INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (IISL) OATI- BASQUE COUNTRY- SPAIN

Limits to Globalization The Case of the World Bank and Model Court Reforms in Argentina
By Carlos Jos Perette

Thesis Director: Professor Halliday - American Bar Foundation

Master Program 2007-2008

Table of Contents Abbreviations, 3 Introduction, 4 PART I: Globalization and Judicial Reform 1.1 Globalization of Law and Judicial Reform, 17 1.2 Judicial Reform in Latin America under the Frame of LAD and ROL Programs, 19 PART II: Judicial Reform in Argentina and the World Bank 2.1 The World Bank and the Promotion of the Rule of Law , 22 2.2 The Judicial Reform in Argentina and the World Bank, 23 PART III: The PROJUM 3.1 World Bank Court Development Project (PROJUM) as a case study, 29 3.2 Description of the PROJUM, 32 3.3 Actors and Agents in the PROJUM and the Argentinian Judicial Reform, 36 3.4 PROJUM Evaluation, 42 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 The PROJUM as a Pilot Court Model Program, 43 The PROJUM and the World Bank assessment, 45 The Evaluation of the PROJUM Outcomes through Organizational techniques, 46

PART IV: Explanations, 65 Conclusions, 80 Annexes, 84 Bibliography, 87 E-Journals, Newspapers, Internet Sites, 92

Abbreviations
AOJ: Administration of Justice CPACF: Colegio Pblico de Abogados de la Capital Federal FORES: Foro de Estudios sobre Administracin y Justicia IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development World Bank IFIs: International Financial Institutions IMF: International Monetary Found LAD: Law and Development LDM: Law and Development Movement LIL: Learning and Innovation Loan NCSC: National Center for State Courts PCU: Project Coordinator Unit also known as CPU in Spanish PROJUM: Proyecto Juzgado Modelo Model Court Development Project ROL: Rule of Law UAC: Common Administrative Unit WB: World Bank

Introduction In recent years, the agencies promoting judicial reform have proliferated in Latin America and worldwide. At the same time, globalization has enhanced the possibilities of reciprocal influence among judiciaries of different countries, the formation of international networks of justices

(Slaughter, 2004:65-103), making communication and cooperation between judges much easier and more dynamic and, to a large extent, transforming the long-established forms of interaction. In Latin America the high-intensity globalization character of the reformist pressure on the judicial system (Santos, 2000:269), exerted by global actors, has also brought about the emergence of new regional networks focused on judicial system both at local and regional levels. They are mainly focused on judicial reform, conceiving it as a necessary step to institutional development and the strengthening of democracy. For instance, CEJA (JSCA), an initiative held by American states

aiming at giving technical assistance to reform efforts undertaken in the American continent, is one of the most important initiatives comprising American countries. Another example of the increasing importance of judicial reform in the agenda of Latin American countries is the Cumbre Judicial Iberoamericana, which includes the higher judicial levels of Latin American countries, also including Andorra, Spain and Portugal. In the last meeting the

XIV Cumbre Judicial Iberoamericana was under the thematic banners of Judicial modernization, legal security and predictability, access to justice and social cohesion (Revista Cumbre Judicial Iberoamericana, 2008). These global trends are taking place simultaneously with a tendency of politicization of the judiciary which is broadening the traditional role of the Judicial branch in the division of state powers, being previous concepts challenged (Sweet, 2000:127, Santos, 2000), mainly in Europe, where the Judiciary and the Constitutional Courts have gained more and more political importance. In Latin America Judicial Reform is fostered not only by the governments or regional

agencies, but also through the intervention of International Organizations, Multilateral International Financial Institutions(IFIs), Government Agencies like USAID and many other European Foreign Assistance Agencies, as well as by Private US and European Foundations (Carothers 2001, Domingo et al, 2001; Salas, 2001).
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As will be developed below, this study is based on globalization and law theories. Four main approaches to globalization and law have been developed -world polity, world systems, postcolonial globalism, law and economic development- (Halliday et al, 2006:1) . Law and economic development is only one of the mainstreams existent in global legal studies. Even though LAD is only one of the possible approaches, the study of undertaken this epistemic community will be more deeply

since LAD and ROL approaches have given rise to an enormous industry of programs

and provided the theoretical tenets in which global actors support their agency. This should not be understood as if I had taken a position to support LAD theoretical approaches. On the contrary, I have focused my study on this epistemic community in order to help explain a program, named PROJUM, in Argentina. I conceive of LAD as another force operating in global legal affairs. This is so because LAD has fostered legal institutional development and been a determinant for the increase of ROL programs worldwide in which the PROJUM is framed. Due to this, an important portion of this study will be dedicated to LAD analysis. Bryant Garth(2002:1) argues that:
resources and institutional support have multiplied tremendously, reflecting the fact that law and development programs are now at the forefront of the agendas of development agencies in the United States and Europe, the World Bank and the IMF, the State Department, the American Bar Association, and even the U.S. Supreme Court. There is now a rather large rule-of-law industry ready to compete for the ever expanding grant money and to promote best practices around the globe. Judicial reform is at the heart of todays programs.(Garth, 2002:1)

Judicial Reform and Rule of Law (ROL) programs in Latin America, undertaken with foreign assistance, have intrinsically been linked to the concept of Development to the extent that the export and transplant of western legal standards (Pistor, 2002) is perceived as necessary in order to produce economic, political and social development. At the initial phase, the first efforts in promoting legal and judicial change in developing countries are historically rooted in the agency of US scholars in the 1960s, which saw law as an important factor for economic development and, consequently, elaborated a body of doctrines in order to export legal templates to developing countries. This movement is known as the Law and

Development Movement (LAD). LAD programs entailed investments in developing countries aiming at provoking legal transformations which were focused mainly on the improvement of legal education

by means of the incorporation of interdisciplinary courses and the adoption of the US casebook method of law teaching. (Salas, 2001, Tamanaha 1995) The second movement, which began in the middle 1980s, is known as the Rule of Law (ROL), differentiated from the first LAD but both sharing substantial relevant points in common. Law and Development (LAD) and Rule of Law (ROL) programs are sometimes used as synonymous in this paper, even though they correspond to different epochs and sometimes to different theoretical approaches. Nevertheless, both concepts and ideas are engaged basically with legal and governance matters aiming at securing free markets and property right protection worldwide. The programs of judicial reform promoted by global actors and developed from the postulates and axioms supported by LAD and ROL scholarship framed under a rationalistic Weberian model of thought (Halliday et al, 2006 ) are only a small part in the global promotion of the rule of law in this case through institution-building initiatives.(Salas, 2001: 17-46, Carothers, 2001;

Santos,2000; Rodriguez Garavito, 2006). Carothers (2003:3) summarizes briefly the main obstacles that ROL initiatives have to face and, by doing so, the author frames conceptually the epistemological limits entailed by ROL:
Although the current rule-of-law promotion field is still expanding as it approaches the end of its second decade, it still faces a lack of knowledge at many levels of conception, operation, and evaluation. There is a surprising amount of uncertainty, for example, about the twin rationales of ruleof-law promotionthat promoting the rule of law will contribute to economic development and democratization. There is also uncertainty about what the essence of the rule of law actually is whether it primarily resides in certain institutional configurations or in more diffuse normative structures. Rule-of-law promoters are also short of knowledge about how the rule of law develops in societies and how such development can be stimulated beyond simplistic efforts to copy institutional forms. And the question of what kinds of larger societal effects will result from specific changes in ruleof-law institutions is also still open. Although aid institutions engaged in rule-of-law assistance do attempt some lessons learned exercises, many of the lessons produced are superficial and even those are often not really learned. Several substantial obstacles to greater knowledge accumulation in this field persist, including the complexity of the task of promoting the rule of law, the particularity of legal systems, the unwillingness of aid organizations to invest sufficient resources in evaluations, and the tendency of both academics and lawyers not to pursue systematic empirical research on rule of-law aid programs. Whether rule-of-law aid is on the path to becoming a well-grounded field of international assistance remains uncertain. (Carothers, 2003:3)

In this study, justice reform efforts, promoted through foreign aid1 in Argentina, will be addressed. In order to evaluate the form in which these programs have been articulated in practice, one specific program, financed by the World Bank in Argentina during the 1990s, has been chosen The PROJUM.
From ROL programs a wide range of questions has arisen. A detailed study of them will not be undertaken in this paper since ROL programs have to deal with an innumerable number of challenges coming from epistemological weaknesses, to pragmatic problems, from legal obstacles to gray conceptual zones and political struggles. 6
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Two interconnected claims frame this study. The first one is formed by two paradoxically competing claims which, in some sense reinforce the idea that in sociological matters non-definitive conclusions can be taken for granted so as to exclude other approaches. The first claim is that the Programs of Judicial Reform, financed by the World Bank in Argentina under the frame of LAD or ROL paradigms, have produced very few effective changes and actual improvements in the National Judiciary. The effectiveness and impact of these projects in provoking relevant judicial changes at National Judicial levels in Argentina is addressed here through a deep study of one single Program developed by the World Bank in Argentina: the Model Court Development Project (PROJUM), which indeed became the unique program financed by the WB in Argentina aiming at producing judicial reform in the national judiciary. Other programs financed by the WB at national level consisted of grants or loans that pursued to obtain judicial sector diagnostics but not operational changes in the national judiciary. The first claim is also counterbalanced by a competing idea: Paradoxically and jointly with their lack of effectiveness to produce sustainable judicial reform, the PROJUM and other initiatives led by IFIs have had the virtue to establish Judicial Reform as a central governance point of the Argentinian National Government Agenda. This phenomenon, in some way, has been complemented with the agency of think tanks business oriented organizations (Riggirozzi, 2006)- and with the advocacy of civil society and NGO networks. Beyond their antagonistic positions and the disparate assumptions held by think tanks and some NGOs about the character of the reforms, both of them are engaged with the improvement of the Judiciary and the administration of Justice as a phenomenon globally present (Rodriguez Garavito, 2006; Dezalay & Garth, 2002; Santos, 2000). In short, the

interconnected claims could be synthesized in that, despite the lack of effectiveness and poor results obtained through the PROJUM implementation, the program had the virtue to reinforce judicial reform as a central point of governance agenda. The second claim is that to be successful the Programs financed with foreign assistance aiming at producing effective judicial reform and improvement in Argentina must be rooted in more empirical research and agency conducted before the launch of the program. It should take into account local expertise in order to build a minimal consensus about the benefits and the forms of the reforms, in which a strong leadership from the judicial governance authorities is critical for any
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program success.(World Bank, 2002). In this order of ideas it is remarkable that previous and stronger agency becomes a condition sine qua non in order to produce ownership (Shihata, 1995 b) by Argentine local actors based on consensus and under strong support and leadership from judicial governance authorities in order to generate successful outcomes. To consider these claims this research focuses on one program launched in Argentina in 1998 through a loan given by the World Bank IBRD Section2: The Model Court Development ProjectPROJUM as known in Argentina3- (World Bank,1998, 2006). The Model Court Development Project (PROJUM) was launched in the late 1990s aiming at producing effective judicial reform in Argentine National Courts in the context of legal and governance changes imposed on developing countries in the last decades under the rationalistic schemes of deregulation, privatization and modernization of the State as a direct effect of the Washington Consensus. The Pilot Program used 12 Federal Pilot Courts: 10 of them located in Buenos Aires (4 Civil Courts, 3 Commercial Courts and 3 Social Security Courts), 1 of them located in Resistencia Province of Chaco and another one located in Mar del Plata, Province of Buenos Aires, the latter two with multijurisdictional competences. In the PROJUM the accent was placed on the improvement of justice through managerial techniques and, in consequence, the more political aspects of judicial reform such as the independence of the judiciary or transparency were avoided. The local expertise and the social claims of the local population of those days were not taken into account or completely heard. They had been pressing for judicial independence and also social justice for a long time. The Reform attempt of the judiciary was secondary to managerial aspects (Riggirozzi, 2006; Finkel ,2004) and, to some extent the WB seemed to take a position in favour of administration policies held by the Argentine government of those days, clearly engaged with current IFIs paradigms and pressures. In order to promote governance reforms, aid agencies worldwide have elaborated a wide range of programs that often impose evaluation as an integral mechanism of the program itself. In order to measure or evaluate judicial performance and programs, results have been achieved by means of different tools, key performance indicators and techniques which involve different kinds of

2 http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?Projectid=P050713&Type=Implementation&theSitePK=40941& pagePK=64330676&menuPK=64282137&piPK=64302789 Consulted on 24th. February 2008.

PROJUM is the usual widespread name to identify the program and its implementation in Argentina and here it will be used this name when referring to the Model Court Development Program.

scientific approaches, which are closely dependent on the goals followed by the evaluation. In other words, there are multiple goals followed in judicial reform initiatives and, consequently, diverse tools and techniques are utilized to implement the reform and to measure the results. One program, for instance, can aim at improving the independence of Justice, another the access to justice, or the promotion of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Mechanisms or to improve the court management; there can be a comprehensive reform program or a specific small program like the PROJUM, etc. The tools utilized to attain those results will be differentiated depending on the goal or objectives of the program and involving different disciplines to accomplish the objectives followed. The evaluation of the outcomes is usually weighted through judicial measurement indicators which have given rise very technical- jurimetric evaluation systems monopolized by consultants and very far from the current capabilities and skills of lawyers and judges. Legal studies in Argentina provide the necessary knowledge to deal with legal cases but not with the necessary administrative or organizational notions in order to properly lead the administration of courts. The lack of a Judicial School, which trains candidates to become judges, has also been a problem in Argentina. (Garavano, interview N6 ) The pilot court program consisted mainly of the improvement of judicial administration through the introduction of case management techniques, staff training programs, layout adequacy, computerized system provision, etc. The PROJUM required for its implementation the assistance of external consultant experts in management and organizational matters. The task to modernize the PROJUM Courts was not an easy task and demanded exceptional efforts from the Judges and

personnel thus overloading their work, which, to some extent, put under risk the whole program and its outcomes.(Simari interview N 11 and Bello interview N 4) Regarding the PROJUM, the tensions existent in the global scenario and the hegemonic and counter hegemonic forces (Carroll, 2007:39) were also reproduced locally through the traditional contesting ideological and political positions which often struggle to impose their own conceptions on governance matters. Up to a point, these contesting positions, struggling for meaning building and political influence, were present in the PROJUM by the reproduction of the tensions existent, for example, between supporters of modernization theory and those of dependency theory.

One of the most important obstacles that the PROJUM had to face was to overcome political and ideological struggles held by some of the actors involved. This was principally evident in the contesting positions assumed by some members of the National Judicial Council. The Council (el Consejo) is a collegiate body in which the deliberation is held under a wider democratic representation and where political struggles are not rare. The Judicial Council, created in 1994 by the reformed National Constitution to appoint National and Federal judges and with wide faculties in the administration of the Judicial branch among others, played a central role in the implementation and culmination of the PROJUM. It was the Councils decision to follow the program after its continuity had been in a risky situation under the sphere of incumbencies of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, with very poor results for some years. It was not an easy task to conclude with the

implementation of the Program. It had to overcome serious resistance inside the Judicial Council, and also from Judges and Unions representatives, and it mainly had to deal with a negative atmosphere around the program. These together reveal one of the central problems of the PROJUM, which was the absence of a minimal consensus in its implementation and the lack of a unified and solid political decision and leadership. The non-replication of the PROJUM in other national courts, a decision made by the Judicial Council after the program ended, shows that the lack of consensus around the program rather than a defective design of the program itself led to the PROJUM failure. Probably, if the Program had been agreed on by main policy and research actors under a strong leadership exerted by judicial governance institutions, the program would have been successfully completed and adapted in order to be replicated. The non-replication of the program was decided because the short-term results of the program were very poor and the WBs lack of willingness in its support was remarkable. As a result of the strong difficulties the program had to face, the Judicial Council decided the best choice was to abandon the program. This lack of commitment to the program in some sense evidences a hazardous waste of human and financial resources. The lack of commitment to program continuity is a serious warning for local actors, mainly judges and court personnel, against this kind of programs financed by IFIs where not only the seriousness of local governance authorities is in question but so too is the credibility of IFIs.

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In this paper the evaluation of the PROJUM and its assessment will be undertaken not only through management techniques but also through other standpoints as will be more deeply

explained in the theoretical framework. A socio-legal approach will permit a wider evaluation of the PROJUM results and the actors involved, the contesting interests, the mechanisms used, the conditionalities, the power supporters and detractors, the outcomes and the impact of the PROJUM (Halliday et al, 2006). This paper begins with the analysis of the theoretical framework in which this study is rooted and the methodology and empirical research conducted. It is divided into four parts besides the introduction and the conclusions. The first part of the study Globalization and Judicial Reform is divided into two sections: 1. Globalization of Law and Judicial Reform; and 2. Judicial Reform in Latin America under the Frame of LAD and ROL Programs. In the second Part this study turns to the Argentinean Judicial Sector assessment, the role of the World Bank as a financial unit for the promotion of governance reforms, as knowledge producer and meaning exporter mainly in developing countries and in the Argentinean Judicial Reform; it also includes the programs financed by external donors and internally produced by Argentine stakeholders. In the Third Part, the main section of this paper, the specific program of the PROJUM will be depicted and assessed under a variety of approaches aiming at giving relevance and meaning to this research study. Part Three is divided into three sections: 1- the description of the PROJUM; 2- Actors and Agents in the PROJUM and the Argentinian Judicial Reform ; and 3- the PROJUM evaluation. The chapter for the evaluation of the PROJUM is divided into the following subsections: The PROJUM and the World Bank assessment; the PROJUM as a Pilot Court Model program; the evaluation of the PROJUM outcomes through managerial techniques. Finally, the last part provides the final explanations in which the program will be approached under a deeper contextual socio-legal analysis. Theoretical framework: The pressures exerted by IFIs and the intervention of foreign actors in domestic legal systems are not a new trend in the world. The great influence of Romanic law over western legal systems spreads its influence up to our days. The pressures for the adoption of unified legal systems were not a minor question in the new world territories incorporated by European conquests of America and other regions assisted by legal or cultural-religious patterns where European legal models were transplanted
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in the newly conquered territories. Entire civilizations were almost extinguished in many parts of the world and those remaining alive had very few chances to impose their customs, causing their own legal conceptions to disappear or to be maintained in closed indigenous frames. These legal

interactions evidence an ongoing process up to now but these legal exchanges among different legal cultures, which, during centuries were framed into the nation state political divisions, are facing a new global challenge in which nation-state paradigms are being supplanted or at least challenged by new waves of global standardization of law. (Pistor, 2002) The new American states imported the legal systems from their colonizing countries and almost nothing officially remained from the former indigenous legal systems. French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, German and English law expanded in America, Asia, Africa and other colonized territories. The Napoleonic Codes, under the umbrella of the Nation State, gained an enormous influence over continental Europe and their colonized territories. The English common law spread its influence over the British dominions in America and worldwide. (Berkowitz et al, 2001) French Law -Napoleonic Codes- was in turn transplanted throughout continental Europe even into Spain and Portugal, former colonizing powers in Latin America. The Spanish Legislation influence -in power in the new world colonies until the independence of the Latin American countries and even after- was supplanted by other legal families in the XIX century. Something similar happened with the English dominions in America with the adoption of the English legal system. The French law after the Napoleonic Civil Code expanded through Latin America and most of continental Europe even to the ex empires of Spain and Portugal. In this context and taking into account legal transplants in the last 200 years, Pistor, Berkowitz and Richard (Berkowitz et al, 2001:166, hereinafter PBR) argue that there have been three major transplantations of legal codes. The first one was the aforementioned transplant of French law and English law. The second one, after World War II when many newly independent states once again borrowed legal code from major western powers and [t]hird, following the collapse of socialist system in the late 1980s, countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union rebuilt their legal systems drawing heavily on the European and the United States models.(Berkowitz et al 2001:166). BPR argue that for law to be effective, it must be meaningful in the context in which it is applied so citizens have an incentive to use the law and to demand
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institutions that work to enforce and develop the law. In other words, law should be adapted to local conditions in order to work more effectively. The BPR thesis is intrinsically connected to my claims in this study, mainly the second one, when it argues that the Programs financed with foreign

assistance aiming at producing effective judicial reform and improvement in Argentina must be rooted in more empirical research and agency conducted previously to the programs launching and taking into account local expertise in order to build a minimal consensus about the benefits and the forms of the reforms, in which a strong leadership from the judicial governance authorities is critical for any program success. The work of PBR is framed theoretically in an emerging literature that attempts to explain the variance of institutional development across countries(Berkowitz et al, 2001:167) in which the most relevant background for my study is the one conducted by Rodrik (2000, quoted by Berkowitz et al, 2001:167) who provides empirical support for his argument that a well designed strategy for institution building should take into account local knowledge, and should not over emphasize best practices blueprints used in developed countries at the expense of local participation and experimentation (Berkowitz et al, 2001:167). Rodriks argument about the relationship between blueprints and local knowledge are key points and provide support to our thesis:
Tacitness implies that much of the knowledge that is required is in fact not written down, leaving the blueprints highly incomplete. For both sets of reasons, imported blueprints are useless. Institutions need to be developed locally, relying on hands-on experience, local knowledge, and experimentation. The two scenarios are of course only caricatures. Neither the blueprint nor the local knowledge perspective captures the whole story on its own. Even under the best possible circumstances, an imported blueprint requires domestic expertise for successful implementation. Alternatively, when local conditions differ greatly, it would be unwise to deny the possible relevance of institutional examples from elsewhere. But the dichotomy--whether one emphasizes the blueprint or the local knowledge aspect of the process-clarifies some key issues in institution building and sheds light on important debates about institutional development. (Rodrik, 2000:15-16)

