Soldiers of Islam: Origins, Ideology and Strategy of the

Taliban

Aabha Dixit, Research Associate, IDSA

Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis
New Delhi

http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug-2.html

Introduction

Labeled variously as soldiers of Islam, a militia in pursuit an obscurantist fundamentalist ideology,

the greatest destabilising threat to the Central Asian Republics, the Taliban's rise to pre-eminence in
Afghanistan necessitates an understanding of their origins, ideology and strategy in the quest for
unrivalled power in the country.

Creation of the Taliban

They emerged from anonymity in 1993 and in the span of four years have radically changed the
complexion of the Afghan civil war by becoming the notable political elite. Essentially, the Taliban
grew out of the turf battle between the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Interior Ministry in
Islamabad during Benazir Bhutto's second term. The Establishment had resisted their creation and
reportedly criticised Benazir Bhutto for the use of the Taliban for their November 1994 operation in
rescuing the trade caravan on its way to Central Asia that had been captured by the local warlord of
Kandahar. The ISI which had run the Afghan operations with complete autonomy since the late
1970s, was averse to the Taliban because they had continued to pin faith on the Hizb-i-Islami under
Hikmatyar to dislodge the Rabbani government. More importantly, the ISI viewed the Taliban as yet
another Benazir Bhutto ploy to reduce its role in Afghan affairs. But Maj. Gen.(Retd) Nasrullah Babar
who had assumed a mandate from the Bhutto government to attempt a parallel track, which offered
the possibility of opening new options in Afghanistan, relentlessly pursued the Talib option, which
initially led to the weakening of the hold of the ISI on the conduct of Islamabad's Afghan policy.
Eventually, the remarkable success of the Taliban forced the ISI to co-opt itself into training and
guiding the Taliban ranks. Despite persistent denials by the Benazir Bhutto government, there is
little doubt that the Taliban have been created, trained and equipped by the ISI and Interior Ministry
special forces. According to some estimates, the Taliban require $70 million on a monthly basis to
keep the militia in functional order and a 'major part of this money is provided from across the
Afghan-Pak border. Recent purchases by the Taliban of tanks, artillery pieces and armoured
personnel carriers ( APC ) have come from illegal tax checkpoints that have been raised along the
trade routes linking Pakistan to the Central Asian Republics. The Taliban have become a more
cohesive force, stocked with adequate weapons, including an Air Force, as a result of the ISI's
vigorous assistance. There have also been reports that Pakistani Army personnel are already
present in Taliban ranks, taking part in operational and tactical missions. Today the Taliban are over
50,000 strong, with 300 tanks, APCs and a squadron of MiG aircraft.1

While there has been no doubt that most of the funding for the Taliban has come from Saudi Arabia,
the Kandahar based organisation has not been able to resist using drug production to fund its
activities. Despite controlling a majority of poppy producing areas and publicly maintaining an anti-
drug profile, recent reports from the UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) indicate poppy was
harvested from 55,000-58,000 hectares during 1996, which is slightly higher than 1995. Despite
political uncertainty, new routes from Afghanistan to Europe and beyond were used.2

The nucleus for the Taliban have been Afghan Talibs (students) who were studying in large numbers
in madrassas throughout Pakistan. Studying in madrassas offered a way out of the dreary living
conditions inside Afghanistan, as most madrassa chieftains supported the Talibs during their stay at
the madrassas in a bid to increase adherents to their particular sect. Between 1989 and 1991, a few
thousand Mujahideen, disillusioned with the post-Soviet withdrawal fighting amongst the various
Mujahideen' groups also joined these madrassas. In creating the Frankenstein monster, the
brilliance of General Babar's accurate analysis of understanding the prevailing sense of despondency
amongst ordinary Afghans will have to be acknowledged. Until the emergence of the phenomenon of
the Taliban, the Pakistani Establishment either overestimated the strength of the various Mujahideen
groups in different regions of Afghanistan or preferred to achieve their objectives by placing implicit
faith of resolving the Afghan conflict in their favour by pushing one group ﾐ the Hizb-i-Islami under
Culbuddin Hikmatyar. General Babar, therefore perceptively recognised the role of the madrassas in
being the fertile ground for indoctrinating the Afghan Talibs to find a new way of establishing a new
order. Closer interaction with numerous madrassas all over Pakistan and specially those belonging to
the Deobandi denomination, because these were funded by the Saudis, saw the first beginnings of a
new puritanical group that would seek to cleanse the country of its corrupt Mujahideen leaders.

