8th Circuit Judicial Complaint

Don Hamrick
5860 Wilburn Road
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179
(501) 728-4235 Direct Email: 4donhamrick@gmail.com
Judge George Howard

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Little Rock
XX
SEE ATTACHED LETTER.

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Little Rock
No. 1:06-cv-0044
XX
Unrepresented Civil Plaintiff (pro se)

XX But, I am very tempted.
In the event that I do file a lawsuit against Judge George Howard it

will be a Civil RICO Act Complaint (18 U.S.C. 1964(c)) Extortion of
Filing Fee (18 U.S.C. § 872) In Violation of Seaman’s Exemption (28
U.S.C. § 1916), as a Predicate Act of Racketeering under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(A)
XX
Don Hamrick Thursday, January 25, 2007
5860 W ilburn Road, Wilburn, Arkansas 72179; cell phone: (757) 472-1776; Email: 4donhamrick@ gmail.com
Complaint of Extortion Against Judge George Howard

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
in Hamrick -v- United Nations, Case No. 1:06-cv-0044
Judicial Council of the Eighth Circuit. This Unrepresented civil Plaintiff with a potential
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit case of first impression is treated as a second class
111 S. 10th Street, Room 24.329 citizen with no First Amendment right to petitition
St. Louis, MO 63102 the government for redress of grievances.
TO THE CHIEF JUDGE:
If it is true that I am in the position to act as a PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1 simply because
I am an unrepresented civil plaintiff with a Civil RICO Act case against the U.S. Government
(and now against the United Nations) then the federal judicial system and the agencies of the U.S.
Government should be treating my case with dignity and respect to the rule of law than what I have
suffered this past four years.
I am submitting my complaint against Judge George Howard of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the court on allegation of unlawfully extorting2 the Court’s $350
filing fee from me, a fully documented U.S. Merchant Seaman in violation of the Seamen’s Suit law,3
on September 11, 2006 at the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Little Rock.
Claim No. 8 in Volume 4 Amended Complaint of my Civil RICO Act Complaint will force Judge
Howard to recuse himself because Claim No. 8 includes him as an extortionist of exempted filing fees
in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1916. It was a case of using a righteous dirty trick as a PRIVATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL to counter a malicious dirty trick by an unconscionable judge.
1
CASE LAW: “The object of civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims but to turn them into
prosecutors, ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity.” Rotella -v- Wood, 528
U.S. 549, 557 (2000); Cited in David F. Herr, A NNO TA TED M A NU A L FO R C O M P L EX L ITIG A TIO N , Fourth Ed.,
2006, Chapter 35.1, p. 792, pub. Thomson-West.
2
18 U.S.C. § 872. Extortion by Officers or Employees of the United States
“Whoever, being an officer, or employee of the United States or any department or agency thereof, or
representing himself to be or assuming to act as such, under color or pretense of office or employment commits
or attempts an act of extortion, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both; but
if the amount so extorted or demanded does not exceed $1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both.”
3
28 U.S.C. § 1916. Seamen’s Suits
“In all courts of the United States, seamen may institute and prosecute suits and appeals in their own
names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety
without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing security therefor.”
1
Excerpted from Volume 4 Amended Complaint of my Case No. 1:06-cv-0044 at the U.S.
District Court in Little Rock is my CLAIM NO . 8. S ELECTED U.S. F EDERAL C OURTS E XTORTED
(18 U.S.C. § 872) E XEMPTED F ILING F EES (28 U.S.C. § 1916) TO THE A MOUNT OF $1,615
S TANDING IN V IOLATION OF A RTICLES 11, 19, 30, AND 34 OF THE U.N. C ONVENTION
A GAINST C ORRUPTION:
Even though my case fits the safety requirements stipulated under 28 U.S.C. § 1916,
Judge George Howard of this Court wrongfully denied my statutory right as a seaman
to file my Civil RICO Act Complaint without pre-paying the Court’s filing fee as a
seaman under 28 U.S.C. § 1916 compelling me to pay the Court’s $350 filing fee.
Compounding the Court’s misconduct the Court Clerk violated my right as a seaman
under 28 U.S.C. § 1916 and under Rule 4(c)(2) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE to have the U.S. Marshals Service perform the Service of Summons and
Complaint on my behalf as a seaman Plaintiff on the pretext that the Court did not have
