AlanTuring

AlanTuring(19121954)neverdescribedhimselfasaphilosopher,buthis1950paperComputing MachineryandIntelligenceisoneofthemostfrequentlycitedinmodernphilosophicalliterature.It gaveafreshapproachtothetraditionalmindbodyproblem,byrelatingittothemathematicalconcept ofcomputabilityhehimselfhadintroducedinhis19367paperOncomputablenumbers,withan applicationtotheEntscheidungsproblem.Hisworkcanberegardedasthefoundationofcomputer scienceandoftheartificialintelligenceprogram. 1.OutlineofLife 2.TheTuringMachineandComputability 3.TheLogicalandthePhysical 4.TheUncomputable 5.BuildingaUniversalMachine 6.BuildingaBrain 7.MachineIntelligence 8.UnfinishedWork 9.AlanTuring:theUnknownMind Bibliography OtherInternetResources RelatedEntries

1.OutlineofLife
AlanTuring'sshortandextraordinarylifehasattractedwideinterest.Ithasinspiredhismother's memoir(E.S.Turing1959),adetailedbiography(Hodges1983),aplayandtelevisionfilm(Whitemore 1986),andvariousotherworksoffictionandart. Therearemanyreasonsforthisinterest,butoneisthatineverysphereofhislifeandworkhemade unexpectedconnectionsbetweenapparentlyunrelatedareas.Hiscentralcontributiontoscienceand philosophycamethroughhistreatingthesubjectofsymboliclogicasanewbranchofapplied mathematics,givingitaphysicalandengineeringcontent.Unwillingorunabletoremainwithinany standardroleordepartmentofthought,AlanTuringcontinuedalifefullofincongruity.Thoughashy, boyish,man,hehadapivotalroleinworldhistorythroughhisroleinSecondWorldWarcryptology. Thoughthefounderofthedominanttechnologyofthetwentiethcentury,hevariouslyimpressed, charmedordisturbedpeoplewithhisunworldlyinnocenceandhisdislikeofmoralorintellectual compromise. AlanMathisonTuringwasborninLondon,23June1912,touppermiddleclassBritishparents.His schoolingwasofatraditionalkind,dominatedbytheBritishimperialsystem,butfromearliestlifehis fascinationwiththescientificimpulseexpressedbyhimasfindingthecommonestinnature foundhimatoddswithauthority.Hisscepticism,anddisrespectforworldlyvalues,werenevertamed andbecameevermoreconfidentlyeccentric.Hismoodyhumourswungbetweengloomandvivacity. Hislifewasalsonotableasthatofagaymanwithstrongemotionsandagrowinginsistenceonhis identity.

HisfirsttruehomewasatKing'sCollege,CambridgeUniversity,notedforitsprogressiveintellectual lifecentredonJ.M.Keynes.Turingstudiedmathematicswithincreasingdistinctionandwaselecteda Fellowofthecollegein1935.Thisappointmentwasfollowedbyaremarkableandsuddendbutinan areawherehewasanunknownfigure:thatofmathematicallogic.ThepaperOnComputable Numbers(Turing19367)washisfirstandperhapsgreatesttriumph.Itgaveadefinitionof computationandanabsolutelimitationonwhatcomputationcouldachieve,whichmakesitthe foundingworkofmoderncomputerscience.ItledhimtoPrincetonformoreadvancedworkinlogic andotherbranchesofmathematics.HehadtheopportunitytoremainintheUnitedStates,butchoseto returntoBritainin1938,andwasimmediatelyrecruitedfortheBritishcommunicationswar. From1939to1945TuringwasalmosttotallyengagedinthemasteryoftheGermanenciphering machine,Enigma,andothercryptologicalinvestigationsatnowfamousBletchleyPark,theBritish government'swartimecommunicationsheadquarters.Turingmadeauniquelogicalcontributiontothe decryptionoftheEnigmaandbecamethechiefscientificfigure,withaparticularresponsibilityfor readingtheUboatcommunications.AssuchhebecameatoplevelfigureinAngloAmericanliaison, andalsogainedexposuretothemostadvancedelectronictechnologyoftheday. Combininghisideasfrommathematicallogic,hisexperienceincryptology,andsomepractical electronicknowledge,hisambition,attheendofthewarinEurope,wastocreateanelectronic computerinthefullmodernsense.Hisplans,commissionedbytheNationalPhysicalLaboratory, London,wereovershadowedbythemorepowerfullysupportedAmericanprojects.Turingalso labouredunderthedisadvantagethathiswartimeachievementsremainedtotallysecret.Hisideasled thefieldin1946,butthiswaslittlerecognised.Frustratedinhiswork,heemergedasapowerful marathonrunner,andalmostqualifiedfortheBritishteaminthe1948Olympicgames. Turing'smotivationswerescientificratherthanindustrialorcommercial,andhesoonreturnedtothe theoreticallimitationsofcomputation,thistimefocussingonthecomparisonofthepowerof computationandthepowerofthehumanbrain.Hiscontentionwasthatthecomputer,whenproperly programmed,couldrivalthebrain.ItfoundedtheArtificialIntelligenceprogramofcomingdecades. In1948hemovedtoManchesterUniversity,wherehepartlyfulfilledtheexpectationsplaceduponhim toplansoftwareforthepioneercomputerdevelopmentthere,butstillremainedafreerangingthinker. Itwasherethathisfamous1950paper,ComputingMachineryandIntelligence,(Turing1950b)was written.In1951hewaselectedaFellowoftheRoyalSocietyforhis1936achievement,yetatthesame timehewasstrikingintoentirelynewterritorywithamathematicaltheoryofbiologicalmorphogenesis (Turing1952). ThisworkwasinterruptedbyAlanTuring'sarrestinFebruary1952forhissexualaffairwithayoung Manchesterman,andhewasobliged,toescapeimprisonment,toundergotheinjectionofoestrogen intendedtonegatehissexualdrive.Hewasdisqualifiedfromcontinuingsecretcryptologicalwork.His generallibertarianattitudewasenhancedratherthansuppressedbythecriminaltrial,andhis intellectualindividualityalsoremainedaslivelyasever.WhileremainingformallyaReaderinthe TheoryofComputing,henotonlyembarkedonmoreambitiousapplicationsofhisbiologicaltheory, butadvancednewideasforfundamentalphysics. Forthisreasonhisdeath,on7June1954,athishomeinWilmslow,Cheshire,cameasageneral surprise.InhindsightitisobviousthatTuring'suniquestatusinAngloAmericansecretcommunication workmeantthattherewerepressuresonhimofwhichhiscontemporarieswereunaware;therewas certainlyanothersecurityconflictwithgovernmentin1953(Hodges1983,p.483).Some commentators,e.g.Dawson(1985),havearguedthatassassinationshouldnotberuledout.Buthehad

spokenofsuicide,andhisdeath,whichwasbycyanidepoisoning,wasmostlikelybyhisownhand, contrivedsoastoallowthosewhowishedtodosotobelieveitaresultofhispenchantforchemistry experiments.Thesymbolismofitsdramaticelementapartlyeatenapplehascontinuedtohaunt theintellectualEdenfromwhichAlanTuringwasexpelled.