At the same time, there was realisation in Islamabad which questioned the ability of major
Mujahideen factions to retain fighters. Surplus weapons or religious ideology were no longer
inducing these fighters to remain loyal to faction leaders. Like all protracted civil war conditions,
once there is a dilution of revolutionary zeal among the foot soldiers, the only manner in which the
leaders could retain their loyalty is through money. This condition had become evident in
Afghanistan from 1993 when reports of the growing role of faction leaders in playing in the volatile
money markets of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and Peshawar became well known. It was also during
Najibullah's post-Soviet rule that frequent desertions by local commanders became common
practice. Najib used it with great success to repulse the Pakistan aided attacks on Jalalabad and
Khost in 1992.

As a result, when the Taliban, supported by Islamabad entered the Afghan arena, there was a clear
strategy of targetting local commanders of regional warlords in a piecemeal fashion. This would
explain in large measure their blitz through southern and central Afghanistan, capturing 14
provinces without encountering resistance. Even in 1997, this policy has been pursued with even
greater success in sensuring that their non-Pashtun opponents like Ahmed Shah Masood, Abdul
Rashids Dostam, Karim Khalili and Syed Naderi have been' weakened not through battles but by
desertion of men, local commanders and equipment. The Taliban's recent entry into Salang was
facilitated after a local commander, Bashir Salangi, switched sides. Similarly, in Uzbek territory, the
Taliban took advantage of the brewing crisis. between General Dostam and Abdul Malik to "buy off"
the latter, along with a string ' of his local commanders. The fall of Mazar-is-Sharif and the fleeing of
a once very powerful Dostam took place only after his entire frontline commanders switched sides
for large sums of money.

Support Base of the Taliban in Pakistan

Initially, the Taliban's principal supporter was Fazlur Rahman, the Jamaat-i-Ulema-Islam (JUI) leader
from Baluchistan. The first batches of Talibs from seminaries run by Maulana Fazlur Rahman were
trained by the Frontier Constabulary Corps and the Sibi Scouts in training camps near the Baluch
border with Afghanistan. Subsequently, reinforcements for the Taliban militia came from other
seminaries located in other parts of Pakistan. The most important seminary is located in New Town
area of Karachi called Jamiat-ul-Uloom-il-Islamiyyah. Run by Maulana Mohammed Yusuf Binnori, the
seminary has 8,000 students from different nationalities. There have been unconfirmed reports that
the Taliban supremo, Mullah Omar, studied at this seminary. But the seminary has assumed a
prominent place within the Taliban hierarchy based in Kandahar, with three seminary members
within the ruling six-member council. Even during the recent call by the Taliban leadership for
sending more men into the frontlines following the reversal at Mazar-is-Sharif, it is believed that the
elusive Mullah Omar had spoken to the "Binnori" Madrassa in New Town.

Mullah Omar clearly acts as primus inter pares within the six-member council in Kandahar. Sketchy
details of Omar have become available. Apart from making his mark in fighting the Soviets, Omar is
reported to have lost one eye, but is well built (over 6 feet 6 inches tall) and is in his early forties.
Well versed in Farsi, Omar is not a cleric. He was associated with Nabi Mohammadi's Harkat group
which was close to the Saudis. He is reportedly influenced by the Deobandi school of thought.