BPRs congruent argument of the transplant effect that the more adapted to local conditions the more effective the legal transplants also theoretically frames the claims made in this study when I analyse the reasons for the failures of the pilot court model implemented in Argentina. In The Globalization of Law Halliday & Osinsky (2006) point out the elements necessary for a comprehensive theory of Globalization and Law: Outcomes; Agents; Mechanisms; Power and Structures and Arenas. They are constant concepts visible in legal globalization processes which
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become relevant tools to sociologically frame global legal studies in order to overcome the gaps in explanation and contradictions among the four main approaches to globalization and law -world polity, world systems, post-colonial globalism, law and economic development-(Halliday et al, 2006) . In this study, these categories have been essential to frame theoretically and give account of the factors intervening in the PROJUM, namely, the actors involved, the mechanisms used, and the pressures exerted. The central thesis of Halliday and Osinsky (2006:3) is that the closer the globalization of legal norms and institutions reaches to transformations in core local values and practices, the greater the contestation is likely around those norms. This provides theoretical sustainability to the main claims I make in this paper because the resistance to IFIs interventions in judicial institution building in Argentina, by means of PROJUM, stemmed from central core values in the Argentinian legal culture and judicial style. In the scenario of legal globalization IFIs play a central role in the construction of a legal global architecture (Pistor,2002; Halliday et al, 2006; Dezalay et al, 2002; Santos, 2000 ). IFI

hegemony (Halliday et al, 2007 a:285-292) and their apparently enormous power to exert pressure on domestic legal systems has been challenged by local constituencies in many countries embarked in legal or institutional adaptations. Sometimes IFI agency for legal change and adaptation of

international legal standards is foiled by the opposition of domestic stakeholders and local governments like in the case of Indonesia, Korea and China. Domestic resistance mechanisms

mentioned include: Outright refusal; Invocation of Cultural Exceptionalism; Symbolic compliance; Substitution of a solution recommended by IFIs; Temporal Delay; etc. (Halliday & Carruthers 2007a: 285-292). Such resistance, mainly Symbolic compliance, Temporal Delay and Invocation of Cultural Exceptionalism, were also adverted in the empirical research conducted in this study. Beyond the enormous power of IFIs and their long expertise in dealing with countries in crisis IFIs also have to deal with strong constraints. First, IFIs operate under severe time constraints in emergency situations. They move from crisis to crisis, their attention span is limited, and their resources are stretched to the limit, since each lawyer in the IMF Legal Department has responsibilities for many countries on different continents. The World Bank had no lawyer specialists dedicated to insolvency during the Crisis(Halliday et al, 2007a:293). Second, IFIs recommendations are based on not accurate diagnostics which are elaborated by IFIs practitioners/diagnosticians.
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Indeed, adequate institutional analysis requires skills that IFIs experts conventionally do not have. (Caruthers and Halliday, 2006) (Halliday et al, 2007 a:293). Third, IFIs programs should be rooted on contextual, institutional and cultural conditions that are beyond the usual expertise of IFIs professionals to discern(Halliday et al, 2007 a: 293). Fourth, IFIs usually fail to build support and consensus within countries and political commitment from key constituencies. In bankruptcy law, for instance, the IFIs effectively represent the creditor community, and more accurately the foreign creditor community (Halliday et al, 2007 a:293). Fourth, [t]he strongest critics of IFIs charge that some IFIs compel countries to accept a one-size-fits-all solution:
IFIs can appear careless of national sensibilities, of the loss of face of rulers in sovereign nations, and of the limitations on their powers. The exercise of economic muscle from Washington fuels the presumption that the laws represent the imposition of foreign interests. These in turn engender nationalist resentment that can be appropriated by local constituencies for political capital (Halliday et al, 2007 a:294)

These limits to the IFIs hegemony were directly or implicitly present in the Model Court Program and to some extent they are strictly linked to my claims in this study. Research Design: This study is based on empirical research conducted on the PROJUM. The most important research activities undertaken were: (a) documentary analysis and the use of secondary sources; (b) surveys; (c) hard data; (d) interviews; and (e ) in situ observation. Documentary analysis and the use of secondary data: Much of the documentary sources in this research were the result of a very complex process of selection from an incredibly huge amount of material available on the topic of Judicial Reform, on the role of IFIs in the promotion of governance programs, Law an Development and Rule of Law theories, evaluation methods of democracy programs, socio-legal approaches to globalization, etc. In this process a wide range of documents and theoretical approaches ought to be discarded. The selection criteria focused on chronological and also logical reasons in order to sustain the initial thesis of the research which, in my opinion, have been widely ratified by the empirical research. Surveys: Two surveys were carried out among the personnel of Civil Courts N 74 and N 78 in the city of Buenos Aires, whose results are related in the respective section of this study. In total 12 Court employees were surveyed. The data obtained was very useful to compare with the previous data
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available about the PROJUM and to weight the PROJUM impact

mainly in comparison with

previous relevant data. Indeed, for the managerial evaluation of the PROJUM I followed the analytical categories provided by the FORES-NCSC evaluation report (FORES-NCSC, 2005) in which some of their conclusions have been translated because of the clarity of the report. Interviews: In total 12 interviews were conducted, all in the city of Buenos Aires during the month of July. The interviewees were: (1) Justice Dr. Juan Casas National Civil Court N 74 ( 3 encounters) ; (2) Justice Dr. Carlos Molina Portela( 2 encounters) National Civil Court N 46 ; (3) Dra. Silvia Di Carli Private Secretary of Justice Dr. Guarinoni National Civil Court N 78; (4)Diego Bello- Court official National Civil Court N 78; (5) Dra. Sandra Elena, FORES International

Programmes Coordinator and scholar specialist in Judicial Reform; (6) Dr. German Garavano, former coordinator of the Comprehensive Reform Program in the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and scholar specialist in Judicial Reform; (7) Ing. Moiss Lichtmajer, (Phd in administration)World Bank consultant. The Executive Director who implemented and concluded the Program; (8) Dr. Carlos Cabral Hunter, responsible for the UAC (Common Administrative Unit) created specially by the PROJUM; (9) Dra. Gabriela Guzzoni Idem; (10) Dr. Juan Carlos Poclava Lafuente President Cmara de Apelaciones de la Seguridad Social; (11) Dra. Virginia Simari Justice National Civil Court N 75( extra PROJUM Court) and former PROJUM Executive Director (12) Dra. Iliana Bustos Private Secretary of Dr. Casas National Civil Court N 74; In total, 24 people were consulted, 12 of them through surveys and the other half through interviews. Some other informal talks were held but not included in the list because no results were obtained. The interviews will be referred to in this paper when necessary for the narrative about the PROJUM and in support of some claims. The information obtained through the interviews and the surveys was very relevant to contextualize empirically the study. The data relevance was strengthened by the previous evaluation carried out by FORES- NCSC. At this point it is remarkable that the FORES-NCSC evaluation was made in 2005 when it was too soon to reach deep and strong conclusions as the FORES report itself warns, a warning confirmed by the World Bank assessment of the program (World Bank, 2006). For that reason, my conclusions may at some time seem to contradict the FORES report. But indeed, this should not be taken for granted since the goal of my empirical research was to look for the contesting
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opinions about the PROJUM aiming at highlighting the blurred spheres where the interests at stake are not self evident. The FORES-NCSC report is an exhaustive investigation of more than 400 pages that was not available to the public since this report was granted with confidentiality for a period of two years, during which it was not available to either the public or the researchers4. In situ observation: Civil Courts in the city of Buenos Aires were visited. The Courts observed were three PROJUM courts- N 74, 46, 78 and one non PROJUM Court- N 75-. UAC -Common Administrative Unit- was also visited, which now also used by some non PROJUM courts. PART I GOLBALIZATION AND JUDICIAL REFORM 1.1 Globalization of Law and Judicial Reform
The most notorious feature of the focus on the rule of law in the developing world from the mid 1980s onwards is the high-intensity globalization character of the reformist pressure on the judicial system. In Latin America, the institutions that exerts this pressure are the USAID, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Ford Foundation and the European Union(collectively or through some of its members).(Santos, 2000:262)

initially had been created for PROJUM courts and is

The failure of communism and the end of the Cold War caused the change of the paradigms under which the world had played after World War II. The triumph of capitalism produced a shift from the old paradigms and left the social sciences orphaned of strong scientific tools to understand and

explain the new social dimension challenged by the continuous and, sometimes, frenetic changes operated daily through what is called the informational era in a network society. (Castells, 2000, Slaughter, 2004) The current globalization phenomenon has raised a huge quantity of theories and research in order to explain and understand globalization in such global arenas as finance, business, culture, religion and population (Halliday et al, 2007 b:3) Paradoxically, law has been almost absent from the sociological studies of globalization (Halliday et al, 2007 b:3)

For this provision after the confidential period, my sincere thanks to Hctor Chayer and Sandra Elena, specialists from FORES. 17
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It is relevant to stress here that globalization is a wide and sometimes enormous field of study which necessarily claims for new tools and paradigms in order to proceed towards its scientific study. Also, Santos (2000) has made an important effort to sociologically represent this phenomenon of globalization in the realms of democracy and law. Santos (2000:254), when discussing one of the most puzzling phenomena of sociology and political theory in the 1990s, the greater social and political visibility and protagonism of courts in several countries , and the global call for the rule of law and the reform of the judicial system, separates countries into core (US, Western Europe), peripheral and semi-peripheral countries. In core countries the central role of the European Court of Justice, when shaping the European legal system, is stressed and, to a lesser extent, the European Court of Human Rights; the US is featured as the motherland of legal and judicial activism producing the Americanization of judiciary and its criticised effect: the litigation explosion. It is also worthy to remark the increasing power of the Supreme Court in Canada and, in general, the expansion of the judicial power and the judicialization of politics present globally. In semi-peripheral countries, the author includes: Portugal and Spain(semi-peripheral

countries of Europe); Central and Eastern Europe countries that underwent democratic transitions in the late 1980s in which the democracy and ROL programs promoted the adequacy of the legal system to the market economy; Latin American countries where the ROL programs have a strong international component with a high intensity globalization character of the reformist pressure on the judicial system; and some African countries such as South Africa and some Asians countries like India and South Korea (Santos, 2000). In peripheral countries such as Mozambique and Cambodia the ROL programs tend to be extreme instances of high-intensity globalization in which the reforms are often driven by the same donors (Santos, 2000:264). Turning back to Latin America, the institutions that exert this pressure are the USAID, the World Bank, the Inter American Development Bank, the US Justice Department, the Ford Foundation and the European Union (Santos, 2000).
Two main contrasts must be noticed between trends in core countries and trends in semi- peripheral countries. On the one hand, while in core countries the reforms under way seem to respond to internal dynamics, even if conditioned by global trends, in some semi-peripheral countries of Central and 18

Eastern Europe and Latin America, the reforms are being conducted under high intensity globalizing pressure, a pressure dominated by American Institutions and American legal models. On the other hand, while in core countries the focus is mainly on courts, since the rule of law is taken for granted and legal reform is an established political process, in most semi-peripheral countries the focus is much broader, contemplating the rule of law and legal reform, as well as judicial reform. (Santos, 2000:269)

1.2 Judicial Reform in Latin America under the Frame of LAD and ROL Programs The intervention of foreign agents, with the aim of promoting legal or judicial changes in domestic legal systems, proceeds from a very precise theoretical frame in accordance with the political international division of labour predominant aftermath World War II. Latin American countries are usually considered as a bloc by ROL programs receiving in consequence a similar treatment from aid agencies. This similar treatment evidences, to some extent, bias in the non-consideration of differences between Latin American countries and the lack of adequacy of programs to local legal cultures. One of the arguments against the PROJUM, by some Argentine scholars, was that the PROJUM model had not originally been designed especially for Argentina but for another Latin American country.(Garavano, interview N 6) Judicial reform in Latin America is at the moment one of the most important issues in policy agendas in Latin American countries. In the last years a plethora of specialized literature has been raised on the topic as the multiplication of reform programs financed by external actors and a strong increase of funds invested in the promotion of the rule of law and judicial reform programs

(Rodriguez Garavito, 2006; Salas, 2001; Carothers,2001 Domingo, 2001; Garth, 2002 ). Rodriguez Garavito (2006) corroborates this phenomenon and calculated the amount of money invested in Latin America and its surprising increase. The money invested changed from around 5 million US dollars, in the first generation of programs in the 1960s and 1970s, to almost one billion invested in Latin America in the second generation of programs until 20045. Historical backgrounds Salas (2001:17-45) distinguishes three moments in ROL programs carried out with foreign assistance in Latin America.

The Law and Development Movement:

5 See Rodriguez Garavito (2006) for a detailed study of ROL programs implemented in Latin America in which there is a full range of programs and countries with the money amounts disbursed by aid agencies.

19

This was initiated in the 1960s by US academics at leading law schools (Harvard, Wisconsin, Stanford and Yale) and rooted in the post-World War II modernization theory, which became

known as the law and development movement. These programs focused on the improvement of legal education by the incorporation of interdisciplinary courses and adoption of the US casebook method of law teaching and also comprised the creation of legal services for the poor.(Salas, 2001)
Law and development projects were part of a broader US foreign policy democratization agenda that included legislative reform, improvement of public administration and public safety. The most controversial assistance project involved upgrading the capacity of foreign police agencies to combat crime and curb potential revolutionary movements. The public safety program , as it became known, was active in numerous Third World countries with the financial support of USAID and usage of US police consultants. (Salas, 2001:18-19)

With the famous article of David Trubek and Marc Galanter (1974), LAD initiatives ended with those features, accused of naive and ethnocentric and after facing strong opposition from Latin American stakeholders and also from the US Congress following revelations of human rights abuses directly arising from the public safety program(Salas, 2001). Administration of Justice: These initiatives were undertaken by USAID in the 1980s after the failure of the first generation of LAD programs. In 1984 USAID launched the El Salvador Judicial Reform Project(Salas, 2001:20). The Central American justice reform initiative was also launched with funds coming from the US Congress and pursuing the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission on Central America. This program was also extended to Guatemala and to six South American countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay).These programs were rarely carried out with cooperation of American universities (Salas, 2001).
There were significant differences between the law and development movement and the administration of justice initiatives. First, law schools were not primary implementers of the programmes. Instead, grants were awarded to Washington-based consulting agencies. Second, primary reliance was placed on the usage of non-US experts with Latin Americans eventually becoming the most prominent group of advisors. Third, projects stayed away from legal education and no assistance was provided to Latin American law schools. Fourth, law drafting, with minor exceptions was avoided. Fifth, the United States government was alone in its reform strategy[,....] Sixth, the US saw government agencies as the primary local partner in these projects and involvement of non-governmental organizations[...] US planners viewed reform of the justice sector as a systemic enterprise in which all of the actors in the system had to be included in the reform. Law reform, by itself, for example was seen as a useless effort without a complementary reform of the institutions that implemented it.(Salas, 2001:21-22)

Also AOJ initiatives results were widely evaluated as not satisfactory and the reform efforts as not productive in the achievement of relevant improvements according to the goals pursued (Salas, 2001).

The Rule of Law (ROL):

20

ROL initiatives are the current name used to name the programs financed with foreign aid to produce governance changes. These programs constitute a second generation of programs (Rodriguez Garavito, 2006; Santos, 2000), deeply connected to the first movement of LAD , aiming to

transform Latin American legal institutions and invigorated after the fall of communism. The eastern European countries and Russia needed new liberal and democratic institutions in order to adequate their institutions to the new market oriented economies. In Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, the Washington Consensus6 influenced deeply the economic postulates and the public policies to be implemented so as to dismantle the state through the neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatization, which was counterbalanced with a menu of reforms with a strong institutional

component (Rodriguez Garavito, 2006). The most important actors in Latin America in the promotion of the rule of law have been the World Bank (WB), the Inter American Bank of Development (IDB) and the United State Agency for International Development (USAID)(Rodriguez Garavito, 2006). The PROJUM is a concrete program into ROL programs framework. The most relevant factors, which led to this new wave of institutional reform efforts, were mainly the failure of the neoliberal policies in countries with evident institutional weaknesses, the

The Washington Consensus is a term invented by John Williamson that constituted a group of proposals about rational economic policymaking. It is interesting to reproduce here the opinion of the creator of the term: Ten years ago I invented the term "Washington Consensus". While it is jolly to become famous by inventing a term that reverberates around the world, I have long been doubtful as to whether the phrase that I coined served to advance the cause of rational economic policymaking. My initial source of concern was that the phrase invited the interpretation that the liberalizing economic reforms of the past two decades were imposed by Washington-based institutions like the World Bank1, rather than having resulted from the process of intellectual convergence that I believe underlies them.2 From this standpoint, much better terms would have been Richard Feinberg's "universal convergence" (in Williamson 1990) or Jean Waelbroeck's "one-world consensus" (Waelbroeck 1998). However, I have gradually developed a second and more significant concern. I have realized that the term is often being used in a sense significantly different to that which I had intended, as a synonym for what is often called "neoliberalism" in Latin America, or what George Soros (1998) has called "market fundamentalism". When I first came across this usage, I asserted that it was erroneous since that was not what I had intended by the term. Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira patiently explained to me that I was being nave in imagining that just because I had invented the expression gave me some sort of intellectual property rights that entitled me to dictate its meaning: the concept had become the property of mankind. To judge by the increasing frequency with which this alternative concept is being employed by highly reputable economists (such as Stiglitz 1999, n.33), I fear that Bresser had a point. The battle of economic ideas is, as McCloskey (1998) has argued, fought to a significant extent in terms of rhetoric. This means that the dual use of a term with strong ideological overtones can pose serious dangers, not only of misunderstanding, but also of inadvertently prejudicing policy stances. Specifically, there is a real danger that many of the economic reforms that the Bank tends to favor - notably macroeconomic discipline, trade openness, and market-friendly microeconomic policies -- will be discredited in the eyes of many, simply because the Bank is inevitably implicated in views that command a consensus in Washington and the term "Washington Consensus" has come to be used to describe an extreme and dogmatic commitment to the belief that markets can handle everything. The set of WDR 2000 consultations already held have led to questions about the consistency of the Bank's supposed ideological base and its commitment to reducing poverty.(Williamson, 1999) 21
6

academic trend into the economics thought named neo-institutionalism and the democratization process of the 1980s in Latin America (Rodriguez Garavito 2006). It is relevant to remark that besides the explicit opposition between the human rights movements and the neoliberal agendas, both have stressed the importance of the judicial reform and the strengthening of the rule of law (Rodriguez Garavito, 2006; Dezalay et. al, 2002).

