199099 200005 Total Trade exposurea % 15.8 26.0 55.3 67.3 60.8 76.8 64.3 113.1 21.7 9.8 26.4 Period change % 19.3 33.9 6.5 2.9 7.9 Per capita output growth due to tradeb % 2000 $ 260 859 290 252 954 2,110 Benefit in 2003b 7.4 30.3 11.8 11.4 45.4 Pop. Per capita GDP 2000 $ 1,110 1,346 2,530 4,459 8,608 12,043

billion 2000 $ million 25.0 28.5 35.3 40.8 45.1 47.6

Sources: IMF-IFS (various years); World Bank (various years). a. Calculated as the average (X + M)/GDP for the decade. b. Subperiod gains are an intermediate calculation, not an estimate of short-term gains from liberalization. Gains due to liberalization may require 10 to 20 years to be fully realized. For the entire period 1960 through 2005, we use a coefficient of 0.3 for the elasticity of trade exposure and growth based on a low midpoint estimate between Clines (2004) survey for developing countries and the OECD (2003).

column, $2,100 per capita, reflects the calculated total increase in per capita GDP resulting from deeper trade exposure between 1959 and 2005. The $2,100 payoff translates to an additional $100 billion of GDP, or roughly 17 percent of 2005 GDP measured in 2000 dollars (total GDP gains are calculated by multiplying per capita gains by 2005 population, 47.6 million).

Import Variety and Price Benefits

Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) charted new ground in the study of trade gains by examining expanded product varieties made available through imports. Broda and Weinstein concluded that conventional import price indices, which do not take into account new import varieties, overstate U.S. import inflation by 28 percent. Using product level data on the fraction of imported goods in total consumption, Broda and Weinstein (2006) calculate that the 28 percent increase in consumer purchasing power is equivalent to a gain of 2.8 percent of 2001 U.S. GDP from greater import variety. Feenstra (2006) not only concludes that this estimate can be safely extended to other developed countries, but he also indicates that the likely gain is probably larger for countries with a larger trade exposure (e.g., South Korea). However, applying the 2.8 percent figure to Korean purchasing power suggests a gain of $375 per capita in 2005 GDP (measured in 2000 dollars), or a total of roughly $18 billion (2000 dollars) for the overall economy.

Static and Dynamic Consequences of a KORUS FTA

33

Import Variety and Productivity Benefits

Broda, Greenfield, and Weinstein (2006) extend their methodology to a number of countries, including South Korea, and find that increased import variety accounted for an average of 5 percent of total factor productivity (TFP) during 19942003 in the typical developed country, and that the South Korean experience was very close to this average. Import variety contributes to TFP because, with a wider range of choices, industrial firms can rightsize their inputs to the exact specifications of their own products. Making a bold assumption that increased import variety accounts for 5 percent of South Koreas total factor productivity growth over the entire postwar period (1959 2003), we can roughly calculate that this single channel contributed about $550 per capita (2000 dollars) to the total gains.6 This amounts to about $26 billion of GDP in 2005 (measured in 2000 dollars).

Export Variety and Productivity Growth

The growth in South Korean export variety during the past 50 years has been outstanding. A simple analysis of UN Comtrade data at the highest level of disaggregation available in Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 1 (the only classification that allows a study of long-term changes) shows that South Koreas exports covered just 570 lines in 1965 but 1,060 in 2004. For comparison purposes, the corresponding figures for U.S. exports are 820 and 1,120. Feenstra et al. (1999) study the linkage between export variety and industry productivity growth in South Korea and Taiwan.7 They find that increased export variety had a positive and significant effect on TFP in 9 of the 16 sectors. In a subsequent study, Feenstra and Kee (2006) estimate that increased export variety can explain about 13 percent of national productivity growth in the industrial sector.8 We assume that that same coefficient applies to the entire traded goods sector some 32 percent of the Korean economy in recent years, but higher in earlier decades. Applying that coefficient to the fraction of South Koreas per capita income associated with the traded goods sector suggests a gain of almost $400 in per capita income, or $19 billion (in 2000 U.S. dollars). This result previews our estimate in the next section.