2.TheTuringMachineandComputability
AlanTuringdrewmuchbetween1928and1933fromtheworkofthemathematicalphysicistand populariserA.S.Eddington,fromJ.vonNeumann'saccountofthefoundationsofquantummechanics, andthenfromBertrandRussell'smathematicallogic.Meanwhile,hislastingfascinationwiththe problemsofmindandmatterwasheightenedbyemotionalelementsinhisownlife(Hodges1983,p. 63).In1934hegraduatedwithanoutstandingdegreeinmathematicsfromCambridgeUniversity, followedbyasuccessfuldissertationinprobabilitytheorywhichwonhimaFellowshipofKing's College,Cambridge,in1935.Thiswasthebackgroundtohislearning,alsoin1935,oftheproblem whichwastomakehisname. ItwasfromthelecturesofthetopologistM.H.A.(Max)NewmaninthatyearthathelearntofGdel's 1931proofoftheformalincompletenessoflogicalsystemsrichenoughtoincludearithmetic,andof theoutstandingprobleminthefoundationsofmathematicsasposedbyHilbert:the Entscheidungsproblem(decisionproblem).Wasthereamethodbywhichitcouldbedecided,forany givenmathematicalproposition,whetherornotitwasprovable? Theprincipaldifficultyofthisquestionlayingivinganunassailablycorrectandgeneraldefinitionof whatwasmeantbysuchexpressionsasdefinitemethodoreffectiveprocedure.Turingworkedon thisaloneforayearuntilApril1936;independenceandisolationwastobebothhisstrength,in formulatingoriginalideas,andhisweakness,whenitcametopromotingandimplementingthem. ThewordmechanicalhadoftenbeenusedoftheformalistapproachlyingbehindHilbert'sproblem, andTuringseizedontheconceptofthemachine.Turing'ssolutionlayindefiningwhatwassoontobe namedtheTuringmachine.Withthishedefinedtheconceptofthemechanicalintermsofsimple atomicoperations.TheTuringmachineformalismwasmodelledontheteleprinter,slightlyenlargedin scopetoallowapapertapethatcouldmoveinbothdirectionsandaheadthatcouldread,eraseand printnewsymbols,ratherthanonlyreadandpunchpermanentholes. TheTuringmachineistheoretical,inthesensethatitisnotintendedactuallytobeengineered(there beingnopointindoingso),althoughitisessentialthatitsatomiccomponents(thepapertape, movementtoleftandright,testingforthepresenceofasymbol)aresuchascouldactuallybe implemented.Thewholepointoftheformalismistoreducetheconceptofmethodtosimple operationsthatcanunquestionablybeeffected. NeverthelessTuring'spurposewastoembodythemostgeneralmechanicalprocessascarriedoutbya humanbeing.Hisanalysisbegannotwithanyexistingcomputingmachines,butwiththepictureofa child'sexercisebookmarkedoffinsquares.Fromthebeginning,theTuringmachineconceptaimedto capturewhatthehumanmindcandowhencarryingoutaprocedure. InspeakingoftheTuringmachineitshouldbemadeclearthatthereareinfinitelymanyTuring machines,eachcorrespondingtoadifferentmethodorprocedure,byvirtueofhavingadifferenttable ofbehaviour.Nowadaysitisalmostimpossibletoavoidimagerywhichdidnotexistin1936:thatof thecomputer.Inmodernterms,thetableofbehaviourofaTuringmachineisequivalenttoa computerprogram.

IfaTuringmachinecorrespondstoacomputerprogram,whatistheanalogyofthecomputer?Itis whatTuringdescribedasauniversalmachine(Turing1936,p.241).Again,thereareinfinitelymany universalTuringmachines,formingasubsetofTuringmachines;theyarethosemachineswithtables ofbehaviourcomplexenoughtoreadthetablesofotherTuringmachines,andthendowhatthose machineswouldhavedone.Ifthisseemsstrange,notethemodernparallelthatanycomputercanbe simulatedbysoftwareonanothercomputer.Thewaythattablescanreadandsimulatetheeffectof othertablesiscrucialtoTuring'stheory,goingfarbeyondBabbage'sideasofahundredyearsearlier.It alsoshowswhyTuring'sideasgototheheartofthemoderncomputer,inwhichitisessentialthat programsarethemselvesaformofdatawhichcanbemanipulatedbyotherprograms.Butthereader mustalwaysrememberthatin1936therewerenosuchcomputers;indeedthemoderncomputerarose outoftheformulationofbehavingmechanicallythatTuringfoundinthiswork. Turing'smachineformulationallowedtheprecisedefinitionofthecomputable:namely,aswhatcanbe donebyaTuringmachineactingalone.Moreexactly,computableoperationsarethosewhichcanbe effectedbywhatTuringcalledautomaticmachines.Thecrucialpointhereisthattheactionofan automaticTuringmachineistotallydeterminedbyitstableofbehaviour.(Turingalsoallowedfor choicemachineswhichcallforhumaninputs,ratherthanbeingtotallydetermined.)Turingthen proposedthatthisdefinitionofcomputablecapturedpreciselywhatwasintendedbysuchwordsas definitemethod,procedure,mechanicalprocessinstatingtheEntscheidungsproblem. InapplyinghismachineconcepttotheEntscheidungsproblem,Turingtookthestepofdefining computablenumbers.Thesearethoserealnumbers,consideredasinfinitedecimals,say,whichitis possibleforaTuringmachine,startingwithanemptytape,toprintout.Forexample,theTuring machinewhichsimplyprintsthedigit1andmovestotheright,thenrepeatsthatactionforever,can therebycomputethenumber.1111111AmorecomplicatedTuringmachinecancomputetheinfinite decimalexpansionof. Turingmachines,likecomputerprograms,arecountable;indeedtheycanbeorderedinacompletelist byakindofalphabeticalorderingoftheirtablesofbehaviour.Turingdidthisbyencodingthetables intodescriptionnumberswhichcanthenbeorderedinmagnitude.Amongstthislist,asubsetofthem (thosewithsatisfactorydescriptionnumbers)arethemachineswhichhavetheeffectofprintingout infinitedecimals.Itisreadilyshown,usingadiagonalargumentfirstusedbyCantorandfamiliar fromthediscoveriesofRussellandGdel,thattherecanbenoTuringmachinewiththepropertyof decidingwhetheradescriptionnumberissatisfactoryornot.Theargumentcanbepresentedasfollows. SupposethatsuchaTuringmachineexists.ThenitispossibletoconstructanewTuringmachinewhich worksoutinturntheNthdigitfromtheNthmachinepossessingasatisfactorydescriptionnumber.This newmachinethenprintsanNthdigitdifferingfromthatdigit.Asthemachineproceeds,itprintsoutan infinitedecimal,andthereforehasasatisfactorydescriptionnumber.Yetthisnumbermustby constructiondifferfromtheoutputsofeveryTuringmachinewithasatisfactorydescriptionnumber. Thisisacontradiction,sothehypothesismustbefalse(Turing1936,p.246).Fromthis,Turingwas abletoanswerHilbert'sEntscheidungsprobleminthenegative:therecanbenosuchgeneralmethod. Turing'sproofcanberecastinmanyways,butthecoreideadependsontheselfreferenceinvolvedina machineoperatingonsymbols,whichisitselfdescribedbysymbolsandsocanoperateonitsown description.Indeed,theselfreferentialaspectofthetheorycanbehighlightedbyadifferentformof theproof,whichTuringpreferred(Turing1936,p.247).Supposethatsuchamachinefordeciding satisfactorinessdoesexist;thenapplyittoitsowndescriptionnumber.Acontradictioncanreadilybe obtained.However,thediagonalmethodhastheadvantageofbringingoutthefollowing:thatareal numbermaybedefinedunambiguously,yetbeuncomputable.Itisanontrivialdiscoverythatwhereas

