Monsicha Hoonsuwan Japanese Politics and Diplomacy Professor Kyoichi Marukusu Final Paper 15 July 2010 The Effects

of Japanese Electoral System on Japanese Party Politics The recent upper-house election held on July 11, 2010 ended with a victory for Japans longstanding hegemon: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who took a total of 51 seats13 seats increase from pre-election. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Naoto Kan from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), who had just started his prime-ministerial post this May, is facing a shaky future as his party lost 10 seats; thus, winning only 44 seatsway short of a majority. The biggest surprise was, yet, the unexpected performance of the Your Party, which acquired 10 seats as opposed to zero before the election. Established less than a year ago by dissatisfied LDP and DPJ types (Banyan, 2010), Your Party is relatively new and does not have as strong of a supporters base as the political giants LDP and DPJ. Therefore, many analysts have remarked that the small victory of the Your Party reflects the change in attitude of the Japanese public. The Japanese people are yearning for change and strong leadership, their faith in the two major political parties is fast dwindling (Goto, 2010). Furthermore, with the eminence of a double-dip recession looming, the election result sent a fairly strong signal in favor of sound economic management and faster growth (Banyan, 2010). The entrance into Japans political arena of the Your Party is partly a result of the parallel voting system that permits small parties to have fairly equal chance to compete with big parties for seats in the Diet. This parallel voting system has been installed in the House of Representatives in 1994 to foster more policy-oriented, party-oriented election. As McKean

and Scheiner explained in their research, the new system was adopted amid voters excitement because the old system seemed to produce one-party dominance no matter what voters tried, and the new system offered them at least the possibility of alternation in power between two large parties, a competitive atmosphere that might incline both parties to appeal more to voter demands (McKean & Scheiner, 2000). However, as this essay will argue, the Japanese electoral reform did not produce any significant changes in Japanese party politics. In fact, there is no evidence as yet that money politics, or the importance of the individual candidate, have disappeared (Gallagher, 1998). From 1947 to 1994, Japan used single nontransferable voting system (SNTV) to elect members of the House of Representatives. Under this system, 511 members from 129 constituencies compete in medium-size constituencies with a district magnitude ranging from two to six, although most districts are three-, four- and five-seat districts. In all election districts, each voter casted only one nontransferable vote for the preferred candidate no matter how many candidates were running. The winners were those who get the most votes. Therefore, in a three-seat district, only three top vote getters would make it to the national Diet. At first glance, the SNTV may display some similarities with the Anglo-American system, differing only in the district magnitude. This district magnitude, however, is the key to explain dissimilar outcomes between the SNTV system and the Anglo-American system. Under the SNTV, any party that seeks to win a majority of the seats in the Diet must nominate more than one candidate in a district, while working strategically to prevent overnomination, undernomination and the failure to equalize the vote between contesting candidates (Grofman, 1999). The fact that more than one candidate from the same party could run against each other had a huge effect on the Japanese politics; it placed disproportionate weight on the individual candidates as opposed to the parties, forcing candidates to run

against their own party members instead of candidates from other parties. For a big party like the LDP, this posed a serious problem on the party integrity as LDP candidates fought each other as much as, or more than, they fought candidates of other parties (Gallagher, 1998). Consequently, the LDP became nothing more than a loose organization comprised of numerous factions vying for control of the partys top positions. The old electoral system produced solemn consequences on Japanese politics; it had contributed to the LDP continuous dominance in the Diet before it lost the majority in 1993. The LDP had long been aware of the advantages it had in smaller districts: the party tended to err in the larger magnitude constituencies and win over 40% of the votes in almost all rural constituencies (Shiratori, 1995). Due to the overrepresentation of rural areas, Japan Communist Party and the Clean Government Party, who have had strong support in mostly urban areas that are underrepresented, had little power to compete against the LDP in national election. Strict apportionment on the basis of population could have reduced the size of the LDPs parliamentary strength in the old system (Hayes, 2009). Lacking the change of government, political responsibility in decision-making and in cases of corruption is almost non-existent, which was apparent in the LDP case. When a policy was proven to be a failure, instead of examining the cause of the failure, LDP politicians tend to solve the problem by removing related politicians and replacing them with someone else until the scandal dies down (Shiratori, 1995). Furthermore, LDPs notorious factionalism is, to a degree, a product of multiple member district system (Hayes, 2009). In order to gain political influence, each faction needs to raise funds, establish connections in the economic world, place faction members into the bureaucracy, and control the party leadership structure. Nominating a candidate to run in a particular constituency is also a way to gain more influences within the partythe more

