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Abstract
The deregulation of US domestic passenger aviation in 1978 resulted in the reconfiguration of airline networks into radial route
systems, spatially concentrated around a small number of central airports or ‘hubs’. This paper investigates whether a similar spatial
concentration trend can be observed in the European aviation network after deregulation at the airline network level. Using the
network concentration index, it is demonstrated that European ‘flag carriers’ already showed a very high traffic concentration rate at
the beginning of deregulation. Between 1990 and 1999, the distribution of European traffic of these carriers remained remarkably
stable according to the network concentration index. A spatial concentration trend of European traffic on a small number of hubs
can only be observed for some regional airlines.
r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
0969-6997/$ - see front matter r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0969-6997(03)00039-5
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310 G. Burghouwt et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 309–323
medium airports were increasingly replaced by indirect studies on European network configurations take the
flights via central airports or ‘hubs’ (see, for example, airport as the object of analysis instead of the
Viscusi et al., 1998). These hub-and-spoke networks airline (e.g., Graham, 1997; Reynolds-Feighan, 1995;
allow airlines to benefit from certain cost and demand De Wit et al., 1999; Veldhuis and Kroes, 2002).
advantages, extensively described elsewhere (e.g., However, in deregulated markets changes in airport
Brueckner and Spiller, 1994; Pels, 2001). connectivity are primarily the consequence of changes in
Overall, spatial concentration and temporal concen- airline network behaviour. Therefore, we use the airline
tration are the two main features of the hub-and- perspective for the analysis of the spatial dimension of
spoke network. The hubbing carrier concentrates its European airline network configurations during the
network around one or a small number of transfer hubs period 1990–1999.
through which the airline operates synchronized, daily Moreover, we introduce the NC-index in order to
waves of flights (Graham, 1995; Reynolds-Feighan, measure changes in airline network configurations. The
2000). NC-index is a modified Gini-index. The Gini-methodo-
On the other hand, some new or recently started US logy was introduced in air transport analysis by
airlines continued operating ‘point-to-point’ networks Reynolds-Feighan (1998, 2001) for the measurement of
on a low-cost, no-frill, low-price basis. Low-cost carriers spatial or market concentration in airline networks.
do not need the cost advantages of hub-and-spoke
networks because they have low marginal costs per
passenger. This is mainly the result of operating high 3. Methodology
density routes with high utilisation rates, high density
seating, electronic ticketing, standardisation of aircraft According to Reynolds-Feighan, the hub-and-spoke
types and maintenance, low levels of on-board service, network requires a concentration of air traffic in both
use of under-utilised secondary airports and flexible space and time. Hence, the network configuration is
labour contracts (Dempsey and Gesell, 1997; Williams, defined as the level of spatial and temporal concentra-
2001). tion of traffic flows in a given network.
However, the resulting network configuration of both The focus here is on the spatial concentration of the
full-service and low-cost carriers will not only depend on airline network. To measure the level of spatial
the cost structure of the airline. Other factors include the concentration of a network, different concentration
size of the origin–destination market, historical back- measures can be used, such as the coefficient of variance,
ground of the carrier and its network, number of the Herfindahl-index, Theil’s entropy measure, the
stations in the network, intercontinental versus con- C4-firm concentration ratio or the Gini-index. Reynolds-
tinental orientation, fleet composition, strategic airline Feighan suggests the Gini-index as the most appropriate
management, hub capacity and the average stage length. concentration measure for airline or airport networks.
In contrast to the large amount of empirical studies Allison (1978) and Sen (1976) examined the properties
regarding the changes in airline network structures in of income inequality measures and proposed a series
the deregulated US air transport market, the number of of criteria that indices should possess. The C4-index
empirical studies with respect to changing airline only reacts to changes in the traffic distribution in an
network configurations in Europe is still somewhat airport population when the four largest airports are
limited. More knowledge of airline network behaviour involved. The Herfindahl-index is only sensitive for
in a deregulated European aviation regime is important changes in the extremes of the population. The
because of a number of reasons. coefficient of variance on the other hand, reacts well
First of all, the structure of airline networks and the to changes in the population but is extremely sensitive to
distribution of traffic over these networks affect airport the underlying distribution. The Gini-index was the
planning and development. Effects include issues in only index to satisfy all of the criteria. The Gini-index is
relation to peaking problems, uncertainty in airport not sensitive to the distribution of the population and
traffic forecasting, runway construction plans, terminal reacts quite well to changes in all parts of a given
lay-outs, regional economic effects, noise effects and population.
