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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT CHRISTIAN COUNTY, ILLINOIS THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, V. RICKY O.

BECKHAM, ET, AL., Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) NO. 93-CF-109A )

MOTION TO DISMISS NOW COMES RICKY O. BECKHAM, Defendant, pro se, in the above captioned ca use pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/114-1, Defendant states as follows: FATUAL CLAIMS AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL The United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to coun sel for both trial and direct appeal; where the state affords the appeal as a ma tter of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393-400, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed. 8 21(1985) The Strickland test is used to measure the performance of counsel. The test under Strickland is met if counsel does not raise an issue preserved and ev ident in the record and the issue is one any competent attorney should raise. Su ch doctrine would also incorporate failures to file briefs or act as an advocate such as making weak or "neutral" arguments. The failure to raise such issue (or properly raise) must prejudice the defendant in the sense that there is a 'reas onable probability that relief would have been granted on that issue." Grey v. G rerr, 778 F.2d 350, 352 (7th Cir. 1985) Clearly, the instances of ineffective as sistance of trial counsel, together, with the other deprivations alleged in defe ndant's petition should have raised by defendant's appellate counsel in his appe al. A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. PRETRIAL LEVEL I. Attorney Edward T. Graham/Thomas Lacy BIAS GRAND JURY Counselor was retained prior to defendant being indicted, Septem ber 27, 1993. (Vol.I,C.21) defendant was charged initially by information, 09/23 /93, and in the custody of the Christian County Sheriff Department. (Vol,I,C.1) Defendant appeared in open court, 09/23/93, represented by retained counsel, Tho mas Lacy. Defendant was joined with codefendant Pat Buchanan; both defendant's b eing represented by said counsel. During the initial appearance, said counsel st ated, "I would like to know the source of the facts that Mr. Grigsby has about P at Buchanan being a resident at the home owned by Mr. Beckham ... , The very thi ng, judge we are at a point where we don't know who did what part of this." (Vol .IV,C.981) (CoI.III,C.919-927) After counsel Graham was retained, defendant's pr eliminary hearing was continued by agreement, 10/05/93. (Vol.l,C.2) Defendant's preliminary hearing was continued to, 10/14/93; subsequently, the State, moved f or continuance that was granted. (Vol.1,C.2) Defendant was indicted, October 28, 1993. (Vol.1,C.2,17-20) Defendant appeared in open court, September 29, 1993, with counselor Graham, for a bond hearing at which time, counselor stated, "I'd also advise the Court that representatives of the Sheriff's Office and the States's Attorney's Office have

frequently in the news media and around the courthouse here and to other indivi duals who are not involved in this case represented that over a half million dol lars worth of marijuana was seized and in fact that article has been printed in the newspapers here in town, and in the Springfield and Decatur newspapers and a lso with respect to all the, all of the audio visual news media." (Vo1.2,C.48081 ) Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed2d 600 (1966) "proscr ibing extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official; and warning the media of the impropriety of publishing material not introduced at trial. Id. at 361-62. Defense counsel caused irreparable harm allowing the pr osecutor to bypass preliminary hearing by taking the case directly to the grand jury. B, Defense counsel caused irreparable harm allowing the prosecutor to bypass pre liminary hearing by taking the case directly to the grand jury Defendant was scheduled for a preliminary hearing, October 12, 1993, Vol.III,C.9 25) After numerous continuances, defendant was indicted, 10/28/93. (Vol.I,C.I-2) LatFave & Israel Second Edition "Thus, where the prosecutor has authority under state law to bypass a preliminary hearing by taking a case directly to the gran d jury, a defendant may challenge that bypass tactic on equal protection grounds by showing intentional discrimination based on an arbitrary classification , an alogous to the showing required on a discriminatory prosecution claim. Id at 14.2. 663. Counsel's omission violated Defendant's rights to equal protection embodie d in the United States Constitutional 14th, amendment. Upon careful consideratio n of all relevant facts "I would like to know the source of the facts that Mr. G rigsby has about Pat Buchanan being a resident at the home owned by Mr. Beckham. The very thing, judge, we are at a point where we don't know who did what part of this."; (VoI.IV,C.891) (Vol.III,C.919927) "Well, you are asking the Court to reduce the bail $20,000.000 in People vs. Buchanan? That is right, Your Honor, a nd $100,000.000 in People vs. Beckham. Well, I am not, I am agreeing to a reduct ion of bond. I am not asking that it be done. I am just agreeing to a reduction 1 bond. I am certainly not proposing that. I have objection to a bond in the amo unt $100,000.00 in Beckham and $20,000.00 in Buchanan, 'because we don't know wh at the extent of his involvement is at this time. We do know that he had only be en at the residence for a couple of months."; (Emphasis added) (Vol.III,C.937) i n conjunction with "Oh, I am not going to bring anything of Beckham, I am going to bring in Buchanan's, shows his address to be Elgin, Illinois,"; (Vo1.III,C.75 2) together, with, exhibits stating co-defendant did live at RR 2, Box 72, Edinb urg, Illinois. Defendant would have testified that, "Patrick Buchanan agreed to live in the bac k room of the RR 2. Box 72, Edinburg house where the tornado had not done any da mage. Patrick Buchanan said he could make the repairs quicker, and cheaper for $ 3500.00, which was much less than the other contractors estimates. Patrick Bucha nan moved into the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house sometime during the second week of July, 1993."; (Vol.IV, C.1070) Harriet Ehrhardt would have testified that, "A fter the death of my husband, Kenny Ehrhardt, I moved into the house at 201 E. M artin, Edinburg owned my Gertie and Dwight Beckham. I slept in the East bedroom on the second floor, while Rick Beckham, and his daughter, Allison Beckham share d the West bedroom and the second floor at the house at 201 E. Martin, Edinburg. Rick and Allison Beckham had already moved into the West bedroom of the house l ocated on 201 E. Martin, Edinburg when I came to live with Gertie and Dwight Bec kham." (Vol,IV,C.1100) Affiant Terrie Beckham would have testified that, "After Patrick Buchanan moved into the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house, I would see Carol Beckham's blue Chevy Nova parked the driveway in the morning when I went to work on several occasions, and at time during the day. I assumed Carol Beckham was c oming by to pick up some things she left behind after the divorce .... I never s aw Rick Beckham's car at RR 2, Box 72, (sic) Edinburg in the morning when I went to work, or during the day from the time Patrick Buchanan moved into the RR. 2, Box 72, Edinburg property." (VoLIV,C.ll04) L.W. Linton would have testified tha t, "About one month before September 22, 1993, Rick Beckham and I discussed pain ting and plaster work that needed to be completed to the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, house. Mr. Beckham explained to me that he intended to sell the house after the

repairs were completed at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property after he gained custo dy of his daughter, Allison Beckham. Rick Beckham told to me that a contractor, Patrick Buchanan, had moved into the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house to repair the damage caused by the tornadoes, while he and his daughter, Allison Beckham were staying with his parents at 201 E. Martin, Edinburg; On one occasion when I drov e to the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, I saw that there were no cars parked i n the driveway. I knocked on the front door, and with no answer, I opened the do or and walked in. I saw Pat Buchanan in the very back room of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house, weighing on a set of scales a leafy substance that looked like m arijuana." (Vol. IV,C.l107-08) Les Hobbs would have testified that "After the fi rst week of July, I came out to the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property after Patric k Buchanan had moved into the RR, 2, Box 72, Edinburg home. From mid July throug h August of 1993, I periodically drove to the RR. 2, Box 72, Edinburg property t o check on the progress of the repairs, but at no time did I see Rick Beckham at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property. From mid July through August of 1993, I di d not see Rick Beckham, or his daughter, Allison Beckham at the RR 2, Box 72, Ed inburg property, I was aware that Rick Beckham and his daughter, Allison were li ving with his parents at 201 Martin in Edinburg." (Vol.IV,C.1141-42) The premises just reviewed were affidavits contained in defendant's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief; together with issues presented by the State; issues tha t could have been adduced into a preliminary hearing to contradict, refute, and challenge the State's position that defendant lived at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, p roperty. People v. Deatherage, 122 Ill.App.3d 620,461 N.E.2d 631 (Ill.App.3 Dist . 1984) "Where the evidence is entirely circumstantial at it is in the case at b ar, guilt must be established so as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of in nocence. Id. at 634. In the case at bar, counsel Lacy, stated, "I would like to know the source of the facts that Mr. Grigsby has about Pat Buchanan being a res ident at the home owned by Mr. Beckham. The very thing, judge, we are at a point where we don't know who did what part of this." (Vol.III,C.923) Subsequently, t he State, stated, "I have no abjection to a bond in the amount of $100,000.00 in Beckham and $20,000.00 in Buchanan, because we don't know what the extent of hi s involvement is at this time. We do know that he had only been at the residence for a couple of months."; in the presence of counsel Graham, prior to defendant being indicted, (Vol. III,C.937) People v. Lee, 271 Ill.App.3d 1093, 649 N.E.2d 457 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1995) N.5 "Joint representation of defendant and codefen dant in drug prosecution resulted in conflict of interest, in violation of defen dant's right to effective assistance of counsel where defense did nothing to cha llenge state's claim that apartment where drugs were found was defendant's; if c ounsel had challenged the state on this point he might have broken link between defendant and the drugs, but only at the cost of establishing for the state the fact of codefendant's control over the apartment." Id. Defendant was indicted on testimony based solely on perjured testimony, by witne ss, Roy Wilbur. The State, asked, "Does he reside there?;" Roy Wilbur replied, " Yes, sir." (Vol.I,C.66) Officer Roy Wilbur testified that Patrick Buchanan was t he only one at the residence at the time of the search of the residence. That up on asking if Defendant was there, Pat Buchanan advised he wasn't there. (Vol.I,C .67) That Patrick Buchanan stated that he had lived at the residence two to thre e months, and that he knew that the cannabis plants were there, (VolI,C.81) Offi cer Roy Wilbur testified that it had been an ongoing investigation, for approxim ately three years, "I had a confidential informant advise me approximately three years ago that this subject had an indoor grow." At a Motion To Suppress Hearin g, 03/01194, Officer Toy Wilbur, testified, when asked, "Did you tell the grand jury when they met in this case that you had been investigation Rick Beckham for about three years based on an informant's tip?" "I believe 1 did, yes sir." (Vo l.II,C.499) (Vol.I,C.81-82) Officer Roy Wilbur testified at the jury trial that it was not a well planned out, procedure, and that it was a spur of the moment d eal really. (Vol.III,C.672) Officer Roy Wilbur testified before the jury, in res ponse to counsel Metnick: "It is pretty common, isn't it, to have maybe surveill ance of drug transactions?" A: "If you're conduction an undercover operation, wh ich this was not." (Vol.II,C.721) Officer Roy Wilbur testified before the grand

jury that he knew that Defendant resided at the Garden City Road residence, (Vol .I,C.66, and C.81) Officer Roy Wilbur testified at the trial defendant had no to iletries, toothbrushes, shaving cream, or clothes indicating Defendant lived at the residence, (Vol.III,C.674-76,C,695) Officer Wilbur testified it was the culm ination after the investigation that resulted in the search warrant and the goin g into the premises. (Vol.I,C.82) Officer Roy Wilbur testified at the trial it w asn't an undercover investigation. (Vol. II,C.674) United States v. Udziela. 671 F.2d 995 (1982) On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed Basurto's conv iction, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated w hen a defendant has to stand trial on an indictment which the government knows i s based partially on perjured testimony, when the perjured testimony is material , and when jeopardy had attached. Whenever the prosecutor learns of any perjury committed before the grand jury, he is under a duty to immediately inform the co urt and opposing counsel -- and if the perjury be material, also the grand jury -- in order that appropriate action may be taken .... when the government allows a defendant to stand trial on an indictment which it knows to be based in part upon perjured testimony, the consequences to the defendant of perjured testimony given before the grand jury are no less severe that those of perjured testimony given at trial, and in fact may be more severe. Id. 999-1000. In the case at ba r, the perjured testimony was never rebutted during trial, for purposes of impea ching testimony that Defendant lived at R.R. 2, Box 72, Edinburg, Illinois. "The Defendant has no effective means of cross-examining or rebutting perjured testi mony given before the grand jury, as he might in court," Udziela, at 1000. Defen dant was convicted on instructions "Possession may be actual or constructive .. " (Vol.I,C.199) Defendant was also prejudiced by being indicted by a bias grand jury. "Under the fifth amendment all that is required of an indictment is that i t be "returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury." Udziela, at 10 00. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel both at the trial level, an d the appellate level; thus, this Honorable Court should reverse the defendant c onvictions. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL A. CONFLICT OF INTEREST I. ATTORNEY THOMAS LACY Defendant appeared in open court, 09/23/93, represented by retained counsel, Tho mas Lacy. Defendant was joined with co-defendant Pat Buchanan; said counsel repr esents both Defendant's. During the initial appearance, said counsel stated, "I would like to know the source of the facts that Mr. Grigsby has about Pat Buchan an being a resident at the home owned by Mr. Beckham .... The very thing, judge we are at a point where we don't know who did what part of this." (Vol.IV, C.981 ) (VoI.III,C.919-927) Uinted States Ex Rel. Zembowski v. DeRobertis, 598 F.Supp. 914 (1984) N.4 Petitioner was denied his tight to effective assistance of couns el by reason of his counsel's joint representation of petitioner and his codefen dant where counsel, who argued to court that the petitioner was the "major malef actor" who should bear primary responsibility for the crime while arguing for le niency on behalf of his codefendant, worked against petitioner's interest. ." U. S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6. Id. at 915. The statement by counsel was so blatant that the court should have inquired into a possible conflict of interest; likewise, the attorney should have stated a possible conflict of interest. Cuyler v. Sulli van, 446 U.S. 335, 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (1980) "An 'attorney' represen ting two defendant's in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial.'" 435 US, at 485, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 98 S.Ct. 112 7 (1973) 'Unless' 'the trial court' knows or reasonably should know that particu lar conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry. Id. at 347. (Emphas is added) Subsequently, Defendant appeared in open court, 10/05/93, for a bond h earing, at which time, State's Attorney, Greg Grigsby, stated, "I have no abject ion to a bond in the amount of $100,000.00 in Beckham and $20,000.000 in Buchana n, because we don't know what the extent of his involvement is at this time. We do know that he had only been at the residence for a couple of months." People v . Lee, 271 Ill.App.3d 1093,649 N.E.2d 457 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1995) Allowing defen

se counsel to represent conflicting interest or to discharge inconsistent obliga tions places in jeopardy counsel's loyalty to accused and could make counsel eit her unwillingly or unable to zealously represent accused; accordingly, accused n eed not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain reversal of conviction where it is shown that defense counsel, whether appointed or retained, acted under actua l or potential conflict of interest without accused's knowledgeable consent. U.S .C.A. Const.Amend. 6; S.H.A. Const. Art. 1, 8. Id. Counsel Lacy, was at the same time representing defendant in a child custody cas e. On, or about, 09/21/93, counsel Lacy recommended defendant file an Order Of P rotection, to prevent Carol Beckham, Jim Sullivan, and James Eddington, from int erfering with child visitation. Counsel Lacy prepared the Order Of Protection do cument to indicate that Defendant, and Defendant 's daughter resided at RR 2, Bo x 72, Edinburg, II. Defendant explained that he did not want it known that Defen dant lived at 201 E. Martin, Edinburg, IL. (VoLIV,C.1072) During the trial the S tate, stated, "I didn't know that he's filed this petition for order of protecti on." Counselor Metnick replied, "Statements of the defendant is the strongest ty pe of evidence." (Vol.III,C.789) "I also believe that, that if Mr. Beckham testi fied that this could be introduced to rebut his testimony either in State's rebu ttal case in chief or through cross-examination of Mr. Beckham." (VoL. III, C. 7 99) Thus, defendant was denied the right to testify. Rock v. Arkansas, 583 US 44 , 97 L Ed 2d 37, 107 S Ct. 2704 N.3. The necessary ingredients of the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty that no one shall be deprived of liberty without due proce ss of law include the right to be heard and to offer testimony, including the ri ght to testify on one's behalf at a criminal trial. Constitutional Law 831.5, 840; Criminal Law 46.3. 50 - due process - -rights of accused. Id. Defendant was advised by Counsel Lacy in the presence of his mother that, he must take full responsib ility for the contents found on the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property. (VoLIV,C.98 1,982,1073) On, September 20, 1993, Defendant initiated an investigation through the DCFS, by calling the 1-800 number, which in essence, instigated the crimina l charges in the instant cause. (VoLIV,C.1071) II. Attorney Edward T. Graham Counsel Edward T. Graham was retained as counsel by Defendant and immediately pr eceded to represent Defendant in a motion to suppress the evidence discovered as the result of an illegally obtained search warrant. (Vol.I,C.21) Defendant was scheduled for a preliminary hearing, 10/12/93. (Vol.I, C.I) Counselor Graham was retained, 09/27/93. Counselor Graham agreed to continuances; thus, Defendant su ffered irreparable harm, by being indicted by a bias grand jury, 10/28/93. (Vol, I,C.2,17) Graham was hired to represent Defendant because counsel assured Defend ant that the charges would be dismissed by successfully suppressing the obviousl y illegally obtained evidence. Thus, Defendant did not ask about or pursue the s cheduled preliminary hearing because Defendant believed, due to conversations wi th counsel, that his case was about to come to an end and there would be no need for a preliminary hearing. Defendant met with Mr. Graham on several occasions. They discussed the search warrant as well as the items found and seized from the RR 2, Box 82, Edinburg, Illinois property. They also discussed the illegally ob tained information and the false information, which led to the issuance of the s earch warrant as well as a list of witnesses that would corroborate defendant's position that he (Defendant) was not growing or manufacturing or distributing an y illegal substances. One of the witnesses that would have corroborated Petition er's claim that he was not involved in any illegal activity was Mr. Kirk Siegris t. Mr. Siegrist owns a building and remodeling company. Defendant requested that Mr. Siegrist come out to the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, Illinois property (the pro perty that was searched) as soon as possible and give defendant an estimate to r epair the damage done by the tornadoes which destroyed and/or damaged buildings on June 8, 1993. Mr. Siegrist came out to the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, Illinois p roperty on June 25, 1993 and proceeded to do a thorough inspection of the entire property including the surrounding grounds. Mr. Siegrist examined the structure for frame damage s well as water damage caused by the rains. Mr. Siegrist put a tarp over the large the large hole in the roof when he was inspecting the attic for latent damage. Mr. Siegrist could have testified that on June 25, 1993, whe

n he inspected the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, Illinois property, he did not see any cannabis growing or drying. (Vol.IV,C.983-84) Contrary to counselor Graham's correspondence, 02/16/96, "Please be advised that this office represents Kirk Siegrist, personally, and Kirk Siegrist Builders. P lease further be advised that his office formally represented Rick Beckham with respect to the matter referred to in your recent letter to Mr. Periard, dated Fe bruary 6, 1996 .... Prior to the trial of Rick Beckham in May, 1994 regarding {K irk Siegrist's} knowledge of the condition of the premises on June 25, 1993." In fact, I contacted Kirk Siegrist on a number of difference occasions to discuss those facts with him." Ante. (Vol.IV,C.1028-29) Zurita v. United States, 410 F.2 d 477 (7th Cir. 1969) N.3 Right to effective assistance of counsel would be null ified if a criminal defendant's attorney were permitted to labor, albeit conscie ntiously, under a conflict of interest which was unknown to defendant. Defendant provided the trial court numerous affidavits, e.g., Allison 'Beckham's affidavi t, "I did not talk to any other attorney concerning the foregoing information be fore trial." (Vol.VI,C.1088) D.R Linton's affidavit, "I was willing to testify t o the foregoing information at the time of trial, but no attorney ever consulted with me concerning my testimony." (Vol.IV,C.1112-1113) Leroy Laymon's affidavit , "I was never contacted by any attorney concerning the foregoing information." (Vol.IV,C.1119-1121) Statement of Kirk Siegrist, (Vol.VI,C.1123) Affidavit of Mo rris Coleman Jr., "Affiant states he was never contacted by any attorney in rega rds to his testimony, although I was willing to testify if called upon." (Vol.VI ,C.1125-1126) Building Estimate of State Farm Insurance Adjuster concerning dama ges caused by the tornadoes to the house, outbuildings, and property, (Vol.IV,C. 1128-1136) Affidavit of Gary Brashear, "At no time did any attorney contact John Harimia, or me to be a witness at the trial of Rick Beckham." (VoLIV,C.l138-113 9) Affidavit of Virginia Collins, "At no time did any state agency, D.C.F.S., Ch ristian County Police, or any attorney consult me concerning the foregoing infor mation." (Vol.VI,C.1l44) Estimate of Pat Buchanan, (VoLIV,C.1146) Counsel Graham was retained for the sole purpose of suppressing the illegal search warrant, th erefore would not have any reason to interview any witnesses in preparation for trial, since he had guaranteed Defendant that he would suppress the illegal sear ch. Defendant's mother, Gertie Beckham was advised by counsel Graham, to provide bai l for co-defendant Pat Buchanan, and to pay for repairs for his car. (VoLIV,C.10 92-98) Defendant was instructed by counsel Graham, to give said counsel the mone y to allow counsel to provide the money to counsel Lacy, to provide bail money f or co-defendant. (Vol.IV,C.99091,1073) In the interim, counsel Lacy moved the co urt to withdraw his representation of Mr. Buchanan due to his indigent status, a nd his inability to finance his defense. Upon receipt of the $2,000.00 bond from petitioner's family, via Mr. Graham, Mr. Lacy withdraw his motion to withdraw a nd proceeded to post bond with the court. (Vo1.IV,C.991) Extortion The obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. 18 U.S.C.A. 871 et seq, 1951. Shortly thereafter, the charges against co-defendant Pat Buchanan were dismisse d for no apparent reason. (Vo1.IV,C.981-82,988 and 1093) III. ATTORNEY MICHAEL M ETMICK Defendant retained counsel 3/11/94, (Vol.l,C.5) unbeknownst to Defendant counsel or was suffering from a conflict of interest; counselor failed to inform Defenda nt of past involvement with two individuals who were involved with this case. Co unsel knew that Defendant and Carol (Eddington) Beckham, were in a strained chil d custody battle over their daughter Allison, Counsel knew that it was false inf ormation obtained via that custody case that led to the search warrant and ultim ately to the arrest of the Petitioner on the charges for which Petitioner was be ing tried. Counsel had represented 'James' Sullivan in a prior criminal case. Ja mes Sullivan was at the time Carol (Eddington) Beckham's boyfriend. Also, in a c ase prior to this, Mr. Metnick's life had been threatened by 'James' Eddington, Carol Beckham's father. Mr. Eddington has a prior conviction for conspiracy to c ommit murder as well as many other criminal offenses. (Vo1.I,C.154) during trial , Michael Metnick, asked Roy Wilbur, "As a matter of fact, an entire big box of

