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Panganiban v Borromeo Facts: 1. Alejandro and Juana Mapala subscribe a contract before notary public Elias Borromeo. Respondent cooperated the in execution of the document although he may not fully understand the content of the document. The substance of the document permits the husband and the wife to live in a adulterous relationship without any opposition. Issue and Holding WON the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral practice Court yes, the contract contained provisions which is contrary to law, morals and public order and as a consequence not judicially recognizable. In his instance, if the spouse should retain their present frame of mind, no prosecution of either one by the other could be expected. Nevertheless, it is far from the purpose of the Legislature to bar to legalize adultery and concubinage .WON the lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct. Court- Yes, the court has the right to discipline an attorney who has been guilty of misconduct A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary and public of a disgraceful or immoral act character may be held to account by the court even to the extent of disbarment. Persons relation: The agreement between Alejandro and Juana prior to marriage were contrary to law, morals and public order, as consequence not judicially recognizable Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein Emilio sold to Agustina 6 parcels of land in, Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included Emilios manifestation that the lands were sold at a low price because it was his loving, helpful and thoughtful daughter who bought the property. He says his son possesses such qualities too. He further claims that the sale did not violate any law and that he did not touch his wifes properties. He acknowledged receipt of payment. 2. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling 2 rice mills and a camalig in Naic, Cavite to Agustina for P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged receipt too. 3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Sale executed March 9, 1969 wherein Emilio and Agustina, excluding Moises, extrajudicially partitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing such into 3. Emilio sold his share to Agustina. All documents were executed before a notary public. Nos. 1 and 2 were registered with the Register of Deeds. Old certificates were cancelled and new certificates issued in the name of Agustina. Moises allegations: 1. #1 is null and void because his fathers consent was obtained by fraud, deceit, undue pressure, influence and other illegal machinations. He also alleges that property was sold for a simulated price considering that his sister had no work or livelihood of her own. Also, he claims that the contract is fictitious, simulated and fabricated. 2. Same allegations re #2 and #3 with additional allegation that he was deliberately excluded and they intended to defraud him of his legitimate share. He also claims that defendants were employed in their parents business and they must have used business earnings or simulated consideration in order to purchase the properties. 3. No real sale between dad and daughter living under same roof. 4. Dad didnt need money since sold properties were all income-producitng. 5. #1 and #2 are unliquidated conjugal properties that Emilio cant validly sell. 6. #3: he only questions sale of dads share to sister but not extrajudicial partition. RTC decided in favor of petitioner. Documents were simulated and fictitious because: 1) no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties, 2) prices were grossly inadequate tantamount to lack of consideration at all, 3) improbability of sale considering circumstances. Designed to exclude Moises. RTC further declared #1 and #2 properties as conjugal by virtue of registration papers which declared: Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. Ordered registration of propertiy to two children.

JOCSON v CA (1989) 170 SCRA 333 Emilio Jocson Alejandra Poblete Moises Jocson & Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is married to Ernesto Vasquez. The mother Alejandra died intestate, and so did the father Emilio in 1972. June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing validity of 3 documents executed by Emilio (their father) during his lifetime. He prays that the following be declared null and void and that the properties involved be partitioned between him andhis sister: -

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIOBS DIGESTS


CA reversed. Nos. 1 and 2 barred by prescription because annulment of contract based on fraud must be filed 4 years from discovery of such which begins on the date of the registration with the Register of Deeds. All documents actually and intended to be binding and effective against Emilio. Proof of such: issuance of new titles. Partition with sale in Number 3 is valid since it was done in accordance with New CC Art. 996 on intestate succession and Moises 1/3 share has not been prejudiced. NO. Improbability of sale is purely speculative. Not relevant considering that all essential requirements for contract are clearly present: consent, object and cause.

ISSUES & RULING:

1. WON suit is solely based on fraud and as such is barred by prescription. NO. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as when consents obtained by fraud is voidable (CC, Art. 1330) and action for annulment must be filed within 4 years from time of discovery of fraud (CC Art. 1391 par.4). Discovery means the time when contract was registered with Register of Deeds (Gerona v. De Guzman). If this was the only consideration, then it is barred by prescription. But he further assailed that sale was without consideration since amount paid were merely simulated. Contracts witho cause or consideration produce no effect whatsoever (CC, Art 1352). A sale with simulated price is void (CC, Art 1471 and 1409[3]) and action for declaration of its nullity does not prescribe (CC, Art 1410).