someinfinitedecimals(e.g.)maybeencapsulatedinafinitetable,otherinfinitedecimals(infact, almostall)cannot.Likewisetherearedecisionproblemssuchasisthisnumberprime?inwhich infinitelymanyanswersarewrappedupinafiniterecipe,whilethereareothers(again,almostall) whicharenot,andmustberegardedasrequiringinfinitelymanydifferentmethods.Isthisaprovable proposition?belongstothelattercategory. ThisiswhatTuringestablished,andintothebargaintheremarkablefactthatanythingthatis computablecaninfactbecomputedbyonemachine,auniversalTuringmachine. ItwasvitaltoTuring'sworkthathejustifiedthedefinitionbyshowingthatitencompassedthemost generalideaofmethod.Forifitdidnot,theEntscheidungproblemremainedopen:theremightbe somemorepowerfultypeofmethodthanwasencompassedbyTuringcomputability.Onejustification layinshowingthatthedefinitionincludedmanyprocessesamathematicianwouldconsidertobe naturalincomputation(Turing1936,p.254).Anotherargumentinvolvedahumancalculatorfollowing writteninstructionnotes.(Turing1936,p.253).Butinabolderargument,theoneheplacedfirst,he consideredanintuitiveargumentappealingtothestatesofmindofahumancomputer.(Turing1936, p.249).Theentryofmindintohisargumentwashighlysignificant,butatthisstageitwasonlya mindfollowingarule. Tosummarise:Turingfound,andjustifiedonverygeneralandfarreachinggrounds,aprecise mathematicalformulationoftheconceptionofageneralprocessormethod.Hiswork,aspresentedto NewmaninApril1936,arguedthathisformulationofcomputabilityencompassedthepossible processeswhichcanbecarriedoutincomputinganumber.(Turing1936,p.232).Thisopenedupnew fieldsofdiscoverybothinpracticalcomputation,andinthediscussionofhumanmentalprocesses. However,althoughTuringhadworkedaswhatNewmancalledaconfirmedsolitary(Hodges1983,p 113),hesoonlearnedthathewasnotaloneinwhatGandy(1988)hascalledtheconfluenceofideasin 1936. ThePrincetonlogicianAlonzoChurchhadslightlyoutpacedTuringinfindingasatisfactorydefinition ofwhathecalledeffectivecalculability.Church'sdefinitionrequiredthelogicalformalismofthe lambdacalculus.ThismeantthatfromtheoutsetTuring'sachievementmergedwithandsupersededthe formulationofChurch'sThesis,namelytheassertionthatthelambdacalculusformalismcorrectly embodiedtheconceptofeffectiveprocessormethod.Veryrapidlyitwasshownthatthemathematical scopeofTuringcomputabilitycoincidedwithChurch'sdefinition(andalsowiththescopeofthe generalrecursivefunctionsdefinedbyGdel).Turingwrotehisownstatement(Turing1939,p.166)of theconclusionsthathadbeenreachedin1938;itisinthePh.D.thesisthathewroteunderChurch's supervision,andsothisstatementisthenearestwehavetoajointstatementoftheChurchTuring thesis: Afunctionissaidtobeeffectivelycalculableifitsvaluescanbefoundbysomepurely mechanicalprocess.Althoughitisfairlyeasytogetanintuitivegraspofthisidea,itis neverthelessdesirabletohavesomemoredefinite,mathematicallyexpressibledefinition. SuchadefinitionwasfirstgivenbyGdelatPrincetonin1934Thesefunctionswere describedasgeneralrecursivebyGdelAnotherdefinitionofeffectivecalculabilityhas beengivenbyChurchwhoidentifiesitwithlambdadefinability.Theauthor[i.e.Turing] hasrecentlysuggestedadefinitioncorrespondingmorecloselytotheintuitiveideaItwas statedabovethatafunctioniseffectivelycalculableifitsvaluescanbefoundbyapurely mechanicalprocess.Wemaytakethisstatementliterally,understandingbyapurely mechanicalprocessonewhichcouldbecarriedoutbyamachine.Itispossibletogivea

mathematicaldescription,inacertainnormalform,ofthestructuresofthesemachines.The developmentoftheseideasleadstotheauthor'sdefinitionofacomputablefunction,andto anidentificationofcomputabilitywitheffectivecalculability.Itisnotdifficult,though somewhatlaborious,toprovethatthesethreedefinitionsareequivalent. ChurchacceptedthatTuring'sdefinitiongaveacompelling,intuitivereasonforwhyChurch'sthesis wastrue.TherecentexpositionbyDavis(2000)emphasisesthatGdelalsowasconvincedbyTuring's argumentthatanabsoluteconcepthadbeenidentified(Gdel1946).Thesituationhasnotchanged since1937.(Forfurthercomment,seethearticleontheChurchTuringThesis.Therecentselectionof Turing'spaperseditedbyCopeland(2004),andthereviewofHodges(2006),continuethisdiscussion.) Turinghimselfdidlittletoevangelisehisformulationintheworldofmathematicallogicandearly computerscience.ThetextbooksofDavis(1958)andMinsky(1967)didmore.NowadaysTuring computabilityisoftenreformulated(e.g.intermsofregistermachines).However,computer simulations(e.g.,Turing'sWorld,fromStanford)havebroughtTuring'soriginalimagerytolife. Turing'sworkalsoopenednewareasfordecidabilityquestionswithinpuremathematics.Fromthe 1970s,Turingmachinesalsotookonnewlifeinthedevelopmentofcomplexitytheory,andassuch underpinoneofthemostimportantresearchareasincomputerscience.Thisdevelopmentexemplifies thelastingvalueofTuring'sspecialqualityofgivingconcreteillustrationtoabstractconcepts.

3.TheLogicalandthePhysical
AsputbyGandy(1988),Turing'spaperwasaparadigmofphilosophicalanalysis,refiningavague notionintoaprecisedefinition.Butitwasmorethanbeingananalysiswithintheworldof mathematicallogic:inTuring'sthoughtthequestionthatconstantlyrecursboththeoreticallyand practicallyistherelationshipofthelogicalTuringmachinetothephysicalworld. Effectivemeansdoing,notmerelyimaginingorpostulating.AtthisstageneitherTuringnoranyother logicianmadeaseriousinvestigationintothephysicsofsuchdoing.ButTuring'simageofa teleprinterlikemachinedoesinescapablyrefertosomethingthatcouldactuallybephysicallydone. Hisconceptisadistillationoftheideathatonecanonlydoonesimpleaction,orfinitenumberof simpleactions,atatime.Howphysicalaconceptisit? Thetapeneverholdsmorethanafinitenumberofmarkedsquaresatanypointinacomputation.Thus itcanbethoughtofasbeingfinite,butalwayscapableoffurtherextensionasrequired.Obviouslythis unboundedextendibilityisunphysical,butthedefinitionisstillofpracticaluse:itmeansthatanything doneonafinitetape,howeverlarge,iscomputable.(Turinghimselftooksuchafinitisticapproach whenexplainingthepracticalrelevanceofcomputabilityinhis1950paper.)OneaspectofTuring's formulation,however,involvesabsolutefiniteness:thetableofbehaviourofaTuringmachinemustbe finite,sinceTuringallowsonlyafinitenumberofconfigurationsofaTuringmachine,andonlya finiterepertoireofsymbolswhichcanbemarkedonthetape.Thisisessentiallyequivalenttoallowing onlycomputerprogramswithfinitelengthsofcode. CalculablebyfinitemeanswasTuring'scharacterisationofcomputability,whichhejustifiedwiththe argumentthatthehumanmemoryisnecessarilylimited.(Turing1936,p.231).Thewholepointofhis definitionliesinencodinginfinitepotentialeffects,(e.g.theprintingofaninfinitedecimal)intofinite tablesofbehaviour.Therewouldbenopointinallowingmachineswithinfinitetablesofbehaviour. Itisobvious,forinstance,thatanyrealnumbercouldbeprintedbysuchamachine,bylettingtheNth configurationbeprogrammedtoprinttheNthdigit,forexample.Suchamachinecouldlikewise