PART II JUDICIAL REFORM IN ARGENTINA AND THE WORLD BANK 2.1 The World Bank and the Promotion of the Rule of Law The World Bank official position in the promotion of the Rule of Law during the early 1990s is represented by Shihata (1995a) when he argues that: 1) law has a powerful potential in promoting social change and progressive development in an orderly manner; 2) ROL and well functioning judicial institutions are quintessential for development, for the private sector and foreign

investments since they create certainty and predictability, reduce the cost of transactions and delays, and protect property rights; 3)The enforcement of law through independent, accountable and well functioning judicial institutions is as relevant as the modifications of the domestic legal systems in order to generate a social atmosphere capable to struggle against corruption and arbitrariness from the other branches of government; 4) Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (arbitration7, mediation, etc) are important tools for institutional improvement in Latin America; 5) ownership is an unavoidable requirement for program success (Shihata, 1995 b:13-15). The key elements to Judicial Reform Efforts from the World Bank standpoint are, namely:1Strengthening the independence of the judiciary; 2- Simplifying and updating legal procedures and laws; 3- Improving the administration of justice; 4-Providing alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution; 5-Improving legal education and training; 6-Expanding access to justice; 7-Improving the quality of legal profession (Rowat, 1995:16-18).

7 International Center of Settlement of Investment Disputes(ICSID), which is an affiliate of the World Bank and in which the participation of Latin American countries have increased considerably from practically non representation in the past to the nowadays 21 memberships (Shihata, 1995 a).

22

The WB article of agreements8 limits WB intervention to the mechanisms necessary to promote economic development but prohibits WB intervention in political affairs. Through the connection of law and judicial institutions to economic development, the WB has founded its

intervention in judicial reform programs by means of conceiving them as the necessary institutional tools in order to promote economic development. Bryan Garth (2002:22) argues that this interconnection and this intervention of the WB in the promotion of institutional changes can be a source of conflicts and complaints from developing countries in a blurred sector where politics and economics are not accurately differentiated. The Banks attention to governance matters and to legal and judicial reform issues has been associated with its role as a development financer. 2.2 The Judicial Reform in Argentina and the World Bank.
The cases of judicial reform and anti-corruption in Argentina proved that the capacity of the World Bank to institutionalise these projects in developing countries cannot rely simply on coercive means, namely the Banks financial-economic power. On the contrary, when the Bank is able to draw on its material and knowledge resources (i.e. forums, publications, learning programmes, training and capacity building initiatives, funded projects, and expert exchanges) to consolidate a pro-reform network with local actors, then it can have considerable influence in advancing and institutionalizing governance-related norms on the ground. (Riggirozzi, 2007:11)

After 1983 when Argentina reestablished the democratic system, judicial reform focused mainly on the removal of the judges who had been engaged with the previous dictatorial process. The

democratization process of the judiciary consisted mainly in renaming some of the judges who had lost their positions during the dictatorship Proceso de Reorganizacin Nacional, the complete removal of judges in charge of High Courts (National Supreme Court and Superior Courts in the Provinces), and the ratification or the removal of those judges clearly engaged with the dictatorship (Binder, 2006). In all cases, the new judges appointed should be engaged with the democratization process.

8 These limitations are: a) Being influenced by the political character of its members countries; b) Interfering in the political affairs of members; c) Allowing political factors or events to influence its decisions. Therefore political considerations should be out except when they have an obvious economic effect relevant to its work. Despite this other than specific projects have grown since 1980s. At present 25 % of the commitments of the World Bank are for structural and sectoral adjustment loans, in order to get a good order or good governance through the introduction and implementation of appropriate rules and institutions.(Shihata, 1995 a:219-233).

23

Even though the legal culture of Argentina, with a system stemming form colonial times, was not basically altered by the democratization process, a new democratic atmosphere was installed in the judiciary. An important commitment to the rule of law was done by Alfonsns administration

influenced by some prominent legal philosophers like Carlos Nino with enduring ties with the US, the Yale Law School and legal liberalism advocacy (Dezalay et al, 2002: 238). However, the manipulation of the judiciary by the Executive (Binder, 2006) has had a chronic influence in power relationships among the government branches and is still a serious matter which affects the independence of the judiciary and enforces the judiciary role as a gatekeeper of the social and political privileges of some social, political and economic elites (Burgos, 2006:141-177). The courts in Argentina , for at least fifty years, have offered not resistance to the chief executive (Dezalay et al, 2002:240). Moreover, in order to become a justice, even in the last two decades, lawyers needed political connections with the Peronist Party or the Radical Party. Since the return to democracy in 1983, the independence of the judiciary in Argentina has been one of the major issues of governance. This lack of independence became even more evident during the administration of President Carlos Menem(1989-1999) when there was a widespread

suspicion of manipulation of the judiciary, in which the judiciary became the political arm that legitimized questionable procedures for the implementation of unpopular market and policy reforms (Riggirozzi, 2007:19). During the years of the Menem administration, the deep economic changes enormously affected the way in which society had moved in the first model of development with the preeminence of the state (Salacuse, 2000). In the new frame, important legal changes were required for elimination of budget deficits, strict control of money supply, privatization of State-owned enterprises, and an openness to international trade and investment (Salacuse, 2000:287) by strong external pressures exerted by IFIs. Concomitantly, the National Judiciary in Argentina suffered serious intromissions parting

from the Executive branch, which seriously affected the independence of courts and its reputation. In those years the Supreme Court was qualified as the Addicted Court by some actors (Riggirozzi, 2006:45). The judiciary had to face serious accusations of corruption, which worsened the credibility of the courts also undergoing frequent journalistic scandals.

24

In 1994, after the Pacto de Olivos (an agreement between the Peronist and Radical Parties) the National Constitution was reformed promulgating the National Judicial Council as an independent organ to appoint National Judges. The goal was to strengthen the judicial independence breaking the link between the judiciary and the executive branch withdrawing the appointment of judges from the hands of the Executive and alleviating judges from the constant pressures exerted on them by the executive. Also in the Provinces new institutions were created to be in charge of the appointment and removal of provincial judges. Even though Judicial Councils provoked some improvements in the

Argentinean Judiciary, the deficiencies are still far from being solved. An independent Judicial school, as a previous step to become a Judge, would be important in order to strengthen the judiciary and its transparency. The initial entrance to the judiciary is the way to become a judge in Argentina at national level. Proof of this is that among the judges appointed by the National Judicial Council there are practically no candidates coming from the legal profession. Almost all, if not all the judges appointed by the National Council, come from the judicial career and very few of them, if any, from the legal profession (Lynch, 2004). The aforementioned fact shows how political concerns are still surrounding the Judiciary. Binder notices the existence of four big streams operating in Judicial Reform in Argentina:
The first of them focuses primarily on the administration of justicestemming from the professional and human deficiencies in the system that can only be resolved by naming better judicial authorities. The second vision focuses on technical and administrative deficiencies and on the notion that the justice system functions poorly because technology is weak, chaotic, and inadequate. A third vision postulates the need to break the traditional hold of past practices of the inquisitorial system, with its authoritarian practices. According to Binder, these three visions of reform must be integrated into a clear strategy for judicial reform that is constantly tested and adjusted. Results to date have been very haphazard, with some important advances in the area of penal practice but very little on the civil law side, with some states [provinces] (Mendoza, Crdoba) showing strong progress but other states and the federal judiciary lagging behind.(Deshazo et al, 2006)

In this context WB intervened in Argentina Judicial Reform.

The vast appreciation of an inefficient judiciary and the costs of corruption for economic development were increasingly championed by international financial institutions, in particular by the World Bank. Since the early 1990s, new concerns within the World Bank's agenda about 'good governance' for development focused on legal and institutional reforms in social sectors; municipal development; privatization and private sector development; and anti-corruption and judicial reform (World Bank 2002, Riggirozzi 2006). (Riggirozzi, 2006:45-46)

To some extent, and for a wide sector of the population, IFI interventions were seen as an imperialist intervention, aiming at deepening the countrys poverty with the complicity of local elites aiming at
25

protecting their privileges. They were also perceived as supporting government policies which had seriously affected wide sectors of the middle class economic capacity with increasing rates of unemployment and condemning millions of people to poverty, strengthening the exclusionary paradigm. The pressures exerted by IFIs and their support to unpopular policies of the government made the WB credibility decrease. This social perception explains, in some way, the behavior of local leftist actors who strongly resisted the PROJUM implementation. The WB election of Pilot methods, focused on case management and judicial administration, fortified these suspects of complicity among IFIs, Menems government and local elites strengthening a new phenomenon of extreme inequalities and economic concentration, never seen before in Argentina. This negative public image of IFIs and the role played by them in internal economic transformations percolated to the other programs launched by the WB and the PROJUM was not an exception.
The involvement of the World Bank in judicial reform was triggered by a sector assessment undertaken between 1993 and 1995. In effect, the Ministry of Justice requested the World Bank to finance a comprehensive diagnostic study of the problems affecting delivery of justice in Argentina. The World Bank's Judicial Sector Study was carried out under a World Bank grant. The team that conducted the report was composed of Argentine lawyers selected by the Ministry of Justice and international experts that participated in other judicial reform experiences supported by the World Bank in the region. The problems of the judiciary were identified with the lack of independence, delays in trials and sentences, and widespread corruption. Court officers, including judges, personnel, and government officials were perceived to be at the root of the problem and the main obstacle to change (World Bank 2001a: ix-xi). A subsequent World Bank diagnostic work, the1996's 'Judicial Reform in Latin American Courts: The Experience in Argentina and Ecuador' also addressed these problems, which were discussed in various seminars with local actors from the Argentine social and political spectrum. Yet, despite the highly political issues raised by the report the World Bank designed a programme which narrowly focused on technical managerial aspects of the system related to justice delivery(Riggirozzi, 2006:46)

Nonetheless, the reformist atmosphere, paradoxically prevalent in Argentina before the PROJUM initiation, had already given birth to other reform initiatives. For instance, during the 1990s, an unimaginable movement for ADR mechanisms had already been present with an enormous promotion. This process, ultimately, led to the incorporation of mediation as a compulsory mechanism in the Procedural Codes at National and at Provincial levels9 and placed Argentina in an international leading role in ADR10.

9 Sections 286/291 bis of the Civil Procedure Code of Province of Entre Rios(where I have my residence place) establishes the obligatory character of Mediation in certain civil cases as a previous step to open court jurisdiction. 10 In this movement for ADR an NGO the Fundacin Libra played a key role. Fundacin Libra was founded by Elena Highton de Nolasco (currently Justice of National Supreme Court), and Gladys Alvarez .

26

In the following Tables, taken from the CEJA data base, can be observed the initiatives undertaken at the national level until 2005 with international cooperation Table 29- and with internal support Table 30-. These tables, in which some formal modifications were introduced and whose translation to English is mine, were originally only available in Spanish.

Table 1

Tabla 29 ProjectswithInternationalCooperation
Projects Names
PROJUM

Description
TheProgramaimsto redesign12courtsin allthecountry, incorporatingnew technologies,anew organizationanda document managementsystem. Executionofremnant fundsfromabigger loantofoment activitiesdirectedto theAccesstoJustice withthegoalto producea comprehensivejudicial reform. Itisaninitiative undertakenwiththe representationofall thejudicialsectors involvedinArgentina todiscussandtoreach consensusonthe generalguidelines underwhichjudicial reformeffortsshould beundertaken. Itisaprojectaimingat promotingthe modernizationof courtsthroughthe diffusionofpositive experiences undertakenintheUS andtheUSjudicial system Withabroad participationofjudges, courtpersonnel, politicalandacademic actors,businessmen

FinancialSources
WorldBank,LoanBIRF 4314AR,Project ARG999/06.US$5 millions

Executive Organism
JudicialCouncil.

References
www.pjn.gov.ar

PROJUS OverallJudicial Sector Assessment

BancoMundial.

MinistryofJusticeand HumanRights.

ArgentineDialog Commisionof Justice Dilogo Argentino MesadeJusticia

Fomentedbythe UNDPUnitedNations DevelopmentProgram

MinistryofJusticeand HumanRights www.reformaju dicial.jus.gov.ar

Justicein change:Civil societies, Lawyersand Judges.Anew projectforthe Administration ofCourts

USEmbassyin Argentina.

MinistryofJustice throughthe Comprehensive ProgramofJudicial Reform USEmbassy, FundacinLibra, JudicialCounciland ARGENJUS.

www.reformaju dicial.jus.gov.ar

27

CasasdeJusticia

andcitizens Itsgoalistodesignan effectivemodelforthe Accesstojusticein differentprovinces, withcoordinated activitiesoflocal judiciaries,local executivesandNGOs

PROJUMremnants resources

Localgovernments, MinistryofJusticeand NGOs.

Source:CEJA.

Table 2

Tabla 30 InternalProjects
Project name
Technical Cooperation Covenant betweenthe National Supreme Courtand ARGENJUSS Covenantfor anew Information systemfor theArgentina Judicial System. Covenantof Inter jurisdictional electronic communicati on

Descripction

Executive Organism
ARGENJUSNational SupremeCourt

References
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/co nvenio/convenio.html

Thegeneralgoalistoimprovethe NationalJudiciarythroughthree centralobjectives:(a)theefficiency ofthecourts(b)thetransparencyin thejudicialserviceand(c)theaccess tojustice.

Thegoalconsistsinthecreationofa newsystemofinformationand judicialstatisticscommonforallthe governmentoffices.

MinistryofJusticeand JUFEJUS

www.reformajudicial.jus.go v.ar

Thegoalistohomogenizethe domainnamesandemailaddresses ofallthejudicialsystem.According toStatute22.172

MinistryofJusticeand JUFEJUS

www.reformajudicial.jus.go v.ar

Source:CEJA11

It is important to remark that parallel to the PROJUM some other programs were launched, being the most important of them the Comprehensive Reform Program of the Ministry of Justice, whose web site, www.reformajudicial.jus.gov.ar, seems to have been abandoned. The aforementioned programs are only some programs undertaken with the intervention of governmental agencies and do not comprise the large amount of initiatives carried out by NGOs and
http://www.cejamericas.org/reporte/muestra_pais.php?idioma=espanol&pais=ARGENTIN&tipreport=REPORTE 2&seccion=PROYREFO Consulted 14th August 2008.
11

28

private organizations. Each organization, on their own or by means of the cooperation of NGOs or internal or external agencies, develops its own programs, which shows an increasing movement pushing for judicial reform. Another important initiative in Judicial reform in the last decades was La Mesa del Dilogo Argentina, a broad representative forum formed to mitigate the disastrous effects of the 2001crisis. The Mesa de Dilogo Argentino - and its Mesa Permanente para la Reforma de la Justicia del Dilogo Argentino - was a Catholic Church initiative with the support of UNDP and the government (Riggirozzi, 2006). It was a forum with wide representation of social sectors in order to contribute to overcome the crisis through the elaboration of proposals for economic and institutional reforms (Riggirozzi, 2006). Five main commissions were created to promote judicial reforms, namely: Access to Justice, ADR Mechanisms, Judicial trainings, judicial backlogs and judicial delays reduction and judges profile (Garavano et al, 2003). NGO delegates, policy makers, magistrates and judicial representatives participated in the commissions. Several projects were proposed and some of them effectively implemented. As I showed, some local programs fostering judicial reform had been launched before and after the PROJUM. Before or simultaneously with the PROJUM the most important of them was the Comprehensive Judicial Reform Program (Programa Integral de Reforma Judicial) by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights . The PROJUM focused its reform program on the managerial aspects of judicial reform and to some extent took position for one of the reform streams existing in Argentina. This position taken by the World Bank was one of the most important obstacles the PROJUM had to face during its implementation. The struggles among the actors involved made the project be in serious risk as it will be introduced in the following sections.

PART III THE PROJUM 3.1 World Bank Court Development Project (PROJUM) as a case study

29

In this scenario the World Bank and Argentina launched the PROJUM -Model Court Development Program12(World Bank 2006), the first and most important of the WB judicial reform initiatives in Argentina. This was a 5-million dollar loan qualified as LIL (Learning and Innovation Loan) granted to the Argentine Government. This Loan agreement was decided between the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the Argentine Republic (as borrower) and its general goals were to identify and establish conditions in Argentina under which judicial administrative improvements could take place and eventually form part of a broader reform program. These goals were to be approached through an examination of some of the judiciarys systemic problems and experimentation of new methodologies for possible uses as models.(World Bank, 2006) This Loan Program -named PROJUM in Argentina- was launched during the last years of the government of the Argentine President Carlos S. Menem and the loan contract was also signed by his Minister of Economy Roque Fernandez. This program was an integral part of the

Modernization process undertaken in all the Argentinian State by Menems Administration. It focused on the judiciary under the framework of the Washington Consensus with its commitments of deregulation, privatization and modernization, which was Argentina during the 1990s. The modernization process had been widely resisted politically, and a similar resistance had to be faced by the programme, which therefore also became controversial and resisted by important applied as a government policy in

actors. The World Bank participation in governance projects in Argentina was not circumscribed only to the judicial sector , since several other governance programs were launched during the 1990s, in which the modernization of the State was the general reform framework (see the programs of the World Bank13). In this order of ideas the PROJUM has become a program which attempted to modernize the administrative realm of the Judiciary, through four components which were Court Management,
12 http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?Projectid=P050713&Type=Implementation&theSitePK=40941 &pagePK=64330676&menuPK=64282137&piPK=64302789- 24th February 2008. Even though this project is not the only one it is the first attempt to produce effective reforms in the judiciary at national level. The previous programs were directed to produce a judicial sector assessment but not to implement and produce effective judicial changes in court administration as in the PROJUM . 13 http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64187835&piPK=64187936&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187283& query=judicial%20argentina&fromDate=&docType=0&toDate=&IRISF=&displayOrder=DOCNA,DOCDT,REPNB,DOCT Y&callBack=&siteName=WDS&sType=2&report=&loan=&trustfund=&projid=&credit=&sourceCitation=&sortDesc=DO CDT&dAtts=DOCDT,DOCNA,DOCTY,SECCL,LANG,REPNB,VOLNB,REPNME&startPoint=0&pageSize=50

30

Judicial Administration, Case Backlog Reduction, Skills development of the judges and their staffs and evaluation and dissemination of the program and its results among the judiciary actors and the public in general (World Bank 2006). The PROJUM aimed to redesign 12 courts throughout the country at the National level, also known as Federal Courts in the Provinces, incorporating new technologies, new working methods and a document management system (World Bank 1998 and 2001). Twelve courts were selected: 10 civil, commercial and social security courts from Capital Federal, and two federal courts from Chaco and Mar del Plata. . The courts were: Table 3

THE COURTS OF THE PROJUM FederalandNationalCourtsintheCity ofBuenosAires

FourNationalCivil15Courtsoffirstinstancein thecityofBuenosAires: 1InstanciaenloCivilN46,N74,N78 andN100. ThreeNationalCommercialCourtsoffirst instanceinthecityofBuenosAires: 1InstanciaenloComercialN5,N1and N15 FederalCivilyComercialN2inMardelPlata ProvinciaBuenosAires

TwomultijurisdictionalFederalCourtsin theProvinces14

FederalCourtinResistencia ProvinciaChaco.

