Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6697 JuIy 25, 2006
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, compIainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
Bar Matter No. 1227 July 25, 2006
RE: OATH-TAKNG OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, NCOMNG PRESDENT OF THE
NTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHLPPNES.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC July 25, 2006
N THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE BP
BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTVE VCE PRESDENT AND GOVERNOR.
N THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLANT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA
DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWTH DENY/DSAPPROVE THE BP RESOLUTON
UNJUSTLY, LLEGALLY, ARBTRARLY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVNG HM FROM THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE BP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASS AND FOR
FLAGRANT DENAL OF DUE PROCESS.
D E C S O N
Per Curiam:
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around ntegrated Bar of the Philippines
(BP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first
pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to schedule
his oath taking as BP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his
removal as Governor and EVP of the BP by the BP Board. The resolution of these cases
will determine the national presidency of the BP for the term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report
and recommendation on subject case,
1
summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:
n a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the
following grounds:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order
rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 BP
Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds
due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the
Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco, State Bar of
California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the
respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the
said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension.
Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to
lead the country's most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation
rule" provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to BP
Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the
requirements outlined in the BP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter
Membership. He surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the
purpose of becoming the next BP National President. Complainant prayed that the
respondent be enjoined from assuming office as BP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues
raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier
administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. n fact, according to
him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon
by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No.
6052 (n Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that
the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res
judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for
presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that
there is substantial evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and
depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed
that the respondent never denied that he used his client's money. Complainant
argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of
California accepted the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted,
complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the
case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent
was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this
Court to schedule his oath taking as BP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the
other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of BP National President Jose Anselmo .
Cadiz (BP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the BP's Resolution, dated 13 May
2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the BP Board and as BP EVP, for committing
acts inimical to the BP Board and the BP in general.
2

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular
meeting of the BP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. n said meeting, by 2/3
vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the BP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition
filed before this Court docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
SC-R165108." The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and
to increase filing fees.
3

The two BP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the
above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor
Carlos L. Valdez.
4

On 19 January 2005, BP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the
BP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the
BP Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution.
5

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for oathtaking
as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No.
6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.
6

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National BP Convention at the
CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. t was at this forum where Atty. de
Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection
with the BP Board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic
Act No. 9227.
7

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de
Vera from assuming office as BP National President.
8

On 12 May 2005, BP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote BP National President Cadiz a letter
wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the BP Board for having
committed acts which were inimical to the BP Board and the BP.
9

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel,
Cebu City, the BP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the
BP Board of Governors and as BP Executive Vice President.
10
Quoted hereunder is the
dispositive portion of said Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE T RESOLVED, AS T S HEREBY RESOLVED, that
Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the BP Board of
Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical to the BP
Board of Governors and the BP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about
the Supreme Court and members of the BP Board of Governors, during the
Plenary Session of the BP 10th National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-
Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that
the decision of the BP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETTON
docketed as "ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo . Cadiz, et al.
vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
With Prayer for the ssuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary njunction, S.C.-R. 165108", was due to influence and pressure
from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;
2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that
brought the BP Board of Governors and the BP as a whole in public
contempt and disrepute;
3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers which mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others", by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant
lies during the Plenary Session of the BP 10th National Convention of
Lawyers in Baguio City;
4. For instigating and provoking some BP chapters to embarrass and
humiliate the BP Board of Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter
to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;
5. For falsely accusing the BP National President, Jose Anselmo . Cadiz,
during the Plenary Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of
withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January
2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong
impression that the BP National President deliberately prevented him from
taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the
reputation and integrity of the BP National President and the BP as a
whole.
11

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon.
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring
njustice of the BP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly
Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due
Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary
Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than
Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal nvestigation."
12

n the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts
inimical to the BP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-
complaint filed by BP Governor Rivera, the BP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without
just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process.
Pertinent portions of his letter read:
t is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice
against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the BP,
am scheduled to assume my position as National President of the BP on July 1,
2005. x x x
was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court
even in administrative cases:
1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The
complaint against me was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of
time after receipt of the complaint.
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against
me. challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so could question him. He
refused. offered to testify under oath so could be questioned. My request
was denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my
accuser, prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.
7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident
because when his motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his
inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he can
vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me.
13
(Emphasis and
underscoring in original.)
On 27 May 2005, the BP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.
14
n
their Reply, the BP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera
was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member.
Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the BP Board were the following:
(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited
resolutions from BP Chapters to condemn the BP Board of Governors for its
decision to withdraw the Petition, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing
the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the Petition.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the BP Board of Governors
and the BP National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th
National Convention of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited' speakers (at the plenary
session), Atty. de Vera "fanned the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of
making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court
and some members of the BP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally
did so to provoke the members of the BP Board of Governors to engage him in an
acrimonious public debate and expose the BP Board of Governors to public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that
some of the members of the BP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal
of the petition (without mentioning names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme
Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court."
He made it appear that the BP Board of Governors approved the resolution,
withdrawing the petition, due to "influence" or "pressure" from the Supreme Court.
15

The BP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was "the
last straw that broke the camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of the BP
Board and the BP; hence, the BP Board decided to remove him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position
paper coming from various BP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the BP Board
and as BP EVP.
16

On 15 June 2005, BP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special
meeting of the BP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the BP
Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the BP EVP brought about by Atty. de
Vera's removal. n his stead, BP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected
and declared as BP EVP.
17

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago.
18
On 20
June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter
addressed to the BP Board.
19
Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the
BP Board elected a new EVP in the person of BP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to
replace Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, BP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice
Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazar's election.
20
BP National President Cadiz also
requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's election be approved and that he be
allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court.
21
Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera
protested the election of Atty. Salazar.
22

n his Extended Comment
23
dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was
absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the BP Board
because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based
on the same grounds as his removal from the BP Board, then his removal as EVP was
likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum
standards of due process of law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed
against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although
undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations,
not once undermining the stature of the BP in general and the BP Board of Governors in
particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during
the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected
member of the BP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the
right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent BP
Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this
Court's Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of
Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards
the election of a new BP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as
it was contrary to the provisions of the BP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall
hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of
their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen
and qualified.
n the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be
performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or
removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting
President for the unexpired portion of the term. n the event of death, resignation,
removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the
Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired
portion of the term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the
pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.
24

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP
die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the BP By-Laws only provides for the election of
an Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when
such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of the BP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as BP EVP, his replacement
should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation
Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article V of the BP By-Laws.
n response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 BP Board, through its counsel,
submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The BP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect
itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article V, Section 44 of the BP By-
Laws;
(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the BP Board and as BP EVP not
because of his disagreement with the BP Board's position but because of the various
acts that he committed which the BP Board determined to be inimical to the BP
Board and the BP as a whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional
right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on
similar conduct by others;
(iv) The BP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the
fundamental principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was
duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the BP Board held on 13 May 2004; was
furnished a copy of Governor Rivera's Letter-Complaint the day before the said
meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meeting's Agenda; and was allowed to
personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under
Section 44 of the BP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the BP
Board and as BP EVP was duly complied with;
(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as BP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao
Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article V, Section 47, par. 2 of the BP
By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern
Mindanao, was elected BP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the
same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as BP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed
to take his oath as BP National President.
25

The Court's Ruling
AC No. 6697
n his Memorandum
26
dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for
the consideration of the Court:
.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)
COMMTED MALPRACTCE WHCH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPTUDE N
THE STATE BAR OF CALFORNA AND N THE PHLPPNES, N THE COURSE
OF HS PRACTCE OF LAW.
.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFCE AS LAWYER S ATTACHED TO THE
PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO
AND NOT NECESSARLY BOUND BY THE TERRTORAL JURSDCTON OF THE
PHLPPNES.
.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE S SUBSTANTAL EVDENCE TO PROVE THE
MORAL T[U]RPTUDE, AS BASS FOR DSBARMENT OF RESPONDENT N AN
ADMNSTRATVE PROCEEDNG.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDCATA APPLES N THS CASE, DUE TO ADMN.
CASE NO. [6052]
27