accessibility (Caves and Gosling, 1999). Regarding spatial concentration, the Gini-index can
Secondly, it can be expected that the effects of be defined as
deregulation on the European airline network config-
urations will be different from the US aviation network 1 XX
G¼ jyi yj j ð1Þ
because of the differences in the geographical, economic 2n2 y% i j
and political structure of both markets (see Bootsma,
1997). where y is the air traffic at airport i or j; defined as the
This paper tries to reduce an apparent gap in the total number of supplied seats per week; n is the number
literature. The limited number of existing empirical of airports in the airline network.
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G. Burghouwt et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 309–323 311
1
0.9 Small radial Large radial
If it is assumed that the total incoming air traffic at command equal shares of the total traffic will result in
each airport to be approximately equal to the total an NC of 0. This includes a multitude of possible
outgoing air traffic at the same airport, no airport will configurations, from fully connected networks at one
command more than half the total air traffic. Therefore, extreme, to collections of isolated routes at the other
the Gini-index cannot reach its theoretical maximum extreme.
value of 1. The maximum Gini score increases with the An increase in NC indicates a more unequal spread of
number of airports in an airline network (n) and can be traffic over the network. This may be caused by
computed as follows:
* A more unequal distribution of seat capacity over the
2 routes in a single or multiple hub-radial network.
Gmax ¼1 ð2Þ
n This is generally the consequence of route-specific
differences in the growth of passenger demand.
This maximum Gini-index can be observed in a single * The removal of routes between smaller airports in the
hub-network where traffic flows are concentrated on one network. The airline concentrates its network on one
hub-spoke route. Theoretically, this makes sense since a or a few primary airports. This can be the consequence
single hub system is most efficient from the airline of hub-and-spoke strategy in order to maximise
viewpoint (Dennis, 2001; O’Kelly, 1998) and the connecting opportunities. It can also be the conse-
concentration of traffic on one route allows for further quence of the outsourcing of ‘hub-bypass’ routes to
advantages of scale. subsidiaries of the airline or regional alliance partners.
In this study we will correct for the size of the airline * The transformation of an airline network from a
network (number of airports) when measuring NC. We single hub to a multiple hub network.
define the level of NC as
G
NC ¼ ð3Þ In order to characterise the (changing) spatial net-
Gmax
work configuration of a carrier, we distinguish between
where G is the observed Gini-index in a network and two dimensions of the airline network. On the one hand
Gmax the maximum Gini-index given the number of the scope of the network using n; the number of airports.
airports in the network. In contrast to the use of the On the other hand we use the level of network
standard Gini-index, our NC-index makes it possible to concentration (NC), independent from n; expressed as
compare the spatial structure of airline networks NC (3). The level of NC labels a carrier as a radial or
independent from network size. linear carrier, with regard to the spatial organisation of
NC varies between 0 and 1. A NC of 1 corresponds to its network. Combining n and NC, four ideal network
a single hub-network where traffic flows are concen- configurations can be distinguished (Fig. 1): (1) the
trated on one hub-spoke route. Visual inspection of small radial network, (2) the large radial network, (3)
network configurations indicates that NC values of dual the small linear network and (4) the large linear
or triple hub networks generally range between 0.7 and network.
0.8. This makes sense, since integrated dual or triple To structure the discussion, four ideal dynamics in
hub-networks require concentration of traffic on the network configurations are distinguished:
routes between the hubs. A single hub-network with
traffic divided equally over all hub-spoke routes * Concentrated network builders: airlines with both an
has an NC of 0.5. Any network where all airports increase in network size and NC-index.
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312 G. Burghouwt et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 309–323
Number of carriers
shrinking network.
* Deconcentrated network builders: Airlines with a
growing network but a decline in NC. 20
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.4 0.6
0.3
0.2
0.1 0.4
0.0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Source: OAG/ABC data 0.2
0.0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Extra-EU airlines have the lowest NC scores. This is number of intra-EU airports
largely caused by the nature of air services of these Source: OAG/ABC data
carriers within Europe: when they operate intra-EU
Fig. 4. Number of airports and NC levels for different airline types in
services, their network is linear, based on fifth freedom
1999.
rights (Weber and Dinwoodie, 2000).