14 Federal Courts (in the Provinces despite some of them can also be found in the city of Buenos Aires) or the National Courts (in the city of Buenos Aires) are courts which belong to the National Government differentiated from the Provincial Courts with jurisdiction in the Provinces. This has been so since the Federal System of Government imposed by the National Constitution in 1853 established a National Government (with the traditional division of branches between the Executive, the Parliament and the Judiciary) and also Provincial Governments( also divided in Executive, Parliamentary and Judicial branches). Consequently in the Provinces Federal Courts and Provincial Courts coexist with similar substantial competences. In the city of Buenos Aires The National Courts possess a wide jurisdiction and are differentiated because of their substantial competences in Civil Courts, Criminal Courts, Commercial Courts, Administrative Courts, Labour Courts, etc. The Federal Courts in the Provinces exert their jurisdiction in very specific matters beyond the local Provincial Courts competences and are in charge of Criminal , Civil, Commercial, and Tax cases among others. This causes Federal Courts in the Provinces to have a wide array of residual competences.

15

The fieldwork here conducted was on PROJUM Civil Courts N74, 46 and 78 and non PROJUM Civil Court

N 76.

31

 ThreeFederalSocialSecurityCourtsoffirst instanceinthecityofBuenosAires: FederaldelaSeguridadSocialN1,N8and N9

The initial steps of the PROJUM are properly summarized by the WB as follows:
Once the respective Chambers (civil, commercial and social security) selected the courts that would implement the New Management Model, the judges were invited to participate in a series of courses and workshops to receive training for the main task that the implementation of the Project required, which was the global design of the Management Model. The design was performed by specialists hired by the UCP and after the approval by the judges involved, a bid was called to contract a firm that would implement the design with support of a computerized system.[.] From 1998 to 2002, UCP did not have a plausible performance. Because of that, the authorities of the Bank proposed the transfer of the UCP to the Consejo de la Magistratura, where the continuity or cancellation of the Project was debated. Finally, the continuity was decided. However, this transfer coincided with the election of new counselors and the subsequent change of authorities within the Consejo. In such conditions, in November 2002 the Project was given a different direction in order to achieve not only concrete goals but also its implementation, even given the insufficient deadlines, product of previous and consecutive delays. The necessary bids were called for the different acquisitions and contract of the firm that would develop the software. Staff was reduced and outcomes were soon observed. (World Bank 2006:19)

PROJUM Times: The program was scheduled to begin on 20th January 1999 but its effective start was on 29th April 1999. The successive stages faced long delays: the scheduled closing date was to be on 30th November 2001 when the program had not yet begun with the implementation stage. The effective closing date was on 30th September 2005 four years after the programmed date of closing. 3.2 Description of the PROJUM As stated, the PROJUM had to overcome several obstacles during its implementation. The most important one was the delay in the launch of the program, which undermined the whole process of implementation and affected seriously the chances of the PROJUM to achieve positive results. The PROJUM had several PCUs during its life. In November 2002 the last PCU was appointed to conclude with the PROJUM Implementation stage.The administrative scheme created for the PROJUM had the following units: Figure N 1

32

Table 4- Executive Committee

Executive Committee
AdministradorGeneraldelaCorteSupremade JusticiadelaNacin (GeneralAdministratoroftheNationalSupreme CourtofJustice) SecretaradePolticaJudicialyAsuntos LegislativosdelMinisteriodeJusticia,Seguridady DerechosHumanos (SecretaryofJudicialPolicyandLegislativeAffairs oftheMinistryofJustice,SecurityandHuman Rights) OnerepresentativefromtheConsejodela Magistratura (JudicialCouncil)

SubsecretariodeCoordinacinyEvaluacin PresupuestariadelaJefaturadeGabinetesde Ministros; (SubSecretaryofCoordinationandBudget EvaluationoftheHeadquartersofMinistry Cabinets)

Even though the above administrative scheme was permanent, the people affected to those offices were often changed during its initial stage. An initial delay had affected seriously all the project, due to which one of the interviewees (Simari interview N 11) affirmed that not all the blame should be laid on the government, since the WB also imposed its own time schedules. The initial delay was caused rather by policy decisions than by inefficiencies. The PROJUM was developed along three consecutive steps: Table 5 The stages of the PROJUM

Theinitialevaluativestepinordertodesignthebesttoolstobe implemented (whiletheprojectadministrationwasunderthecontroloftheMinistryof Justice) TheimplementationprocessconductedbyUTEDDSUNITECH (underthecontroloftheJudicialCouncil) TheevaluationprocessoftheoutcomesconductedbyFORESNCSC

1-The initial evaluative step was undertaken by individual consultants who worked on the 12 courts where the PROJUM was to be implemented. They developed interviews to judges and judiciary
33

staff, organized workshops, evaluated the layout, observed the fieldwork, gave recommendations and elaborated a wide diagnostic with different possibilities to be implemented. The diagnostic embraced all the compounds of the PROJUM, mainly the organizational, documentary and computerized system diagnostics. (Colegio Pblico de Abogados de la Capital Federal, 2001). During this stage the digitalized file (expediente digitalizado) was still considered as an option, which was later abandoned. This was so because the digitalized file required changes in the Civil Procedure Code which exceeded the practical chances of PROJUM implementers. Justice Portela (interview N 2) expressed that the PROJUM did not succeed because the real need for an improvement in case management and court administration was the implementation of the digitalized file in which all the notifications could be done without using paper-based documents. 2- Implementation process: Ing. Moises Lichtmajer (interview N 7) was the consultant (with management and administration expertise) chosen from a triad of consultants proposed by the government to the WB in order to lead the UCP in the implementation stage of the PROJUM . The work of implementation was initiated in November 2002 and concluded in June 2005. The initial goals of he PROJUM as stated in the Contract Appraisal document (World Bank, 1998) were:
A. The number of cases pending will decrease by 15% every year B. Clearance rate will increase by 20% every year' C. Duration of a typical case, juicio executivo (from filing until the decision stage and then from the decision until the enforcement stage) will decrease D. Increase of percentage of judgments written with information technology as a proxy for the use of modern technology E. Increase in trust in the judiciary and satisfaction by the public in the service provided by the judiciary F. Index of management performance based upon a self-audit.(World Bank, 1998)

One of the most important issues of the PROJUM was to implement a model with a clear division between jurisdictional functions and administrative functions of the court. The new management model was developed around this organizational concept. Some of the motives behind this distinction were to alleviate the judges labor in administrative matters in order that they could dedicate themselves exclusively to jurisdictional decisions.

34

In order to achieve those goals, a new model of court administration- New Management Model (Nuevo modelo de gestin16) was developed , elaborated by the judges and the staff of the courts, with the assistance of the permanent consultants of the UCP. Once approved this Global Design, UTE DDS UNITECH (the bid winner for the program implementation) began as external consultant in order to implement the program, to develop a managerial structure according to the new management model of court administration (Nuevo modelo de gestin), elaborated by the

judges(with the assistance of the previous consultant) and to provide a new computerized system to the PROJUM courts. UTE DDS UNITECH began the work on 1st April 2003. The consultant specialized in software systems updated the previous diagnostics, enriched the design and began with the training program in organizational matters for judges and staff. On 8th March 2004 the implementation of the New Model began jointly with the new computerized system named IURIX .(Lichtmajer interview N 7) The task was complemented with a wide range of activities and reforms ranging from: Diagnostic of the court situation at the program start; Global design of the new model of court administration(the new management model); Standardization of the judicial documents.; Key performance indicators; New system of files archieving (vertical instead of horizontal); Proposal to universalize the use of Paper A4 (international standard); The design of an adequate layout for the work in the judicial office (Lichtmajer, 2005:3) One of the most important matters for the judges and court staff was the modernization of the court furniture and the hardware provided by the PROJUM. A building reform was also made, and the change of the furniture of the courts was undertaken jointly with the provision of computers. Dr. Casas17 (interview N 1) affirmed they (the court as a whole) had accepted to be part of the program because in his Court they did not have computers. The only computers they had, had been provided either by the judge himself or by the staff with private resources. The excessive insistence on the computerization of the courts provoked claims from some stakeholders. They argued that the goal of the program was not only to provide the court with computers and with proper software. Its broader intention was to produce a wider mentality change in
16 17

See Annexes N 1 and 2. Civil Court N 74 received the ISO 9002 certification

35

the administration of justice and the case management. Unfortunately, for some scholars (Sandra Elena interview n 5) the main point of the PROJUM was to appear merely as a computerized system and furniture modernization program. My fieldwork mainly focused on the Civil Courts participants of the Program and one court from outside the program. My first impression, when visiting the PROJUM courts, was to observe a new layout , modern and suitable furniture, an orderly space and a remarkably better organization than the one in the courts outside the program.

3.2.1 Actors and Agents in the PROJUM and the Argentinian Judicial Reform Concerning all Judicial Reform, in this case the PROJUM, there are diverse actors pursuing their own interests in the reform. Global actors (Halliday et al, 2006), in this case the World Bank, government bodies like the Supreme Court, the Executive, the Ministry of Justice, the Judicial Council, the court judges, consultants and epistemic communities operated jointly or successively, competitively or cooperatively in the PROJUM, all of them showing their private interests and opinions, exerting pressure, etc. In the PROJUM the actors involved were: The Executive and the Supreme Court : They have strong corporate interests that inhibit

reform (Riggirozzi, 2006 ) as will be developed further below in Part IV. The judicial Council: Created by the constitutional reform of 1994. The Judicial Council began its activities in 1999 and since the Constitution had transferred to the Council the administration of the National judiciary, problems of competence with the Supreme Court and its delegates in the Project the Ministry of Justice and Human rights- interfered and hindered the normal development of PROJUM (World Bank, 2006) . Under the Judicial Council, the PROJUM was implemented, concluded and evaluated. However, implementing the Program was not easy. For the completion of the PROJUM, the Judicial Council also faced several internal problems. After being in the Ministry of Justice for some years, without results and having disbursed approximately one million and a half US dollars, some of the Councilors posed resistance to the continuity of the Program. Beyond the fact that there had been accusations of corruption, Councilor Szmukler
18

18

opposed the continuity of the

See the Website: http://www.consejero-szmukler.com.ar/ (04-09-2008)

36

PROJUM arguing that this program, like others in Latin America and The Caribbean, aims at installing a hybrid justice model, rational and efficient useful only for the IFIs to recover their credits in developing countries. The World Bank representative, Dr. Yung Tung was present in a Council meeting trying to instruct the councilors about their responsibility in justice administration, and Councilor Szmukler warned him about the WB responsibilities in the chaotic socio-economic situation of the country and the continent. Szmulkler also emphasized the high costs of the program and the poor results, the lack of a planned and detailed budget for its replication in all the judiciary, and the chaotic socio-economic situation of the country at the moment. Even though the implementation of the program was wholly completed, the Judicial Council decided not to replicate the PROJUM in other courts, as had been requested by some magistrates, and in March 2008, by means of the Resolution N98/08 also decided not to replicate the software IURIX acquired by the PROJUM in order to elaborate its own software. The PROJUM judges and Court Staff: They played a very important role in all the PROJUM implementation process. Their range of commitment varied and the engagement with the Program goals was also diverse. Some of the actors showed an enthusiastic attitude but some others were overloaded with work by the implementation exigencies, the training courses and workshops. Even though their entrance into the program was voluntary, at least regarding the civil courts, the work burden that the PROJUM entailed (without economic incentives and scarce personnel) affected their compromise and commitment with the project. (Simari, interview N 11). The judges created, assisted by the consultants, the new management model to be implemented in the PROJUM courts. They also supported the continuity of the program even after the assistance of the PROJUM had been finalized. A technocratic group within the Ministry of Justice(Riggirozzi,2006): In 1998 the

Ministry of Justice and Human Rights launched a Comprehensive National Program for Judicial Reform. Meanwhile, the Executive and the WB were planning to launch the PROJUM initially under the control of the Supreme Court (later the control was delegated to the Ministry of Justice).To a great extent, this lack of coordination was a source of frictions among policy makers, researchers and the PROJUM administration. This was mainly because in those days some researchers, coming from

37

civil societies and NGOs specialized in judicial reform, had launched the aforementioned reform program for the judiciary. Furthermore,
some representatives of think-tanks like FORES move[d] from the realm of policy-oriented analysis to occupy civil servant positions within the Ministry of Justice during the years of Menem's administration and subsequent administration of De la Ra(Riggirozzi, 2006:54).

Garavano (interview N 6) said that while the program was under the Ministry of Justice there were some other programs such as the digitalization of signatures, and others supported by Mesa de Dilogo, which lacked financial resources for their implementation. This generated resistance from many actors who saw how their reform efforts vanished due to the WB program, since local reformers had practically no participation in it. Consultants: The PROJUM was developed principally by external consultants, which raised rejection and complaints from the judiciary and local knowledge producers due to this nonparticipative external intervention.
Two main factors are identified as affecting the context in which local knowledge producers interact with local policy-makers[.] The first relates to the fact that donors, like national stakeholders, often push their own agendas and therefore compete with local contending paradigms on how to approach reform programmes. Global knowledge carried put forth by external consultants versus local knowledge cannot only inhibit joint efforts but also duplicate existing work[] The second factor relates directly to World Bank consultants. It has been claimed that World Bank consultants sometimes have little or no country experience, and that their aim is to replicate a World Bank's blueprint to solve problems in the judicial sector (Brenna 2003: interview). Moreover, by supporting certain actors the World Bank enhances certain policy ideas and proposals and their political influence. Bank staff can improve the environment for reform by engaging with local consultants in networking activities and enhancing the support and capacity to lead the reform. If Bank managers follow a top-down strategy implementation of the reform will be hampered and thus the gap between global and local knowledge (and between differing local approaches and agendas) will not be bridged. (Riggirozzi, 2006:54-55)

Lichtmajer (interview N 7) alluded to the resistance he had to overcome to succeed in concluding the program. The resistance came principally from ideological bias about foreign aid programs put in evidence in the Council deliberations and also from the judiciary conservative character evidenced in the lack of commitment of some judges. Lichtmajer stressed the deep effort which the program implementation entailed in an antagonistic environment since at the moment he had been appointed, the program had been close to failure.

Epistemic Communities: The existence of four mainstreams in the Academia about Judicial Reform is stressed by Binder(2006) as it was quoted above. Riggirozzi (2006) points out the existence of two main currents or organizations and communities of thought : a) Think-tanks and business-oriented

2) Non-Governmental Advocacy Organizations. Their intervention in judicial

38

matters and judicial research has been constantly increasing during the last two decades invigorated by the proliferation of NGOs and civil society organizations . Think Tanks Table 6 Thinktanksandbusinessorientedorganizations
Very influential before the 2001 socio economic crisis. Their research is focused mainly on case management19andjudicialadministrationandtheyhaveoftenactedasgovernmentandWBconsultants. TheirparticipationinthePROJUMwasscarceandlimitedtotheinitialstages.(Riggirozzi,2006)Someof themactinginArgentinaJudicialreformare,namely: FORES ForumfortheStudyofJusticeandAdministration (ForodeEstudiossobreAdministracinyJusticia) AnNGOspecializedinJudicialReformwhichcarried outtheevaluationofPROJUMoutcomes.Someof itsmemberswereappointedtopositionsofpolitical responsibilitywithintheMinistryofJustice (Riggirozzi,2006:50) FundacindeInvestigacinEconmica LatinoamericanaFIEL Akeythinktankinvolvedinpolicyoriented researchandanalysisonissuesofjudicial reform.(Riggirozi,2006:51) JuntaFederaldeCortesySuperioresTribunalesde JusticiadelasProvinciasArgentinasJUFEJUS: AfederalentitythatgathersmembersofSupreme CourtsofJusticeattheprovinciallevel(Riggirozzi, 2006:51) InstitutoparaelDesarrolloEmpresarioenla ArgentinaIDEA: Anongovernmentalinstitutionwhosemembers aresomeofthemostimportantcorporateexecutive officersofthecountry.(Riggirozzi,2006:51) ARGENJUS: AconsortiumformedbyrepresentativesofNGOs, thinktanks,expertsandconsultants,and educationalinstitutions[]thatworkonthejustice system.(Riggirozzi,2006:51). FundacinLibra AnNGOthatworkscloselywiththeMinistryof Justiceintheproductionofresearchrelatedto AlternativeDisputeResolution,aswellastraining judiciarypersonnel(Riggirozzi,2006:51).Oneofits founderswasElenaHighton,nowNationalSupreme CourtJustice.

The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights elaborated an Integral Plan for judicial reform and this plan, based on case management, was created by former and current members of local think tanks. For more details about the plan you could see until some weeks ago the Ministry of Justice web site: www.reformajudicial.jus.gov.ar. (not available on 4th. August 2008) Indeed, that website was very useful at the initial stages of this research. At the moment that website seems to have been abandoned the same as some years ago the Plan Integral de Reforma Judicial had been abandoned and whose chief head was Dr. Germn Garavano . However, the information provided in that website was not updated. JSCA( CEJA in Spanish) website provides the following information about the website of the Programa Integral de Reforma Judicial de Argentina (Comprehensive Program for Judicial Reform in Argentina): This program was created in July 2000 by the Secretary of Justice and Legislative Affairs of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights of Argentina, which established the general outline of the reform process. This excellent website provides up-to-date information on events, publications, statistics and projects, including multiple resources on the aspects and parties involved in judicial reform, such as access to justice, management, infrastructure, administrative reforms, legislative reforms, training, consensus-building activities, and full reports on past events. Also, noteworthy is its user-friendly page design and careful organization of the topics. Available only in Spanish (CEJA, http://www.cejamericas.org/)
19

39

UnidosporlaJusticia: Itsgoalistopromoteactionsfortheimprovementof thejudicialsystemandthestrengtheningoftherule oflaw.(Riggirozzi,2006:51).

GestinJudicial: Aforumrecentlycreatedbyjudgesandcivilservants whousemanagerialtechniquesfortheimprovement ofthejusticesystemandwherethemembers exchangesuggestionsandexpertise.Eventhough thisforumisnewanddoesnotfollowjudicialreform directly,itisrelevanttoshowhowsomejudgeshave organizedthemselvesinordertopromotetheuseof managerialtoolsfortheimprovementofJustice.