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue.
Consequently, we will start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.
n disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent
Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order
rendered against him by the State Bar in California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (n the Matter: 1989 BP
Elections).
t appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier
administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued
upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by
this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052
(n Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:
"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients
when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to
surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot
serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for
the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final
judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied
upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee
which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline
which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court.
He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has
retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainant's money, but
unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer.
xxx"
"On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera
while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final
judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of
the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he
suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue
the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of
contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the
burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how
the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run
for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post
because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in
Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only
changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of
attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners
aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the
domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II,
a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register
with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not
automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place
of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular
chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register
his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place
where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's
preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at
the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this
Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies
with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must
be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the
chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
n the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his BP
membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, BP
National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z.
Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of BP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero,
Secretary of BP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de
Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their
respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification
mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was
made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On
27 February 2003, the elections of the BP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of
the BP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and
Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year.
Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had
elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more
than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.
n the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case
No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:
"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers."
n the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for
grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the
bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter
a complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same
incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be
charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the respondent
is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to
double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This
Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an
erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over courts while, in the
second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over
membersof the legal profession.
n subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still
applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs.
Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled
that:
"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be
contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a
second time for an act which he had already answered for.";
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L.
Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No.
MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:
"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present
administrative case becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of
competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively
settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and
for the same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be
affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same
matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not
be permitted to litigate it again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of
unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the
clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and
promotes the rule of law."
n the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant
had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The
complainant's contention that the principle ofres judicata would not apply in the case
at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant
administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given
least credence. t is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is
denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the
suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin
the respondent from assuming office as BP National President.
28

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition
to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election" and promulgated on 11
December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the
parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their
capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby
barring the application ofres judicata.
n order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions
must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and
(4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject
matter, and identity of causes of action.
29
n the absence of any one of these elements, Atty.
de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.
t is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and
causes of action. n Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de
Vera to run as a candidate for the position of BP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. n the
present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. n the
first administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged violation
or circumvention of the BP By-laws. n the present administrative case, the primary cause
of action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. n the first case, the
complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as BP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. n the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum,
what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved
on the basis of the parties' rights and obligations under the BP By-laws. We held therein
that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is
nothing in the present BP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for BP
governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on.
Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit
as the BP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can
file with the BP President a written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement,
therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit
was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the BP By-laws do not allow for pre-election
disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the
administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him
from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case that
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for BP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination
of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the
House of Delegates. ndeed, based on each member's standard of morality, he is
free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic
requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate
involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense
which involves moral turpitude.
30

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper
case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of BP Regional Director
is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive
audience in the BP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary
disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition
is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm.
Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be
suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by
complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is
not proof of malpractice.
n the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty.
Leon G. Maquera,
31
we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of
the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was
suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as
member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was
admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and
against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction.
However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment
was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as
he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the
Supreme Court of California.
n Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a
foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and
suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the
foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or
final order is as follows:
x x x x
(b) n case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
n either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
n Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,
32
we explained that "[a]
foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes,
until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the
giving of due notice in the foreign forum."
n herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must
prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing
officer was based. f he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise
unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of
such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.
33

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable
men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
34
The statutory enunciation of the
grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its
officers cannot be restricted.
35

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a
lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice."
36
That
meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business.
37

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.
38

Now, the undisputed facts:
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California,
docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. t arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera
handled involving Julius Willis, who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de
Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son
to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the
release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement
of the case which he then deposited to his personal account;
39

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for three years;
40
and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the
Supreme Court of California.
41

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to
use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation
notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera
might use the money for a few days."
By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the
funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal
use.
n fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that
he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said
amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he
spent the amount for personal purposes.
42

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
43
t means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact
in issue can be reasonably inferred.
44

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD N TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTES OF HS CLENT THAT MAY COME TO HS POSSESSON.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
n Espiritu v. Ulep
45
we held that
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it
requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. ts fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all
money and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly,
he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or
gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into
the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted
for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his
own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by
him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by, his client. t is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)
n herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for
personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more
than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden
of rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.
n his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use
the funds intended for the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted
the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against
him in the State Bar of California.
46

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records
of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his
client. n Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera
47
we declared that
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis
had indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." As
Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this
statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis "expected
de Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of
consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of the
probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not
speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.
n the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the
latter's acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. t is clear that
Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own
benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused
dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot
be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence.
48
Respondent violated his oath
to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.
49
Where any
lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
n Mortera v. Pagatpatan,
50
we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from
his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account
without the latter's knowledge. n Reyes v. Maglaya;
51
Castillo v. Taguines;
52
Espiritu v. Atty.
Cabredo IV,
53
the respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to
their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively,
received by them for their clients without the latter's permission. n Dumadag v. Atty.
Lumaya,
54
we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount
of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of
execution. Considering the amount involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the
penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a
ground for his suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque,
Las Pias and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur BP Chapter is a
circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming BP
National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del
Sur nor does he hold office therein.
n Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another BP
Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of BP Governor as the same is
allowed under Section 19 of the BP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be
made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said
that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that
a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in
transferring to an BP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule will produce the next BP
EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code
of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit nor punish
lawyers from aspiring to be BP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in
accomplishing such goal.
Bar Matter No. 1227
Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following
issues must be addressed:
. Whether the BP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in
removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the BP on 13 May 2005.
i. Whether the BP Board of Governors complied with administrative due
process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the BP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.
. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the BP on 25 June
2005, and can consequently assume the Presidency of the BP for the term 2005-
2007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the BP Board is vested with the power to
remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article V of the BP By-Laws, which
states:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. f the Board of Governors should determine after
proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason
become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the
remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse,
by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject
to the approval of the Supreme Court.
n case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates
from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of
the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the
unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the BP Board may be removed for cause
by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to
the approval of this Court.
n the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural
and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due process
recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer
formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf,
the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-
examine the complainant, BP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera
voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same
time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting
on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the
necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting
so he could vote to support his own motion.
The BP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session,
and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal
hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was
enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed
against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that
he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against
him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in
fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.
We are in agreement with the BP Board.
First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life,
liberty and property.
55
t cannot be said that the position of EVP of the BP is property within
the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said
position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of governors for
cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side.
56
At
the outset, it is here emphasized that the term "due process of law" as used in the
Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due "to the very nature of the doctrine
which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not
susceptible of more than one general statement."
57
The phrase is so elusive of exact
apprehension,
58
because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter
and the necessities of the situation.
59

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in
court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon
different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and
its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character,
the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional
requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. t is not essential that hearings be had before the making
of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all
objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and
considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for
"hearing" may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.
60

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.
61
Nor is an actual
hearing always essential
62
especially under the factual milieu of this case where the
members of the BP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for
removal of an BP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court all
witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the BP National Convention in question.
t is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he
was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of
the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera
was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.
Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the
complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and
judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially
inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the
necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in
favor of his motion.
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the BP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's
expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the BP By-Laws provides:
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse,
by resolution adopted by two-thirds of theremaining members of the Board, subject to
the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an BP Governor is done via a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to the
members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason
therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable
to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de
Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining
members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion
while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of
an BP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the BP By-Laws albeit it includes
three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the BP
Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an
intractable member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the BP Board
but due to various acts committed by him which the BP Board considered as inimical to the
BP Board in particular and the BP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution
of the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or
expel a duly-elected member of the BP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him
only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by
the BP Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of
the BP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de
Vera's removal from the BP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.
ndubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are
inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the BP since lawyers are
said to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the BP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts
are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the BP,
which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members
in an authoritative fashion. t would accordingly diminish the BP's prestige and repute with
the lawyers as well as with the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the
governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal
cleavages are made public.
The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and
resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given
an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision
on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound
thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing
board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters
within the authority of the board.
63