the storage capacity for the defendants’ copies of the Plaintiff’s 3-volume plus one
addendum Complaint. The Court Clerk instead required me to take the copies of the
complaint (4 large boxes) home (60 miles North of Little Rock) and then return to the
Court when Judge Howard would grant the Plaintiff’s Rule 4(c)(2) Motion. Finding that
procedure inexcusable I took the copies of the Complaint (all 4 boxes) home and mailed
them to the defendants by certified U.S. Mail.
The Plaintiff cites as comparative evidence that the seamen’s statutory right under 28
U.S.C. § 1916 are not given the same respectful regard in every Court of the United
States, up to and including the U.S. Supreme Court:
(1) the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
extorted the Court’s filing fee from the Plaintiff in the
amount of $350.
(2) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit extorted its filing fee
from the Plaintiff on several appeals in the amount of $465.
(3) the U.S. Supreme Court twice extorted its filing fee from the Plaintiff
in the amount of $600.
(4) PACER Monthly Fees in the amount of $348.
(5) the total amount of the above extorted filing fees in
violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1916 = $1,763.4
(6) the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
Charlotte Division, and the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia DID NOT EXTORT their filing fees from the Plaintiff
because they OBEY THE FEDERAL LAW UNDER 28 U.S.C.
§ 1916 and allowed me to file my cases without paying their
filing fee.
4
Corrected amount from that shown in Claim No. 8 in Volume 4 Amended Complaint.
2
I have tried every means available to get the extorted filing fees returned but to no avail.
The FBI won’t even respond to my criminal complaint or inquiries into this matter.
I construe the above incidences as a predictive propensity of this [District] Court for
judicial bias against the Plaintiff’s case. And because I construe the [District] Court to be
a corrupt court in league with the federal courts in Washington, DC, I filed my PETITION
1142-06 alleging human rights violations against the United States with the INTER -
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS located in Washington, DC. They oversee
the INTER -AMERICAN COURT ON HUMAN RIGH TS located in Costa Rica. This action is
compliant with Article 33.1 of the United Nations Charter.
United Nations Charter, Article 33.1:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
United Nations Charter, Article 52.1:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security5 as are appropriate for
regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their
activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations.
However, as a non-state actor, (a term used by the United Nations), I find that the
purpose of my federal litigation is not consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations under Article 52 of the U.N. Charter in regard to the United
Nations PROGRAMME OF ACTION TO PREVENT , COMBAT AND ERADICATE TH E ILLICIT TRADE
IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS (UN Document
A/CONF.192/15)
Because I do not have trust in Judge Howard [to] properly adjudicate this case I
initiated a human rights case against the United States Government in accordance with
Article 33.1 of the U.N. Charter and under Article 8 of the Genocide Convention for
violation of Article 3(e), Complicity in Genocide, of the Genocide Convention by filing
Petition No. 1142-06 with the INTER -AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGH TS in
Washington, DC.
The central point of my PETITION 1142-06 which has now become the central point in
this case before the U.S. District Court in Little Rock, Arkansas, puts the Second
Amendment of the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution on international
judicial review for its proper role in the prevention of genocide within the United States.
5
Plaintiff’s emphasis questioning which has greater importance to the People of not only the United States
but to the People of the other 191 Foreign States of the United Nations. “International peace and security” or
American style “international freedom and liberty?”
3
I am curious to know what are the guidelines for a PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL that an
unrepresented civil plaintiff can use so that his case will be taken seriously by the bench and bar
of the federal judicial system.
The remaining pages are supporting evidence under Rule 406, HABIT, ROUTINE
PRACTICE, of the Federal Rules of Evidence of a corrupt federal judicial system.
Sincerely,
Don Hamrick
Courtesy Copy delivered to the FBI, Washington, DC and Little Rock,

Arkansas as a "PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL" Complaint.
I want to see if the FBI considers extortion by a judge, 18 U.S.C.