Non Governmental Advocacy Organizations Table 7 NonGovernmentalAdvocacyOrganizations

Theyarecivilsocieties,whichfollowthejudicialreformbutfromastandpointdifferentfromthinktanks. TheyareadvocacyNGOswithamorepoliticalapproach,focusingmainlyontheindependenceofjustice, accesstojustice,protectionofhumanrights,anticorruption,etc..Theirinfluenceinjudicialreformpolicies inArgentinabecamemorerelevantafterthe2001crisis(Riggirozzi,2006).Amongthemcanbecited: CivilRightsAssociation(Asociacinporlos DerechosCivilesADC20) Itpromotescivilrightsrecognitionand enforcementastherighttoaccesstoinformation. (Riggirozzi,2006:53) EnvironmentandNaturalResourcesFoundation (FundacinAmbienteyRecursosNaturales FARN22) AnNGOpromotingsustainabledevelopment throughpolicy,lawandinstitutionalreform (Riggirozzi,2006:53) theArgentineChapterofInternational Transparency,havepioneeredgroundbreaking anticorruptioninitiatives,probonolawservices andpublicaccessinitiativesandparticipatedin draftingtherulesofthepublichearing(Riggirozzi, 2006:52) Acivilorganizationwhichofferslegalprotectionfor consumersanduser.(Riggirozzi,2006:53) CenterofLegalandSocialStudies(CentrodeEstudios LegalesySocialesCELS21) AnNGOthatfocusesonhumanrightsadvocacy (Riggirozzi,2006:53) InstituteofComparativeStudiesinCriminaland SocialSciences(InstitutodeEstudiosComparadosen CienciasPenalesySocialesINECIP23)(Riggirozzi, 2006:53)

FundacinPoderCiudadano24

UsersandConsumersUnion(UnindeUsuariosy Consumidores

International Agencies operating in Judicial Reform Table 8

20

http://www.adc.org.ar (08-04-2008) http://www.cels.org.ar (08-04-2008) http://www.farn.org.ar/ (08-04-2008) 23 http://www.inecip.org/ (08-04-2008) 24 http://www.poderciudadano.org (08-04-2008)
21 22

40

 CEJAJSCA25(CentrodeEstudiosdeJusticiadelas AmricasJusticeStudiesCenteroftheAmericas): Thisisaninternationalagencycreatedin1999by themembersoftheInterAmericanSystem.Its membersaretheactivememberstatesofthe OrganizationofAmericanStates.Themaingoalof theagencyistogivesupporttothecountriesin theirreformprocesses.Theinformationavailable intheJSCAwebsiteisaveryimportantsourcefor researchandcooperation.

CumbreJudicialIberoamericana IberianAmericanJudicialSummit ThehigherjudiciallevelrepresentationofLatin AmericancountriesalsoincludingAndorra,Spainand Portugal.

26

Bar Associations and Judicial Associations Table 9

ColegioPblicodeAbogadosdeCapital Federal(CPACF): TheLawyerBarAssociationalsoshowedinterest inthePROJUMbypublishinganextensivearticle (CAPCF,2001,FascculoN14)detailingtheinitial diagnosticstageofthePROJUMinJanuary2001. Thispublicationwaspartofthescheduledgoalsof thePROJUMinthediffusioncompoundofthe programamongcourtusers.TheCPACFalso decidedtoconductasurveyamongthelawyersin 27 2007 whoseresults,ifconducted,werenot available. FederacinArgentinadeMagistrados(FAM) (ARGENJUSmember) AsociacindeMagistradosyFuncionarios JudicialesdelaNacin (ARGENJUSmember) ColegiodeAbogadosdelaCiudaddeBuenosAires (ARGENJUSmember)

FederacinArgentinadeColegiosdeAbogados(FACA) (ARGENJUSmember)

World Bank Units: The important role of the WB in the PROJUM was related above. WB units were operating in Argentina during the PROJUM times. As some interviewees stressed, the WB was also responsible for the initial delay at the start of the program (Simari; interview N11 ). Lichtmajer (interview N7 ) expressed that during the period in which he had been Executive Director of the PROJUM, the WB had carried out several supervision missions with positive results. However during the PROJUM times WB visibility in the project was scarce and its influential presence was practically not perceived by the public according to the low profile sometimes exerted by the WB in this type of programs.
25 26

http://www.cejamericas.org/ (08-04-2008) http://www.cumbrejudicial.org/eversuite/GetRecords?Template=default&app=cumbres (08-24-2008) 27 http://www.cpacf.org.ar/verde/vB_RevAbo/revistas/evista69-06.htm (08-04-2008)

41

Journalists: They had a peripheral influence on the PROJUM. Even though the media covered sometimes the PROJUM, only specialized and judicial media covered it mainly when corruption allegations raised against the initial stages of the PROJUM. Only the internet media Diario Judicial28 covered the PROJUM on some occasions. Judicial-Unions: They had neither participation nor influence over the program. Like many other actors involved, they complained about the PROJUM profile. They criticized WB programs since they only facilitate the operation of the consultants without participation of local expertise, enlarging the costs of judicial reform. Giarone (2003) also criticized the WB involvement in local judicial reform programs. Even though the judicial union had scarce influence over the program, their claims for better conditions of work were present in the PROJUM. Some employees stressed the lack of incentives for the workers in the PROJUM, which demanded extra work without extra payment (Bello, interview N 4).

3.3 PROJUM EVALUATION In order to evaluate the PROJUM some questions should be answered: Why were Pilot Courts used? Why did the WB as donor not intervene in the implementation itself of the program? Why was the program developed by external agents, consultants? To what extent was the local expertise consulted previously to the Program launch? Why was the money of a fixed sum of 5 million US dollars invested? Who were the competing actors around the PROJUM? To what extent did these

antagonisms and contesting opinions limit the effectiveness of the program? What was the real impact of the PROJUM? What are its real outcomes? Who were the stakeholders involved in the PROJUM outside the judges and personal staff? The PROJUM, as said, entailed the usage of Pilot Courts as a first-step method to achieve an overall improvement of the judicial administration. The demanding issues of independence of justice, corruption, and social justice had been avoided since the beginning of the project. The reformist atmosphere prevalent in Argentina concomitantly to the PROJUM initiation had already provoked other reform initiatives. For instance, during the 1990s an unimaginable movement

28

http://www.diariojudicial.com.ar/nota.asp?IDNoticia=2571 (08-04-2008)

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for ADR mechanisms had already been present with an enormous promotion, a process which ultimately led to the incorporation of mediation as a compulsory mechanism in the Procedural Codes at National and at Provincial levels and placed Argentina in an international leading role in ADR. (Dezalay et al, 2002:242-245) Even though some questions have already been answered or advanced previously, for the evaluation task this section is separated into some subsections: The PROJUM as a Pilot Court Model program; The PROJUM and the World Bank assessment; the evaluation of the PROJUM through organizational techniques. 3.3.1 THE PROJUM AS A PILOT COURT MODEL PROGRAM

The Pilots are a methodology used by the WB and other reforming institutions in order to make reforms in the judiciaries world wide. The reasons which sustains this option are the impossibility or the difficulties to implement serious and effective comprehensive reforms29 in some countries where comprehensive reforms could be stopped by contesting opinions and by political struggles, requiring legislative changes beyond the donors possibilities with uncertain results and the waste of resources. In the early 1990s Argentina required assistance to the WB for reforming the judiciary.
It was agreed that, even though piecemeal studies had been conducted in the past, it would be beneficial to undertake a comprehensive review of the judicial sector with analysis of the problems and suggestions for change so as to facilitate dialogue and consensus building. Consequently, a Judicial Sector Study completed in 1995 under an IDF grant was carried out. The study brought together a team of local and international experts to review Argentina's justice system. The results were disseminated and discussed during workshops with stakeholders -including the judiciary, bar associations, the business community, NGOs, academia, and the general public. (World Bank, 2001:82)

Aftermath Argentina government requested more assistance for judicial reform and because of the lack of consensus among stakeholders or key actors in the judicial reform on the nature, scope, or timing of any more substantive reform of the system the decision was to proceed with the reform through Pilots. (World Bank, 2001:82) This is one of the most problematic aspects of the PROJUM: the absence of a previous consensus among the stakeholders. There seems to be a contradiction between two WB arguments: on the one hand, that the lack of consensus for an overall reform justified the use of pilot models and,
29

on the other hand, the

In Salvador a comprehensive attempt by the USAID failed. (Salas, 2001)

43

permanently

stressed requirement of ownership

which was not taken into account. The

contradiction could be explained by the urgency of the then Argentinean Government to obtain public results in the judiciary reform and to appear as a reformist though, in fact, the intention was to build a faade as a reformist to temperate the serious allegations of manipulation of the judiciary exerted by the opposition and the majority of the population. However, the WB position is well represented by Dakolias and Said (1999) when they argue that an overall reform should not be attempted at one stage. The reform process requires both cultural change and a systematic change in the delivery of justice, so countries need to institute the reform process in a program of stages. Undoubtedly, the pilot models are a way to face the reform as a first step for an overall and comprehensive reform. This is one of the essential points of the PROJUM: the reform attempted through 12 pilot courts was with the purpose of it being replicated. The replication of the program was one of the most important goals when the program was launched. Nevertheless, the PROJUM will not be replicated in Argentina in the near future. The Judicial Council decided not to do so despite some Judges petitions in that respect. Dr. Poclava Lafuente, President of the Camara Federal de la Seguridad Social, and Dr. Luis Otero, President of the Camara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo requested the replication of the Program in their courts of first instance in 2005 when the PROJUM was showing visible changes in the Courts benefited with the program (Diario Judicial30). Dr. Poclava Lafuente (interview N 10) argued that he had requested the replication because they had observed the positive changes produced in the PROJUM courts but, although the program initially seemed to be very good, later on many technical problems had

appeared and everything had to be abandoned. It seems that the system was not vey good. It was a failed experiment. Nonetheless, the decision not to replicate the PROJUM was not uncontested. There are also many stakeholders who still think the PROJUM should be replicated and an initial recommendation of the Comisin de Administracin y Financiera of the Judicial Council advised to implement the replication of the PROJUM. Virginia Simari(interview N 11), former Executive

Director of the PROJUM and now Judge, also stressed the benefits achieved by this program for the
30

See Diario Judicial at: http://www.diariojudicial.com/nota.asp?IDNoticia=26255 (04-09-2008)

44

improvement of the administration of justice and the ability of the PROJUM to install the judicial reform in the key actors agenda. In spite of the contesting opinions, the replication of the program is now a closed matter. The Judicial Council decided not to replicate it in other courts; furthermore, it decided not to use the software -IURIX- developed by the PROJUM (Resolucin N 94/08)31 In order to assess the PROJUM impact, it is relevant to point out that, at the beginning of the current year, the Poder Judicicial de la Nacin (Judicial Council and the Supreme Court) launched

two programs with the goal to reform the Judiciary32: The Plan de Gestin (Management Plan) and the Proyecto Informtico (Informatic Project). The Plan de Gestin establishes a set of instructions for the different types of courts (for some scholars it does not constitute an administration of justice reform program, they are only simple instructions insufficient to produce an important reform). The Proyecto Informtico is currently attempting to create specific software tools to be globally used by all national courts.

3.3.2

THE PROJUM AND THE WORLD BANK ASSESSMENT

Overall assessment of the Project Implementation by the world Bank: The WB in its web site presentation page of the PROJUM expresses:
The Argentina Model Court Development Project had an unsatisfactory outcome, is unlikely to be sustainable, and has a modest institutional development impact. Bank performance and borrower performance are unsatisfactory. Among the lessons cited were: (a) In such difficult sector circumstances, the lack of an adequate risk analysis with careful assessment of the borrower's implementation capacity and commitment to reform was particularly costly. (b) The Project should not have been started when the judiciary's governance structure may have been undergoing a substantial change. Neither should the Bank have persisted in pushing a project when there was lack of commitment from the authorities responsible for its execution. (c) In the light of the two aforementioned points, the key prerequisites for future Bank-supported judicial activity in Argentina should include (1) a clear project concept and design; (2) a strong understanding by the judicial authorities of the project's concept and objectives; (3) the assurance of adequate independence for the judiciary for the task; (4) assurance of adequate "ownership" of the proposed design and work plan; (5) provisions for building project execution capabilities in the courts; (6) a realistic time frame; and (7) selection of a good lending instrument. (d) The design and supervision of computerized systems intended for integrated management improvements need to be closely monitored.33(World Bank website)

31 32

http://www.pjn.gov.ar/Publicaciones/00010/00020577.Pdf (09-15-2008) Both projects are available at: http://www.pjn.gov.ar/Publicaciones/fijo/Plan%20de%20Gestion%20Judicial.pdf (04-09-2008) http://www.pjn.gov.ar/Publicaciones/fijo/Plan%20Informatizacion%20judicial.pdf (04-09-2008) http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK= 64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000112742_20060724121459&searchMe nuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679 (02-24-2008)

33

45

However as the World Bank itself recognizes:

a full [and complete] assessment of the Project's achievements and outcome is hindered by the limited number of pilot courts in which the planned changes were fully tested, the relative brevity of their duration, and their evaluation too soon before their results and impact were completely clear. It might be useful, accordingly, to undertake some further analysis of those cases which had the highest level of activity in order to see more definitively what took hold, what remains and what were the more complete effects of the Project's interventions.(World Bank , 2006: 10; the emphasis is mine)

Even though more studies would be convenient in order to measure the changes operated around the PROJUM, the decision of not replicating the PROJUM and the general opinion which considers it as a failure diminish the chances of the program to be continued officially as well as in academic studies. Nevertheless, as I will show in due course, the PROJUM and its indirect effects have had the virtue to reinforce judicial administration reform as a central point of the agendas of governmental and non-governmental organizations.

3.3.3 TECHNIQUES;

THE

EVALUATION

OF

THE

PROJUM

THROUGH

ORGANIZATIONAL

while it is commonly acknowledged that evaluation is essential to programme development, this lesson has had little apparent impact on judicial reforms. For the quantity of work that has been done, evaluations are remarkably few, and all too often neither widely consulted nor even available. Everyone reads the evaluation of their own project; almost no one reads those of anyone elses work. This suggests an amazing lack of interest in acquiring information and an incentive system which allows and possibly encourages it, but it is also evident that by intent or mere oversight, evaluations are not easily accessible, even to members of agencies which conducted them. A recent suggestion that major donors share their evaluations is a good sign, but it will be hard to implement if only because they may not know where they have stored them (Hammergren 2002 quoted by Elena et al, 2007:99).

The evaluation of Judicial Reform programs is an integral part of ROL program evaluations in the broader field of processes of democratic development measurement. Research efforts have been focused on developing rigorous comparative methods, including country case studies, large-scale quantitative studies, systematized expert interviews, democracy surveys, and specialized comparisons of areas such as the rule of law(Sarles, 2007:47). Undoubtedly, the evaluation of democracy

programs entails a new field of study developed in the last decades, which is in constant progress and accompanies the increasing feature of the larger and larger amount of foreign aid programs.
46

The very concept of evaluation is not uniform and is being shaped under a dynamic contesting process of knowledge production. Neither is there a unique answer to how to evaluate. (Elena et al, 2007:97). The methodology for evaluating a programme varies from country to country, programme to programme, and donor to donor. Sometimes evaluation is an opinion based on expert observation. At other times it is the analysis of hard data collected through social research methods. (Elena et al, 2007:97)
Evaluation has been defined as the system for and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, programme or policy, and its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine how relevant the objectives have been and how far they have been fulfilled, and to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of programmes. Evaluation also refers to the process of determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy or programme (Molund and Schill 2004: 106).(Burnell, 2007:16 ) The main reasons for doing evaluations (apart from the fact that it may be legal requirement) are[.]to ensure proper bookkeeping, that is, accountancy-type audits; to serve the aim of achieving efficiency or value for money; to facilitate accountability to the political masters and taxpayers who sanction or authorize democracy support in their name, which is a case that looks incontrovertible for any organization that claims to stand for democratic principles; to enable lessons to be learned from experience and make improved and more effective practice possible; and to offer a form of security against the kind of ill-judged political meddling that displaces the formal goals of an organization or takes decisions on operational details away from the hands of able and experienced practitioners.(Burnell, 2007:16)

Judicial Reform as a part of ROL programs also needs to be evaluated and in this task, as mentioned before, the techniques to operate the evaluation vary and principally are dependent on the program objectives. Even though justice has many other dimensions, and judicial reforms often strive for less quantifiable changes, such as improving the independence of the judiciary and enhancing procedural transparency (Buscaglia et al, 1999:2) to measure the effectiveness of Courts worldwide, specialists have elaborated a complex quantitative system of evaluation using Court Performance Indicators. They can vary from program to program, or from donor to donor so as to be implemented. According to the PROJUM specific objectives some performance indicators were defined: (a) annual reductions in the numbers of pending cases and their durations; (b) increases in clearance rates; (c) increases in the percentages of judgments written with information technology, (d) enhanced public trust in and satisfaction with the judiciary; and (e) upgraded judicial management performance. (World Bank, 2006:3) FORES and the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) won the bid called for the external evaluation of the outcomes once the PROJUM had been implemented. The outcomes evaluation
47

process held by FORES and the NCSC was limited to the points of evaluation expressly detailed in the call for the bid, consequently, the design and the implementation stages were excluded as well as the software implemented IURIX. Their intervention was restrained to evaluate the results or outcomes of the program (Sandra Elena interview N 5). The final report, recently available34, Proyecto de Desarrollo de Juzgado Modelo (PROJUM)-Evaluacin de los Resultados de la Implantacion del Modelo de Gestin en los Juzgados Modelo Prstamo BIRF 4314 AR INFORME FINAL is a very detailed , thoughtful and complete report evaluating the PROJUM outcomes elaborated by FORES. It has been designed to provide the necessary tools for the analysis of the data obtained in the fieldwork developed by FORES with the assistance of consultant specialists. The FORES report, following the requests from PROJUM authorities, comprises the following points: a) Evaluation of the Court Performance Indicators; b) Evaluation of the Range of observance of quality norms; c) Evaluation of the new organic structure and the new layout; d) Evaluation of the control exerted over the products provided by the Court users; e) Evaluation of the software IURIX; f) Evaluation of the Common Administrative Units; g) Evaluation of the Court User Groups Perception;

h) Evaluation of the Court personnel opinion; i) Evaluation of the Training Programs;

The items listed above will be analyzed below jointly with the WB - Implementation Completion Report and with the empirical research I carried out on the PROJUM Courts. a) Evaluation of the Court Performance Indicators:

These indicators permit the evaluation of the changes operated in the Court administration after the implementation of the New Management Model. With this purpose, two surveys were compared by FORES: ex ante(2003) and ex post(2004), so as to make possible the comparisons and the

conclusions. (FORES-NCSC, 2005)

This report was granted with confidentiality for two years and during that period it was available neither to the public nor to the researchers. For its provision after the confidential period expired my sincere thanks to Hctor Chayer and Sandra Elena, specialists from FORES.
34

48

Only the Civil Courts and Social Security Courts were measured since, ex ante data was missing for the other Courts, whereas for the Courts measured (Civil and Social Security Courts) the Court Performance Indicator results were positive as it is shown in figure 2:

Figure 2

Source:FORES- NCSC Report

Notice that ex ante and ex post data were taken in 2003 and 2004 respectively. This brief period of time weakens the results in order to measure the sustainability of the improvement rates. Another problem of the data was the exponentially increase of cases during this period due to the pesification of dollar accounts(World Bank, 2006) after the 2001 crisis. World Bank Report: The number of pending cases in the civil courts fell by 69 percent and by 24 percent in the social security courts. This was well above the performance indicator target of 15 percent decreases annually. The courts' clearance rate (the number of cases resolved as percentages of cases filed that year) in two jurisdictions increased in: (a) the civil courts by 312, 377 and 101 percents, and (b) the social security courts by 58, 45 and 49 percents. These figures exceeded by far the performance targets of 20 percent annual increases. The duration of typical cases in two jurisdictions from filing until decision stages, and from there on until enforcement stages fell by 82 percent (four civil courts) and 43 percent (three social security courts). (World Bank, 2006:8) Figure 3 shows Court Performance Indicators. They evidenced substantial rate improvements, but the above mentioned lack of reliability of this data, in order to take relevant conclusions about the sustainability of the reform, has also been stressed. In figure 3 each goal pursued is contrasted with the results.