The BP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's
actuations during the 10th National BP Convention were detrimental to the role of the BP
Board as the governing body of the BP. When the BP Board is not seen by the bar and the
public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court
enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the
administration of justice.
n view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a
member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The
effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are
resisted in public by a board member.
ndeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he
should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to
his heart's content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his
removal as EVP as well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his
removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article V of the By-Laws of the BP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers. The ntegrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the BP, one must necessarily be a member of BP Board of Governors.
Atty. de Vera's removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from
acting as BP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the BP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera
since it was rendered without grave abuse of discretion
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision
over the BP,
64
it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the BP should not preclude the BP from exercising
its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by
the provisions of its By-Laws. The BP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so
as to define the powers and functions of the BP and its officers, establish its organizational
structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With
these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the BP shall be able to
carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Court's interference.
t should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the BP has been
vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and
representative of each of the nine regions of the BP as delineated in its By-Laws.
65
The
Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The
foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the BP Board acting on the basis of
personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of
the BP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption
66
of validity, which shall
continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared
invalid by the Supreme Court. n the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the
BP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion,
we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Board's action or resolution.
There is no question that the BP Board has the authority to remove its members as
provided in Article V, Section 44
67
of the BP By-Laws. ssue arises only as to whether the
BP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his
post as an BP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de
Vera's removal from the BP Board was in accordance with due process and the BP Board
acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the
Board's resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera
was conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws
n the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 BP
Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the
removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the BP since the same is a purely internal matter, done
without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-
Laws of the BP.
With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the BP Board Resolution
dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant
vacancy in the position of BP EVP.
Article V, Section 41(g) of the BP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill
vacancies, however arising, in the BP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the
ntegration Rule,
68
and Section 11 (Vacancies),
69
Section 44 (Removal of
members),
70
Section 47 (National officers),
71
Section 48 (other officers),
72
and Section 49
(Terms of Office)
73
of the By-Laws. The BP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in
its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We
have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the
remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds
of the BP Rules and By-Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 BP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the
Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to
the Board by the BP By-Laws, particularly Article V, Section 47, which provides that "[t]he
EVP shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term." The phrase "for
the next succeeding term" necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz
as BP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the
members of the 2003-2005 BP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we
restrained now BP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President
because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the
2003-2005 BP Board of Governors.
Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as BP EVP, and
thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new BP EVP, upon the
relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.
Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his
removal as BP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as BP EVP should come
from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article V, Section
47, of the BP By-Laws.
According to Article V, Section 47, of the BP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the
Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a
rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:
"ORDER
x x x x
3. The former system of having the BP President and Executive Vice-President
elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] BP
regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. V, Original BP By-
Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-
President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was
abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should
be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors
shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of
Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) BP regions. One who
has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9)
regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
x x x x
(Emphasis Supplied)"
n Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of BP EVP which is actually rotated
among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a
result of the automatic succession rule of the BP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation
rule pertains in particular to the position of BP EVP, while the automatic succession rule
pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a
consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the BP By-Laws.
n the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty.
De Vera as BP EVP, each of the nine BP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus,
the rotation was completed. t is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de
Vera's removal as BP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the BP
Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite
the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the BP Presidency.
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and
purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter.
The automatic succession rule affords the BP leadership transition seamless and enables
the new BP National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to
expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The
time that an BP EVP spends assisting a sitting BP President on matters national in scope
is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. t should
also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an BP EVP is
elected from among the members of the BP Board of Governors, who are serving in a
national capacity, and not from the members at large. t is intrinsic in the BP By-Laws that
one who is to assume the highest position in the BP must have been exposed to the
demands and responsibilities of national leadership.
t would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule
for Governor Salazar to assume the post of BP President. By electing the replacement EVP
from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the BP benefits from the
experience of the BP EVP of 2003-2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would
have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
t will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the
EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of
Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De
Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the
2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been
able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the BP Presidency.
n any case, Section 47 of the BP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to clearly
indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in
compelling and exceptional circumstances.
t is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the BP
national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from
where he comes, can not hold water. t would go against the intent of the BP By-Laws for
such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only
one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the BP would have.
We therefore rule that the BP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the BP By-
Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as BP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of
the BP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified
to assume the Presidency of the BP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the BP By-
Laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for
TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this
Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies
furnished the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts;
2) DSMSS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May
2005, of the Board of Governors of the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines removing
him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the ntegrated Bar of
the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of
discretion;
3) AFFRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar
as Executive Vice President of the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder
of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws
and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and
assume the Presidency of the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-
2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article V, Section 47 of
the BP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
Garcia, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.
















SECOND DVSON

ROLLY PENTECOSTES,
CompIainant,



- versus -



ATTY. HERMENEGILDO
MARASIGAN, CIerk of Court VI, Office
of the CIerk of Court, RegionaI TriaI
Court, Kabacan,North Cotabato,
Respondent.

A.M. No. P-07-2337
[Formerly A.M. OCA P No. 04-
2060-P]

Present:

QUSUMBNG, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPO,
CARPO MORALES,
TNGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 3, 2007
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x


D E C S O N
CARPO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan (respondent), Clerk of Court V of the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, North
Cotabato, stands administratively charged with grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming
a public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal case which was
placed under his care and custody.

The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-
complaint
[1]
filed on November 11, 2004 by Rolly Pentecostes (Pentecostes), the owner of a
Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered by members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of M'lang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappersagainst whom a criminal case
for carnapping, Criminal Case No. 1010, was lodged at Branch 22, RTC, Kabacan,
North Cotabato.

On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M'lang, North Cotabato turned
over the motorcycle to respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof onAugust 1, 1995.

After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the motorcycle, the trial
court issued an Order
[2]
of November 15, 2000 for its release toPentecostes.

Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to
him. Respondent, however, told him to wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the
filing of the complaint.

n his Comment
[3]
filed on February 9, 2005, respondent gave the following
explanation:

After the motorcycle was delivered to him by the M'lang chief of police on August 1,
1995, he requested Alex Pedroso, a utility worker, to inspect the engine, chassis, and make,
after which he issued an acknowledgement receipt thereof.

He thereafter instructed Pedroso to bring the motorcycle to the Kabacan police
station for which he (respondent) prepared a receipt.

He and Pedroso visited and inspected the motorcycle every time a hearing on the
criminal case was conducted. When the court finally ordered the release of the motorcycle
to Pentecostes on November 15, 2000, the latter refused to receive it, claiming that it was
already "cannibalized and unserviceable.

From that time on until 2003, Pentecostes harassed him, demanding that he be
responsible for reconditioning the vehicle. During the latter part of 2004, upon the advice of
the executive judge, he accompanied Pentecostes to the Kabacan police station only to
discover that the motorcycle was missing.

As no explanation could be offered by then Kabacan police chief Nestor Bastareche
for the loss, he prepared a letter-complaint requesting for assistance in the recovery of the
motorcycle and for the conduct of an investigation. Pentecostes refused to sign the letter,
however.

He later discovered that the turnover receipt attached to the record of the criminal
case and the page of the blotter where the turnover was recorded weremissing. Hence, he
submitted the sworn statements of Pedroso
[4]
and SPO4 Alex Ocampo
[5]
who confirmed the
transfer of the vehicle from his custody to that of the Kabacan chief of police.

Belying respondent's averments, Pentecostes, in his "Rejoinder,
[6]
contended as
follows:

The vehicle was in good running condition when it was delivered to respondent by
police operatives
[7]
of M'lang.
Respondent's act of passing the blame to the PNP of Kabacan was a clear case of
hand washing as the records showed that respondent was responsible for the safekeeping
of the motorcycle. t was for this reason that he (Pentecostes) refused to sign the letter to
the chief of police of Kabacan protesting the loss. Moreover, the police blotter of PNP
Kabacan has no entry or record of the alleged turn over.

By Resolution of October 19, 2005,
[8]
this Court referred the case to the Executive
Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato, for investigation, report and recommendation.

Then Executive Judge Francisco G. Rabang, Jr. of the RTC, Kabacan,
North Cotabato submitted on January 16, 2006 his findings and recommendation for the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent.
[9]


n his report, Judge Rabang noted that Pentecostes denied any knowledge about the
turnover of the motorcycle to the PNP of Kabacan.

On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge found that the motorcycle
was delivered by the PNP of M'lang, North Cotabato to respondent who in turn transferred it
to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabang, what remained an issue was the actual physical condition of the
motorcycle when it was turned over to the PNP of Kabacan. The judge noted that there was
no proof of Pentecostes' claim that the vehicle was "cannibalized from the time it was under
respondent's custody until its transfer to the PNP of Kabacan.
n light of the peace and order situation in Kabacan in the late 1990s and in the early
part of 2000 and the absence of a suitable courthouse then, Judge Rabang believed that
respondent had made a wise decision in turning over the custody of the vehicle to the PNP
of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabang's report and recommendation, Pentecostes filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
[10]
in which he assailed the conclusion that the motorcycle was no longer
roadworthy and was already "cannibalized when it was delivered to the office of the clerk of
court from the M'lang police station.