The growth chart of the Taliban has run parallel to the mushrooming of sectarian madrassas in
Pakistan in recent years. The Punjab government had conducted a secret survey in 1997 which
revealed staggering figures. As revealed in a micro-study of one sectarian organisation, the Muridke
(Sheikhupura district) based madrassa belonging to the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) had spread
its tentacles with 28 centres in Punjab alone. This madrassa is of recent origin having begun its
functioning in 1987. Today, it has spread its tentacles into Baluchistan with 3 centres, 3 centres in
interior Sind, 43 centres in Karachi alone, besides having representative bodies in various
universities. At a macro-level, the mushrooming of sectarian bodies has been documented in
another survey conducted in 1996. There were 2,512 functioning deeni madrassas, representing all
schools of sectarian thought in Punjab. This figure sharply contrasts with the creation of 868
madrassas between 1947 and 1975. All these madrassas were reported to have a student
enrolment of over 2 lakh students. A nation-wide survey would reveal the overwhelming influence
that madrassas have come to assume in Pakistani politics as well as in the Taliban's growth chart.

Taliban's Route to Power in Afghanistan

The rise of the Talibs is thought to have begun with the capture of the small town of Doorahi on the
outskirts of Kandahar, although other reports have indicated that Talibs were initially used along
border areas to prevent cross border smuggling of goods. From there the Talibs moved to Spin
Boldak, a town controlled by Mullah Akhtar Jan who owed allegiance to Hikmatyar. After Spin
Boldak, it was a remorseless movement towards the periphery of Kabul, capturing 10 provinces in
the process. The unexpected success meant requiring more Talibs for operations. As a result, in less
than six months after Spin Boldak, their ranks swelled from 2,500 to over 30,000 by the time they
were perched at the gates of Kabul. But significantly, they had to fight no major battle, as bribery
accounted for most turnarounds. They fought two battles in 1995 to gain Farah and Nimroz
provinces.3 But without battle experience, Masood's forces were able to keep them at bay along the
perimeter of Kabul for over a year. Before the capture of Kabul, they suffered a few defeats when
the Rabbani forces pushed them out of Zabul and parts of Hilmand province.4
Their capture of Kabul in September 1996 was a combination of several factors, which significantly
did not include exhibiting their military prowess on the battlefield. Rapid desertions amongst the
Pashtun militia. then aligned with Masood for the defence of Kabul, the failure of Dostam to switch
sides from the Taliban into Masood's camp, thereby relieving pressure on the Afghan capital from
the north-west and the slow but steady progress made by the Taliban to cut Masood's links with
Jalalabad, forced the Tajik militia to make a strategic retreat from Kabul. In the post-Kabul capture
scenario, buoyed by their recent successes, they pushed ahead into Jabal-us-Siraj, Gubahar and
Bagram. But they suffered humiliating defeats near the Salang Tunnel. These reverses forced the
Taliban to undertake the now familiar strategy of encouraging defections amongst local commanders
before making their advances. In February 1997, their move into the Ghorband Valley, which lies
adjacent to the Panjshir Valley, came after local commanders switched sides, along with their
equipment. This weakened Masood and the Shia forces of the Hizb-i-Wahdat, located near the
Shiber Pass. In their push through the Chorband Valley, a month later, they were able to split the
Hizb-i-Wahdat by having two key commnanders desert Khalili, allowing the Taliban an open route
towards Mazar-is-Sharif. These two key commanders had belonged to a faction of the Hizb-i-Wahdat
led by Haji Diljo, with whom the Taliban had nearly clinched an accord in July 1997 in Maidan
Shahr.'5 Azizullah and Gafoor, two commanders from the Ghorband Valley who belonged to Masood
defected during the same period, weakening the Masood-Khalili alliance.

In simultaneous negotiations with Uzbek leaders belonging to the Rasul Pahalwan faction, the
Taliban had been successful in weaning away Abdul Malik Pahalwan and Gul Mohammad, the
younger brothers of Rasul. By exploiting natural differences between Dostam and the Pahalwan
faction for leadership of the Jumbush Milli as well as agreeing to pay Abdul Malik a staggering sum
of $200 million, the Taliban ensured that most of Dostam's field commanders on the frontline
deserted Dostam, forcing the Uzbek warlord to flee Mazar-is-Sharif. Failure to understand the
sensitivities of the Uzbeks and the Shia population, led to the Taliban being counter-attacked by
Abdul Malik and Karim Khalili's forces, exposing the Taliban's poor record in actual fighting.