49

Figure 3

Source: World Bank Implementation Completion Report

The PROJUM empirical research My fieldwork in Courts concentrated on in situ observations and interviews held in 3 Civil Courts of the city of Buenos Aires: National Civil Court N 74 (three visits), N 46 (two short interviews with the judge) and N 78 (where two agents of justice were interviewed: the Judges Private Secretary and an administrative official). The results of my empirical research will be related following the analytical frame used by FORES in the evaluation of the PROJUM outcomes. Dr. Casas (interview N 1) showed a very positive opinion about the PROJUM results in his Court. Notice that this court postulated and was awarded with a 9002 ISO quality norms certification in 2006. For Casas and most of the Court staff ( Survey 1) the PROJUM was very useful for the Court Administration improvement. As he argued, all the Court Performance indicators improved significantly in his Court after PROJUM implementation. He also stressed the importance of the Civil Procedural Code reform of section 360 establishing the Conciliation Audience. The Conciliations passed from 5 per year to 70 per year. Through the observation in situ of Civil Court N 74, its organized feature of the work , the comfortable layout and working atmosphere should be remarked. Carlos Molina Portela (interview N 2) said that the PROJUM achievements were not as positive as for justice Casas and no substantial reform was achieved. However, Portela recognized
50

improvements in organizational features and building adequacy, and also pointed out that the real improvement of the judicial administration could be achieved only through the digitalization of the judicial file. It was not possible for the PROJUM to advance in the file digitalization because of the existence of legal obstacles in the Civil Procedure Code. In order to proceed with the normative adequacy of the Civil Procedural Code to the digitalized file, it would have been necessary to implement a legislative procedure, which clearly exceeded the possibilities of the PROJUM. Portela also pointed out that the most significant achievement of the PROJUM was to have changed the public image of the Court. The Court has now visible building reforms, it has a better organization, new equipment, therefore, the Court works better and the services provided have improved. Nonetheless, Dr. Portelas opinion is contested with the replication chances of the PROJUM. For the interviewee the real chances of replication had vanished due to the great costs and the long time which its implementation would imply. In Portelas opinion, the relation between implementation costs and results cannot justify an investment of 5 million dollars. Two interviews were conducted in the National Civil Court N 78: one to the Judges private secretary Dra. Silvia De Carli, and another to a Court Official Diego A. Bello. While Di Carli stressed some improvements like the new furniture equipment provided by the PROJUM, a better organization, new computers, and the new software IURIX, she also emphasized that the reform had not achieved the goals and that PROJUM had not provoked a substantial and conclusive reform. The lack in human resources was also pointed out. While an improvement in the backlog rate was stressed by De Carli, the time disposal of the case had not improved significantly. Survey to the Court staff: Accordingly to the survey carried out among the staff of Civil Court N 74, the employees opinion about the PROJUM outcomes was also positive. 50% of the surveyed staff considered that the case disposal time, the backlog rates and the overall Court administration had significantly improved and the other 50 % said that the changes had not been so clear but showed confidence in the reform. Contrastingly, the employees of the National Civil Court N 78, showed very disparate opinions. For 67 % of the employees surveyed the PROJUM had not improved the overall functioning of the court. For 83 % of them the case disposal time had not diminished and the backlog rate had not

51

improved. The observation in situ also showed that the working atmosphere and organizational improvements in the layout had not been achieved in Civil Court 78. b) Evaluation of the Range of observance of quality norms

The evaluation of FORESNCSC stresses that at the moment of the evaluation the quality management system had an incipient level of development, because of which it cannot be affirmed that there exists a quality management system as robust as to assure its sustainability and permit a constant improvement on a systematic base. The staff training program provided by PROJUM has been insufficient and the staff has not been trained enough and does not know fundamental aspects of the quality management systems (FORES-NCSC, 2005). Although this overall assessment of the Courts involved in the PROJUM made by FORES, one of the PROJUM courts, National Civil Court N 74 headed by Judge Juan Casas was awarded with the quality norms certificate ISO 9002. In the observation of Civil Court 74 the certifications awarded are visible in Mesa de Entradas and in the Judge office. Casas (interview N 1 ) pointed out that in order to become a candidate for ISO certificates, he requested authorization from the Civil Camera of Appeals but not answer was received. As the closing date for applications was expiring, the Court, consequently, requested the Quality norms ISO 9002 and received the quality certificate. Casas referred to the tremendous audits they had to be subjected to by the auditor Organism and the challenging character of the procedure. Casas (interview N 1) also stressed that the style of his court management is based on the training programs received during the PROJUM. He emphasized that the management changes

achieved through the PROJUM were based on the following points:

Table 10

CivilCourtN74ManagerialTechniquesDevelopedthroughthePROJUM DrCasas(interviewN1)
Adeepchangeofthementality(Thiswasalsostressedbytheotherjudgesandcourtpersonnel interviewed). Rotationofthestaffintothecourtpositionstopermitallthestafftobeacquaintedwiththeworkin thedifferentdependenciesandtobeinvolvedintheCourtoverallworkandresults.Thechangeof mentality,itwasstressed,alsorequirestimeformeditationanddevotiontothework.

52

 InternalAudits: Theyregularlyconductinternalauditsinwhichallthestaffisauditedbytheworkmatesthrough reciprocalaudits.Eventhejudgeisauditedbytheemployees. Internalatmospheresurveys: Theyareconductedinordertoimprovethecommunicationamongthepersonnelincludingthejudge. Inordertodetectifthecommunicationhasimproved.theyhaveappointedtheManagement Secretarytobeinchargeofthecommunicationissues. ThedocumentationofalltheCourtmovements,meetings,surveys,etc. TheperiodicaldeliveryofinternalworkshopsandcoursestotraintheCourtpersonnelwith examinationsandgrades,withdifferentlevelsinaccordancewiththetasks,functionsandpositions heldbythestaff.Higherlevelcoursesareorganizedforthoseappointedtojurisdictionalfunctionsand lowerlevelcoursesforthoseinchargeofminorresponsibilities. Aplanofcontingencies: Tobeusedwhentheoperationsareaffectedas,forexample,bytheabsenceofoneemployeeor more.Theyhaveelaboratedthisplanforawiderangeofcontingencies. Thecreationofmanualstoorganizetheworkandtoguidethecourtactivities.

Unfortunately, the achievements of National Civil Court N 74 with its high standards of quality and service is an isolated case, which might be followed by Civil Court N 100 (Dr. Prada Errecart where fieldwork was not carried out). Even though my fieldwork concentrated on 3 PROJUM civil courts it can be affirmed that the other courts do not show the same level of engagement with the reform efforts for different and maybe justified reasons and arguments. However, the significant improvement achieved by Civil Court N 74 cannot be minimized in order to evaluate the reform efforts . If one court was able to achieve these high results, it means that more efforts should be placed on promoting the program. In fact, Civil Court N 74 is often presented as a model court and courses and conferences are dictated about this model ( Casas interview N 1). The resources invested cannot be wasted by abandoning the PROJUM as a failed project and impeding to reproduce the lessons learned in its implementation. The Management Plan launched in February by the National Judicial Power evidences the lack of continuity in the support of programs like this and this lack of continuity is one of the most important obstacles for development. The periodical changes of successive democratic governments with diverse and sometimes competing ideological standpoints cannot justify the rejection of the programs and the former policy agendas as well as its human and financial efforts
53

in the realms in which other important issues are at stake. The improvement of the system is crucial and the tools to be implemented, the same as its goals, can be achieved through several instruments (Elena et al, 2007) though the goals pursued by some policies should be held or enhanced and improved instead of being abandoned beyond the ideological or conservative bias that can oppose resistance.

c) Evaluation of the new organic structure and the new layout.

The new organic structure: In this activity FORES-NCSC observes that the Judge leadership as well as the establishment of work teams have been in accordance with the new operational structure in which the division between jurisdictional activities and administrative activities is a central point. However, not all the courts have implemented this division through the appointment of Secretaries Ad Hoc. In the courts where this has been implemented, FORES evaluation suggests that it was achieved an interesting distribution of roles, which strengthens the functional specialization and the operative capacity of the court (FORES-NCSC, 2005). The judicial Council had to approve operational norms of exceptions guaranteeing the legal continuity of the New Organic Structure (FORES-NCSC, 2005). The new layout: The building reforms and space adequacy jointly with the new system of archives were made on the 4 civil courts, the 3 commercial courts and the multi jurisdictional court of Mar el Plata. None of the aforementioned changes was made in the Court of Resistencia. (FORESNCSC, 2005) The building renovation improved work team environment, facilitated the personnel interaction, eased the transmission of directives from the Secretary in a unique act, differentiated the areas to exert the jurisdictional and administrative functions, etc. Nonetheless, some disadvantages were pointed out like, for instance, the lack of privacy of the court staff from litigants (FORES-NCSC, 2005). The New system of archives -vertical instead of horizontal- with a new design for the files cover provided to the courts with extra free place, facilitated the files manipulation and reduced the working time. Nevertheless, in the special case of the fiscal files (ejecuciones fiscales) the new cover is not justified since it multiplies the required space for its storage (FORES-NCSC, 2005).

54

Figure N 4. New Archive System

Source: World Bank Implementation Completion Report

Empirical Research: One of the most important matters for the judges and staff of civil courts was the modernization of the court furniture and the hardware provided by the PROJUM. A renovation on the court building reform was also made, and the change of the furniture of the courts was undertaken jointly with the provision of computers. Dr. Casas35 (interview N 1) affirmed they had accepted (the court as a whole) to be part of the program because in his Court, the few computers they had, had been provided either by the judge himself or by the staff with private resources. The excessive insistence on the computerization of the courts provoked complaints from some stakeholders. They argued that the goal of the program was not only to provide the court with computers and with proper software but
35

mainly to achieve a wider mentality change in the

Civil Court N 74 received the ISO 9002 certification

55

administration of justice and the case management. Unfortunately, for some scholars (Sandra Elena interview n 5) the main point of the PROJUM was to appear merely as a computerized system and furniture modernization program. My fieldwork mainly focused on the Civil Courts participating in the Program and one court from outside the program. The first impression, when visiting the PROJUM courts, was to observe a new layout , modern and suitable furniture, orderly space and a remarkably better organization than the one in the courts outside the program. A contrasting situation was perceived in the non-PROJUM Courts visited, in which the furniture and layout were obsolete, and the organization was much less efficient and convenient. Carlos Molina Portela (interview N 2) stressed the effective improvements in the building and organizational items despite the fact that he insisted on the limited outcomes of the PROJUM.

d) Evaluation of the control exerted over the products provided by the Court users.
This activity aims at evaluating the initial judicial procedures such as the judicial petitions by court users, the reception of presentations and communication of them and its delivery according to the changes introduced by the New Management Model (FORES- NCSC, 2005). The changes achieved in the process of initiation of the judicial claims are scarce. The most notorious advantage introduced by IURIX is that the data obtained in external administrative units must not be reloaded in the PROJUM Courts and that the information is also available in the UACs (Common Administrative Units) created by the PROJUM (FORES-NCSC, 2005).

e) Evaluation of the software IURIX.

This activity undertaken by FORES aims at comparing paper-based documents with digital

documents: to determine if the information contained in the system IURIX is updated; to establish the reasons of the mismatches in case they existed- and suggest corrective measures; to receive the motives for which differences could have taken place; to identify patterns, to suggest corrective measurements; and to define if court judgments are easily available in internet. (FORES- NCSC, 2005) All the checked records were loaded in IURIX in some cases with minimal mismatches. The information of the files of the Model Courts is available in the terminals of computerized public

56

consultation in the 12 Courts, coinciding with the information registered in IURIX. (FORESNCSC, 2005) The availability of the information of the records in Internet is diverse: there is no information in internet about the Court of Resistencia and Mar Del Plata; in the Social Security Courts only the procedural situation is published; in the Civil and Commercial there exists the possibility of gaining access to full judicial resolutions texts. The information in paper-based documents coincides with the loaded information in the software IURIX. There is no data base of Court judgments, wherefore they are not available for consultation neither in the system IURIX nor in Internet. (FORES- NCSC, 2005)

Figure N 5 - Veracity of information available in the IURIX system.

Source: FORES Report

Empirical research- Court staff perception about IURIX . According to the information collected in the interviews conducted in civil courts, the opinions about the new computerized system IURIX provided by the PROJUM were generally positive. Casas (interview n 1) remarked that the software IURIX was outstanding : all the Court staff share the same agenda. It differentiates the several types of audiences. It provides recognize the differences between the various statistics and it can

types of trials. It can instantly determine the

productivity of the agents and all the personal work available on a daily basis. Judge Casas said that
57

until PROJUM in Civil Court N 74 there were neither hardware nor computers provided officially by the Judicial Administration. Initially, the PROJUM computers had been provided by the judge himself or by the workers from their private budget. The PROJUM provided the court with official computers and equipment. This was not the case with the other Civil Courts visited. Civil Court N 78 and Civil Court N 46 both had already computerized systems provided officially before the PROJUM. Silvia De Carli.(interview n 3) qualified the software IURIX as a good product. Molina Portela also,

referring to IURIX, qualified it as a better system than the previous one. However, as it can be observed in the FORES report, (FORES- NCSC, 2005) the opinions are not uniform and the general perception about the software IURIX was qualified in the variable range of satisfaction and adequacy as middle among all the PROJUM Courts staff in 2005 when the evaluation process was carried out see Figure N 6.-

Figure N 6 - Court staff perception about the New Management Model

Source: FORES-NCSC Report.

Survey among the Court staff: According to the survey I carried out among the personnel of Civil Court N 74 the employees opinion about the software IURIX was positive. 85% of the workers surveyed qualified the software IURIX as good and the other 15% as Excellent. Also, among the employees of the National Civil Court N 78, the result was positive. 70% of the surveyed staff qualified the software IURIX as Good and only 30 % as regular. The software IURIX is one of the most positive achievements of the PROJUM. Almost all the interviewees agreed on its benefits and utility although some of them expressed some objections.

58

IURIX and the Judicial Council:

Nevertheless, the Judicial Council (Resolution 93/08),

through a decision taken on 13th March 2008, decided not to replicate the IURIX system in all the other National or Federal Courts founding the decision on reports and researches developed by internal technical offices which advised the non-replication of IURIX and recommended to create a special system for the National Judiciary. A new plan of computerization was launched, in which the internal offices will elaborate a similar or better software system adequate to the concrete exigencies of the National Judicial Power.

f) Evaluation of the Common Administrative Units(UACs);

The UACs are external administrative offices created by the PROJUM which display their activities outside the PROJUM Courts aiming at achieving the decentralization of functions. The UACs are designed to alleviate the administrative work of the Courts. The UACs principal functions are to receive and archive the files or records, to make the external communications with other entities outside the court and to store the records currently inactive (intermediate archive). They have three main activities: the reception and archive of documents(URED), the courier services(UM) and the provision of auto-consulting computerized units (UC). (FORES- NCSC, 2005) In the Civil Courts and Social Security Courts at the moment of FORES evaluation (2005), the UACS had been implemented partially. In the Federal Courts in the provinces and in the Commercial Courts of Buenos Aires, only the Computerized Auto-Consulting Units were implemented. According to the FORES evaluation report the objective of decentralization had been achieved only partially. Empirical research: This consisted mainly of informal interviews to two Pro-Secretarios and in situ observation of the UAC created for Civil Courts of Buenos Aires. It was observed that an external administrative office was created in which a large quantity of judicial records were stored. Carlos Cabral Hunter (interview N8) and Gabriela Guzzoni (interview N9 ) said that the UAC is under the administrative control of Civil Chamber of Appeals. One of the judges of the PROJUM Courts has been appointed Coordinator of the UAC. The administrative technical procedures used in the administration of the UAC are a mixture between the traditional administrative tools and the new tools incorporated by the PROJUM. The interviewees informed that UAC was created by the PROJUM exclusively for the Courts of the Program but lately, due to the success of the
59

UAC services, some other Civil Courts have been incorporated into the UAC administrative system. Thus, nowadays they work not only for the PROJUM Courts but also for some other Civil Courts and the plan for the future is to extend or replicate the UAC to all the National Civil Courts in the City of Buenos Aires. Dra. Virginia Simari (interview N 11), former PROJUM Executive Director and current National Civil Judge, said that the replication of the UAC to other Civil Courts is an achievement of the PROJUM. Simari affirmed that the PROJUM entailed an important cultural change, another way of doing the work and, in some sense, the PROJUM has had some positive results like the replication of the UAC to other Civil Courts. Also Silvia De Carli (interview N 3) stressed the utility of the UAC and the useful assistance provided to the Court.

g) Evaluation of the Court Users Group Perception

This activity carried out by FORES aimed at measuring the opinion and perception of Court users (lawyers litigants, plaintiffs and respondents) about the results achieved with the establishment of the new Model Court; and to compare the results obtained with the fieldwork carried out in August of 2003 by the PROJUM implementers. The main conclusions were framed by FORES-NCSC in the following topics: Table 11 EvaluationoftheCourtUsersGroupPerceptionbyFORESNCSC
Tangibility Theappraisaloftheelementsoftheservice(installations, dataprocessingteams,presenceofthepersonnel,etc.)has beentheaspectwhichmostimprovedintheperceptionof theusersinalltheCourts,exceptfortheCourtof Resistenciawherepracticallytherewerenochanges accordingtotheusersopinion.(FORESNCSC,2005) Reliability Thequalityofthejurisdictionalandadministrativeservices ofthecourtsandthecompliancewiththenormativeofthe ProceduralCivilCode,amongotheraspects,wasevaluated. Certainimprovementwasperceivedbytheusersofthe CommercialCourtsandFederalCourtN2ofMardelPlata. TheCivilCourtsandtheFederalCourtofResistenciahada negativechangeinusersperception.TheSocialSecurity Courthasnotsufferedsubstantialvariationsamongboth measurements.(FORESNCSC,2005) Security TheCourtusersopinionabouttheconfidentialityandthe courtesyoftheofficialsdidnothavechanges,althoughin thecourtsoftheinterior,itbecameslightlymorenegative. (FORESNCSC,2005)

Capacityofanswer Aspectssuchastheefficacyofthecourt,theorganization oftheentranceofficeandtheachievementofbenefits (onInternetorterminalsofSelfconsultation)were evaluatedhere.TheCourtusersopinionresultsdidnot changefromthefieldworkfindingsin2003exceptforthe CourtofResistencia,whereanegativechangewas observed.(FORESNCSC,2005) Empathy Theopinionofusersaboutthepersonnelcapacitytooffer

Satisfactionofexpectations Theperceptionontheservicereceivedwithrespecttowhat

60

aserviceofqualityhasimprovedinSocialSecurityCourts. Onthecontrary,intheFederalCourtofResistencia,the variationwasnegative,whileintheothercourtsithas beenmaintainedrelativelywithoutchanges.(FORESNCSC, 2005)

wasexpectedtofindhasnotchangedintheCivilCourts; whereasintheFederalCourtofResistenciaithasbecome worse,whileintheothercourtsitisperceivedinamore positiveway.(FORESNCSC,2005)

Figure N 7 Model Court User Survey results- Comparison between 2003 and 2005.

Source: World Bank report.