Moreover, Pentecostes maintained that the alleged turnover of the motorcycle to the
police station of Kabacan was irrelevant because the proper custodian of the vehicle was
respondent who should be held responsible for its eventual loss.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the investigating judge's
recommendation to be sufficiently supported by the evidence.
[11]


The OCA thus concurred with Judge Rabang's recommendation for the dismissal of
the complaint against respondent, subject to certain qualifications with respect to the
physical condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to respondent and the latter's lack of
authority for the turn over of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

While the investigating judge found no evidence to show the actual condition of the
motorcycle at the time it was turned over to respondent, the OCA observed that the
evidence presented during the investigation supported a finding that the vehicle had missing
parts when it was delivered to respondent.

From the testimony of Pentecostes' witness SPO2 Servando Guadalupe, the OCA
noted, the motorcycle was loaded into a service vehicle for delivery to respondent. This
fact, according to the OCA, could only mean that the vehicle could not run by itself.

Although the OCA agreed with the investigating judge that the evidence sufficiently
proved that the vehicle was turned over to the PNP of Kabacan where it got lost, it noted
that respondent failed to ask prior authority from the trial court to transfer its custody. Only
when respondent was having problems with Pentecostes did he bring the matter to the
attention of the executive judge, the OCA added.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be reminded to secure prior
authority from the court before evidence is turned over to any authorized government office
or agency and that he be warned to be more careful to prevent any similar incident from
arising in the future.

The finding of the OCA insofar as respondent's lack of authority to transfer the
motorcycle is well taken, on account of which respondent is administrativelyliable for simple
misconduct.

t is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, files, exhibits and
public property committed to his charge.
[12]
Section D (4), Chapter V of the 1991 Manual
For Clerks of Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter V of the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court) provides:

All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and before
the case/s involving such evidence shall have been terminated shall be under
the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.


Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. The clerk shall safely keep all
record, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge,
including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture belonging to his
office.


From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan,
respondent was charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes' motorcycle, and
to keep it until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its
safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.

No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the
motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, respondent was mandated to secure prior
consultations with and approval of the trial court.

Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt evidencing the
turnover of the motorcycle from the trial court to the Kabacan police station was lost from
the records of Criminal Case No. 1010,
[13]
with nary a lead as to who was responsible for
it. This circumstance is viewed with disfavor as it reflects badly on the safekeeping of court
records, a duty entrusted to respondent as clerk of court.

With regard to the condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to respondent, the
evidence indicates that it was still serviceable when it was delivered by the M'langpolice to
respondent and at the time it was turned over by respondent to the Kabacan police
station. The Joint Affidavit
[14]
of SPO2 Guadalupe and Police nspector Romeo
Banaybanay categorically stated that the motorcycle was in "good running condition when
they delivered it to respondent. Later during his testimony, Guadalupe narrated that he was
the "the driver of the service jeep while Chief Banaybanay was on board the motorcycle
when the vehicle was turned over to respondent on August 1, 1995.
[15]


Even respondent's following testimony that:

"x x x when x x x [he] received the motorcycle for safekeeping, he
immediately delivered together with Alex Pedroso [sic] because it could be
noted that respondent do[es] not know how to drive a motorcycle, I requested
x x x Alex Pedroso to accompany me and deliver [it] to [the] chief of police of
Kabacan
[16]
(talics supplied)


suggests that the vehicle was in running condition when respondent took and subsequently
transferred its custody to the Kabacan police.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking
officers of our judicial system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice.
[17]
Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and
management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits
and public property committed to their charge.

Clearly, they play a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted
to slacken on their jobs under one pretext or another.
[18]
They cannot err without affecting
the integrity of the court or the efficient administration of justice.
[19]


The same responsibility bears upon all court personnel in view of their exalted
positions as keepers of public faith.
[20]
The exacting standards of ethics and morality
imposed upon court employees are reflective of the premium placed on the image of the
court of justice, and that image is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise,
of court personnel.
[21]
t becomes the imperative and sacred duty of everyone charged with
the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts' good
name and standing as true temples of justice.
[22]


By transferring Pentecostes' motorcycle without authority, respondent failed to give
premium to his avowed duty of keeping it under his care and possession. He must,
therefore, suffer the consequences of his act or omission, which is akin to misconduct.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more
particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.
[23]
The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999) classifies simple misconduct as a less grave
offense, punishable by suspension of One Month and One Day to Six Months. Considering
that this is respondent's first offense and no taint of bad faith has been shown by his
actuations, a 15-day suspension without pay is deemed appropriate.


WHEREFORE, respondent, Clerk of Court Hermenegildo Marasigan, is found guilty
of Simple Misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for 15 days without pay, with a
stern WARNNG that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DVSON
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a
profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article X-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article X-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of
law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. t is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. t
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary,
3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee,
or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose
of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. n
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. t embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court
and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. t
is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R..] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. f what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows
some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may make a
manifestation which forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESDNG OFFCER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members
of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of
the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would
like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers
who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in
COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance
with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this
is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article X-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is
still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: llinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering
legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the
members called shareholders. n either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. n most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The
practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly
understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325,
22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers
spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without
litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).
n this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once
articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such
as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work
is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases.
The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. [t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should
be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
n the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of
legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty.
And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal
task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else.
nstead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer
skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained
in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient
features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. n some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work.
The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
n several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
n a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a
"model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting
and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-
variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of
decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
n our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as
the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money
and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and
industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only
for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
n a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from
the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of
the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. n short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered
this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. n most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so
to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the
legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's;
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as
firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-
national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. n Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds
of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge
of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. n general, such external activities are
better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer
vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops,
inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can
be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be
used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support,
including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing
the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. t needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric
as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment.
The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects
of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex
make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge
of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than
a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer
admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day,
he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
ntegrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as
the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made
use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-
Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
n a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays
down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
n the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by
L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
nternational Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in vory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set
of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the
recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation.
For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which
in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry
no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and
bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J.
Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign nvestments," ntegrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p.
265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. f
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission,
171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
t is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. t also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would
be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it
is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance
of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments
of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081,
October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-
Article C, Article X of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. n no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times
a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice sagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations,
most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. n that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for
over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first
becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of
the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter,
greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as
required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. V, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. n the instant case, there is no occasion for
the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) f the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,
may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) n the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) f the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
n view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DSMSSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.



Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:
concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of
his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits
nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution. therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADLLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at
bar, voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but was the
sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod
from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod
did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, am even more convinced that
the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been
met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. X(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." t is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action.
1
To "practice" law,
or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. n the
same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager,
other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental
agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:
2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. n other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
t is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum
it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
constitutes "practice of law." t states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. n other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as
a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901)
and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806
citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) f
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v.
Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot
be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).
3

The above-enumerated factors would, believe, be useful aids in determining whether or
not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least
ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of
law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABTUALLY
FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records,
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged
in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by
the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:
4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDNGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as
not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find must dissent just
the same. There are certain points on which must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.
To begin with, do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. n my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be
subject to our review.
n Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. t was that kind of discretion that we said could not be
reviewed.
f a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for
lack of the required qualifications, see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee
simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the
term, have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law,
however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could
come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to
become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated
by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. n fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer
does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can
be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. f
he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance
of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells
us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. t is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. t
is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of
his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer
when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and
the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was
a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is
doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but
must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law;
2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue;
and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in
terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience
in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.
nspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to
say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement fail
to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also
for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices
will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no
active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one
joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To
be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of one's decisive choice. t means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the
ten-year period.
agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. n fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during
that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, ndustry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, nternational Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup
Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, nc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, nc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine ndustrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, nc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. nstead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for
him. nstead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
regret that cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of
this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law
at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert
that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
t is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 ll. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 ll. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
t would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what
constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service
by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition
of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct
in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 ll. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive.
He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in
real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered:
"Very seldom." n answer to the question as to how many times he had
prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business,
he said: " have no dea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen
times his answer was suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number
of instances, he answered: " don't recall exactly what was said." When asked
if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in
instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, don't
believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the
broker, he finally answered: " have done about everything that is on the books
as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has
a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and
the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the
years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed
by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of
persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal
proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and
non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single
word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
"Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of
a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court
on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true
to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care,
skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to
be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The
transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to
practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a
theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice
law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
n this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession
of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. n other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p.
112)
t is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of
law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as
a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. n other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1
27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active
and continuous. solated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case
of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify
for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but
the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he
may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no
less than this Court to obey its mandate.
, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of
his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits
nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution. therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADLLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at
bar, voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but was the
sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod
from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod
did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, am even more convinced that
the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been
met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. X(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." t is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action.
1
To "practice" law,
or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. n the
same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager,
other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental
agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:
2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. n other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
t is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum
it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
constitutes "practice of law." t states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. n other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as
a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901)
and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806
citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) f
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v.
Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot
be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).
3

