No: 11-253

In the Supreme Court of the United States

___________________ Ariel King, v. Michael Pfeiffer, ___________________ Petitioner

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Maryland ___________________ REPLY ___________________

Roy L. Morris, Esq. Office of Roy Morris PO Box 100212 Arlington, Virginia 22210 202 657 5793 Counsel for Petitioner Dr. Ariel R. King (Pro Bono) October 17, 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS ARGUMENT ............................................................... 1 I. The Issue of Due Process Is Properly Before this Court........................................................... 4 II. The Maryland Judicial Manual Requires Notice To Modify or Vacate Before the Court Set Hearing ....................................................... 4 III. An Out-of-State Custody Proceeding Is Irrelevant to a States Power to Urgently Protect Those Within It Borders From Domestic Violence ............................................. 6 IV. There Was a Clear Lack of Due Process .......10 There Was No Court Scheduled Hearing ..... 10 Email From Respondent Is Not Effective Notice and Violative of TPO No Contact Restriction ................................................ 11 No Child Abuse Investigation Was Completed, and Respondents Pre-Emptive Actions Blocked Respondent From Being Interviewed ............................................... 12 CONCLUSION .........................................................13 APPENDIX (Reply App. - ) ........... Reply App. 1 Maryland Code Ann. Family Law 9.5-305 and -306 ........................ Reply App. 1 District of Columbia Code 16-4603.05, -4603.05 ................... Reply App. 4 US Code, Title 28,Part V 1738A . Reply App. 7 MD Rule 1-321........................... Reply App. 11 i

TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases City of Newport Kentucky v Iacobucci, 479 US 92, 107 S. Ct. 383, 93 L.Ed. 2d 334 (1986) . 8 Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988) ......................... 7 Torboli v. Torboli, 365 Md. 52, 775 A.2d 1207 (Md. 2001) .................... 4 Yopp v. Hodges, 598 S.E.2d 760, 43 Va.App. 427 (Va. App. 2004) .... 9 Statutes DC Code 16-4603.05, -4603.06 .................................. 7 MD Family Law Code Ann. 9.5-305, -306 ................. 7 MD Family Law Code Ann. 4-507 ..........................4-6 US Code. Title 15 1738A ........................................... 7 Other Authorities Custody Battle May Have Fueled Killings at Salon, Victims Kin Say; New York Times, October 13, 2011 (online version) ................................................ 1 Maryland Judges Judicial Domestic Violence Resource Manual (published by Administrative Office of the Courts, MD) (2010) ........................6-10 Rules Rule 5(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .......... 12 Maryland Rule 1-321 ................................................. 11 Maryland Rule 2.535(b) ............................................... 4 Maryland Rule 15-504 ................................................. 5 Treatises 16A Am Jur. 2d Constitutional Law 224 .................. 8 16A Am. Jur 2d Constitutional Law 332 .................. 8 72 Am Jur 2d States, Etc. 23 ..................................... 8 ii

ARGUMENT
It cannot be underestimated the critical role that Temporary Protective Orders (TPOs) play in reducing the incidence of life changing domestic violence. [Pet. Brief at 1-5] Underscoring how important due process is to the handling of TPOs in domestic violence situations is the recent fatal shooting of eight innocent people at a hair salon in California, where a custody dispute between the shooter and one of the shooting victims (the mother a 7 year old boy) was at its core. (Custody Battle May Have Fueled Killings at Salon, Victims Kin Say; New York Times, October 13, 2011 (online version)). The instant petition for certiorari presents an important opportunity for this Court to clearly establish the due process required before the protections of a TPO are taken away from a domestic violence victim. The seriousness and wide ranging implications of this case were evidenced by the strong support of Amici for the Petitioner before the Court of Appeals in Maryland (The Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project (DV LEAP; The Legal Resource Center on Violence Against Women (LRC); and The Battered Womens Justice Project (BWJP).1 No party intervened below to support the indefensible position of the Respondent.