1990 1999
0.9
SAS
KLM
Aerlingus
Sabena
Austrian
Lufthansa
Alitalia
Icelandair
Luxair
Iberia
Finnair
Olympic Airways
Swissair
Fig. 5. NC indices for national airlines, 1990 and 1999. Source: OAG/ABC data
1990 1999
120
Number of airports served
100
80
60
40
20
0
Olympic Airways
Iberia
British Airways
SAS
Austrian
Aerlingus
Icelandair
Sabena
Lufthansa
Luxair
Swissair
Alitalia
Finnair
Fig. 6. Number of EU airports served, national airlines, 1990 and 1999. Source: OAG/ABC data
a pan-European level. The Swiss airline Crossair for Regional carrier network configurations have been
example served more intra-EU destinations in 1999 than less stable than those of the national carriers between
most of the flag carriers (Figs. 4 and 8). 1990 and 1999, both with respect to the network size as
In 1999, most of the regional carriers had less to the level of concentration (Table 2). While changes of
concentrated networks than the nationals. But also with NC of national carriers did not exceed 0.1 points
respect to NC, a large variation in seat capacity between 1990 and 1999, NC levels of a number of
distributions can be observed (Figs. 4 and 9): the regional carriers have changed dramatically (Fig. 10).
regional network configurations range from typical Table 4 and Fig. 10 show the different network
linear networks (Wideroe’s, Suckling Airways), radial strategies of a number of regional carriers.
networks combined with a large amount of point-to- Most of the regional airlines concentrated their
point routes (Skyways, Regional Airlines) to concen- network in some extent around one or two central hub
trated radial networks (Crossair, Air Liberte! , airports. This can be an independent, mini-hub expan-
Braathens). Yet, the radial network dominated the sion strategy in the case of the French carrier Regional
scene in 1999. Only Wideroe’s, Suckling Airways and Airlines at Clermont-Ferrand (Appendix B). However,
Oltostfriesische Lufttransport had considerable linear the carrier had a relatively low NC score because of the
networks in 1999. large amount of point-to-point routes it still operated in
0.08
Table 2
Change in network concentration, 1990-1999
1990 1999
Network concentration for intra-EU traffic
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
AP
D
ES
S
TE
E
AL
S
N
G
F.
AI
AY
SK
N
LA
R
R
IN
A.
LI
SS
BE
M
O
EL
ID
IR
S.
KL
TT
R
LI
O
M
ES
A
S
AI
R
LI
R
R
H
EN
AL
C
EU
YV
AI
IS
AN
N
TH
AI
IT
FL
IO
LE
BR
AA
EG
S
O
E'
BR
R
R
O
TY
ER
ID
W
Fig. 8. NC indices for selected regional carriers, 1990 and 1999. Source: OAG/ABC data
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316 G. Burghouwt et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 309–323
1990 1999
70
Number of airports
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
AP
D
ES
S
TE
E
AL
S
N
G
F.
AI
AY
SK
N
LA
R
R
IN
A.
LI
SS
BE
M
O
EL
ID
R
S.
KL
TT
R
AI
LI
O
M
ES
S
AI
R
LI
R
R
H
EN
AL
C
EU
YV
AI
IS
AN
N
TH
AI
IT
FL
IO
LE
BR
AA
EG
S
O
E'
BR
R
R
O
TY
ER
ID
W
Fig. 9. Number of airports for selected regional carriers, 1990 and 1999. Source: OAG/ABC data
Table 3
Network strategies of regional airlines
Concentration Deconcentration
Network growth Concentrated network builders: British Midland, Deconcentrated network builders: Suckling Airways,
Braathens S.A.F.E., Deutsche BA, Aurigny Air Services, Maersk Air, Sata Air Acores, Tyrolean Airways
Hahn Air, Air Libert!e, Augsburg Airways, Jersey
European Airways, Skyways, Air Botnia, Crossair,
Eurowings, Olt Ostfriesische Lufttransport, KLM UK,
Regional Airlines, Wideroe’s, Aero Lloyd, Monarch
Airlines, Muk Air
Network decline Concentrated network rationalizers: Air Littoral, Manx Deconcentrated network rationalizers: Air Sicilia
Airlines
0.4
YQ
0.3
change in NC, 1990-1999
UK IJ VM
0.2 JY KF EW
DI
JZ
FU IQ BU
0.1 ZB BD LX
WF YP
JE ZR OL
BM
-0.0 VO
SP DM
IG
-0.1
-0.2 CB
-0.3
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
1999. It can also be the consequence of alliances between From Fig. 10 it can be concluded that the only carrier
national and regional carriers, in which the regional with a significant, regional, linear strategy is Suckling
carriers play a hub-feeding role (Graham, 1997). For Airways. In 1990 the carrier operated a Cambridge–
example, Eurowings and Air UK centered their network Manchester and Cambridge–Amsterdam route. In 1999
on KLM’s hub Amsterdam Schiphol between 1990 and the airline had services to 11 destinations but did not
1999. operate out of a central airport in the UK.