The above-enumerated factors would, believe, be useful aids in determining whether or
not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least
ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of
law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABTUALLY
FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records,
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged
in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by
the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:
4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDNGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as
not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find must dissent just
the same. There are certain points on which must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.
To begin with, do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. n my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be
subject to our review.
n Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. t was that kind of discretion that we said could not be
reviewed.
f a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for
lack of the required qualifications, see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee
simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the
term, have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law,
however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could
come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to
become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated
by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. n fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer
does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can
be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. f
he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells
us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. t is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. t
is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of
his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer
when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and
the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was
a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is
doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but
must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law;
2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue;
and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in
terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience
in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.
nspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to
say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement fail
to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also
for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices
will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no
active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one
joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To
be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of one's decisive choice. t means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the
ten-year period.
agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. n fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during
that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, ndustry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, nternational Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup
Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, nc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, nc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine ndustrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, nc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. nstead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for
him. nstead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
regret that cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of
this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law
at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert
that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
t is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 ll. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 ll. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
t would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what
constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service
by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition
of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct
in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 ll. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive.
He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in
real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered:
"Very seldom." n answer to the question as to how many times he had
prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business,
he said: " have no dea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen
times his answer was suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number
of instances, he answered: " don't recall exactly what was said." When asked
if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in
instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, don't
believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the
broker, he finally answered: " have done about everything that is on the books
as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has
a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and
the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the
years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed
by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of
persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal
proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and
non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single
word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
"Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of
a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court
on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true
to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care,
skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to
be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The
transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to
practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a
theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice
law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
n this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession
of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. n other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p.
112)
t is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of
law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as
a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. n other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1
27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active
and continuous. solated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case
of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify
for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but
the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he
may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no
less than this Court to obey its mandate.
, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Footnotes
1 Webster's 3rd New nternational Dictionary.
2 14 SCRA 109
3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE:
WHAT CONSTTUTES PRACTCE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.
4 14 SCRA 109.








SECOND DVSON
A.C. No. 5737. October 25, 2004]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.
R E S O L U T O N
AUSTRA-MARTNEZ, J.:
n an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty.
Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he
instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own
cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on
January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City,
presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired:
xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?
The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied:
You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx
xxx.
Thereafter, the respondent said:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself
to be a lawyer!
To this the complainant remarked:
"Your Honor, 'm not xxx xxx.
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.
Respondent's imputations were uncalled for and the latter's act of compelling the court to
ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public,
inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in
his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent's imputations of complainant's
misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the
intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the
manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna!" were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign,
ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondent's display of improper attitude, arrogance,
misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the
court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that
lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate
penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed on the
respondent.
n his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious
scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom
complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further complainant's
illegal practice of law; complainant's complaint occurred during a judicial proceeding
wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was appearing
in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating "[i]n
today's hearing both lawyers appeared; because of which, respondent stated: "Your honor
would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff
in this case is not a lawyer, to which complainant replied: "The counsel very well know that
am not yet a lawyer; the reason he informed the court that complainant is not a lawyer was
because the presiding judge did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant
did not inform the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated: "for the plaintiff
your honor; he stated "pumasa ka muna" out of indignation because of complainant's
temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of
Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against him considering that in a precedent
case the Supreme Court stated: "t is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements
made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of
Appeals, 325 SCRA 540); in another malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the
complainant against the Mina family pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch
108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for
himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated
among other; to wit:
n connection with Ferdinand A. Cruz's motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise
denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A,
Sections 1 and 2.
Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge
Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court "Hay naku masama yung
marunong pa sa Huwes! OK? the same was dismissed by the Honorable Court's Third
Division which stated among others: "That the questioned remarks of respondent were
uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to complainant's actuations and taking into
account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the court on a matter
which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the part of the complainant.
Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.
The administrative case was referred to the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines (BP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
n a report, dated March 4, 2004, BP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating
Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
n her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that
respondent's averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged
communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the
case in question under trial before the said court.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against
the complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust
Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial
before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City.
Likewise respondent did not refute complainant's allegation that in 1979 he was held in
contempt and was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the
administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed
as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing with others.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the
manner, substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him "that appear ka ng
appear, pumasa ka muna in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive
but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar
examination required of them.
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his
purpose relative to complainant's appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in
his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections
1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.
Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional
dealings so as not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case.
On April 16, 2004, the BP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set
aside the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal
of the case for lack of merit.
Prefatorily, we note that the BP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural
requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the
Board of Governors which states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the BP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the nvestigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. t shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from
the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the nvestigator's report. (Emphasis
supplied)
n Teodosio vs. Nava,
[1]
the Court stressed the important function of the requirement
that the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus:
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out
to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them
decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of
Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.
[2]

n this case, the Board of Governors' resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct
does not contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-
compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the
controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could
be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case
in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases.
[3]
This case falls within the
exception.
We hold that respondent's outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna does
not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out
to the trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judge's impression of
complainant's appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted
that complainant is a lawyer.
[4]
Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such
magnitude as to warrant respondent's suspension or reproof. t is but a product of
impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. t
has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the
heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court
to condone even contemptuous language.
[5]

Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating
personally his cases. A party's right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section
34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- n the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. n any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
n Maderada vs. Mediodea,
[6]
this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its
progress -- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own
attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those
qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. ndividuals
have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when
they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law
by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a
profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative
capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been
defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. n other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges
and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.
x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding
herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such
services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
[7]

On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the
courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in
the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.
[8]
Though a lawyer's
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
[9]

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct
in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is DSMSSED for lack of merit. He is,
however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer
of the court.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THRD DVSON
G.R. No. 154207 ApriI 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
D E C S O N
AUSTRA-MARTNEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded
on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary njunction assailing the Resolution
dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City,
in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No.
00-1705;
1
and the RTC's Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry
of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats,
where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.
2
that a non-lawyer may
appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor
and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of
the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law
student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice
Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and
set the case for continuation of trial.
3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration
seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student
Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the
authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court
alone.
n an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
with Prayer for Preliminary njunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge
from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the
RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ
on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is
one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that
therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The
petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no
civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which
expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an
agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the
petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC
seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of
Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold n Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the
RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner's Second Motion
for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the
RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns
the following errors:
.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer
for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the
necessity of granting the writ;
.
THE RESPONDENT TRAL COURT ABUSED TS DSCRETON, TANTAMOUNT TO
GNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN T RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE
WRT OF PRELMNARY NJUNCTON AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTON FOR
RECONSDERATON OF THE HEREN PETTONER ON THE BASS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CVL ASPECT, FOR THE SAD BASS OF DENAL S NOT N
ACCORD WTH THE LAW;
.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLTAN TRAL COURT ABUSED TS DSCRETON WHEN
T DENED THE MOTON TO HOLD N ABEYANCE TRAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENED
BY THE RESPONDENT REGONAL TRAL COURT S THE SSUANCE OF THE WRT OF
PRELMNARY NJUNCTON and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGONAL TRAL COURT
S YET TO DECDE ON THE MERTS OF THE PETTON FOR CERTIORARI;
V.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY GNORNG THE LAW WHEN THEY
PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT,
CANTMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVDNG FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER
COURTS (MTC'S).
4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature
of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.
5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing
law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court
in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance
in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of
an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTCE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed
his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any
trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic
of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or
other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.
However, in Resolution
6
dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc
clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. n inferior courts, a law student may appear in
his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - n the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. n any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar.
7
(Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "n the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently
changed to "n the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138,
thus:
8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. n the Court of a municipality a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. n any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the
MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A.
n the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is
expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a
quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student
in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in
denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that
Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner's appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar
Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or
a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil
liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a
private prosecutor is not possible.
t is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. n
denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no
claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the
case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner's appearance as
private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such
as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation.
9
The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution
of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from
Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private
prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DRECTED to ADMT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the
direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
R E S O L U T O N
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume
the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
1
On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his
law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
Thus, this petition.
n a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTON 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines,
at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications
and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. t recommends that he be
allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the
lawyer's oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine
bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
2
t is so delicately affected with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the
ntegrated Bar of the Philippines (BP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of
any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts
and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.
4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTON 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions
of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance
with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to
practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of
age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.
5
He must also produce
before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;
7
passing the bar examinations;
8
taking
the lawyer's oath
9
and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of
this Court a certificate of the license to practice.
10

