August 26, 2007 No.

28

Radical Islamism in Pakistan

Yoram Evron

Since July 11, when the Pakistani Army took over the Red Mosque in Islamabad and
released the hostages being held there, the violent confrontation between the regime and
radical Islamists has only escalated. That confrontation, which claimed many lives in the
1980s, revived after September 11 due to enhanced cooperation between the Pakistani
government and the United States. It now undermines the foundations of the political
system in the country, at a moment when the regime seems particularly vulnerable. For
several months, Pakistan has been shaken by a revitalized al-Qaeda movement operating
in the northwestern tribal areas and, simultaneously, by growing liberal opposition to
President Pervaiz Musharraf following his attempt to sack the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and his refusal to comply with the constitution and resign as army Chief
of Staff.

Immediately after the attack on the Twin Towers, the United States asked Musharraf for
support it in its war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding
his reservations, Musharraf felt obliged to comply, and since 2002, the Pakistani Army
has been operating, with varying degrees of commitment and effectiveness, against
Islamist groups in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. From the American perspective,
Pakistan was a natural and important ally in the war in Afghanistan. It is one of the
largest Muslim countries (about 165 million people), mostly Sunni with a Shi’ite
minority. The regime, though defined constitutionally as Muslim, is fairly moderate, and
the army plays a major role in it.

Pakistan’s enlistment in the struggle against Islamist terrorist is of paramount importance.

First of all, Pakistan borders on al-Qaeda refuges and constitutes a geographical barrier
between Iran and Afghanistan, on the one hand, and India, on the other; the latter is itself
struggling against militant Islamist groups in Kashmir. Secondly, given Pakistan’s
demonstrated nuclear capabilities, any takeover of the regime by radical Islamists would
be an extremely grave matter. Given Pakistan’s history of proliferating nuclear
technologies and the ambitions of some Arab states to acquire nuclear capabilities, such a
development could accelerate the nuclearization of the Middle East. Thirdly, the endemic
political instability elsewhere in Central Asia, coupled with the relatively moderate
regime in Pakistan and the long history of cooperation with the United States, mean that
Pakistan is the only Muslim country in the region on which Washington can count.

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From Musharraf’s perspective, cooperation with the United States also provides some
benefits. First of all, it enhances the international legitimacy of his regime, which had
been burdened by a negative image since he seized power in 1999. Moreover, by lining
up with the Americans against extremist Islamic terrorism, he can ease the
confrontational relationship with India, which had deteriorated very badly following the
1998 nuclear tests by the two sides and the Pakistani attack on the Kargil region soon
afterward.

At the same time, the alliance with the United States also poses some serious problems.
While the regime has no ideological commitment to Islamism, almost all of the
population is Muslim – in fact, Pakistan was explicitly founded as a Muslim state – and
the country is tightly bound to the Muslim world. It adheres to Muslim political positions
(to the extent that they exist), such as the refusal to maintain ties with Israel, and it takes
an active part in Arab and Islamic organizations. Moreover, its economy is dependent on
trade with, remittances from and investment by Muslim states (especially in the Persian
Gulf). Consequently, its alignment with the United States against the Taliban provoked
serious internal disagreements.

The totality of these circumstances and constraints explains the current developments in
Pakistan. Musharraf is exposed to domestic pressures by both Islamist movements and
liberal elements. The former are stepping up their confrontation with the army, and al-
Qaeda elements are apparently consolidating their stronghold in the tribal areas of the
northwest; the latter are outraged at Musharraf’s actions against the Supreme Court and
his defiance of the constitution. Musharraf is also being subjected to significant pressure
by the United States, which is unhappy with the anti-democratic measures apparently
taken to bolster his declining position (e.g., nationalization of the electronic media) and
charges that his regime does too little to seek out al-Qaeda leaders hiding out in the areas
bordering Afghanistan.

Pakistan poses a dilemma for the United States, which wants to support an ally in the war
on terror while encouraging the emergence of a stable democracy. In a state in which the
army has taken power several times and whose current ruler came to power in a military
coup, there can be no certainty that the same thing will not happen again if the situation
continues to deteriorate. Moreover, some analyses suggest that Islamist tendencies in
army ranks have grown stronger in recent years and that the restraint in fighting al-Qaeda
in the tribal areas stems from the army’s dissatisfaction with a proactive policy imposed
on Pakistan by the United States. In other words, the ability of the United States to
secure Pakistani alignment with American policy depends on the existence of a regime
that can impose its authority on the army.

Notwithstanding the challenges, several things suggest that this might continue to be the
case. First of all, the Pakistani army is immeasurably larger and more powerful than the
Islamist movements. Secondly, Islamist extremism -- a common threat to Pakistan,
China and India – strengthens the interest of the latter two in supporting a semi-secular
regime in Pakistan and damps down the ferocity of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Thirdly,

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Musharraf is apparently making some progress on forging a coalition with the moderate
opposition parties and he is reported to be negotiating with Benazir Bhutto, the former
prime minister and now one of the liberal opposition leaders, on power sharing
arrangements in advance of the forthcoming elections.

Pakistan’s importance in the struggle against Islamist extremism is hard to exaggerate.

The overthrow of the current regime by Islamist forces could give extremists access to
nuclear weapons and seriously impair America’s ability to combat al-Qaeda. For Israel,
the implications could include the accelerated seepage of nuclear technology to hostile
regimes and movements and upgraded capabilities for al-Qaeda and other extremist
organizations. Preventing that depends on the ability of a moderate Pakistani regime to
impose its authority on extremist elements, both in the army and in the broader society.