storeanycountablenumberofstatementsaboutallpossiblemathematicalexpressions,andsomakethe Entscheidungsproblemtrivial. Church(1937),whenreviewingTuring'spaperwhileTuringwasinPrincetonunderhissupervision, actuallygaveaboldercharacterisationoftheTuringmachineasanarbitraryfinitemachine. Theauthor[i.e.Turing]proposesasacriterionthataninfinitesequenceofdigits0and1be computablethatitshallbepossibletodeviseacomputingmachine,occupyingafinite spaceandwithworkingpartsoffinitesize,whichwillwritedownthesequencetoany desirednumberoftermsifallowedtorunforasufficientlylongtime.Asamatterof convenience,certainfurtherrestrictionsareimposedonthecharacterofthemachine,but theseareofsuchanatureasobviouslytocausenolossofgeneralityinparticular,a humancalculator,providedwithpencilandpaperandexplicitinstructions,canberegarded asakindofTuringmachine. Church(1940)repeatedthischaracterisation.Turingneitherendorseditnorsaidanythingtocontradict it,leavingthegeneralconceptofmachineitselfundefined.TheworkofGandy(1980)didmoreto justifythischaracterisation,byrefiningthestatementofwhatismeantbyamachine.Hisresults supportChurch'sstatement;theyalsoarguestronglyfortheviewthatnaturalattemptstoextendthe notionofcomputabilityleadtotrivialisation:ifGandy'sconditionsonamachinearesignificantly weakenedtheneveryrealnumberbecomescalculable(Gandy1980,p.130ff.).(Foradifferent interpretationofChurch'sstatement,seethearticleontheChurchTuringThesis.) Turingdidnotexplicitlydiscussthequestionofthespeedofhiselementaryactions.Itisleftimplicitin hisdiscussion,byhisuseofthewordnever,thatitisnotpossibleforinfinitelymanystepstobe performedinafinitetime.Othershaveexploredtheeffectofabandoningthisrestriction.Davies (2001),forinstance,describesamachinewithaninfinitenumberofparts,requiringcomponentsof arbitrarilysmallsize,runningatarbitrarilyhighspeeds.Suchamachinecouldperformuncomputable tasks.Daviesemphasisesthatsuchamachinecannotbebuiltinourownphysicalworld,butarguesthat itcouldbeconstructedinauniversewithdifferentphysics.Totheextentthatitrulesoutsuch machines,theChurchTuringthesismusthaveatleastsomephysicalcontent. Truephysicsisquantummechanical,andthisimpliesadifferentideaofmatterandactionfrom Turing'spurelyclassicalpicture.ItisperhapsoddthatTuringdidnotpointthisoutinthisperiod,since hewaswellversedinquantumphysics.Instead,theanalysisandpracticaldevelopmentofquantum computingwaslefttothe1980s.Quantumcomputation,usingtheevolutionofwavefunctionsrather thanclassicalmachinestates,isthemostimportantwayinwhichTuringmachinemodelhasbeen challenged.Thestandardformulationofquantumcomputing(Deutsch1985,followingFeynman1982) doesnotpredictanythingbeyondcomputableeffects,althoughwithintherealmofthecomputable, quantumcomputationsmaybeverymuchmoreefficientthanclassicalcomputations.Itispossiblethat adeeperunderstandingofquantummechanicalphysicsmayfurtherchangethepictureofwhatcanbe physicallydone.

4.TheUncomputable
TuringturnedtotheexplorationoftheuncomputableforhisPrincetonPh.D.thesis(1938),whichthen appearedasSystemsofLogicbasedonOrdinals(Turing1939). Itisgenerallytheview,asexpressedbyFeferman(1988),thatthisworkwasadiversionfromthemain thrustofhiswork.Butfromanotherangle,asexpressedin(Hodges1997),onecanseeTuring's

developmentasturningnaturallyfromconsideringthemindwhenfollowingarule,totheactionofthe mindwhennotfollowingarule.Inparticularthis1938workconsideredthemindwhenseeingthetruth ofoneofGdel'struebutformallyunprovablepropositions,andhencegoingbeyondrulesbasedonthe axiomsofthesystem.AsTuringexpressedit(Turing1939,p.198),thereareformulae,seenintuitively tobecorrect,butwhichtheGdeltheoremshowsareunprovableintheoriginalsystem.Turing's theoryofordinallogicswasanattempttoavoidasfaraspossibletheeffectsofGdel'stheoremby studyingtheeffectofaddingGdelsentencesasnewaxiomstocreatestrongerandstrongerlogics.It didnotreachadefinitiveconclusion. Inhisinvestigation,Turingintroducedtheideaofanoraclecapableofperforming,asifbymagic,an uncomputableoperation.Turing'soraclecannotbeconsideredassomeblackboxcomponentofanew classofmachines,tobeputonaparwiththeprimitiveoperationsofreadingsinglesymbols,ashas beensuggestedby(Copeland1998).Anoracleisinfinitelymorepowerfulthananythingamodern computercando,andnothinglikeanelementarycomponentofacomputer.Turingdefinedoracle machinesasTuringmachineswithanadditionalconfigurationinwhichtheycalltheoraclesoasto takeanuncomputablestep.Buttheseoraclemachinesarenotpurelymechanical.Theyareonly partiallymechanical,likeTuring'schoicemachines.Indeedthewholepointoftheoraclemachineisto exploretherealmofwhatcannotbedonebypurelymechanicalprocesses.Turingemphasised(Turing 1939,p.173): Weshallnotgoanyfurtherintothenatureofthisoracleapartfromsayingthatitcannotbe amachine. Turing'soraclecanbeseensimplyasamathematicaltool,usefulforexploringthemathematicsofthe uncomputable.Theideaofanoracleallowstheformulationofquestionsofrelativeratherthanabsolute computability.ThusTuringopenednewfieldsofinvestigationinmathematicallogic.However,thereis alsoapossibleinterpretationintermsofhumancognitivecapacity.Onthisinterpretation,theoracleis relatedtotheintuitioninvolvedinseeingthetruthofaGdelstatement.M.H.A.Newman,who introducedTuringtomathematicallogicandcontinuedtocollaboratewithhim,wrotein(Newman 1955)thattheoracleresemblesamathematicianhavinganidea,asopposedtousingamechanical method.However,Turing'soraclecannotactuallybeidentifiedwithahumanmentalfaculty.Itistoo powerful:itimmediatelysuppliestheanswerastowhetheranygivenTuringmachineissatisfactory, somethingnohumanbeingcoulddo.Ontheotherhand,anyonehopingtoseementalintuition capturedcompletelybyanoracle,mustfacethedifficultythatTuringshowedhowhisargumentforthe incompletenessofTuringmachinescouldbeappliedwithequalforcetooraclemachines(Turing1939, p.173).ThispointhasbeenemphasisedbyPenrose(1994,p.380).Newman'scommentmightbetterbe takentorefertothedifferentoraclesuggestedlateron(Turing1939,p.200),whichhasthepropertyof recognisingordinalformulae.OnecanonlysafelysaythatTuring'sinterestatthistimein uncomputableoperationsappearsinthegeneralsettingofstudyingthementalintuitionoftruths whicharenotestablishedbyfollowingmechanicalprocesses(Turing1939,p.214ff.). InTuring'spresentation,intuitionisinpracticepresentineverypartofamathematician'sthought,but whenmathematicalproofisformalised,intuitionhasanexplicitmanifestationinthosestepswherethe mathematicianseesthetruthofaformallyunprovablestatement.Turingdidnotofferanysuggestionas towhatheconsideredthebrainwasphysicallydoinginamomentofsuchintuition;indeedtheword braindidnotappearinhiswritinginthisera.Thisquestionisofinterestbecauseoftheviewsof Penrose(1989,1990,1994,1996)onjustthisissue:Penroseholdsthattheabilityofthemindtosee formallyunprovabletruthsshowsthattheremustbeuncomputablephysicaloperationsinthebrain.It

shouldbenotedthatthereiswidespreaddisagreementaboutwhetherthehumanmindisreallyseeing thetruthofaGdelsentence;seeforinstancethediscussionin(Penrose1990)andthereviews followingit.HoweverTuring'swritingatthisperiodacceptedwithoutcriticismtheconceptofintuitive recognitionofthetruth. ItwasalsoatthisperiodthatTuringmetWittgenstein,andthereisafullrecordoftheir1939 discussionsonthefoundationsofmathematicsin(Diamond1976).Tothedisappointmentofmany, thereisnorecordofanydiscussionsbetweenthem,verbalorwritten,ontheproblemofMind. In1939Turing'svariousenergeticinvestigationswerebrokenoffforwarwork.Thisdid,however,have thepositivefeatureofleadingTuringtoturnhisuniversalmachineintothepracticalformofthe moderndigitalcomputer.