The BWJP also serves as a designated technical assistance provider for the Office on Violence Against Women of the U.S. Dept. of Justice.
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By its own plain written words, the June 2, 2008 TPO explicitly granted the following rights of protection to both the Petitioner and her child for the next seven days, ending June 9, 2008: 1) Respondent SHALL NOT abuse, threaten to abuse, and/or harass the Petitioner and her child, 2) Respondent SHALL NOT contact Petitioner and her child by any means, 3) the Maryland Child Protective Services shall complete an investigation of physical abuse and sexual abuse of the child by the Respondent, and 4) at the end of the seven days, there shall be an Full Protective Order (FPO) hearing providing both parties an opportunity to present evidence and witnesses, and have assistance of counsel. (Pet. App.-1). The protections of the June 2, 2008 TPO were prematurely taken away from both the Petitioner and her child without due process and equal protection because it was done at an unscheduled ex parte hearing that: a) b) c) d) was not Court-scheduled, was not noticed by the Court, had inadequate and inaccurate notice, did not provide opportunity for pro se Petitioner to obtain Maryland counsel to represent her and her child, e) was held before completion of a sexual 2

and physical abuse investigation ordered by the TPO, and f) occurred days before the only courtscheduled hearing, which had been set for June 9, 2008. As explained herein, Respondents position supporting the courts actions below is inconsistent with the policy and laws of Maryland. In the case below, no person died or was immediately injured as an immediate consequence of the Respondents success at having the TPO prematurely quashed without due process. That was only because the Petitioner did not wait around to see what would happen to her and her child at the hands of her enraged and abusive husband, the Respondent, without the TPOs protections in place. She sought the safety of a womens shelter in New York, and took her child to Montefiore Childrens Hospital in New York. However, emboldened by the success in manipulating the Maryland Court, the Respondent went into a Virginia court the next day and obtained an ill gotten custody order and used it to successfully block that evaluation in that New York hospital, as well.2 As a consequence of the events that started with the due process failure below, the now eight-year-old child remains in an abusive and neglect situation with Respondent after three years, while the Petitioner continues to fear for her life and that of her child. The unlawful pre-emptive quashing of the TPO protections without due process has been used by Respondent as a seal of approval to deter other institutions from properly addressing the childs problems, including those institutions failures to
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I. The Issue of Due Process Is Properly Before this Court In the case below, the TPOs protections were brazenly taken away without due process. Respondent admits that, although raised at each stage below, the lower courts failed to rule on the question of the need for due process in this situation. Resp. Brief at 12. Respondent attempts to get around the lower courts omission by mischaracterizing the Motion to Vacate below as a Petition for Reconsideration. Id. at 12. Under Maryland rules, the Motion to Vacate, which was filed under Maryland Rule 2.535(b), was NOT found to be untimely. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals decision went to the merits of all issues raised except the denial of due process in the brazen taking away of the TPO protections. II. The Maryland Judicial Manual Requires Notice To Modify or Vacate Before the Court Set Hearing Respondent mischaracterizes Torboli v. Torboli, 365 Md. 52, 63, 775 A.2d 1207 (Md. 2001). Resp. Brief at 16. Torboli only found that a prior version of MD Code Section 4-507 was clear and unambiguprovide the child with an independent medical and psychological examination for her ongoing potentially fatal condition of Severe Chronic Neutropenia (SCN; low immunity that test results point to drugs used to cover up abuse as its cause) that is documented in her medical records, as well as her dissociative disorder symptoms and delayed development now revealed in her school records. 4

ous that the court that issued a protective order had the power to modify a protective order. That case did not address the notice and hearing requirements. The current language of Md Code FL 4-507 sets forth no standard for what constitutes proper notice for modification or rescission of a protective order. The statutory language only generally states that modification or rescission may be done after: i) giving notice to all affected persons eligible for relive and respondent; and a ii) a hearing. - MD Family Law Code Ann. 4-507 (2011) (reproduced at Respondents Resp. App. 68). The Respondents Brief attempts to fill the obvious void in MD Code FL 4-507 by arguing that the two day notice requirement for Temporary Restraining Orders set forth in the Maryland Rule 15504 is applicable to TPOs. [Resp. Brief at 12-13] However, there is no case law cited and nothing in the statutory language to suggest is the case. Even if it were the case, that two-day standard was not met here. (see, discussion, infra.) The Maryland Judicial Domestic Violence Manual gives its own clarification on a notice requirement for Md. Code FL 4-507. It specifies that the notice must be provided before a hearing is set and that ex parte revocation of protective orders is