The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of
annual membership dues in the BP;
11
payment of the annual professional tax;
12
compliance
with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;
13
faithful observance of the
rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.
14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in
the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.
15
Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine
bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. n other words, the
loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."
17
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer
who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed
never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume
law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."
18
Stated otherwise, before a
lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice,
he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the BP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner's knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge
to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject
to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance
to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues DeIinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
R E S O L U T O N

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines (BP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1
(n the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the BP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the BP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article of the By-Laws of the BP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the
Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be
sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the BP President and the BP Board of Governors to
reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule)
1
in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article , of the
BP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the BP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section
24, Article ll of the BP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the
order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the ntegrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the BP is stated in these words
of the Court Rule:
SECTON 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national
body to be known as the 'ntegrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all
persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the ntegrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of
the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion
of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the BP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived
of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the BP By-Laws are
void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the
Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable
by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional
issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made
to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license
granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before
the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, n the Matter of the Petition for the
ntegration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there
made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and
the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar ntegration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "ntegrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. ntegration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally
justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal
convenience of individual lawyers.
3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the
Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of
justice as an officer of the court.
4
The practice of law being clothed with public interest,
the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of
"subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397
5
authorizing the Supreme Court
to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The
Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence,
the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through
its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in
decreeing the constitution of the BP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No.
181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and
motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal
liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The
public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy
(Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). t is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some
individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar
...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTON 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act
No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting
the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power
in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as
might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties. f he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his
concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with
them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel
him to become a member of the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the
Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
ntegrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
6

ntegration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.
7
All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined
but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.
8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his ntegrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers.
9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of
the ntegrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State.
10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule
requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. t is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then
a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege,
13
and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.
14

n In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the
court, sustaining the Bar ntegration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the
conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory
grounds. t is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary
power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. t has limitations no less real because they are
inherent. t is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. t is a grave responsibility, to be assumed
only with a determination to uphold the deals and traditions of an honorable profession and
to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a
guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly
granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the
power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws
of the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.










Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM
PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
D E C S O N
CHCO-NAZARO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines (BP)
dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
n his letter,
1
dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of BP
dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005.
He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA
in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
assessed BP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since
the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service,
and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the BP for comment.
2

On 16 November 2004, the BP submitted its comment
3
stating inter alia: that membership
in the BP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included
in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the BP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the BP Board of
Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the BP members has
been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an ntegrated Bar Program; and that the
policy of the BP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the BP to help in defraying the
cost of integration of the bar. t maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of
payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. t asserted that what petitioner could have
done was to inform the secretary of the BP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the BP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could
have been stopped. t also alleged that the BP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if
approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive BP members
from payment of the annual dues.
n his reply
4
dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the
BP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership
dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice.
He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership
dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due
process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the BP annual membership
dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive
status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from
nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right
without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in
inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive
status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of
his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in
the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "ntegrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership
in which is voluntary. ntegration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the
Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an ntegrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for
the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline
or disbarment of the offending member.
5

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not to attend the meetings of his ntegrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers.
7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar
8
- which power required members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. t is quite apparent that the
fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out
the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the ntegration of the Philippine
Bar,
9
thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax
purpose of a tax is a revenue. f the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar,
it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. t would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means
to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the
power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted
by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member
resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the BP, of which no
one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as
long as one's membership in the BP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the
type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership
dues. At most, as correctly observed by the BP, he could have informed the Secretary of
the ntegrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. n such case, his
membership in the BP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could
have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the BP in its comment stated that the BP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of
their dues during such inactivity. n the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
obligation to pay membership dues to the BP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,
10
in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under
the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions,
11
one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any
of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of BP dues is DENED. He
is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the BP as membership fees for the
years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this
decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of
law.
SO ORDERED.




SECOND DVSON
A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.
LLAMAS, respondent.
D E C S O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
n a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos,
Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, wish to bring to your attention and appropriate
sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years
now, has not indicated the proper PTR and BP O.R. Nos. and data (date &
place of issuance) in his pleadings. f at all, he only indicates "BP Rizal
259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown
by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996
and 1997: (originals available)
Annex
A.......-
"Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated
December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253,
RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex
B.......-
"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated
November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC
Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM
Annex
C.......-
"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of
Time to File Required Comment and Opposition"
dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil
Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which
qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section
10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the ntegrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action
on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant
and with the BP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to
be a member. Jksm
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "BP Rizal 259060" sometimes,
he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an
attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of
these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as
shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter
No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case
No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated
February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction
which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13,
1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what
appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt number "BP
Rizal 259060."
[1]
Also attached was a copy of the order,
[2]
dated February 14, 1995, issued
by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for
violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification
[3]
dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. da R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondent's "last payment of his BP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days
from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the BP for investigation, report
and recommendation. n his comment-memorandum,
[4]
dated June 3, 1998, respondent
alleged:
[5]

3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995,
1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal BP, respondent is
automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of
the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in
good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court
decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of
Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set
aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of
Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787
was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of
dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the
decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his ncome Tax
Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. n fact, in
his ncome Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His
30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen
since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took
effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total
practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him
of dues with the ntegrated Bar is covered by such exemption. n fact, he never
exercised his rights as an BP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption
and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed
and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and
pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties.
He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his
skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by
the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality
for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith,
to the contrary. Esmsc
On December 4, 1998, the BP Board of Governors passed a resolution
[6]
adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the nvestigating Commissioner which found
respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three
months and until he pays his BP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the
decision, but this was denied by the BP in a resolution,
[7]
dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the
decision of the BP ordering respondent's suspension for three months.
The findings of BP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the
proper BP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C"
of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "BP Rizal 259060 for at
least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from BP Rizal
Chapter President da R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of
his BP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992,
he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took
effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
. . . .
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. n fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that
the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his ncome tax
Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par.
4 of Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the
ntegrated Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court
about his standing in the BP by using the same BP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent
in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. ndeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without
having paid his BP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted
by complainant to this Court, he indicated "BP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in
court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his
BP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were
filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes
in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A.
No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the ntegrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval
of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for
disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section
12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the ntegrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
n accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A.
No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined
by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption
does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "BP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to
the public and the courts that he had paid his BP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TMES UPHOLD THE NTEGRTY
AND DGNTY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSON, AND SUPPORT THE
ACTVTES OF THE NTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FARNESS AND GOOD FATH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his BP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed
in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced
age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of
the law,
[8]
we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he
has paid his BP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his BP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of
this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies be furnished to all chapters of the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC


ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792
Complainant,
Present:

Panganiban, CJ,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ

Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:
Respondent. January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECSON

PER CURAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit
[1]
for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by
Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the ntegrated Bar of the
Philippines (BP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime
involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction,
violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
[2]
and constitutes
sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
[3]


Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint,
the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that
an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.
[4]
After that hearing,
complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and
its attachments.
[5]
Accordingly, the CBDdirected him to file his Position Paper, which he did
on July 27, 2004.
[6]
Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and
Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the BP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XV-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

n his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for
frustrated homicide,
[7]
which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent's conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:

"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on
his way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac
with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the
accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just
someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community
who was under the influence of liquor. ncensed, the accused tailed the taxi
driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino
Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held
him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door
causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the
accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the
accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get
up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to
deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead.
The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the
taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi
driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released
him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way
back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the
ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as
he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun
held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on
the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The
incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that
of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.
[8]


t was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of
Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had
lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck,
[9]
complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical
assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr.
Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part
of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18,
2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on
several conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court
in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano.
[10]


According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to
comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of
Appeals.
[11]


n her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime,
but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the
following facts:

"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because
the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,
Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a
handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and
fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent
denied that he had shot Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he
was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,]
not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant.
[12]



On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the BP Resolution
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the nvestigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as
approved and adopted by the BP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is
deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character.
[13]
n the instant case, respondent has been found
guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his
conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues
that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide
involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
[14]

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been
discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,
[15]
a labor case
concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide.
Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this
Court rejected the employer's contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve
moral turpitude. (f it did, the crime would have been violative of the RR's Employment
Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the
attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was
not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion
belonged to the courts, as explained thus:

"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on
the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act
and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute,
but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.
x x x.
[16]
(Emphasis supplied)



n the RR case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the
Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime
are quoted as follows:

"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the RR employee] was
then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto
Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy
urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and
that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the
left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his
hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These
facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend
his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of
self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any
aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions
were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.
[17]




The present case is totally different. As the BP correctly found, the circumstances
clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when
the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated
by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the
circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer's
assault.