Ideology of the Taliban

Initially metamorphosed into a militia by using disenchantment amongst the ranks with existing
Mujahideen leaders, the Taliban revealed their Islamic ideology only after the capture of Kandahar.
Between Doorahi and Kandahar, the ISI cultivated the Taliban amongst their principal backers viz"
Saudia Arabia and the US with a "catch all" philosophy. To the US and Pakistan, the Taliban's
attempts to curb poppy growing and heroin refinement was a welcome step as their own attempts
to break the nexus between the smuggler and drug producer were unsuccessful. If the anti-drug
programme undertaken by the Taliban provided tacit backing from Washington, pushing for a
pristine Islamic society found favour with the Saudis, who were not only bankrolling the madrassas
inside Pakistan, but were now reported to be funding the Taliban as well. The only discordant voice
came from the Iranians, who along with other ethnic minority groups like the Tajiks, Hazaras and
Uzbeks perceived the entry of the Taliban as an attempt to reintroduce Pashtun hegemony in
Afghanistan, undermining the plural character of Afghan society.

In areas controlled by the Taliban, efforts to impose a very narrow interpretation of the Shariah
were made. All Western technological advances including TVs, VCR, photography, films were
condemned and individual items destroyed and publicly displayed. Capital punishment was used
frequently and the position of women and children was reduced to pathetic proportions. All these
efforts, dubbed as "obscurantist", came in for strong criticism from the West, forcing countries like
the USA to refrain from recognising the Taliban regime in Kabul. But in the past year, the Taliban
leadership has shown some sensitivity to world opinion by seeking to re-define its interpretation of
women and children. Similarly, they have modified their strong objection to photography and
routinely allow the foreign Press to film Taliban fighters. The top leadership, however, remains
adamant about not being captured on film. Another indication of the Taliban bowing to international
pressure was the recent controversy over blowing up Buddha statutes in Bamiyan. A spate of
criticism finally forced the Taliban leadership to issue a denial. A third indication of the Taliban
leadership becoming less doctrinnaire in their approach is the recent 3-point offer by Mullah Omar
to the northern Opposition alliance which recognises the multi-ethnic character of Afghanistan and
seeks political accommodation. Such a change of tactics has taken place undoubtedly with prodding
from Pakistan, which now places a greater premium on getting a semblance of order and peace in
the country to facilitate closer links with Central Asia. The Taliban are not isolationist in approach,
and have offered closer contacts with the rest of the world. These have largely been conditioned by
the fact that there has been negative publicity about their implementation of Shariah laws.6

But there has been sharp reaction from human rights groups in Europe and the US. Ulrich Fischer of
the Greens Party accused the Taliban of creating a "religious police state' and that Western countries
should be very conservative in their official recognition of the Taliban." The presence of the Saudi
terrorist, Osama bin-Laden, in Afghanistan, proved embarrassing for the Taliban as well. Initially,
the Taliban confirmed that Laden was in Afghanistan, but when pressures for his extradition
increased, the Taliban leadership refused extradition, but announced that Laden would not be
allowed to use Afghan soil to target other countries.

Divisions within the Taliban

In these four years of existence, the Taliban have been successful in maintaining a monolithic
image, with Mullah Omar as the head of the movement. But a closer analysis of the Taliban
leadership structure would reveal that there are factions within the organisation. The first such
divide came to notice during the siege of Kabul in 1996. There were reports that some factions of
the Taliban were not averse to doing local deals with the Rabbani government, while the Kandahar
based leadership shunned all contacts with Kabul. In one such instance, the local commander of the
Taliban forces had agreed to an "unofficial" 10-day ceasefire, which pro-Rabbani leaders within the
Taliban were reported to have resorted to, so as to 'test the sincerity of the Rabbani government."
This ceasefire had been brokered by a Pakistan political leader, Mohammad Khan Sherani, and was
done to secure the release of 85 Talibs.7 Elsewhere, specially around their strongholds in Kandahar,
the Taliban had spurned all offers to cease fires with Rabbani. A Kandahar based Taliban leader,
Mullah Rabbani, had been quoted as saying that "we don't believe in talks with Rabbani as long as
he is in power."8 In another instance, fighting between Rabbani's forces and the Taliban broke out in
Dilaram area of western Afghanistan, when an unofficial ceasefire came into effect in other areas
where they faced each other.9