prohibited -- making the case below a clear violation of that guidance: Md. Code FL 4-507(a). Notice must be provided first before a hearing can be set on the request for a modification or rescission. The court may not grant a modification or rescission as emergency or ex parte relief. POLICY STATEMENT. Victims remain especially vulnerable even after a protective order has been granted. Abusers may attempt to regain control of the victim by reconciling or renewing the intimate relationship. While some victims may genuinely believe reconciliation to be in their best interest, others may have been intimidated into requesting a rescission or dismissal, and many remain at risk. Judges should require the petitioner to appear in open court before a request to rescind or dismiss can be granted to ensure victim safety and to make sure the victim is not being intimidated, coerced, or threatened into dismissing the petition or rescinding the order. - Maryland Judges Judicial Domestic Violence Resource Manual (published by Administrative Office of the Courts, MD) (Md.JDVR Manual) at 44 (www.courts.state.md.us/family/pdfs/dv manualcomplete.pdf) There is clearly a conflict between the courts actions below and the Md.JDVR Manuals policies. The constitutional requirements of due process 6

which the Courts below ignored ultimately must determine what notice and hearing is required. III. An Out-of-State Custody Proceeding Is Irrelevant to a States Power to Urgently Protect Those Within It Borders From Domestic Violence Respondents explicit and implied suggestion of a pre-emptive effect of any alleged Virginia custody proceeding is misguided. [Resp. Brief at 2-11]3 A Virginia custody proceeding would necessarily be irrelevant to this domestic violence case in Maryland for the following undisputed reasons: a) the Petitioner who sought TPO protection for herself from stalking -- lived in Maryland for most of two years and at the time the Maryland TPO was issued, It is noted for reference that the full faith and credit provisions of the US Constitution have been found not apply to child custody orders. E.g. Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 484 U.S. 174 at 180 (1988). Each state must determine for itself, through a registration process, whether an out of state order meets the standards for enforcement within such state. US Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA, 28 USC 1738A), also, MD Code FL 9.5-305, -306; DC Code 16-4603.05, -4603.06. The unlawful nature of the Virginia custody proceeding cited by Respondent is evidenced by his inability to successfully register any order from that proceeding in any other state jurisdiction, including his home state of the District of Columbia.
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b) the Petitioners child for whom TPO protection was sought for neglect and abuse attended school in Maryland, and lived in both Maryland with Petitioner and in the District of Columbia with Respondent, at the time of the TPO was issued, c) no party, including the Respondent, lived in Virginia or had any connection to Virginia, except for a brief period ending in October 2007, over a year before the Maryland TPO was sought and granted, and d) in obtaining the TPO, no allegation was made of any incident of domestic violence or abuse or neglect taking place in Virginia. Clearly, any alleged custody proceeding in Virginia could not interfere with Petitioners right to seek emergency protection for herself from domestic violence in Maryland. Yet, Respondent seems to suggest that a custody proceeding in another state (here Virginia) would pre-empt Maryland from providing emergency protection to Petitioner and her child (protection from abuse and medical neglect) when both are physically present, attending school (in the case of the child), and living, in Maryland. Respondents distorted view clearly violates the sovereignty of Marylands police powers for protecting those within its borders. E.g., 16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law 332; City of Newport Kentucky v Iacobucci, 479 US 92, 107 S. Ct. 383, 93 L.Ed. 2d 334 (1986); 72 Am Jur 2d States, Etc. 23, 16A Am Jur. 2d Constitutional Law 224.

Equally nonsensical and irrelevant is Respondents misplaced belief that a guardian ad-litem (GAL) appointed in Virginia would be relevant to an emergency domestic violence proceeding in Maryland. [Resp Brief at 25-26] Virginia, itself, has ruled that, even within Virginia, GALs are not necessary or indispensible parties. Yopp v. Hodges, 598 S.E.2d 760, 43 Va.App. 427 (Va. App. 2004). If Judge Boynton felt that a GAL was needed for the child in the Maryland TPO proceeding, Judge Boynton had the power to assign a Maryland-licensed-GAL to the child; but, in fact, he did not. Finally, the Respondents argument that the pro se victim of domestic violence seeking a TPO is not deserving of a TPO if the victim does not list the details of each and every proceeding that has ever occurred between the victim and the abuser is nonsensical. [Resp Brief at 25-26] In Maryland, the burden for determining what other proceedings may or may not exist at the time the TPO is issued has been placed on the Court clerks offices, NOT the applicant for the TPO: POLICY STATEMENT. It is recommended that commissioners and Circuit and District Court Clerks Offices search the Maryland Protective/Peace order Application for any cases that have been filed previously or are pending currently between the respondent and PEFR(s) [i.e., the TPO applicant]. This is to prevent conflicting orders. Many petitioners may have difficulty properly noting any past or pending cases. This information should be provided to the judge at the time the temporary protective order hearing is held. 9