5.BuildingaUniversalMachine
Whenapprisedin1936ofTuring'sideaforauniversalmachine,Turing'scontemporaryandfriend,the economistDavidChampernowne,reactedbysayingthatsuchathingwasimpractical;itwouldneed theAlbertHall.Ifbuiltfromrelaysasthenemployedintelephoneexchanges,thatmightindeedhave beenso,andTuringmadenoattemptatit.However,in1937Turingdidworkwithrelaysonasmaller machinewithaspecialcryptologicalfunction(Hodges1983,p.138).WorldhistorythenledTuringto hisuniqueroleintheEnigmaproblem,tohisbecomingthechieffigureinthemechanisationoflogical procedures,andtohisbeingintroducedtoeverfasterandmoreambitioustechnologyasthewar continued. After1942,Turinglearntthatelectroniccomponentsofferedthespeed,storagecapacityandlogical functionsrequiredtobeeffectiveastapesandinstructiontables.Sofrom1945,Turingtriedtouse electronicstoturnhisuniversalmachineintopracticalreality.Turingrapidlycomposedadetailedplan foramodernstoredprogramcomputer:thatis,acomputerinwhichdataandinstructionsarestoredand manipulatedalike.Turing'sideasledthefield,althoughhisreportof1946postdatedvonNeumann's morefamousEDVACreport(vonNeumann1945).Itcanhoweverbeargued,asdoesDavis(2000),that vonNeumanngainedhisfundamentalinsightintothecomputerthroughhisprewarfamiliaritywith Turing'slogicalwork.Atthetime,however,thesebasicprincipleswerenotmuchdiscussed.The difficultyofengineeringtheelectronichardwaredominatedeverything. ItthereforeescapedobserversthatTuringwasaheadofvonNeumannandeveryoneelseonthefuture ofsoftware,orashecalledit,theconstructionofinstructiontables.Turing(1946)foresawatonce: Instructiontableswillhavetobemadeupbymathematicianswithcomputingexperiences andperhapsacertainpuzzlesolvingability.Therewillprobablybeagreatdealofworkto bedone,foreveryknownprocesshasgottobetranslatedintoinstructiontableformat somestage. Theprocessofconstructinginstructiontablesshouldbeveryfascinating.Thereneedbeno realdangerofiteverbecomingadrudge,foranyprocessesthatarequitemechanicalmay beturnedovertothemachineitself. Theseremarks,reflectingtheuniversalityofthecomputer,anditsabilitytomanipulateitsown instructions,correctlydescribedthefuturetrajectoryofthecomputerindustry.However,Turinghadin mindsomethinggreater:buildingabrain.

6.BuildingaBrain
TheprovocativewordsbuildingabrainfromtheoutsetannouncedtherelationshipofTuring's technicalcomputerengineeringtoaphilosophyofMind.Evenin1936,Turinghadgivenan interpretationofcomputabilityintermsofstatesofmind.Hiswarworkhadshowntheastounding powerofthecomputableinmechanisingexperthumanproceduresandjudgments.From1941onwards, Turinghadalsodiscussedthemechanisationofchessplayingandotherintelligentactivitieswithhis colleaguesatBletchleyPark(Hodges1983,p.213).Butmoreprofoundly,itappearsthatTuring emergedin1945withaconvictionthatcomputableoperationsweresufficienttoembraceallmental functionsperformedbythebrain.Aswillbecomeclearfromtheensuingdiscussion,theuncomputable intuitionof1938disappearedfromTuring'sthought,andwasreplacedbynewideasalllyingwithin therealmofthecomputable.Thischangeshowseveninthetechnicalprospectusof(Turing1946), whereTuringreferredtothepossibilityofmakingamachinecalculatechessmoves,andthen continued: ThisraisesthequestionCanamachineplaychess?Itcouldfairlyeasilybemadeto playaratherbadgame.Itwouldbebadbecausechessrequiresintelligence.Westated thatthemachineshouldbetreatedasentirelywithoutintelligence.Thereareindications howeverthatitispossibletomakethemachinedisplayintelligenceattheriskofitsmaking occasionalseriousmistakes.Byfollowingupthisaspectthemachinecouldprobablybe madetoplayverygoodchess. ThepuzzlingreferencetomistakesismadeclearbyatalkTuringgaveayearlater(Turing1947),in whichtheissueofmistakesislinkedtotheissueofthesignificanceofseeingthetruthofformally unprovablestatements. Iwouldsaythatfairplaymustbegiventothemachine.Insteadofitgivingnoanswerwe couldarrangethatitgivesoccasionalwronganswers.Butthehumanmathematicianwould likewisemakeblunderswhentryingoutnewtechniquesInotherwordsthen,ifamachine isexpectedtobeinfallible,itcannotalsobeintelligent.Thereareseveralmathematical theoremswhichsayalmostexactlythat.Butthesetheoremssaynothingabouthowmuch intelligencemaybedisplayedifamachinemakesnopretenceatinfallibility. Turing'spostwarviewwasthatmathematiciansmakemistakes,andsodonotinfactseethetruth infallibly.Oncethepossibilityofmistakesisadmitted,Gdel'stheorembecomeirrelevant. Mathematiciansandcomputersalikeapplycomputableprocessestotheproblemofjudgingthe correctnessofassertions;bothwillthereforesometimeserr,sinceseeingthetruthisknownnottobea computableoperation,butthereisnoreasonwhythecomputerneeddoworsethanthemathematician. Thisargumentisstillverymuchalive.Forinstance,Davis(2000)endorsesTuring'sviewandattacks Penrose(1989,1990,1994,1996)whoarguesagainstthesignificanceofhumanerroronthegroundsof aPlatonistaccountofmathematics. Turingalsopursuedmoreconstructivelythequestionofhowcomputerscouldbemadetoperform operationswhichdidnotappeartobemechanical(tousecommonparlance).Hisguidingprinciple wasthatitshouldbepossibletosimulatetheoperationofhumanbrains.Inanunpublishedreport (Turing1948),Turingexplainedthatthequestionwasthatofhowtosimulateinitiativeinadditionto disciplinecomparabletotheneedforintuitionaswellasmechanicalingenuityexpressedinhis prewarwork.Heannouncedideasforhowtoachievethis:hethoughtinitiativecouldarisefrom systemswherethealgorithmappliedisnotconsciouslydesigned,butisarrivedatbysomeothermeans.