2. WON sales were without consideration. NO. Since Moises alleges such, it is incumbent upon him to prove his allegations, especially since documents show that his dad (vendor) acknowledged receipt of price and they are notarized. He failed to do so and thus he was not able to overcome the presumption that a contract is with consideration (CC Art. 1354). Even his own witness contradicted his claim that his sister and her husband had no source of income. Witness Bagnas said that Agustina and Ernesto were into buy and sell of palay and rice. Even he himself said that he didnt know if his sister had other businesses. Agustina testified that she was into buy and sell even prior to her marriage. 3. WON prices were simulated NO. No proof of inadequacy of price. In fact, purchase price was higher than assessed value (#1: P10k vs. P8920.00, #2 P5k vs. P3,500, and #3 P8k vs. P24,840.00). Besides difference between market value and purchase price is understandable considering fathers filial love for his daughter. Gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect the contract except perhaps an indication of defect in consent (CC Art. 1470). No proof of defective consent. 4. WON sale is improbable.

5. WON properties in #1 and #2 were conjugal properties of Emilio and his wife. NO. CC, Art. 160 provides that all property of marriage is presumed to belong to CP unless proven otherwise. Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for party who invokes this to prove that properties were indeed acquired during the marriage (Cobb-Perez v Lantin). Thus, Moises has to present proof that properties in question were indeed obtained during the marriage of their parents before he can invoke the presumption. However, titles used by RTC in declaring properties as CP (see RTC decision in bold letters) are insufficient proof. Doesnt say when properties were obtained. Acquisition of title (actual owning of land) is different from registration. Possible that Emilio acquired properties when he was still a bachelor and only registered such after marriage. Married to phrase is a mere description of Emilios civil status at the time of registration (Litam v Rivera). It should be interpreted as Emilo is the owner, property registered in his name alone and that he is married. Consistent with the principle that registration of property in name of only one spouse doesnt negate possibility of it being conjugal (Bucoy v Paulino). Both require sufficient, clear and convincing proof to rebut the presumption. Moises should have presented sufficient proof to show that properties were acquired during the marriage so that he may enjoy the presumption under Art. 160. Due to lack of proof, presumption does not exist, thus, properties are considered exclusive to Emilio.

Ansaldo v. Sheriff 64 Phil 115 Facts Upon the express guarantee of the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands, the Philippine Trust Company granted Agcaoili a credit in current account not to exceed 20,000. Angel Ansaldo in turn agreed to indemnify Fidelity and Surety Company for any losses and damages from the obligations of Agacaoili to PTC. Agcaoili defaulted hence FSC brought an action against Ansaldo for the recovery of 19K, and caused the sheriff to levy on the joint savings account of Ansaldo and his wife. Ansaldo said that they levied on a conjugal property, hence not liable to Ansaldos personal obligations. Ansaldo filed action in CFI to declare it null and void. It was granted by CFI. Issues: WON joint savings account is liable for the payment of the personal

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIOBS DIGESTS


obligations of the husband. Held: No. Ratio: It must be proven that the fruits of the paraphernal property benefited the family to prove that it is conjugal. In this case, there was no effort to prove that the obligations contracted benefited the family of Ansaldo. and in the skillful hands of Dr. Manahan who was the ob- gyne of her putative mother. Extrajudicial settlement of Nilo and Vicente after Isabels death saying that they are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel for she has no other ascending or descending heirs Letter of Isabel to Vicente pleading him to give Marissa her share which she would not have need to do had Marissa been their legal heir