personal papers was taken from the location, it was not?" Roy Wilbur replied "Ye s. sir." Counselor Metnick stated: "There were many - - And you didn't tell the jury about many records of Patrick Buchanan that was recovered from this box, we re there not?" (Vol.III,C.681-82) Counsel filed Motion To Require The State To D isclose Promises To An Accomplice Witness, Unindicted Co-Defendant Or Others For Forbearance From Prosecution Indulgence, Reduction Of Sentence, Mitigation Or I mmunity; (Vo1.I,C.167) however, counsel failed to pursue these issues which woul d have shown that co-defendant was the one who committed the alleged offense; up on concluding cross-examination of officer Eck, Counselor stated, "I wound merel y like to ask this witness about the papers of Mr. Buchanan, that were recovered from the residence that are in the courtroom and that was part of the gigantic box of stuff that I saw this morning." The Court stated, "I think that you, you can ask this witness about those matters that you want to ask him about, but not in cross." (Vol.I1,C.754,765) Counsel recalls Officer Eck, and asks, "And were there a number of documents and papers and such that were identified as being 'J ames' Buchanan's?" (Emphasis added) (Vol.lll,C.840) Counselor states upon redire ct examination, "Or Jim Buchanan's? Pat Buchanan's?" (Vol.III,C.852) Zurita v. U nited States, 410 F.2d 477 (1969) "We agree with the above authorities that the right to effective assistance of counsel would be nullified if a criminal defend ant's attorney were permitted to labor, albeit conscientiously, under a conflict of interest which was unknown to the defendant. Such a conflict would occur if the attorney represented ''two masters" with opposing interests which might requ ire less that an undivided fidelity toward either client. Id. at 480. Defendant, during a recess was taken into a room located on the third floor of the courtho use. Sitting on a table in the room was a rectangular shaped box, approximately one foot with and two feet long. Inside the box were many photographs of Pat Buc hanan and other individuals standing next to marijuana plants; tables piled high with marijuana and bags of a white, powdery substance, Counsel Metnick took a r eddish colored, leather bound folder belonging to Pat Buchanan out of the box, a nd presented the folder to the court during cross examination of Officer Terry E ck. (VoLIV.C.1075) Brien v. United States, 695 F.2d 10 (1982) NA. To establish a n actual conflict of interest, a defendant ordinarily must prove two elements: f irst, he must demonstrate that some plausible alternative defense strategy or ta ctic might have been pursued, but need not show that defense necessarily have be en successful if it had been used, only that it possessed sufficient substance t o be a viable alternative, and second, he must establish that alternative defens e was inherently in conflict with attorney's other loyalties or interests. Id., at 10. Based on the foregoing, Defendant 's conviction must be set aside. SELECTIVE PROSECUTION The United States Constitutional 14th amendment guarantees: No State sha ll make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of c itizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, li berty, or property, without due process of law; nor to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Defendant was initially charged, 09/23/93, (Vol.I,C.l) after the police on the s cene observed Defendant at the scene, several hours after their arrival, (VoLIII ,C.772) the team arrived, at about 2:45; it was about 6:30, or 6:45, at which ti me Defendant arrived. (Vol.II,C.773) Defendant upon arriving at Defendant 's mot her's residence, after leaving work early to have a root canal procedure at Whit e Oak Dental Center, was informed that the police, and news media had come to th e RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, residence. Defendant 's mother, Gertie Beckham drove Defendant the RR 2, Edinburg, property. (Vol.IV,C.1072,1093) Officer Roy Wilbur testified that upon entering the premises that he observed cannabis laying aroun d. (Vol.I,C.68) Officer Roy Wilbur testified that Patrick Buchanan stated that h e had lived at the residence two to three months, and that he knew that the cann abis plants were there. (Vol.I,C.81) Officer Roy Wilbur testified at the trial Petitioner had no toiletries, toothbru shes, shaving cream, or clothes indication Defendant lived at the residence. (Vo l.III,C.674-76,C.695) During trial Roy Wilbur was asked. "As a matter of fact, a

n entire big box of personal papers was taken from the location, it was not?" Ro y Wilbur replied, "Yes, sir." Counselor Metnick stated: "There were many - - And you didn't tell the jury about many records of Patrick Buchanan that was recove red from this box, were there not" (Vol.III,C.681-82) The State, asked Roy Wilbu r, "Did you search Mr. Buchanan to determine if he had a key to the padlock?" Ro y Wilbur replied, ''No, sir. (Vol,lll,C.648) Counselor Michael Metnick, stated, you didn't ask Pat Buchanan for the key, did you. Roy Wilbur replied, No. Sir." (Vo1.llI,C.683) Officer Wilbur stated that he went to the padlocked door and use d bolt cutter, that he did not search the residence for a key. (Vo1.III,C.684) O fficer Eck testified "The grow room was padlocked," Counselor Metnick asked, "We ll, that very well -- But there -- You never asked Buchanan for the key for that , did you?" Officer Eck replied, "I didn't question Buchanan. Q: Or no one else ever asked him for the key. A: 1 don't know. Q: Or asked him where the key was k ept. A: 1 do not know." (Vo1.III,C.749) Officer Patrick testified that the grow room was padlocked, and "it was under construction if you consider to be finishe d like the normal home." (Vol.III,C.764,768) Defendant was charged initially by information, 09/23/93, and in the custody of the Christian County Sheriff Department. (Vol.I,C.1) Defendant appeared in open court, 09/23/93, represented by retained counsel, Thomas Lacy. Defendant was joi ned with co-defendant Pat Buchanan; both defendant's being represented by said c ounsel. During the initial appearance, said counsel stated, "I would like to kno w the source of the facts that Mr. Grigsby had about Pat Buchanan being a reside nt at the home owned by Mr. Beckham .... The very thing, judge we are at a point where we don't know who did what part of this." (Vol.IV,C.981) (Vol.III,C.91992 7) Petitioner appeared in open court, 10/05/93, for a bond hearing, at which tim e, State's Attorney, Greg Grigsby, stated, "I have no abjection to a bond in the amount of $100,000.00 in Beckham and $20,000.00 in Buchanan, because we don't k now what the extent of his involvement is at this time. We do know that he had o nly been at the residence for a couple of months." (Vol.ill,C.937) United States ex rei. Zembowski v. DeRobertis, 598 F.Supp. 914 (1984) "this kind of palpable conflict of interest permeated the present case. Defendant's own counsel, Julius Sherwin, argued to the court that petitioner was the "major malefactor" who sho uld bear primary responsibility for the crime." Id. at 921. Petitioner's mother, Gertie Beckham, was advised by counsel Graham, to provide bail for co-defendant Pat Buchanan, and to pay for repairs for his car. (Vol.IV ,C. 1 092-98) Petitio ner was instructed by counsel Graham, to give said counsel the money to allow co unsel to provide the money to counsel Lacy, to provide bail money for co-defenda nt. (Vol.IV,C.1073) (Vol.IV.C.990-91) Counsel Lacy moved the court to withdraw h is representation of Mr. Buchanan due to his indigent status, and his inability to finance his defense. Upon receipt of the $2,000.00 bond from petitioner's fam ily, via Mr. Graham, Mr. Lacy withdrew his motion to withdraw and proceeded to p ost bond with the court. (Vol.IV,C.991) Shortly thereafter, the charges against codefendant Pat Buchanan were dismissed for no apparent reason. (Vol.IV,C.991) U nited States v. Jones, 52 F.2d 924 (11th Cir. 1995) N.2. Attorney's conflict of interest which adversely affects his performance only as to an affirmative defen se, the validity of which can be redesided by court without a new trial, does no t require reversal of conviction, unless it is determined, in a proceeding free from any effect of the conflict, that the affirmative defense has merit. Id. at 924. During the jury selection as Judge Coady left the jury room, Judge Coady turned to Defendant and smiled, then the State's Attorney Grigsby approached defendant and told defendant to give him $100,000.00 and he would drop the charges against defendant. Defendant told Mr. Grigsby to go to Hell. Counsel Metnick responded by saying that we came here to try this case. (Vol.IV,C.1075) U.S. v. Jones, N 4 In order to prove claim of selective prosecution, defendant bears heavy burden of showing: that he has been singled out for prosecution although others similar ly situated who have committed the same acts have not been prosecuted; and that government's selective prosecution of him has been constitutionally invidious. I d. at 924. Defendant's convictions should be vacated; based on all that ensued from the inc

eption as a result of being indicted by a Bias Grand Jury, Conflict of Interest, and Selective Prosecution; likewise, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, for the State Appellate Defender not raising the issues previously reviewed. II ATTORNEY MICHAEL METNICK Defendant retained counsel, 3/11/94. Counsel, Edward T. Graham unsuccessfully ar gued, 03/01/94, Motion To Suppress Evidence. (Vol.I,C.4,VoI.II,C.485~54l) Michae l Parkin, employed as a child protective investigator for the Department of Chil dren and Family Services testified, (VoI.II,C.488) on or about September 21st th at he had been called to investigate a report of suspected child abuse or neglec t. Michael Parkin repeatedly stated that he did not contact Roy Wilbur, on the 2 1st; (VoI.II,C.492) however, whenever presented with the report, 09/21/93, Micha el Parkin admitted, "Yes, I wrote this out and gave it to Roy Wilbur." Michael P arkin was asked who called in the report of suspected abuse or neglect that you were investigation? Michael Parkin replied, "That's confidential by state law." The Court remained silent, and the State induced the witness to respond without any objection of counsel. Ergo, Michael Parkin replied, "Rick Beckham" (V oI.II, C.493-494) Subsequently, counselor asked, "Mr. Parkin, you are aware the disclos ure of a report of suspected child abuse or neglect is a crime in the State of I llinois, don't you?" Michael Parkin replied, "Yes, I do." VoI.II,C.495) 325 ILCS 5/11 ... It is a Class A misdemeanor to permit, assist, or encourage the unauth orized release of any information contained in such reports, referrals or record s. Id. (Vol.II,C.496) . Officer Roy Wilbur testified at the suppression hearing, that, at the time he wa s first contacted be the representative of the Department of Children and Family Services, the he had been given a statement with information transmitted to Mik e Parkin. And that, that, statement was attached to the affidavit and complaint for the search warrant. (Vol. II, C.502-03) Roy Wilbur testified that he had bee n investigating Rick Beckham for about three years based on an informant's tip; that the investigation had nothing to do whatsoever with any allegation of the a lleged child abuse or neglect. (Vol. II, C.499-500) Roy Wilber repeated that the investigation of the growing of contraband at the time the officer made that af fidavit and sought the search warrant the he was not investigating any alleged a buse or neglect. (Vol. II, C.505) Counselor Graham argued that the thing happene d here was that Mr. Parking took the information that he had about the growing o f marijuana on the premises, to the sheriffs department which is attached to the affidavit and complaint for search warrant. That statement doesn't make any ref erence at all to any type of suspected or known child abuse or neglect. It only makes reference to that fact that cannabis is alleged to be growing on Mr. Rick Beckham's property. The sheriff's department with that statement prepared an aff idavit to present to the court. The affidavit doesn't make any reference to an o ngoing or commencing and investigation with respect to child abuse or neglect, a nd in fact the testimony here today indicates that there was no investigation at the time of known or suspected child abuse of neglect. (Vol. II, C.514) Counsel or stated, the disclosure by Mr. Parkin to the sheriff's department is unlawful; that the disclosure was in violation of a confidentiality provision in regards to the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act of the State of Illinois. Counsel w ent on to state that the exception for the disclosure of the records in this cas e is only to a law enforcement agency investigating known or suspected child abu se or neglect, that Mr. Parkin had possession of the confidential information, s trictly confidential information, which dealt with something other that child ab use and neglect. They took confidential information that should not have been di sclosed which a state agency had an obligation not to disclose and they disclose d it to obtain a search warrant. (Vol.III,C.515-517) 325 ILCS 5/11. Confidential ity of records -- All records concerning referrals under the Act and all records generated as a result of such reports or referrals, shall be confidential and s hall not be disclosed except as specifically authorized by the Act or other appl icable law. Id. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.CT. 989, 94 L.2d. 40 , 55 U.S.L.W. 4180. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding that defense counsel must be allowed to examine the confidential information. A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does not include the unsupervised authori

ty to search the State's files and make the determination as to the materiality of the information. Both respondent's and the State's interest in ensuring a fai r trial can be protected fully requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial court for in camera review. To allow full disclosure to defense couns el in this type of case would sacrifice unnecessarily the State's compelling int erest in protection its child abuse information. Id. at 59-61. The Ritchie Court went on to hold, that, "If the CYS records were made available to defendant's, even through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child abuse is one of the most difficult cr imes to detect and prosecute, in large par because there often are no witnesses except the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly acute to whom he may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality. Id. Lowrance v. Marion Pepsi-Cola Bottling, 221 Ill.App.3d 623, 581 N.E.2d 725 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1991) The Legisla ture mandate as expressed in the Act is clear and unambiguous. Information obtai ned in accordance with the Act cannot be used in any court in any collateral lit igation. Just as a court cannot create an exception under the Act for situations involving malice or fraud see People v. Ellis (1984), 128 Ill.App.3d 180, 183, 470 N.E.2d 524, 526. (1984) we will recognize no exception for unfairness. If th e question of disclosure should be based on a weighing of equities, that is some thing which the legislature must address. Id at 727-28) The court stated, "Matte rs here seen to be important, perhaps matters that will be considered by the App ellate Court, and we need a complete record," (Vol.II,C.495) "But, as I said bef ore, there seems to be, seems to be a significant chance this case will be taken to higher courts." (Vol.Il,C.537) ''Here's what 'I' believe. First of all, as M r. Grigsby points out, it would 'appear' that the statute does not specifically state that a remedy for its violation is suppression of evidence in the fashion that's being requested here .... The next one is, that the confidentiality in 11 .1 says that a person shall have access to the records described in section 11 o nly in furtherance of purposes directly connected with the administration of thi s act. ... As ' I ' understand this, this was a child protective investigator wh o is turning to the police the fact a little 6 year old child is being used by h er father to help in the drug trade. At least in the planting process. And that is child neglect as '' I ' understand the child neglect law." Ante. (Vol.II,C.53 6-538) During the Fall of 1996, Defendant was researching law at the Illinois Supreme C ourt Library when he saw Judge Robert Davison. Judge Davison explained to Defend ant that he had a case prior to Defendant s suppression hearing referring to suppres sion of evidence seized pursuant to a D.C.F.S. caseworker s investigation. Judge Dav ison explained, that, he had ruled the evidence inadmissible due to the confiden tiality of records statute. Since the Court had previously ruled that evidence s eized pursuant to a D.C.F.S. report was confidential and therefore, inadmissible in a court of law, Judge Coady's ruling was prejudicial and denied Defendant hi s 5th and 14th amendment right to due process and equal protection of the law. In Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 65 L.Ed.2d 205, 100 S.Ct. 2247 (1980) "The Court's opinion in Ladner v. United States, 358 US 169, 178, 3 LEd 2d 199, 79 S Ct 209 (1958), stated the rule: "This policy of lenity means that the Cour t will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty th at is places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on not mo re that a guess as the what Congress intended," Id. at 387. Upon careful conside ration of the totality of the Court's ruling "And I see in the Lowrance case, Mr . Graham, you pointed out there to me, that that statute said that any informati on obtained in violation of the act couldn't be used in an court in any pending action or proceeding. There's no similar provision in this statute, so initially let me say that as far as I can tell the remedy for violation of this act 'does n't appear' to include suppression of evidence that was obtained in this fashion ." Ironically, the Lowrance court held, citing, the Ellis, court, "If the questi on of disclosure should be based on a weighing of equities, that is something wh ich the legislature must address. Lowrance v. Marion Pepsi-Cola Bottling, 221 Il l.App.3d 623, 582 N.E.2d 725 (Ill.App.5 Dist. 1991) Id. at 727-28. Thus, counsel

, was ineffective for not requesting a rehearing, and stating, that, Defendant w as entitled to the rule of lenity. Bifulco. Like wise, counsel, Michael Metnick, was ineffective for not including the fourth amendment violation in the argumen t that counsel presented to the court; both aspects of the fourth amendment viol ation could have been presented to the court in toto. On, 05/11/94, counsel Michael Metnick, argued the second aspect of the Petitione r's Fourth Amendment violation. Counsel called Deputy Wilbur, of the Christian C ounty Sheriffs office (Vol.ll,C.558-59) and, he testified on, 09/23/93, that he verified a affidavit and complaint for search warrant that described an area whe re cannabis was growing at a certain residence in Buckhart township in Christian County, Illinois; (Vol.II,C.650-61) The search warrant authorized the premises which are, described as a ranch style house with a gray roof with attached garag e, (Vol.ll,C.561-62) As the search warrant was being executed marijuana, cannabi s plants were seized from outside of the house, in a garden in the rear of the h ouse; the garden was about 30 yards distant from the residence; several weeds we re in the garden; the cannabis found in the area 30 yards from the residence, ki nd of like in the middle. There was a tarp over it; or some kind of like landsca ping screen or something like that. There were plastic bows to support a tarp. ( Vol.ll,C.561-66) Counselor Metnick asked "Were there other-- Was there other veg etables and other materials that were being grown?" Officer Wilbur replied "I kn ow was several weeds, whether there was nay other 1 don't recall that." (Vol.ll, C.564) The tarp was not transparent, from a distance of 30 feet or 30 yards you can't see through it. (Vol.II,C.568) The search warrant; the affidavit and compl aint for search warrant there was reference to there being any cannabis found in a garden or growing in the outside of the premises. (Vol.II,C.568) The Court st ated, "It would 'appear' that this is a residence with an attached garage Is tha t a fair inference to draw from this evidence? Then went on to rule "And" ' I ' believe that a search warrant may say in this situation, that the premises may b e searched. To do so is within the rules and requirements for particularity as t o the place to be described, it is required by Illinois law and the United State s Constitution, and to do so other wise would be a significant, significantly re strictive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constituti on that apparently 'no court' has yet given. Maybe this will be the case that ha ppens. But, let me say it again. When the officers have parties saying the there 's marijuana being grown in this residence, and there is 'the room' that it's be ing grown in , a court may properly issue a search warrant for a search of the, those premises where the structure is, similar to the one the we have in the cas e at bar .... the Motion to Suppress is denied." Counselor inquired "that applie s equally for the marijuana that was found outside in the garden area." The Cour t stated without giving any ruling ''yes, that includes the garden area." (Empha sis added) (Vol.II,C.581-82) During the grand jury proceedings, the State's Attorney, Gregory B. Grigsby, ask ed "When you came to the residence, was the residence protected by an gates or a ny kind of protection?" Witness, Roy Wilbur, responded, "Yes, sir, it has a chai n link fence around it, and he has a remote control like a garage door opener, a nd there is approximately a 20 foot electric gate before you could ever, you cou ld pull off the road, but you could not enter into the residence or the driveway until that electric gate was opened up" (Vol.I,C.67) During trial, Deputy Rober t Patrick, testified, that he participated in the execution of a search warrant on a residence located in rural Edinburg; west of Edinburg; the Garden City Road , the Beckham residence, 09/22/93, that he observed Defendant, in the garden are a at the rear of the house while pulling up purported marijuana plants; approxim ately 44. He stated, I heard someone call my name from behind me, there was some tall weeds behind me, and it was Rick." (Vol.III,C.759-761) The Deputy testifie d, we'd had like a 6 inch rain and water was splashing up into my face an I was pretty wet, He was, like I said, he was in horse weeds or that type of weed, a t all weed that was head high or over. So he was down, they were soaked, of course , of the heavy rain. (Vol.III,C.762) The Deputy testified that prior to entering there was a security gate; (Vol.III,C.771) that he participated in the search o f the house, and then his assignment shifted to the yard; to the garden, which i

s set aside from the house; that he first observed Petitioner in the weeds, whil e in the garden; that he didn't know exactly what time it was because a storm ha d come through; a lot of things had transpired. (Vol.III,C.773) The State in his closing argument to the jury stated, "And he plants 44 marijuana plants in the back yard without Mr. Beckham's knowledge. And he has elaborate closed circuit T .V. and electric gates that close in and out to keep out people, law enforcement people." (Vol.III,C.869) Counselor Metnick was ineffective for not citing any r elevant law to support the theory that the protection of privacy of a person's h ouse, but has extended to open areas immediately adjacent thereto. The differenc e between an immediately adjacent protected area and an unprotected open field h as usually been analyzed as a problem of determining the extent of the "curtilag e." People v. Stork, 203 Ill.App.3d 1028, 561 N.E.2d 419 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1990) The Court held in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed 2d 326, 55 D.S.L.W.4251. Extent-of-curtilage questions should be resolved with p articular reference to the following four factors, at least to the extent that t hey bear upon whether the area claimed to be curtilage is so intimately tied to the home itself that is should be placed under the home's ''umbrella'' of protec tion: (1) the proximity of the area to the home; (2) whether the area is within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature and uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the resident to Protect the area from observatio n by passerby." (480 U.S. at 300, 94 L.Ed.2d at 334, 107 S.Ct. at 1139) Id at 42 1. "First , the record discloses that the garage is located approximately 50 fee t behind defendant's garage and ending approximately 75 feet behind defendant's garage . We believe that this relatively short distance supports an inference th at the area was within defendant's own backyard and not in open fields. Second, while there was no fence enclosing the area, the State itself admitted in its br ief that the area in question was not visible from the public road by virtue of the garage and a brush pile on one side and the woods on the other three sides. Third, an area 50 feet behind a person's garage and home is close enough to be c onsidered one's own backyard which could be used for a number of family activiti es, including recreation or 'gardening'." (Emphasis added) Stork. At 421. Watten burg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (1968) The protection afforded by Fourth Ame ndment insofar as houses are concerned is not restricted to interior of the hous e but extends to open areas immediately adjacent thereto. N.l U.S.C.A. Const. Am end 4. "As a Government witness testified, the stockpile of Christmas trees was on the premises known as Hideaway Lodge, the pile being among some standing tree s. He further testified the distance between the stockpile and the lodge was fro m twenty to thirty-five feet, and that a parking area used by personnel and char acterized the position of the stockpile as "immediately adjacent" to the lodge. Wattenburg, at 857. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PREPARE AND I NVESTIGATE FOR TRIAL Defendant was charged, 10/28/93, by Grand Jury, (Vol.,C.17-20) in violat ion of 720 lLCS 550/8(d), and count II, in violation of 720 ILCS 550/5(e); toget her with co-defendant Pat Buchanan. As evidenced by the Appellate Court's Order vacating the offense of unauthorized production or possession of cannabis sativa plant (720 ILCS 550/8(d) (West 1992) the indictment was multiplicitous; thus, P etitioner was prejudiced in attempting to defend against unauthorized production or possession of cannabis with intent to deliver or manufacture (720 ILCS 550/8 (d) (West 1992) and unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver or ma nufacture (7201LCS 550/5(e) (West 1992) U.S v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1108 N.4 ( 6th Cir. 1988) As the rules of pleading, the defects of duplicity and multiplici ty are not fatal to an indictment but may be cured by reformulation. In determin ing whether there is duplicity or multiplicity the decisive criteria are legisla tive intent and separate proof. When legislative intent is ambiguous, the rule o f lenity prescribes that doubt will be resolved against turning a single transac tion into multiple factual predicates into the same. Id. at 1108. In the case at bar, the multiplicitious indictment was double flawed: a.) Defendant was prejud iced by the jury believing defendant to be a bad person; believing Defendant had committed not one but several crimes. United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104. a t 1108. n. 4 (6th Cir. 1998) During the State's closing argument to the jury, "T

