Granada: Crescent and Crown

Granada: Crescent and Crown
A Political Ethnography of a Muslim Community in Andalusia
Abstract:
An exploration of the challenges facing the Moroccan immigrants in
Granada, Spain, uncovers deep historical factors influencing the local civic
identity, divisions within the city’s Muslim community and political
obstacles impeding the creation of a multicultural state. Interviews with
various actors in the political climate illustrate how grassroots organizations
and personal connections can eclipse ‘official’ efforts in bridging cultural
divides and creating a more accepting community. An exploration of the
city’s Muslim past provides important elements with which present-day
leaders can create a more multicultural identity.
After nearly five centuries, Islam has returned to Granada, Spain. In 1492, the
Catholic Kingsi conquered the final stronghold of the Moorish kingdom used it as a focal
i
Fernando II of Aragón and Isabella I of Castilla (‘Isabel la Católica’), whose 1469 marriage unified their
kingdoms and began the political process leading to the creation of modern Spain.
Granada: Crescent and Crown – A Political Ethnography of a Muslim Community in Andalusia Alan Cordova
point for the intense reshaping of Spain into a Catholic country. Today, however, the city
is once again home to a significant Muslim population, comprised of both Moroccan
immigrants and native Spanish converts.
This research examines the challenges facing the city’s Islamic community and
how their presence has helped Spain begin to re-imagine itself as a multicultural state.
The first section illustrates several interconnected challenges facing Granada today. First,
many of the difficulties encountered by the growing Muslim population have been
exacerbated by the consolidation of cultural policymaking in Seville, the regional capital,
and Madrid. Stronger local governance over education would enable Granada’s
municipal leaders to highlight how the city’s complex history plays an important role in
shaping civic identity. Second, immigration will bring issues of religious discrimination
into sharper focus, motivating the governments of Granada, Andalusia and Spain to more
formally address not only the services provided to religious and ethnic minorities, but
also their vision for a future multicultural community.
In the second part, I explore the ways in which Granada’s past multiculturalism
provides the basis for a re-imagining of the city’s identity as both a Catholic and Muslim
community. By examining ways in which Catholic histories shaped the way Spanish
history is currently portrayed, it is possible to remove the layers of interpretation and
understand the character of convivencia – a time of great intercultural exchange that
characterized the Golden Age of Spain.
CHALLENGES FACING PRESENT-DAY GRANADA
My primary research in January 2005 illuminated several factors shaping the
present-day popular conception of Granada. Beneath its still-strong Catholic image,
2
other voices have emerged, opening space in the public space for greater discourse on its
character. However, the process of re-imagining Granada is far from complete, and my
experiences and interviews illuminated a city in transition, with elements of the past
juxtaposed against ideas about the future. One of the theories informing my inquiry was
the distinction drawn by an article by Oxford professor Sebastian Poulter. Reacting to the
1997 amplification of the debate in France over Muslim schoolgirls’ wearing of the hijab,
he contrasted “the French ‘assimilationist’ insistence on the denial of ethnic difference, at
least in the public domain, in a spirit of uniform citizenship.”1 French cultural politics
have long followed the traditions of laïcité and state centralization, emphasizing national
identity over all other types of identity.2 In contrast, England has maintained a policy of
“pluralism within limits”3 that allows members of ethnic minorities to maintain their
traditional customs and languages. Particularly since the 1976 Race Relations Act, 4 this
has also extended into the area of legal recognition, giving groups a measure of
sovereignty. I found this distinction quite useful for illustrating the two possible extremes
of multicultural policy. Spain, lacking a comprehensive cultural policy grounded in a
philosophy as sharply defined as British civil law or French common law, will inevitably
head towards one of these extremes. I found many people preferring the British model,
probably because of the bad press that French cultural policy has received. However, as I
discovered, the latter might be the direction in which, against the will of its minorities,
the government may be taking the country.
January 6 was the Festival of the Magi Kings (Fiesta de los Reyes Magos), the
Spanish celebratory equivalent of Christmas Day.ii All businesses and offices were
closed, halting my research progress but providing me a unique opportunity to observe an