6. We obtain this rough approximation by calculating 5 percent of the per capita GDP gain measured in 2000 dollars [($12,043 less $1,110) times 5 percent]. 7. Feenstra et al. (1999) measure variety based on disaggregated exports from Korea and Taiwan to the United States for 16 sectors during 197591. 8. Feenstra and Kee (2006) estimates are based on a pool of 34 developed and developing countries (including Korea) and data from 1982 to 1997.

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The Korea Economic Institute

Productivity Gains from Sifting and Sorting

The sifting and sorting mechanism identified by Richardson9 provides a theoretically grounded way of thinking about the impact of globalization on productivity. Increased global opportunities that result from declining tariffs and transportation costs, better communications, and other forces can enhance productivity by weeding out weak firms and nourishing strong ones. Highly productive firms tend to expand when they discover opportunities in the global market, while unproductive firms tend to contract under the pressure of import competition. The result is an increase in average productivity of the industry, even though there may be no effect on any single firms productivity. The sifting and sorting mechanism by which these productivity gains emerge reflects market selection among heterogeneous firms that differ in either their inherent overall productivity or their access to worker pools of varying skills, creativity, and reliability. Some scholars have tried to estimate the firm-level payoff from trade and investment liberalization, where sifting and sorting is the main mechanism. Econometric results are still at a preliminary stage, but a simulation by Bernard et al. (2003) suggests that a 5 percent reduction of global trade barriers (tariffs and other costs expressed on an ad valorem basis) could, through the sorting of resources toward more productive firms, boost overall U.S. manufacturing productivity by 4.7 percent. The coefficient is derived from a model simulation, not a longitudinal estimate. While the actual coefficient could differ quite a bit from one to one, we draw on this resultthat a one-percentagepoint decrease in trade barriers raises manufacturing productivity by about 1 percent to estimate the gains from trade opening through the sifting and sorting process.10 To calculate the postwar reduction in South Korean trade barriers, we look at the difference between the simple average applied tariffs in different periods. We take the difference of 31.3 percentage points as a rough estimate of the overall decline in tariff barriers during the past 50 years.11 Applying the one-to-one coefficient gleaned from the literaturethat a one-percentagepoint decline in trade barriers will induce a 1 percent improvement in productivity in traded goods sectorswe use the constructed series in Table 2 as a measure of induced productivity gains in the traded goods sectors for each period as a result of
9. This section is largely paraphrased from Richardson (2004). 10. We assume that a one-to-one payoff also results when agriculture and mining trade barriers are decreased. Other methods of summarizing gains are possible but all require some degree of speculation. Appendix 2A of Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2005) (based on Richardson [2004]) presents a separate methodology that examines the growing use of intermediate imports in U.S. manufacturing. 11. This method ignores nontariff barriers, which probably declined as well.

Table 2: Sifting and Sorting: Productivity Benefit of Reduced Import Tariff Barriers for South Korea Growth in output per worker in full economy due to tariff changee Benefit in 2003f Memorandum Output per worker billion 2000 dollars 2000 dollars 2,879 0.4 15 0.2 2.4 3.3 1.7 8.2 2.8 25 84 1,267 0.5 1.9 187 232 110 469 144 3.6 3.2 1.2 3.8 0.9 0.1 0.4 3,521 5,151 7,230 9,204 12,503 15,718 19,228 23,621 Labor force million 10.4 11.3 12.8 14.2 15.5 17.5 19.5 21.4 23.1

Years

Import liberalization ratea

Simple average MFN tariff at end of periodb Estimated Average share ad valorem of traded goods tariff sectors in reductionc South Korean value addedd percentage percent points percent 2000 dollars 51.0 0.8 52.7 47.8 47.8 41.2 40.8 35.3 33.0 32.3 7.6 6.7 2.9 9.2 2.6 0.4 1.1 31.3