§ 872, of an exempted filing fee from an American merchant seaman,
28 U.S.C. § 1916, and if withholding evidence vital to my RICO Act
case in Washington, DC, by the U.S. Department of Justice as serious
crimes worth investigating and prosecuting -or- if they will ignore my
complaint because I am an unrepresented civil plaintiff with a Civil
RICO Act case against the U.S. Government. I want to learn whether
the FBI places greater value in institutional protectionism than in
constitutional protectionism. I want to see if a "Private Attorney
General has any real power under the Tenth Amendment's separation
of powers (i.e., power reserved to the People).
I want my hard earned $1,763 back!!
4
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas,
Northern Division 1, Batesville, Arkansas
Don Hamrick )
5860 Wilburn Road )
Wilburn, AR 72179 ) Is there any interest in justice?
PLAINTIFF ) Or does corruption and judicial
v. )
activism govern the rule of law?
President George W. Bush )
White House ) 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1)
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. ) 28 U.S.C.§ 1404(a)
Washington, DC 20500 )
)
Michael Chertoff, Secretary ) 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
Department of Homeland Security ) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; § 1985; § 1986; § 1988
Washington, DC )
) 1:06-cv-0044
Civil Action No. _______________
Secretary ) Jury Trial Demanded
U.S. Transportation Security Administration ) Damages Sought: $9 million
Washington, DC )
)
Commandant (G-C) Nine Justices )
U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Supreme Court )
Washington, DC 1 First St., NE )
(1) Judge Reggie B. Walton )
(2) Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle Dennis Barghaan )
(3) Calendar Committee U.S. Attorney’s Office )
U.S. District Court for DC 2100 Jamieson Ave. )
333 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 22314 )
Washington, DC )
Anthony Campos, Dep. Marshal )
Chief Judge U.S. Marshals Service )
U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit 333 Constitution Ave., NW )
333 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC )
Washington, DC )
DEFENDANTS )
JUDICIAL N OTICE OF A DJUDICATIVE FACTS

S EAMEN’S S UIT LAW
28 U.S.C. § 1916
THE PLAINTIFF IS EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES,
COURT COSTS, AND PACER FEES
BECAUSE HE IS A U.S. SEAMAN
SEAMAN ’S SUIT UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1916: PLAINTIFF IS EXEMPT FROM FILING FEE , COURT COSTS , &
PACER FEES
28 U.S.C. § 1916 states:
“In all courts of the United States, seamen may institute and
prosecute suits and appeals in their own names and for their own
benefit for wages or salvage or the enforcement of laws enacted for
their health or safety without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing
security therefor.”
The Plaintiff is a U.S. Seaman as indicated by Figure 1 agove. The Plaintiff’s case is
undeniably about safety for the U.S. Merchant Seaman in the maritime environment and in open
society in the United States. The legislative history of the Seamen’s Suit Law does not subject
itself to arbitrary imposition of en forma pauperis filing to qualify for the statutory exemption.
To imposes such conditions is an unconstitutional act of prior restraint of a statutory

right. It cannot be sustained that Congress giveth a statutory right and the Courts taketh it away
by judicial fiat. That fiat invokes the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions.
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES ON THE SEAMAN ’S SUIT LAW