ii
It’s actually the twelfth day of Christmas; Spain, unlike most of the United States, celebrates all of them.
3
unusual Spanish tradition. That night, I attended a parade celebrating the holiday down
the Gran Vía de Colón, the city’s primary arterial. Although it had all of the typical
pageantry (and commercializationiii) of an American Christmas festivity, the “Thousand-
and-One Nights” Orientalism emerged as a dominant theme. Symbols of numerous Arab
and Persian cultures were condensed to create a pan-Islamic scene. Interestingly, the role
of the Magi King Balthasar, the representative of the African kingdoms, was played by a
white actor in blackface rather than a black man.iv Later, watching the national news, I
saw this portrayal, which would have been understood in the United States as a deliberate
statement of sheer racism, take place all over Spain. Although the use of blackface in the
United States was abandoned during the Civil Rights Movement, the symbol retains its
potent connotation and supports the stereotyping of Balthasar as the dark ‘other,’ a
pernicious stereotype exacerbated by his role in popular Spanish tradition: to leave lumps
of coal for the bad children.5 While I did not observe any connections explicitly drawn
between the portrayal of Balthasar and perceptions of immigrants, as an outsider to the
Spanish cultural context I found the polarizing imagery shocking.
My interview with University of Granada engineering professor Rafael Gallego
Sevilla, helped set the stage for my further investigation by identifying several key issues.
He leads “Granada Laica” (‘Secular Granada’), which opposes the continued presence of
religion in public institutions, particularly public education. According to him, religion is
offered as an elective in primary curricula, although in many schools there is no other
option besides Catholicism. The structure of education policymaking is particularly
problematic for Spain’s Muslim population, because Islam does not have the hierarchical
iii
As demonstrated by a Ronald McDonald float trailing those of the Three Kings.
iv
Because of extensive immigration from sub-Saharan Africa, there is no shortage of qualified candidates
for the role of Balthasar. Thus, the use of blackface was a conscious decision made by municipal
governments.
4
organization of the Catholic Church. Thus, Muslims have no special religious authorities
to represent them on a national level in the same way that the archbishop selects a
representative to coordinate Catholic education policy with Madrid. This corresponds to
other areas of social service, in which the Catholic Church has a dominant presence:
“when a Muslim becomes sick, he goes to a Christian hospital.” The extent of the
church-state partnership is most pronounced in the area of funding: citizens can mark a
box on their income tax forms to donate up to 30% of it directly to the Catholic Church;
other religions enjoy no such financing. The teaching of religion impeded modernity and
social evolution and lead to cultural homogenization. He recommends that these classes
be optional, and that local communities be allowed to decide whether religious
instruction should occur in public schools, in extracurricular religious programs, or in the
home. As an advocate for neither Catholic nor Muslim communities, Dr. Gallego’s
position gave him a unique perspective on the political challenges faced by a cultural
minority. However, I left the interview unconvinced that secularism could promote
religious equality. Although the desire to teach Catholicism in schools may be waning,
many Muslims see religious instruction as an integral part of their education. Tariq
Ramadan, a scholar of European Islam, notes that “at the heart of every family, in every
organization, and in Western Muslim communities generally, the same concern and fear
are expressed about passing on Islamic values to the children. How can the flame of
faith, the light of spiritual life, and faithfulness to the teachings of Islam be preserved in
environments that no longer refer to God and in educational systems that have little to say
about religion?”6
5
I was able to explore the problems of Muslims’ access to proper services more
thoroughly in my interview with Carín Carrasco, who leads the Junta Islámica de España,
which according to him seeks to help people organize within communities to confront the
stereotype that equates Islamic practice with fundamentalism (particularly “Arab
Islam”v). He described the government’s apathy towards its own lack of a comprehensive
Islamic cultural policy. In the realm of education, for example, “there is simply not the
political will” to create necessary changes such as a standardized curriculum. Rather,
there are many empty promises, such as a 1996 agreement between the Spanish
government and leaders of regional Muslim associations to create a system for recruiting
primary school teachers, but no action: he has waited for eight years for the government
to fulfill its guarantee and provide the needed material resources and political support. To
this day, the Islamic community is waiting for the state to authorize classes in Islam,
which are currently taught in Ceuta and Mellila, Spain’s enclaves in North Africa, but
they lack the power, both in terms of voice (because of their socially marginalized status)
and capacity (because they remain a small minority), to compel the state to carry out its
promise. Part of the difficulty is structural: the Imam is not a figure of religious
authority, but merely the most knowledgeable person willing to lead. As a result, Islamic
practices and traditions are very mixed. However, echoing the opinion of Dr. Gallego,
Mr. Carrasco noted that in the future, as a more secular generation comes of age in Spain,
the “Catholic State” might find it difficult to maintain its protection of the church, which
he sees as in a “state of trauma.” I found his structural explanation of the problem an
interesting (and refreshing) alternative to ascribing all of the problems to Spanish
discrimination, although I suspected that both were likely operating, with the former
v
By this I took him to mean the more conservative traditions of the Middle East.
6
being an excuse offered by officials when the latter was the more central cause.
However, I was uncertain that his willingness to blame the government was entirely
accurate – my experience with popular campaigns had shown that they could succeed
with enough involvement and targeted advocacy, even if they represent a small
demographic.
I next traveled to the Zona Norte, an area of low-income apartment high-rises on
the edge of the city to interview Abdulqader Husni Qamhiyeh, the Imam of the Mezquita
de la Paz. His mosque works with the area’s distinct population – the working class and
students (the university is nearby) – to create a community. He preaches a “moderate,
mainstream” Islam and hopes to appeal to youth of the “discothèque culture” with the
message that Islam prepares them for the “second phase” – that is, the afterlife. He said
that people truly wanted education in Islam, but the state has denied their right to access
it. Comparing the racism with apartheid South Africa, he said that the state needs to
uphold its part of the social contract by guaranteeing minimal rights, rather than giving
each group certain rights and perpetuating the popular tendency towards cultural
assimilation. I found the contrast to Mr. Carrasco interesting: while he wanted to work
through government institutions to achieve a wider acceptance of Islam, Mr. Qamhiyeh
sought to achieve this by working on the social level with the younger generations. As I
would later learn, the two people represent very different groups: Mr. Qamhiyeh’s
mosque is comprised primarily of lower-class Moroccan immigrants, while Mr.
Carrasco’s group works with middle- and upper-class Spanish converts.
Following my interview with Mr. Qamhiyeh, I met with Zakaría Maza, the Imam
of the Mezquita del Temor de Allah, a larger mosque near the merchants’ area on Caldería
7
Nueva street. He spoke of a “spiritual anxiety” among the general population caused by
the “failure” of the Church: “Society permits drugs” among youth. “Western culture is
conflicted by materialism.” He “wanted something authentic,” and found this in the
religion brought back from people who had visited Muslim nations. For him, conversion
– a “radical change” – inaugurated a “new phase of life.” His goal as Imam is to “create
a society where people don’t need to steal,” emulating the original Muslim community
and providing for a “healthy diet” of Islam. He wants to use this ideal and the peace
between peoples it created as the vehicle for creating a community of “Muslim
Spaniards.” Unfortunately, according to Mr. Maza, the Spanish state has made it difficult
to establish a minority community. Regarding primary education, he asserted that the
state didn’t want teachers in Islam; rather it wanted to assimilate students. He connected
it to a larger failing of its cultural policy, which he found to be “hypocrisy,” for it “does
not consider the mosque a place of worship” like a church. It “censures” historical books
and allows the “falsification of history.”
I was unable to determine exactly how the current government was falsifying
history, although Rosa Rodríguez, the longtime Granadan I was staying with, speculated
that he was referring to the Franco-era teaching of a narrow interpretation of Spanish
history that virtually ignored the contributions of its Islamic kingdoms. Mr. Maza spoke
of a mystical, spiritually focused interpretation Islam that I suspected might not appeal to
all Muslims. Like Mr. Qamhiyeh, he wanted to present Islam as an alternative lifestyle to
mainstream secularism and materialism that he saw pervading Spanish society. I could
begin to see several important themes coalescing: the failure of the government for
8
reasons structural or cultural, the appeal to Islam as an alternative lifestyle, the
importance of the younger generation and the need for the equality of religions.
Another component of my research involved a survey of the educational
textbooks at the library of the University of Granada’s School of Education. Analyzing
the texts offered insight into the moral philosophy underlying Religious and Ethicsvi
classes, highlighted the values guiding Spain’s national cultural policy and provided a
glimpse into an important influence of the granadino mindset. Although textbooks, like
any other cultural artifact, are the result of numerous decisions opaque to the reader of the
finished product and a product of their time and social context, their themes and patterns
indicate areas of importance to the authors and sponsors. What mattered to me is that
they were the official ‘approved’ texts in use in present-day schools.
The central goal of the primary-level Ethics textbook Learning to Live was to
impart the means to happiness: “True happiness is not in having video games…the true
happiness is in health, friendship, caring, the possibility of helping and of joining with
others in the enjoyment of nature.”7 The strategy of teaching morals by promising the
goal of lasting happiness draws on the central principle of cognitive behavioral therapy,
that thoughts cause particular positive and negative feelings and that the key to happiness
is to replace negative thoughts with positive ones.8 Another textbook series invokes the
social necessity of morality and a balance between universalism and relativism9. Both
books appeal to personal necessities, corresponding to the second through fourth (of five)
on Abraham Maslow’s famous ‘Hierarchy of Needs.’ Happiness corresponds to
“love/belonging,” the third level, and “esteem,” the fourth, promising that the need for
vi
Ostensibly, a class in Ethics (non-sectarian civics and training in moral inquiry) is an option to Religion
(which amounts to a heavy dose of Catholic doctrine). However, many of the people I interviewed said that
Ethics was never taught in public schools.
9
“love and affection”10 and “self-esteem.”11 Social acceptance invokes, on a primitive
level, fear of isolation and chaos12 and desire for a structured, orderly world.13 While
these textbooks assume that students are religious, they skillfully avoid invoking the
tropes of any particular religion. However, because of this, they avoid discussing themes
of self-actualization and self-transcendence that comprise much of the literature of moral
philosophy.vii Ethics textbooks emphasize the practice of religion as a value, which,
although explicitly avoiding an endorsement of Catholicism, implies support for it as the
majority religion. “Nonreligious human nature of the present descends from previously
religious human nature,”14 proclaims one textbook. The emphasis on Catholicism is
subtle but ubiquitous: in The Moral Life (1995) monotheism is presented as the standard
for religion, and the only two images of Islam are a mihrab and the Ayatollah Khomeini.
The textbooks for Religion, in contrast, were dominated by appeals to religiosity: “There
is no doubt that the knowledge of the religious thing is generator of values and attitudes
for the development of the personality and the social integration.”15 However, the focus
quickly shifts from explaining the necessity of religion in modern-day society to the
particularities of Catholic doctrine. With a survey of the New Testament comes a strong
message about the role of the Church in society, past and present. The two textbook
genres indicate two corresponding traditions: one secular, leading to the relatively
unfulfilling pursuit of worldly happiness, and one religious, guiding students towards a
life of faith and reverence. However, neither presents a balanced view of the fundamental
texts of modern moral philosophy.viii This failure to address critical issues of identity and
morality from a neutral perspective is a possible cause of the ambiguity felt by Granadans
vii
Except when applied to politics in order to inform the creation of a moral society.
viii
Although it must be remembered that these are primary and secondary textbooks, the text is quite
transparent to the underlying philosophy.
10
toward their culture and history and of the polarizing vacuum that pervades issues of
multiculturalism. Textbook reform can be the vanguard of Spain’s addressing its own
issues with cultural identities. However, first, it must thoroughly exposing the implicit
partialities embedded within the present texts. Although no textbook is without its
controversy over bias and misinformation, I thought that the Spanish textbooks should
have better explained the tenets of Islam so that students could understand the religion as
a legitimate way of life, rather than a mysterious and distant presence. Textbooks should
engage in general discussions about sacrality and the importance of ritual without
necessarily privileging those of any particular group. Although they could use somewhat
broader curricular horizons, the Catholic textbooks function well in instructing Catholic
students; however, to be useful, parallel curricula should be developed for Spain’s
religious minorities (including Jews and Protestants) so that all students learn the same
ethical lessons.
I briefly met with Dr. Rafael López Guzmán, Professor of Art History at the
University of Granada. He saw the city’s religious dualism as a defining characteristic:
“Rome and Islam constructed the city.”ix Mudéjarx art comprises an integral element in
the city’s architecture. The cathedrals, he noted, are really just transformed mosques, and
many of the traditions, social norms, and forms of conduct result from what he called a
“cultural synchronism.” Walking back home afterwards along the Gran Vía del Colón, I
observed how the modern city created space for both legacies: to my left, the shops along
Elvira and Caldería Nueva streets bustled with activity, selling handcrafted wares
imported from Morocco and the Middle East; to my right, behind the main cathedral, the
ix
“Rome” referred to the Catholic Church, rather than the Roman Empire.
x
“Mudéjar” is the term for both the Moors living in Catholic kingdoms after the reconquista and the art
style they perpetuated, which combined Islamic forms with contemporary European designs. Mudéjars
were converted to Christianity in the sixteenth century became Moriscos.
11
modern shopping center, replete with the most fashionable brands and glamorous stores,
sprawled westward. Each side drew inspiration from the other: the shopping center’s
narrow streets echoed those of the Albaicín, while the numerous restaurants along Elvira
Street have adapted to the modern tourist economy, advertising their specialties and
offering multilingual menus. Reflecting on this conjunction, I remembered something
Dr. López Guzmán had said, that only Granadans can inherit their city’s past.
That evening, I met with Mohamed el-Hadat of Mediadores Interculturales, which
monitors and prevents religious discrimination by arbitrating disputes between groups.
He acknowledged the magnitude of the problem, which involved the concepts people use
to understand society. Although there is no xenophobia, there is fear. Granada’s Muslims,
4% of the population, are marginalized because they do not participate in civic life. To
alleviate these complex problems, his group looks for points in common to begin the
mediation. Often the “mediator is the translator” between different perspectives. The
ultimate goal is cooperation: if everyone doesn’t work together, they all eventually lose
out. In this way, the group’s reaction to a situation can begin to build connections. He
commented that the Ayuntamiento (municipal government) does not have much contact
with smaller organizations such as his. It also doesn’t understand the complex struggles
facing immigrants as they try to establish themselves in a community, pursue
employment, and secure legal residency. Greater civic organization among the
immigrants and with the general community is needed to prevent further segregation.
Reflecting on the day’s interviews, I found it interesting that Mr. El-Hadat and Dr.
López Guzmán held quite different views regarding the progress of relations between
Islam (and Muslim community) and the Spanish government. Looking back over 30
12
years of democratic development and nearly a century of changes in Spanish
historiography, Dr. López Guzmán observed how Granadans’ conception of Spain as an
exclusively Catholic country was being replaced by a more pluralistic understanding that
accords to each monument or artwork its unique genealogy. In contrast, Mr. El-Hadat
saw how a burgeoning immigrant population and the municipal government’s inability to
mediate conflicts could allow the perpetuation of negative stereotypes and an increase in
antagonism and disjuncture. It seemed to me that in different ways, each was correct:
although the ‘official’ government perspective was one of multiculturalism and tolerance,
its incapacity or unwillingness to change social norms to create a more open and
accepting atmosphere has allowed continued discrimination.
In order to understand the network of social service organizations that have
reached out to the Moroccan immigrant community, I next met with Charo de Gorostegui
of Granada Acoge, which provides legal and occupational services and has created a
thriving support network. Ms. de Gorostegui estimated that there are approximately 9000
documented and 4000 undocumented immigrants in Granada, most of whom are young
and recently arrived. In analyzing the challenges they face, she noted several prominent
trends. First, there is marked “cultural racism” in the hiring of immigrants: employers
tend to favor Ecuadorians over Moroccans due to the perception of cultural affinity, and
the former enjoy a higher quota of residency permits. Second, numerous instances of
racism indicate how entrenched the problem is: “it is very difficult to change
dispositions.” Third, Spaniards’ unwillingness to take low-wage jobs, particularly in the
agricultural sector, has created an “ethnic labor segmentation” of the work force.
Unfortunately, the Spanish state does not have a clear policy or a political will to prepare
13
one. Because national administrations can change every four years, they react to
immediate situations rather than dedicating themselves to creating what is needed for
lasting institutional change. The Andalusian government, Ms. de Gorostegui, must
“create bases of services for immigrants,” offering information, legal counseling and
employment opportunities. To achieve this, pressure must come from the general
population, which must be informed of both the true nature of immigration and the
different ways the government can improve the situation.
Out of their small office, Granada Acoge acts primarily as a resource bank for
immigrants, distributing information about housing, employment, health services and
legal protection. It connects recent immigrants to established communities, and organizes
new groups. Finally, Granada Acoge raises awareness among Granadans of the problems
of discrimination and marginalization. However, I found that perhaps their most valuable
function was their weekly social teas, attended by immigrants, volunteers and other
Granadans. I came to the tea that evening and was impressed by the event’s ability to
create a space of safety and relief and facilitate the creation of strong connections
between disparate individuals. Lively discussions unfolded in several languages
(Spanish, French, Arabic and probably Berber) between classes, age groups and
ethnicities. I chatted with teenagers about soccer, charity networks with a volunteer and
politics with Moroccan students, the latter of which consisted of them thoroughly and
incisively grilling me about the various idiosyncrasies and peccadilloes of American
politics and foreign policy. The tea connected all of Granada Acoge’s other services by
helping immigrants learn the language and culture, giving Granadans contact with real
people and encouraging constructive and proactive dialog. It gave participants the
14
opportunity to take a primary role in shaping a hybrid Moroccan-Spanish identity that
serves as a point of cultural unity for immigrants, a reference point for Spaniards to
understand them and a unique foundation for the construction of a community.
I was extremely impressed with Granada Acoge’s ability to mobilize resources to
identify and solve the most pressing issues facing Granada’s immigrant population. Their
pragmatic, hands-on approach contrasted with larger cultural organizations that I visited,
such as Fundación Legado Andalusí (Andalusian Legacy Foundation), which receive