percent

percent

1962

5.6

39.9

196368

57.6

39.1

196973

52.1

31.5

197479

67.6

24.8

198084

84.8

21.9

198589

94.7

12.7

199092

97.7

10.1

199398

99.9

9.7

19992004

100.0

8.6

Static and Dynamic Consequences of a KORUS FTA

Total

35

Source: World Bank (various years), Dent (2002), Ng (2006). a. The import liberalization rate is the ratio of tariff lines not subject to import licenses to total tariff lines in the Korean schedule. b. Two sources were used for constructing the series: data for 196289 are based on data reproduced in Dent (2002), while subsequent data are based on World Bank (Francis Ng database). c. Given the estimated 1-to-1 relation between tariff reduction and productivity gains, these numbers are also the estimated productivity growth in the traded goods sector due to tariff reduction. d. Traded sectors are manufacturing, agriculture, and minerals. e. Subperiod gains are an intermediate calculation, not an estimate of short-term gains from liberalization. Gains due to liberalization may require 10 to 20 years to be fully realized. f. Benefit in 2003 is calculated by multiplying the benefit per worker measured in 2003 dollars by total employment in 2003.

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The Korea Economic Institute

tariff cuts. To find the productivity improvement to the entire economy caused by reduced tariff barriers, we multiply this figure by the average share of traded goods sectors in the total economy for different periods.12 Based on these productivity increases, we estimate an annual GDP benefit of $1,300 per worker for all liberalization between 1960 and 2004roughly an income gain of $615 on a per capita basis. This equates to a benefit of $29 billion of additional GDP in the South Korean economy in 2005 (measured in 2000 dollars). Since the sifting and sorting estimate measures just productivity gains owing to resource reallocation, we can combine this estimatean income gain of approximately $615 per capitawith the other gains enumerated earlier: a $375 per capita gain from greater household purchasing power; a $550 per capita gain from enhanced TFP through rightsizing industrial inputs; and another $400 per capita gain from enhanced TFP through greater export variety. The result of this adding-up exercise is a per capita GDP gain of $1,940 (in 2000 dollars) from postwar Korean opening, which equates to some $92 billion additional GDP for the Korean economy. The adding-up result is in the same ballpark as the growth regression described at the outset $2,100 gain per capita, $100 billion gain for total GDP. Since the growth regression can be interpreted as an umbrella calculation of all the enumerated channels, plus others not identified in this article, the rough correspondence gives reassurance.

III. Future Gains

So far we have tried to quantify the gains of past trade liberalization for South Korea. Now we turn to the future. While South Korean average tariffs are moderate by developing country standards, they are high when compared with advanced OECD countries (Table 3). A similar conclusion can be drawn from the trade restrictiveness indexes for key areas of the service sector, namely banking and telecommunications (Table 4). While comparable estimates of trade barriers in services are difficult to find, several comparative indicesthe A.T. Kearney annual survey of corporate executives, the Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index, is one indexindicate that South Koreas attractiveness for inward foreign direct investment (FDI) lags behind the best emerging markets. One studythe PricewaterhouseCoopers opacity indexsuggests that FDI could increase if South Koreas regulation were less opaque. In this section, we draw on scenarios that are contemplated in standard computable general equilibrium (CGE) and gravity models. A caveat is in order. After examining

12. This method assumes that labor moving from traded to nontraded sectors maintains its productivity level.

Static and Dynamic Consequences of a KORUS FTA

37

the predictive power of these models, as applied to past free trade agreements (FTAs) and the Uruguay Round, DeRosa and Gilbert (2005) conclude that neither model has a stellar forecasting record.
Table 3: Simple Average Bound and Applied Tariffs, Selected Nations, percentage Country Advanced nations Japan Australia United States Canada European Union South Korea Developing nations Indonesia Malaysia South Africa Russia China Brazil Colombia Pakistan India Egypt 37.1 14.5 19.1 n.a. 10.0 31.4 42.9 59.9 49.8 36.6 7.0 7.3 7.7 9.5 10.0 12.4 12.4 14.2 18.3 19.6 2.9 9.9 3.6 5.1 4.1 15.9 3.1 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.2 11.2 Simple average MFN tariffs Bound Applied

Source: WTO (2006). Note: Tariff in latest available year, 2005 or 2006.

