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July 31, 1996 ANTONIO A. S.

VALDEZ, petitioner, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents. Petition on a pure question of law Facts: 1. Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971 and later had 5 kids. 2. On June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC. 3. The RTC of Quezon City rendered judgment and declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 of the FC on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations and ordered the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art. 147 of the FC and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50, 51 and 52 of the FC 4. Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of the court and asserted that the FC did not have provisions for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage 5. The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including the family home acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through joined efforts and the property would be owned by them in equal shares and the liquidation and partition of property would be governed by the regime of co-ownership 6. The court also explained that Art 102 does not apply since it refers to the procedure for liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Art 129 also does not apply because it refers to procedures for liquidation of the absolute community of property 7. Antonio moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied. Issues: WON Art 147 is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar WON Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and void pursuant to Art. 36 Ruling: WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED Ratio: 1. In void marriages, the property relations of the parties during the cohabitation period is governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 148 2. In the case at bar, Art. 147 applies because there was no legal impediment to their marriage and they were capacitated wherein the word capacitated refers to legal capacity of a party to contract marriage Notes: Potential conflict between Art. 129 and Art. 147 Trial courts decision o The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations; o The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with. o "Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes. o "The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the other. o The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions ofArticles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision. Alleged Errors: o "Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated. o "Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. o "Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129. o "It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay." February 2, 2001 SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent. Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts: 1. SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted 2 marriages during his lifetime. The first was on June 20, 1969 with Susan Nicdao Carino, the petitioner of the case at bar with whom he had 2 children and the second was on November 10, 1992 with Susan Yee Carino, the respondent, with whom he had no children. Santiago has been cohabiting with Susan Yee since 1983 but became bedridden in 1988 and died 13 days after the second wedding. 2. Both Susans filed for monetary benefits and financial assistance. Susan # 1 was able to collect 146K while Susan # 2 was able to collect 21K. 3. On December 14, 1993, Susan Yee filed an instant case for collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao. Susan Yee wanted at least half of the 146K. 4. Susan Nicdao failed to file her answer and was declared in default. 5. Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to Santiago took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she

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had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the [5] marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which summarily stated that there was no record of a marriage license The trial court ruled in favor of Susan Yee Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court

Issues: WON the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to settle claims to death benefits Ruling: The petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. Ratio: 1. Art 40 clearly gives the court authority to invoke the absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes other than remarriage provided that sufficient testimonial or documentary evidence be presented. st 2. Since the 1 marriage was solemnized in 1969, the CC was therefore the law in force. Under the CC, the absence of a st marriage license, with certain exception, renders a marriage void ab initio. And the 1 marriage is not part of the exceptions and as was decided in the Republic vs. CA the certification issued by a local civil registrar is sufficient as evidence to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. 3. But going back to Art. 40, a judicial decree declaring the marriage as void is required in order to remarry. But none was issued. So in effect, the marriage of Susan Yee is bigamous and also void ab initio. 4. Since both marriages are void ab initio, (theres no absolute community or conjugal partnership of property) the property regime would therefore be governed by Art. 147 and 148 of the FC. 5. The second marriage was bigamous because of a legal impediment the prior marriage so Art. 148 governs. Under Art. 148 the property regime is one of co-ownership, wherein wages, salaries and properties acquired by each a party, belongs to that part exclusively exclusively. 6. And since the disputed 146K is from AFPMBAI, Pag-ibig, NAPOLCOM, etc. are remunerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer, and unless proven otherwise, it can be assumed that Susan Yee did not contribute money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits and the monetary benefits therefore belong to the deceased alone or to his legal heirs. Sinc 7. As for the marriage with Susan Nicdao, Art. 147 applies because both parties were legally capacitated and there were no legal impediments and the only reason the marriage is void is because of the absence of a marriage license 8. The difference bet 147 and 148 is that wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation period will be split equally between them even if only one party contributed. So under Art 147, Susan Nicdao is entitled to half of the remunerations and the other half belong to the legal heirs of Santiago, who are in this case, the children of Susan Nicdao