significant corporate and government sponsorship to put on special programs that
highlight particular aspects of Islamic culture or Muslims’ contributions to Andalusian
life.xi Although the programs teach a great deal in dynamic and appealing ways, often
through a high-tech medium (for example, with an interactive web interface), they do not
attempt to address the difficulties expressed by Granada’s Muslim population. Although
in their glossy (often bilingual) prospectuses, they claim as a goal building mutual
cultural literacy, their methods are highly ineffective in this, for it is unlikely that isolated
exhibits and school programs have the power to change popular sentiment. Reading
through the carefully-designed brochures, which contrast in format and style with
Granada Acoge’s no-nonsense statistics and realist analyses, I thought that a better
strategy for increasing intercultural understanding would be to discuss Islamic culture
today, perhaps even highlighting the traditions of the Moroccans in order to erase the
‘Moro’ characterization from the popular mindset.
Later that day, I discussed the nature of the Granadan Muslim community with El
Hadji Ahradou Faye of the Andalusia chapter of SOS Racismo, an NGO that combats
xi
For example, I attended an excellent exhibit entitled “El Jardín Andalusí” (The Andalusian Garden)
organized by Fundación de Cultura Islámica (Islamic Culture Foundation) that explored the Moors’
employment of a wide variety of plants in their gardens. It was fascinating but completely unrelated to any
of the issues facing present-day Granada or Spain.
15
political and labor discrimination by documenting it, denouncing it to the press,
researching causes and making recommendations to municipal and regional authorities.
The organization works directly with the Ayuntamiento to develop specific strategies,
such as intercultural education programs for youth. The chapter itself is of the same scale
and composition as Granada Acoge. According to Mr. Ahradou, the primary divisions in
the Muslim population of Granada are between converts and Moroccans and between
Sufis and non-Sufis. Some mosques are members of the umbrella organization FEERI
(Federación Española de Entidades Religiosas Islámicas), others not. Combined with the
external financing that some mosques (such as the Grand Mosque of Granada) receive,
these tensions have created significant divisions. Complicating this dilemma is the
Spanish cultural policy of ‘assimilationism,’ which excludes immigrants by challenging
their beliefs and imposing socioeconomic consequences to the maintenance of a Maghreb
identity. Mr. Ahradou would like to see mosques be able to build the kind of relationship
with the Ayuntamiento that Catholic churches currently enjoy, in which the government
supports politically and financially the religious institution’s providing of basic social
services. Discussions have always existed, but the government has always claimed that
the Muslim community is not cohesive enough to present a unified front for negotiation.
He would also like to see a liberalization of residency requirements and greater voting
opportunities to allow immigrants to have a voice in their communities. He insisted that
there exists a European Islam, and that the governments of Europe have the responsibility
of providing for it. However, they must focus on political integration while respecting
cultural differences. However, Muslims must also buy into this concept and accept its
norms, which may conflict with those of their country of origin. I noticed that, as a
16
human rights watchdog for Granada, Mr. Ahradou was in a unique position to call for
reforms. However, I was struck by perception that although neither civil society leaders
nor the government wanted discrimination, nobody had stepped forward with a unified
plan to combat it. Instead each group works towards tolerance without municipal,
regional or national coordination. It seems like this would be possible, accomplished
through a coordinated campaign in public exhibits, curricular changes, newspaper
columns, advertisements, etc. However, leaders would first need to determine the most
effective course of action, which I would imagine would be a contentious conclusion.
The next day, I returned to the University of Granada, to talk with Javier Rosón, a
researcher at the Intercultural Studies Laboratory (LDEI). He echoed Mr. Ahradou’s
observation of the numerous and profound differences separating the Spanish converts
and the immigrants. First, each side claims to have a deeper and more legitimate
understanding of Islam, which is complicated by the proliferation of Sufism among the
converts. According to Mr. Rosón, the converts are more orthodox in their practices and
more interested in establishing religious authority. Second, each side has specific
concerns that does not relate to the other. While converts have spearheaded efforts to
change the tone of the Día de la Toma, the immigrants don’t necessarily want to
challenge the established tradition. The converts have tried to recover the Al-Andalus of
myth, while immigrants simply want to establish themselves economically and socially.
Third, each group remains so isolated from the other that it seems impossible that they
could ever unify to create a single voice for Muslims in Spain, which would significantly
enhance their effectiveness. Meetings between leaders do not facilitate dialog and the
two major groups, FEERI and UCIDE (Unión de Comunidades y Islámicas de España),
17
have been unable to unify under the banner of the Comisión Islámica de España. As SOS
Racismo’s Mr. Ahradou notied, excluded from this struggle is the Senegalese community,
who remain insular but marginalized.
In reality, all Muslims in Spain face many common dangers, such as the threat of
Día being used by extreme right-wing groups to perpetuate the “myth of
fundamentalism” – the notion of Spaniards’ pure European ancestry. Both people suffer
from discrimination caused by the public “visibility” of Islamic symbols such as the
hijab. From this commonality, Mr. Rosón asserted, must come a new Spanish Muslim
identity, replete with values, symbols and a support system of imams and community
organizations. Regional and national governments have some responsibility for creating
a social atmosphere to facilitate this: teachers must impart lessons in tolerance and
parents, the primary source of children’s’ training and awareness, must correct mistakes
and not condone discriminatory attitudes. Rather than allowing employers to hire other
immigrants when Moroccans picket for higher wages, the government could intervene
and establish labor contracts. I was impressed with the potential and ambition of the
LDEI, which Dr. García chairs, to take a strong leadership position by making
empirically-driven recommendations and acting as an outside observer and mediator of
antidiscrimination and community-building programs. The academic fields of
multicultural and immigration studies are certainly rich with useful theory, but they could
benefit from a long-term case study such as Granada. However, in order to fulfill their
potential as catalysts for change, LdEI members must be willing to move beyond the
university’s ‘ivory tower’ and onto the streets to engage residents and convince them to
buy into the process.
18
That evening, I met with members of the Moroccan Students Association of the
University of Granada, whose work highlights important issues facing the community.
The university currently hosts 2000 Moroccan students, 90% of whom study in the
School of Pharmacy in the hopes of using their Masters degrees to pursue a career in the
burgeoning pharmaceutical industry back home. Unfortunately, the university does not
have many services to accommodate foreign students: it is difficult to get residency cards,
and credits do not easily transfer between Morocco and Spain. Because Morocco has no
consulate in Andalusia, the students could not obtain the residency papers necessary to
find employment. The students formed the association to assist others in finding services
and to help the university administration to better accommodate the Moroccan student
population. According to the members, Moroccan students feel alienated and
disconnected from the Granadan community. The lack of on-campus housing means that
they live scattered throughout the city in apartments. University students arrive with
stereotypes, creating an atmosphere of division. Each objects to particular elements of
the other’s culture: Spaniards do not accept veiling, and Moroccans disapprove of
drinking. Although Granadans welcoming, they exhibit a tendency to classify people
without recognizing it. At the same time, many Moroccans find their values and
experiences in conflict with each other; lessons from home do not match their
perceptions.
Political attitudes add another layer of friction. Modern-day youth receive a great
deal of information from television, which, as the members pointed out, refers to Al
Qaeda as ‘Islamic.’ The unpreparedness of the Spanish government to teach about Islam
and ensure the dissemination of accurate information about global politics has created
19
fear among people of a cultural clash. The members perceive Spain as ‘assimilationist’
rather than as willing to integrate ethnic, religious and geographic minorities into its
society (‘España pura’ as one member called it). The members would like to see real
commitment to change at all levels: “we don’t want Kleenex policy.” Granada benefits
from the money that students bring to the city, but without a way to pursue legal
employment, the students find life very difficult. Working with ATIME, the Moroccan
workers’ union, the association seeks to actively combat discrimination on campus and in
Granada by creating discussion and intercultural programs. The members saw France’s
foreign student policy, which recognizes students’ need to work, as superior to that of
Spain.
I enjoyed speaking with the association members, who were hopeful of the future
and seemed willing to work through intercultural issues in Granada. Learning about the
social atmosphere at the University of Granada, I was struck by the great contrast with
the great lengths taken by American universities to create an open and accepting campus
environment. Although the University was immense, departments were distributed in a
European style throughout the city. However, even the Cartuja complex, which contained
the central humanities building several schools, seemed to lack any sense of community;
its purpose was entirely educational and was built on a steep hill, precluding any common
spaces such as the ubiquitous American campus quad. Although many buildings
contained cafeterias, there were no student centers or places for congregation. This lack
of functional public space discourages meaningful contact between students of different
origins, which might lead to the ongoing public dialog and interpersonal exchange
necessary to defuse tensions and overcome stereotypes.
20
My most interesting interview was with three Moroccan immigrants at another
Granada Acoge tea. Each was in their early twenties; one had spent six years in Spain,
another one year and the third, six months. They said that they were in Spain exclusively
to find a job and earn money. Spain presents them with a thorny Catch-22: although
other countries offer better rights, services and community, Spain has the best
employment opportunities and the lowest cost of living. If they could obtain money and
residency papers, they would move elsewhere because they don’t feel comfortable in
Spain: “people say to others, ‘I don’t want to work with Moroccans’,” and people in
Almería (a neighboring province) react to women who wear the hijab. They
acknowledged that Spaniards exhibit a “difference in mentality” “when they know we’re
Arab.” They find that “half of the things [Spaniards learn] are lies,” such as that the
Alhambra was ‘improved’ by Christians. When I asked what the Alhambra means to
them, they said that it is very difficult to accept the Islamic monument a commercialized
tourist attraction. However, although “no [adult] Spaniard wants a foreigner to enter their
county,” youth are more accepting. They are disheartened by incidents of discrimination,
but they see it as part of the reality of immigrant life in Spain. Even though jobs exist in
Spain, the country’s economic policies make it difficult to earn a living: employers are
not legally bound to pay fair wages, and every change in national administration brings
unpredictable changes in the Foreigner’s Law (Ley de Extranjero), which governs
immigration. Because there is no Moroccan embassy outside Madrid, it is expensive and
logistically difficult for them to begin the residency application process. Spaniards only
want to speak Castilian, creating an often-insurmountable hurdle. Besides better rights
protections, they would like to see improved access to health services: when the Red
21
Cross finds out they are immigrants, they leave. Unfortunately, I see them facing an
uphill battle to find both their citizenship and acceptance in Spain. Regarding
participation in established Muslim communities, the immigrants said that the groups
within the mosques are only for Spanish Muslims, not Moroccans. They find that the
Eid-al-Adha (Fiesta del Cordero) is particularly difficult to celebrate. I asked about
which community they most identify with, hoping that they would describe themselves in
hyphenated terms (e.g. African-Spaniard). However, because they see Spain as simply a
transitional location, they do not identify with the area or its people and describe
themselves as Muslims and Moroccans who happen to be currently living in Spain.
Later that evening, I spoke with Lahsen el-Himer, the imam of the Mezquita
Omar. located in an unassuming retail space in the city’s middle-class northwest, and
president of the Islamic Community of Granada, a “religious entity” that is “more than a
mosque”: it seeks to Islamic create spaces for students and families. His overall goals are
to create a space for participation in Islamic life and to demonstrate that coexistence and
tolerance is possible. The Community belongs to the national umbrella federation of
UCIDE, whose goal is to provide an intellectual culture for students and workers. It does
not receive funding from the government, though Mr. el-Himer said that he had good
contacts within the government. He creates programs on a case-by-case basis, putting on
a Muslim festival at a local high school, although he would like to expand them to a
regional level. When I brought up the political contrast between France and England, he
spoke of the necessity of integration rather than assimilation. Unfortunately, the
application of laws of religious equality depends on the political will. Current Prime
Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has the political will to negotiate with the Islamic
22
federations, but there should be a solution that does not depend on politicians. Some of
this will depend on the ability of Muslims to maintain their values while contributing in
the development of the society. They must work together despite differences in the
interpretation of religious precepts because, ultimately, they seek the same end: to create
space for cultural development and participation. I found it interesting that although each
imam spoke of coexistence and tolerance, such a marked divide exists within the Muslim
community. It would seem that the leaders, who seemed very personable and
conciliatory, should be able to overcome religious differences or a rivalry for the
legitimate claim to Andalusia’s Islamic past and aim towards the shared goals of greater
recognition of Islam and the expanded delivery of services and protections. However, it
seemed to me that the Spanish converts, observing the popular trepidation over the
possibility of Moroccan immigration, want to carve out a niche in the nation’s social
consciousness as ‘real’ Spaniards who happen to practice Islam. While this may have
allowed them to gain prominence within the Spanish polity, it has made political
unification and coordination difficult.
To better understand the nature of the Spanish public education system, I sought
an interview with a representative of the autonomous community’s education department.
Upon arriving in Granada, I initially contacted their local office to inquire about meeting
with the coordinator of Islamic education. I found that none of the staff had heard of the
November 9, 2004 announcement that in January 2005 Spain would begin teaching
classes in Islam would be taught on the mainland.xii16 I eventually ascertained through
extensive telephone inquiries to Madrid that the Religious Affairs Department of the
xii
Spain offers classes in Islam in Ceuta and Melilla, two small patches of territory in North Africa
surrounded by Morocco in which a large percentage of citizens practice Islam.
23
Justice Ministry, whose director, Mercedes Rico-Godoy, announced the classes, had not
communicated this to the Ministry of Education and Science, which directs educational
policy. As I later learned, such pronouncements are regularly offered like appeasements;
the reality is that the national government has not fulfilled a promise made in 1996 to
fully support Islamic education.
I spoke with Javier Botrán, the Director of IES (Instituto de Educación
Secundaria). For children who do not speak Spanish, 10 hours per week of language
immersion is offered. Madrid hires professors based on the annual education budget, and
the individual schools have no control over the process except to negotiate with the Junta
de Andalusia based on specific student needs. However, the main problem is that
teachers are hired to fill shortages in classroom hours rather than gaps in knowledge.
Since all professors teach 18 hours per week, some end up teaching subjects outside their
field of expertise, such as religion. In this particular subject, Mr. Botrán emphasized, all
students attend classes in “religious cultures” and ethics (see discussion above), and a
class in Catholicism is optional. Other religious classes, he said, do not function because
the students are not motivated.
I later spoke with José Manuel Palma of the IES Cartuja, a middle school in the
northern area. In theory, he said, when a student matriculates, a class should be offered in
his or her religion. The reality is that teachers are not requested. Rather, the state decides
whether to hire a religion teacher. Catholic students can attend a class on their religion.
However, while the class is optional, there are no educational alternatives – the only other
activity is study help. Intercultural activities are part of all curricula, and the parents’
association helps create activities. This interview confirmed for me the
24
incontrovertibility of the connection between the educational administrative structure and
the lack of classes in Islam. Whether a particular will towards discrimination drove the
desire for status quo or whether it was simply a case of bureaucratic inertia, the
centralization of educational policy deprived those best equipped to respond to
demographic changes – the directors of primary and secondary public schools and
municipal educational officials – the ability to implement solutions. However, if the
Spanish government were to decentralize educational planning, it would need to
strengthen local alliances between government, social organizations and research
institutions in order to prevent a tyranny of the majority.
One of my final interviews was with Malik Ruíz, the president of the Grand
Mosque. Ironically, although he maintains the most public presence of any of Granada’s
Muslim leaders, he was the most difficult to reach: I had to submit credentials and draft a
letter explaining by background and intentions. The first modern Islamic communities in
Andalusia, including the current group in Granada, were begun in the 1970’s by members
of the Murabitun.17 Among the sect’s set of beliefs is that all Muslims should abandon
their nations’ currencies in favor of the Islamic dinar to “challenge the hegemony of the
US dollar.”18 Although the influence of the founders’ extremism has long since faded, 19
their vision of Islam as the spiritual solution to the secularism sweeping Western Europe20
has continued to inspire mosque leaders. Completed with funding from Libya, Morocco
and Gulf monarchies21 after a twenty-year struggle to secure the stunning location in the
Albayzín, it stands as a dramatic assertion that Islam is in Spain to stay. Although he
asserted that the Grand Mosque was founded on the model of an “open mosque,” the
impression I received from speaking with others was that the mosque primarily served
25
converts (Mr. Ruíz himself converted in 199222). He spoke of an articulation of an
existing European-Muslim identity, which suggested that the Grand Mosque converts are
trying to assume a leadership role in the development of Spain’s Islamic policy, a move
that could empower members of the group in the short term, but might deleteriously
impact immigrants, who could become outcasts within their already marginalized
community. I left the brief and painstakingly scheduled interview a bit frustrated, as we
had managed to gloss over the Grand Mosque’s major controversies (such as its location)
and accusations leveled against it (such as it not being very welcoming to Moroccans).
Given Mr. Ruíz’s national and international prestige, I doubt he would have admitted or
addressed them in a balanced manner. Certainly, his denials of a division between
converts and immigrants were contradicted by my interviews with other leaders and by
the conclusion of Liliana Suárez-Navaz, that “many [immigrants] dispute the
‘authenticity’ of Spanish converts as leaders of the Islamic community of Granada.”23 I
concluded that although the Grand Mosque creates an ‘official’ center for Islam in
Granada that helps establish the community’s presence, its attempt to position itself as the
official representative (much in the way a cathedral would eclipse all other churches)
could cause future difficulties.
Walking home from my final day of interviews, I reflected on the depth and
complexity of the issues facing Granada and its Muslim community. My original
research concept – to investigate classes in Islam – turned into a sociological journey
through the profound complexities of the politics of identity and a political study of the
challenges of immigration to Southern Europe. Clearly, the history of the city has helped
shape present granadino attitudes, particularly the discrimination expressed by many of
26