Estimates from CGE Models: Global Free Trade

Using the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade, Kiyota and Stern (2007) provide the most optimistic scenario of the potential impact of a world without tariffs and nontariff barriers. They estimate that South Korean GDP could expand by almost 12 percent, with most of the gains recorded in the manufacturing sector, followed by services. Not surprisingly, South Korean agricultural GDP would contract. The estimated gains are equivalent to $76 billion in 2005 GDP (measured in 2000 dollars), or almost $1,600 per capita. The key feature of the Michigan model is that, while focusing on static gains, it allows for the modeling of many features of the new trade theory such as product variety, economies of scale, and monopolistic competition.

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Table 4: Most-Favored-Nation Applied Tariffs on Merchandise Imports and Trade Restrictiveness Indices for Traded Services Trade restrictiveness indices (2000) Accountancy 40.9 41.8 31.2 38.7 31.6 43.1 41.2 19.3 33.2 47.7 39.2 44.3 56.4 51.4 35.8 44.4 11.1 30.9 33.3 30.2 54.8 64.7 17.2 19.0 7.8 59.9 15.6 51.3 18.6 42.7 23.4 6.3 16.0 32.8 22.8 32.3 31.7 40.3 10.7 6.8 6.5 7.1 19.2 7.8 37.3 7.1 18.6 19.4 25.5 4.4 44.4 0.0 3.3 68.2 30.9 68.9 67.5 58.5 53.2 58.7 21.5 9.1 4.9 20.7 15.3 7.1 24.0 4.9 14.1 7.1 32.6 21.0 33.3 7.1 18.9 44.2 32.0 33.0 39.0 40.3 40.8 20.7 23.9 60.0 58.2 52.1 60.5 55.8 52.0 47.8 n.a. 15.3 12.2 9.7 4.4 41.6 Architectural Services Banking Distribution Telecom Maritime Legal 42.1 51.8 58.2 48.6 26.7 52.2 41.6 31.5 48.1 44.5 0.0 39.9 57.0 53.8 48.7 n.a.

Country/region

Simple average merchandise tariff (2005)

Australia

3.4

Canada

3.8

France

4.2

Germany

4.2

The Korea Economic Institute

Hong Kong

0.0

Japan

3.1

Singapore

0.0

United Kingdom

4.2

United States

3.7

South Korea

11.2

Brazil

12.4

India

n.a.

Indonesia

7.0

Malaysia

7.3

Mexico

14.5

South Africa

7.7

Source: Productivity Commission (various years). a. The extent of government regulation of a particular service is quantified using a trade restrictiveness indices. Trade restrictiveness indices summarize the nature and extent of restrictions on trade in services for each economy. The more restrictions and the greater their severity, the higher the index and the more restrictive an economy is judged to be.

Static and Dynamic Consequences of a KORUS FTA

39

Another advantage of the Michigan model is that it better accounts for potential gains in the service sector. Other CGE models without such features tend to yield lower results. As Table 5 illustrates, gains for South Korea under global free trade are much loweraround 2 percentwhen modeled using the standard GTAP model, as done by Scollay and Gilbert (2001), DeRosa and Gilbert (2004), and Cline (2004). This is equivalent to about $13 billion in 2005 GDP (measured in 2000 dollars). However, as Cline (2004) points out, the GTAP database does not capture barriers in the services sector; therefore, Cline cautions that the results should be interpreted as essentially referring to merchandise trade only.13 A scenario of global free trade requires hugely successful WTO negotiations of much more ambitious scope than currently envisaged. In fact, Cline (2004) performs different simulations based on various proposals and concludes that South Koreas prospective gains under the Doha Round of negotiations realistically range from 15 percent to 67 percent of potential gains under global free trade. An alternative scenario that is highly valued by economists but dismissed by policymakers is the unilateral dismantling of barriers. Kiyota and Stern (2007) conclude that unilateral liberalization would bring large gains for South Korea, on the order of 5 percent of GDP, or roughly $30 billion dollars in 2005 GDP (measured in 2000 dollars), $630 per capita. However, this gain is just 40 percent of the global free trade scenario, indicating that South Korea also has a major stake in the removal of barriers by its commercial partners.