June 12, 1917, ch. 27, Sec. 1, 40 Stat. 157 (H.R. 11; Pub.L.No. 21: An Act Making appropriations
for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth,
nineteen hundred and eighteen, and for other purposes.) — Provided further, That courts
of the United States shall be open to seamen, without furnishing bonds or prepayment
of or making deposits to secure fees or costs, for the purpose of entering and prosecuting
suit or suits in their own name and for the own benefit for wages or salvage and to
enforce laws made for their health and safety.
July 1, 1918, ch. 113, Sec. 1, 40 Stat. 683 (H.R. 12441; Pub.L.No. 181: An Act Making
appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending
June thirteenth, nineteen hundred and nineteen, and for other purposes.) — Provided,
6
That courts of the United States, including appellate courts, hereafter shall be open to
seamen, without furnishing bonds or prepayment of or making deposit to secure fees or
costs, for the purpose of entering and prosecuting suit or suits in their own name and for
their own benefit for wages or salvage and to enforce laws made for their health and
safety.
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 955 (H.R. 3214; Pub.L.No. 773: An Act: To revise, codify, and
enact into law title 28 of the United States Code entitled “Judicial Code and Judiciary”)
— 28 U.S. 1916: In all courts of the United Stats, seamen may institute and prosecute
suits and appeals in their own names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the
enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees or costs or
furnishing security therefor.
Case Law
“The due process clause forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty; where a person’s good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,
the minimal requirements of the clause must be satisfied.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 US 565, 95 S.Ct.
729, 42 L.Ed. 725.
“When those fundamental rights which are recognized and declared, but not granted or
created, by the Constitution, are thereby guaranteed only against violation or abridgment by the
United States or by the states, and cannot therefore be affirmatively enforced by Congress against
unlawful acts of individuals, yet every right created by, arising under, or dependent upon, the
Constitution of the United States, may be protected and enforced by Congress by such means and
in such manner as it may deem best.” Logan v. United States 144 US 263, 12 S.Ct. 617, 36 L.Ed.
429. “If not warranted by any just occasion, the least imposition is oppressive.” Mountain Timber
Co. v. Washington, 243 US 219, 37 S.Ct. 260, 61 L.Ed. 685. “The constitutional guaranty of rights
and immunities to the citizen insures to him the privilege of having those rights and immunities
judicially declared and protected.” Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 US 276, 52 S.Ct. 556,
87 ALR 374, 76 L.Ed. 1102.
Respectfully submitted,
Don Hamrick
7
Case 4:06-mc-00026-GH Document 4 Filed 08/15/2006 Page 1 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION
DON HAMRICK PLAINTIFF
v. No. 4:06MC00026 GH
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, ET AL. DEFENDANTS
ORDER
On August 11th, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a 2000-page civil Rico Act complaint
in book form,1 a motion to expedite case, and a judicial notice of adjudicative facts exempting him
from filing fees, court costs, and PACER fees because he is a United States seaman under 28 U.S.C.
§1916. In support of his notice of exemption, he has submitted a photocopy of his U.S. Merchant
Mariner’s Document reflecting his name, address, and picture and his argument that his case is about
safety for a seaman in the maritime environment and in open society in the United States. Plaintiff
continues that the legislative history of this act does not subject itself to arbitrary imposition of in
forma pauperis filing to qualify for the statutory exemption.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1916 provides:
In all courts of the United States, seamen may institute and prosecute suits and appeals in
their own names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the enforcement of laws
1
At the demand of plaintiff, two miscellaneous actions were filed. This one is his
“Petition for Writ of Mandamus (or Court order), Writ of Prohibition, Declaratory Judgment, and
Injunctive Relief for the ‘National Open Carry Handgun’ Endorsement on Plaintiff’s Merchant
Mariner’s Document, and Demanding the Same Second, Ninth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights and Tenth Amendment Power Reserved to the People as a U.S. Citizen for
Intrastate and Interstate Travel.”
-1-
Case 4:06-mc-00026-GH Document 4 Filed 08/15/2006 Page 2 of 2
enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing security
therefor.
Nothing that the plaintiff has submitted supports that this proposed action is for the
“enforcement of laws enacted for [seamen’s] ... safety.” Moreover, the Court notes that the United
States Supreme Court – in other litigation2 – on February 28, 2005, denied plaintiff’s motion for
leave to proceed as a seaman and, by order filed on March 11, 2005, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Hamrick v. Bush, No. 04-5316, held that plaintiff
there was not exempt under 28 U.S.C. §1916 from payment of the appellate filing fee.
Accordingly, plaintiff is directed, within 30 days of the file-date of this order, to either pay
the $350 filing fee or file an application to proceed in forma pauperis which the Clerk’s office is to
send to plaintiff along with a copy of this order. Plaintiff is placed on notice that failure to comply
with the directives in this order will result in dismissal of this miscellaneous action for lack of
prosecution. The Court will take no further action regarding the motions for leave to file (#1) and
to expedite (#2) until plaintiff has either paid the required $350 filing fee or has timely filed a
completed in forma pauperis application.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of August, 2006.
________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2
Hamrick v. Bush, 543 U.S. 1185, 125 S.Ct. 1412, 161 L.Ed2d 187 (2005).
-2-
T ITLE 28 - J UDICIARY AND J UDICIAL P ROCEDURE
P ART V - P ROCEDURE
C HAPTER 123 - F EES AND C OSTS

“In all courts of the United States, seamen may institute and prosecute suits and
appeals in their own names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the
enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees
or costs or furnishing security therefor.”
Clarifications:
(1) “In all courts of the United States” = includes the DC Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court.
(2) “the enforcement of laws enacted for their . . . safety” = includes civil lawsuits for Second
Amendment rights of the American seafarer at sea aboard U.S. flag vessels and ashore in the United
States in intrastate and interstate travel.
(3) “without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing security therefor.” = means not to pay the
filing fees of the DC Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court AND the billing fees of PACER for access to the
Docket Report.
Extorted Fees
The DC Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court extorted from the Appellant a combined about of $1,065
in filing fees in violation of the above noted federal law from 2002 to the present.
DC Circuit, Case No. 02-5334 $105.00
DC Circuit, Case No. 03-5021 105.00
U.S. Supreme Court, Case No. 03-145, 300.00
U.S. Supreme Court, (DC Circuit Case No. 04-5316) 300.00
U.S. District Court, Little Rock, Arkansas 350.00
Extorted Payment of PACER Fees Paid to Date 348.00
----------
TOTAL: $1,763.006
H ISTORICAL AND R EVISION N OTES O N T HE S EAMAN ’S S UIT L AW