my Muslim interviewees. The transformation of Granada into a tourist destination has
made its Islamic past suddenly appealing (and profitable), but many questions remain
about the veracity of its historical remembrance and the ulterior motives of those
involved in it. Larger and more divisive issues such as the role of religion in the Spanish
public sphere and the claim to the legitimate inheritance of the city’s Islamic heritage.
Each merits a thorough exploration, for the answers will have not only lasting
consequences for the societies of Granada and Spain, but also an impact on the
definitions such global constructions as ‘Christendom’ and ‘the Islamic world’ and ‘the
West’.
While Granada remains a thoroughly Catholic city, associations such as LDEI and
Granada Acoge have created important opportunities for underrepresented groups, such
as the city’s Muslim community, to make their voices heard. However, as the problems
of public education illustrate, significant challenges lie ahead on the path to integration
and multiculturalism. However, unlike many other European countries, Spain possesses
a rich and proud Islamic history. Muslim rule from the 711 landfall of the Umayyads to
the 1492 capitulation of the Nazaris was characterized by the spirit of convivencia, in
which each of the religious communities was allowed to establish its own laws.
Reaching through layers of interpretation to access this past provides the basis for this
process.
GRANADA’S MULTILAYERED PAST
The city’s past offers important cultural categories and concepts for defining
Spanish multiculturalism. However, they are often hidden beneath the standard Spanish
27
history that casts Christian warriors, namely Rodrigo (El Cid) and the Catholic Kings as
heroes and Muslims, such as Tariq and Boabdil,xiii as adversaries. This story, authored by
nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians and taught throughout the Franco period 24,
that has most profoundly influenced modern-day granadino perspectives on Muslims,
Islam and the city’s Moorish heritage. However, it does not tell the complete story, and
by removing layers of interpretation it is possible to understand the ways in which the
city’s past can shape its present identity.
Moorish rule saw a flowering of civilization along the Guadalquivir River.
Governance stemmed from a cultural policy of convivencia (‘coexistence’) of religious
tolerance that encouraged minorities to take active roles in civic life. 25 Although the
Umayyads attempted to create a kingdom equivalent to the one they lost in Damascus
(hence their later use of ‘Caliphate’), in reality the land was a rich, dynamic cultural
meting pot, best exemplified by Córdoba’s Grand Mosque (begun in 786), “a rich
amalgam of Roman, Visigothic, Byzantine and Syrian Islamic architectural and
ornamental ideas, some imported to Iberia from abroad, and others observed locally.” 26
Their distinctive style exemplifies the artistic wealth of the region’s Golden Age.
Elements of this style were integrated into subsequent buildings, reaching into the
twentieth century, indicates the centrality of Moorish designs to the local identity.
Moreover, as Robin Totton notes, the fandango style of flamenco,27 particularly the
granaina,28 can be traced back to Moorish dance forms. Ruggles points out that the
mothers of future Umayyad rulers were often Berber, Frankish or Basque.29 The region’s
prosperity as a global center of agriculture production and trade generated great wealth
xiii
The last Emir of Moorish Granada, called Muhammad XI (sometimes Muhammad XII) by European
sources and Abu Abdullah by Arabic sources, the latter of which became corrupted into the current moniker
Boabdil.
28
for the Umayyad rulers, allowing them to develop their cities into some of the world’s
foremost artistic and intellectual capitals. Dr. Carmen Trillo San José, Professor of Arabic
Studies at the University of Granada, described the use of Moorish irrigation techniques
after Andalusia’s conquest and subsequent sociopolitical restructuring. In many cases,
the old techniques have survived to the present day simply because they are the most
effective.
However, 19th- and early 20th-centrury historians rejected much of the period’s
actual history, preferring to craft a tale of subjugation and moral decay and infusing into
Spanish historical remembrance a “‘Thousand-and-One Nights’ atmosphere,”30 reflecting
their own Orientalism rather than accurately characterizing Umayyad rule as decadent.
For example, Washington Irving’s The Alhambra captures this folkloric mystique
attached to that building,31 and the book’s commercial success ensured the proliferation of
this image throughout Europe and the United States, even though it was a work of pure
fiction. That today’s landmark buildings of Andalusia (Córdoba’s Umayyad Grand
Mosque, Seville’s Almohad Giralda, Málaga’s Hammudid Alcazaba and Granada’s
Nazari Alhambra) were largely constructed under the reign of Islamic rulers highlights
the power of the legacy of the era.
In the collective Spanish memory, the reconquista, the retaking of Iberia by
Christian forces began with the minor Second Battle of Covadonga in 722, not chronicled
until two centuries later but glorified today as the “cradle of the reconquest.” 32 In this
remembrance, the reconquista acts as a counter-narrative to that of convivencia and the
Islamic dynasties, creating a linear historical narrative out of a protracted series of battles
whose causes and outcomes depended on a wide variety of factors such as the political
29
stability of each side.xiv Two central beliefs anchor the general theory of a linear historical
progression: that the Reconquest completely reshaped the demographics of the Iberian
Peninsula and that “pure” Spaniards descend only from the Catholic conquerors.
However, both are refuted by historical modern DNA evidence.33
The Reconquest culminated in La Toma de Granada (Taking of Granada), the
Catholic Kings’ capture of the city. The moment of the city’s fall, on the morning of
January 2, 1492, marks a momentous historical turning point not only for the city, but
also for the course of world events. Although the Emirate, isolated on the Iberian
Peninsula and well beyond the extent of the Ottoman Empire’s ability to help, was
doomed, the final capture, marking the triumphant end of the 770-year reconquista, was
meticulously planned and personally executed by Ferdinand and Isabella. This event is
celebrated annually in the Fiesta del Día de la Toma de Granada, one of the most lavish
of the archetypical “Moros y Cristianos” celebrations. In the drama,
The Moorish king presents himself as the legal heir to the last Muslim ruler of the
kingdom of Granada. The Christian leader invokes the Heart of Jesus Christ and
the Virgin Mary for help, whereupon an angel is sent to him as an ambassador
from Heaven. The Moorish king on his turn invokes Muhammad and is helped by
Lucifer.34
This supernatural alignment invokes a recurrent theme in sixteenth-century literature (e.g.
Torquato Tasso’s 1575 Crusader epic Jerusalem Delivered) of a European army
demolishing its Islamic foe thanks to divine intervention on the side of the “righteous”.
Consequently, in Granada’s reenactment, “The Moors are defeated and submitted
symbolically by conversion to Catholicism…The pageant shows the victory of the [good
Christians] over the [evil Moors], thus tying the destiny of the Spanish people to a heroic
xiv
During this period the various Christian kingdoms fought with each other at least as often as they fought
with Muslim forces. With few exceptions (such as the decisive Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa), the
Reconquest was actually quite sporadic and military progress as much on the gradual crumbling of Moorish
authority as the expansion of Christian power.
30
and cosmic cause.”35 The drama of the historical moment, its ready identification of the
expelled Moors as the barbarous ‘other’ and usage of Catholic tropes have helped to
enshrine the narrative as a Spanish myth of origin. Steeped in a nonwestern culture and
the longtime source of opposition to the Christian kings, “Granada long housed a
particularly fluid and dynamic frontier society distinct from the more established social
orders of many of Spain’s other major cities.”36 Although these celebrations are an old
tradition throughout Andalusia, the twentieth-century promotion of the linear narrative
has coincided with an increased popularity. In Granada the reenactment has become
quite controversial in recent years, prompting the municipal government in 2004 to
simultaneously stage a ‘Festival of the Cultures’ as an overtone-free celebration of the
city’s entire history and heritage. The 2005 celebration provoked a heated exchange in
the local opinion pages throughout the subsequent week.
As Spanish rule consolidated the Iberian Peninsula under a unified church and
state governance, local authorities made a conscious effort to marginalize and control its
Muslim population and to recast the city as a properly Christian city. At the turn of the
sixteenth century mass baptisms occurred in Granada. While its mudéjars, the Muslims
living under Christian rule who comprised the “overwhelming majority”37 of the
population, were forced to become moriscos, or converted Muslims, the sixteenth century
saw increasingly severe attempts to solve “the Morisco problem,”38 culminating in their
1609 expulsion, following their condemnation by Philip III as “the most obstinate of their
evil sect.”39 Opposition to the Moriscos served to strengthen the power and legitimacy of
the Spanish crown: “political imperatives of the infant central state developing in Spain
tipped the balance against the Moriscos. These people represented a common enemy or
31
‘counteridentity’ that could serve all the different Christian people in this polyglot
empire”40 The “ideology that transformed difference into deviance, beliefs into threats”41
tied racial opposition to imperial fervor, enshrining in the Spanish political psyche a false
pride in European identity and fear of the Moorish ‘other’ that still powerfully resonates
in the present day.
According to historian Simon Doubleday, “since the conquest of Granada,
Spanish identity has been based on a militant sense of difference from Islam,”42 and
certainly it enjoyed no greater legitimacy and official recognition than during the 38-year
rule of Francisco Franco, who infused his rhetoric with the language of reconquest and
“demanded conformity in the form of national Catholicism.”43 During this period, “the
‘principle of nationality’ endowed the notion of citizenship with ethnic content whose
peculiarity was that it is made invisible in relation to other purportedly less universal,
more locally focused cultural identities designated as ‘ethnic groups’ or ‘cultural
minorities’.”44 Historians of the age sought to find a biological difference between
Europeans and Arabs that could explain the perceived differences in the level of civility:
Although the Hispanic Christian and the Muslim agreed in maintaining the
conscience of their person and of the world in around (en torno) in compact
union, there was on the other hand a decisive difference; the direction of his vital
interest incited the Arab to be invested in objects exterior to himself. In the
Spaniard, the direction of the vital dynamism was the object of the person, by
being thus the reality of its structure, of that gist that makes intelligible the
history, and that I call vividura.45
These historians rejected attempts to create a continuous narrative, preferring to return to
old concepts of discrete sections of Spanish history: “The integrationalism xv of Spaniards
xv
By integracionalismo, Castro means the tendency to look inward, studying only the history of one’s own
civilization, rather than studying that of others.
32
is not a simple projection of that of Muslims.”46. Moreover, as historian Maria Rosa de
Madariaga notes,
the participation of Moroccan troops in the 1936 Civil War on the Francoist side
has been, to the best of my understanding, one of the factors most responsible for
reviving and ingraining the image, already negative, of the “Moor” in the
collective memory of the Spanish people.47
This ‘othering’ of Moors (and, by extension, all North Africans), led to a popular
association of Catholicism with the Spanish national identity, a connection which greatly
influences present-day civil society: “To all intents and purposes, Catholicism in Spain is
still not so much a religion as the religion, and its pre-eminence has long been reflected in
the unusually close ties between Church and state.”48 While these themes still remain, as
I discovered, they have been tempered by the secularization of modernity. Although
primary and secondary educational programs, which long reflected nationalist ideology,
were modernized following the death of Francisco Franco, a vocal set of critics contend
that “today’s young children have no idea what they are supposed to learn.” 49
Nationalism, “the concept of Spain [that] is based on the unquestionable assumption that
the state is one single entity,”50 makes the historical narrative, which ends in the creation
of the modern Spanish state, easy to teach. While much of the primary curriculum has
changed to reflect a more objective and cosmopolitan perspective, the nationalist
language remains dominant and continues to provide a context for popular social
conceptions and norms.
TOWARDS A MULTICULTURAL GRANADA
Chronicles of Spanish history, particularly those written around the sixteenth
century, focus on events leading up to the capture of Granada. These texts portrayed the
33
Moors in two lights: “on the ‘vilifying’ side, Moors are hateful dogs, miserly, treacherous,
lazy and overreaching. On the ‘idealizing’ side, the men are noble, loyal, heroic, courtly
– they even mirror the virtues that Christian knights aspire to.”51 Although the anti-
Muslim sentiment is fairly common (as exemplified by the 1430 Crónica Sarracina),
particular elements of the more favorable characterizations remain a part of the modern
remembrance. These descriptions, most often narrated as a secondary alternative to the
dominant narrative of the reconquista, offer important historical elements that present-
day leaders and groups such as LDEI could draw upon to create a more multicultural
civic identity. The contradictory portrayals of Boabdil highlight the presence of multiple
narratives and identify sources of identity for the present-day Muslims of Granada.
Boabdil is commonly portrayed, with peculiar empathy, as a tragic hero, symbolic
of everything forever destroyed by the sword of the conquering army. In writings by
sixteenth century authors, the recurrence of melancholy attached to the remembrance of a
fallen kingdom suggests a double layer to the granadino identity. Boabdil plays this role
in Granada’s memory: that the meme of the “Moor’s last sigh”52 remains so strong in the
city that celebrates the Día de la Toma speaks volumes about the profound depth of the
Moorish legacy surviving beneath the reconquista narrative.xvi Even Washington Irving,
the ultimate outside observer to Spanish culture, recognizes the weight of Boabdil’s
tragedy in his historical fiction Conquest of Granada: “Their obstinate resistance, says an
ancient chronicler, shows the grief with which the Moors yielded up the Vega, which was
to them a paradise and heaven.”53 Boabdil’s quiet dignity contrasts with the muscularity
projected by the Spanish crown.
xvi
Adding another dimension to the memory of Boabdil, the place at which he exhaled his final sigh has
become a tourist destination (Puerto del Suspiro del Moro).
34
Given these noble characteristics, how can the fallen king serve as a focus of
identity and a source of strength? Strategies for remembrance can be elucidated by
comparing him with Cuauhtémoc, the Aztec emperor of Tenochtitlán (Mexico City), who
capitulated to the Spanish conqustador Hernán Cortésxvii on August 13, 1521, after a
dramatic siege comparable to that of Granada. In the early years of colonial rule when the
Spanish governed through puppet emperors, the native Mexicans Cuauhtémoc came to
personify both the tragedy of the capture and the stoic heroism of remembrance. Today,
“Cuauhtémoc represents the indigenous resistance against Cortés.” He is “the modern
culture hero”54 who has undergone a complete “apotheosis” by followers of the
“Cuauhtémoc cult.” Two similarities in these dramas enable the Mexican remembrance
of their vanquished ruler to inform its Granadan counterpart.
First, while the Christians-vs.-Others skits are frequently staged in both Andalusia
and Mexico, in the latter the plays take on a more complex form and a moral ambiguity.
In the uniquely Mexican manner of weaving disparate and seemingly contradictory
elements into a narrative, the modern-day dances performed by indigenous communities,
“[adaptations] of the Spanish tradition”55 of Moros y Cristianos, revel in double entendres
and embedded subtexts: “although the names [of the characters in the dance] proclaim a
Christian victory, the masks reveal a hidden transcript that speaks instead of the triumph
of the Sun over pale-faced Spanish conquistadors.”56 “Cortés, if he appears at all is
represented by Pilate, who wears the mask of the devil.”57 Although the Mexican
remembrance takes a step beyond anything recorded in the literature on Granada by
xvii
Hernán Cortés (1485-1547) conquered the territory of modern-day Mexico for the Spanish crown. See
below.
35
creating a cycle in which the forces of Montezuma eventually prevail, the two narratives
share a profound melancholy that colors the memory of subjugation.
Second, the invocation of supernatural spirits haunting the landscape of their
former kingdoms connects both tragedies: just as the specter of the fallen Aztec emperor
haunts Valley of Mexico, Spaniards wait with anxiety for Boabdil to return to the site of
his former glory.58 In fact, some observers today see immigration from Muslim nations
as “Boabdil’s revenge”59. This image parallels the Mexican mythology of ‘Montezuma’s
revenge,’ which long symbolized the colonial government’s worst nightmare of a peasant
revolt.60 The structure of popular retellings of the Aztec dynastic cycles are anchored by
the future return of “a king perhaps named Motecuhzoma,”61 a “messiahlike figure,” to
“defeat the Spanish and initiate a new Indian hegemony.”62 Certainly the same revenge
complex fuels the fictitious Mayan conquest of Spain that closes Fuentes’s novella63 and
gives him opportunity to deliver his own interpretation of the conquest of the New
World64. Author Ilan Stevens comments, “A famous legend in Mexico, ‘The Revenge of
Moctezuma,’ suggests that if Hispanics are ever to regain control over their own destiny,
it shall happen by infiltrating the aggressor’s terrain.”65 The imagery of the past,
particularly that of a powerful indigenous emperor, provides a focal point for asserting
independence and strength.
As in Granada, in Mexico Catholicism became superimposed over a powerful and
resilient indigenous identity whose legitimacy was first recognized by chroniclers of the
conquest. However, for Europeans, the indigenous identity held its own appeal: “They
[the Indians] lived in a golden age: they did not know any measure for the land; nor [did
they know] judges, nor laws, they did not know writing nor trade: they lived day by day
36
and did not make plans for a longer period of time.”66 Much of the use of the concept of
a primitive ‘golden age’ was meant to highlight the violence perpetuated by the Spanish
soldiers67, whose conduct inaugurated the “Black Legend, in which the Christian
principle was often invoked as the measure with which to judge and condemn the
unquestionable cruelties perpetuated by the Spaniards in the New World.”68 This
romanticism of indigenous tranquilityxviii and its preservation through Christianized rituals
meant that it could not easily be ignored or eliminated. Nevertheless, for several
centuries, in colonial Mexico political and religious authority were virtually synonymous.
A similar process took place in Granada. As Israel Burshatin notes, the “total domination
over the Moor – the linking through teichoskopia, of metaphor and sword, the Moor as
chattel and as romantic Other – is a key moment…in shaping the Spanish Orientalist
tradition.”69 Spaniards needed to bestow upon the Moors qualities that made them a
worthy opponent. However, in doing so, they ended up creating a sympathetic
characterization that survived attempts to eliminate it.
However, neither the Catholic identity nor its indigenous counterpart has
prevailed in Mexico. Rather, a hybrid identity borrowing from both traditions has
emerged. Philosopher Octavio Paz observes that “Mexicans…act like persons who are
wearing disguises, who are afraid of a stranger’s look because it could strip them and
leave them stark naked.”70 This character, which Paz calls the pachuco exists as an
archetype within Mexican society whose “hybrid language and behavior represent a
physic oscillation between two irreducible worlds – the North American and the Mexican
– which he vainly hopes to reconcile and conquer.”71 Trapped between two great cultures,
xviii
Which is not altogether accurate; the empires of pre-Columbiuan Mexico rose and fell with great
velocity.
37
individuals are utterly alone in their struggle to discover their personal identity. Expelled
through time or space from the geographic center of power, they struggle to make sense
of the labyrinth of mystifying symbols in which they are trapped. In his attempt to
reconcile the opposite realms, a hybrid identity emerges as a compromise between the
two. The politically dominant identity functions only as an interface with society, while
the oppressed native identity continues to shape the way individuals truly think. Thus,
people with this identity can operate in the Catholic social sphere and its indigenous
counterpart because of their familiarity with both systems of signs and symbols.
However, Paz suggests that, in their hearts, Mexicans still hold faith in the native beliefs:
Christianity condemns the world, while the Indian conceives of personal salvation
only as a part of the salvation of society and the cosmos…nothing has been able
to destroy the filial relationship of our people with the divine [that is, the Aztec
panoply of gods].72
One can look for elements of this hidden identity by first weighing the relative
importance of current rituals and searching for parallels in preconquest times. Paz
skillfully dissects the lineage of the influential following of the Virgin of Guadalupe:
It is no secret to anyone that Mexican Catholicism is centered around the cult of