here's different kinds of possession. Actual possession. And the there's constru ctive possession. Well, Ricky Beckham certainly actually possessed all of this d ope and all of these plants and he certainly actually constructed this room and certainly grew this. But beyond that he had what's called constructive possessio n because if you have control over a house, whether that control be joint or exc lusive, if you have control over a house and the evidence is he had control-- (V ol.III,C.871) Defense counsel was ineffective for filing numerous motions that were meritoriou s; subsequently, abandoning the motions, stating that the motions were moot, May 11, 1994. (V 01.II,C.558) Counselor Michael Metnick, filed, Motion For Inspecti on Of Photographs and Videotapes, April 5, 1994; (Vol.II,C.154) this flip-flop w ithin itself is indicative of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel; notwithstanding , counsel realized that, counsel was remiss for not pursuing the motion during t rial; during trial, counsel asked Roy Wilbur, "As a matter of fact, an entire bi g box of personal papers was taken from the location, it was not?" Roy Wilbur re plied "Yes, sir." Counselor Metnick stated: "There were many - - And you didn't tell the jury about many records of Patrick Buchanan that was recovered from thi s box, were there not?" (Vol.III,C.68 1-82) Upon concluding cross-examination of officer Eck, by counselor Michael Metnick, counselor stated, "I wound merely li ke to ask this witness about the various documents and papers of Mr. Buchanan, t hat were recovered from the residence that are in the courtroom and that was par t of the gigantic box of stuff that 1 saw this morning. And that's now in the co urtroom." The Court stated, "I think that you, you can ask this witness about th ose matters that you want to ask him about, but not in cross." (Vol.III,C,754,75 6) It is the defense counsel's duty to prepare and investigate his client's case. P eople v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810,817,819 (1954) United States v. Tu cker, 716 F.2d 576 (1983) Pretrial investigation and preparation are the keys to effective representation of counsel. Courts have repeatedly stressed the import ance of adequate consultation between attorney and client, the interviewing of i mportant witnesses, and adequate investigation of potential defenses. Id at 581. Defendant was taken into a room by defense counsel during a recess at the crimi nal trial and was shown a rectangular shaped box, approximately one foot wide an d two feet long. Inside the box were many photographs of Pat Buchanan and other individuals standing next to marijuana plant; tables piled high with marijuana a nd bags of a white, powdery substance. (Vol.IV,C.1075) On 04/05/94 defense counsel filed Motion for Independent Testing, (Vol.I,C.5) On 05/11194 defense counsel announces all of his pending motions have been mooted. (Vol.I,C.6) Petitioner was prejudiced at the outset from the evidence not being placed to an adversarial test. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 u.s. 365, 91 L.Ed.2d 305, 106 S.Ct. 2574 (1986) N.18 Counsel for a criminal defendant has a duty to b ring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable advers arial testing process; in determining counsel's competency for purposes of a Six th Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a court should keep in m ind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in a particular case. Id. Defendant appeared in court, October 5, 1993, for a Bond Reduction Hearing; (Vol.III,C.92 8) the Court had continued the hearing for a couple of reasons; one of them was that the State wanted additional time, the State made a written Motion to Contin ue and alleged in its motion that it needed that time to subpoena witnesses to t estify about the street value of the cannabis. (Vol.Ill,C.934) The Court stated, "Well, I would to hear something about the street value of the alleged contraba nd. It is my understanding that the street value was in excess of 500,000.00, an d that is what I understood from the prior hearing." ('VolIll,C.935) The State, stated, "Because it goes so much per pound, and that has to be weighed out. It w ould have to be weighed out. If the Court wishes, I could find out for sure from Officer Eck when that calculation is going to be made." (V01.III,C.937) Defenda nt appeared in open Court, July 22, 1994, before the Hon. John P. Coady, (Vo1.II ,C.381) at which time, Defense counsel stated, in response to the Court's inquir y if counsel had received the Presentence Report in a timely fashion; that, coun

sel, had received the Report, this week; (VolII,C.386) Counsel, subsequently, st ated, ''1 was astounded when I received the Probation Report a couple of days ag o to see this Mr. Grigsby has tried to salvage the damage that hs been dome by s tating to the Court he wants the Court to consider this or that." (V01.II,C.38990) 720 ILCS 5/5-3-4. Disclosure of reports. (2) to the state's attorney and the defendant's attorney 'at least 3 days' prior to the imposition of sentence, unl ess such 3 day requirement is waived. Id. (Emphasis added) Roy Wilbur was called as a witness, and testified that the cannabis weighed by t he Police Forensic Scientist, was 'approximately' 22 pounds, and that the street va lue of cannabis was 'approximately' eighteen hundred dollars a pound. (Vol.II,C.398-99) Counselo r Metnick asked Roy Wilbur if any attempt was made to separate the stems, the tw igs, the seeds and these, urn, urn, other non-drug inducing portions of the drug s, is that correct?" at which time he answered "Correct .. " (Vol.II,C.402) The larger ones would, of course, be the ones that had the greater weight, isn't tha t true? Roy Wilbur responded. Yes, sir. Counselor stated, "So if we where to sep arate the, the, the twigs and the stems and the roots and these other items that we have been discussing for the last few minutes, the weight would be, you woul d agree would be less than 22 ponds, wouldn't they? Roy Wilbur responded, "Yes, sir." (Vol. II,C403) Counselor asked, "It would be less that half, isn't that co rrect?" Roy Wilbur, responded, "could be." (VoI.II,C405) Officer Terry Eck, was called as a witness, and testified that the cannabis street value was 'approxima tely' 18 hundred dollars a pound; street value; the factors that go in to making that determination is the quality of the cannabis; basically there is, a kind c alled ditch weed which grows wild. There is a kind that is cultivated that will bring a lot better price; (V0I.II,C408) when asked if it was cultivated or ditch , he responded that it was cultivated. Officer Eck testified that the root syste m wouldn't be used; probably part of the stalk would be cut out; beyond the stal k and the root, all of it would be packaged. VoI.II,C409-1O) Counselor Metnick a sked if Officer Eck had made tests or examination as to the quality of the canna bis; Officer Eck responded "outside of my visual, no." (Vol.II,C410) At the time of sentencing, the only person capable of testifying, for the State, to the fact that the alleged substance purported to be cannabis, was in fact, c annabis; whether, 'ditch weed, or cultivated', John Martin, Forensic Scientist, counselor and the State, agreed to stipulate that if he was called to testify th at he would testify, as the Court stated: "John Martin, forensic scientist of th e Illinois State Police, would testify that people's exhibits 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 8 an d 10. Mr. Grigsby: Are cannabis. And that their weight is over 500 grams." The C ourt advised that there could be certain risks when things are stipulated to; (V oI.III,C.728) Ergo, the State, and counsel agreed to the stipulation, and the ju ry was so informed: "and has found them to be cannabis and that their weight and the combined weight of the exhibits is over 500 grams." (VoI.III,C.730) Ergo, the Court, entered the following sentencing regarding the fine of the stre et value. "Okay. Then there was that issue of stalks, stems, seeds, roots; and i t was conceded in the examination that those things aren't sold on the street. T hen ' I ' raised the question to defense about if ' I ' set it at a lesser amoun t, does that compromise the integrity of the verdict? It was the defense's posit ion it does not. As ' I ' look at the charge and the way it is worded and ' I ' consider what street value means, ' I ' agree, it would not compromise. ' I ' am going to set the street value fine at sixteen pounds times eighteen hundred dol lars, which is twenty-eight thousand dollars." (Vol.II,C.463) U.S. v. Thompson, (CA 3) (1973) 483 F.2d 527 N.3 A defendant is entitled to trial before a judge w ho is not biased against him at any point of trial and most importantly, at sent encing. Id. Thus, the Court arbitrarily, and capriciously set the street value, 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) "Street value" shall be determined by the court on the bas is of testimony of law enforcement personnel and the defendant to the amount sei zed and such testimony as may be required by the court as to the current street value of the cannabis or controlled substance seized. Ibid. The only person capa ble of testifying as to the substance, and weight, stipulation was that "and was

found them to be cannabis and that their weight and the combined weight of the exhibits is over 500 grams." United States v. Tavano, 12 F.2d 301, 305. Due proc ess requires that defendant not be sentenced based on conflicting testimony of d rug quantity. Id. People v. Sedrel, 184 Ill.App. 3d 1078, 540 N.E.2d 792 (1989) The defendant contends the fine assessed was excessive. We agree. The trial cour t imposed a fine based upon the weight of all the substance confiscated from her possession. The police seized a total of approximately 26 ounces of a white sub stance believed to be cocaine; however, they only positively identified two ounc es of cocaine. In order to impose a fine commensurate to the value of the cocain e seized, it is imperative that the substance seized be conclusively established as cocaine. Id. Recently, in People v. Spencer, Slip-op (No. 5-02-0638) (4/06/0 4) The Court stated, "The defendant contends that the trial court erred in setti ng his street value fine at $200 without any evidentiary basis. The State counte rs that the defendant has waived this issue on appeal by failing to object at th e sentencing hearing and that the defendant stipulated to the value. We agree wi th the defendant." On August 29, 2002, the trial court entered an order that sta ted, in relevant part: "Pursuant to the stipulation by the State and the defenda nt of the testimony of the law enforcement officer in regard to 'street value', a statutory fine of $200 pursuant to this section [(730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1 (West 200 ))] is assessed as part of the judgment order in this cause ***" The Appellate C ourt stated, "However, neither a formal stipulation nor any law enforcement test imony regarding the street value of the seized methanphetamine appears in the re cord. It appears, rather, that the court accepted the State's contention at the sentencing hearing that $200 represented the appropriate fine. We therefore vaca te defendant's fine. Ibid. By the fact that the evidence was stipulated to" "ove r 500 grams"; the only accessible street value fine, pursuant to the evidence wa s "over 500 grams"; thus, this would compute to (1) one pound, that is, if in fa ct the substance in question was actually cannabis sativa plant, or perhaps, can nabis hemp. Defense counsel filed Motion To Make Children Available For Interview; (V 01.I,C .6) however, 05/11/94, counsel stated, "Your Honor, the only motion that we inte nd on pursuing is the Motion to Suppress which was filed on April 5, 1994, the o ther motion are mooted" (Vol.II,C.558) Petitioner was advised by L.W. Linton, th at, his son, D.R Linton, was advised that, a conversation, that, he had with Ama nda Eddington, daughter of Carol Beckham, that, she was taken by Carol Beckham, to the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, house, and into a room at the back of the garage. Carol Beckham explained to Amanda, that, Rick Beckham, was growing marijuana in the back room of the garage, at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, house, and into a room at the back of the garage. Carol Beckham explained to Amanda, that, Rick Beckham , was growing marijuana in the back room of the garage, at RR 2, Box 72, Edinbur g, house. (V01.IV,C.ll08,1112). Affidavit of Allison Beckham, states, Affiant, h ad conferred details that, Affiant, had been coerced into giving information to men purporting to be investigators of the D.C.F.S. Affiant stated, "On or about the morning of September 21, 1993, my grandfather, James Eddington, arrived at t he house my mother, Carol Beckham was renting at 416 West Douglas Street, Edinbu rg. My mother, Carol Beckham and James Eddington began screaming at my sister, A manda Eddington, and my brother, Stephen Butler that the D.C.F.S. was coming, an d they must tell the D.C.F.S. about a room in the back of the garage located at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg where my father was growing marijuana. Carol Beckham and James Eddington said they must also tell the D.C.F.S. that my father, Rick Beckh am, sexually abuse them. When Amanda and Stephen refuse, Carol Beckham and James Eddington began slapping them in the face threatening them, if they did not lie to the D.C.F.S., they would be placed in a foster home." "My mother, Carol Beckham and James Eddington then started on me. They began scr eaming at me that the D.C.F.S. was coming, and I must tell the D.C.F.S. that my father, Rick Beckham has a room in the back of the garage located at RR 2, Box 7 2, Edinburg where he grows marijuana. Carol Beckham and James Eddington said I m ust tell the D.C.F.S. that I help my father, Rick Beckham plant marijuana seeds; dry marijuana and sell marijuana. Carol Beckham and James Eddingtom said I must tell the D.C.F.S. that my father, Rick Beckham sexually abused me, James Edding

tom said he would kill my father, Rick Beckham if! did not lie to the D.C.F.S. p eople." "1 was still wiping the tears from my eyes with a tissue when three men drove up in front of the house located at 416 West Douglas St., Edinburg driving a red a nd white pick-up truck. When the three men came into the house on 416 W. Douglas St., Edinburg, my mother, Carol Beckham, introduced them as being from the D.C. F.S. (Emphasis added) Not one of the three men introduced themselves by name. On e of the three sat in the chair next to the couch, while the other two men sat o n the couch. Only one of the three men interviewed Amanda Eddington, Stephen But ler, and 1. The man that interviewed us was much heavier set then the other two men, At this time, the man who interviewed us was growing a beard; was plain clo thed; wore a ball cap on his head and had a fat cigar stuck in his mouth. He was the only man of the three men who spoke to Amanda Eddington, Stephen Butler, an d I while they were present at the 416 West Douglas St., Edinburg house. This he avy set man asked Amanda Eddington, Stephen Butler, and specific questions about a room at the back of the garage located at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg where my fat her, Rick Beckham was growing marijuana. The large, heavy set man growing the be ard never asked any questions concerning child abuse, or being left home alone." "The foregoing information was told to counsel Mike Metnick, my father, Rick Be ckham, and my grandmother, Gertie Beckham before trial. I did not talk to any ot her attorney concerning the foregoing information before trial. I wanted to test ify to the foregoing information at trial, but was not allowed to." (VoI.N,C.108 6-88) Lafave & Israel Right of Compulsory Process. The constitutional right of c ompulsory process is essentially a trial right; when the defendant's guilt or inno cence is at issue, due process requires that the accused be able to present witn esses in his own defense "to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." Ci ting Chambers v. Mississippi, 419 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 I.Ed.2d .297 (1973 ) Ante. Page 514 Second Edition. Affiant Allison Beckham, stated, in the affidavit, that "On or about the morning of September 22, 1993, my mother, Carol Beckham and Jim Sullivan started cuttin g garbage bags using gray duct tape to make a tarp at the house on 3140 S. Dougl as Ave. in Springfield. My mother, Carol Beckham and Jim Sullivan, and I drove t o the tall warehouse where I had seen marijuana growing at Westside Mini Storage , 3142 S. Douglas Ave., in Springfield. I stayed in my mother's blue chevy Nova while my mother, Carol Beckham (sic) and Jim Sullivan went into the tall warehou se at 3142 S.Douglas Ave, Springfield. Jim Sullivan brought several full, large garbage bags and placed them in the trunk of Carol Beckham's blue Chevy Nova One of the garbage bags were open, and I could see marijuana plants inside the garb age bag bent several times to fit into the bags. Carol Beckham and Jim Sullivan then brought plastic container filled with marijuana plants and placed them in t he back seat of Carol Beckham's blue Chevy Nova. The marijuana plants were tall enough to touch the ceiling of Carol Beckham's car. My mother, Carol Beckham and Jim Sullivan them covered the marijuana plants in the back of Carol Beckham's c ar with the tarp make of garbage bags. I sat on Jim Sullivan's lap on the passen ger side of Carol Beckham's blue, Chevy Nova, while my mother, Carol Beckham dro ve to the R.R. 2, Box 72, Edinburg property. My mother, Carol Beckham had to dri ve because Jim Sullivan had lost his drivers license (sic) due to a recent D.D.I " My mother, Carol Beckham, Jim Sullivan and I drove to the R.R. 2, Edinburg prope rty. Patrick Buchanan, Carol Beckham and Jim Sullivan unloaded the garbage bags bull of marijuana along with the marijuana plants in the back seat to Carol Beck ham's blue, Chevy Nova, and took them into the house located at R.R. 2, Box 72 E dinburg. Once inside the house at RR 2, Edinburg, I started looking of some of m y toys to play with. I then looked up, and seeing no one around, I started looki ng for my mother, Carol Beckham I walked through the house and into the garage a t the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house. I noticed that a new wall had been built enc losing the entrance of the garage, and the entrance to the room in the back room of the garage at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, and walked in. There were small plants under light to the lift, and large plants under a very bright light to the righ t. I went into the next room, and saw my mother, Carol Beckham doing something w

ith an overhanging light fixture. Patrick Buchanan and Jim Sullivan were taking the marijuana plants from the plastic container, and placing them on tables. My mother, Carol Beckham told me not to tell my father, Rick Beckham what they were doing, for it was a surprise. Carol Beckham then told me to go back inside the house at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg and play. I had played with my toys for a little while when I heard the door in the back r oom of the house at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg open and close. I walked to the back of the house located at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, and looked out the window that o verlooks the garden in the back yard. I saw my mother, Carol Beckham, Jim Sulliv an, and Pat Buchanan planting some of the marijuana plants under a green canopy in the garden located at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg.(Vol,IV,C.1087-88) Evidence to document the Affiant, Allison Beckham, was absent from school was av ailable to corroborate Affiant, e.g., documentation from the Edinburg Community Unit District No.4; indicating that Affiant, Allison Beckham, was absent from sc hool: 8/24-9/30 5 days 20,21,22,23,24. (V01.IV,C.1091) Likewise, Affiant, Virgin ia Collins, a first grade instructor for Edinburg Elementary School, Allison Bec kham, could have supported the fact, that, Affiant, Allison Beckham, was absent from School the entire week starting September 21, 1993 through September 24, 19 93." Affiant stated, that, Affiant, was willing testify at the time of trial, bu t was never called upon. (V01.IV,C.1044) Counsel's failure to children available denied Petitioner The United States Constitutional 5th Amendme: right to due pr ocess. Defense counsel filed Motion To Require The State to Disclose Promises To Accomp lice Witness, Unidicted Co-Defendant Or Others For Forebearance From Prosecution Indulgence, Reduction Of Sentence, Mitigation Or Immunity, 04/12/94; (Vol.I,C.6 ) how 05/11/94, counselor stated, "Your Honor, the only motion that we intend on pursing is die Motion to Suppress which was filed on .April 5, 1994, the other motions are mooted,(Vol.II,C.558) The record, 05/19/94, reflects that, "State's M in Limine regarding bar of evidence that case against co-D was nolle'd is gran ted." (V01.I,C.7) Obviously, counsel realized, again, that counsel was remiss, d uring closing arguments, counsel stated, "And he may, you may ask yourself this question, the State had the burden of proof who must prove guilt beyond a reason able doubt, ''why didn't they put Patrick. Buchanan on this witness stand so he could be scrutinized'. They have to prove their case. You know there are gray ar eas abounding, ladies and gentlemen." (Emphasis added) (Vol.III,C.882) On, 05/11 /94, the motion was not mooted; moreover, once counsel learned co-defendant's ch arges were nolle'd with all that entailed, counsel should have moved to dismiss, based on Selective Prosecution; the jury was never apprised that codefendant Pa t Buchanan was never prosecuted. Taylor v. U.S., 789 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1986) A claim of selective prosecution is judged by ordinary equal protection standard. Wayte, 105 S.Ct. at 1531; Mitvhell, 778 F.2d at 1277. To obtain an evidentiary h earing on the claim, the defendant must allege intentional discrimination and pr esent facts sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the prosecutor's purpos e. Id at 274. Co-defendant's charges were dismissed for no apparent reason; (V01 .IV,C.991) Defendant's mother was advised by counsel Graham, to provide bail for co-defendant Pat Buchanan, and to pay for repairs for his car. (Vo1.IV,C.1092-9 8) Defendant was instructed by counsel Graham, to give said counsel the money to allow counsel to provide the money to counsel Lacy, to provide bail money for c odefendant. (V01.IV,C.1073) (Vo1.IV,C.990-91) In the interim, counsel Lacy moved the court to withdraw his representation of Mr. Buchanan due to his indigent st atus, and his inability to finance his defense. Upon receipt of the $2,000.00 bo nd from Petitioner's family, via Mr. Graham, Mr. Lacy withdrew his motion to wit hdraw and proceeded to post bond with the court. (V01.IV,C.991) State's Attorney , Greg Grigsby, told Petitioner that for $100,000.00 the State would drop the ca se against Defendant. V0l.IV,C.993,1075) Taylor v. U.S., 798 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1986) "In order to make a prima facie case of selective prosecution, the defenda nt must show both the that he 'had been singled out for prosecution while others had not been prosecuted and that the. government's discriminatory selection was based upon an impermissible ground,''' Id. at 274. Counsel stated, defense would call witnesses; the Court inquired "Is there - - A