Estimates from CGE models: Bilateral and Regional Approaches

Bilateral and regional initiatives may provide a second-best path toward the benefits from global free trade. Table 5 summarizes the results of empirical simulations of several negotiating scenarios for South Korea. The first observation is that, when models allow for dynamic gains (e.g., an increase in capital stock or better productivity as a result of trade liberalization), the gains vastly exceed the results predicted under static models, sometimes twice or three times as large.14 However, the prospects of dynamic gains from trade liberalization are hotly disputed, and we do not pursue them further in this paper.

13. Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2003) estimate that the gains from services liberalization could be four times the gains from goods liberalization. 14. The same magnitude of underestimation may well apply to the estimated gains of global free trade reported in the previous section.

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Table 5: Economic Effects of Global Free Trade and Proposed FTAs on South Korea, CGE-Based Estimates, Percentage increase or billions of U.S. dollars Type of model GDP percent change Exports to partner percent or $ billion chnage 8.0 8.3 16.9 16.3 39.7 2.1 Imports from partner percent or $ billion change Total exports percent change Estimated impact Total imports percent change

Authors

Proposed partner

The Korea Economic Institute

Global free trade and the unilateral benchmark Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE (with IRS) Static CGE (with IRS) Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE 0.07 0.07 0.06 1.83 2.16 2.41 11.70 4.60 39.3 3.1

Scollay and Gilbert (2001) DeRosa and Gilbert (2004) Cline (2004) Kiyota and Stern (2007) Kiyota and Stern (2007)

Global free trade Global free trade Global free trade Global free trade Unilateral free trade

Bilateral and regional scenarios: static and dynamic CGE models

Cheong (1999)a KIET (2000)a IDE / JETRO (2000)

Japan Japan Japan

Cheong (2001) Brown et al. (2001) Scollay and Gilbert (2001) Nakashima (2002) Kiyota and Stern (2007) Nam et al. (2004) Lee H. et al. (2005) Scollay and Gilbert (2001) Cheong (2003) Lee C. et al. (2005)

Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan China China Japan + China Japan + China Japan + China

Static CGE Static CGE (with IRS) Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE (with IRS) Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE

0.07 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.141.28 2.40 0.80 0.94 3.54

3.1

8.4

8.2
4.8 19.5 8.1

8.1
5.2 19.4 8.8

ASEAN + 3 European Union United States United States United States United States United States Static CGE Static CGE (with IRS) Static CGE Dynamic CGEb Dynamic CGEc Dynamic model Dynamic G-cubedd Dynamic CGE Dynamic CGE Dynamic CGE Dynamic CGE Dynamic CGE Dynamic CGE Dynamic CGE Dynamic CGE Dynamic CGE 3.47 3.90 2.45 0.452.30 3.10 2.45 5.15 0.48 $5.56.5 1.08 8.70 2.88 1.09 11.0 $3.3 16.0 $9.0 $5.814.2 3.50 1.26 $6.9 $9.2

Scollay and Gilbert (2001) Kim et al. (2005) Wang and Cheong (1998) McDaniel and Fox (2001) Choi and Schott (2001) DeRosa and Gilbert (2004) Lee J. and Lee H. (2005) Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006) Kiyota and Stern (2006) Scollay and Gilbert (2001) 23.4 30.0 4.2 5.5 9.8 3.4 3.0 15.1 57.0 23.2 0.0 4.7 5.9 10.6 2.2 23.7 11.9 72.8

Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE Static CGE (manuf.)

1.18 2.02 1.70 0.69 0.91 0.240.37 0.420.59

19.6 21.0 26.2 22.9 4.5

31.3 54.0 46.1 49.6 4.8

23.0 2.6

22.9 3.8

Static and Dynamic Consequences of a KORUS FTA

IDE / JETRO (2000) Cheong (2001) Nakashima (2002) McKibbin, Lee, and Cheong (2002) Kawasaki (2003) Nam et al. (2004) Lee H. et al. (2005) Cheong (2003) Lee C. et al. (2005) Bchir and Fouqin (2006) Bchir and Fouqin (2006) Bchir and Fouqin (2006)

United States United States APEC on MFN basis Japan Japan Japan

Bchir and Fouqin (2006)

Japan Japan China China Japan + China Japan + China ASEAN (industrial) ASEAN (agriculture) ASEAN + 3 + India (industrial) ASEAN + 3 + India (agriculture)