faction members elected, the more chance of having faction members in the partys important posts. Hence, the intra-party rivalry became a fierce competition that, most of the time, overshadows the significance of inter-party competition. The old electoral system had been fostering this dynamism since it allowed more than one candidate from each party to run against each other based on their characteristics instead of party platform, leading to the lessening importance of the partyand therefore policies. In addition, the intra-party competition induces each candidate to establish his or her own personal support organization or koenkai to tighten the ties with local constituencies, impressing voters with ones own charisma and promises, then, if elected, use political power to give back to the constituencies to keep that loyalty. Indeed, such pork barrel is common in Japanese politics. Epitomized by Tanaka Kakuei, the extension of the shinkansen that cost $6.3 billion was built through Niigata Tanakas own constituencyand served very few passengers. Although his reputation was tainted by the Lockheed Scandal (1976), among his constituency, his popularity remained undiminished, as Tanaka had taken care of his voters well. It takes a great deal of money to service constituents in Japan. Japanese are fond of gift-giving, and politics is not exempt. Diet members shower constituents with gifts on the occasion of births, deaths, weddings, and holidays, a relationship that voters have come to expect (Hayes, 2009) In 1988, the Recruit Scandal broke out during Takanas successor as a faction leader Takeshita Noborus cabinet. This time it involved top LDP officials, including ministers of finance and justice, some local officials, and journalists. Perhaps, the most shocking was the involvement of the bureaucracy who had, prior to the scandal, enjoyed untarnished reputation. This scandal caused the public and politicians alike to blame the electoral system, and Prime Minister Takeshita decided to propose electoral reform as a part of his New Years address.

Yet, the series of scandals did not end there, as Takeshitas own faction leader Kanemaru Shin was also involved in the Sagawa Kyubin scandal later where back debentures, cash, and gold ingots were discovered at Kanemarus office and he was charged with tax evasion. Unsurprisingly, the public grew weary of existing political parties, which failed to represent a variety of opinions expressed by the public. The voters turnout in 1991 was the lowest since WWII. For these reasons, the old electoral system took the full blame on creating a structure that was conducive to corruption, factionalized politics and election that was individual-based instead of policy-based. Knowing that it had a strong support in smaller constituenciesthat district magnitude provides the largest positive contribution of the LDPs seat bonus and victories (Christensen & Johnson, 1995), the party proposed a single-member district (SMD) system, which would help consolidate the LDP power and increase its seats in the Diet, amidst strong opposition from smaller parties. The LDP said that, by introducing the single-member constituency system, corruption in politics as well as factional politics in Japan would be ended (Shiratori, 1995). After the LDP lost control of the Diet in 1993, however, a coalition government comprised of eight parties proposed an electoral reform that introduced a two-tiered system: single-member district and proportional representation. Under this system, part of the Diet members are elected using a single-member district plurality vote, meaning that only one candidatethe highest vote getterfrom each electoral district is elected into the Diet, while the rest is elected under a proportional representation system (PR). Using the PR system, each party has a list of candidates; the number of candidates elected into the Diet depends on the proportion of votes the party receives. Seat allocation would be conducted according to the dHondt method with 3% threshold (2% in some reports) applied in each constituency. Although the final draft of the electoral reform bill fixed the total number of seats in the House of Representatives at 500, with 300 being elected by SMD and