We also consider the trial court's finding of treachery as a further indication of the
skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to
defend himself. n fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the
unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter
unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun
with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. n so doing, he betrayed his sly intention
to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his
conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it
were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be
slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his
fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness,
which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. n the
tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who
has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of
superiority and to exact revenge.

t is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm
[18]
and
his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.
[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and
disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney's
oath
[20]
and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of
the land.

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic
sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his
sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years
[21]
since he was
ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in
refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by
his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity,
good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the
measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the
profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.
[22]
Where their
misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit
for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the
law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.
[23]


We also adopt the BP's finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral
character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of
law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
[24]


n the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous
behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel
Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainant's family.
[25]
But when this effort failed,
respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant's family
that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.
[26]


The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely
implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.
[27]
The trial
court had this to say:

"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors
who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people
including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The
injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright
unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to
death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the
complainant's version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed
the accused on the chest. x x x.
[28]




Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is
more important than truthfulness.
[29]
The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium
on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.
[30]
Hence, lawyers must not mislead the
court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. n all their dealings, they are expected to act in
good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal
profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a
noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are
vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
[31]


The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal
a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the
penalty recommended by the BP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice
by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and
reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
[32]
Thus, whenever a
clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall
not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the
end desired. n the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to
respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and
his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would beirreconcilable
with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar
of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as
a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
n sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances
not the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal
profession. n the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of
respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his
name is ORDERED STRCKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the
ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.







Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THRD DVSON
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, CompIainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
D E C S O N
CARPO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco
("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,
1
Rules 1.01
2
and
1.02
3
of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
n his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a
criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document
4
against Duane O. Stier
("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized
the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for
perjury
5
against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and
notarized by me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located
at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to
own real property in his name agreed that the property be transferred in the name
of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several
documents that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the
property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,
recognizing Mr. Stier's free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and
business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which
Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.
6

Complainant averred that respondent's act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his
name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant
prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law
and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
n his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the
disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Bonifacio
A. Alentajan,
7
because respondent refused to act as complainant's witness in the criminal
case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
n a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the ntegrated Bar of
the Philippines (BP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The BP's Report and Recommendation
n her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
("Commissioner San Juan") of the BP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent
liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as
Notary Public.
n Resolution No. XV-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the BP Board of Governors adopted,
with modification, the Report and recommended respondent's suspension from the practice
of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the BP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as
provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B
8
of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the BP. Respondent
stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the
termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of
support for his family and his six minor children.
n a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the BP denied the motion for reconsideration
because the BP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been
referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.
9
A lawyer who assists a client in
a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.
10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from
owning real property.
11
Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,
12
respondent admitted that he
caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware
of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant's name. But
respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents,
13
including the
Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier's recognition as the actual owner of the
property despite its transfer in complainant's name. n effect, respondent advised and aided
Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands
14
by
preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code
when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against
foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an
unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended.
15

n Balinon v. De Leon,
16
respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law
for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage.
n In re: Santiago,
17
respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for
one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine
years of separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GULTY of violation of
Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney, the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.






FIRST DIVISION


PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMN, JJ.



ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:

September 4, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T O N

CORONA, J.:


This is a complaint for disbarment
[1]
filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of
clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients
[2]
to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance
[3]
and expeditious collection on their claims.
[4]
To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit
[5]
of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations
with complainant and utilize respondent's services instead, in exchange for a loan
of P50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent's calling card:
[6]


Front

NCOMEDES TOLENTNO
LAW OFFFCE
CONSULTANCY & MARTME SERVCES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MJ Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719



Back
SERVCES OFFERED:
CONSULTATON AND ASSSTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRATED DUE TO ACCDENT,
NJURY, LLNESS, SCKNESS, DEATH
AND NSURANCE BENEFT CLAMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.
[7]


The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
ntegrated Bar of the Philippines (BP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
[8]


Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,
[9]
found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of
complainant, violating Rule 8.02
[10]
and other canons
[11]
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138
[12]
of the
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern
warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the BP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify
the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainant's professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means
employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted
distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyer's services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR
provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER N MAKNG KNOWN HS LEGAL SERVCES SHALL
USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAR, DGNFED AND OBJECTVE
NFORMATON OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their
wares.
[13]
To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of
law, degrade the profession in the public's estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.
[14]


Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMT TO BE DONE ANY
ACT DESGNED PRMARLY TO SOLCT LEGAL BUSNESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers.
[15]
Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.
[16]


Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTVE OR
NTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUT OR PROCEEDNG OR DELAY ANY
MAN'S CAUSE.


This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)
[17]
as
a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.
[18]


Complainant presented substantial evidence
[19]
(consisting of the sworn statements of
the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent's office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals' suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted
it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice was benefited. Hapless
seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano's word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03,
and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyer's client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.
[20]
Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labiano's "referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labiano's connection to
his office.
[21]
Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another's legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
client's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees,
stenographer's fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer's independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.
[22]
t seeks to ensure his undivided
attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client's
cause. f the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client's case, the
lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake
in its outcome.
[23]
Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his
interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity
to the client's cause.
[24]


As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice
[25]
which calls
for the exercise of the Court's disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining employment.
[26]
Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition
on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the BP, a mere reprimand, is a
wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer's
best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
based on his character and conduct.
[27]
For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional
cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer's name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
[28]



Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance. The phrase
was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with
a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away
from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional
vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his
culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly
responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano's calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03,
8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the ntegrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.










Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, compIainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUNO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint,
sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the
name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in llinois.
n a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of
Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for
the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products nternational, nc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to
Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker &
McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not
having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in
Chicago, llinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents,
aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero
& Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render
legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical
because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker
& McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.









EN BANC
A.C. No. 4984. ApriI 1, 2003]
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR.
ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA
CORONACION, and JOSE RABALO, complainants, v. ATTY. FELINA
DASIG,respondent.
R E S O L U T O N
PER CURAM:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,
1
an official
of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of
respondent in violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. n their
sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege
that respondent, while she was OC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27,
2
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon,
a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the
amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application
for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of
her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . n addition,
Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of the
existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED... n addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer
who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of
name.
3

Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing
eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.
4

Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section
36
5
of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to Borela
Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake & Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored checks she
issued,
6
the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.
7

Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against
complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged
and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a
result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 36.
8

Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph
Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no
less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their
re-appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for herself.
9

n our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the
charges.
10
A copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot
12, Hobart Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the
notation Unclaimed.
11

On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by
registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.
n a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed
the Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by
one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on August 27, 1999.
12

On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline, ntegrated Bar of the Philippines (BP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
n its order dated February 6, 2001, the BP Commission on Bar Discipline directed
respondent to submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in
default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January
8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to
comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had waived her right to
file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the
basis of the documents submitted and on record.
n its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the BP Commission on Bar
Discipline stated as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of
her oath as a government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful
demands or attempted to extort money from certain people who had pending
applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on said
applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to
secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on
Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning
that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the BP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the
full text of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the nvestigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A:; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules; and
considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial
spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education,
Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.
13

At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge
(OC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance,
considering that her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was Chief Education
Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards,
CHED.
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official.
14
However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
15

n this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure
as OC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B.
Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her
favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence
remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by
this Court and the BP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find
that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her
qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was
patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the
approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any
violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The
Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money
or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
16
Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of
pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the
oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations.
Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not
meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those
in government service. This is clear from Canon 6
17
of said Code. Lawyers in government
are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be
more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is
subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending
before her office are violative of Rule 1.01
18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful,
dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02
19
of the
Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests.
Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any
transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of
his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character
required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in
public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon
1
20
and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts
of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that
respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years suspension from membership in the
Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the BP Board of Governors, but
outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this
decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and
dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DSBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records
of the respondent, as well as to the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout
the country.
SO ORDERED.