the Virgin…in the first place, she is an Indian Virgin…in the second place, the
scene of her appearance…was a hill that formerly contained a sanctuary dedicated
to Tonantzin, “Our Mother”…We know that the Conquest coincided with the
apogee of the cult of two masculine divinities…The defeat of these gods…caused
the faithful to return to the ancient feminine divinities.73
By aligning Catholic practice with indigenous beliefs and rituals, Mexicans took
ownership of the religion by interpreting it and integrating it into existing customs and
rituals, preserving elements of indigenous spirituality and cosmology while maintaining a
certain level of Catholic piety.
38
Could this process of conflict and eventual integration, well-documented and
well-articulated in Mexico, be taking place in Granada? Clearly, some historical realities
separate the two places, particularly the 1910-1917 Mexican Revolutionxix and subsequent
1926-1929 Cristero War,xx which led to the separation of religion from Mexican politics.
However, the evolution of national identity has taken place on a much larger time scale,
and although political developments matter in terms of the identities expressed by people
at a particular time, it is very difficult to eliminate the concept of the identity. For
example, although dictator Francisco Franco promulgated a nationalist identity that
denied the people any connections to their Islamic heritage, the idea of Islam in Spain
survived to be ‘re-discovered’ at the twilight of his rule. The politics of identity in
Granada are subtle and complex, and the comparison with a better-articulated modern
divided identity such as that of Mexico, can help illuminate the sources of contention and
provide insight into the opportunities for reconciliation.
Why does multiculturalism matter? Although the exact nature of Spain’s cultural
policy might seem an amorphous cultural category or a matter of semantics, it influences
popular attitudes and politics, which in turn, directly affect minority groups such as the
Muslim community. However, the economic and political realities of the twenty-first
century mean that Spain can no longer afford to cling to a belief that it is ethnically or
culturally homogenous; Spain will come to depend upon the contribution of its minority
xix
Sparked by a fraudulent election, it was fought primarily for control over farmlands. The primary result
was the 1917 Constitution (still in effect), which guarantees extensive labor protections and the separation
of church and state.
xx
Fought over controversial anticlerical measures initiated by the Mexican government, the war was ended
by a pact that decreed that religious instruction would only be in churches, that the clergy could petition
laws, that the church could control and manage its own properties.
39
communities and will need to prove them constitutionally guaranteed services such as
classes in Islam.
First, to modernize Spanish society and prepare it for the economic and political
realities of the twenty-first century, immigration must be accepted as a reality.
Immigration from the Maghreb will be the reality for Andalusia in the twenty-first
century. “Spain will need some 12 million foreign workers to sustain economic growth
over the next 50 years, according to the government.”74 In the past, agricultural
administration had tied class divisions into political rights, which excluded immigrants:
Class solidarity among those who, in local terms, ‘honestly work the land with
their own hands’ and local peasants’ utopia of equality and autonomy from
outside forces were progressively displaced by a new ideological universe of
impartiality and equality of citizens newly constituted before the law, under the
aegis of a purportedly rational and neutral state. Left at the margins of this
process were African immigrants, now categorized as foreign, disposable workers,
racially and religiously marked; they had become ‘dangerous’ men, with no rights
to settle down. Being categorized as ‘illegals’, their access to a shrinking welfare
state was now seen as an illegitimate threat.75
“Spanish immigration policy has been characterized by Janus-faced discourses and
measures on immigration issues.”76 Immigration law “produces and reproduces illegality
and thus effectively criminalizes immigrants, yet simultaneously implicitly condones
their presence” by not automatically deporting them upon their identification as such. 77
When I spoke with them, both the Moroccan students and immigrants conveyed their
frustration with current policy, despite current rhetoric. The perception of Spain as a
bridge to Europe is a both risky and unsustainable. In the short term, it could create the
perception among North Africans that immigrating through Spain will allow them to
shortcut other countries’ more restrictive barriers. In the long term, it might divert the
Spain’s focus from creating a welcoming environment in which immigrants can settle, a
40
necessary condition for maintaining a sufficient labor supply. “Spain’s legal framework…
has been one of the main factors in the generation of ‘undocumented’ labour supply”;
because immigrants cannot obtain an employment contract (required for entry)
beforehand, they enter illegally.78 The EU-influenced concept of “Fortress Europe” and
the “shift in the focus of the [policy] debate from immigration to ‘illegal’ immigration”79
reduces a normative discussion over policy into a polemical contest over principles.
Second, although much progress has been made to teach tolerance, racism persists
in Spain: when asked if they would expel Arabs from Spain if it were up to them, 26% of
respondents answered affirmatively in 1993,80 compared with only 11% in 1986.81 In a
1993 survey of youth, the most visible products of cultural undercurrents,82 50% of
respondents said that it would bother them to marry an Arab, a figure surpassed only by
the long-marginalized Gypsies; but only 8% would feel the same about a European.83 In
Granada,
the growing local visibility of the ‘other', that awakes a historic hold and a refusal
– by some of we will call muslimofobia, present in large sectors of granadino
society, in which, basically the Moroccan immigration is being exploited to awake
the old stereotypes of ‘poor, illiterate, quarrelsome, sexist, Moslems fanatic and
intransigents, etc’ with the return of the ‘Moors of the coast.' This xenophobia
anti-immigrant in general and the specific one of ‘Muslimophobia’ is confused in
the media representation of culture and religion.84
Discrimination extends into the political realm as electoral campaigns mix political and
cultural categories to appeal to voters. However, “the habitual question is, ‘will the
immigrants integrate’, and never presented as “will we integrate with the immigrants?’”85
Although economic statistics indicate otherwise, Spaniards perceive that Moroccans are
undercutting them in the race for employment, particularly in the low-wage agricultural
41
sector. Spain’s past use of Morocco and present use of Europe as a sociopolitical
reference point has helped create a polarized climate. In many places,
peasants are thus embracing (European) citizenship as an identity category, fusing