re all these people law enforcement officers?" The State's Attorney replied "Yes ." Counselor replied: "All of mine are too, Judge, I'm just - - I forgot we are on the record. No. None of mine are." (Vo1.III,C.603) Counsel had listed as witn esses: Wes Hobbs, L W Linton, Gerdie Beckham, Harriet Airheart; (V01.III.,C.954) u ltimately, counsel called 'no' witnesses for defense. Counsel had filed Motion I n Limine, May 18, 1994; (Vol.I,C.954) ultimately, counsel stated, that it would be critical during the section process if a juror knew of Mr. Linton's convictio n, that if any of the jurors know any of the witnesses, that that be handled sep arately and outside of the presence of the other jurors. The Court stated, "Well , I would do that for L. W. Linton. If they indicate they know some of the other .witnesses there is no reason to." (Vol.III,C.606) Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161 (6th Cir. 1997) Ineffective assistance when, based of belief that defendan t had no defense, counsel failed to interview witnesses, conduct any legal resea rch or obtain or review any records. Id. at 1161, 1170. In the case at bar, the jury 'possibly' convicted on constructive possession. People v. Torres, 209 Ill. App.3d 314, 568 N.E.2d 157 (Ill.App. 1 Dist 1991) "Counsel's strategy, the court reasoned, was deficient because he did not attempt to develop a theory of innoc ence during his cross-examination of several key witnesses, and did not present any witnesses on behalf of the defense, even though he told the jury in his open ing court argument that he would call the defendant. . . . The court noted, howe ver, that the jury had been instructed on both felony murder and accountability. " Id at 161. (Emphasis Added) I the case at bar, the jury 'possibly' convicted o n constructive possession. Counsel was aware of available witnesses that would have assisted in exoneration Defendant. Ricky Beckham, Defendant, could have explained why the fence surroun ding Defendant 's residence was erected; that a tornado destroyed the ability of Defendant, and daughter, Allison Beckham, from continuing to reside at the resi dence known as RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg,.; (V01.IV,C.1076) due to insect bites and other undesirable conditions, Defendant and his daughter moved in with Defendan t's parents, at 201 East Martin, Edinburg, 11.; (V01.IV,C.I069) that upon Defend ant becoming aware of Defendant 's ex-wife, Carol Beckham, dating James Sullivan , having been told by Allison Beckham, that Carol Beckham, and James Sullivan, w ould perform sex acts, e.g., watch pornographic videos, and, climb on top of Mom my and stick his pecker up her butt, being left alone for two to three days at a time, that, Defendant kept meticulous records documenting incidents of sexual a buse and neglect. Defendant retained counselor Thomas Lacy to obtain custody of Allison Beckham; (V01.IV,C.I069) that, in the presence of co-defendant, Pat Buch anan, Petitioner,. called the D.C.F.S., thus, initiating the investigation conce rning child abuse and neglect against Carol Beckham; (VolIV,C.I071) that, co-def endant, Pat Buchanan agreed to live in the back room of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinbu rg, residence; that, Patrick Buchanan, moved into the residence, sometime during the second week of July, 1993; that, Patrick Buchanan agreed to do the repairs for $3500.00; which was much less than the other estimates. After numerous alter cations with Patrick Buchanan for having a serious drinking problem, Defendant c ontacted, L.W. Linton, to complete the remodeling. (VoLIV,C.1070) Defendant would have testified that, approximately ten days prior to September 2 2, 1993, Petitioner learned from L. W. Linton that rumors that Carol Beckham's d aughter, Amanda Eddington told D. R Linton, L.W. Linton' son, that, Defendant wa s growing marijuana at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, and had observed pat Buchanan weighing what looked like marijuana; that, Defendant confronted Pat Bu chanan, and stated, unequivocally, that, if he was doing anything, to get rid of it, and find another place to live; that, on,or about September 20, 1993, Defen dant, and Allison Beckham, was confronted by Defendant 's ex-wife, Jim Sullivan, and James Eddington, Carol's father', at which time the three started screaming death threats, attempting to surround Defendant and his daughter, Allison; Peti tioner called the Christian County Sheriffs Deputy Slovac to come into the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house to take a report; that, on or about September 21, 1993, Defendant visited counsel Lacy, at his office and paid him $1500.00 to initiate the child custody case; informed counsel Lacy of the incident at RR 2, Box 72, E dinburg; informed counsel Lacy about the incidents of child sexual abuse and neg

lect of Petitioner's daughter, Allison Beckham was enduring while in the care of her mother, Carol Beckham; counsel Lacy recommended filing an order of protecti on against Carol Beckham, Jim Sullivan and James Eddington; counsel Lacy filled out an order of protection form and instructed Defendant to give it to State's A ttorney Grigsby; counsel Lacy was informed that Defendant 's daughter, Allison B eckham, and Defendant, were living with Defendant 's parent's located at 201 E. Martin, Edinburg; counsel Lacy was informed that Defendant did not want anyone t o know Defendant 's daughter, Allison Beckham, and Defendant were living with De fendant 's parent's at 201 E. Martin in Edinburg; that, upon delivering the orde r of protection form to State's Attorney Grigsby, Mr. Grigsby refused to do anyt hing about the order of protection against Carol Beckham, Jim Sullivan, or James Eddington; that, not until the criminal trial, that, Defendant learned counsel Lacy had written on the order of protection form, that, Defendant, and Allison B eckham lived at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg residence. State's Attorney Grigsby a ttempted to have the order of protection entered as evidence against Defendant. Defendant would have testified, that, on or about September 22, 1993, Defendant left work early to have a root canal procedure at White Oaks Dental Center; afte r returning home around 6:30 p.rn. at Defendant's parent's house, located on 201 E. Martin, Edinburg, Defendant's mother, drove Defendant to the RR 2, Box 72, E dinburg property; attempting to avoid the news media, Gerite Beckham dropped Def endant off at a com field just North of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property; bec ause it was raining outside, Defendant placed a garbage over Defendant 's head, and upper body before exiting Gerite Beckham's car; that, Defendant walked to th e rear of the yard, in the back of the garden, and saw deputy Bob Patrick walkin g in a clearing in the garden; that, Defendant approached deputy Patrick, and as ked him what was going on, and deputy Patrick was visibly startled; then, deputy Patrick turned attempting to draw his pistol; that, Petitioner stated, ''what a re you going to do Bob, shoot me?"; then, deputy Patrick placed handcuffs on Def endant, and led Defendant to the south side of the house where deputy Patrick in troduced Petitioner to deputy Roy Wilbur; at this time, deputy Wilbur was a heav y man growing a beard, and had a fat cigar stuck in his mouth. (V01.IV,C.1073) Defendant would have testified, that, on September 22, 1993, Defendant 's car wa s illegally confiscated from Defendant's home at 201 E. Martin, Edinburg; that, notebooks documenting incidents of Allison Beckham's abuse and neglect disappear ed from Defendant 's car, along with Defendant 's checkbook; that, Defendant 's checkbook resurfaced at the criminal trial when the State's Attorney successfull y presented the checkbook as evidence Defendant lived at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinb urg property. (V01.IV,C.996-97,I069-70) Defendant would have testified, that, upon conferring with counsel, Lacy, that, counsel informed Defendant 's mother, Gertie Beckham, and Defendant, that, becau se Defendant owned the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, that, Defendant must tak e full responsibility for the activities Pat Buchanan done, and for any illegal contraband found at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property; that, counsel "never in formed Defendant of a conflict of interest that may develop in his dual represen tation of Defendant, and Pat Buchanan; that, Defendant 's father, Dwight Beckham , then hired Ted Graham; that, during a meeting with Defendant 's mother, Gertie Beckham, counsel Graham explained that even though Defendant did not live at th e RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, Defendant must take full responsibility for t he activities of codefendant Patrick Buchanan, and for any illegal contraband fo und at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property; that, during a meeting with counsel Graham, counsel guaranteed Defendant 's mother, Gertie Beckham, and Defendant, t hat, counsel would be successful in suppressing the illegal search warrant. (Vol .IV,C.I073) Defendant would have testified that counsel Graham called and informed Defendant and his mother instructing Gerite Beckham to bail co-defendant Pat Buchanan, th at, counsel Graham instructed Defendant instructed Defendant to give counsel Gra ham two thousand dollars to give counsel Lacy to bail Patrick Buchanan out of ja il, and to provide enough money to pay for repair for Patrick Buchanan's car whi ch was being repaired at Shaners Auto Salvage, Edinburg, II.; that, counsel Grah am provided to logical reason to bail Pat Buchanan out of jail, other then to sa

y Pat Buchanan was doing Defendant harm by staying in jail. (Vol.IV,C.l073) Defendant would have testified that, on or about the first Saturday night after being released on bond, Defendant 's aunt, Harriet Ehrhardt, and Defendant were sitting at the kitchen table at 201 E. Martin, Edinburg, and Defendant 's mother , Gertie Beckham was working at the kitchen sink looking out the window to the d riveway; that Mrs. Beckham called to me and said James Eddington had drove behin d the 24 foot comer that sat near the alley next to Defendant 's car; Defendant jumped up and ran out the kitchen door to where Defendant 's car was parked; tha t, upon seeing Defendant, Mr. Eddington ran back to his car and drove off toward route twenty nine heading South; that, during the second attempt by James Eddin gton to place a brown paper bag in Defendant 's car, Defendant and Defendant's a unt, Harriet Ehrhardt, were sitting at the kitchen table while Defendant's mothe r, Gertie Beckham worked at the kitchen sink looking out the window overlooking the driveway at 201 E. Martin, Edinburg; that, Mrs. Beckham called to Defendant and said James Eddington had driven again behind the 24 foot camper; that, Defen dant ran out of the house toward Defendant's car and saw Mr. Eddington approachi ng Defendant 's car with a brown paper bag; that, Mr. Eddington ran back to his car located behind the 24 foot camper and drove away heading South on route 29 t o the first left road know as roads 205N and 825E; that, Defendant slowed down c oming to the intersection of 2050N and 825E to see clearly, that, the individual who met with Mr. Eddington was Officer Roy Wilbur, and Mr. Eddington was handin g Officer Wilbur a brown paper bag; then, Defendant, drove back to Defendant's p arent's house, and informed Defendantr's mother, Gertie Beckham, and Defendant's aunt, Harriet Ehrhardt what Defendant had seen. (VOL.IV.C.1074) Defendant was denied the right to testify by counsel Metnick repeatedly stating Defendant would have to accept responsibility of co-defendant Pat Buchanan's act ions and for the contraband found at the RR2, Box 72, Edinburg property; (Vol.IV .C-1075) also, by the State's Attorney, Greg Grigsby, stating that if Defendant testified, that, the State would introduce an order of protection document stati ng Defendant lived at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, Illinois; which, said document was a result of a conflict of interest by representation of counsel Lacy. Counselor Metnick stated, "Statements of the defendant is the strongest type of evidence. " ''1 also believe that, that if Mr. Beckham testifies that this could be introd uced to rebut his testimony either in State's rebuttal case in chief or through cross-examination of Mr. Beckham." (Vol.III,C.798-99) Counsel was aware, Allison Beckham, could assist Defendant; however, counsel nev er called Affiant, Allison Beckham. Allison Beckham could have testified that, h er mother, Carol Beckham's live-in boyfriend, Jim Sullivan had been incarcerated with Mr. James Eddington in a prison at Lincoln Illinois; during visitation wit h Affiant's mother, Carol Beckham, Affiant, at times stayed in a house located a t 3140 South Douglas Ave. in Springfield; Affiant's sister, Amanda Eddington; Af fiant's brother, Stephen Butler, also lived there a times with Jim Sullivan, and his daughter, Angel Sullivan; after Carol Beckham began dating Jim Sullivan, th ey would make me watch movies with naked men and women having sex; Carol Beckham and Jim Sullivan would then take off their clothes and have sex on the couch in front of me; at times, Jim Sullivan would use a 'plastic pecker' on my mother, Carol Beckham, shoving it up her butt; that, Carol Beckham would leave me home a lone without food to eat for two to three days. About one month before Ricky Beckham was arrested, Jim Sullivan brought a plant in the house located at 3140 S. Douglas Ave. in Springfield, Mr. Sullivan called the plant marijuana; the marijuana plant was growing in a cube placed in a cube placed in a plastic container, Jim Sullivan placed the marijuana plant on.a cab inet located in the center of the kitchen, Jim Sullivan place a poem about marij uana on the door of a kitchen cabinet, and made me, Amanda Eddington, and Stephe n Butler memorize the poem about marijuana; (Vo1.IV, C.1084-85) the house on 3140 South Douglas Ave., Springfield is situated in front of Westside Mini Storage fa cility located at 3142 South Douglas Ave; one evening while hunting frogs and to ads near a tall warehouse located in the back of Westside Mini Storage, 3142 Sou th Douglas Ave, Springfield, II., Affiant heard familiar voices, and opened a gr ay door, and walked inside; once inside, Affiant saw Carol Beckham, Jim Sullivan

, and Gary Bryan standing in front of long tables; there were very bright light hanging over the marijuana plants that were growing on the tables; Gary Bryan tu rned to Affiant, and said, "Oh, you like to explore, yuh?"; Gary Bryan then lead Affiant to a room that looked like an office; there was a water fountain, desk, and typewriters in the room, Gary Bryan locked the door behind Affiant, so, Aff iant, could not get out of the room; Gary Bryan is the owner of Westside Mini St orage, 3142 S. Douglas Ave, Springfield, n. Affiant was locked in the office roo m located at Westside Mini Storage, 3142 S. Douglas Ave, Springfield with no foo d to eat, and only water to drink: from a fountain; slept on the floor for the t wo days that Affiant was locked up; Jim Sullivan's daughter, Angel Sullivan unlo cked the door, and let Affiant out on the morning of the third day, (V01.IV,C.10 85) Affiant, Allison Beckham, could have testified that, on or about June 10, 1993, after tornadoes damaged the house located at R.R 2, Box 72, Edinburg, Affiant aw oke to find bug bites over most of Affiant's body; that, Defendant, and Affiant gathered personal belongings, and moved in with Affiant's grandparents at 201 EI Martin, Edinburg. (V01.IV,C.1085) Affiant, Allison Beckham, could have testifie d that, Defendant, advised Affiant not to tell Affiant's mother, Carol Beckham t hat they were living with Affiant's grandparents because Defendant feared Carol Beckham would come and get Affiant before Defendant 's visitation time was up. ( Vol.IV,C.1085) Affiant, Allison Beckham, could have testified that, during the time Affiant liv ed at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, until Defendant, and Affiant moved in with Affiant's grandparents house at 201 E. Martin, Edinburg there were not any marijuana plants growing in the garden, yard, or the storage room located at th e back of the garage. (Vol.IV,C.1085) Affiant, Allison Beckham, Could have testified that, on many occasions Affiant h eard, James Eddington, Affiant's grandfather, threaten to kill Defendant, Rick B eckham; on two occasions when Defendant, and Affiant were leaving the Trinity Ch urch of the Nazarene, 1108 N. Daniels Ave, Springfield, James Eddington would ap proach us, and threaten to kill my father, Rick Beckham, Defendant then invited James Eddington to the back of the church to give him the opportunity to kill hi m; on visitation with Affiant's mother, Carol Beckham, James Eddington would tal k on and on about killing Affiant's father, Defendant, Rick Beckham; on or about September 20, 1993, Affiant heard James Eddington, Carol Beckham, and Jim Sulli van threaten to kill my father, Rick Beckham at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg prope rty. (Vol.IV,C.1086) Defendant asserts, that, James Eddington has an extensive criminal background ex tending to the year of 1958. Of which is not limited to, but including; convicti ons for Solicitation & Conspiracy to Commit Murder of under cover F.B.I. agent, Levine Bonly, 75 CF 237; Delivery of a Controlled Substance; Possession of a Con trolled Substance, 75 CF 46. Indictment for Murder of Attorney Fredrick Pefferle (5 counts); Voluntary Manslaughter, (2 counts); Conspiracy (3 counts) Armed Rob bery (2 counts) in 1973. (See attached partial criminal records sheets of James Eddington) Affiant Allison Beckham, could have testified that, on or about the morning of S eptember 21, 1993, Affiant's grandfather, James Eddington, arrived at the house Affiant's mother was renting located at 416 West Douglas Street, Edinburg; that Carol Beckham and James Eddington began screaming at Affiant's sister, Amanda Ed dington, and Affiant's brother Stephen Butler, that the D.C.F.S. was coming, and they must tell the D.C.F.S. about a room in the back of the garage located at R R 2, Box 72, Edinburg, where my father was growing marijuana; that, they must te ll the D.C.F.S. Affiant's father, Rick Beckham sexually abused them; that, when Amanda Eddington and Stephen Butler refused, Carol Beckham and James Eddington b egan slapping them in the face threatening them, if they did not lie to the D.C. F.S., they would be placed in a foster home. (Vol.IV,C.1086) Affiant Allison Beckham, could have testified that, after assaulting Amanda Eddi ngton and Stephen Butler, they began screaming at Affiant, that, the D.C.F:S. wa s coming, and Affiant must tell the D.C.F.S., that Affiant's father, Rick Beckha m, had a room in the back of the garage located at R.R 2, Box 72, Edinburg, wher

e he grows marijuana, and Affiant must tell the D.C.F.S., Affiant helped Rick Be ckham plant marijuana seeds; dry marijuana and sell marijuana; that Affiant must tell the D.C.F.S. that Affiant's father, Rick Beckham, sexually abused Affiant; that Affiant's grandfather, James Eddington said he would kill Affiant's father if Affiant did not lie to the D.C.F.S. (VoLIV,C.1086-87) Affiant could have testified, that, on or about September 21, 1993) after Carol Beckham and James Eddingtom threatened us, three men drove up in front of the ho use Carol Beckham was renting located at 416 West Douglas Street, Edinburg, driv ing a red and white pick-up truck; that the three men were introduced by Carol B eckham as being from the D.C.F .S.; (Emphasis added) that the only man of the th ree men who interviewed Affiant, Amanda Eddington and Stephen Butler was growing a beard; was plain clothed; wore a ball cap on his head; was heavier set than t he other two men, and had a fat cigar stuck in his mouth; that this heavy set ma n asked Affiant, Amanda Eddington, and Stephen Butler specific questions about a room at the back of the garage located at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, where Rick Be ckham grows marijuana; that, the large, heavy set man, growing a beard never ask ed one question concerning child abuse, or being left home alone. (V01.IV,C.l087 ) Affiant, Allison Beckham, could have testified that, Affiant, on or about Septem ber 22, 1993, observed Carol Beckham, and Jim Sullivan cutting garbage bags usin g gray duct tape to make a tarp at the house on 3140 S. Douglas Ave., in Springf ield; Carol Beckham, and Jim Sullivan, together, with Affiant, drove to the tall warehouse where Affiant saw marijuana growing; Affiant, stated in Carol's blue Chevy Nova while Carol Beckham, and Jim Sullivan went into the tall warehouse; t hat, Jim Sullivan brought several full, large garbage bags, and place them in th e trunk of Carol Beckham's blue Chevy Nova; one of the garbage bags were open, a nd Affiant could see marijuana plants inside the garbage bag bent several times to fit into the bags; Carol Beckham, and Jim Sullivan then brought plastic conta iners filled with marijuana plants, and placed them in the back seat of Carol Be ckham's blue Chevy Nova; the marijuana plants were tall enough to touch the ceil ing of Carol Beckham's car; Carol Beckham, and Jim Sullivan then covered the mar ijuana plants in the back seat of Carol Beckham's car with the tarp made of garb age bags; Affiant sat on Jim Sullivan's lap on the passenger side of Carol Beckh am's blue, Chevy Nova, while Carol Beckham drove to the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg p roperty; Carol Beckham drove to the RR. 2, Box 72, Edinburg property; Carol Beck ham had to drive because Jim Sullivan had lost his drivers license due to a rece nt D.D.I.; that, Patrick Buchanan, was there, and assisted Carol Beckham, and Ji m Sullivan unload the garbage bags full of marijuana; along with the marijuana p lants in the back seat of carol Beckham's blue, Chevy Nova; once inside, after l ooking for some toys to play with, seeing no one around, Affiant walked through the house and into the garage at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, and notice d that a new wall had been built enclosing the entrance of the garage, and the e ntrance to the room in the back of the garage from the outside, and opened the d oor to the back room of the garage and saw small plants under lights to the left , and large plants under a very bright light to the right, and saw in another ro om, Carol Beckham doing something with an overhanging light fixture; Patrick Buc hanan, and Jim Sullivan were taking the marijuana plants from the plastic contai ner, and placing them on tables; that, Carol Beckham told Affiant not to tell Af fiant's father, Rick Beckham, what they were doing, for it was a surprise; while at the residence, upon hearing noises, Affiant, walked to the back room of the house, and looked out the window that overlooks the garden in the back yard, and saw Carol Beckham, Jim Sullivan, and Pat Buchanan planting some of the marijuan a plants under a green canopy in the garden located at R.R. 2, Box 72, Edinburg, . (V01.IV,C.1087-88) Affiant, Allison Beckham, could have testified that on or about September 23, 19 93, Gary Bryan barged into the house located at 3142 S. Douglas Ave., Springfiel d screaming, and cursing profanities at Carol Beckham, and Jim Sullivan, and ope ned the outside door, and started throwing furniture out the door, and fired Jim Sullivan, and ordered him to move out of his house; Jim Sullivan, and his daugh ter, Angel Sullivan then moved into the house located at 416 Douglas Street, Edi

nburg, along with Amanda Eddington, Stephen Butler, Carol Beckham, and Affiant, that Carol Beckham had been renting; (VoLIV,C.1088) at no time has Affiant ever ob served Defendant, drink alcohol of any kind, or use any kind of drug; at no time did Defendant ever teach Affiant to plant marijuana seeds; dry marijuana or sel l marijuana; at no time did Defendant ever leave Affiant alone at home, or abuse Affiant. (V01.IV,C.1098-90) Affiant, Allison Beckham's testimony would have procured documentation from the Edinburg Community Unit District No.4 reflecting Allison Beckham was absent from school: 8/24/03 for 5 days 20,21,22,23,24; to corroborate Allison Beckham's tes timony; (VolIV,C.1091) likewise, Affiant Virginia Collins would have corroborate d Allison Beckham's testimony, stating, Affiant, Virginia Collins is a first gra de instructor for Edinburg Elementary; was Allison Beckham's teacher, from Augus t of 1993, until the end of that tenure; that, Allison Beckham, at no time attem pted to possess drugs, or drug paraphernalia, or attempt to sell drugs to any ch ild attending Edinburg school; never appeared to be under the influence of any d rug during the 1993 term; at no time did any state agency, D.C.F.S., Christian C ounty Police, or any attorney consult Affiant; that, Affiant, would have been wi lling to testify. (Vol.IV,C.1144) Counsel had listed, Affiant, Gertie Beckham, as a witness; however, counsel fail ed to call Gertie Beckham. Gertie Beckham, could have testified, that, Affiant r esides at 201 East Martin, Edinburg, Illinois; that, about two days after the to rnadoes damaged the home of Defendant, and his daughter, Allison, moved in with Affiant; Defendant determined the house was not fit to live in with the large ho le in the roof allowing insects to come into the house located at R R 2, Box 72, Edinburg; Defendant would park his car on the East side of the house to keep hi s ex-wife, Carol Beckham from taking Allison Beckham before his visitation time was up; Allison Beckham, complaining of being left home alone, and being made to watch pornographic videos while Carol Beckham, and Jim Sullivan had sex in fron t of her; on or about September 22, 1993, Defendant returned home from work at A ffiant's house located at 201 East Martin St., Edinburg; at that time, Affiant, informed Rick Beckham that his brother, Steve Beckham had called informing Affia nt the police, and news media were present at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, proper ty; Defendant, stated, Carol Beckham, Jim Sullivan, and James Eddington probably came out to the ,RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property seeking revenge from the Septe mber 2, 1993, incident, and killed or hurt Pat Buchanan; Affiant, drove Defendan t, toward the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg; that, Affiant, let Petitioner out at the c ornfield just north of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, property. (V01.IV,C.2092-93) Affiant, Gertie Beckham, could have testified that, Affiant was present at a mee ting with Defendant, and counsel, Tom Lacy, at the county jail at which time, co unsel Lacy informed Defendant, that, because he owned the property at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, he must take full responsibility for the activities of ca-defendan t, Pat Buchanan, and for any illegal contraband found at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinb urg property; counsel never informed Defendant of any conflict of interest that may arise from dual representation; counsel Lacy was relieved, and counsel Ted G raham, was substituted; during a meeting with counsel Graham, counsel informed D efendant, and Affiiant, that even though Petitioner, did not live at the RR 2, B ox 72, Edinburg property, Defendant must take full responsibility for the activi ties of co-defendant pat Buchanan, and for any illegal contraband found at the R R 2, Box 72, Edinburg property; (Vol.IV,C.1093) during a meeting with Defendant, counsel Ted Graham guaranteed that he would be successful in suppressing the il legal search warrant; after counsel Graham's unsuccessful attempt to suppress th e illegal search warrant, counsel Graham was replaced by counsel Mike Metnick. ( V01.IV,C.1095) Affiant, Gertie Beckham, could have testified that, counsel Graham called, and i nformed AffIant, that, Affiant, must bail codefendant, Pat Buchanan out of jail; counsel Graham instructed Affiant, to withdraw $2000.00 from Affiant's bank acc ount in cash plus enough money to pay for the repairs of Pat Buchanan's car whic h was being repaired at Shaners Auto Salvage in Edinburg; the cost of repairs fo r Pat Buchanan's car was more than the extra $300.00 Affiant withdrew from Affia nt's bank account; Affiant had to write another check to cover the cost of Pat B