Even the Norwegian carrier Wideroe’s-probably the
best example of (PSO subsidized) linear carrier in
Europe-focused part of its network around Oslo during 8. Low-cost carriers
the period of analysis (Appendix B).
Regional linear strategies among regional carriers are The entrance of low-cost carriers to the European
rare in Europe. It underlines the conclusion of various aviation market was one of the most profound effects of
authors that spatial concentration of traffic at a limited deregulation. In the US, a number of low-cost carriers,
number of airports has cost advantages, even without such as Southwest, operate linear networks with low
the transfer of passengers from one flight to another. levels of NC.
These cost advantages include the spread of fixed costs In Europe, the low-cost carrier networks seem to be as
over more passengers as well as easy crew rotation and concentrated as the networks of national carriers (Table
aircraft maintenance. 4, Figs. 3, 11 and 13). All the low-cost carriers operated
out of central airports. Ryanair, for example, used
Dublin and Stansted as its central airports in 1999. The
Table 4 only exception is Virgin Express (former Eurobelgian).
Number of airlines, average network concentration level per airline, Besides its Brussels-network, Virgin Express also oper-
average Gini scores, average number of airports per airline and ated services between Madrid–Barcelona–Rome and
average share (%) in total intra-EU seat capacity per airline, low-cost
Shannon–Stansted in 1999.
airlines, 1990–1999
The difference in the network configurations between
Number of Network Gini No. Capacity low-cost and national carriers can mainly be found in
airlines concentration index Airports % network size (Fig. 12). This is because low-cost carriers
1990 2 0.654 0.280 8.0 0.2 have been operating air services only for a short period.
1991 2 0.742 0.389 6.5 0.2 Therefore, it makes little sense to categorise the carriers
1992 3 0.763 0.566 8.5 0.3 according to their network strategies.
1993 3 0.657 0.498 9.3 0.2
1994 5 0.660 0.524 15.2 0.3
However, the described networks of the low-cost
1995 6 0.611 0.484 13.7 0.6 carriers are about to change. The low-cost carriers
1996 8 0.667 0.518 13.5 0.6 experienced fast growth after 1999. Low-cost carriers
1997 9 0.630 0.543 19.9 1.0 did not suffer as much from the crisis in the air transport
1998 9 0.647 0.561 21.3 1.1 industry after September 11th because of the low fare
1999 9 0.617 0.551 24.1 1.3
levels and the fact that low-cost carriers transport
Source: OAG/ABC; own calculations. relatively few passengers from the American continent
1
Network concentration level
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6 base year
0.5
1999
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
VIRGIN EXPRESS
RYANAIR
DEBONAIR AIRWAYS
AIR EUROPA
TRANSAVIA
FLUGDIENST
SPANAIR
FLUGGESSELSCHAF
EASYJET
AIRLINES
CONDOR
HAPAG LLOYD
Source: OAG/ABC data. Base year for low-cost carriers: Debonair: 1996; Virgin: 1995;
Condor: 1993; Ryanair: 1990; Hapag Lloyd: 1997; Transavia: 1991; Spanair: 1994;
easyJet: 1996; Air Europa: 1994
Fig. 11. NC indices for low-cost carriers, base year and 1999.
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318 G. Burghouwt et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 309–323
50
SPANAIR
VIRGIN EXPRESS
FLUGGESSELSCHAF
TRANSAVIA
DEBONAIR AIRWAYS
RYANAIR
AIR EUROPA
FLUGDIENST
EASYJET
AIRLINES
CONDOR
HAPAG LLOYD
Source: OAG/ABC data. Base year for low-cost carriers: Debonair: 1996; Virgin: 1995;
Condor: 1993; Ryanair: 1990; Hapag Lloyd: 1997; Transavia: 1991; Spanair: 1994;
easyJet: 1996; Air Europa: 1994
Fig. 12. Number of intra-EU airports served by low-cost carriers in base year and 1999.