together ethnic loyalties and membership rights that depict Andalusians and
‘Moors’, or Europeans and Africans, as rivals. The labeling and criminalization
of immigrants was thus part and parcel of the legitimization of social control and
construction of modern legal subjectivities, which, in turn, perpetuated the
stratified and segmented social structure of rural Andalusia.86
The combination of this economic discontent and latent prejudice can erupt
unexpectedly into immense violence and chaos. Granada and other foci of immigration
must keep in mind El Ejido, Almería, as a particularly severe example of the
consequences of administrative inaction. The gateway to the winter farmlands of the
province’s interior, El Ejido witnessed a dramatic population explosion due to massive
immigration of foreign laborers, putting pressure on the civil infrastructure designed to
serve a populace with one of Europe’s highest per-capita incomes.87 In February 2000,
after a mentally ill Moroccan immigrant stabbed a Spanish woman, “local Ejidenses,
allied with imported fascists, descended upon the Moroccans’ hovels,” burning, beating,
and looting88. The conservative mayor, “secure in his local fiefdom”89, did nothing, and
of the 50 arrests made after national police quelled the violence, only 16 were
Spaniards90. “Associations involved with helping immigrants were targeted.”91 Although
much of the tension in El Ejido comes from the economic pressures of the heavy
agriculture in a desert environment, “the mutual distrust…seems to go deeper…and touch
a hidden nerve. ‘You hear people say: ‘They’ve come to take our land’’, said [a local
environmentalist].”92 The return to a primitive dichotomy of Moroccans and European
Spaniards threatens opportunities for economic coordination and the development of
support systems for the immigrant laborers Andalusian agriculture now depends on. “In
42
the particular case of African Muslim immigrants, their cultural difference is constructed
as a threat to the fundamental principles of modern liberal democracies.” 93 In order to
avoid this bleak dystopia, regional governments must implement social sensitization and
tolerance programs in order to prepare citizens for the realities of demographic changes.
Fortunately, such solutions already exist in the form of programs offered by grassroots
organizations, such as Granada Acoge’s brochure highlighting racially insensitive words
and proper substitutes (see figure 1). However, as I heard repeatedly from many
interviewees, the political will to undertake significant programs with difficult objectives
and indeterminate outcomes simply does not exist presently in Spain. In my opinion, if
fear of violence and chaos motivates people to anything, it should be towards engaging in
strengthening intercultural dialog, monitoring discrimination and supporting a healthy
local civil society network.
In order to create a positive labor environment, curb racism and provide
meaningful outlets for immigrant youth, Spain must make several important changes in
its social policy. Although they are neither readily apparent nor quick fixes to problems
in these three areas, they are ultimately necessary if Spain is to truly fulfill its role as a
bridge between civilizations.
First, it must move beyond relying on exhibits by cultural foundations for the
crucial task of mass cultural reeducation. The first step is the development of general
textbooks and curricula that specifically address the reality of Moroccan immigration
rather than speaking in a broad and abstract manner about multiculturalism. Secondly,
Spain must develop textbooks and other materials specifically for Muslims. The failure
to properly equip and train teachers means that often “two education systems are created
43
within the same school: one for native pupils and one for immigrant pupils, even though
not all immigrant pupils need the same back-up to adapt to the education system.” 94 I
would argue that secularism is not the best direction for Spain, as it would alienate the
Catholic Church and necessitate a profound national soul-searching in order to find
something to fill the gap left by faith. As the American experience with religion and
public life has demonstrated, the balance between church and state is always contentious.
Tariq Ramadan recommends local community engagement with the public schools “We
might even contemplate a ‘school for parents’…with courses that provide basic
information but also socialize fathers and mothers in the area of educational concerns.” 95
Furthermore, he argues, Islam must be taught independently, rather than as a subject in a
curriculum: “The universality of the message of Islam is not adequately served by an
intellectual hodgepodge through which students are supposed to acquire the tools they
need to face the difficulties and to discover for themselves how to use them.”96 Just as
Catholic textbooks integrate notions of social justice and order into lessons on doctrine
and spirituality, lessons for Muslim students must draw on core religious and
philosophical texts in order to reinforce the notion, expressed by numerous interviewees,
of “Islam as a way of life.” Despite being dwarfed by the Catholic population, Muslim
students deserve equal access to quality instruction and literature in schools. The
question of deciding how the texts are interpreted should be left as open as possible so
that each school can work with community groups to reach a consensus over its specific
traditions.
Beyond this, municipal governments could revisit the hidden subtext of events
such as the Dîa de la Toma and Reyes Magos celebrations in the interest of presenting the
44
events in their entirety. Beyond simply providing for political correctness, this conscious
reexamination would set an example for inquiries into other areas of municipal cultural
affairs. When setting economic policy, business and community leaders should take
immigrants’ unique skills and needs into account in order to both protect them against
marginalization and maximize their contribution to local wealth.97 To accomplish this,
the national government must recognize that the key to addressing difficulties in
providing social services is the inversion of present authority. Top-down governance,
dominated by centralized authorities who frequently misunderstand local contexts, leads
to situations similar to the that of the Albayzín, described to scholar Gunther Dietz by a
social worker:
There is no point of confluence among [Muslims], well, yes, their only point of
convergence is Allah, they say, but I tell them ‘What’s Allah to do with this mess?
Forget it!’ That’s why…they will never be able to achieve anything until…they
strategically choose a common path, in order to become real counterparts of
ours.98
This quote exemplifies the inevitable problems created when a large authority attempts to
categorize and administer communities in which they lack direct experience. National
government agencies must devolve authority, empowering local agencies to respond to
changing demographics or social conditions. The changes implemented by Birmingham,
England in the 1980’s might illuminate possible solutions for Granada and other cities
with a large Muslim community. That city’s Muslim Liaison Committee brought together
all major Muslim groups to draft a set of recommendations to the municipal education
department, emphasizing community involvement in the educational process. At the
conclusion of the yearlong process, the department issued a set of guidelines to its
schools covering Muslim holidays, traditions and sensitivities.99 Rather than hand down
45
arbitrary decrees or resign to letting chaos overtake order, the city government negotiated
with major actors in a contractual and consensual manner, allowing the organizations to
see their stake in the process. Granada could follow this example to ensure that each
Muslim group had a voice in planning its cultural programs and policy. This process
provides a modern alternative to traditional methods of political representation, such as
petitioning, protesting or running for office, all of which are nullified by the Muslims’
relative demographic triviality and social marginalization.
Second, however, rather than releasing all responsibility for creating an accepting
social environment, the national government should reinforce local efforts by
strengthening antidiscrimination laws. A study by the European Foundation concluded
that although there are numerous examples of well-implemented laws, “policies to
combat racial discrimination and promote equal treatment are not formulated at the
various levels” of governance.100 Concurrently, Spain must reform its immigration laws to
clarify divisions between residency and citizenship and to liberalize access to services.
This legal ambivalence, likely derived from a multilayered historical identity, places
immigrants in a precarious position between wanting to live and work in Spain and not
being able to enjoy the privileges of legal residency. While the immigrants I spoke with
at the Granada Acoge tea did not express fear of arrest or deportation, they were
concerned about being the victims of racist attacks (many mentioned El Ejido). Regional
authorities should adopt elements of successful reconciliation efforts: “A crucial element
in the integration process was participation by all parties in civil affairs. Immigrants were
considered social agents who should speak for themselves.”101 These reforms will give
46
administrations at all levels of governance more flexibility to deal with demographic and
economic changes.
Third, equally critical to the process of consensus-building is the will of Muslim
organizations to work towards the articulation of a moderate, mainstream Islamic
identity: although Islam provides a powerful source of identity for both the Spanish
converts and immigrants, it will most likely not “[replace] Marxism as the ideology of
contestation”, which Gilles Kepel finds happening in France102. Nevertheless, the
community must fight against the perception that it is expanding in a “completely
uncontrolled fashion.”103 Islamic associations that “help normalize the presence of
Muslims in the West”104 by assisting immigrants, teaching non-Muslims about their
religion and helping to build a common identity, must be strengthened. To do this, local
mosques must find points of unity and build upon them a structure to interface with the
municipal government. Rather than ignoring or rejecting immigrants and their needs,
Spanish converts, who hold a great deal of influence, must become their advocates. They
must advocate pragmatic policies, rather than radical notions such as the plan proposed at
a 2003 Granada conference for Muslims to stop using Western currencies in favor of a
reinstated gold dinar.105 Moreover, mosques must begin to develop independent social
services to offer Muslims an alternative to relying on Catholic charities for assistance.
Although this depends on capital that most mosques currently lack, the Spanish
government could help by cosponsoring programs. Most importantly, Islamic leaders
must come together to agree on a set of traditions and principles that defines Spanish
Islam. According to scholar Tariq Ramadan, unlike public schools, which encourage self-
expression and dialog, “the exact opposite is found in some mosques and Islamic
47
organizations [in Western Europe]…there is no room for discussion.”106 “To our way of
thinking, normalizing our presence without trivializing it means insisting, for Muslims,
not on sustaining a sense of Otherness but rather on an awareness of their belonging and
commitment to society in general.”107 Compromises with community leaders, which
facilitated the construction of the Grand Mosque of Granada, must be made in other areas
in order to ease the transition for Muslims and the Spanish government towards accepting
and embracing a permanent Muslim presence in Spain.
An important actor in the process is Morocco, which has far too many
employment-age youth for its own economy. Rather than accepting a northward flow of
immigration, it could strengthen ties with the Gulf states in order to create an eastward
emigration flow.108 For Morocco, questions of remittances, the traditional boon received
by a labor-exporting economy, must be dealt with as its emigrants begin to lose their
connections to their former country. Ultimately, the nation must abandon its emphasis on
cultural differences and commit to accepting Moroccan immigrants as equally legitimate
heirs to the glory of the Golden Age of Spain. In doing so, it will resolve the
contradictions of its present split identity and the subsequent anxiety of contemporary
politics. To transition from a split identity to a hybrid one would require a significant
reopening and reconciliation of past injustices, but it would lead to a strengthened
national identity and political unity. “Otherness,” Octavio Paz soliloquizes,
is a projection of oneness: the shadow with which we battle in our nightmares.