the other 200 elected by proportional representation, in practice 480 Diet members are divided into two groups: 300 elected under the SMD and 180 are elected from 11 electoral blocs. Nevertheless, the Japanese parallel voting system in unique in the fact that it permits dual candidacy; a candidate can run in a single-member district while having his or her name listed on the party list. In case he or she loses the single-member district election, one still has a chance of being elected depending on how many votes the party receives under the PR system. Japans unusual dual candidacy system has more or less negative impacts on the electoral reform. That is to say, if the purpose of the reform is to divert Japanese politics away from the individual-based one toward the more party-oriented, policy-oriented one, this electoral reform has done very little to promote that change. Even more bizarre than dual candidacy is, perhaps, the party-list ranking system in which some or all dual candidates are ranked equally in group. Only after the electionwhen the SMD winners leave the PR list that these candidates are ranked individually according to their performance during the race. The closer that dual candidates who are in evenly ranked groups of individuals on their party PR list come to winning in their SMD, the higher their score and post-election ranking within their evenly ranked cohort and the more likely they are to win a PR seat after all (McKean & Scheiner, 2000). The LDP, DPJ and some smaller parties take full advantage of this system. On the eve of the electoral reform, many voters had hoped that the PR system would put more emphasis on political parties, policies, and limit the ties between individual candidates and local constituencies to those elected from the SMD; thus, reducing the extent of intra-party rivalry and compelling candidates to battle against pork barrel and koenkai. Despite such potential, the use of dual candidacy defeats the purpose, though not entirely, of electoral reform. Having a party like the LDP taking full advantage of the dual candidacy system

means that even SMD-losers who win the PR seats are local based, After all, they are ranked according to their performance in the SMD race. Thus, having been listed on the PR seat does not guarantee a seat in the Diet unless a candidate campaigns heavily and gains enough support from the constituency. Ultimately, the quantity of PR representationwhich is supposedly party-baseddecreases. Furthermore, as McKean and Scheiner pointed out, if parties increasingly rely on dual candidacy and SMD-based ranking, it would be theoretically possible for all 500 seats in the House of Representatives to be filled by persons who campaigned principally in the SMDs and who were identified and placed there on the basis of votes cast in the SMDs (McKean & Scheiner, 2000). Dual candidates who become a Diet member through the PR system are not only looked down upon by the general public, but also by the fellow party members themselves. The rationale behind this phenomenon is the concept of real victors or gold medalists (Gallagher, 1998), which is an MP elected on the basis of SMD. Those listed only on the party list and win are silver medalists, while those who stand in both and win in SMDs are bronze medalists (Gallagher, 1998). Hence, those who stand for both and merely make it into the Diet though PR are considered losersthe lowest, stigmatized category. Therefore, it is only logical for many aspirants to seek SMD nominations as a way to become an elected member of the Diet instead of PR, not only because SMD come with higher prestige, but also because of the belief that those elected through SMD will be invulnerable and able to maintain the seat for life (Gallagher, 1998). With such system, the candidate selection process within a party becomes an important process, especially for a big party like the LDP because it has more incumbents than there are SMD spots. Consequently, instead of competing against fellow party members on the campaign ground, aspirants are competing to be nominated as the partys SMD candidate. Comparing this new dynamic within the party to the old dynamic

under the SNTV system, there are little differences since members of the same party still contend against each other and, as will be explained in the next paragraph, the importance of faction has died down only so little, if at all. Considering the nature of Japanese factionsthe emphasis on seniority and lifetime membershiponce one becomes a member of any particular faction, one is expected to stay with the particular faction until the political career is done. Leaving one faction to join another will cost one to lose his or her seniorityand influences. In short, factionalism is quite deep-rooted in Japanese politics. Although the electoral reform has affected factions on the ground that factional roots no longer penetrate all the way down to electoral politics (Cox, Rosenbluth, & Thies, Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japans Liberal Democratic Party, 1999), it still flourishes (Felter, 2005). Felters survey of factional behavior within the LDP from 1993-2000 reveals that the majority of LDP members belong to factions as factional membership remains a crucial factor in deciding party and cabinet appointments. Faction leaders still submit lists with potential prospects from their faction whenever party or cabinet positions need to be filled. The party president/prime minister uses these lists to fill vacant positions based on his supporters, seniority, and the necessity to balance factional power within the party (Felter, 2005). One of the main functions of factions is fundraising. With the declining in factions influence on endorsement since the need to consolidate constituencies has left factions with scant room for maneuver (Cox, Rosenbluth, & Thies, Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japans Liberal Democratic Party, 1999), candidates seem to depend more on their parties prefectural organizations instead of their factions. Hence, the distribution of campaign funding relies heavily on the decision of party organizations. Rational funding would require the party to distribute more resources to places that they will