0.9
Network concentration level
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year
2G BQ/TV DE FR HF HV JK U2 UX
Source: OAG/ABC data
Fig. 13. Change NC for low-cost carriers 1990–1999 (see Appendix A for airline codes).
compared to the national airlines. New low-cost west in the US with a NC value of 0.47 in 1999.
subsidiaries have entered the market (Buzz, Go). British However, further expansion of Ryanair at the European
low-cost carriers have expanded their services on the continent and the increase in the number of home bases
European continent (Ryanair, easyJet). may eventually result in a lower NC value for the
Ryanair, for example, opened new base airports at network.
Frankfurt Hahn and Brussels Charleroi. In March 2003,
Ryanair served about 65 destinations in contrast to 33 in
1999. Based on the flight schedule available on the 9. Extra-EU airline networks
website of Ryanair, we have computed the NC-index for
Ryanair in 2003. Ryanair had an NC value of 0.7 in For a long time, the use of 5th freedom rights by
March 2003 (against 0.68 in 1999). Hence, the network international airlines was the only possibility to create
of Ryanair still centred on multiple central airports world-embracing network. The 5th freedom is ‘the right
(London Stansted, Dublin, Brussels Charleroi, Frank- of an airline of one country to carry traffic between
furt Hahn, Glasgow Prestwick, Stockholm Skavsta and countries outside of its own country of registry as long
Shannon). Ryanair does not have a criss-cross or linear as the flights originates or terminates in its own country
network such as the network of low-cost carrier South- of registry’ (Button and Taylor, 2000). This traffic right
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G. Burghouwt et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 309–323 319
was defined at the Chicago Conference of 1944 and viable as non-stop routes. Some airlines, such as Delta
could be agreed upon in air service agreements between (the airline acquired the extensive 5th freedom network
states. It enables international airlines to operate routes of Pan Am), TWA and United Airlines set up mini-hub
that would not be economically viable as non-stop operations within Europe based on 5th freedom rights.
destination. These kind of operations resulted in relatively high NC
Overall, the 5th freedom networks of extra-EU values in 1990 compared to 1999.
airlines have a linear character with very low NC values Weber and Dinwoodie (2000) identify a number of
compared to the national and regional airline networks. factors that limited the 5th freedom traffic in Europe
However, a significant decline of NC values together during the period of analysis:
with a decline in capacity share/number of airports
served took place during the period of analysis. This * Global airline alliances: Alliances form a substitute or
development is in line with the study of Weber and even a refinement of 5th freedom traffic: European
Dinwoodie (2000) on 5th freedom traffic operations in partner airlines can offer better connectivity to more
the Single European Aviation market. They state that, destinations. In 1991, for example, the US carrier
in the early 1990s, 5th freedom traffic was the only United Airlines, used London Heathrow as its
opportunity for extra-EU airlines to develop a Eur- European hub, connecting its intercontinental
opean network with destinations that would not be services with smaller Boeing 727s to Brussels,
Amsterdam and Paris Charles de Gaulle. Gradually,
the carrier shifted its European gateway to Frankfurt,
Table 5 anticipating to the alliance-agreement with Lufthansa
Number of airlines, average network concentration level per airline, in 1993. Now, the European partners of the Star-
average Gini scores, average number of airports per airline and alliance (e.g. Lufthansa, SAS) provide the intra-EU
average share (%) in total intra-EU seat capacity per airline, extra-EU
services.
airlines, 1990–1999
* Technological developments: Introduction of the Air-
Number of Network Gini No. Capacity bus A340 and Boeing 777 has enabled airlines to
airlines concentration index Airports %
operate economically thin long-haul routes incapable
1990 72 0.362 0.159 4.8 0.08 of supporting Boeing 747–400 s.
1991 66 0.349 0.136 4.5 0.06 * Product life cycle of international routes: A number of
1992 67 0.301 0.123 4.6 0.06 5th freedom routes has reached maturity and have
1993 68 0.337 0.131 4.5 0.06
1994 37 0.403 0.108 3.6 0.05
sufficient demand to justify non-stop service.
1995 30 0.423 0.118 3.9 0.10
* Competition: Competition of European carriers with
1996 41 0.353 0.079 2.9 0.03 higher corporate strength in the markets served
1997 34 0.435 0.078 2.7 0.02 makes it less attractive to operate 5th freedom routes.
