Pp vs. Alfredo Pangilinan (March 14, 2007) (Rule 116 Sec.

1) (appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision) Facts: In this case, two informations were filed against Pangilinan charging him with rape of AAA, his 11 year old daughter. On 5 May 1997, appellant, who was arrested and detained with no bail recommended, filed a petition for bail. In the hearings for the petition for bail, the prosecution presented the private complainant-victim, BBB, and Dr. Melinda Layug. On 9 June 1999, when the case was already submitted for decision, the trial court having discovered that appellant had not yet been arraigned, scheduled his arraignment. On 17 June 1999, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. Since the prosecution adopted all the evidence it adduced during the hearing for the petition for bail as part of its evidence-in-chief, which evidence the trial court admitted, the trial court deemed the cases submitted for decision. On September 9, 1999, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5 convicted him of two counts of rape and imposed upon him the capital punishment for each count. Pangilinan contended that since he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural error which is prejudicial to him and is tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person. Issue: WON there is a valid arraignment Ruling: Yes, there is a valid arraignment Appellants belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any

objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsels active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it. In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised under similar circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is nonprejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellants rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated.
Decision: WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 November 2005 finding appellant Alfredo Pangilinan y Trinidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that each penalty of death imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.

--extra-When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person. Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.

By: Ian

Dino vs Olivares (June 23, 2009) (Rule 116, Sec. 11) Facts: Dino instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo Olivarez. Based on the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor of Paraaque, two Informations were filed before the RTC on 29 September 2004 charging respondent Pablo Olivarez with Violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code x x x or simply vote buying. The arraignment of the respondent was initially set on 18 October 2004. On 7 October 2004, respondent filed before the Law Department of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) an "[a]ppeal of [the] Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City with Motion to Revoke Continuing Authority" pursuant to Section 10, Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Respondent argued that the pendency of the appeal of the Joint Resolution before the COMELEC should prevent the filing of the Informations before the RTC as there could be no final finding of probable cause until the COMELEC had resolved the appeal. Moreover, he argued that the charges made against him were groundless. During this time: --The Law Department of the COMELEC directed the city prosecutor to transmit or elevate the entire records of the case and to suspend further implementation of the Joint Resolution dated 20 September 2004 until final resolution of the said appeal before the COMELEC en banc. --Respondent on the other hand filed a Motion to Quash the two criminal informations on the ground that more than one offense was charged therein, in violation of Section 3(f), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court

--The Prosecutor filed a motion for "Opposition to the Motion to Quash and Motion to Admit Amended Informations. (Despite the Comelecs order, to transmit or elevate the entire records of the case and to suspend further implementation of the Joint Resolution dated 20 September 2004 until final resolution of the said appeal before the COMELEC en banc prosecutor continued to prosecute the case.) With all these motions, the arraignment was reset thrice and on 1 February 2005, Judge Madrona reset the arraignment to 9 March 2005, with a warning that the arraignment would proceed without any more delay, unless the Supreme Court would issue an injunctive writ. Issue: WON the arraignment could be suspended in view of the appeal made by the accused to the Comelec on the finding of probable cause. Ruling: No. The pertinent rule is Section 11 of Rule 116. Suspension of arraignment.Upon motion of the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: xxxx (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, That the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. From the foregoing, it is clear that the arraignment of the accused is not indefinitely suspended by the pendency of an appeal before the Department of Justice or, in this case, Law Department of the COMELEC; rather, the reviewing authority is allowed 60 days within which to decide the appeal. In this case, respondent filed his Appeal of the Joint Resolution at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque on 7 October 2004. Thus,

the arraignment that was scheduled on 11 October 2004 was re-scheduled to 13 December 2004, approximately 60 days thereafter. On 1 December 2004, the arraignment scheduled on 13 December 2004 was reset to 1 February 2005 because of the pending Motion to Quash. When the respondent failed to appear on the scheduled arraignment, Judge Madrona nonetheless reset the arraignment to 9 March 2005, with the warning that the court would impose the appropriate sanctions, should respondent still fail to appear therein. It was only on 9 March 2005, or five months after the respondent filed his appeal before the Law Department of the COMELEC that Judge Madrona held the arraignment and issued the Bench Warrant of Arrest against respondent. Five months, which far exceeded the sixty days provided by the rules, was ample time for the respondent to obtain from COMELEC a reversal of the Joint Resolution. Decision: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89230 is REVERSED. This Court orders the continuation of the proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-1105 before the RTC, the prosecution of which shall be under the direction of the Law Department of the COMELEC. No costs.

--Extra Respondent Olivares filed a motion for reconsideration of this ruling and the Special Third Division of the Supreme Court granted the MFR. So there is another decision bearing the same GR no. but different date of promulgation. The SC reversed its earlier decision based on some Election related issues that in my humble opinion renders the applicability of Rule 116, Sec. 11 nugatory for this particular case. Please read this matter on http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/dec2009/ gr_170447_2009.html Decision: WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Pablo Olivarez is GRANTED, and our assailed decision dated 23 June 2009 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89230 is REINSTATED. The amended informations filed by the City Prosecutor of Paraaque on 28 October 2004 aredeclared VOID and of NO EFFECT. SO ORDERED.

By: Ian