make a difference. Candidates who contest in the less important districts are left reliant on their own pocket, and in some cases, on the koenkai to help strengthen ties with the local constituencies in order to be elected. Thus, the same thing happens here as it would happen under the SNTV system: candidates are relying upon the support of koenkai, compelled to establish ties with businesses and local constituencies in order to be elected. Although the extent of this relationship is unknown, it is and evidence that money politics is still alive and kicking. For smaller parties, higher campaign cost means they need to focus on PR seats instead of spending money on SMDs. As a result, smaller parties might choose not to send candidates to compete in all single-member districts. This poses another problem: if smaller parties decide not to send candidates in some districts, voters will have less choices and are forced to choose the least hated candidate instead of the best (Gallagher, 1998). This could potentially be a turn-off for Japanese voters. Another possible effect is on policy differences. The prestige that comes with SMD victory lures many Diet member-wannabe to focus on getting elected. Once a member fails to be nominated as a partys contestant in one single-member district, he or she could switch a party and be nominated to run as an SMD candidate in the particular district. As such, the policy differences are almost tactical. Recent examples can be seen in the case of the consumption tax: the LDPs support for the consumption tax increase was to distinguish itself from the DPJ, which acted as if it did not support the consumption tax. However, Prime Minister Kan Naoto has recently proposed a plan to raise consumption tax to 10%, a move that had contradicted the DPJs initial stance. Moreover, Hatoyamas downfall, a result of his flipflopping stance regarding the relocation of Futenma Base (Kingston, 2010), signifies the tactical differences in DPJ and LDPs policy; Hatoyama, promising to move Futenma off Okinawa, ended up adopting the agreement the LDP had made with the U.S.

Since taking over last year, the DPJ has thrown out or modified much of its manifesto to the point where its policies are not that much different from those of the LDP. It has basically adopted the agreement that the LDP made with the United States on moving the Futenma air base to Nago; pulled back on many of its public welfare schemes; and is now pretty friendly with the bureaucracy after having pledged to reduce its power (Brasor, 2010). The differences between the LDP and the DPJ are almost non-existent. It can be said that the policy-oriented goal of the electoral reform has not been materialized, as the electoral reform does not divert Japanese politicians toward focusing on ideology and policy differences but instead on getting elected. In short, Japanese politics has not been affected by the change in electoral system in a significant way. There are still remnants of individual-based politics as can be seen through the interaction between the single-member district system and the proportional representation system. Candidates still campaign based on strong local ties despite the attempt to emphasize the importance of party platform through proportional representation. At the core of this electoral dilemma is dual candidacy system, which has defeats the purpose of installing the PR system. If party-centric politics is what the Japanese truly want, a better approach would likely have been to adopt a national closed party list PR system (Lundberg, 1995). Having the entire House of Representatives being elected through the PR system while increasing the threshold to prevent excessive party fragmentation could help minimize parochialism and personality-based politics. Although such change would come at the expense of a stable, effective government Japanese people were used to under the continuous ruling of the LDP. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that corruption, although still exits in this new electoral system as it would in every system, has shown a decreasing trend. Recent scandals in Japanese politics such as Hatoyamas fake campaign donation scandal or Ozawas controversial land purchasing scandal have not reached the same scale as the Lockheed or Recruit scandal did in

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the past. Of course, scandals are never acceptable, but if this were to 1993, Hatoyamas and Ozawas wrongdoings might not have been uncovered by the public as there were bigger, more serious scandals to focus on. In a sense, corruption in Japan has declined as a result of weakening factional politics and local ties. Yet, the ties are still there. Parallel voting system has done so little to remove those ties and redirect the Japanese politics toward a more partyoriented and policy-oriented future. Further political reforms are, indeed, needed to restructure Japanese political system if those goals are to be reached.

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