uchanan's light blue Turismo; the only explanation counsel Graham gave for baili ng Pat Buchanan out of the Christian County Jail was that Mr. Buchanan was doing Affiant's son, Rick Beckham harm by staying in jail. (Vol.IV,C.1093-94,97,98) Affiant, Gertie Beckham, could have testified, that, on or about the first Satur day night after Defendant was released from the county jail, Affiant, was workin g in the kitchen, and observed, Carol Beckham' blue Chevy Nova drive up behind P etitioner's car which was parked in the driveway at 201, E. Martin, Edinburg; Af fiant, saw Stephen Butler get out of Carol Beckham's car holding a brown paper b ag, and attempting to gain access to Petitioner's car; Affiant, then called to D efendant, who was sitting at the kitchen table with Affiant's sister, Harriet Eh rhardt; P Defendant jumped up, ran out the kitchen door onto the deck, and yelle d to Stephen Butler to get away :from his car; Stephen Butler then, ran back to Carol Beckham's blue Chevy Nova, jumped in, and they sped away running the stop sign at the comer of Martin, and Campbell streets in Edinburg. (V01.IV,C.1094) Affiant, Gertie Beckham, could have testified, that, on two occasions when James Eddington attempted to place a brown bag in Defendant 's car, Affiant, observed James Eddington drive a yellow station wagon with brown wood like side panels; that, on the first attempt by James Eddington to place a brown paper bag in Defe ndant r's car, Affiant was cleaning dishes at the kitchen sink: when Affiant loo ked out the kitchen window, and saw James Eddington drive through the alley pull ing up on the opposite side of a 24 foot camper that was parked in the drive at 201 E. Martin, Edinburg; Defendant, and Harriet Ehrhardt were sitting at the kit chen table at Affiant's house on 201 E. Martin, Edinburg; Affiant called to Defe ndant . that, James Eddington had driven on the other side of the camper which w as parked next to Defendant 's car; Affiant saw Defendant approach the 24 foot c amper, and as he got close, James Eddington drove out from the other side of the 24 foot camper heading South toward route twenty nine' during the second attemp t by James Eddington to place a brown paper bag in defendant's car; Affiant was again cleaning sone dishes at the kitchen sink when Affiant looked out the windo w and saw James Eddington again drive through the alley up to the other side of the 24 foot camper; agaon, Affiant called to defendant that James Eddington had drove on the other side of the 24 foot camper; as defendant came close to the ca mper, James Eddington sped away, and again drove South toward route twenty nine; this time, defendant followed James Eddington; later, defendant returned and ex plained to Harriet Ehrhardt and Affiant what defendant had seen; defendant expla ined he followed James Eddington south on route twenty nine to the first left tu rn known as 205N and 824E defendant saw Mr. Eddington drive up to deputy Roy Wil bur's black Bronco and saw James Eddington pass a brown paper bag to deputy Roy Wilbur. (Vol,IV,C1094-95) Affiant, Harriet Ehrhardt, could have testified that, on two occasions when Jame s Eddington attempted to place a brown paper bag in Defendant 's car; on the fir st occasion, Affiant, Harriet Ehrhardt, was sitting across the kitchen table fro m Defendant when Gertie Beckham called out to Defendant that, James Eddington, h ad driven through the alley up to the other side of the 24 foot camper; Defendan t ran out of the house; and approached the 24 foot camper parked next to his car ; during the second attempt by James Eddington to place a brown paper bag in Def endant's car, Affiant was sitting again, across the kitchen table at the house l ocated at 210 E. Martin, Edinburg, when Affiant's sister, Gertie Beckhaam called out to Defendant that, James Eddington had pulled up again on the other side of the 24 foot camper; again, Defendant, ran out of the house, and approached the 24 foot camper; this time, Defendant followed James Eddington; Defendant came ba ck to the house, and informed Affiant, that, Defendant saw James Eddington drive to roads 205N, and 825E, where, Defendant, saw James Eddington then pass a brow n bag over to deputy Roy Wilbur. (Vol.IV,C.1101) Affiant, Terrie Beckham, could have testified, that, Affiant lives at RR 2, Box 80 B, Edinburg, Illinois, at the end of the dead end road on the same road as th e RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property; Affiant is Defendant 's sister-in-law; after co-defendant Patrick Buchanan moved into the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house, Affia nt, would see Carol Beckham's blue Chevy Nova Parked in the driveway in the morn ing, when Affiant, went to work on several occasions, and at times during the da

y; Affiant, assumed Carol Beckham was coming by to pick up some things she left behind after the divorce; on or about the morning of September 22, 1993, Affiant drove past the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, and observed, Carol Beckham's c ar parked in the driveway of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, and was the on ly car present at this time; Carol Beckham, and a man know to Affiant, as, Jim S ullivan were unloading large, full garbage bags from the trunk of Carol Beckham' s blue Chevy Nova, and taking the garbage bags inside the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house; Affiant, never saw Petitioner's car at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, in the mo rning when Affiant went to work, or during the day from the time co-defendant, P atrick Buchanan, moved into the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house. (Vol.IV,C.ll04) Affiant, L.W. Linton, could have testified, that, Affiant lives at RR 2, Box 43, Edinburg, Illinois; that, Affiant, farms, and contracts out for painting, and h ome improvement work; about one month before September 22, 1993, Defendant, and Affiant, discussed painting, and plaster work, that needed to be completed to th e RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house; Defendant, explained that, he intended to sell t he house, after the repairs were completed at R.R 2, Box 72, Edinburg property a fter he gained custody of his daughter, Allison Beckham. (Vol.IV,C.1107) Affiant , could have testified, that, Defendant had stated, that, a contractor, Patrick Buchanan, had moved into the R.R. 2, Box 72, Edinburg house to repair the damage caused by the tornadoes, while Defendant, and his daughter, Allison Beckham wer e staying with his parents at 201 E. Martin, Edinburg; Defendant explained to Af fiant, that, Pat Buchanan was taking too long to finish the repairs, and Mr. Buc hanan was drunk, or drinking on every occasion that, Defendant would check on th e repairs of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property; Defendant, asked Affiant, to s top by, and give Defendant an estimate, as soon as Pat Buchanan moved out; in th e morning after Affiant drove Affiant's children to school, Affiant would drive past the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property to see if Pat Buchanan had moved out; o n several occasions when Affiant drove past the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, Affiant saw a dark blue Chevy Nova, which Affiant knew belonged to Carol Beckha m, parked in the driveway along with a light blue Chrysler Turismo; on one occas ion when Affiant drove to the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, Affiant saw that, there were no cars parked in the driveway; Affiant knocked on the front door, a nd with no answer, Affiant opened the door, and walked in; Affiiant saw, Pat Buc hanan in the very back room of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house. weighing on a s et of scales a leafy substance that, looked like marijuana; Pat Buchanan jumped up in the doorway of the back room, and walked into the front room of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house demanding to know what Affiant was doing in his house; Af fiant introduced himself and explained to Mr. Buchanan, that, Defendant, had sen t Affiant to take an estimate for painting, and plaster repair work; Mr. Buchana n, was very upset, and explained, that, he would be the one to finish the repair s on the house; Affiant, then replied, "OK", and departed. (Vol.lV,C.ll07-1108) Affiant, could have testified, that, about two days later, Affiant's son, D.R Li nton, came home from school, and informed Affiant, of a conversation he had with Amanda Eddington, daughter of Carol Beckham; D.R explained to Affiant, that, Am anda told him her mother, Carol Beckham, had taken her to the RR 2, Box 72, Edin burg house, and into a room at the back of the garage; Carol Beckham explained t o Amanda, that, Defendant was growing marijuana in the back room of the garage a t RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house; after several attempts to call Defendant, at his parent's house on 201 E. Martin, Edinburg, Affiant finally contacted Defendant, and explained the conversation Affiant had with Affiant's son, D.R Linton; at t his time, Affiant explained to Defendant, that, Affiant saw Pat Buchanan, weighi ng on a set of scales a substance, that, looked like marijuana; Defendant told A ffiant he would look into it at once. (Vol.IV,C.1008) Affiant, could have testified, that, on the morning of September 22, 1993, Affia nt drove by the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, and saw, Carol Beckham's dark b lue, Chevy Nova parked in the driveway with the trunk of her car open, and a lar ge garbage bag sitting next to her car; no other car was present at the RR 2, Bo x 72, Edinburg property at this time; during the first time Affiant spoke with D efendant, about giving him and estimate on tornado damage to the RR 2, Box 72, E dinburg house, until after September 22, 1993, Affiant never saw Defendant 's ca

r at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property. (Vol.IV,C.1108) Affiant, D.R Linton, could have testified, that, Affiant is sixteen years old; A ffiant resides at RR 2, Box 43, Edinburg, Illinois; Affiant has know Defendant s ince birth; during the Edinburg School Fall Term, Affiant was in the same class as Amanda Eddington, and became very good friends; about ten days before the arr est of Petitioner, Amanda Eddington, Graham Newlin, and Affiant were sitting on the bleachers by the large baseball diamond behind the Edinburg High School; Ama nda explained to Graham, and Affiant, that, her mother, Carol Beckham, had taken Amanda to the RR. 2, Edinburg house where she had lived with Mr. Beckham before their separation; Amanda Eddington explained to Graham Newlin, and Afiant that, after her and her mother, Carol Beckham arrived at the RR. 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, Amanda's mother, Carol Beckham took her inside a room located at the b ack of the garage; Amanda explained that, one inside the room, her mother, Carol Beckham told Amanda the plants growing in the room were marijuana plants, and D efendant was growing the marijuana; as soon as Affiant got home from school, Aff iant informed his father, L.W. Linton that, rumors of Defendant growing marijuan a was being told at the Edinburg school. (VolIV,C.1112) Affiant, Leroy Laymam, could have testified, that, on or about June 8, 1993, Ric k Beckham called and requested a large tree be removed from the roof of the RR 2 , Box 72, Edinburg house; on or about June 16, 1993, Affiant's son, Kirt Layman, and Affiant arrived at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, and removed a large tree from the roof using a track hoe, and Affiant could see clearly into the at tic due to the large hole created by the fallen tree; and, that, Affiant's son, Kirt Laymon, and Affiant, examined a large tree that fell near the area of the g arden crushing two out buildings; that while Affiant was present at the RR 2, Bo x 72, Edinburg property, Affiant did not see marijuana drying in the attic; grow ing in the garden; or growing anywhere in the yard. (Vol.IV,C.1115-17) Affiant, Kirt Laymon, could have testified, that, Affiant is employed at Laymon' s Excavating; on or about June 8, 1993, Defendant called, and requested Affiant to remove a large tree from the rook of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house that fe ll due to tornado damage; on or about June 16, 1993, Affiant's father, Leroy Lay mon and Affiant arrived at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, and removed a la rge tree from the roof of the house; Affiant's father, Leroy Laymon climbed onto the roof: and attached a chain to the tree; Affiant removed the tree using a tr ack hoe; after Affiant removed the tree from the roof. Affiant walked around to the back of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house, and examined a large tree that fel l near the area of the garden crushing two out buildings; Defendant took Affiant inside the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house where Affiant observed the damage to th e wall, and ceiling caused by the fallen tree; while Affiiant was present at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property, Affiant did not see any marijuana growing in t he house, garden or in the yard. (Vol.IV,C.1119-1121) Affiant, Morris Coleman Jr., could have testified, that, Affiant is employed at Coleman's Tree Service, Pana, Illinois; on or about July 5, 1993, Affiant came t o the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property to give Defendant an estimate for removal of two trees, and yard cleanup; Affiant examined two large trees, on located at the front of the house, and the other tree located near the garden of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property; Affiant states, he did not see any marijuana growing in the area of the garden, or anywhere on the property. (Vol.VI,C.1125-36) Affiant, Gary Brashear, could have testified, that, Affiant is the owner of Bram aco/Kool Vent Builders, and Remodelers, Springfield, Illinois; after being first contacted by Defendant, Affiant sent John Harimia to inspect, and appraise the house damaged by tornadoes, located at RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg, Illinois on or ab out July 12, 1993; John Harimia now lives in California; John Harimia, and Affia nt talked about the estimate of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house, on several occ asions; if Mr. Harimia had seen any marijuana growing in the RR 2, Box 72, Edinb urg house, garden, yard, or marijuana drying in the attic, he would have told Af fiant about it. (VolIV,C.I138-39) Affiant, Wesley Hobbs, could have testified, that, Affiant resides at Rural Roch ester, Illinois; has known Ricky O. Beckham for over sixteen years; after the to rnadoes damaged Petitioner's RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg house and property, Affiant

assisted Defendant in cleaning up around the yard, and inside the house on sever al occasions during the month of June, and the middle of July; that, after the f irst week of July, Affiant came out to the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property after Patrick Buchanan had moved into the R.R. 2, Box 72, Edinburg filling the garage up with furniture; that, Mr. Buchanan was not present at the RR 2, Box 72, Edin burg property at this time; Defendant informed Affiant that Mr. Buchanan had mov ed into the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg to repair the root: walls and ceiling that we re damaged by the tornadoes. (Vol.IV,C.1141) Affiant could have testified, that, at this time, Affiant helped carry boxes, sm all furniture to a storage room located at the back of the garage; Affiant was i n every room in the house including the storage room located at the back of the garage; all over the area of the garden and yard of the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg p roperty, and did not see any marijuana growing at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg pro perty. (Vol.IV ,C.1141) Affiant could have testified, that, from mid July through August of 1993, Affian t periodically drove to the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property to check on the prog ress of the repairs, and on one occasion, Affiant stopped by the Edinburg proper ty introducing himself to Pat Buchanan; that, Mr. Buchanan explained that Rick B eckham was busy with his job, and hadn't come by for a while; that, from mid Jul y through August of 1993, Affiant did not see Defendant, or Defendant 's daughte r, Allison Beckham at the RR 2, Box 72, Edinburg property; that, Affiant was awa re Defendant, and his daughter, Allison Beckham were living with Defendant 's pa rents at 201 E. Martin, Edinburg. (Vol.IV,C.1142) Affiant Virginia Collins could have testified, that, Affiant resides in Edinburg , Illinois; that, Affiant is a first grade instructor for Edinburg Elementary Sc hool; that, Affiant was Allison Beckham's teacher from August of 1993, until the end of the school term ending in May of 1994; at no time did Allison Beckham at tempt to possess drugs, or drug paraphernalia, or to Affiant's knowledge, attemp t to sell drugs to any child attending Edinburg school; at no time did Allison a ppear to be under the influence of any drug during the 1993 term, at no time did Addison Beckham tell Affiant about any marijuana growing at the R/R/ 2. Box 72, Edinburg property; Allison Beckham did not attend classes the entire week start ing September 21, 1993, through September 24, 1993; at no time did any state age ncy, D.C.F.S., Christian County Police, or any attorney consult Affiant concerni ng the foregoing information. (Vol.IV,C.1l44-1l45) Harris v. Reed, 894 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1990) N.3 Defendant was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness in fai ling to call eyewitnesses to shooting who would have testified that they saw ano ther man running from scene of crime; by resting without presenting any evidence in favor of defense, counsel left jury to believe prosecution witness' account of incident as only account. (Emphasis added) Counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue all motions counsel had filed; all motions were meritorious; likewise, counsel was ineffective for not pursuing is sues pertaining to miss-trial, that, counsel raised orally, on day two of jury s election, "I came here and the court security officer who you know is a deputy s heriff, was talking to one of the jurors who was sitting on the bench .... 1 thi nk that now there have bee 12 jurors that have been impaneled, when they arrive here at the courthouse they should be separated ... the first person whose eye c aught me as 1 stepped off the elevator was Roy Wilbur, and 1 have had this probl em, you know, ... I'm not accusing Mike Seedy of any impropriety. And I'm not ac cusing the juror of anything. 1 just think it's bad form." (Vol.III,C.617-18) Th e appropriate remedy, would have been to have moved for a miss-trial; obviously, by The Court, stating, prior to jury selection, "But, but 1 just ask this, ' I ' mean ' I ' don't want jury selection to go on two days."; (Vol.III,C.609) coup led with The Court's statement, and all the ensued, e.g., the bailiff s had alre ady been introduced, "The bailiffs 1 think you've met before, Beulah Blakely on my right, Daris Boaden on my left."; Vo1.III,C.613) and counsel's 'vague' and 'n eutral' arguments; during the trial the Court inquired: "Do you have any objecti on if I get court security to assist us?"; counselor realizing the impropriety o f allowing deputy Sheedy being allowed to mingle with the jury, was unable to ar ticulate any objection, and replied, "Yeah, I ... Whatever you want to do, I don

't mind the court security being there."; The court stated, "Could you get deput y Sheedy, please?" (Vol.III,C.667) Prior to jury deliberations, the Court stated, "Could you tell the State's Attor ney that I'm going to excuse the alternate juror and ask him if he wishes to be present?" Deputy Sheedy replied, "Sure." (Vol.III,C.900) People v. Butler, 23 Il l.App.3d 108, 318 N.E.2d 680) (5 Dist. 1974) "Although the record is unclear as to how continual or intimate the association between Sheriff Gross and the jury was, such interaction was improper and should have been corrected when called to the attention of the trial court." Id. at 683. In the case at bar, counsel call ed 'no' witnesses; coupled together, with the fact, that, counsel flip-flopped a round, i.e., filed meritorious motions; subsequently, stated, that, they were mo ot; when, if fact, they could have never been rendered moot is indicative of Ine ffective Assistance Of Counsel, standing alone. Defendant's convictions should b e vacated; based on all of the aforementioned. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE AT POST-TRIAL LEVEL Defense counsel was ineffective at the sentencing hearing, 07/22/94, (VoLII,C.38 3476) Ron Judge Coady, presided at the sentencing hearing, at which time, counse lor Michael Metnick, stated, "Yes, I did receive the Presesentence Report this w eek." (VoLII,C.386) Defense counsel stated, "I was astounded when 1 received the Probation Report a couple of days ago to see this Mr. Grigsby has tried to salv age the damage that has been done by stating to the Court he wants the Court to consider this or that." (Vol.II,C.389-90) 720 ILCS 5/5-3-4. Disclosure of Report s. (2) to the state's attorney and the defendant's attorney 'at least 3 day' pri or to the imposition of sentence, unless such 3 day requirement is waived. Id. ( Emphasis added) Counsel was ineffective for not preparing to argue the issues of the alleged weight; likewise, the Defendant was prejudiced by the trial judge b eing biased; The Court stated. ''It might impact me, 1 suppose, a little bit, if you plan to, to call witnesses in regard to these matters D.C.F.S. talks about, about the physical abuse of the children, about the threats to kill the individ uals involved, the gun, and what was done with the gun, allegedly, by the defend ant in front of the children and with these other people (Vol.II.C,.387) Now the testimony ' I ' heard, just so we all understand, and you can help me, but it w asn't at trial that'!, heard that. '1' heard that at a Motion to Suppress Hearin g (Vol.II,C.390) ' I ' am going to consider the evidence introduced at the Motio n to Suppress hearing. ' I ' have in here that testimony about Allison talking t o Mike Parkin and indication about the, her father drying marijuana. ' I ' have the exhibit that was introduced and all three children, Allison, Stephen, and Am anda, talking about the lights with, the room with lights with plants growing in it; telling them it was marijuana flowers, and Allison told how there was a pla ce in the room where plants dried so her dad could sell them to other people. (V ol.II,C.435-36) ' I ' am going to set the street value fine at sixteen pounds ti mes eighteen hundred dollars. (Vol.II,C.463) ' I ' take it from all the other ev idence in this case about your relationship with Allison, she wasn't telling the investigator something about how did had mistreated her. ' I ' have, from all t his evidence, ' I ' take that considered that, and'!' hold that against you, tha t you would have exposed Allison. At a minimum, Allison knew what was going on i n there. Because as ' I ' understand the evidence at the Motion to Suppress, tha t is how this whole case came about. There was a D.C.F.S. investigator investiga tion a case of child abuse Allison and perhaps the two stepchildren. And because the investigator was there, then this case broke up open, because the statement s that the children made; (Vol.III,C.469) however, the Court, as a matter of con venience, had now referred to the alleged investigation as being abuse; as a con vertible term, as a matter of convenience; at the earlier hearing, that, Judge C oady, has indicated to recall so vividly. At the Motion To Suppress, Judge Coady , has stated, "At least in the planting process. And that is 'child neglect' as ' I ' understand the child neglect law." (Vol.II,C.538) Again, Defendant, was prejudiced by The Court being biased at sentencing; The Co urt stated, "The Court has considered the evidence that was received at trial an d also as ' I ' previously indicated, the evidence that at the Motion to Suppres s hearing, especially the first one, and the evidence that has been offered here

