MATERIAL OF LOGIC

PRESENTATION

SUBMITTED TO: MADAM FAZIA

 DEFINITION

A definition is a statement of the meaning of a term, word or phrase. The term to be

defined is known as the definiendum (Latin: that which is to be defined). The words
which define it are known as the definiens (Latin: that which is doing the defining).[1]

Stipulative definitions
A definition may either give the meaning that a term bears in general use (a descriptive
definition), or that which the speaker intends to impose upon it for the purpose of his or
her discourse (a stipulative definition). Stipulative definitions differ from descriptive
definitions in that they prescribe a new meaning either to a term already in use or to a
new term. A descriptive definition can be shown to be right or wrong by comparison to
usage, while a stipulative definition cannot. A stipulative definition, however, may be
more or less useful. A persuasive definition, named by C.L. Stevenson, is a form of
stipulative definition which purports to describe the 'true' or 'commonly accepted'
meaning of a term, while in reality stipulating an altered use, perhaps as an argument for
some view, for example that some system of government is democratic. Stevenson also
notes that some definitions are 'legal' or 'coercive', whose object is to create or alter
rights, duties or crimes.[2]

Intension and extension

An intensional definition, also called a connotative definition, specifies the necessary and
sufficient conditions for a thing being a member of a specific set. Any definition that
attempts to set out the essence of something, such as that by genus and differentia, is an
intensional definition.

An extensional definition, also called a denotative definition, of a concept or term

specifies its extension, for example a list naming every object that is a member of a
specific set.

So, for example, an intensional definition of 'Prime Minister' might be the most senior
minister of a cabinet in the executive branch of government in a parliamentary system;
whereas an extensional definition would be simply a list of all past and present Prime
Ministers.

One important form of extensional definition is ostensive definition. This gives the
meaning of a term by pointing, in the case of an individual, to the thing itself, or in the
case of a class, to examples of the right kind. So you can explain who Alice (an
individual) is by pointing her out to me; or what a rabbit (a class) is by pointing at several

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and expecting me to 'catch on'. The process of ostensive definition itself was critically
appraised by Ludwig Wittgenstein.[3]

An enumerative definition of a concept or term is an extensional definition that gives an

explicit and exhaustive listing of all the objects that fall under the concept or term in
question. Enumerative definitions are only possible for finite sets and only practical for
relatively small sets.

Definition by genus and differentia

Scientific classification of living things uses definition by genus and differentia.

Main article: Genus-differentia definition

Traditionally, a definition consists of the genus (the family) of thing to which the defined
thing belongs, and the differentia (the distinguishing feature which marks it off from
other members of the same family). Thus 'triangle' is defined as 'a plane figure (genus)
bounded by three straight sides (differentia).[4]

Rules for definition by genus and differentia

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Certain rules have traditionally been given for this particular type of definition.[5][6]

1. A definition must set out the essential attributes of the thing defined.
2. Definitions should avoid circularity. To define a horse as 'a member of the species
equus' would convey no information whatsoever. For this reason, Locke adds that
a definition of a term must not consist of terms which are synonymous with it.
This error is known as circulus in definiendo. Note, however, that it is acceptable
to define two relative terms in respect of each other. Clearly, we cannot define
'antecedent' without using the term 'consequent', nor conversely.
3. The definition must not be too wide or too narrow. It must be applicable to
everything to which the defined term applies (i.e. not miss anything out), and to
no other objects (i.e. not include any things to which the defined term would not
truly apply).
4. The definition must not be obscure. The purpose of a definition is to explain the
meaning of a term which may be obscure or difficult, by the use of terms that are
commonly understood and whose meaning is clear. The violation of this rule is
known by the Latin term obscurum per obscurius. However, sometimes scientific
and philosophical terms are difficult to define without obscurity. (See the
definition of Free will in Wikipedia, for instance).
5. A definition should not be negative where it can be positive. We should not define
'wisdom' as the absence of folly, or a healthy thing as whatever is not sick.
Sometimes this is unavoidable, however. We cannot define a point except as
'something with no parts', nor blindness except as 'the absence of sight in a
creature that is normally sighted'.

Essence

Main article: Essence

In classical thought, a definition was taken to be a statement of the essence of a thing.

Aristotle had it that an object's essential attributes form its "essential nature", and that a
definition of the object must include these essential attributes.[7]

The idea that a definition should state the essence of a thing led to the distinction between
nominal and real essence, originating with Aristotle. In a passage from the Posterior
Analytics,[8] he says that we can know the meaning of a made-up name (he gives the
example 'goat stag'), without knowing what he calls the 'essential nature' of the thing that
the name would denote, if there were such a thing. This led medieval logicians to
distinguish between the so-called quid nominis or 'whatness of the name', and the
underlying nature common to all the things it names, which they called the quid rei or
'whatness of the thing'. (Early modern philosophers like Locke used the corresponding
English terms 'nominal essence' and 'real essence'). The name 'hobbit', for example, is
perfectly meaningful. It has a quid nominis. But we could not know the real nature of
hobbits, even if there were such things, and so we cannot know the real nature or quid rei
of hobbits. By contrast, the name 'man' denotes real things (men) that have a certain quid

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rei. The meaning of a name is distinct from the nature that thing must have in order that
the name apply to it.

This leads to a corresponding distinction between nominal and real definition. A nominal
definition is the definition explaining what a word means, i.e. which says what the
'nominal essence' is, and is definition in the classical sense as given above. A real
definition, by contrast, is one expressing the real nature or quid rei of the thing.