Thus,henowseemedtothinkthatthemindwhennotactuallyfollowinganyconsciousruleorplan, wasneverthelesscarryingoutsomecomputableprocess. Hesuggestedarangeofideasforsystemswhichcouldbesaidtomodifytheirownprograms.These ideasincludednetsoflogicalcomponents(unorganisedmachines)whosepropertiescouldbe trainedintoadesiredfunction.Thus,asexpressedby(Ince1989),hepredictedneuralnetworks. However,Turing'snetsdidnothavethelayeredstructureoftheneuralnetworksthatweretobe developedfromthe1950sonwards.Bytheexpressiongeneticalorevolutionarysearch,healso anticipatedthegeneticalgorithmswhichsincethelate1980shavebeendevelopedasalessclosely structuredapproachtoselfmodifyingprograms.Turing'sproposalswerenotwelldevelopedin1948, andatatimewhenelectroniccomputerswereonlybarelyinoperation,couldnothavebeen.Fresh attentiontothemhasbeendrawnbyCopelandandProudfoot(1996),andtheyhavenowhavebeentried out(Teuscher2001). ItisimportanttonotethatTuringidentifiedhisprototypeneuralnetworksandgeneticalgorithmsas computable.Thishastobeemphasisedsincethewordnonalgorithmicisoftennowconfusingly employedforcomputeroperationsthatarenotexplicitlyplanned.Indeed,hisambitionwasexplicit:he himselfwantedtoimplementthemasprogramsonacomputer.UsingthetermUniversalPractical ComputingMachineforwhatisnowcalledadigitalcomputer,hewrotein(Turing1948): Itshouldbeeasytomakeamodelofanyparticularmachinethatonewishestoworkon withinsuchaUPCMinsteadofhavingtoworkwithapapermachineasatpresent.Ifone alsodecidedonquitedefiniteteachingpoliciesthesecouldalsobeprogrammedintothe machine.Onewouldthenallowthewholesystemtorunforanappreciableperiod,andthen breakinasakindofinspectorofschoolsandseewhatprogresshadbeenmade.One mightalsobeabletomakesomeprogresswithunorganisedmachines Theupshotofthislineofthoughtisthatallmentaloperationsarecomputableandhencerealisableona universalmachine:thecomputer.Turingadvancedthisviewwithincreasingconfidenceinthelate 1940s,perfectlyawarethatitrepresentedwhatheenjoyedcallingheresytothebelieversinmindsor soulsbeyondmaterialdescription. Turingwasnotamechanicalthinker,orasticklerforconvention;farfromit.Ofallpeople,heknewthe natureoforiginalityandindividualindependence.EvenintacklingtheUboatEnigmaproblem,for instance,hedeclaredthathedidsobecausenooneelsewaslookingatitandhecouldhaveitto himself.Farfrombeingtrainedororganisedintothisproblem,hetookitondespitetheprevailing wisdomin1939thatitwastoodifficulttoattempt.Hisarrivalatathesisofmachineintelligencewas nottheoutcomeofsomedullorrestrictedmentality,oralackofappreciationofindividualhuman creativity.

7.MachineIntelligence
TuringrelishedtheparadoxofMachineIntelligence:anapparentcontradictioninterms.Itislikely thathewasalreadysavouringthisthemein1941,whenhereadatheologicalbookbytheauthor DorothySayers(Sayers1941).In(Turing1948)hequotedfromthisworktoillustratehisfullawareness thatincommonparlancemechanicalwasusedtotomeandevoidofintelligence.Givingadate whichnodoubthadhishighlysophisticatedEnigmabreakingmachinessecretlyinmind,hewrotethat upto1940onlyverylimitedmachineryhadbeenused,andthisencouragedthebeliefthatmachinery wasnecessarilylimitedtoextremelystraightforward,possiblyeventorepetitious,jobs.Hisobjectwas

todispeltheseconnotations. In1950,TuringwroteonthefirstpageofhisManualforusersoftheManchesterUniversitycomputer (Turing1950a): Electroniccomputersareintendedtocarryoutanydefiniteruleofthumbprocesswhich couldhavebeendonebyahumanoperatorworkinginadisciplinedbutunintelligent manner. Thisis,ofcourse,justthe1936universalTuringmachine,nowinelectronicform.Ontheotherhand, healsowroteinthemorefamouspaperofthatyear(Turing1950b,p.460) Wemayhopethatmachineswilleventuallycompetewithmeninallpurelyintellectual fields. Howcouldtheintelligentarisefromoperationswhichwerethemselvestotallyroutineandmindless entirelywithoutintelligence?ThisisthecoreoftheproblemTuringfaced,andthesameproblem facesArtificialIntelligenceresearchtoday.Turing'sunderlyingargumentwasthatthehumanbrain mustsomehowbeorganisedforintelligence,andthattheorganisationofthebrainmustberealisableas afinitediscretestatemachine.Theimplicationsofthisviewwereexposedtoawidercircleinhis famouspaper,ComputingMachineryandIntelligence,whichappearedinMindinOctober1950. Theappearanceofthispaper,Turing'sfirstforayintoajournalofphilosophy,wasstimulatedbyhis discussionsatManchesterUniversitywithMichaelPolanyi.Italsoreflectsthegeneralsympathyof GilbertRyle,editorofMind,withTuring'spointofview. Turing's1950paperwasintendedforawidereadership,anditsfreshanddirectapproachhasmadeit oneofthemostfrequentlycitedandrepublishedpapersinmodernphilosophicalliterature.Not surprisingly,thepaperhasattractedmanycritiques.Notallcommentatorsnotethecarefulexplication ofcomputabilitywhichopensthepaper,withanemphasisontheconceptoftheuniversalmachine. Thisexplainswhyifmentalfunctioncanbeachievedbyanyfinitediscretestatemachine,thenthe sameeffectcanbeachievedbyprogrammingacomputer(Turing1950b,p.442).(Note,however,that Turingmakesnoclaimthatthenervoussystemshouldresembleadigitalcomputerinitsstructure.) Turing'streatmenthasaseverelyfinitisticflavour:hisargumentisthattherelevantactionofthebrainis notonlycomputable,butrealisableasatotallyfinitemachine,i.e.asaTuringmachinethatdoesnot useanytapeatall.Inhisaccount,thefullrangeofcomputablefunctions,definedintermsofTuring machinesthatuseaninfinitetape,onlyappearsasbeingofspecialtheoreticalinterest.(Of uncomputablefunctionsthereis,afortiori,nomention.)Turingusesthefinitenessofthenervous systemtogiveanestimateofabout109bitsofstoragerequiredforalimitedsimulationofintelligence (Turing1950b,p.455). ThewitanddramaofTuring'simitationgamehasattractedmorefamethanhiscarefulgroundwork. Turing'sargumentwasdesignedtobypassdiscussionsofthenatureofthought,mind,and consciousness,andtogiveacriterionintermsofexternalobservationalone.Hisjustificationforthis wasthatoneonlyjudgesthatotherhumanbeingsarethinkingbyexternalobservation,andheapplieda principleoffairplayformachinestoarguethatthesameshouldholdformachineintelligence.He dramatisedthisviewpointbyathoughtexperiment(whichnowadayscanreadilybetriedout).Ahuman beingandaprogrammedcomputercompetetoconvinceanimpartialjudge,usingtextualmessages alone,astowhichisthehumanbeing.Ifthecomputerwins,itmustbecreditedwithintelligence. Turingintroducedhisgameconfusinglywithapooranalogy:apartygameinwhichamanpretendsto