41

42

Kim et al. (2005) Choi and Schott (2001) Lee J. and Lee H. (2005) Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006) Kiyota and Stern (2006) Dynamic CGE Dynamic CGE 6.60 8.05

European Union United States United States

Dynamic CGE Dynamic CGE Dynamic CGE

3.08 2.41 1.992.27

26.7 30.0

32.9 49.0

4.5 7.2

4.9 8.6

The Korea Economic Institute

United States United States

Source: Data compiled by authors. Notes: CGE = computable general equilibrium; IRS = Increasing returns to scale; MFN = most-favored-nation a. Cited in Lee C. et al. (2005). Does not allow for full capital mobility. b. Assumes an FTA-induced productivity growth of 10 percent to 30 percent of total productivity growth, depending on the outlook of the sector. c. Assumes an FTA-induced annual productivity growth of 1 percent for 10 years. d. The model permits the incorporation of rational expectations and forward-looking intertemporal behavior on the part of individual.

Static and Dynamic Consequences of a KORUS FTA

43

The second observation from Table 5 is that South Korea could go a long way toward the benefits from global free trade through agreements that create free trade with Japan and China, ASEAN, the European Union, and the United States. According to Scollay and Gilbert (2001), for example, the successful conclusion of ASEAN + 3 would yield gains for South Korea that could be equivalent to 65 percent of total gain under global free trade (as they estimate them). Kim et al. (2005), Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006), and Kiyota and Stern (2007) show that South Korea could also obtain very significant gains from FTAs with the European Union and the United States. Given that South Korea has already signed an FTA with ASEAN (goods only) and the United States (not yet ratified), and given that talks are ongoing with the European Union and with Japan and China (under the ASEAN + 3 framework), South Korea may well obtain most of the benefits of free trade in the near term especially if the Doha Round is brought to a successful conclusion.

Estimates from Gravity Models

In the past decade, empirical and theoretical research has revived the gravity model, which posits that trade between two countries is directly proportional to their size and inversely proportional to their distance.15 The gravity model has been augmented, notably by Frankel (1997) and Rose (2003, 2004), to quantify the effects of common language, shared borders, postcolonial relationships, and other variables that may affect bilateral trade. Rose (2003) used the gravity model to test the influence of international institutions (the GATT and WTO, IMF, OECD, and regional or bilateral FTAs) on bilateral trade (Table 6).16 Using IMF data on trade between 178 countries over the period 1948 99, he reported that participation in a regional FTA can increase bilateral trade by 118 percent.17 Park and Kang (2004, table 6), reach a central estimate very close to Rose (2003). By contrast, DeRosa and Gilbert (2007) introduce several modifications to Roses (2003) original workimportantly, they consider a wider number of bilateral and regional FTAs and obtain a smaller FTA effect, a gain of approximately 62 percent.

15. The gravity model was used as early as 1946 to analyze trade. Linnemann (1966) provided significant refinements to the technique. 16. Rose has made his data set publicly available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm. 17. The 118 percent coefficient may also be exaggerated because of selection biasthe tendency of countries to put priority on FTAs with partners that promise the largest trade gains. In the case of the United States, however, noneconomic factors appear to play a large role in the selection of FTA partners (e.g., Israel, Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman); see Schott (2004, 36573).

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Table 6: Gravity Models: Insights into Possible Effects of South Koreas Free Trade Agreements Proposed Type of Insights on trade Other partner model expansion results Gravity models applied to South Koreas negotiating scenarios Sohn and Japan GM Ratio of actual trade to Yoon (2001); potential trade is 67% (1995). Kim (2002) Implied 50% increase of two-way trade with FTA. Lee C. and Asian GM with No evidence of an emerging Park S. (2002) regionalism tariffs and North Asian trading bloc. regional ASEAN + 3 is emerging as dummy a natural trading bloc in the region. They also find evidence of a special relation between ASEAN and the United States. Choi and United States GM U.S.-Korea trade is already Schott (2001) 300% of model prediction. Trade with China and Japan is below model prediction. DeRosa and United States GM with 27% increase in South Korean Gilbert (2004) regional exports to the United States dummy only. Park and United States GM with (see below) U.S.-South Kang (2004) FDI dummy Korea FTA could expand U.S. FDI into South Korea by 14% to 35%, and expand FDI in in South Korea from third parties by 28% to 35%. DeRosa and Global free GM with 54% increase in South Korean Gilbert (2004) trade regional total exports to the world. dummy Gravity models applied to capture typical impact of FTAs Rose (2003) FTAs of GM with 118% increase in bilateral several regional trade between members. countries dummy Park and FTAs of GM with 103%135% increase in Kang (2004) several regional bilateral trade between countries dummy members. DeRosa and FTAs of GM with 62% increase in bilateral trade Gilbert (2007) several regional between members. countries dummy
Source: Compiled from authors data. Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; FTA = free trade agreement; GM = gravity model