Empirical research: Judges Casas and Molina Portela argued that litigants have perceived positive changes in the administration and case management of their courts. Casas pointed out that lawyers litigating in his court are aware that they cannot abuse of procedural mechanisms to delay the disposal time of cases.

h) Evaluation of the Court personnel opinion.

This activity undertaken by FORES-NCSC aims at measuring the opinion of the judicial personnel (judges, officials and workers) about the PROJUM implementation ex ante and ex post, mainly about the New Management Model; the satisfaction of the range of quality norms, of court personnels expectations and the detection of critical aspects of PROJUM (FORES-NCSC, 2005). FORES findings in this activity showed that for 51 % of the Court personnel the New Management Model implemented worsened or did not change the Court efficiency; 52% think that
61

the new organic structure does not modify the judicial process dynamic or it causes delays; 45 % expressed that the administrative activity quality remained the same; 80% considered IURIX as easy to operate; nevertheless, 57% said that IURIX not only did not facilitate the work, but it even obstructed the work; the training received was perceived as insufficient by the majority of the personnel; the new layout was adequate for 39 %; 54 % considered that the New Management Model is working below their expectations. (FORES- NCSC, 2005) Empirical Research Survey to the Court staff: According to the survey carried out among the staff of Civil Court N 74 the employees opinion about the PROJUM outcomes was also positive. 50% of the surveyed staff considered that the case disposal time, the backlog rates and the overall Court administration had significantly improved and the other 50 % said that the changes had not been so clear but showed confidence in the reform. In contrast, the employees of the National Civil Court N 78, showed very disparate opinions. For 67 % of the employees surveyed the PROJUM had not improved the overall functioning of the court. For 83 % of them the case disposal time had not diminished and the backlog rate had not improved.

i) Evaluation of the Training Programs;

This activity of FORES-NCSC evaluated the impact produced by the training programs given to judges and court workers under the Skills Learning Plan of the New Management Model. FORES-NCSC informed that the identification of training needs had not been well

elaborated and the courses did not take into account either the reality of the work in the Courts or the human resources composition. In general, the training teams provided by PROJUM were considered as skilled for the task and the material provided in the course adequate to reform needs. For some of the surveyed personnel, the courses were inopportune; some of them were too soon and some others too late. The Court staff pointed out the absence of permanent technical assistance, the resistance existent in the Judiciary to the management logic and that the importance of this aspect had been overlooked. (FORES- NCSC, 2005)

62

Figure N8: Impact of the Training Courses adequacy to the New Management Model .

Source: FORES-NCSC Report

Figure N9: Court Personnel general opinion about the training courses.

Source: FORES-NCSC Report

Empirical research: By means of the empirical research conducted on Civil Courts 74 and 78, all the personnel surveyed confirmed their participation in the training courses. The training received was qualified by Civil Court 74 personnel as good by 83% of the surveyed group and as excellent by 16%. To the question if the skills learned during the training courses were used in the daily work, 50% answered affirmatively that they use the knowledge acquired and the other 50% that they seldom use it. In Civil Court 78 the training received was qualified as good by 50% of the surveyed group and as regular by the other 50 %. To the question if the skills learned in the training courses were used in the daily work, 50% answered that they rarely used the knowledge acquired, 34 % answered that they did not use the skills every day and 16 % answered that they did use it. Final comments about the Managerial evaluation of PROJUM

63

From the previous analysis some broader conclusions can be reached to the extent that the PROJUM had disparate results depending on the courts commitment to the reform. It is not easy to explain

these disparate results. Lower court dynamics has made courts become like units isolated from each other and depending almost exclusively on the leadership of the Judge. This is in some way justified in order to preserve the principle of independence of justice, but this isolation of lower courts is perceived nowadays as an obstacle to court modernization. One important issue of the judicial

reform programs in Argentina was to strengthen the communication among judges36. These factors are intrinsically connected with the leadership and judicial government concepts. The organizational structure of courts at national level as independent units has strengthened their isolation, since the control exerted over them by the Higher level of the judiciary is exceptional and only for extreme and grave cases. This makes judges lead the court under their own exclusive criteria and explains in some way the difference in the results among the courts. The great number of activities carried out by the PROJUM has been evaluated by FORESNCSC and the results obtained, to a great extent, correspond to the instability shown by all the PROJUM courts, in which in situ observation was carried out. The general opinion is that the PROJUM failed. The implementation mechanisms chosen by the PROJUM are considered not to be a complete and effective way to promote judicial reform. The PROJUM failed in its implementation and in its initial delay, as well as in the design of the program itself, which included no mechanism to promote the participation of local stakeholders. Nonetheless, considering the final failure of the program, its design was not as relevant as the lack of consensus and participation of stakeholders and the absence of a strong leadership, factors that had a great influence in the negative results of the program. This claim is corroborated by the fact that even today the positive results of the PROJUM are maintained by the isolated efforts of judges without any kind of support from the higher levels of the judiciary. The lack of leadership and the lack of a strong guidance from the judicial governance authorities has been evident in the PROJUM case. This lack of leadership was present during all the program and is still evident after its conclusion.

36

See table 2. One of the programs aimed at improving communication among judges 64

PART IV EXPLANATIONS
The 2001 Crisis in Argentina and the PROJUM Argentinas economic collapse in December 2001 is seen as perhaps
the most emblematic evidence of the failure of neoliberalism in the developing world to provide sustainable and equitable economic growth. A new policy frame has gradually emerged since the crisis which relies on a more active state in the promotion of growth.(Grugel et al, 2007:2)

With the definitive breakdown of the economy in December 2001 in Argentina all the spheres of the governance system were affected. The ruin of the convertibility system (monetary system that equalized one peso to one dollar), which had survived for 10 years, percolated all over the political system and in a few weeks provoked the resignation of President De La Rua after being only two years in office. The social situation became very grave with millions of people below the poverty line, with the payment chains broken, private property rights seriously restricted, the banking system collapsed, the shadows of bankruptcies hanging over small farmers and producers and the proliferation of claims in courts asking for the return of the deposited funds in bank accounts. All the system had collapsed and more than 30 people had died in the turmoil of those disastrous days of December 2001. This was the environment in which the PROJUM had to be implemented. To some extent the delays in its initiation were widely justified. It is not a minor question that the IFIs had been seriously engaged with the convertibility system and all the unpopular policy decisions of privatization, free markets, and deregulation which had devastated the country and had received the support of IFIs mainly the IMF-. This breakdown affected seriously the payment chains provoking the proliferation of new claims through a specific judicial petition el Amparo Judicial37 which seriously overloaded the work of the courts. This is the main factor that weakened the court performance indicators and

backlog rates measurements in the PROJUM. The courts were overloaded with amparo complaints.

37

The amparo judicial is a quick trial when rights are affected without any other judicial proper remedy.

65

Social and political sectors reacted accordingly to this situation of breakdown and successive presidents were appointed by the Congress in order to face the worst crisis in the history of the country and its uncertain future. To mitigate the disastrous effects of the crisis the Mesa de Dilogo Argentino was created, with its Mesa Permanente para la Reforma de la Justicia del Dilogo Argentino. This was a Catholic Church initiative with the support of UNDP and the government (Riggirozzi, 2006:53). It was a forum with wide representation of social sectors in order to contribute to overcome the crisis through the elaboration of proposals for economic and institutional reforms. (Riggirozzi, 2006:53). Five main commissions were created to promote judicial reforms, namely: Access to Justice, ADR Mechanisms, judicial training, judicial backlogs, judicial delay reduction and judges and judicial

profile.(Garavano et al, 2003) . NGO delegates, policy makers, magistrates

representatives participated in the commissions. Several projects were proposed, some of which effectively implemented. During this period the PROJUM implementation was delayed but in the streets of Argentina the political turmoil was a daily event. A new role of the state in the economics was in the scene: In Argentina, the search for post-crisis governance has involved a more dynamic role for the state in the pursuit of growth and social stability(Grugel et al, 2007) This tendency, jointly with the scarce credibility of IFIs38 as efficient promoter of sustainable changes and development in Latin American countries, impacted negatively on the PROJUM as well. Its lack of connection with the Mesa de Dilogo proposals was evident. The efforts of political parties concentrated on the enactment of emergency statutes which impeded the operability of bankruptcy regimes and suspended the mortgage recoveries. The whole legal system was subjected to an impasse. In the overall assessment of the

PROJUM by the WB it is clearly expressed that [t]he Project should not have been started when the judiciary's governance structure may have been undergoing a substantial change. Neither should the Bank have persisted in pushing a project when there was lack of commitment from the authorities responsible for its execution.(World Bank website39, the emphasis is mine).
In 20056 the government of Argentina decided to repay its whole debt to the International Monetary Fund with the sole purpose of avoiding IMF intervention.
39 http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510& 38

66

However, the PROJUM continued and was finally implemented but to some extent all these globalised changes experimented in Argentina affected seriously its final chances to succeed. In this scenario some other important factors influenced positively or negatively the PROJUM outcomes, namely: 1) Absence of Judicial Independence: The political struggles to influence the judiciary are historically rooted in old practices, which have determined the role that the Judiciary usually played during history as supporter of Executive policies, which affects and often impedes any attempt to produce judicial reform. The conservative character of the judiciary coming from colonial times, resistant to outside changes, its closely connection with the political power and the historical dependency on the Executive and the economic elites dictates have systematically weakened the effectiveness of the judiciary and undermined its independence. This Politicisation of the Supreme Court and Executive interference in the judiciary has made it much easier to find pro-reform actors at lower levels of the judiciary and at the level of the ministry of justice.(Riggirozzi, 2006) As the World Bank itself indicates, in order to avoid the political struggles around the Judiciary, (hence to avoid to interfere with the Executive policies towards the judiciary) attempted was to produce the way

changes in the Judiciary improving its effectiveness (court delays,

organizational skills, etc) through management tools setting aside the more problematic issues like independence or transparency of the judiciary(Riggirozzi, 2006) But this depoliticized strategy assumed by the World Bank, paradoxically provoked more political problems among the actors involved instead of alleviating the conflicts which, to a great extent, confirms the claim made here about the need for more empirical research and agency previous to the programs launching and the building of a real previous consensus among policy makers, and judicial and academic actors involved. 2) The reform methodology chosen by the WB reinforced the status-quo.

The lack of involvement in the PROJUM design and implementation of researchers and policy makers and other actors and the setting aside of reform proposals, already designed by local expertise,
searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000112742_20060724121459&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSi tePK=523679 (09-10-2008)

67

show in some way that the path followed by the WB with the PROJUM led to empower the executive-judiciarys status-quo (Riggirozzi, 2006) instead of promoting effective judicial reform.
Recognising that various interests are involved in the local distribution of aid funds is critical for international donors to encourage linkages between research and experts groups that hold other sets of ideas and proposals different from those supported or close to government positions. The lack of recognition of these points in the case of judicial reform in Argentina led the Banks Legal Department, willingly or not, to support a depoliticised judicial reform agenda that led to a stalemate situation enhancing the governments agenda, and with it empowering the Executive-judiciarys status-quo, while des-empowering local experts and civil society organizations that sustained the need to change governance underpinning of the system.(Riggirozzi, 2006:48)

3) Operational difficulties in achieving effective judicial reform and political consensus.

Creating an effective judicial reform in Argentina is a very difficult task. In this sense the role of the WB and IFIs, in general, could be very productive for improving domestic institutions but these attempts should not be disconnected from the already existent state of the art of local academics and reform programs projected by policy makers with scarce implementation power (Riggirozzi , 2006). This necessity of consensus became evident in the case of the PROJUM, in which, in order to avoid political problems and choosing a managerial approach, the problems and struggles were

paradoxically multiplied to an extent in which the continuity of the program was posed to significant risk. As one of the interviewees confirmed, the initial delays rested more on policy decisions (supported both by the WB and the government) rather than on the inefficiency of the executive units.(Simari, interview N 11) These operational difficulties in producing an effective judicial reform have been stressed by many argentine authors:
Binder concluded that the many and diverse steps taken at both federal and state [provincial] levels to carry out judicial reform have been difficult to sustain and have fluctuated to the point where they have become enervated. A permanent standoff occurs between the forces of reform and those who seek the political manipulation of the judiciary, forces that are distributed equally in all the key institutions: the executive, Congress, political parties, academia, and lawyers associations. Early efforts to promote a coherent national policy of judicial reform did not prosper, and in the two decades since democracy was restored, the debate between reformers and those resistant to change has been a constant. Although a certain social consensus and technical consensus in favor of integral judicial reform has been attained, there is no political consensus to move the process forward. In an environment such as this, smaller-scale impact reforms should be carried out to improve the quality and delivery of judicial services. In general, far more progress has been made on the criminal than on the civil law side and at the micro level rather than at the top.(De Shazo et al, 2006)

The difficulties to reach political consensus on Judicial Reform is one of the main obstacles to succeed in judicial reform efforts. Because of that, the promotion of networking activities, like the ones

68

developed by think tanks and advocacy NGOs, can become an important tool to install or reinforce judicial reform in the government policy agenda. 4) Lack of leadership and the absence of a strong Judicial Government. Precisely a smaller impact reform(Binder, 2006) was the PROJUM but it was, however, not successful. To a great extent, those poor results rested further on the lack of a serious commitment of judicial government authorities rather than on the way chosen for the reform. This lack of leadership (Elena, interview N 5) was accentuated by the fact that in the PROJUM times the Judicial Council had recently begun its activities and hard conflicts of power had aroused with the Supreme Court of Justice. This shows that consensus should also comprise a strong leadership of the higher levels of the judiciary with policy power for implementation. Consensus without leadership would not be sufficient, furthermore, leadership is the key word for future reform processes and, therefore, a strong redefinition of judicial government is required. As already said, the initial delay condemned all the program chances to succeed and predisposed some stakeholders to its failure. To some extent the conservative character of the Supreme Court, such as inhibiting reform, can be ratified by the limited character of the last Court administration plan recently launched by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Council, in which the lessons learned through the PROJUM were not taken into account and the plan recently launched circumscribes to give recommendations very far from the suggestions of the epistemic communities and the lessons learned with the PROJUM. This lack of positive reaction in pro of reforming courts and the superficial attitude approaching judicial reform can be very disappointing for some stakeholders and can cause a paralyzing effect. Leadership is intrinsically connected to the concept of judicial government. A serious judicial government (gobierno judicial) in the hands of the judicial branch itself (Garavano, 2005; Hammergren , 2005:3) should comprise the functions of monitoring the courts performance and the institutional policies for the sector, the traditional budget administration, the selection of human resources -mainly the justices, the control over the judicial career and the administrative careers. (Hammergren, 2005:3). Some interviewees (Elena, interview N 5) pointed out the lack of leadership in the program administration with the consequent lack of commitment by judicial authorities. This instability in the
69

judicial government was more profound and evident in the initial stages of the program when the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Council were struggling to exert the judicial government and the control over the PROJUM (World Bank, 2006 ) Even though the stagnant situation was improved later, it was too late to achieve positive results since the public opinion, mainly among the key actors involved, had stigmatized the project and, consequently, the scarce enthusiasm for the program collapsed.

5) Little policy continuity in Institution Building in Argentina Another remarkable point in institution building initiatives in Argentina is the scarce range of continuity of public policies across time and successive governments. In the specific case of judicial reform at the beginning of this research, the Programa Integral de Reforma Judicial (a comprehensive program launched by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights in 1998), was available on the web. It had been launched the same year in which the PROJUM had been negotiated by the WB and the Argentine government. The program was abandoned some years ago and the initiative vanished due to this lack of continuity.40 Even the non-replication of the PROJUM to other courts is showing the deficiency of policy continuity. The Judicial Council had two meetings to deal with the replication or not of the PROJUM and decided against it, even though two Courts of Appellation had requested it. 6) Absence of policy consensus The non replication of the PROJUM to other non-participant national courts decided by the Judicial Council after the conclusion of the program shows that the lack of consensus about the program, rather than a defective design of the program itself, led to the PROJUM failure. Probably, if the Program had been agreed on by main policy and research actors under a strong leadership exerted by judicial governance institutions, the program would have been successfully completed. The non replication of the program was decided because its results were very poor and the WB lack of will in its support was also remarkable. Moreover, a second project that was proposed as a continuation of PROJUM, the Reform of the Judicial System (Project ID 55479) was in the
The comprehensive program web site provided a very useful data base of programs and initiatives. Amazingly, in the last days the access was not possible. The web site was: www.reformajudicial.jus.gov.ar . and it had been very useful for this research.
40

pipeline to be

70

implemented in the fiscal year 1999 but was later cancelled in the light of the PROJUM results (Dakolias 2004: interview). (Riggirozzi, 2007: 22) In the face of the strong difficulties, the only solution to be chosen was to abandon the program, both by local authorities and the WB , instead of reinforcing mechanisms to secure its continuity. This lack of commitment with the program is in some sense evidencing lack of responsibility and a hazardous misuse of human and financial resources. The lack of commitment with the program continuity is a serious warning for local actors, mainly judges and court personnel, against this kind of programs financed by IFIs where not only local governance authorities seriousness is at stake but also the credibility of IFIs. . As said above, the main claims regarding judicial reform in Argentina were not heard. Binder

(2006) speaks about the existence of at least three big currents in judicial reform41, only one of them was taken into account by the WB program without building a minimal consensus among the other theorists claims. As regards the empirical research, it should be pointed out that the anarchic way in which the PROJUM was implemented, with practically no assistance from the higher levels of the judiciary to the judges of the PROJUM courts, confirms the lack of adequacy of the PROJUM to the local context, and the conflicts of power are evidencing once again the absence of contextualization and leadership. 7) Political struggles constraining judicial reform processes Dezalay and Garth (2002) claim that judicial reform initiatives in Latin America under the frame of LAD are bound by a phenomenon called The Logic of Half Failed Transplants. The phenomenon is a consequence of the palace wars operating in the north and the south, in which the cosmopolitan elites in the south exert a hegemonic control over the state of the art produced in the north taking advantage of their capabilities to study abroad and in particular in the US. The power and legitimacy of this elite in large part comes from its claim not just to privileged backgrounds and connections but rather their possession of state-of-the-art technologies of governance(Dezalay et al, 2002:246-50). The cosmopolitan elites are also embedded in structures of powers with important intermediaries able to keep the social peace essential to maintain their elite status. Always behaving in defense of the elites privileges, some interruptions are destined to the import of institutions
41

I alluded to these currents intervening in judicial reform in pages 24 and 25.