in aggravation and mitigation." (Vol.II,C.46l) The Court, arbitrarily, and capr iciously, imposed the street value fine. "' I ' am going to set the street value at sixteen pounds times eighteen hundred dollars, which is twenty-eight thousan d eight hundred dollars." (Vol.II,C.463) The evidence adduced at trial, was, "Jo hn Martin, forensic scientist of the Illinois State Police, would testify that p eople's exhibits 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and 10. Mr. Grigsby: Are cannabis. And that the ir weight is over 500 grams." The Court advised that there could be certain risk s when things are stipulated to; (Vol.III,C.728) Ergo, the State, and counsel ag reed to the stipulation, and the jury was so informed: "and was found them to be cannabis and the their weight and the combined weight of the exhibits is over 5 00 grams." (V ol.III,C. 730) By the fact that the evidence was stipulated to: "o ver 500 grams"; the only accessible street value fine, pursuant to the evidence was "over 500 grams"; 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1. "Street value" shall be determined by the court on the basis of testimony of law enforcement personnel and the defenda nt as to the amount seized and such testimony as my be required by the court as to the current street value of the cannabis or controlled substance seized." Id. People v. Sedrel, 184 Ill.App. 3d 1078, 540 N.E.2d 792 (1989) The defendant con tends the fine assessed was excessive. We agree. The trial court imposed a fine based upon the weight of all the substance confiscated from her possession. The police seized a total of approximately 26 ounces of a white substance believed t o be cocaine; however, they only positively identified two ounces of cocaine. In order to impose a fine commensurate to the value of the cocaine seized, it is i mperative that the substance seized be conclusively established as cocaine. Id. In People v. Spencer, Slip-op (No. 5-02-0638) (4/06/04) The Court stated, "The d efendant contends that the trial court erred in setting his street value fine at $200 without any evidentiary basis. The State counters that the defendant has w aived this issue on appeal by failing to object at the sentencing hearing and th at the defendant stipulated to the value. We agree with the defendant." On Augus t 29, 2002, the trial court entered an order that stated, in relevant part: "Pur suant to the stipulation by the State and the defendant of the testimony of the law enforcement officer in regard to 'street value', a statutory fine of $200 pu rsuant to this section [(730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1 (West 200))] is assessed as part of the judgment order in this cause ***" The Appellate Court state "However, neithe r a formal stipulation nor any law enforcement testimony regarding the street va lue of the seized methamphetamine appears in the record. It appears, rather, tha t the court accepted the State's contention at the sentencing hearing that $200 represented the appropriate fine. We therefore vacate defendant's fine. Ibid. By the fact that the evidence was stipulated to" "over 500 grams"; the only access ible street value fine, pursuant to the evidence was "over 500 grams"; thus, thi s would compute to (1) one pound, that is, if in fact the substance in question was actually cannabis sativa plant, or perhaps, cannabis hemp or tomato plants. Defendant was convicted of unauthorized production or possession of cannabis pla nt under section 8(d) of the Cannabis Control Act (the Act) (720 ILCS 550/8(d) ( West 1992) and unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver or manufac ture under section 5(e) of the Act (720 ILCS 550/5(e) (West 1992) There can only be one act of possession of cannabis sativa plant under the one-act one of Peop le v King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 363 N.E.2d 838, cert. Denied, 434 U.S.894 (1977) In P eople v. O'Mahoney, 169 Ill. App. 3d 194, 532 N.E.2d 635, 638, 119 Ill. Dec. 879 (5th Dist. 1988) The Court noted that, while a defendant may be charged with a violation of both sections 4 (720 ILCS 550/4 (West 1992) formerly Ill. Rev. Stat ., 1987, Ch. 56 1/2, 704)(unlawful possession of cannabis) and 8 (formerly Ill.Re v. Stat., 1987, Ch.56 1/2, 708)) of the Act, only one conviction and sentence coul d be imposed. In O'Mahoney, the Court noted that section 4 of the Act was "more inclusive" than section 8 of the Act, but a conviction and sentence could only b e entered "for whichever offense is greater under the circumstances of the case. " O'Mahoney, 523 N.E.2d 635, 638. In People v. Mills, 239 Ill. App. 3d 997, 607 N.E.2d 608, 180 Ill. Dec. 539 (3rd Dist. 1993) the Court held that unlawful poss ession of cannabis under section 4 of the Act was an included offense of unlawfu l manufacture of cannabis under section 5 of the Act. The Court vacated the conv iction and sentence for unlawful possession. In the case at bar, due to ineffect

ive assistance of counsel, Michael Metnick, Defendant was indicted, tried, convi cted and sentenced on the two (2) counts that arose from the same act. Since the Trial Court could never determine if in fact, the alleged substance was cannabi s sativa; could not determine the weight on the alleged cannabis, Defendant's se ntence must be vacated and the $10,000.00 bail returned. At the close of the sentencing hearing, 07/22/94, counsel Michael Metnick stated , ''Um, Mr. Beckham and his family have discussed an appeal with me and have exp ressed an intention to appeal the verdict, the ruling on motion, urn, and 'sente nce'." (Emphasis added) (Vol.II,C.473) After Defendant was convicted, Defendant and Defendant 's mother, Gertie Beckham met with counsel Mike Metnick in counsel's office. Counsel Metnick informed Pet itioner, and Petitioner's mother of a friend named Daniel Kirwan, a Deputy Defen der at the Fifth District Appellate Court, who would make sure the issue of the illegal search warrant was briefed, and all other issues. (Vol.IV,C.1075,1095) After Defendant was incarcerated, Defendant called counsel Michael Metnick and a sked counsel to represent Petitioner on a motion for reduction of sentence. Sinc e the 30 day time limit for filing a motion for reduction of sentence was soon a pproaching, and Defendant had not received conformation from counsel Metnick, De fendant filed the motion for reduction of sentence, pro se assuming counsel Metn ick would amend said motion. (Vol.IV,C.1012-13,1076) Affiant, Gertie Beckham, arranged to have Defendant call Mike Metnick collect fr om prison concerning counsel Metnick's representation for Defendant 's motion fo r reduction of sentence. Affiant was present in counsel Metnick's office when De fendant called. Counsel Metnick displayed the forms for an amended motion of red uction of sentence, and the four form that Affiant's daughter-in-law, Terri Beck ham had faxed counsel Metnick. Three months later, counsel Metnick sent Affiant a letter stating, "There is no state court mechanism for a reduction of sentence ." (Vol.IV,C.1030,1096) 730 ILCS 5/5-8-l(c) Sentence of Imprisonment for Felony, A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence w ithout motion, within 30 days after the sentence is imposed. A defendant's chall enge to the correctness of a sentence or to any aspect of the sentencing hearing shall be made by a written motion filed within 30 days following imposition of sentence. If a motion filed pursuant to this subsection is timely filed within 3 0 days after the sentence is imposed, the for purposes of perfecting an appeal, a final judgment shall not be considered to have been entered until the motion t o reduce sentence has been decided by order entered by the trial court. (Emphasi s added) Id. . People v. Reed, 282 Ill.App.3d 278,668 N.E. 2d 51 (Ill.App. 1 Dis t. 1996) "Effective August 11, 1993, however, section 5-8-1 (c) was amended to r ead as follows: "(c) A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 30 days after the sentence is impose. A defendant's challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any aspect of the sentencing hearing 'shall' be made by a written motion filed within 30 days fol lowing the imposition of sentence, ... we agree with the other panels of this co urt that have held that the amended statute creates a precondition for a defenda nt's appeal of sentencing issues." Ante. at 52-53. The Wilk, court held, that, " The appropriate remedy lies in out Post-Conviction Hearing Act." At 223. United States v. Castellanos, 26 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1994) N.2 Federal habeas pet itioner contending that a defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by fai ling to perfect direct appeal from conviction, as requested by petitioner, did n ot have to demonstrate that petitioner would have prevailed had an appeal been t aken to satisfy cause and prejudice requirements for proceeding with a habeas pe tition; per se violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel occurred; overrulin g Belford v. US., 975 F.2d 310; Van Russell v. Us., 976 F.2d 323, 28 U.S.C.A. 225 5; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6. Defendant filed Proof of Service, Motion For Reduction of Sentence, Motion To Pr oceed In Forma Pauperis And Appointment Of Counsel, Affidavit In Forma Pauperis and Verification filed by Defendant. Upon filing the said documents, the Court e ntered: The Court has been shown by the clerk the defendant's Motion For Reducti on of Sentence and accompanying documents filed today. The court notes that a No tice of Appeal was filed today. The court notes that a Notice of Appeal was file

d 8-12-94. As the court understands the law, the trial court no longer has juris diction of this case and cannot hear a Motion For Reduction of Sentence. If this understanding of the law is incorrect, the state's attorney or defendant is ord ered to immediately inform the court in writing of its error. The clerk is to ma il a copy of this entry to the defendant and provide the state's attorney a copy . (Vol.I,C.12-13) People v. Hook, 284 Il1.App.3d 16, 185 Ill.Dec. 711, 615 N.E.2 d 6 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1993) N.2 First degree murder defendant's filing of motio n to reduce sentence was implicit motion to dismiss appeal which rendered previo usly filed notice of appeal premature and, thus, Appellate Court did not have ju risdiction in action, in light of defendants failure to file second notice of ap peal after trial court's order denying defendant's motion to reduce sentence. Su p.Ct.Rules, Rules 309, 606(b); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch, 38, 1005-8-1(c). Id. The options for the remedy of the motion for reduction of sentence in the corres pondence from Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Fifth Judicial District, dated September 1, 1994 were not open to Petitioner. The remedy was to remand the case back to the trial court for a ruling on the motion for reduction of sentence. P eople v. Macke, 587 N.E.2d 1113 (Ill. App. 5 Dist. 1992) "Requiring a defendant to file a motion to reduce his sentence is similar to requiring a post-trial mot ion to preserve issues on appeal (II1.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 11601(b) and r equiring a defendant who pleads guilty to move to withdraw that pleas before app ealing. (134 Ill.2d R. 604(d).) Failure to file these motions denies the trial c ourt the opportunity to correct any error that might have occurred and thereby b urdens appellate counsels and the court of review with the time and expense of p reparing and processing appeals. Id. at 1114. Defendant in an attempt to be diligent in obtaining a hearing on the motion for reduction of sentence, corresponded with the State Appellate Defender, and recei ved faulty advise. Daniel M. Kirwan, stated in pertinent part: "I suspect that y ou may have misunderstood what has happened in response to you filing a motion f or reduction of sentence ..... You have two choices. You can dismiss your appeal and have the circuit court consider you request for a sentence reduction .... Y our second choice would be to continue with your current appeal, and not pursue sentencing relief in the circuit court." (Vol.IV,C.1079) Based on the foregoing, Defendant 's convictions should be reversed in the inter est of justice. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL OF DENIAL OF POST CONVICTION PETITION Defendant was substituted State Appellate Defender, Judith L. Libby, after corre sponding with counsel, Defendant received correspondence, dated, 10/15/97, stati ng in pertinent part "Thank you for your letter enumerating the issues you want researched with the recent developments in the law of ''revestment'' (of jurisdi ction to the trial court after a notice of appeal has been filed, if a time (sic ) motion to reconsider sentence has been filed), and I will see what I can do fo r you in this regard. I direct your attention to a case decided by the Second Di strict on September 16th: People v. Johnny Rowe,_ Ill.App.3d_, _N.E.2d _ (NoI295 -9551, September 16, 1997)." Ante. Petitioner received correspondence from couns el of record, dated, 11/10/97, stating in pertinent part "Based upon my analysis , I regret to inform you that I plan to move the appellate court to dismiss your appeal. Here are my reasons: Your post-conviction petition was not timely filed under 122-1 (c) of the Post-conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (c) (West 1 996), which provides for filling in you case no later than the earlier of 3 year s after conviction, or 6 months after a petition for leave to appeal (PLA) was d ue .... Your petition did not allege that this late filing was not due to your " culpable negligence." This is the only "excuse" the law recognizes for late fili ng .... Although the court (Judge Joy) docketed you petitioner under 122-2/1(b) (i .e., stage two of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act), the appellate court will aff irm a trial court's ruling if the result is correct. regardless of the basis upo n which the trial court reached its conclusion .... I regret that this letter do es not contain better news for the status of your appeal. I will be filing what is called a "Finley" motion within the next week or ten days." Petitioner forwar ded correspondence to counsel of record, dated, 11/12/97, presenting numerous fa

cts/issues that would warrant having the instant cause remanded Defendant presented authority to support the references. The said correspondence referred to Procedural Law; notwithstanding, that there are Substantive Issues; as alleged in the Post-Conviction; alleging 'actual innocence' and numerous oth er issues, that Defendant reinstates, and re-asserts, and reiterates. Defendant received correspondence for counsel of record, dated, 11118/97, which stated in pertinent part, "I have enclosed with this letter a copy (sic) of a re cent case (Perry) showing just how hard it is to allege/prove lack of culpable n egligence in a late filing of a postconviction petition. I have decided not to f ile a Finley motion, since an argument can be made that you were entitled to app ointment of counsel once Judge Joy declined to dismiss your postconviction petit ion under the statute as "frivolous or patently without merit." This flip-flop a lone is indicative of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner received a copy of the: BRIEF AND ARGUMENT FOR DEFENDANT APPELLANT; f iled herein, by counsel of record; as evidenced by the caption counsel has filed in the FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT; coupled with the fact that counsel was substit uted; the Fifth Judicial District was discharged; and all that has ensued the St ate Appellate Defender was ineffective and Fifth Appellate Court errored in deny ing Petitioner's Motion to Supplement the Record On Appeal. State Appellate Defe nder, Judith L. Libby, would have caused irreparable harm by filing Petitioner's Brief And Argument in the Fourth Appellate District; as evidenced by the captio n. S.Ct. Rule 341(a,b). Cf. People v. Moore, 133 Ill.2d 331, 140 III Dec. 385, 5 49 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. 1990) "Notice of appeal was filed June 2, 1980. The appeal was dismissed on July 22, 1980, for want of prosecution." Ibid.at 1258. In Caste llanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1994) citing Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), held, that, the "prejudice" comp onent of Strickland does not apply when an appellate lawyer fails either to file a brief or to satisfy the requirements of Anders in seeking leave to withdraw. Id. at 719. . (See enclosed brief from Judith Libby) THE ILLINOIS STATE COURTS HAVE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST PETITIONER ATTEMPTING TO RA ISE HIS FEDERAL CLAIMS Perfection of Appeal Defendant filed Petition For Post Conviction, August 22, 1996; (Vol.l,.C.14) (Vo l.IV,C.974) Defendant alleged that, Defendant, had filed a Motion For Reduction Of Sentence, pro se, August 22, 1994, (Vol.l,C.12) asserting, that, at the sente ncing stage Mr. Metnick failed to protect Defendant 's rights, that, Defendant, requested that, counsel file, in a timely manner a motion for reduction of sente nce; however, counsel failed to file; therefore, Defendant filed the said motion , pro se; likewise, counsel stated in open court ''Um, Mr. Beckham and his famil y have discussed an appeal with me and have expressed an intention to appeal the verdict, the ruling on the motion, urn, and 'sentence'," (Emphasis added) (Vol. II,C.473) People v. Wilk, 124 Ill.2d 93, 529 N.E.2d 218 (Ill. 1988) "Obviously, the divisions of the appellate court do not want defendants to suffer because of the incompetence of counsel. To preclude this result, they have declared that f ailure to file a motion to perfect an appeal amounts to ineffective assistance o f counsel." Id. at 222. Justice Clark, concurring in part and dissenting in part , joined by Justice Stamos: "I also agree that failure to file may constitute in effective assistance (whether it is ineffective depending, in crucial measure, u pon whether the defendant communicated to counsel a desire to appeal) Ante. at 2 255. People v. Reed, 282 Ill.App.3d 278,668 N.E. 2d 51 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1996) " Effective August 11, 1993, however, section 5-8-1 (c) was amended to read as fol lows: "(c) A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 30 days after the sentence is impose. A defendan t's challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any aspect of the sentencin g hearing 'shall' be made by a written motion filed within 30 days following the imposition of sentence, ... we agree with the other panels of this court that h ave held that the amended statute creates a precondition for a defendant's appea l of sentencing issues." Ante. at 52-53. The Wilk, court held, that, "The approp riate remedy lies in out Post-Conviction Hearing Act." At 223. In the case at bar, Defendant communicated a desire to counsel to perfect his ap

peal, subsequently, filed a Motion For Reduction of Sentence and accompanying do cuments, at which time, the Court stated, that, a notice of appeal was filed 8-1 2-94. As the court understands the law, the trial court no longer has jurisdicti on of this case and cannot hear a Motion For Reduction of Sentence. If this unde rstanding or the law is incorrect, the state's attorney or defendant is ordered to immediately inform the court in writing of its error. The clerk is to mail a copy of this entry to the defendant and provide the state's attorney a copy. (Vo l.I,C.12-13) People v. Hook, 248 Ill.App.3d 16, 615 N.E.2d 6 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1 993) N.1 Reviewing court is stripped of jurisdiction when defendant files timely motion to reduce sentence after filing notice of appeal. Sup.Ct.Ru1es, Rules 30 9, 606(b); Ill. Rev. 1991, ch. 38, , 1005-8-1(c). The State may argue that Defendant's pro se, Motion for Reduction of Sentence co ntained no issues whereby the court could grant relief. However, in People v. Mo ore, Ill.App.3d, 175 Ill.Dec. 796, 600 N.E.2d 1254 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1992) the C ourt held, "Although defendant's written motion to reconsider did not specify th e particular mitigating factors sought to be reviewed, there is nothing to indic ate that defendant would not have presented these specific matters during a hear ing on the motion. By declining to hear the motion, the court denied defendant t he opportunity to argue the merits of his motion. Id. at 1256. On April 14, 1999, the Fifth Appellate Court entered it's opinion that, Defendan t's Post-Conviction Petition was barred by time limits, and affirmed the trial c ourt's 'dismissal' without ruling on Defendant 's issue of trial and appellate c ounsel's ineffectiveness in pursuant of perfecting Defendant's appeal. On Januar y 22, 1999, the Fifth Appellate Court issued a slip opinion in People v. Everage , IlI.App.3d_, _N.E.2d _(5th Dist. No. 5-98-0371. (1/22/99) and is now a publish ed opinion cited as People v. Everage, 712 N.E.2d 830 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1999) wh ich held, "The statute clearly provides that if a post-sentencing motion is time ly filed, then the circuit court is required to consider the motion, and for pur poses of perfecting an appeal, no final judgment shall be considered entered unt il the motion is disposed of by order entered by the trial court. Read together, Supreme Court Rule 606(b) and section 58-( c) provide that if a "motion directe d against the judgment" is timely filed, in this case, a post sentencing motion, the appeal period is tolled until that motion is ruled upon. Id at 832. The Eve rage, Court, citing People v. Reed, 177 Il1.2d 389, 394, 226 Ill. Dec. 801, 686 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1997) "The court noted that requiring a written post sentencing motion allows the trial court the opportunity to review a defendant's contentio n of sentencing error and saves the delay and expense inherent in an appeal if t he are meritorious. Such a motion focuses the attention of the trial court and g ives the appellate court the benefit of the trial court's reasoned judgment on t hose issues. Reed, 177 Ill.2d at394, 226 Ill.Dec. 801,686 N.E.2d at 586. As the above case authorities have held, Defendant 's first appeal is null and void, an d, therefore, Defendant had three (3) years from the date of conviction to file his Post Conviction Petition. Fern v. Gramley, 99 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 1996) N 4 S tate court's holding the defendant was required to show that he suffered prejudi ce as a result of counsel's failure to perfect his direct appeal was contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the Unite d States, and thus amended federal habeas statute did not prevent Court of Appea ls from granting relief. 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d)(I). People v. Hernandez, 283 Ill.App .3d 312, 218 Ill.Dec. 800, 669 N.E.2d 1326 (Ill.App. 4 Dist 1996) N 6. Postconvi ction relief petitioner was not required to plead facts that showed he was preju diced by his counsel's failure to perfect an appeal; however, the mere allegatio n that counsel failed to perfect an appeal was not enough, defendant still had t o satisfy first of Strickland, namely that counsel's failure to perfect appeal w as deficient. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 6. In the case at bar, this Court ruled that, everything filed after Defendant's Mo tion for Reduction of Sentence is void stating that, a motion for reduction of s entence is a condition precedent to an appeal; and stating that, "But, in any ev ent, we have not only the law as it exist now, but the law as it existed as of t he date of the filing of your motion to reconsider, or motion for reduction of s entence. (Page 29, Hearing June 28, 2004.)

Time Limitations, Plain Statement The Trial and Appellate Court erred by ruling, that, Petitioner's Post Convictio n Petition was barred by time and lacked merit. On, 9/17/96, Hon. Dennis M. Midd endortI, 'denied' Petitioner's pro se Post Conviction Petition, after the petiti on had been docketed pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b); without the appointment of counsel. The docket entry for the date stated in toto: This court has been as signed to the post-conviction petition filed herein by defendant Ricky O. Beckha m. Having reviewed the post-conviction petition, the memorandum in support of the p ost-conviction petition, and the motion to dismiss the post-conviction petition, the court finds and adjudges as follows: 1. While the post-conviction petition and accompanying memorandum are both weigh ty and well bound, they have little else to recommend them. Specifically, the co urt find the following: A. That the defendant made a motion to suppress evidence which was denied. Denial of the motion to suppress was an issue which could have been raised throu gh the appellate process. Failure to raise this issue waives it for purposes of the post-conviction petition. Counsel on appeal may not raise issue (sic) which they believe to have been without merit. B. The defendant accuses each of his attorneys of ineffective assistance, which he attributes to conflict of interest. None of these claims are (sic) supported by the attachment of affidavits or any other instruments of proof The court is n ot required to conduct hearings on post-conviction petitions which fail to conta in sufficient information upon which relief could be granted, C. The only relevant item of proof attached to the post-conviction petition is t he letter from Attorney Graham which refutes the defendant's claims. 2. Contrary to the argument of the defendant, lack of legal representation does not absolve him of the necessity of satisfying the requirements of the law. 3. The defendant has failed to file his post-conviction petition in a timely man ner. As such, allowing additional time to amend would be fruitless. By reason of the above, the petition for post-conviction relief is 'denied'. Cle rk to send a copy of this order to all parties. (Emphasis added) Copy of Judge's docket entry dated 9/17/96 furnished to State's Attorney and Defendant. (Vol.I, C.14A-E) Prihoda v. McCautry, 910 F.2d 1379, "A state ground is "adequate" only if the state court acts in consistent and pr incipled way. A basis of decision applied infrequently, unexpectedly, or freakis hly may be inadequate, for the lack of notice and consistency may show that the state is discriminating against the federal rights asserted. Johnson v. Mississi ppi, 48 6 U.S. 578, 578-89, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 1987-88, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988); Bar r v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, 84 S.Ct. 1734, 1736, 12 l.ed.2d 766 (1962). Cf . Howlett v. Rose,_ U.S._, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 2440-42, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990) Defendant filed a variety of motions and objections to the trial court's dismiss al of his post-conviction petition. (Vol.IV,C.1158,1161-63,1170,1173,1189,1194) The court conducted a hearing on these motions on March 18, 1997 (Vol.IV,C.1206l5) and entered the following order: Pet. Beckham w/o attorney -- Hg. on Pet. mo tion to reconsider ct's previous ruling dismissing pet. as not being timely file d. Court finds that the petition was not timely filed and fails to state facts a lleging that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence. Having determined that the petition was not timely filed the court denies the defendant's motion to reconsider-- et. advised of Appeal Rights -- Clerk to send notice to Pet. per Sup.Ct. Rule 651. Notice to Petitioner of Adverse Judgment In A Post-Conviction Proceedings {sic} issued and filed. Notice issued certified mail receipt #P377189-918. (Vol.I,C.14F) During the rehearing, defendant had before the Court, tha t, affidavits, had been filed, the same date of the Court's ruling, 9/17/96, 'de nying' Petitioner's petition. (Vol.IV,C.1173) (Vol.I,C.14F) At no time did the c ourt appoint counsel, even though Defendant, had filed a Motion To Proceed In Fo rma Pauperis And Appointment Of Counsel. (Vol.IV,C.1170) Defendant stated, that, "first off: without being appointed counsel I would like to invoke the chilling effect doctrine forcing me to proceed without first appointing counsel denying