And, conversely, oneness is a moment of otherness, that moment in which we
know ourselves as a body without a shadow-or as a shadow without a body.
Neither within nor without, neither before nor after: the past reappears because it
is a hidden present.109
48
Most importantly, reconciling with the reality of the past will lay the foundation for a
national re-imagining along the lines of history and culture, rather than authority and
tradition. As Javier Rosón comments:
On the other hand, the increasing importance of immigration from the Muslim
regions of the Maghreb is widely accepted by the Andalusian intellectuals who
aim at ‘re-discovery’ and ‘re-invention’ by the Muslim roots of Al-Andalus; thus
arises a movement of muslimophilia.110
If the Granada, Andalusia and Spanish governments can channel the desire for change
into this multitiered cultural project, the unprecedented opportunity exists for a
fundamental redefinition of what it means to be Spanish: as Tomás Calvo Buezas
concludes, “today a malevolent collective paralysis among the adults, who do not dare to
promote to the youth humanitarian ideals, utopian messages, open horizons and illusions
of delivery (entrega) sacrificed to noble causes. Perhaps it is the expression of flat
pragmatism and empty consumerism or the old, invalid and disillusioned ones, but the
youth have the right to dream of the creation of a new world, more just and more
humane, without frontiers and above race and location.”111 The critical question,
however, is the determination of a specific social framework within which this
reconciliation and reconstruction could take place. Will Granada, as the historic focal
point of the convivencia that marked the blossoming of Moorish civilization, reach into
its past to provide the answer for Spain’s future?
49
1
Acknowledgements
• Dr. Dwight Reynolds, Professor of Islamic & Near Eastern Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara
• Rosa Rodríguez Valdivía, longtime Granadan
• María José Gálvez and Agustín García, ILYC Granada, S.L.
• Dr. Armando Vargas, Gaius Charles Bolin Fellow in Comparative Literature, Williams College
• Dr. Olga Shevchenko, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Williams College
• Special thanks to the Gaudino Trust Board of Williams College for providing the funding for my fieldwork.
Interviewees
• Dr. Rafael Gallego, Professor of Engineering, University of Granada, and Chair of Granada
Laica (“Secular Granada”)
• Carín Carasco, Junta Islámica de España
• Abdul-Qader Husni Qamhiyeh, Imam of the Mezquita de la Paz
• Zakaría Maza, Imam of the Mezquita del Temor de Allah
• Dr. Rafael López Guzmán, Professor of Art History, University of Granada
• Mohamed el-Hadat, Mediadores Interculturales
• Charo de Gorostegui, Granada Acoge (“Granada Welcomes”)
• Dr. Carmen Trillo San José, Professor of Arabic Studies, University of Granada
• Dr. F. Javier García Castaño, Professor of Anthropology,
Laboratorio de Estudios Interculturales (LDEI), University of Granada
• El Hadji Ahradou Faye, SOS Racismo
• F. Javier Rosón Lorente, Researcher, Laboratorio de Estudios Interculturales,
• University of Granada
• Hind Tsouli, Lemkhur Houda and Mohamed Eskarme,
Asociación de Estudiantes Marroquíes, University of Granada
• Dr. Emilio Molina López, Professor of Arabic Studies, University of Granada
• Francisco Garrido Fernández, Jefe del Servicio, Servicio de Gestión de Personal (“Personnel Management”),
Delegación Provincial de Educación y Ciencia de Granada
• Juan Rodríguez Hidalgo, Presidente, Confederación de Federaciones Católicas de Asociaciones de Padres de
Alumnos de Andalucía (CONCAPA) (“Catholic School Parents’ Federation”)
• Javier Botrán, Director, IES Albayzín
• 3 Moroccan immigrants
• Lahsen el-Himer, President, Mezquita Omar
• José Manuel Palma, Director, IES Cartuja
• Malik Ruíz, President, Mezquita de Granada
Secondary Citations
Poulter, Sebastián. “Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches in England and France.” Oxford Journal
of Legal Studies. 17.1 (Spring 1997). 44.
2
Poulter, Sebastián. “Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches in England and France.”
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 17.1 (Spring 1997). 50.
3
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 17.1 (Spring 1997). 51.
4
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 17.1 (Spring 1997). 62-63
5
In contrast, Melchior brings trinkets and Caspar brings toys. Both are portrayed as light-skinned. “Carrying coals
to naughty kids at Christmas.” Agence France Presse. 8 December 2004. Retrieved via Lexis-Nexis, 20 April
2005.
6
Ramadan, Tariq. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 126.
7
Aprender a Vivir: Propuesta Didáctica. Vol. 3. Madrid: Grupo Anaya, 1995. 94.
8
“Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy.” 20 April 2005. National Association of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapists
<http://www.nacbt.org/whatiscbt.htm>
9
La Vida Moral y la Reflexión Ética (Libro del Profesor). Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 1994. 13-14.
10
Maslow, Abraham H. “A Theory of Human Motivation.” Psychological Review. 50 (1943). 380.
11
12
13
14
Abad, Juan J. La Vida Moral y la Reflexión Ética. Madrid:McGraw Hill, 1995. 241.
15
Sánchez, M. Bello. Religión Católica 3. Madrid: Grupo Anaya, 1995. 12.
16
Sanz, Sara. “Las clases de religion islamica empezaran en el mes de enero. La directora de Asuntos Religiosos
afirma que comenzaran en Madrid, Barcelona, Andalucia y Levante, pero quiere extenderlas a toda Espana.” El
Mundo. 10 November 2004. 19:4.
17
Smith, Craig C. “Granada Journal: Where the Moors Held Sway, Allah is Praised Again.” New York Times. 21
October 2003. A4
18
Taib, Dzulkarnain. “Lead way in promoting use of Islamic dinar, Malaysia urged.” Business Times (Malaysia). 1
August 2001. 4.
19
Smith, Craig C. “Granada Journal: Where the Moors Held Sway, Allah is Praised Again.” New York Times. 21
October 2003. A4
20
Zarcone, Thierry. “Rereadings and Transformations of Sufism in the West.” Diogenes. 47.187 (Fall 1997): 110
21
Sennott, Charles M. “Seeking Madrid Motives in a Cradle of Muslim Glory.” Boston Globe. 28 March 2004.A6.
22
Smith, Craig C. “Granada Journal: Where the Moors Once Held Sway, Allah is Praised Again.” New York Times.
21 October 2003. A4.
23
Suarez-Navaz, Liliana. Rebordering the Mediterranean: Boundaries and Citizenship in Southern Europe. New
York: Berghan Books, 2004. 213.
24
I have the matriarch of the family I stayed with in Granada, Rosa Rodríguez Valdivía, for informing me about the
rigid political conformity and cultural narrow-mindedness of Francoist Spain and how it shaped the way Spaniards
think even a quarter-century after the Generalissimo’s death.
25
Ruggles, D. Fairchild. “Mothers of a hybrid dynasty: race, genealogy and acculturation in al-Andalus.” The
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies. 34.1 (Winter 2004).
26
Ruggles, D. Fairchild. “Mothers of a Hybrid Dynasty: Race, Genealogy and Acculturation in al-Andalus.” Journal
of Medieval and Early Modern Studies. 34.1 (2004). 80. The essay describes several specific examples of ideas
and techniques imported from non-Umayyad civilizations.
27
Totton, Robin. Song of the Outcasts. Portland: Amadeus Press, 2003.121.
28
Totton, Robin. Song of the Outcasts. Portland: Amadeus Press, 2003. 131.
29
Ruggles, D. Fairchild. “Mothers of a Hybrid Dynasty: Race, Genealogy and Acculturation in al-Andalus.” Journal
of Medieval and Early Modern Studies. 34.1 (2004). 88.
30
Harbron, John D. “Spain, Spanish Morocco and Arab Policy.” African Affairs. 55.219 (April 1956): 137. The
quote is of particular interest because the article in general praises Islamic accomplishments, noting on the same
page that “Moslem civilization in Spain possessed a superior position culturally.”
31
Buchanan, M. A. “Alhambraism.” Hispanic Review. 3.4 (October 1935). 270.
32
Boyd, Carolyn P. “The second battle of Covadonga: the politics of commemoration in modern Spain.” History and
Memory: Studies in Representation of the Past. 29 (Fall 2002): 37.
33
Arnaz-Villena, Antonio, Martinez-Laso, Jorge & Alonso-Garcia, Jorge. “Iberia: Population Genetics,
Anthropology and Linguistics.” Human Biology. 71.5 (October 1999): 725.
34
Driessen, Henk. “Mock battles Between Moors and Christians. Playing the confrontation of crescent and Cross in
Spain’s south.” Ethnologia Europea. 15.23 (1985). 112.
35
Driessen, Henk. “Mock battles Between Moors and Christians. Playing the confrontation of crescent and Cross in
Spain’s south.” Ethnologia Europea. 15.23 (1985). 112.
36
Coleman, david. Creating Christian Granada. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 3.
37
Coleman, David. Creating Christian Granada. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 1.
38
Perry, Mary Elizabeth. The Handless Maiden: Moriscos and the Politics of Religion in Early Modern Spain.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 17.
39
40
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 145-146.
41
42
Abend, Lisa and Pingree, Geoff. “Whose edifice is this? Spain peels back the layers of its identity.” Christian
Science Monitor. 26 May 2004.
43
Abend, Lisa and Pingree, Geoff. “Whose edifice is this? Spain peels back the layers of its identity.” Christian
Science Monitor. 26 May 2004.
44
45
Castro, Américo. Ensayo de Historiología: Analogías y Diferencias entre Hispanos y Musulmanes. New York:
Franz C. Feger, 1950. 44.
46
Castro, Américo. Ensayo de Historiología: Analogías y Diferencias entre Hispanos y Musulmanes. New York:
Franz C. Feger, 1950. 19.
47
Madariaga, María Rosa de. Los Moros que Trajo Franco: La Intervención de Tropas Coloniales en la Guerra
Civil Española. 1st ed. Barcelona: Ediciones Martínez Roca, 2002. 11.
48
Hooper, John. The New Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain. Rev. ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1987. 128.
49
Manzano Moreno, Eduardo and Pérez Garzón, Juan Sisino. “A Difficult Nation? History and Nationalism in
Contemporary Spain.” History and Memory. 14.1/2 (2002) .274.
50
Manzano Moreno, Eduardo and Pérez Garzón, Juan Sisino. “A Difficult Nation? History and Nationalism in
Contemporary Spain.” History and Memory. 14.1/2 (2002) .279.
51
Burshatin, Israel. “The Moor in the Text: Metaphor, Emblem and Silence.” Critical Inquiry. 12.1 (Autumn 1985)
98.
52
Ajami, Fouad. “Forgotten voyages of 1492.” U.S. News & World Report. 112.6 (17 February 1992):39.
53
Irving, Washington. A Chronicle of the Conquest of Granada. Boston : Twayne Publishers, 1988. 281.
54
Gibson, Charles. “Cuauhtemoc. The Hispanic American Historical Review. 35.1 (February 1955): 105.
55
Harris, Max. “The Return of Moctezuma: Oaxaca’s “Danza de la Pluma” and New Mexico’s “Danza de los
Matachines.” TDR. 41.1 (Spring 1997). 106.
56
Harris, Max. “Moctezuma’s Daughter: The Role of La Malinche in Mesoamerican Dance.” The Journal of
American Folklore. 109.432 (Spring 1996). 167.
57
Harris, Max. “Moctezuma’s Daughter: The Role of La Malinche in Mesoamerican Dance.” The Journal of
American Folklore. 109.432 (Spring 1996). 168.
58
“Until recently it was a widespread belief that Moorish spirits, ghosts of the original owners of treasure, visited
particular persons to reveal the location of hidden wealth.” Driessen, Henk. “Mock battles Between Moors and
Christians. Playing the confrontation of crescent and Cross in Spain’s south.” Ethnologia Europea. 15.23 (1985).
108.
59
Smith, Craig C. “Europe's Muslims May Be Headed Where the Marxists Went Before” New York Times. 26
December 2004. Late Edition: 4.7
60
Martin, Luis “Lucas Alaman Pioneer of Mexican Historiography: An Interpretative Essay.” The Americas. Vol. 32,
No. 2. (Oct., 1975), 244.
61
Gillespie, Susan D. The Aztec Kings: Construction of Rulership in Mexica History. Tucson, University of Arizona
Press, 1989. 166. (quoted in Harris, Max. “Moctezuma’s Daughter: The Role of La Malinche in Mesoamerican
Dance.” The Journal of American Folklore. 109.432 (Spring 1996). 153.)
62
Gillespie, Susan D. The Aztec Kings: Construction of Rulership in Mexica History. Tucson, University of Arizona
Press, 1989. 201. (quoted in Harris, Max. “Moctezuma’s Daughter: The Role of La Malinche in Mesoamerican
Dance.” The Journal of American Folklore. 109.432 (Spring 1996). 153.)
63
Jay, Paul. “Translation, Invention, Resistance: Rewriting the Conquest in Carlos Fuentes's "the two Shores."
Modern Fiction Studies 43.2 (1997) 419.
64
(Quoting Fuentes) “The Mayans bring to their ‘discovery of Spain’ exactly what the Spanish brought to their
discovery of Mexico: the ‘true’ religion. According to Aguilar ‘all the gods were already in Spain,’ but ‘the fact is
they'd been forgotten. The Indians managed to reanimate the Spanish gods.’” Jay, Paul. “Translation, Invention,
Resistance: Rewriting the Conquest in Carlos Fuentes's "the two Shores." Modern Fiction Studies 43.2 (1997) 420.
65
Stevens, Ilan. “Moctezuma’s Revenge.” Transitions. 56 (1992): 119.
66
Cro, Stelio. The Noble Savage: Allegory of Freedom. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1990. 3.
67
68
69
Burshatin, Israel. “The Moor in the Text: Metaphot, Emblem and Silence.” Critical Inquiry. 12.1 (Autumn 1985)
102.
70
Paz, Octavio. The Labyrinth of Solitude. Trans. Lysander Kemp, Yara Milos and Rachel Phillips Belash. New
York: Grove Press, 1985. 13.
71
72
73
74
Daly, Emma. “The Strains in Spain: Blaming Almeria’s problems on its Moroccan workers.” Newsweek
International. 28 February 2000. 43.
75
76
77
Calavita, Kitty. “A ‘reserve army of delinquents: The criminalization and economic punishment of immigrants in
Spain.” Punishment and Society. 5.4 (2003). 409.
78
Zapata-Barrero, Ricard. “EU and US approaches to the management of immigration: Spain.” Migration Policy
Group. May 2003. 30.
79
Zapata-Barrero, Ricard. “EU and US approaches to the management of immigration: Spain.” Migration Policy
Group. May 2003. 31.
80
Calvo Buezas, Tomas. Crece el Racismo, También la Solidaridad. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1995. 102.
81
82
83
84
Rosón Lorente, Francisco Javier. “¿El Retorno de Tariq? Las Comunidades Musulmanes en la Ciudad de
Granada.” Granada: Laboratorio de Estudios Interculturales, Universidad de Granada, 2001. 22.
85
Pumares Fernandez, Pablo. Que es la integracion? Reflexiones sobre el concepto de integración de los
inmigrantes. Africanos en la otra orilla. Ed. Francisco Checa. Icaria: Barcelona, 1998. 297
86
87
Barrero, Ricard Zapata. “The ‘Discovery’ of Immigration in Spain: The Politicization of Immigration in the Case
of El Ejido.” Journal of International Migration and Integration. 4.4 (Autumn 2003). 526.
88
Higginbottom, Andy. “Spanish election ups racial tension.” Red Pepper. 70 (April 2000): 11
89
Webster, Justin. “Racism rears its head in Andalucia.” New Statesman. 129.4478 (20 March 2000): 23.
90
Tremlett, Giles. “Africans arrested after race riots.” The Scotsman. 11 February 2000. 17.
91
Webster, Justin. “Racism rears its head in Andalucia.” New Statesman. 129.4478 (20 March 2000): 23.
92
Webster, Justin. “Produce of Spain: Under this vast sea of plastic, thousands of immigrant workers tend vegetables
destined for British supermarkets. Spain’s hothouses are a billion-pound success story. Unfortunately, they’re also
blamed for one of Europe’s worst race riots and an ecological disaster in the making.” The Independent. 29 July
2001. 16-17.
93
94
“Analytical Report on Education” National Focal Point for Spain. Madrid: Movement for Peace, Disarmament and
Liberty, 2004. 31.
95
96
97
Lorenzo Cachón. “Case Studies of Good Practice for the Prevention of Racial Discrimination and Xenophobia and
the Promotion of Equal Treatment in the Workspace.” European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions. March 1997. 50.
98
Dietz, Gunther. “Frontier hybridization or culture clash? Transnational migrant communities and sub-national
identity politics in Andalusia, Spain.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 30.16 (November 2004): 1090
99
Nielsen, Jorgen S. Towards a European Islam. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. 61.
100
Lorenzo Cachón. “Case Studies of Good Practice for the Prevention of Racial Discrimination and Xenophobia and
the Promotion of Equal Treatment in the Workspace.” European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions. March 1997. 49.
101
102
Smith, Craig C. “Europe's Muslims May Be Headed Where the Marxists Went Before” New York Times. 26
December 2004. Late Edition: 4.7
103
Sills, Ben. “Spain seeks to control what imams preach.” The Guardian. 4 May 2004. Final Edition: 12.
104
105
Glick, Caroline B. “Fighting Minority Tyranny.” Jerusalem Post. 18 July 2003. 1A.
106
107
108
Findlay, Allan, Findlay, Anne and Lawless, Richard. “Moroccan Emigration: A National and Regional Problem.”
The Maghreb Review. 4.3 (May-June 1979). 89
109
110
Rosón Lorente, Francisco Javier. “¿El Retorno de Tariq? Las Comunidades Musulmanes en la Ciudad de
Granada.” Granada: Laboratorio de Estudios Interculturales, Universidad de Granada, 2001. 22
111
Calvo Buezas, Tomas. Crece el Racismo,Tambien la Solidaridad. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1995. 1052.