June 12, 1917, ch. 27, Sec. 1, 40 Stat. 157 (H.R. 11; Pub.L.No. 21: An Act Making
appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June
thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, and for other purposes.) — Provided further, That
courts of the United States shall be open to seamen, without furnishing bonds or prepayment
of or making deposits to secure fees or costs, for the purpose of entering and prosecuting suit
or suits in their own name and for the own benefit for wages or salvage and to enforce laws
made for their health and safety.
6
Updated for current totals
8
July 1, 1918, ch. 113, Sec. 1, 40 Stat. 683 (H.R. 12441; Pub.L.No. 181: An Act Making
appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June
thirteenth, nineteen hundred and nineteen, and for other purposes.) — Provided, That courts
of the United States, including appellate courts, hereafter shall be open to seamen, without
furnishing bonds or prepayment of or making deposit to secure fees or costs, for the purpose of
entering and prosecuting suit or suits in their own name and for their own benefit for wages or
salvage and to enforce laws made for their health and safety.
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 955 (H.R. 3214; Pub.L.No. 773: An Act: To revise, codify, and
enact into law title 28 of the United States Code entitled “Judicial Code and Judiciary”) — 28
U.S. 1916: In all courts of the United Stats, seamen may institute and prosecute suits and
appeals in their own names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the enforcement
of laws enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing security
therefor.
COMPLAINANT’S OTHER CASES