1998 31 0.373 0.064 2.5 0.02 The implementation of the ‘Third Package’ in 1992
1999 34 0.302 0.034 2.2 0.02
resulted in a significant decrease of 5th freedom
Source: OAG/ABC; own calculations. operations of extra-EU carriers (Table 5).
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
AC CX DL GA KU PA QF SQ TG TW UA
Source OAG/ABC data
Fig. 14. NC values for selected extra-EU airlines (see Appendix A for carrier codes).
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320 G. Burghouwt et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 309–323
These developments resulted in a decline in market sische Lufttransport operated some kind of linear
share of extra-EU airlines and lower NC values. A network in 1999. Only Suckling Airways intensified its
number of US carriers and Asian carriers gave up most linear network structure.
of their fifth freedom operations (Fig. 14). In contrast to the US, European low-cost carriers
focused their service on a limited number of airports
until 1999. Yet, signs of change are already there: very
10. Conclusion fast growth, inauguration of new routes, entrance of
British low-cost carriers at the continent and use of
Both the spatial concentration of seat capacity on a secondary airports might be the first signs of linear/criss-
limited number of hubs and the temporal concentration cross networks of low-cost carriers.
of flights around a number of synchronized waves of The evolution of the intra-European aviation network
flights per day, are essential features of a hub-and-spoke can be characterised by both a spatial deconcentration
system. This paper has presented an overview of the trend at the airport level and a spatial concentration
changes in the spatial concentration of airline networks trend at the airline network level. Intra-EU traffic is
in Europe during the period 1990–1999. Spatially spreading over more and more airports (Burghouwt and
concentrated networks possess a radial route structure Hakfoort, 2001). Although we cannot draw any firm
whereas deconcentrated networks possess a linear or conclusions about the factors decisive for the network
criss-cross route structure. developments observed based on our data, deregulation
The NC-index, derived from the Gini-index, has been seems to have given regional airlines and airports the
used to measure the spatial distribution of traffic flows opportunity to play an important role in the European
in airline networks. Combined with the number of aviation scene. Economic growth and lower prices
airports served, the NC-index makes it easy to detect generated sufficient demand for new services, not only
changes in the structure of airline networks. We from primary but also from smaller airports. At the
have applied the NC to answer the question to what same time, a number of regional carriers concentrated
extent airlines in Europe operate radial or linear their networks around one or two central airports
networks and how these networks have developed over during the period of analysis. National carrier networks
time. were already focused on key nodes at the beginning of
Taken together, the networks of European airlines are deregulation.
increasingly concentrated. Radial networks have been In the planning process of these central airports,
developed between 1990 and 1999. Yet, large differences airport authorities and governments will have to
exist between the various airline types. cope with periods of very fast traffic growth at
The national carrier networks can be characterised as hub airports. This may result in increasing noise
large radial networks. The ‘flag’ carriers are still pollution in airport regions, peaking problems and
bounded to their national airports because of bilateral new terminal layout requirements. Airports forming
regulation of intercontinental services. This implies the part of the network of hubbing carriers, will be more
operation of radial network structures. Moreover, large and more dependent of network decisions of these
networks are complex networks and have many dimen- airlines and their alliances for their future network
sions to absorb new developments (Swan, 2002). There- position.
fore, changes in the NC level of national carriers have
been quite small. Radical geographical restructuring of
networks of major carriers, as in the US after deregula- Appendix A. Carrier codes
tion, cannot be observed in Europe.
Nevertheless, at a smaller scale, radial strategies can National carriers
be observed among regional carriers. Taking advantage AF AIR FRANCE
of the liberalised market, some regional airlines restruc- AY FINNAIR
tured their networks from linear into radial networks. AZ ALITALIA
Others started from a small traffic base at a central BA BRITISH AIRWAYS
airport and, due to alliances with national carriers, EI AER LINGUS
benefited from traffic feed of large intercontinental FI ICELANDAIR
carriers. Some of the regional carriers, such as Crossair, IB IBERIA
had even larger European networks than most of the KL KLM-ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES
national airlines. LG LUXAIR
Large linear networks were an exceptional pheno- LH LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES
menon in Europe at the end of the nineties. Regional OA OLYMPIC AIRWAYS
airlines such as Suckling Airways, the PSO subsidized OS AUSTRIAN AIRLINES
Norwegian carrier Wideroe’s and the German Oltfrie- SK SAS SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES
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G. Burghouwt et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (2003) 309–323 321