Granada: Crescent and Crown

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Исходное описание:

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Granada: Crescent and Crown

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Granada: Crescent and Crown

A Political Ethnography of a Muslim Community in Andalusia

is once again home to a significant Muslim population, comprised of both Moroccan

immigrants and native Spanish converts.

exacerbated by the consolidation of cultural policymaking in Seville, the regional capital,

also their vision for a future multicultural community.

history is currently portrayed, it is possible to remove the layers of interpretation and

understand the character of convivencia – a time of great intercultural exchange that

characterized the Golden Age of Spain.

CHALLENGES FACING PRESENT-DAY GRANADA

My primary research in January 2005 illuminated several factors shaping the

present-day popular conception of Granada. Beneath its still-strong Catholic image,

he contrasted “the French ‘assimilationist’ insistence on the denial of ethnic difference, at

of multicultural policy. Spain, lacking a comprehensive cultural policy grounded in a

the government may be taking the country.

closed, halting my research progress but providing me a unique opportunity to observe an

pageantry (and commercializationiii) of an American Christmas festivity, the “Thousand-

and-One Nights” Orientalism emerged as a dominant theme. Symbols of numerous Arab

between the portrayal of Balthasar and perceptions of immigrants, as an outsider to the

Spanish cultural context I found the polarizing imagery shocking.

My interview with University of Granada engineering professor Rafael Gallego

religion in public institutions, particularly public education. According to him, religion is

offered as an elective in primary curricula, although in many schools there is no other

option besides Catholicism. The structure of education policymaking is particularly

representative to coordinate Catholic education policy with Madrid. This corresponds to

be optional, and that local communities be allowed to decide whether religious

instruction should occur in public schools, in extracurricular religious programs, or in the

stereotype that equates Islamic practice with fundamentalism (particularly “Arab

political will” to create necessary changes such as a standardized curriculum. Rather,

he sees as in a “state of trauma.” I found his structural explanation of the problem an

interesting (and refreshing) alternative to ascribing all of the problems to Spanish

I next traveled to the Zona Norte, an area of low-income apartment high-rises on

students (the university is nearby) – to create a community. He preaches a “moderate,

through government institutions to achieve a wider acceptance of Islam, Mr. Qamhiyeh

mosque is comprised primarily of lower-class Moroccan immigrants, while Mr.

Carrasco’s group works with middle- and upper-class Spanish converts.

conflicted by materialism.” He “wanted something authentic,” and found this in the

between peoples it created as the vehicle for creating a community of “Muslim

to establish a minority community. Regarding primary education, he asserted that the

and allows the “falsification of history.”

that he was referring to the Franco-era teaching of a narrow interpretation of Spanish

reasons structural or cultural, the appeal to Islam as an alternative lifestyle, the

Another component of my research involved a survey of the educational

textbooks at the library of the University of Granada’s School of Education. Analyzing

they were the official ‘approved’ texts in use in present-day schools.

on Abraham Maslow’s famous ‘Hierarchy of Needs.’ Happiness corresponds to

“love and affection”10 and “self-esteem.”11 Social acceptance invokes, on a primitive

of self-actualization and self-transcendence that comprise much of the literature of moral

philosophy.vii Ethics textbooks emphasize the practice of religion as a value, which,

although explicitly avoiding an endorsement of Catholicism, implies support for it as the

religious human nature,”14 proclaims one textbook. The emphasis on Catholicism is

students; however, to be useful, parallel curricula should be developed for Spain’s

University of Granada. He saw the city’s religious dualism as a defining characteristic:

offering multilingual menus. Reflecting on this conjunction, I remembered something

That evening, I met with Mohamed el-Hadat of Mediadores Interculturales, which

monitors and prevents religious discrimination by arbitrating disputes between groups.

to understand society. Although there is no xenophobia, there is fear. Granada’s Muslims,

facing immigrants as they try to establish themselves in a community, pursue

years of democratic development and nearly a century of changes in Spanish

historiography, Dr. López Guzmán observed how Granadans’ conception of Spain as an

accepting atmosphere has allowed continued discrimination.

In order to understand the network of social service organizations that have

dispositions.” Third, Spaniards’ unwillingness to take low-wage jobs, particularly in the