Md.JDVR Manual at 10

The time of seeking a TPO is very stressful for the TPO application. As observed in the Md.JDVR Manual, a victim of domestic violence may behave in ways that appear crazy to outside observer who do not have the information to discern the craziness as a normal response to abuse. Md.JDVR Manual at 1. Thus, it is both naive and unreasonable of Respondent to expect that, when seeking a TPO, a domestic violence victim would have their wits about themselves to have the clarity to ramble off all details of any proceedings that might be taking place, or that took place. IV. There Was a Clear Lack of Due Process As noted above, Respondent concedes that Marylands lower courts did not rule on the issue lack of due process. [Resp. Brief at 12] Respondent does not allay concerns that due process was denied when the protections of the TPO were abruptly taken away from both the Petitioner and her child. Given that a TPOs primary purpose is to offer temporary protection for a fixed time until the full protective order (FPO) hearing where all parties can appear with counsel, prepare, and systematically present their evidence and witnesses, it is inconsistent with the expectations created by the TPOs own words for those protections to abruptly taken away without due process. It also leaves the Petitioner in the even more vulnerable position of not knowing that she lost the protections of the TPO, and

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being left to only finding out of that loss at an unexpected confrontation with the abuser. There was No Court Scheduled Hearing: Respondents Brief repeatedly falsely claims or implies that the hearing to quash the TPO was court scheduled. E.g. Resp. Brief at 6. However, Respondent provides no evidence of this false claim. The complete docket for the case is set forth in Respondents Appendix at 12 (Resp. App. 12). There is no advanced entry in that docket of a notice by the Court for a hearing on June 5, 2008. Resp. App. 1215. As explained above, even the Md.JDVR Manual states that the court must set the hearing after proper notice is provided to the victim. Email From Respondent Is Not Effective Notice and Violative of TPO No Contact Restriction: Respondent identifies no credible evidence that supports its claim that there was two day notice for the unscheduled hearing ad hoc hearing on June 5, 2008. Respondents pointing to his selfcreated certificate of service for his Motion to Quash claiming an email notice from him on June 3, 2008 is in no way evidence of effective notice of the unscheduled ad hoc hearing on June 5, 2008. That Motion to Quash (which was filed on June 4, 2008 at the Court) did not even mention any planned hearing for June 5, 2008 (or any other day). Furthermore, in Maryland, email is NOT an acceptable method of provide service or notice (Md. Rule 1-321 (2011) (Service of pleadings and papers other than original pleadings). Even the Federal rules do not consider email notice unless the receiving party has agreed in writing in advance that they will accept email service. Fed. R. 11

Civ. P 5(b). Thus, there was no two day notice, nor was there any other form of adequate notice to satisfy the due process requirement.4 The Court should also reject Respondents suggestion that Petitioner should have shown up based on a violative email contact by the Respondent at a non-scheduled hearing without Maryland DV counsel. That would be inconsistent with the expectations of the TPOs protections. Respondent does not dispute that Petition was pro se and that Petitioner did not have adequate opportunity to obtain counsel for Respondents non-scheduled hearing. No Child Abuse Investigation Was Completed, and Respondents Pre-Emptive Actions Blocked Respondent From Being Interviewed: Respondent does not dispute that the TPOordered child sexual and physical abuse investigation Neither Petitioner nor any Maryland attorney representing her made an appearance at the June 5, 2008 hearing. The presence of Petitioners Washington DC counsel who is shown as unknown speaker because he did not make an appearance on Petitioners behalf has no legal significance because he was not, nor could be recognized by the Maryland Court as representing the Petitioner. Moreover, the Opposition mentioned in the Respondents Brief proves nothing about whether adequate notice was provided to Petitioner to adequately prepare for a hearing on that day with less than a few hours notice. That Opposition was to Respondents Motion to Quash which neither mentioned or provided any notice for any hearing.
4