In another instance, there was an instant rejection of proposals made by the Kabul regime by the
Quetta based Taliban spokesman, which in turn had come within hours of Islamabad officially
rejecting them as 'backward". But the Kandahar based leadership council under Mullah Omar agreed
to meet the Kabul delegation in their first official contact in October 1995. The Kandahar group is
more purist in its approach demanding that Afghans keep beards among other edicts that they have
issued, 'while the other centres of the Taliban, mainly the Pakistan based ones, want a less
doctrinnaire imposition of Islamic values and life styles.

When UN Special Envoy Mehmoud Mestiri had resumed his peace parleys in Afghanistan in March
1996, he had been assured by the political leadership of the Taliban, represented by Maulvi
Mohammad Rabbani, who also commanded the forces encircling Kabul, that the Taliban were ready
for discussions with the Rabbani government. With this perceived shift in the Taliban's strategy,
Mestiri had moved to Kabul to tie up other details. This would explain in large measure the Taliban's
removal of heavy weaponry from areas surrounding Kabul very recently. But no sooner had Maulvi
Rabbani given this assurance to the visiting UN envoy, the religious leadership based in Kandahar
rejected talks with Kabul, scuttling Mestiri's efforts. In an bid to shore up their support bases, the
Taliban leadership called. an Ulema Shoora in Kandahar comprising 1,500 delegates, which in turn
declared Maulvi Omar, the 37-year-old founder of the movement, as the next Amirul Momineen.

During the recent forward move into Nangrahar in September 1996, hardliner elements in the
Taliban leadership like Mullah Mohammad Ghaus and Maulvi Wakeel Ahmed, who have been
favouring a tougher stance against the Kabul government, brushed aside the neutrality claims of the
Shoora-i-Mashreqi and virtually walked into the capital, Jalalabad.

With the passage of time and after the incorporation of local commanders who 'had defected from
other Mujahideen groups, the Taliban leadership has been exposed to more dissensions. Broadly,
two types of divisions exist in the organisation. The first division is between factions of the Taliban
itself, with some factions, notably those led to Mullah Ghous and Maulvi Ehsanuilah, plugging a more
moderate line. Another faction, led by Maulvi Khairullah and Maulvi Rabbani, are believed to be
more orthodox and are presently supported by Mullah Omar. The second split is between the new
entrants and the older leadership. Differences in the comings days would be magnified with newer
warlords being inducted into the Taliban organisational set-up.

Conclusion

Several conclusions can be drawn from this detailed study of the Taliban.

• First, their embryonic connection with Pakistan is well known and widely acknowledged
within Pakistan. Further proof has been provided by Islamabad's recognition of the Taliban
government in Kabul.
• Second, despite the desire of the Taliban to put into place a conservative and orthodox
regime, there have been numerous examples of the Taliban making concessions to improve
their international image.
• Third, in the past four years, the Taliban have shown the capability to build a massive force
in comparison to their opponents, but their performance on the battlefield has been less
than satisfactory. The Taliban have not been able to coalesce into a fighting force capable to
crushing its opposition.
• Fourth, despite their present dependence on Islamabad, the Taliban have given enough
indication that they would seek to operate independently once in control of the country.
• Fifth, for Pakistan, the rise of the Taliban might have helped to break the logjam that had
been created because of the indecisive intra-Mujahideen fighting since the Soviet
withdrawal. But unleashing into the civil war an unknown element has radically altered the
 character of the civil war. But this by itself does not guarantee Islamabad a feeling that it
would achieve its objectives in Afghanistan.

NOTES

1. Hindustan Times, September 26, 1995.

2. The News, March 18, 1997.
3. Frontier Post, May 14, 1995.
4. Muslim, May 14,1995.
5. "Taliban Confirm Accord with Hezb-i-Wahdat", The News, July 16.,1996.
6. The Frontier Post, February 22, 1997.
7. The News, June 21, 1995.
8. Muslim, June 1, 1995.
9. Frontier Post, June 14, 1995.