71

delegating the task to the successive generations. The future generations will bring the latest technologies in a process reproduced dialectically through time.(Dezalay et al, 2002:246-50) A critical socio-legal approach to the Dezalay and Garth (2002) theory suggests that even though it is not entirely applicable to the Argentine case, it serves to emphasize the conservative role of the judiciary coming from colonial times, and the struggles around the judiciary in which elites (through corporate law firms, governmental and judicial positions, economic concentration, etc.) have a predominant role. It also serves to remark that political pressures on the judiciary have not diminished with the initiatives of judicial reform undertaken in the last years as, for instance, through the creation of the judicial council even though some improvements have been achieved. The

situation is not as dramatic as in previous years since the new appointments of justices in the Supreme Court undertaken by the Kirchner administration have slightly improved the chronic situation of judicial dependence on the Executive. The Supreme Court public image has improved in the last years and the prestige of the new appointees is widely recognized. In the case of Argentina, the palace wars social scheme is partially applicable and more research should be undertaken to prove the claim that the non conclusion of the reform programs is based on a familypower nucleus base. However, the surprising work of Dezalay and Garth (2002) and their empirical approach is very useful to understand and deepen sociolegal scholarship about legal exports and imports and the social forces surrounding transplants and institutional reforms in Latin America. 8) Governance struggles in the Judicial Government The governance struggles between the National Supreme Court and the Judicial Council, which affected seriously the PROJUM in its initial delays, were also a key factor in the failure of the PROJUM. The high financial costs of this program, which impeded its easy replication, and the lack of governance support (leadership) were the main reasons for the non-replication of the program. Nevertheless, to achieve governance support for this kind of programs does not seem to be an easy task at National Judicial levels and these difficulties (World Bank, 2001), connected to consensus building (Binder, 2006 ) in the national judiciary in Argentina, moved WB units to prefer the Pilot methodology in order to settle judicial reform as a key aspect of the agenda of the government in institutional building in Argentina. Moreover, the enormous effort ,which
72

entails the reform of

National Courts in the city of Buenos Aires, cannot be dismissed. There are hundreds of national courts only in the city of Buenos Aires. The task undoubtedly cannot be undervalued and the efforts to achieve improvements in judicial administration should be supported mainly by judicial governance institutions and policy makers. 9) Resistance of intervention The inability of the program to propose a sustainable system for judicial reform in Argentina through the PROJUM was a consequence of intrinsic difficulties of the judicial reform and the lack of leadership from the authorities in which the absence of a solid judicial government should be stressed again. From the beginning, the program appeared not to be contextualized with the aspirations and expectations of local actors. It was definitely resisted by almost all of them, each arguing different reasons. The high levels of the judiciary probably have seen in the program a threat to their rooted practices and their style of judicial administration. This tendency, as explained above, is based on the fact that the judiciary usually perceives often with justified reasons- external interventions in their internal affairs as a dangerous practice which challenges judicial independence and the status quo. The PROJUM was launched by the Executive without any commitment of the judiciary but only some isolated support from very few judicial actors. Policy makers from the Ministry of Justice perceived the PROJUM as a program far from the policy goals followed by them through the implementation of some other programs which had already been launched with insufficient financial resources(Garavano, interview N 6). Argentina already had 15 years of experience in studies and investigation on judicial reform before the involvement of the World Bank. 'Yet existing studies were ignored by the World Bank mission and therefore delayed the start of the projects. The result was an over-diagnosed sector with limited capacity of policy implementation' (Lynch 2003: interview). (Riggirozzi, 2006:56) Think tanks engaged with organizational reform and case management did not agree with the lack of participatory mechanisms impeding local expertise intervention. The emergence of programmes for judicial reform based on local knowledge has not always encountered political interlocutors among the key actors within the judiciary. As a consequence, there has been a growing
73

local actors to reformist processes undertaken with

IFIs external

gap between local knowledge supply and lack of demand for policy proposals from policymakers.(Riggirozzi, 2006:56) NGOs and advocacy civil societies, engaged with a more political vision of the reforms needed, posed resistance to the rational model to be implemented and to the role played by the WB as lobbyist of the interests of core countries and supporting government policies which were seriously questioned for the lack of transparency and the evident manipulation of the Supreme Court of those days. The perception of local experts that the World Bank pursued de-contextualised approaches aimed at benchmarking reform processes have limited debate and reduced the process to one best way of doing things. International agencies have sometimes supported research that fits their own and their government's agendas. (Riggirozzi, 2006:56) feel Judges and court staff complained, in many instances, of being overloaded with the

additional burdens that entailed the implementation of the program and the training schedule as well as isolated in their efforts. This is strongly connected with the organizational structure of the national judiciary in which Court's collegial organization works against a leadership role and in favour of corporate interest.(Riggirozzi, 2006:55) In case that lower judicial levels were able to sustain a policy proposal (or support to existing ones) (Riggirozzi, 2006:55), they would have very few chances to implement it. Nonetheless, some judges and court staff showed a remarkable enthusiasm (Casas, Interview, N 1) supporting the program because they realized judicial administration deficiencies were challenging their own professional reputation.(Molina Portela, Interview N 2) A culture of resistance to IFIs intervention, as evidenced in the resistance exerted by key actors, is a widespread and visible phenomenon intrinsically linked to nation state paradigms. During PROJUM times it was politically correct for the judicial-political and academic actors to take a political position against the PROJUM (Simari, interview N 11 ). This perception shows, in some way, how deep the struggles around the PROJUM were and also about the World Bank intervention in domestic judicial reform in Argentina. The absence of previous networking and consensus building by the World Bank is to be emphasized and, even though the impact of the PROJUM is still not definitely closed, it explains the negative socio-political environment among key actors, in which the PROJUM was developed; an argument confirmed by some interviewees (Interviews N 6, 7, 11).
74

The role played by the WB in the last decades has turned it into a key actor in judicial reform matters in Argentina. WB intervention and its impact on policyresearch nexus has been thoughtfully accounted by Rigirozzi (2006, 2007). The lack of participation of the epistemic communities and even from the more qualified policy makers in the PROJUM was remarked and this explains, to some extent, the poor results achieved by the program. Furthermore, some researchers with long experience in judicial reform stressed that WB intervention in the Argentine judicial reform ultimately sterilized local efforts. (Riggirozzi, 2007:22) Nonetheless, not the whole intervention of IFIs is questioned and resisted in judicial reform in Argentina by key actors. On many occasions, the WB intervention is seen as a relief and as a real facilitator of improvement and development. Indeed many WB programs in Argentina at National and Provincial levels have had satisfactory outcomes42. Unfortunately, this was not the case in the PROJUM at the national levels of the judiciary. To some extent, the reason for this to occur was not having followed the lessons previously learned by the WB (Carothers, 2003) on previous occasions . The requirement of ownership in the terms used by the WB and IFIs had already been stressed before to the PROJUM launching (Shihata, 1995 a). The lack of ownership was evident in the PROJUM case. This lack of ownership made the program fail from the moment it was launched. Even the WB assessment report qualifies performances of the WB and Argentinean authorities as unsatisfactory. 10) High financial costs of the Project Another important question about the program was the large amount of money for the loan, considered as exorbitant by some stakeholders and which made the replication of the program economically nonadvisable. Five million US dollars, or more, were invested by Argentina in the program to reform only 12 courts. Approximately 416.000 US dollars per court were invested. Only in the city of Buenos Aires there are more than 600 Courts. The major goal of the program was its replication. The replication of the program with those costs became practically impossible. The relation implementation costs results obtained- was at the centre of the scene and sustained critics about the program. One of the most important arguments of the actors opposed to the program continuity was

42 See for instance a WB program in Province of Santa Fe: http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510& searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000333038_20080813005942&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSi tePK=523679 (08-25-2008)

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the fact that after having invested more than one million dollars, the only visible achievement of the program was the provision of computers to the courts Many interviewees pointed out the lack of correspondence between the money invested and the results obtained, stressing that better results could be achieved with less funds. Moreover, some programs later implemented in the provinces achieved much better results with ten per cent of the PROJUM budget, specifically , the case of the Province of Rio Negro (Elena et al, 2007:112). The Rio Negro program was also a program attempting to make changes in court management and administration, but the results were positive with a much smaller budget. The participatory commitment and the strong leadership of the Rio Negro Provincial Supreme Court were the main factors (Elena et al, 2007) argued by some interviewees for the achievement of positive results. 11) Pressures for Argentine courts to adopt global norms. Isomorphism (Powel & Di Maggio, 1983) The mirror effect followed by public organizations when seeking to improve their organizations can be approached trying to answer to what extent the more rational organizational styles operant in more developed organizations in the same organizational field can be used to improve the outcomes in the own activities. Di Maggio and Powell (1983) argue that it is to ask why organizational fields43 tend to be similar instead of asking why they are different. Following this idea they claim that in organizational fields there operates an organizational rule that necessarily making them more efficient. The concept that best captures the process of homogenization is isomorphism[.] isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental condition. At the population level, such an approach suggests that organizational characteristics are modified in the direction of increasing compatibility with environmental characteristics. (Di Maggio et al, 1983:149 ) makes the organizations more similar without

The authors set out three mechanisms of Institutional Isomorphic change: Coercive Isomorphism: it stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy. It is imposed by legal or authoritative constraints.

43 Organizational field is conceptualized by the authors as "those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life"

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Mimetic Isomorphism: (modeling) resulting from standard responses to uncertainty or modeling. The tendency to imitate better organizations.

Normative

Isomorphism:

Associated

with

professionalization.

Quality

norms

standardization, accountancy norms, etc The above is an analytical distinction since empirically it can be intermingled among different types. The authors try to elaborate predictors of isomorphism that should be tested empirically. One of the hypothesis elaborated by the authors corresponding to institutional coercive isomorphism is that: The greater the dependence of one organization on another organization, the more similar it will become to that organization in structure, climate and behavioural focus.( Hypothesis A-1) The aforementioned organizational hypothesis makes us speculate why in the PROJUM the lower Court levels of the judiciary were chosen as Pilots. Probably, if the program had included in its design high level courts jointly with low courts, the program would have been more easily replicated. The fact that the more serious problems like courts backlogs and delays were in lower courts does not seem to be a solid argument to avoid the fact that in Argentina higher level courts have much more implementation power than lower courts . This characteristic of organization of courts in Argentina is remarkable. The lack of leadership from higher courts and its lack of

commitment with the PROJUM is evidencing to some extent that a serious hierarchical factor was not taken into account by the PROJUM design. This issue is linked to and brings back the problem of the judicial government in Argentina once again. Beyond the hypothetical character of the aforementioned argument, my intention is to draw attention to this point: the chances of the PROJUM would have increased if the higher levels of the judiciary had been included in the program or if, at least their engagement in the program had been stronger. Higher Courts had no participation in the program and if they did have any, it was secondary. In a globalized world isomorphism is a recurrent phenomenon for leading organizations. The organizational skills were a central point in the PROJUM and isomorphism can be observed in the program through coercive isomorphism (despite the lack of commitment of higher levels of the judiciary) and normative isomorphism.
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Mimetic isomorphism of organizational forms can be adverted in the free initiatives held by think tanks and civil society efforts and programs. The subtle power of PROJUM in installing the necessity that the judiciary adapts its own administration to global organizational parameters also corresponds to an increasing tendency of adaptation of the administration of justice, mainly in Latin America, to the templates of the northern countries . The agencies in the promotion of judicial reform have proliferated in the last years being CEJA (ASJC) -an initiative held by American states aiming at supporting technically reform efforts in the continent- one of the most important initiatives. Another example of the relevance of judicial reform in the agenda of Latin American countries is the Cumbre Judicial Iberoamericana which also includes Andorra, Spain and Portugal. In the last meeting, the Cumbre Judicial Iberoamericana, the thematic organization was focused on Judicial modernization, legal security and predictability, access to justice and social cohesion (Revista Cumbre Judicial Iberoamericana, 2008). One of the most relevant virtues of foreign aid programs(in this case the PROJUM), as many interviewees(Simari, interview N 11) asserted, was to install the necessity of judicial reform in the agenda, not only of the governments but also the judges, actors involved such as lawyers, NGOs, etc. The replication of the UAC in the Civil Courts of Buenos Aires, primarily destined to serve only to the PROJUM courts, and now extended to some courts non-participant in the Program, is a relevant issue to be remarked. The benefits of an external unit to deal with external communications of courts and to serve as intermediate archive of records have been perceived by some other civil courts. They requested to use the UAC since this external unit alleviates considerably the work in courts. Here mimetic isomorphism can also be adverted since some civil courts are modeling on the PROJUM courts. Finally, the aforementioned factors around the PROJUM and the national judiciary enlighten some of the restraints as well as the chances of a future federal judicial reform process mainly in the city of Buenos Aires, where my fieldwork was conducted. The judicial style of courts and its administrative hierarchical organization make any reform of the National and Federal Judiciary in the city of Buenos Aires a very complex task. The huge quantity of courts also makes the coordination among them difficult and its modernization will require a strong decision making process based on a

78

strong leadership of the judicial governance authorities, (Elena et al, 2007:103) as well as on the broadest political and technical consensus available. (Binder, 2006) The Pilot has been very useful to clarify the next steps of judicial reform in Argentina. The goal of improving court performance indicators and circumscribing the judicial reform to managerial aspects is very laudable even though it ignores important items of judicial reform. Some important conclusions can be drawn from the PROJUM. The most important of them is that any reform program should be decided with the participation and the strong commitment of the judicial governance authorities (Elena et al, 2007:103), at this moment, the Supreme Court and the Judicial Council. The decision to launch a Judicial Reform Program at National level cannot be decided unilaterally by the Executive even though its participation is unavoidable. The process should be led by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Council with a strong support and commitment of the other government branches. Beyond the fact that the non-replication of the PROJUM is a final decision, the positive achievements of the PROJUM should be strongly stressed and widely disseminated in which Civil Court N 74 it can play an important role as a court model granted with an ISO 9002 certificate. The layout inadequacy and administrative organization deficiencies are still evident in non PROJUM courts. The knowledge generated by local stakeholders and its expertise should be taken into account by future initiatives and the stakeholders participation should be guaranteed by the project design itself. With the accomplishment of some conditions, future programs could become successful since the reformist environment is increasing and the help that IFIs could provide, properly framed, a very useful technical resource for a judicial reform in Argentina.

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Conclusions The tendency to make national legal organizations adapt to international legal standards (Pistor, 2002) is a phenomenon called the standardization of law. Pressures for harmonizing legal and judicial systems can be achieved through the agency of global actors like IFIs in areas like accounting, auditing, bankruptcy, corporate governance, insurance regulation, and securities market

regulations(Pistor, 2002:101). Yet, as many scholars have asserted, it is not proved that legal uniformity will produce economic development (the East Asian countries case is stressed by authors as Halliday, Ginsburg). That fact has not impeded the growth of the efforts to build a global legal architecture. Pistors claim that the new standards need to be fitted into domestic legal systems is particularly relevant to the case of foreign aid programs in Argentinian judicial reform. The exigency of adequacy to local contexts is currently widespread into socio-legal scholarship. However, blueprints are still being used by reformers. The WB exigency of ownership is the translation of the same quest in IFIs terms. WB request of ownership is a claim for

sustainability of the programs projected by WB departments encouraging concrete and empirical approaches instead of abstract and normative ones predominant in early LAD programs. BPRs theory of the transplant effect maintains that in legal transplants should be taken into account domestic legal contexts in order to achieve effective reform and avoid resistance by local actors that leads to law in the books but not in practice. BPRs hypothesis that in legal transplants is more important the way in which the transplant is implemented than the legal family to which the exported law belongs is a way to focus the issue far from a normativist and abstract conception rooted in western weberian-kelsenian-hartian conceptions and anchor the quest into the frames of empirical speculation. The limits to globalization imposed by inadequacies between social reality and normative speculation shows that the process of globalization deserves more empirical enquires in order to enhance the theoretical and pragmatic embracement in order to address the daily increasing and challenging quests . The cases of South East Asia in which legal transplants had very little relation with the amazing growth of the markets indicates the insufficiency of the existent paradigms of western legal assumptions to deal with globalization.(Halliday et al, 2007a)

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The limited attention to legal globalization (Halliday et al, 2006) by socio-legal scholarship shows that the challenge is substantial. The existence of ideological bias and political quests in actors and researchers should not affect the progress of socio-legal knowledge about globalization of law. Even IFI power can be foiled by local actors with much fewer instruments and less knowledge than international organizations and financial institutions. (Halliday et al, 2007a) The claim for more legal adequacy to local contexts in legal transplants is another way to understand legal interactions among peoples and, to some extent, it is directed to reach a better understanding of other cultures. To some extent it is claiming for the respect of the other, the alien cultures, through the preservation of indigenous legal conceptions and cultural diversity. Legal globalization studies should not loose the path opened by interdisciplinary studies and perhaps in this way it will be able to avoid the chronic limitations of normativist assumptions and theoretical rigidity that have condemned ROL programs to failure on frequent occasions. One of the most serious obstacles that global legal studies will face is to overcome the strong claims made by anthropologists who conceive globalization as a new way of colonialism, a postmodern colonialism (Silbey,1996) Nonetheless, the ubiquity of law in the global scenario reinforces the necessity for global legal studies and a strong analytical and empirical approach is, probably, the only way to prevail over ideological and political bias, the boundaries imposed by nation state paradigms (Halliday et. Al, 2006), unlimited powers, and give account and provide interpretative tools of the globalized world. The argument of Halliday and Osinsky (2006:1) that whatever convergences can be observed in the globalization of law, it remains a highly contingent process shows to some extent that globalization is a contested process in which IFIs intervention on domestic legal systems, as in the case of the model court reforms in Argentina, will probably face serious limits and constraints. The demand for legal adequacy to local contexts in legal transplants that comprise the voluntary election of the reform, a minimal affinity between the legal systems of the exporting and importing countries (Halliday et al, 2006:19), and some kind of familiarity with the principles of law is a demand that cannot be avoided either by exporters or importers of law if they seek to obtain successful results. (Berkowitz et al, 2001; Halliday et al, 2006: 19)

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The case of the Argentinian judicial reform shows that several of the elements for successful legal change, identified by theorists of law and globalization, were lacking. Even though the government requested the WB assistance in the reform process, the local conditions were far from the ideal and the lack of a minimal commitment of the stakeholders to support the reform weakened the possibilities of success of the program. Moreover, the lack of an adequate leadership of judicial authorities made the program become anarchical, unable to overcome the logical resistances of opposite sectors to the reform. For those anxious to preserve the status quo or to abort the reform, it was not very difficult to find the way to deepen the prevailing negative atmosphere around the program. The 2001 crisis deepened the chaotic situation in which the PROJUM had to be implemented. The commitment to the program was only a commitment of some few actors and judges. Nevertheless, there were positive results, and not only for PROJUM courts. The PROJUM program had significant indirect effects as the impact of the reform is still spreading over the country, mainly in the city of Buenos Aires. The replication of the Common Administrative Unit (UAC) to be used, not only by PROJUM Courts but also by other non PROJUM Courts with Civil jurisdiction, shows that the reform followed by the PROJUM is a necessary reform and its benefits were perceived by non PROJUM courts that requested the use of the Common Administrative Unit (UAC). The accent put on organizational matters, by recently created civil societies of judges, as a way to improve judicial administration, is an indirect effect of PROJUM implementation. The growing relevance of judicial reform as a main point of the agenda of governmental and non governmental organizations to improve democracy and the judicial service, was reinforced, to some extent, by the PROJUM. The proliferation of new non governmental organizations on judicial reform, the launching of judicial reform initiatives as in many provinces, the increasing conviction of judges about the necessity of judicial reforms to improve justice administration shows that the Model Court Reform was not very far from the expectations of the Argentine society and, to some extent, fixed the limits of the debate about the improvement of judicial administration. These wider reforms suggest that the enormous amount of resources, financial and human, invested in rule of law initiatives may show its positive results in the mid-term if they are linked to strengthening democracy and human freedom. Ironically, therefore, PROJUM may have been a failed project. Its continuity is not guaranteed nowadays. However, as in many cases of globalization of law, its effects may be seen in ways not
82

anticipated by reformers outside or inside Argentina. The lessons learned, either positive or negative, will be present for a long time in the National judiciary of Argentina. Its powerful presence may well have impacted the whole process of judicial reform in the city of Buenos Aires and from there to the whole country.

83

 Annex1.WorkflowChart

Source: World Bank Implementation Completion Report

84

 Annex2NewManagementModel

Source: World Bank Implementation Completion Report

85

Annex3ProjectDevelopment.

Source: World Bank Implementation Completion Report

86

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