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ordered was not completed. In fact it was, according to the testimony, not started. The unscheduled hearing on June 5, 2008 was clearly intended to block the Maryland Child Protective Services efforts to interview Respondent on the afternoon of June 5, 2008. The social workers did not claim that there was no sexual abuse or neglect. They only stated that the child had not informed them of any which is typical of child abuse victims. Since those social workers had not reviewed the transcript from the TPO hearing on June 2, 2008, they were unaware of the evidence that the Respondent was sleeping with the child, the child had broken down earlier on the day the TPO had been issued (June 2, 2008) after visiting with the father for two consecutive nights, the physical abuse against the Petitioner and the child, that other personnel in the Maryland CPS had previously met with the child several times in the several months preceding and witnessed her breakdowns (urinating on floor during interviews) causing them to refer the child to the Montgomery County Treehouse program for concerns for sexual and physical abuse, and that the child was suddenly suffering from a potentially fatal rare Severe Chronic Neutropenia (low immunity or Low ANC) that has since been determined is likely caused by drugs used to facilitate and cover up abuse. [Pet. App.-27]. The SCN began only after the child began to regularly sleep in Respondents small one bedroom apartment in the big bed a condition that remains unchanged to this day and is ignored by authorities because of the misinformed view perpetuated by the Respondent that Maryland fully investigated and found no abuse and neglect.

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Conclusion
Respondent fails to show why the issues raised by Respondent at the June 5, 2008 hearing could not have been addressed at the only court-noticed and court-scheduled hearing, which was set for June 9, 2008. As explained in the Petition, because of the futility of appeals of Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) proceedings, it cannot be over-emphasized that this one of those rare TPO cases that will ever make its way up for review to any high state court, and, in turn, this esteemed court. Review here is for the benefit of domestic violence victims in the future by clarifying their rights to protect against the abrupt premature loss of TPO protections without due process. Respectfully submitted,

Roy L. Morris, Esq. Office of Roy Morris PO Box 100212 Arlington, Virginia 22210 202 657 5793 Counsel for Petitioner Dr. Ariel R. King (Pro Bono) October 17, 2011

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APPENDIX (Reply App. - )

Maryland Code Ann. Family Law 9.5-305 and -306 Maryland Code Ann. FL 9.5-305. Registration (a) Documents required. -- A child custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in this State, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by sending to the appropriate court in this State: (1) a letter or other document requesting registration; (2) two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been modified; and (3) except as otherwise provided in 9.5-209 of this title, the name and address of the person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child custody determination sought to be registered. (b) Registration required. -- On receipt of the documents required by subsection (a) of this section, the registering court shall: (1) cause the determination to be filed as a forReply App. - 1

eign judgment, together with one copy of any accompanying documents and information, regardless of their form; and (2) serve notice upon the persons named in subsection (a)(3) of this section and provide them with an opportunity to contest the registration in accordance with this section. (c) Notice. -- The notice required by subsection (b)(2) of this section shall state that: (1) a registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the registration in the same manner as a determination issued by a court of this State; (2) any request for a hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination shall be made within 20 days after service of notice; and (3) failure to contest the registration will result in confirmation of the child custody determination and preclude further contest of that determination with respect to any matter that could have been asserted. (d) Contest. -(1) A person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order shall request a hearing within 20 days after service of the notice. (2) At that hearing, the court shall confirm the registered order unless the person contesting registration establishes that: (i) the issuing court did not have jurisdiction under Subtitle 2 of this title; (ii) the child custody determination sought to be registered has been vacatReply App. - 2

ed, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under Subtitle 2 of this title; or (iii) the person contesting registration was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance with the standards of 9.5-107 of this title, in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which registration is sought. (e) Confirmation. -- If a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the registration is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law and the person requesting registration and all persons served shall be notified of the confirmation. (f) Same -- Preclusion of further contests. -- Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration. Maryland Code Ann. FL 9.5-306. Recognition and enforcement of registration. (a) Granting relief. -- A court of this State may grant any relief normally available under the law of this State to enforce a registered child custody determination made by a court of another state. (b) Modification. -- A court of this State shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, except in accordance with Subtitle 2 of this title, a registered child custody determination of a court of another state.