my Sixth Amendment right. I would like to get that on the record. Second, as for as your order is concerned, it's a violation of United States Supreme Court cas e Harris versus Reed in line of the plain statement rule." (Vol.IV,C.1209) Defen dant went on the state that the Court errored by not allowing the trial judge to rule on the petition; and that, the record did not reflect any administrative r uling assigning the cause before an judge. (Vol.IV,C.1209) In contradiction the Court states, "a different judge can't come in and sit in review on my order."; however, by not appointing counsel, Hon. Dennis M. Middendorff , has done exactl y that. Judge Middendorff created a procedure not authorized under the Post-Conv iction Hearing Act. Nothing in the Act gives one judge the power to "review and reverse" another trial judge's decision to docket a post-conviction petition for further consideration under the Act. Once Judge Joy declined to dismiss Mr. Bec kham's post-conviction petition as having no merit, then the other provisions of the Post conviction Hearing Act were triggered and Petitioner was entitled, int er alia, to appointed counsel. People v. Porter, 521 N.E.2d 1158 (Ill. 1988) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to section 122-2.1 the indigent defendant is entitled to appointment of counsel. See IllRev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 122-4 . Id. at 1159. In People v. McCain, 727 N.E.2d 383 (Ill. App. 5 Dist. 2000) "The circuit court dismissed defendant's petition on October 21, 1997, finding that defendant's petition was not timely filed, that the defendant was culpably negli gent in not filing it on time, and that nothing in the petition alleged any cons titutional violation that was not addressed on direct appeal or other wise waive d. Id. at 384 The Court then held, ''In regard to the timeliness issue, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that compliance with the time limits i n section 122-1 of the Act is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining a post conviction petition." People v. Wright, 189 Ill.2d 1, 9-10, 243 Ill.Dec 19 8, 723 N.E.2d 230 (1999) Thus, a defendant's failure to file his petition within the time limits prescribed in the Act does not deprive the trial court of juris diction to consider the petition. Id at 385. The Trial and Appellate Courts held, that, Defendant could not claim that filing his Post-Conviction Petition was not due to his culpable negligence. However, P etitioner was never allowed a hearing, represented by counsel, to argue the evol ving nature of law. In People v. Wright, 723 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. 1999) the court he ld, "Because time is not an inherent element of the right to bring a post-convic tion petition, compliance with section 122-1 cannot be a jurisdictional prerequi site." "This conclusion is supported by the fact that we have previously conside red the limitations period to be a statute of limitations. In Bates, this court questioned whether an amendment to section 122-1, shortening the limitation peri od, applied retroactively to a defendant who had been convicted before the amend ment adopted. In holding that the amendment applied retroactively, the court tre ated the limitations period in section 122-1 as a statute of limitations and spe cifically noted that "statutes of limitations have historically been classified as procedural in character, and that procedural amendments are generally applied retroactively." Bates, 124 Ill.2d at 85, 124 Ill.Dec. 407, 529 N.E.2d 227. Ibid at 235. The Wright, Court then held, "We therefore hold that the time limit fou nd in section 122-1 is a statute of limitations and that defendant's failure to file his petition within the limitations period did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to consider defendant's petition. Id. at 236. Defendant was convicted on July 22, 1994. (VoLI,C.180-1;Vol.II,C.354-55) Defenda nt filed his Post Conviction Petition, August 22, 1996. (VoLIV,C.974-1058) There fore, in applying the Wright Court's decision to the case at bar, the trial cour t still has jurisdiction to hear Defendant 's Post-Conviction Petition. Not withstanding this Court's recent ruling that Defendant's pro se, Motion for Reduction of Sentence had to heard before Defendant could take an appeal and all relevant law to date applied. The Hon. Judge Robert E. Davison, filed an Order Of Recusal; after, considering Constitutional issues. e.g., "This proceeding does not merely present a situatio n in which the above two attorneys are representing a party in the case, instead , their professional judgment (and perhaps their integrity as well) is being att acked. Contrary to Petitioner's incorrect statement of the law (on Page 41 of hi

s petition (effective appellate representation does not require the raising of a ll legal issues preserved at trial by rather the raising of issues on appeal is within the "professional judgment: of the appellate attorney .... The Chief Judg e of the Fourth Judicial Circuit will be notified today, by letter, of this Orde r," (VoLIV,C.14). The Hon. Judge Joy orders the Post Conviction Petition Dockete d Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/1222.1(b) (VoLIV,C.14) The Hon. Judge Middendorff enter ed the order denying Defendant 's Post Conviction Petition after ruling on const itutional issues and that, the petition was barred by time. A total of three (3) judges ruled that, Defendant's Post Conviction Petition has constitutional meri t. Yist v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 112 L.Ed.2d 394, (1991) "Where there has be en one reasoned federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground. If an earlier opinion "fa irly appear{s} to rest primarily upon federal law, "Coleman, ante, at 740, we wi ll presume that no procedural default has been invoked by a subsequent unexplain ed order that leaves the judgment or its consequences in place. Id. Defendant ha s raised the issues of the 'plain statement' violation in the trial court; appel late court and the Illinois Supreme Court. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT/POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS Democrat Chairman for Christian County, Jack Mazzoti When Defendant was released from the Decatur Work Release Center and placed on h ome monitor, Defendant's mother, Gertie Beckham arranged a meeting with Defendan t and Democrat Chairman for Christian County, Jack Mazzoti to discuss defendant' s intention to file in the trial court, a Petition for Post Conviction Relief. D efendant informed Democrat Chairman, Jack Mazzoti, the criminal conspiracy that led to Defendant's illegal arrest, trial and conviction. Defendant discussed the many constitutional issues Defendant planned to raise in his Post Conviction Pe tition with Chairman Jack Mazzoti. Defendant was instructed by his Mother, Gerti e Beckham, to write Chairman Mazzoti a letter. In the letter to Chairman Mazzoti , Defendant complained of the incompetence of counsel Michael Metnick and especi ally the incompetence concerning Defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence. ( See attached letter to Chairman Mazzoti) Defendant asserts that, one of the issues that was discussed with Democrat Chair man Jack Mazzoti was the fact that, State's Attorney Gregory Grigsby, during the time of the jury selection, in the presence of counsel Michael Metnick, had att empted to solicit a bribe from defendant for $100,000.00 in order to drop the ch arges against defendant. Defendant asserts, that Democrat Chairman for Christian County, Jack Mazzoti had guaranteed defendant that he would arrange with Judge John Coady to vacate defe ndant's criminal conviction after defendant filed his pro se, Post Conviction Petition. Chairman Jack Mazzoti instructed defendant to file defendant's Post Conviction P etition to the attention of Judge John Coady. Defendant asserts that, during one of his meetings with Democrat Chairman for Ch ristian County, Jack Mazzoti informed defendant that Fourth Judicial Judges and Justices from the Fifth Appellate Court would meet periodically at Rene's Pharma cy to discuss pending cases on appeal in order to decide how the Fifth Appellate Justices would rule on pending cases. Defendant asserts, that, since Democrat Chairman, Jack Mazzoti had guaranteed de fendant that he would make arrangements with Judge John Coady for defendant's co nviction to be vacated, defendant was sure he could file his Post Conviction Pet ition without concern for any time limitations. Defendant asserts, that, Democrat Chairman for Christian County, Jack Mazzoti in formed defendant that he needed some time to review defendant's pro se, Post Con viction Petition in order to edit any issues that he did not want raised in the Post Conviction Petition before defendant filed said petition. Chairman Jack Maz zoti expressed his concern that some issues concerning the criminal conspiracy t hat led to defendant's illegal arrest, trial, and conviction may reach the news media and cause harm to his Democrat Party. After some time had passed since Defendant gave a rough copy of his Post Convict ion Petition to Democrat Chairman for Christian County, Jack Mazzoti, Defendant

conferred with Chairman Jack Mazzoti to discuss the issues Defendant had raised in his Post Conviction Petition. Chairman Jack Mazzoti informed Defendant that, due to State's Attorney Gregory Grigsby's arrest for possession of cocaine, that , the Democrat Party was through with Prosecutor Grigsby since the most of the c itizens of Christian County had become aware of his arrest for drugs. Chairman M azzoti instructed Defendant to file his Post Conviction Petition in the trial co urt with the issue of State's Attorney Gregory Grigsby's attempted solicitation of a bribe. Chairman Jack Mazzoti further instructed Defendant to call him soon after Defendant filed his pro se Post Conviction Petition; in order to make sure defendant's conviction was vacated by Judge John Coady. On or about (3) three days after defendant filed his pro se, Post Conviction Pet ition, Defendant called Democrat Chairman Jack Mazzoti and informed him that Def endant filed his post conviction petition in the trial court. Chairman Jack Mazz oti asked Defendant if he had raised the issue of State's Attorney Gregory Grigs by's attempted solicitation of a bribe of $100,000.00 in order to drop the charg es against defendant. Defendant explained to Chairman Jack Mazzoti that he kept the issue of the attempted solicitation of a bribe in his post conviction petiti on as he had instructed. Chairman Jack Mazzoti then began screaming and cursing at Defendant, stating that Defendant should not have raised the issue of the att empted solicitation of a bribe. Defendant attempted to explain to Chairman Jack Mazzoti that he had instructed Defendant to raise the issues of attempted solici tation of a bribe, but Chairman Jack Mazzoti would not allow Defendant to speak. Chairman Jack Mazzoti then informed Defendant that because of his political inf luence, Defendant would never obtain any relief from his post conviction petitio n in either state, or federal courts. Judge Ronald Spears. Judge Middendorff Defendant filed, Petition For Post Conviction relief and Memorandum In Support O f Post conviction Petition, 8/22/96. (Vol.I,C.14) (Vol.IV,C.974-1057) Defendant addressed the petition to the presiding judge that presided at the conviction, H on. Judge Coady pursuant to Democrat Chairman for Christian County, Jack Mazzoti 's instruction. People v. Wilson, 37 Ill.2d 617, 230 N.E.2D 194 (Supreme Court S ept. 29, 1967) "the trial judge who heard the cause in the first instance presum ably would know whether the facts sought to be presented in the supplementary pr oceeding are facts which were unknown to the court at the time of judgment was e ntered and which, if known, would have precluded the entry of judgment," Id. at 196. In the case at bar, no entry reflecting the chief judge made assignment to any other judge other than Judge John Coady. 730 ILCS 5/10-124 (1) Where the cou rt has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the 'matter', place, sum or person. Ibid. Moreover, no request for recusal was made; therefore, all entries made thereafter is void and null. CF. In Re Dominique F, 145 Ill.2d 311, 583 N.E.2d 555 (Ill. 1991) "Where a petition for change of venue is timely file d and in proper form, it must be granted and any order entered after its present ation is a nullity. Id at 561. People v. Joseph, 133 Ill.2d 36, 494 N.E.2d 501 ( Ill. 1986) N.6 "Authority of judge designated as administrative judge of county by chief judge of Ninth Circuit, to assign post conviction petitions in case, ev en though he had presided over original jury trial in which defendant had been c onvicted of murder, flowed directly from provisions of Constitution, Supreme Cou rt rule governing Appellate Court and circuit court rules and general order. S.H .S. ch 38, 122-8; ch. 11oA, 21, 21 (a,b) Id. RULES OF PRACTICE CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS OURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. Rule 2. JUDICIAL ADMINISTATION. 2-2 acting Chief Judge: The Chief Judge shall designate one of the Circuit Judges to act as Chief Judge in his absence, who shall have the same powers and duties as Chief Judge. Id. Th e record does not reflect any order assigning the case to any judge; the record arbitrarily reflects, "Judge Spears recuses himself. Case assigned to Judge Davi son." (Vol.I,C.14) The Hon. Judge Robert E. Davison, filed a Order of Recusal; t hen ruled of Constitutional issues The Chief Judge of the fourth Judicial Circuit w ill be notified today, by letter, of this Order," (Vol.IV,C.1059-60) Again, the record does not reflect the chief judge appointing any judge; however the next e ntry by the Hon. Judge Joy states: "The Court orders the Post Conviction Petitio n docketed pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (b)-The state is granted 30 days to an

swer or move to dismiss-Clerk to notify Petitioner & SA." (Vol.IV,C.14) The Stat e filed Motion To Dismiss; (Vol.IV,C.14) Hon. Judge Dennis M. Middendorff, enter ed an order 'denying' defendant's Post Conviction Petition after ruling on Const itutional issues, 9/17/96; together with the State's Motion to Dismiss without a ppointing counsel as required by the Act. After Defendant received Judge Middendorff's Order denying Defendant's Post Conv iction Petition, Defendant went to the circuit clerk' s office to review the cou rt records. Defendant asked Beverly, a representative of the circuit clerks offi ce, where Judge Middenforff presides, and inquired if there was such a judge tha t was in the Fourth Judicial Circuit. The clerk responded that Judge Ronald Spea rs called Judge Middendorff from Carlyle, Illinois and asked him if he would com e up to Taylorville and "get rid" of Defendant's Post Conviction Petition. Judge Ronald Spears is the Deacon at Bethel Baptist Church, Edinburg, Illinois. Judge Spears and his wife, Annette Spears regularly attend services at Bethel Ba ptist Church. Defendant's Mother, Gertie Beckham, Defendant's daughter, Allison Beckham are also members of Bethel Baptist Church and attended services along wi th Defendant. When Defendant was released on home monitor, Defendant and his Mother, Gerite Be ckham proceeded to gain guardianship of Defendant's daughter from Defendant's ex -wife, Carol Eddington-Butler-Beckham-Disney of Allison Beckham. Annette Spears, wife of Judge Ronald Spears, informed Defendant's Mother, Gertie Beckham that s he would help Mrs. Beckham gain guardianship of Defendant's daughter through her influence being the wife of Judge Spears of condition that Defendant's daughter , Allison Beckham would spend time with Mrs. Spears going shopping and other act ivities. Defendant's daughter, Allison Beckham later informed Defendant and Defe ndant's Mother, Gertie Beckham that during these activities with Judge Spears wi fe, Annette Spears, Mrs. Spears would always prod Allison Beckham concerning her wanting to adopt Allison and wanting Allison to live with her family. Allison B eckham explained to Defendant and his Mother, Gertie Beckham that she waited unt il after the supervised visits with her ex-mother, Carol Beckham fearing that Ju dge Davison would force her to live with Mrs. Eddinton-Beckham and her live in b oyfriend, Jim Sullivan. Allison Beckham feared again, that Mrs. Beckham and Mr. Sullivan would force her to watch pornography videos; watch Mrs. Beckham and Mr. Sullivan have sex; be left with strangers for days at a time; and feared that s he would get physically abused when her Mrs. Beckham, Jim Sullivan, James Edding ton and others would become violent after drinking alcohol with using illegal dr ugs. CANON I "An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in o ur society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforci ng, and should personally observe, high standards of conduct so that the integri ty and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Co de should be construed and applied to further that objective." Ibid. CANON 2 A J udge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge's Activities A. A judge should respect and co mply with the law and should conduct himself or herself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judici ary. B. A judge should not allow the judge's family, social, or other relatio nships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment. A judge should not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of others ; nor should a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. A judge should not testify vol untarily as a character witness. Ibid. Judge Spears and his wife, Annette Spears violated the above Canons in their pursuit of attempting to adopt Defendant's d aughter, Allison Beckham by conspiring with Judge Middendorff to "get rid" of De fendant's Post Conviction Petition after Judge Joy docketed the petition pursuan t to 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) leaving Defendant convicted unable to provide support for his daughter, Allison Beckham. During the hearing on Defendant's pro se, Mo tion for Rehearing on denial of Defendant's Post Conviction Petition, Defendant had before the court, affidavits that had been filed the same date of the court'

s ruling, 9/17/96, which stated "The defendant accuses each of his attorneys of ineffective assistance, which he attributes to conflict of interest. None of the se claims are [sic] supported by the attachment of affidavits or any other instr uments of proof. Copy of Judge's docket entry dated 9/17/96 furnished to State's Attorney and Defendant. (Vol.IV,C.1173) (Vol.I,C.14A-E) At no time did the cour t appoint counsel, even though defendant had filed a Motion To Proceed In Forma Pauperis And Appointment Of Counsel. (Vol.IV,C.1170) During the hearing on the Motion for Rehearing From Denial of defendant's Post C onviction Petition defendant stated that the Court errored by not allowing the t rial judge to rule on the petition; and that, the record did not reflect any adm inistrative ruling assigning the cause before any judge. (Vol.IV,C.1209) In cont radiction the court states, "a different judge can't come in and sit in review o f my order."; however, by not appointing counsel, Hon. Dennis M. Middendorff has done exactly that. Judge Middendorff created a procedure not authorized under t he Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Nothing in the Act gives one judge the power to "review and reverse" another trial judge's decision to docket a post-conviction petition for further consideration under the Act. Once Judge Joy declined to dis miss defendant's post-conviction petition as have as having merit, the other pro visions of the Post-conviction Hearing Act were triggered and defendant was enti tled, inter alia, to appointed counsel. In total contradiction to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, by over ruling Hon. J udge Joy's ruling, 'docketing' the petition under 725 ILCD 5/122-2.1(b) and not appointing counsel; the Court in essence caused the denial of appointed counsel to be double-flawed. Defendant filed post-conviction petition on August 22, 1996 ; the petition was docketed under 725 ILCD 5/122-2.1(b) on September 5, 1996; on September 10, 1996, the State filed a motion to dismiss; a different trial judg e, 'denied' the petition after considering constitutional issues; on September 1 7, 1996; on March 18, 1997, the Court stated, "Now, Judge Joy, reviewed your pet ition and did docket the matter for hearing. But then Judge Joy recused himself (The record does not refect Judge Joy recused himself) almost immediately after making that finding and I was appointed to hear this case. I have the right to r eview Judge Joy's ruling and under those circumstances, and I did in fact review judge Joy's ruling and determined that Judge Joy's ruling was in fact in error because Judge Joy did not consider the question of whether your petition was tim ely filed." By the fact that, Judge Middendorff, has at this time claimed to hav e over-ruled Judge Joy's docketing the petition, this would trigger the 90 day r ule. People v. Oury, 259 Ill.App3d 663, 631 N.E.2d 822 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994) " Some 10 years ago, the legislature amended the Act by adding section 122-2.1 to provide that, without further input from the State or further pleadings from the defendant, the trial court was to determine whether a defendant's petition was frivolous or patently without merit." Id. at 825. In the case at bar, the State filed a motion in regard to the petition being untimely; thus, Defendant was ent itled to appointment of counsel. In the case at bar, Defendant's petition was de cided two times to have withstood 'dismissal'; " a petition "' need only contain a simple statement which presents the gist of a claim for relief which is merit orious when considered in view of the record of the trial court proceedings.'" O ury, Ibid. at 825. People v. Saunders, 261 Ill.App.3d 700, 633 N.E.2d 1340,1343 (2d Dist. 1994) "Because the trial court never determined, within the time presc ribed, whether to dismiss summarily the petition pursuant to section 122-2.1(a) (2), it was without the power to do so at the original hearing, and it may not d o so on remand." Ibid. In the interim approximately (7) seven months passed; not withstanding, procedural law dictated that, Defendant should have had counsel ap pointed upon Judge Robert E. Davison ruling on constitutional issues; (Vol.IV,C. 1059-60 likewise, upon Judge Joy docketing petition pursuant to 725 ILCD 5/122-2 .1(b). For these reasons, Mr. Beckham is entitled to have the 'denial' of his post-conv iction petition reversed, and to have appointment of counsel, etc., under 122-4 thro ugh 122-6 of the Act. Defendant, proceeding pro se, raised the issue of ineffective assistance of defe nse counsel