Benitez-Badua v. CA 229 SCRA 468 Facts: Vicente Benitez married Isabel Chipongian, acquired many props in Laguna. Isabel predeceased Vicente, former died on 4/25/82 while latter died intestate on 11/13/89. On 9/24/90 Vicentes sis and nephew Victoria (priv resps) Benitez Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar filed @ RTC for issuance of letter of admin for Aguilar, saying that Vicente had no legal heirs since Marissa Benitez Badua was never a related by blood and not legally adopted therefore not a legal heir. On 11/2/90 Marissa opposed saying that shes sole heir and shes capable of managing estate. She presented the ff evids: Cert of live brith Baptismal cert ITR and Info Sheet for Members of Gsis of late Vicente naming her as daughter School records Private resps (Victoria) presented testimonial evids: That spouse failed to beget a child Isabel (then 36) was even referred to an ob-gyne for treatment Victoria Benitez Lirio (then 77 years old and about to die) elder sis of Vicente categorically declared that Marissa is not a biological child TC on 12/17/90 dismissed petition of Victoria. Ruled that Marissa is legitimate daughter and sole heir (relying on FC 166 and 170) CA reversed on 5/29/92 saying that Marissa is NOT biological child and therefore not legal heir. CA said that TC failed to apply FC 166 and 170. Issue: WON Marissa is a biological child of Vicente and Isabel and WON TC misapplied FC 166 and 170 Held: NO. Marissa is not a biological child and yes, TC misapplied said FC provisions. SC said that reliance on FC 164, 166, 170 and 171 are misplaced since said provisions show situation where husband denies own child with wife and not a situation where a child is alleged not to be a natural child of a couple. SC only sustained CA findings on ruling that Marissa is not a biological child Vicente and Isabel based on the ff: Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant, as substatntiated by his brother Dr. Nilo Chipongian, saying that shes been married already for 10 years but at age 36 was not yet pregnant and so she was even brought to the attention of Dr. Manahan who was a well known ob-gyne. Many other people (neighbors) corroborated this point that Iabel never became pregnant. Had she been, it would have been noticed by people around her. Marissas birth certificate is highly dubious because it showed that she was born in the Benitez household in Nagcarlan when she would have been born in the hospital arkhaye04 Republic vs. CA and Bobiles 205 SCRA 356 Facts: Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC of Legaspi City granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari. Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six years old and who had been living with her family since he was four months old. The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order setting the petition for hearing. The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The trial court rendered judgment disposing that the minor child, Jason Condat, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles. Ruling: The rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, SC holds that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life.

St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos 3

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIOBS DIGESTS


G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002 Facts: Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner St. Marys Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Ruling: GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the school. The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos WON Emperatriz can change her civil status from married to single in Victorias birth certificate Held: No. The petition for correction of entries in the civil registry does not only involve the correction of petitioner Labayo's name and surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo in the birth certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her status from "married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing the status of her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter.

Naldoza v. Republic 112 SCRA 658 Facts: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio Divinagracia on 5/30/70. They had 2 children: Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio abandoned conjugal home after Zosima confronted him about his previous marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50k from Rep. Maglana and 10k from a certain Galagar, etc. Classmates of Jr. and Bombi were teasing them because of their swindler father. To obliterate any connection between her children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the kids of the remarks of classmates), Zosima filed @ CFI Bohol on 4/10/78 a petition to change surname of her 2 children from Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden name). TC dismissed pet. saying that aforementioned reasons (swindling, abandoning, previous marriage of Dionesio <but their marriage has not yet been annulled nor declared bigamous> ) were not sufficient grounds to invoke such change of surname. Furthermore, change of name would give false impression of family relations. Issue: WON two childrens prayer to drop their fathers surname is justified Held: NO. Following NCC 364, since Jr. and Bombi are LC (legitimate children), therefore they should use their fathers surname. Said minors and their father should be consulted about such, mothers desire should not only be the sole consideration. Change of name is allowed only upon proper and reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec 5 ROC). Change of name may even redound to the prejudice of the children later on, may cause confusion as to the minors parentage and might also create the impression that said minors are ICs, which is inconsistent with their legal status. In Oshita v. Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change names have been granted, but petitioners in said cases have already attained mature age. In this case, when these minors have attained the right age, then they can already file said action for themselves.

Labayo-Rowe v Republic 168 SCRA 294 Facts: Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe filed a petition for the correction of entries in the civil registry with the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga. She asked the court to order the Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth certificates of her children Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat especially with regard to petitioner's name which appears in both certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-Labayu and as regards her civil status and date of marriage which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat as "married" with the year appearing "1953 Bulan." She claimed that she was never married to Vicente Miclat and that she was now married to an American citizen, William Rowe. Her petition was granted changing her civil status from married to single in the birth certificate of Victoria. arkhaye04

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