Reply App. - 3

District of Columbia Code 16-4603.05, -4603.05 DC Code 16-4603.05. Registration of childcustody determination. (a) A child-custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in the District, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by sending to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia: (1) A letter or other document requesting registration; (2) Two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been modified; and (3) Except as otherwise provided in section 164602.9, the name and address of the person seeking registration and of any parent or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child-custody determination sought to be registered. (b) On receipt of the documents required by subsection (a) of this section, the registering court shall: (1) Cause the determination to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy of any accompanying documents and information, regardless of their form; and (2) Serve notice upon the persons named pursuant to subsection (a)(3) of this section and Reply App. - 4

provide them with an opportunity to contest the registration in accordance with this section. (c) The notice required by subsection (b)(2) of this section must state that: (1) A registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the registration in the same manner as a determination issued by a court of the District; (2) A hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination must be requested within 20 days after service of the notice; and (3) Failure to contest the registration will result in confirmation of the child-custody determination and preclude further contest of that determination with respect to any matter that could have been asserted. (d) A person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order must request a hearing within 20 days after service of the notice. At that hearing, the court shall confirm the registered order unless the person contesting registration establishes that: (1) The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under subchapter II of this chapter; (2) The child-custody determination sought to be registered has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under subchapter II of this chapter; or (3) The person contesting registration was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in acReply App. - 5

cordance with the standards of section 164601.07, in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which registration is sought. (e) If a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the registration is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law and the person requesting registration and all persons served must be notified of the confirmation. (f) Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration DC Code 16-4603.06. Enforcement of registered determination. (a) A court of the District may grant any relief normally available under the law of the District to enforce a registered child-custody determination made by a court of another state. (b) A court of the District shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, except in accordance with subchapter II of this chapter, a registered child-custody determination of a court of another state.

Reply App. - 6

Title 28, Part V, 1738A. Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations (a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) of this section, any custody determination or visitation determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State. (b) As used in this section, the term (1) child means a person under the age of eighteen; (2) contestant means a person, including a parent or grandparent, who claims a right to custody or visitation of a child; (3) custody determination means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications; (4) home State means the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which the child lived from birth with any of such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period; (5) modification and modify refer to a custody or visitation determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody or visitation determination concerning the same child, whether made by the same court or not; (6) person acting as a parent means a person, other than a parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by a court Reply App. - 7

or claims a right to custody; (7) physical custody means actual possession and control of a child; (8) State means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States; and (9) visitation determination means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the visitation of a child and includes permanent and temporary orders and initial orders and modifications. (c) A child custody or visitation determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the provisions of this section only if (1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and (2) one of the following conditions is met: (A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the childs home State within six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State; (B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such State other than mere physical presence in such State, and Reply App. - 8

(II) there is available in such State substantial evidence concerning the childs present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships; (C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, a sibling, or parent of the child has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse; (D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody or visitation of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction; or (E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. (d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody or visitation determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant. (e) Before a child custody or visitation determination is made, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated and any person who has physical custody of a child. (f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child made by a court of Reply App. - 9

another State, if (1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and (2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination. (g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody or visitation determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody or visitation determination. (h) A court of a State may not modify a visitation determination made by a court of another State unless the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction to modify such determination or has declined to exercise jurisdiction to modify such determination.

Reply App. - 10

Md. Rule 1-321 (2011) Service of pleadings and papers other than original pleadings (a) Generally. Except as otherwise provided in these rules or by order of court, every pleading and other paper filed after the original pleading shall be served upon each of the parties. If service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivery of a copy or by mailing it to the address most recently stated in a pleading or paper filed by the attorney or party, or if not stated, to the last known address. Delivery of a copy within this Rule means: handing it to the attorney or to the party; or leaving it at the office of the person to be served with an individual in charge; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office; or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of that person with some individual of suitable age and discretion who is residing there. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. (b) Party in default -- Exception. No pleading or other paper after the original pleading need be served on a party in default for failure to appear except a pleading asserting a new or additional claim for relief against the party which shall be served in accordance with the rules for service of original process. (c) Requests to clerk -- Exception. A request directed to the clerk for the issuance of process or any writ need not be served on any party.

Reply App. - 11