Michael Metnick; Deputy Defender for the Fifth Appellate Court; Daniel M. Kirwin , and Appellate Defender Dan Evers in his Post Conviction Petition for failure t o comply with appellate procedure pursuant to Defendant' pro se, Motion for Redu ction of Sentence. (C-1012-1016,1076) In his appeal to the Fifth Appellate Court from 'denial' of his Post Conviction Petition; (See exhibit B pages 107-111,117 -125) The State raised the issue of Defendant's pro se, Motion for Reduction of Sentence in their Brief and Argument for Plaintiff-Appellee. (See exhibit C page s 5-7) Defendant again raised the issues of the trial court still had jurisdicti on to hear defendant's, pro se Motion for Reduction of Sentence in Defendant's R eply Brief for Defendant-Appellant. (See exhibit D pages 10-14 of Reply Brief) D efendant again raised the issue of that the trial court maintained jurisdiction in his Petition for Rehearing in the Fifth Appellate Court. (See exhibit E pages 1-4 Petition for Rehearing) The Justices of the Fifth Appellate court ignored the well, briefed issue of Def endant's pro se, pending Motion for Reduction of Sentence along with other Const itutional issues and instead ruled defendant's Post Conviction Petition was time barred. (See exhibit F) Defendant still proceeding pro se, raised the issue in his Petition for Leave to Appeal for Defendant-Petitioner request the Illinois S upreme Court to utilize their supervisory powers to remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on defendant's pro se, Motion for Reduction of Sentence. (S ee exhibit G pages 1, 18-20) The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently denied defe ndant's pro se, Petition for Leave to Appeal. The Trial Court; Fifth Appellate C ourt and the Illinois Supreme Court has a duty to recognize their jurisdiction. "A reviewing court has a duty to consider its jurisdiction and to dismiss an app eal if jurisdiction is lacking." People v. Theis, 220 Ill. App.3d 24, 25, 580 N. E.2d 547, 548 (1991) People v. Reed, 282 Ill. App.3d 278, 668 N.E.2d 51 (Ill. Ap p. 1 Dist. 1996) "Effective August 11, 1993, however, section 5-8-1(c) was amend ed to read as follows: " ( c ) A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 30 days after the sentence i s imposed. A defendant's challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any as pect of the sentencing hearing 'shall' be made by a written motion filed within 30 days following the imposition of sentence,. . . we agree with the other panel s of this court that have held that the amended statute creates a precondition f or a defendant's appeal of sentencing issues." Ante. At 52-53. The issue of appe llate jurisdiction has been well settled in case law. Cohen v. Virginia, 19 (6 W heat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821) which stated, "A judge who acts where he does not have jurisdiction is engaged in treason upon the Constitution." Ibid. Theref ore, the judges of the Trial Court, Fifth Appellate Court and Illinois Supreme C ourt have committed acts of treason upon the Constitution by denying defendant t he right to due process and equal protection of the law. Defendant asserts that, this Honorable Court ruled June 28, 2004, that the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentenc e; that everything filed after the filing of said motion was void; and that all relevant case law pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Reduction since the filing of said motion, was relevant to this date. (See Transcripts of June 28, hearing, December 28, 2004 pages 24-34) Judge John Coady, Motion to Suppress, Jury Selec tion, Sentencing Hearing, Incarceration of Defendant, May 28, 2004 Hearing SUPPRESSION HEARING Michael Parkin, employed as a child protective investigator for the Department o f Children and Family Services testified, (Vol.I,C.488) on or about September 21 st that he had been called to investigate a report of suspected child abuse or n eglect. Michael Parking repeatedly stated that he did not contact Roy Wilbur, on the 21st; (Vol.II,C.492) however, whenever presented with the report, 09/21/93, Michael Parkin admitted, Yes, I wrote this out and gave it to Roy Wilbur, Michael Pa kin was asked who called in the report of suspected abuse or neglect that you we re investigation Michael Parkin replied, That s confidential by state law. Judge emained silent refusing to recognize Defendant s right to confidential information p rotected by state law. The State induced the witness to respond without any obje ction by defense counsel, or by any intervention by Judge Coady. Michael Parkin replied, Rick Beckham. (Vol.II,C.493-494) Subsequently, counselor asked, Mr. Parki

are aware the disclosure of a report of suspected child abuse or neglect is a cr ime in the sate of Illinois, don t you? Michael Parkin replied, yes, I do. (Vol. ge Coady continued to remain silent concerning the issue of illegal disclosure o f the alleged report of suspected child abuse or neglect. 325 ILCS 5/11. It is a Class A Misdemeanor to permit, assist, or encourage the unauthorized release of any information contained in such reports, referrals or records. Id. Michael Pa rkin admitted in open court that he did not have any consent of that reporter to disclose that reporter s identity. Deputy Roy Wilbur testified that the investigati on had nothing to do whatsoever with any allegation of child abuse or neglect. ( Vol.II,C.499-500) Deputy Roy Wilbur repeated that the investigation of the growi ng of contraband at the time the officer made the affidavit and sought the searc h warrant that he was not investigating any alleged abuse or neglect. (Vol.II,C. 505) Counselor Graham argued that the thing that happened here was that Mr. Park in took the information that he had about the growing of marijuana on that premi ses, to the sheriff s department and he gave a statement to the sheriff s department wh ch is attached to the affidavit and complaint for search warrant. That statement doesn t make any reference at all to any type of suspected or know child abuse or n eglect. It only makes reference to the fact that cannabis is alleged to be growi ng on Mr. Beckham s property. The sheriff s department with that statement prepared an ffidavit to present to the court. The affidavit doesn t make any reference to an ong oing or commencing an investigation with respect to child abuse or neglect, and in fact, the testimony here today indicates that there was no investigation at t hat time of known or suspected child abuse or neglect. (Vol.II,C.514) Counselor stated, the disclosure by Mr. Parkin to the sheriff s department is unlawful; that t he disclosure was in violation of a confidentiality provision in regards to the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act of the State of Illinois. Counsel went on to state that the exception for the disclosure of the records in this case is on ly to a law enforcement agency investigation know or suspected child abuse or ne glect, that Mr. Parkin had possession of confidential information, strictly conf idential information, which dealt with something other that child abuse and negl ect. They took confidential information that should not have been disclosed whic h a state agency had an obligation not to disclose and they disclosed it to obta in a search warrant. (Vol.II,C.515-517) 325 ILCS 5/11. Confidentiality of record s All records concerning reports of child abuse and neglect or records concerning referrals under the Act an all records generated as a result of such reports or referrals, shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except as specifical ly authorized by this Act or other applicable law. Id. Lowrance v. Marion PepsiCola Bottling, 221 ill.App.3d 623, 582 N.E.2d 725 (Ill.App.5 Dist. 1991) The Leg islative mandate as expressed in the Act is clear and unambiguous. Information o btained in accordance with the Act cannot be used in any court in any collateral litigation. Just as a court cannot create an exception under the Act for situat ions involving malice or fraud (see People v. Ellis (1984), 128 Ill.App.3d 180, 183, 470 N.E.2d 524, 526) we will recognize not exception for unfairness. If the question of disclosure should be based on a weighing of equities, that is somet hing which the legislature must address. Id. At 727-28. Judge Coady stated, Matters here seem to be important, perhaps matters that will be considered by the Appellate Court, and we need a complete record. (Vol.II,C.495) But as I said before, there seems to be, seems to be a significant chance this case will be taken to higher courts. (Vol.II,C.537) Judge Coady ruling on logic instea w, stated, Here s what I believe. First of all, as Mr. Grigsby points out, it wo statute does not specifically state that a remedy for its violation is suppress ion of evidence in the fashion that s being requested here. The next one is, that the confidentiality exception in 11.1 says that a person shall have access to the re cords in section 11 only in furtherance of purposes directly connected with the administration of this act. As I understand this, this was a child protective who is turning to police the fact that a little 6 year old child is being used by her father to help in the drug trade. At least in the planting process. And t hat is child neglect as I understand the child neglect law. Ante. (Vol.II,C.536fulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 65 L. Ed,2d 205, 100 S.Ct. 2247 (1986) The Co urt s opinion in Ladner v. United States, 358 US 169, 178, 3 L Ed2d. 199, 79 S.Ct. 2

09 (1958), states the rule: This policy of lenity means that the Court will not int erpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places o n an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. Id. At 387. Upon careful consideration of the totali ty of the Judge Coady s ruling And I see in the Lowrance case, Mr. Graham, you pointed out there to me, that that statute said that any information obtained in violati on of the act couldn t be used in any court in any pending action or proceeding. Jud ge Coady erroneously stated, There s not similar provision in this statute, so initial y let me say that as far as I can tell the remedy for violation of this act doesn t ap ear to include suppression of evidence that was obtained in this fashion. Ironically, the Lowrance Court held, citing, the Ellis, Court, If the question of disclosure sh ould be based on a weighing of equities, that is something which the legislature must address. Lowrance v. Marion v. Marion Pepsi-Cola Bottling, 221 Ill.App.3d 623, 582 N.E.2d 725 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1991) Id. At 727-28. It is well settled th at Congress makes laws; Judge Coady does not make laws. During the Fall of 1996, Defendant was researching law at the Illinois Supreme C ourt Library when he saw Judge Robert Davison. Judge Davison explained to Defend ant that he had a case prior to Defendant s suppression hearing referring to suppres sion of evidence seized pursuant to a D.C.F.S. caseworker s investigation. Judge Dav ison explained, that, he had ruled the evidence inadmissible due to the confiden tiality of records statute. Since the Court had previously ruled that evidence s eized pursuant to a D.C.F.S. report was confidential and therefore, inadmissible in a court of law, Judge Coady's ruling was prejudicial and denied Defendant hi s 5th and 14th amendment right to due process and equal protection of the law. JUDGE COADY WAS PREJUDICED DUE TO PECUINARY INTEREST A. Jury SelectionDuring the jury selection phase of the criminal proceedings, Ju dge Coady excused the potential juror. Judge Coady stood up and proceeded to lea ve the jury selection room. As Judge Coady turned to his right to step up on the bench, Defendant observed Judge Coady turn back toward Defendant smiling. Prosecutor Gregory Grigsby then approached Defendant and stated, "Give me $100,0 00.00 and I will drop the charges against you." Defendant told Prosecutor Grigsb y to go to Hell. Counselor Michael Metnick stated, "We came here to try this cas e." B. Sentencing Hearing Judge Coady stated, "Well, I would like to hear something about the street value of the alleged contraband. It is my understanding that th e street value was in excess of 500,000.00 and that is what I understood from th e prior hearing," (Vol.II,C.935) The State, stated, "Because you arrive at the s treet value by the weight. Because it goes so much per pound, and that has to be weighed out. It would have to weighed out. If the Court wishes, I could find ou t for sure from Officer Eck when that calculation is going to be made." (Vol.II, C.937) Deputy Roy Wilbur was called as a witness, and testified that the cannabi s weighed by the Police Forensic Scientist, was 'approximately' 22 pounds, and t hat the street value of cannabis was 'approximately' eighteen hundred dollars a pound. (Vol.II,C.398-99) Counselor asked Roy Wilber if any attempt was made to s eparate the stems, the twigs, the seeds and these, um um, other non-drug inducin g portions of the drugs, is that correct?; at which time, Deputy Wilbur answered "Correct." (Vol.II,C.402) The larger ones would, of course, be the ones that ha d the greater weight, isn't that true? Roy Wilbur responded, "Yes, sir." Counsel or stated, "So, if we were to separate the, the, twigs and the stems and the roo ts and these other items that we have been discussing for the last few minutes, the weight would be, you would agree would be less than 22 pounds, wouldn't they ? Roy Wilbur responded, "Yes, sir." (Vol,II,C.403) Counselor asked, "it could be less than half, isn't that correct?" Roy Wilbur, responded, "could be." (Vol.II ,C.405) Officer Terry Eck, was called as a witness, and testified that the canna bis street value was 'approximately' 18 hundred dollars a pound; (Vol.II,C.407) there is a range of process for cannabis, street value; the factors that go in t o making that determination is the quality of the cannabis; basically there is, a kind called ditch weed which grows wild. There is a kind that is cultivated th at will bring a lot better price; (Vol.II,C.408) when asked if it was cultivated

or ditch, he responded that it was cultivated. Officer Eck testified that the r oot system wouldn't be used; probably part of the stalk would be cut out; beyond the stalk and the root, all of it would be packaged. (Vol.II,C.409-10) Counselo r Metnick asked if Officer Eck had made test or examination as to the quality of the cannabis; Officer Eck responded "Outside of my visual, no." (Vol.II,C.410) 2. At the time of sentencing, the only person capable of testifying, for the Sta te, to the fact that the alleged substance purported to be cannabis, was in fact , cannabis; whether, 'ditch weed, or cultivated', was John Martin, Forensic Scie ntist, counselor and the State, agreed to stipulate that if he was called to tes tify that he would testify, as Judge Coady stated: "John Martin, forensic scient ist of the Illinois State Police, would testify that people's exhibits 1,2,3,4,5 ,6,7 8 and 10. Mr. Grigsby: Are cannabis. And that their weight is over 500 gram s." Judge Coady advised that there could be certain risks when things are stipul ated to: (Vol.III,C.728) Ergo, the State, and counsel agreed to the stipulation, and the jury was so informed: "and has found them to be cannabis and that their weight and the combined weight of the exhibits is over 500 grams." (V0l.III,C.7 30) Judge Coady entered the following sentencing regarding the fine of the stree t value. "Okay. Then there was that issue of stalks , stems, seeds, roots; and i t was conceded in the examination that those things aren't sold on the street. J udge Coady then took imaginary scales and weighed imaginary cannabis plants and stated, "'I' am going to set the street value fine at sixteen pounds times eight een hundred dollars, which is twenty-eight thousand dollars." (Vol,II,C.463) U.S . v. Thompson, (CA 3) (1973) 483 F.2d 527 N.3 A defendant is entitled to trial b efore a judge who is not biased against him at any point of trial and most impor tantly, at sentencing. Id. Thus, Judge Coady arbitrarily, and capriciously set t he street value. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) "Street value" shall be determined by the court on the basis of testimony of law enforcement personnel as may be required by the court as to the current street value of the cannabis or controlled subst ance seized. Ibid. John Martin, Forensic Scientist for the Illinois State Police was the only person capable of testifying as to the substance, and weight, stip ulation was that "and was found them to be cannabis and that their weight and th e combined weight of the exhibits is over 500 grams." People v. Sedrel, 184 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 540 N.E.2d 792 (1989) The defendant contends the fine assessed was excessive. We agree. The trial court imposed a fine based upon the weight of al l the substance confiscated from her possession. The police seized a total of ap proximately 26 ounces of a white substance believed to be cocaine; however, the only positively identified two ounces of cocaine. In order to impose a fine comm ensurate to the value of the cocaine seized, it is imperative that the substance seized be conclusively established as cocaine. Id. Recently, in People v. Spenc er, Slip-op (No. 5-02-0638) (4/06/04) The Court stated, "The defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting his street value fine at $200 without any evidentiary basis. The State counters that the defendant has waived this issue o n appeal by failing to object at the sentencing hearing and that the defendant s tipulated to the value. We agree with the defendant." On August 29, 2002, the tr ial court entered an order that stated, in relevant part: "Pursuant to the stipu lation by the State and the defendant of the testimony of the law enforcement of ficer in regard to 'street value', a statutory fine of $200 pursuant to this sec tion [(730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1 (West 200))] is assessed as part of the judgment order in this cause ***" The Appellate Court stated, "However, neither a formal stipu lation nor any law enforcement testimony regarding the street value of the seize d methamphetamine appears in the record. It appears, rather, that the court acce pted the State's contention at the sentencing hearing that $200 represented the appropriate fine. We therefore vacate defendant's fine. Ibid. By the fact that t he evidence was stipulated to" "over 500 grams"; the only accessible street valu e fine, pursuant to the evidence was "over 500 grams"; thus, this would compute to (1) one pound, that is, if in fact the substance in question was actually can nabis sativa plant, or perhaps, cannabis hemp. It is apparent from the above court records that, the fine imposed by Judge John Coady was pursuant to the weight of the alleged cannabis plants. Ironically, on March 12, 1996 the Fifth Appellate Court vacated Defendant's conviction for una

uthorized production or possession of cannabis sativa plant under section 8(d) o f the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/8(d) (West 1992). 720 ILCS 550/8(d) sta tes in pertinent part: (d) More than 50 plants is guilty of a Class 2 felony for which a fine not to exceed $100,000 may be imposed and for which liability for the cost of conducting the investigation and eradicating such plants may be asse ssed. Id. Judge John Coady is now, after (10) years demanding payment of the fine he impos ed on the weight of the alleged cannabis plants of which was vacated by the Appe llate Court during the first appeal. Therefore, Judge Coady has a continuing pec uniary interest in obtaining $21,253.00 fine that has been vacated. (Emphasis ad ded) JUDGE JOHN COADY WAS PREJUDICED AT SENTENCING DUE TO HEARSAY TESTIMONY Judge Coady was prejudiced during the sentencing hearing by 'hearsay' testimony. Judge Coady stated, "It might impact me, I suppose, a little bit, if you plan t o, to call witnesses in regard to these matters D.C.F.S. talks about, about the physical abuse of the children, about the threats to kill the individuals involv ed, the gun, and what was done with the gun, allegedly, by the defendant in fron t of the children and with these other people (Vol.II,C.387) Now the testimony ' I' heard, just so we all understand, and you can help me, but it wasn't at trial that 'I' heard that. 'I' heard that at a Motion to Suppress Hearing (Vol.II,C.3 90) 'I' am going to consider the evidence introduced at the Motion to Suppress h earing. ' I ' have in here that testimony about Allison talking to Mike Parkin a nd indicating about her father drying marijuana. ' I ' have the exhibit that was introduced and all three children, Allison, Stephen, and Amanda, talking about the lights with, the room with lights with plants growing in it; telling them it was marijuana flowers, and Allison told how there was a place in the room where plants dried so her dad could sell them to other people. (Vol,II,C.435-36) ' I ' am going to set the street value fine at sixteen pounds times eighteen hundred dollars, which is twenty-eight hundred dollars. (Vol.II,C.463) ' I ' take it fr om all the other evidence in this case about your relationship with Allison, she wasn't telling the investigator something about how dad had mistreated her. ' I ' have, from all this evidence, ' I ' take that considered that, and ' I ' hold that against you is what ' I ' am saying. ' I ' hold that against you, that you would have exposed Allison. At a minimum, Allison knew what was going on in the re. Because as ' I ' understand the evidence at the Motion to Suppress, that is how this whole case came about. There was a D.C.F.S. investigator investigating a case of child abuse of Allison and perhaps the two stepchildren. And because t he investigator was there, then this case broke up open, because the statements that the children made; (Vol.II,C.469) however, Judge Coady, as a matter of conv enience, has now referred to the alleged investigation as being abuse; as a conv ertible term, as a matter of convenience; at he earlier hearing, that Judge Coad y, has indicated to recall so vividly. None of the children, and especially Alli son Beckham, never testified during the entire criminal process. Therefore, Judg e Coady was prejudiced against Defendant relying on hearsay testimony. JUDGE COADY WAS PREJUDICED WHILE DEFENDANT WAS INCARCERATED On April 18, 1995, Judge John Coady sent correspondence to Odie Washington, Dire ctor of Illinois Department of Corrections, stating: On July 22, 1994, I sentenc ed Ricky O. Beckham to 41/2 years to the Illinois Department of Corrections for drug offenses. Another Judge recently informed me that Mr. Beckham appeared in h is court and Mr. Beckham was not in the custody of any correctional officers. Th e local probation office has confirmed that Ricky O. Beckham is not being curren tly housed in any D.O.C. facility. I request the following information: 1. When was Mr. Beckham released from prison? 2. Has Mr. Beckham spent any time at a work release center or at another D.O.C. facility that is not a "prison"? If so, how long? 3. Is Mr. Beckham subject to home confinement with or without electronic monitor ing? If so, when did it start and when does it end?

4. Most importantly, what standards and calculations were made that resulted in Mr. Beckham being released from prison only after serving approximately 7 months on a 41/2 sentence? Who (meaning name and title) made this decision? Were any m istakes made in applying the standards or in doing the calculations? The information you provide me may well have profound impact on future sentences I impose. In sentencing any felon, it is important to me to know actual time th at will probably be spent in incarceration. (C-949-50) Liteky v. United States, 510 US __, 127 L Ed 2d 474, 114 S Ct 1147) where the Court held that judicial bi as must come from an extra judicial source. The above correspondence from Judge Coady is clear and continuing evidence of prejudice that goes beyond the courtho use and can only be conceived as a deep hatred for Defendant. Defendant asserts, and reasserts, that, he was prosecuted for the sole purpose of attempted solici tation of a bribe of $100.000.00 by States Attorney, Gregory Grigsby since the c harges against co-defendant Patrick Buchanan, the only person living at R.R. 2, Edinburg property were dropped. JUDGE COADY WAS PREJUDICED AGAINST DEFENDANT AND DEFENDANT'S DAUGHER DURING THE MAY 28th, 2004 HEARING Defendant timely filed Motion for Substitution of Judge, May 6, 2004. Defendant received an order from Judge Coady May 26, 2004, with his order denying Defendan t's Motion for Substitution of Judge pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/114(a) with instruct ions for filing a motion pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/114(d) dated May 17, 2004. Defen dant received Notice to Appear May 26, 2004 for a hearing dated May 28, 2004. De fendant stated in his Motion for Extension of Time, that, it was ludicrous and p rejudicial to Defendant to comply with Judge Coady's order only given (2) two da ys to respond when by state law, Defendant has (30) days to respond. During the May 28, 2004 hearing, Judge Coady instructed the court stenographer t o leave the courtroom and take a break.. Judge Coady began talking to the (2) st ate prosecutors seated directly in front of Defendant and Defendant's daughter, Allison Beckham and other individuals seated in the courtroom. Judge Coady state d, that he will begin to start ruling on law instead of 'logic'. Judge Coady the n talked about a case that was remanded back to the trial court involving a man who raped a (16) month old baby girl. Judge Coady then gave a very vivid, and ho rrifying description of the surgical repair needed for the baby. Defendant asserts that, he and his (17) seventeen year old daughter was shocked and humiliated to have to sit and listen to Judge Coady's vivid description of t he rape of a (16) sixteen month old baby girl while waiting for Defendant's case to be called. Defendant asserts that Judge John Coady's vivid description of the rape of a (16 ) sixteen month old baby girl is in violation of the Judicial Code of Conduct Ru le 61 and 62 obviously having no respect for Defendant, or Defendant's daughter, Allison Beckham. JUDGE JOHN COADY HAS RECUSED HIMSELF FROM RULING FURTHER IN THIS CAUSE Defendant filed, Petition for Post Conviction Relief and Memorandum In Support O f Post conviction Petition, 8/22/96. (Vol.I,C.14) (Vol.IV,C.974-1057) Defendant addressed the petition to the presiding judge, that, presided at the conviction, Honorable Judge John Coady as instructed by the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Wilson, 37 Ill.2d 617, 230 N.E.2d 194 (Supreme Court Sept. 29, 1967) "the tri al judge who heard the cause in the first instance presumably would know whether the facts sought to be presented in the supplementary proceeding are facts whic h were unknown to the court at the time of judgment was entered and which, if kn own, would have precluded the entry of judgment." Id at 196. In the case at bar, no entry reflecting the chief judge, assignment to any other judge, other than, the Honorable John Coady. 735 ILCS 5/10-124(1) Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the 'matter', place, sum or person. Ibi d. Moreover, no request for recusal was made; therefore, all entries made therea fter is void and null. People v. Banks, 213 Ill.App3d 205, 571 N.E.2d 935 (Ill.A pp. 4 Dist. 1991) N. 8 "Judge who has previously been substituted from case may perform only formal or administerial functions having no direct relationship to merits of case. Id.

CONCLUSION Upon careful review of the premises reviewed, and the authorities contained ther ein, Defendant has presented issues pertaining to the denial of an appeal from t he outset. Defendant 's Fourth Amendment Violation was well preserved, and immin ent for the record on appeal; however, as a result of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Defendant has been denied the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the illegally obtained search warrant, and the scope of the search. Stone v. Pow ell, 428 U.S. 456, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) Id. at 481-82. Defendan t has presented a "free-standing" claim of actual innocence"; that, defense coun sel, Michael Metnick was ineffective for not presenting defendant's defense; fai ling to prepare and investigate for trial; likewise, ineffective at post-trial; also, issues that pertained to representation as a result of conflict of interes t by all attorneys of record. By the documents, exhibits and case law authorities, it should be obvious that D emocrat Chairman for Christian County, Jack Mazzoti never intended for defendant to have a hearing on his pro se, Motion for Reduction of Sentence/ pro se Petit ion for Post Conviction Petition. Therefore, defendant has been denied the right to due process and equal protection of the law in pursuit of perfecting his fir st appeal of his criminal conviction. Defendant has been denied his 4th, 5th, 6t h and 14th Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution. WHEREFORE, Defendant herein prays this Honorable Court grant Defendant's pro se, Motion to Dismiss in the interest of fundamental fairness and finality of justi ce. by vacating Defendant's conviction. Respectfully submitted, ______________________ RICKY O. BECKHAM, pro se 309 Alan Street, P.O. Box 501 Ashton, Illinois 61006 CERTIFICATION Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civi l Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this ins trument are true and correct except as to the matters therein stated to be on in formation and belief, and as to such matters, the undersigned certifies that he verily believes the same to be true. See, 735 ILCS 5/1-109. Dated this _7th __, day of April, 2006. ________________________________________________ NOTE: Petitioner is a layman at law, see, United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 50 5 74 S.Ct. 247 (movant should not be denied relief because he has miss-styled hi s motion; the court should construe it as the appropriate vehicle, and decide it on its merits); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 30 L.Ed.2d 652, 92 S.Ct. 594 (1 972) Allegations of pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than f ormal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Id.