beawoman.Hisloosewording(Turing1950b,p.434)hasledsomewriterswronglytosupposethat Turingproposedanimitationgameinwhichamachinehastoimitateamanimitatingawoman. Others,likeLassgue(1998),placemuchweightonthisgameofgenderpretenceanditsrealor imaginaryconnotations.Infact,thewholepointofthetestsetting,withitsremotetextmessagelink, wastoseparateintelligencefromotherhumanfacultiesandproperties.Butitmayfairlybesaidthat thisconfusionreflectsTuring'srichlyambitiousconceptofwhatisinvolvedinhumanintelligence.It mightalsobesaidtoillustratehisownhumanintelligence,inparticularadelightintheWildean reversalofroles,perhapsreflecting,asinWilde,hishomosexualidentity.HisfriendsknewanAlan Turinginwhomintelligence,humourandsexwereoftenintermingled. Turingwasinfactsensitivetothedifficultyofseparatingintelligencefromotheraspectsofhuman sensesandactions;hedescribedideasforrobotswithsensoryattachmentsandraisedquestionsasto whethertheymightenjoystrawberriesandcreamorfeelracialkinship.Incontrast,hepaidscant attentiontothequestionsofauthenticityanddeceptionimplicitinhistest,essentiallybecausehe wishedtobypassquestionsabouttherealityofconsciousness.Asubtleaspectofoneofhisimagined intelligentconversations(Turing1950b,p.434)iswherethecomputerimitateshumanintelligenceby givingthewronganswertoasimplearithmeticproblem.ButinTuring'ssettingwearenotsupposedto askwhetherthecomputerconsciouslydeceivesbygivingtheimpressionofinnumeratehumanity,nor whyitshouldwishtodoso.Thereisacertainlackofseriousnessinthisapproach.Turingtookona secondranktargetincounteringthepublishedviewsofthebrainsurgeonG.Jefferson,asregardsthe objectivityofconsciousness.Wittgenstein'sviewsonMindwouldhavemadeamoreseriouspointof departure. Turing'simitationprincipleperhapsalsoassumes(likeintelligencetestsofthatepoch)toomuchofa sharedlanguageandcultureforhisimaginedinterrogations.Neitherdoesitaddressthepossibilitythat theremaybekindsofthought,byanimalsorextraterrestrialintelligences,whicharenotamenableto communication. Amorepositivefeatureofthepaperliesinitsconstructiveprogramforresearch,culminatingin Turing'sideasforlearningmachinesandeducatingchildmachines(Turing1950b,p.454).Itis generallythought(e.g.inDreyfusandDreyfus1990)thattherewasalwaysanantagonismbetween programmingandtheconnectionistapproachofneuralnetworks.ButTuringneverexpressedsucha dichotomy,writingthatbothapproachesshouldbetried.DonaldMichie,theBritishAIresearch pioneerprofoundlyinfluencedbyearlydiscussionswithTuring,hascalledthissuggestionAlan Turing'sBuriedTreasure,inanallusiontoabizarrewartimeepisodeinwhichMichiewashimself involved(Hodges1983,p.345).Thequestionisstillhighlypertinent. ItisalsoacommonlyexpressedviewthatArtificialIntelligenceideasonlyoccurredtopioneersinthe 1950safterthesuccessofcomputersinlargearithmeticalcalculations.ItishardtoseewhyTuring's work,whichwasrootedfromtheoutsetinthequestionofmechanisingMind,hasbeensomuch overlooked.Butthroughhisfailuretopublishandpromoteworksuchasthatin(Turing1948)helargely lostrecognitionandinfluence. ItisalsocuriousthatTuring'sbestknownpapershouldappearinajournalofphilosophy,foritmay wellbesaidthatTuring,alwayscommittedtomaterialistexplanation,wasnotreallyaphilosopherat all.Turingwasamathematician,andwhathehadtoofferphilosophylayinilluminatingitsfieldwith whathadbeendiscoveredinmathematicsandphysics.Inthe1950paperthiswassurprisinglycursory, apartfromhisgroundworkontheconceptofcomputability.Hisemphasisonthesufficiencyofthe computabletoexplaintheactionofthemindwasstatedmoreasahypothesis,evenamanifesto,than

arguedindetail.Ofhishypothesishewrote(Turing1950b,p.442): Ibelievethatattheendofthecenturytheuseofwordsandgeneraleducatedopinionwill havealteredsomuchthatonewillbeabletospeakofmachinesthinkingwithoutexpecting tobecontradicted.Ibelievefurtherthatnousefulpurposeisservedbyconcealingthese beliefs.Thepopularviewthatscientistsproceedinexorablyfromestablishedfactto establishedfact,neverbeinginfluencedbyanyunprovedconjecture,isquitemistaken. Provideditismadeclearwhichareprovedfactsandwhichareconjecture,noharmcan result.Conjecturesareofgreatimportancesincetheysuggestusefullinesofresearch. Penrose(1994,p.21),probingintoTuring'sconjecture,haspresenteditasTuring'sthesisthus: Itseemslikelythatheviewedphysicalactioningeneralwhichwouldincludetheaction ofahumanbraintobealwaysreducibletosomekindofTuringmachineaction. ThestatementthatallphysicalactionisineffectcomputablegoesbeyondTuring'sexplicitwords,butis afaircharacterisationoftheimplicitassumptionsbehindthe1950paper.Turing'sconsiderationofThe ArgumentfromContinuityintheNervousSystem,inparticular,simplyassertsthatthephysicalsystem ofthebraincanbeapproximatedascloselyasisdesiredbyacomputerprogram(Turing1950b,p.451). CertainlythereisnothinginTuring'sworkinthe194550periodtocontradictPenrose'sinterpretation. Themoretechnicalprecursorpapers(Turing1947,1948)includewiderangingcommentsonphysical processes,butmakenoreferencetothepossibilityofphysicaleffectsbeinguncomputable. Inparticular,asectionof(Turing1948)isdevotedtoageneralclassificationofmachines.Theperiod between1937and1948hadgivenTuringmuchmoreexperienceofactualmachinerythanhehadin 1936,andhispostwarremarksreflectedthisinadowntoearthmanner.Turingdistinguished controllingfromactivemachinery,thelatterbeingillustratedbyabulldozer.Naturallyitisthe formerinmoderntermsinformationbasedmachinerywithwhichTuring'sanalysisis concerned.Itisnoteworthythatin1948asin1936,despitehisknowledgeofphysics,Turingmadeno mentionofhowquantummechanicsmightaffecttheconceptofcontrolling.Hisconceptof controllingremainedentirelywithintheclassicalframeworkoftheTuringmachine(whichhecalleda LogicalComputingMachineinthispaper.) Thesamesectionof(Turing1948)alsodrewthedistinctionbetweendiscreteandcontinuous machinery,illustratingthelatterwiththetelephoneasacontinuous,controllingmachine.Hemade lightofthedifficultyofreducingcontinuousphysicstothediscretemodeloftheTuringmachine,and thoughcitingthebrainasacontinuousmachine,statedthatitcouldprobablybetreatedasifdiscrete. Hegavenoindicationthatphysicalcontinuitythreatenedtheparamountroleofcomputability.Infact, histhrustin(Turing1947)wastopromotethedigitalcomputerasmorepowerfulthananalogmachines suchasthedifferentialanalyser.Whenhediscussedthiscomparison,hegavethefollowinginformal versionoftheChurchTuringthesis: Oneofmyconclusionswasthattheideaofaruleofthumbprocessandamachine processweresynonymous.Theexpressionmachineprocessofcoursemeansonewhich couldbecarriedoutbythetypeofmachineIwasconsidering[i.e.Turingmachines] TuringgavenohintthatthediscretenessoftheTuringmachineconstitutedareallimitation,orthatthe nondiscreteprocessesofanalogmachinesmightbeofanydeepsignificance. Turingalsointroducedtheideaofrandomelementsbuthisexamples(usingthedigitsof)showed

thatheconsideredpseudorandomsequences(i.e.computablesequenceswithsuitablerandom properties)quiteadequateforhisdiscussion.Hemadenosuggestionthatrandomnessimplied somethinguncomputable,andindeedgavenodefinitionofthetermrandom.Thisisperhaps surprisinginviewofthefactthathisworkinpuremathematics,logicandcryptographyallgavehim considerablemotivationtoapproachthisquestionataseriouslevel.