Authors

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We adjust these coefficients downward to take account of trade diversion. Bilateral and regional FTAs increase trade among members through both trade creation (increased trade as a result of relative efficiency) and trade diversion (increased trade as a result of privileged access). Estimates by DeRosa and Gilbert (2004, table A.6) for 14 prospective U.S. FTAs enacted simultaneously suggest that trade diversionmeasured as the dollar decline in nonpartner tradecould account for up to 25 percent of the gross gain in trade with partner countries. In view of this estimate, we reduce the gravity model trade augmentation effect by 25 percent, from 118 percent to 89 percent in the case of estimates by Rose (2003) and from 62 percent to 47 percent in the case of estimates by DeRosa and Gilbert (2007).18 We use the range of adjusted coefficients to estimate the potential increase in South Korean merchandise trade if FTAs were concluded with all trading partners. This is the same as assuming that all countries eliminated their policy barriers to merchandise trade with South Korea, and vice versa. For simplicity purposes, we use trade data of 2005 that do not reflect the impact of bilateral agreements, with the minor exception of the South KoreaChile FTA. Table 7 drives the reader through the arithmetic. Because we assume no existing preferential trade for South Korea in 2005, bilateral trade of South Korea expands between 47 and 89 percent, leading to a comparable change in the trade exposure ratio. Applying the OECD (2003) estimate for the elasticity of trade exposure to per capita income of 0.2, we obtain a range of estimates for South Koreas possible GDP gains, ranging between 9 percent and 18 percent.19 The true value may be found somewhere within this range, but we prefer closer to the lower bound estimate because the DeRosa and Gilbert (2007) coefficient is estimated from a larger and more recent database. A GDP gain of 9 percent from future liberalization (about $57 billion based on 2005 GDP measured in 2000 dollars) would translate into per capita benefits of about $1,200 (2000 dollars).

18. All these coefficients apply to two-way bilateral trade (merchandise imports plus exports). DeRosa and Gilbert (2004) performed a slightly different calculation based on exports only. They conclude that, under global free trade, South Korean exports could expand by 54 percent. This estimate suggests that export gains could be considerable. 19. Unlike in our estimates of past gains, we now feel comfortable in using the OECD (2003) estimate because there is no question that South Korea is and will remain a developed country.

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Table 7: South Korean Merchandise Trade under Global Free Trade, 2005, billions of nominal U.S. dollars South Korean trade South Korean imports South Korean exports Total trade Memorandum Base Nominal GDP Trade exposure Change in trade exposure Change in GDP 787.6 0.69 0.00 1.02 0.47 9.4% 2.47 0.89 17.8% Total (2005) 261.2 284.4 545.6 With world FTA Lower bound n.a. n.a. 802.0 Upper bound n.a. n.a. 1,948.9

Sources: UN (2005), IMF-WEO (2005), Rose (2003), DeRosa and Gilbert (2007), and authors calculations. Notes: Modeled by assuming worldwide FTAs in a gravity model framework. FTA = free trade agreement.

IV. Conclusion
Without a doubt, South Korea ranks among the great economic successes of all time. From shambles at the end of the Second World War, South Korea has risen like a phoenix to approach the first rank of nations. Past participation in the process of globalization, abetted by both policy liberalization and technological innovation, clearly contributed to Koreas enormous success. Future participation in the global economy, through complete liberalization of remaining barriers, promises even greater gains.

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