This preoccupation with essence dissipated in much of modern philosophy. Analytic

philosophy in particular is critical of attempts to elucidate the essence of a thing. Russell
described it as "a hopelessly muddle-headed notion".[9]

More recently Kripke's formalisation of possible world semantics in Modal logic led to a
new approach to essentialism. In so far as the essential properties of a thing are necessary
to it, they are those things it possesses in all possible worlds. Kripke refers to names used
in this way as Rigid designators.

Genetic definition
A genetic definition describes the process or method by which a thing is formed.

"But if you define the circle as a pattern resulting from having a segment of a line revolve
around one of its ends, this is a genetic definition because it tells you how to make a
circle."[10]

Recursive definitions
A recursive definition, sometimes also called an inductive definition, is one that defines a
word in terms of itself, so to speak, albeit in a useful way. Normally this consists of three
steps:

1. At least one thing is stated to be a member of the set being defined; this is
sometimes called a "base set".
2. All things bearing a certain relation to other members of the set are also to count
as members of the set. It is this step that makes the definition recursive.
3. All other things are excluded from the set

For instance, we could define natural number as follows (after Peano):

1. "0" is a natural number.

2. Each natural number has a distinct successor, such that:
o the successor of a natural number is also a natural number, and
o no natural number is succeeded by "0".
3. Nothing else is a natural number.

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So "0" will have exactly one successor, which for convenience we can call "1". In turn,
"1" will have exactly one successor, which we would call "2", and so on. Notice that the
second condition in the definition itself refers to natural numbers, and hence involves
self-reference. Although this sort of definition involves a form of circularity, it is not
vicious, and the definition is quite successful.

Limitations of definition
Given that a natural language such as English contains, at any given time, a finite number
of words, any comprehensive list of definitions must either be circular or leave some
terms undefined. If every term of every definiens must itself be defined, where should we
stop?[11] A dictionary, for instance, in so far as it is a comprehensive list of lexical
definitions, must resort to circularity.[12][13][14]

Many philosophers have chosen instead to leave some terms undefined. The scholastic
philosophers claimed that the highest genera (the so-called ten generalissima) cannot be
defined, since we cannot assign any higher genus under which they may fall. Thus we
cannot define being, unity and similar concepts.[15] Locke supposes in An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding[16] that the names of simple concepts do not admit of
any definition. More recently Bertrand Russell sought to develop a formal language
based on logical atoms. Other philosophers, notably Wittgenstein, rejected the need for
any undefined simples. Wittgenstein pointed out in his Philosophical Investigations that
what counts as a "simple" in one circumstance might not do so in another.[17] He rejected
the very idea that every explanation of the meaning of a term needed itself to be
explained: "As though an explanation hung in the air unless supported by another one",[18]
claiming instead that explanation of a term is only needed when we need to avoid
misunderstanding.

Locke and Mill also argued that we cannot define individuals. We learn names by
connecting an idea with a sound, so that speaker and hearer have the same idea when the
same word is used.[19] This is not possible when no one else is acquainted with the
particular thing that has "fallen under our notice".[20] Russell offered his theory of
descriptions in part as a way of defining a proper name, the definition being given by a
definite description that "picks out" exactly one individual. Saul Kripke pointed to
difficulties with this approach, especially in relation to modality, in his book Naming and
Necessity.

There is a presumption in the classic example of a definition that the definiens can be
stated. Wittgenstein argued that for some terms this is not the case.[21] The examples he
used include game, number and family. In such cases, he argued, there is no fixed
boundary that can be used to provide a definition. Rather, the items are grouped together
because of a family resemblance. For terms such as these it is not possible to state a
definition; rather, one simply comes to understand the use of the term.

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Extensional definition
An extensional definition of a concept or term formulates its meaning by specifying its
extension, that is, every object that falls under the definition of the concept or term in
question.

For example, an extensional definition of the term "nation of the world" might be given
by listing all of the nations of the world, or by giving some other means of recognizing
the members of the corresponding class. An explicit listing of the extension, which is
only possible for finite sets and only practical for relatively small sets, is called an
enumerative definition.

Extensional definitions are used when listing examples would give more applicable
information than other types of definition, and where listing the members of a set tells the
questioner enough about the nature of that set.

This is similar to an ostensive definition, in which one or more members of a set (but not
necessarily all) are pointed out as examples. The opposite approach is the intensional
definition, which defines by listing properties that a thing must have in order to be part of
the set captured by the definition.

Ostensive definition
An ostensive definition conveys the meaning of a term by pointing out examples. This
type of definition is often used where the term is difficult to define verbally, either
because the words will not be understood (as with children and new speakers of a
language) or because of the nature of the term (such as colors or sensations). It is usually
accompanied with a gesture pointing out the object serving as an example, and for this
reason is also often referred to as "definition by pointing." Ostensive definitions rely on
an analogical or case-based reasoning by the subject they are intended to.[citation needed]

For example, defining "red" by pointing out red objects -- apples, stop signs, roses -- is
giving ostensive definition, as is naming. It is thought that children may learn a great deal
of their language ostensively.[citation needed]

Ostensive definition assumes the questioner has sufficient understanding to recognize the
type of information being given. Ludwig Wittgenstein writes: So one might say: the
ostensive definition explains the use--the meaning--of the word when the overall role of
the word in language is clear. Thus if I know that someone means to explain a colour-
word to me the ostensive definition "That is called 'sepia' " will help me to understand the
word.... One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of
asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?[1]

The limitations of ostensive definition are exploited in a famous argument from the
Philosophical Investigations (which deal primarily with the philosophy of language), the

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private language argument, in which Wittgenstein asks if it is possible to have a private
language that no one else can understand.[2]