8.UnfinishedWork
From1950Turingworkedonanewmathematicaltheoryofmorphogenesis,basedonshowingthe consequencesofnonlinearequationsforchemicalreactionanddiffusion(Turing1952).Hewasa pioneerinusingacomputerforsuchwork.Somewritershavereferredtothistheoryasfounding ArtificialLife(Alife),butthisisamisleadingdescription,aptonlytotheextentthatthetheorywas intended,asTuringsawit,tocountertheArgumentfromDesign.Alifesincethe1980shasconcerned itselfwithusingcomputerstoexplorethelogicalconsequencesofevolutionarytheorywithout worryingaboutspecificphysiologicalforms.Morphogenesisiscomplementary,beingconcernedto showwhichphysiologicalpathwaysarefeasibleforevolutiontoexploit.Turing'sworkwasdeveloped byothersinthe1970sandisnowregardedascentraltothisfield. ItmaywellbethatTuring'sinterestinmorphogenesiswentbacktoaprimordialchildhoodwonderat theappearanceofplantsandflowers.Butinanotherlatedevelopment,Turingwentbacktoother stimuliofhisyouth.Forin1951Turingdidconsidertheproblem,hithertoavoided,ofsetting computabilityinthecontextofquantummechanicalphysics.InaBBCradiotalkofthatyear(Turing 1951)hediscussedthebasicgroundworkofhis1950paper,butthistimedealingratherlesscertainly withtheargumentfromGdel'stheorem,andthistimealsoreferringtothequantummechanical physicsunderlyingthebrain.Turingdescribedtheuniversalmachineproperty,applyingittothebrain, butsaidthatitsapplicabilityrequiredthatthemachinewhosebehaviouristobeimitated shouldbeofthesortwhosebehaviourisinprinciplepredictablebycalculation.We certainlydonotknowhowanysuchcalculationshouldbedone,anditwasevenarguedby SirArthurEddingtonthatonaccountoftheindeterminacyprincipleinquantummechanics nosuchpredictioniseventheoreticallypossible. Copeland(1999)hasrightlydrawnattentiontothissentenceinhisprefacetohiseditionofthe1951 talk.However,Copeland'scriticalcontextsuggestssomeconnectionwithTuring'soracle.Thereisis infactnomentionoforacleshere(noranywhereinTuring'spostwardiscussionofmindandmachine.) Turinghereisdiscussingthepossibilitythat,whenseenasasaquantummechanicalmachinerather thanaclassicalmachine,theTuringmachinemodelisinadequate.Thecorrectconnectiontodrawis notwithTuring's1938workonordinallogics,butwithhisknowledgeofquantummechanicsfrom EddingtonandvonNeumanninhisyouth.Indeed,inanearlyspeculation,influencedbyEddington, Turinghadsuggestedthatquantummechanicalphysicscouldyieldthebasisoffreewill(Hodges1983, p.63).VonNeumann'saxiomsofquantummechanicsinvolvetwoprocesses:unitaryevolutionofthe wavefunction,whichispredictable,andthemeasurementorreductionoperation,whichintroduces unpredictability.Turing'sreferencetounpredictabilitymustthereforerefertothereductionprocess.The essentialdifficultyisthatstilltothisdaythereisnoagreedorcompellingtheoryofwhenorhow reductionactuallyoccurs.(Itshouldbenotedthatquantumcomputing,inthestandardmodernsense, isbasedonthepredictabilityoftheunitaryevolution,anddoesnot,asyet,gointothequestionofhow reductionoccurs.)Itseemsthatthissinglesentenceindicatesthebeginningofanewfieldof investigationforTuring,thistimeintothefoundationsofquantummechanics.In1953Turingwroteto

hisfriendandstudentRobinGandythathewastryingtoinventanewQuantumMechanicsbutitwon't reallywork. AtTuring'sdeathinJune1954,GandyreportedinalettertoNewmanonwhatheknewofTuring's currentwork(Gandy1954).HewroteofTuringhavingdiscussedaprobleminunderstandingthe reductionprocess,intheformof theTuringParadox;itiseasytoshowusingstandardtheorythatifasystemstartinan eigenstateofsomeobservable,andmeasurementsaremadeofthatobservableNtimesa second,then,evenifthestateisnotastationaryone,theprobabilitythatthesystemwillbe inthesamestateafter,say,1second,tendstooneasNtendstoinfinity;i.e.thatcontinual observationwillpreventmotion.AlanandItackledoneortwotheoreticalphysicistswith this,andtheyratherpoohpooheditbysayingthatcontinualobservationisnotpossible. Butthereisnothinginthestandardbooks(e.g.,Dirac's)tothiseffect,sothatatleastthe paradoxshowsupaninadequacyofQuantumTheoryasusuallypresented. Turing'sinvestigationstakeonaddedsignificanceinviewoftheassertionofPenrose(1989,1990,1994, 1996)thatthereductionprocessmustinvolvesomethinguncomputable.ProbablyTuringwasaimingat theoppositeidea,offindingatheoryofthereductionprocessthatwouldbepredictiveandcomputable, andsoplugthegapinhishypothesisthattheactionofthebrainiscomputable.HoweverTuringand Penrosearealikeinseeingthisasanimportantquestionaffectingtheassumptionthatallmentalaction iscomputable;inthistheybothdifferfromthemainstreamviewinwhichthequestionisaccordedlittle significance. AlanTuring'slastpostcardstoRobinGandy,inMarch1954,headedMessagesfromtheUnseen WorldinallusiontoEddington,hintedatnewideasinthefundamentalphysicsofrelativityand particlephysics(Hodges1983,p.512).Theyillustratethewealthofideaswithwhichhewasconcerned atthatlastpointinhislife,butwhichapartfromthesehintsareentirelylost.Areviewofsuchlostideas isgivenin(Hodges2004),aspartofalargervolumeonTuring'slegacy(Teuscher2004).

9.AlanTuring:theUnknownMind
ItisapitythatTuringdidnotwritemoreabouthisethicalphilosophyandworldoutlook.Asastudent hewasanadmirerofBernardShaw'splaysofideas,andtofriendswouldopenlyvoiceboththe hilaritiesandfrustrationsofhismanydifficultsituations.Yetthenearesthecametoseriouspersonal writing,apartfromoccasionalcommentsinprivateletters,wasinpenningashortstoryabouthis1952 crisis(Hodges1983,p.448).HislasttwoyearswereparticularlyfullofShaviandramaandWildean irony.Inoneletter(tohisfriendNormanRoutledge;theletterisnowintheTuringArchiveatKing's College,Cambridge)hewrote: Turingbelievesmachinesthink Turinglieswithmen Thereforemachinesdonotthink ThesyllogisticallusiontoSocratesisunmistakeable,andhisdemise,withcyanideratherthanhemlock, mayhavesignalledsomethingsimilar.AparallelfigureinWorldWarII,RobertOppenheimer,suffered thelossofhisreputationduringthesameweekthatTuringdied.Bothcombinedthepurestscientific workandthemosteffectiveapplicationofscienceinwar.AlanTuringwasevenmoredirectlyonthe receivingendofscience,whenhissexualmindwastreatedasamachine,againsthisprotesting

consciousnessandwill.Butamidstallthishumandrama,heleftlittletosayaboutwhathereally thoughtofhimselfandhisrelationshiptotheworldofhumanevents. AlanTuringdidnotfiteasilywithanyoftheintellectualmovementsofhistime,aesthetic,technocratic ormarxist.Inthe1950s,commentatorsstruggledtofinddiscreetwordstocategorisehim:asa scientificShelley,aspossessinggreatmoralintegrity.Butuntilthe1970stherealityofhislifewas unmentionable.Heisstillhardtoplacewithintwentiethcenturythought.Heexaltedthesciencethat existentialistsheldtohavehadrobbedlifeofmeaning.Themostoriginalfigure,themostinsistenton personalfreedom,heheldoriginalityandwilltobesusceptibletomechanisation.ThemindofAlan Turingremainsanenigma.

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