FRST DVSON
A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, PubIic
Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RZALNO T. SMBLLO, petitioner, vs. BP COMMSSON ON BAR DSCPLNE
and ATTY. SMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief, Public nformation Office, respondents.
R E S O L U T O N
YNARES-SANTAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July
5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily nquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF
MARRAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.
[1]

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public nformation Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino
Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree
within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody
of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of
which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon
has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public nformation
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.
[2]

On September 1, 2000, Atty. smael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public nformation Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
[3]

n his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising
and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views
about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not
served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on
lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be
abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and
that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is
not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.
[4]

The case was referred to the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.
[5]
On June 29, 2002, the BP Commission on Bar Discipline passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-306,
[6]
finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court,
and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a
repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The BP Resolution was noted
by this Court on November 11, 2002.
[7]

n the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
[8]
which was
denied by the BP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002
[9]

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court's
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
n a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or
not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.
[10]
Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not
submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof.
[11]
Respondent, on the other hand,
filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the BP's Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications
or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
t has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.
[12]
t is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
[13]
The gaining of a livelihood should
be a secondary consideration.
[14]
The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves.
[15]
The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which
one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
[16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Court's indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the
fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion
and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy &
Sell Free Ads Newspaper.
[17]
Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be
published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.
[18]
Such acts of respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court's authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a self-
styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines
not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite
the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. ndeed, in assuring prospective
clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of
the case,
[19]
he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However,
for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. f
it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to
the bar.
[20]
Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the
office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is
now acceptable.
[21]
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:
[22]

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name
and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions;
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a
mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish
his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or
society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the
public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm
name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RZALNO T. SMBLLO is found
GULTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
ntegrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.














Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THRD DVSON
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, nameIy, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.
R E S O L U T O N
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the
Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa
Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become
final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as
required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did
not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still
resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view
of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the
foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXV, presided by
the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987,
a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987,
the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate
court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when
it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. t correctly applied
the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5,
1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. n its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated
and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
ntermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate
and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the
grace period, to wit:
n other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on
May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or
up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file
motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986,
it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still
be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No.
73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
n the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on
September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30,
1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length
of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the
Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of
their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the
reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective. t is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active
law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring
shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine
of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this
case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.









Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010
JOVITO S. OLAZO, CompIainant,
vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
D E C S O N
BRON, J.:
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O.
Tinga (respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of
violating Rule 6.02,
1
Rule 6.03
2
and Rule 1.01
3
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for representing conflicting interests.
Factual Background
n March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was
previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for
disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476,
4
issued on January 7, 1986, and
Proclamation No. 172,
5
issued on October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study,
evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared
open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and
the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the
Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent's district includes
the areas covered by the proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
n the complaint,
6
the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered
with the complainant's sales application because of his personal interest over the subject
land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence
over the complainant's father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant's
sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant also alleged that
the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as
payment of the latter's alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed
that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent's deceased wife.
As a result of the respondent's abuse of his official functions, the complainant's sales
application was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales
application were subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to
Manuel Olazo, the complainant's brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent
persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent's promptings, the rights to the land were
transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
n addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for
the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to
one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this
regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his
knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under
Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a
bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the
approval of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the
objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period,
when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the
Committee on Awards.
n his Comment,
7
the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious
charge filed against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial
and Bar Council when he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the
second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of
Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the
antecedent events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he
later conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo's rights over the
subject land and the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized
by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land
(between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant
on the other hand) was brought. n its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
a qualified applicant, and his application over the subject land was given due course. The
respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. t was affirmed
by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
The respondent also advanced the following defenses:
(1) He denied the complainant's allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant)
that the respondent had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent
argued that this allegation was without corroboration and was debunked by the
affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainant's sister.
(2) He denied the complainant's allegation that he offered the
complainant P50,000.00 for the subject land and that he (the respondent) had
exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the
subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the
subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo's
affidavit where the latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely
attested to the truth.
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to
sell his rights over the subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition
and the illness of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the
money he extended to them was a form of loan.
(5) The respondent's participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the payment of the loan that the respondent
extended to Miguel Olazo.
(6) Manuel's belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated
January 20, 2000, regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier
Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. n the said
Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo,
not the complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his
agreement to the transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in
favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father's application to
give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez's application.
(7) The complainant's allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced
Miguel Olazo to sell the subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity
and corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the complainant had no rights
over the subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the
conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their
conflicting claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office of the
Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the conflicting claims only on
August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are
allowed by law to engage in private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from
engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the
active practice of law.
8
n this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in
Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting
applications of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications
were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.
The Court's Ruling
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
9
He may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes
a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
10

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent's actions
constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct first, while the respondent was still an
elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he
was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the
office he was previously connected with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of
evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of
ethical conduct to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks.
n addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government
employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of
conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the
government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice.
Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of
public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private
interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with
the discharge of their official functions.
11

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
t imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote
private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with
his or her public duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all government
lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private interests.
12

n Huyssen v. Gutierrez,
13
we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts
or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office,
or may be affected by the functions of his or her office. n Ali v. Bubong,
14
we recognized
that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of
relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent
uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.
15

n Vitriolo v. Dasig,
16
we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on
Higher Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending
before her office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
17
We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the
respondent (an employee of the Bureau of mmigration and Deportation) liable under Rule
6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he
demanded money from the complainant who had a pending application for visas before his
office.
18

Similarly, in goy v. Soriano
19
we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable
for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the
evidence showing that he demanded and received money from the complainant who had a
pending case before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete
proof that the respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the
Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant's sales application was ever brought
before the Committee on Awards. By the complaint's own account, the complainant filed a
sales application in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the
complainant's sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director,
NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the
Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of
the respondent's elective public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which
expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or
use his private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales
application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still
a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal
benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainant's sales application over
the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainant's allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get
the subject land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears
clear in the records is the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated
May 25, 2003,
20
categorically stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land,
and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. n
the absence of any specific charge, Olazo's disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on
the respondent's alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondent's favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to
support his claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father
(namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;
21
the
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;
22
and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17,
1996
23
), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the
respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the respondent helped
Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also
showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to
another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel
Olazo to contest the complainant's sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any
credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only
hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel
had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly
exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.
n turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by
corroborating evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums
of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. n her affidavits dated May
25, 2003
24
and July 21, 2010,
25
Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent's claim that
the sums of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical
treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that
some of the money borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment and
hospitalization expenses.
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent's claim that
the latter's involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and
Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that
a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent
and the amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject
land.
26

t also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the
dates when the sums of money were extended by the respondent on February 21, 1995,
September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of
Conveyance
27
over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the
sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These
pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondent's allegation that Miguel Olazo
decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the
respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his
separation from the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" where
the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there
was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
n Cayetano v. Monsod,
28
we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court,
that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713
and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions
on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. n addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
x x x x
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; x x x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2)
above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall
likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency.
29
By way of exception, a government lawyer can
engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the
private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; andsecond, the practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions.
30
The last paragraph of
Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. n case of lawyers separated from the
government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No.
6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before
the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits
lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene"
which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to
influence the proceedings.
31
Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or
employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised
power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.1avvphi1
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered
with the sales application covering Manuel's land when the former was still a member of the
Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the
respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by
the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document. n Borja, Sr. v.
Sulyap, nc.,
32
we specifically described private practice of law as one that contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the
public as a lawyer.
n any event, even granting that respondent's act fell within the definition of practice of law,
the available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was
made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be
presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider
any uncertainty in this regard against the respondent's favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From
the above discussion, we already struck down the complainant's allegation that respondent
engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant's claim that the
respondent violated paragraph 4(1)
33
of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the
sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was
not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez's qualifications to apply for
a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the
affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004,
34
when the
DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point,
bound by this finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the
President, the Court of Appeals
35
and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated
October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. n our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for
review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible
error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.
36

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension
of a member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.
37
The respondent
generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense,
38
until the burden shifts to him/her
because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been
proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.
39

With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for
the complainant's failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former
committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Court's disciplinary power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DSMSS the administrative case for violation of
Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against
retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.