In all of the following cases and appeals the Federal Courts have obstructed justice for the
Plaintiff/Appellant because of his pro se status. This level of obstruction implies corruption and bias in
the federal judicial system and in the Justice Department simply because of the Second Amendment
subject matter of the cases.
CASE NO . 1: Hamrick v. Adm. Thomas H. Collins, et al, U.S. District Court for DC,
No. 02-1434 filed July 18, 2002, COMPLAINT FOR DEFAMATION & DAMAGES , LIBEL AS A
MATTER OF PRIVATE CONCERN , INJURY TO REPUTATION , UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH THE
LAWFUL OPERATION OF A U.S. MERCHANT VESSEL , UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE W ITH A SEAMAN ’S
EMPLOYMENT ABOARD A U.S. MERCHANT VESSEL , WRONGFUL DETENTION /FALSE IMPRISONMENT
OF A U.S. MERCHANT SEAMAN IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY , HARASSMENT , EMOTIONAL DISTRESS , AND
SUBJECTION TO A MALICIOUS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION EXTENDING FROM PETITIONER ’S EXERCISE
OF FIRST AMENDM ENT RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH AND TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS
OF GRIEVANCES PURSUING SECOND AMENDM ENT RIGH TS ; Dismised with Prejudice.
CASE NO . 2: Hamrick v. President Bush, et al, U.S. District Court for DC, No. 02-1435 filed July
18, 2002, PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS , A WRIT OF PROHIBITION , DECLARATORY
JUDGM ENT , AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ; Dismised with Prejudice; Affirmed District Court’s Dismissal
with Prejudice on October 10, 2002. Appeal filed with DC Circuit, October 28, 2002. DC
Circuit affirmed Dismissal with Prejudice. Appealed to U.S. Supreme Court. Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, No. 03-145, Denied.
CASE NO . 3: Hamrick v. President Bush, et al, U.S. District Court for DC, No. 03-2160, October
21, 2003, AMENDED COM PLAINT CRIMINAL & CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT OF RACKETEERING AND
FRAUD UNDER THE RICO ACT FOR AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION SCHEME UNDER COLOR OF
LAW OVER THE SECOND AMENDM ENT VIOLATING PLAINTIFF ’S RIGHT TO PETITION AND RIGH T TO
DUE PROCESS AND FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS , WRIT OF PROHIBITION , DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF & FOR DAMAGES ; Dismissed with Prejudice. Appealed to DC Circuit,
Case No. 04-5316. Appealed to U.S. Supreme Court on Rule 11 (Before Judgment of the
DC Circuit); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No. 04-1150, Denied. O Hamrick filed own
Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice in order to refile in proper venue, Little Rock,
Arkansas.
CASE NO . 4: Hamrick, pro se v. United States, U.S. District Court for DC, No. 1:04MS00422,
filed September 1, 2004; MOTION FOR THE COURT TO SUMMON A SPECIAL GRAND JURY ,
9
IN RE : HAMRICK , (pro se) V . PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH , ET AL : A SECOND AMENDM ENT CASE ;
TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN TH E FEDERAL JUDICIARY
AND IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE , This case seeks a criminal review of Cases 1 through
3 above. Case is pending. O The federal judge continues to sit on this case, doing nothing.
Case No. 5: Hamrick v. George, et al, U.S. District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, Charlotte Division, filed July 20, 2004; SEAMAN ’S COM PLAINT OF WRONG FUL ,
MALICIOUS TERMINATION , HARASSMENT , DISCRIMINATION , AND RETALIATION FOR EXERCISING
PROTECTED RIGHTS AND OPPOSING UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN VIOLATION OF
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) & (b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq.; 42
U.S.C. § 2000E -3(a); AND UNDER 46 U.S.C. § 2114 PROTECTION OF SEAM EN AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION ; AND FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) & (b)(2)(A).
O Case dismissed without prejudice after nearly 2 years inexcusable delays by the
Courts.
Case No. 6: Hamrick v. Adm. Thomas H. Collins, Commandant USCG, et al, U.S. District Court
for New Jersey, Camden Division, No. 05-4427, filed September 12, 2005; SEAMAN ’S
COMPLAINT OF RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT , HARASSMENT , AND DEFAMATION , AND DERELICTION
OF DUTY (AGAINST THE U.S. COAST GUARD AND THE DEPT . OF HOMELAND SECURITY ); SEAMAN ’S
COMPLAINT OF HARASSMENT , DEFAMATION , AND RETALIATION (AGAINST REM AINING
RESPONDENTS ) IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAW S UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) & (b);
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 18 U.S.C. § 241, 242; 245(b)(1)(B); AND
UNDER 46 U.S.C. § 2114 PROTECTION OF SEAMEN AGAINST DISCRIM INATIO N ; IN VIOLATION OF
RULE 2 OF THE INTERNATIONAL RULES OF NAVIGATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW S & TREATIES
WITH THE UNITED STATES . O Dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution (could not
keep up on this case)
Case No. 7: Hamrick v. Vice Admiral David L. Brewer III, USN, Military Sealift Command, et al,
U.S. District Court for DC, No. 05-1993; filed October 7, 2005; COM PLAINT (1) OF
BREACH OF CONTRACT ; COM PLAINT (2) OF AGE DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA); COM PLAINT (3) OF SOLICITATION TO COMMIT
MEDICAL FRAUD , HARASSMENT /BULLYING , DEFAMATION /RITUAL DEFAMATION IN VIOLATION OF THE
LABOR -MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN AMSEA AND THE SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION ;
COM PLAINT (4) OF RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT (RFRA); COM PLIANT (5) OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE ENFORCEM ENT OF FEDERAL
LAW S AGAINST INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ; COM PLAINT (6) OF WRONGFUL /MALICIOUS
DISCHARGE /FIRING IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII RETALIATION FOR REPORTING THE 5-YEAR EXISTENCE
OF A CHILD PORN PHOTOGRAPH ON THE CREW ’S EMAIL COMPUTER ABOARD THE USNS FISHER
TO THE U.S. COAST GUARD IN ACCORDANCE WITH 46 U.S.C. § 2114, PROTECTION OF SEAMEN
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (ALSO KNOW N AS THE WHISTLE BLOW ER ’S LAW FOR SEAM EN ) AS
REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LAW , 18 U.S.C. § 4, MISPRISION OF FELONY ; COM PLAINT (7) OF
HUMILIATION (DEFAMATION /RITUAL DEFAMATION ) AND FALSE /WRONG FUL DETENTION AND /OR
FALSE IMPRISONM ENT BY CONFINEMENT TO QUARTERS UNDER CONTINUOUS MILITARY GUARD
WHILE ABOARD SHIP PRIOR TO DISCHARGE BY ORDER OF THE MASTER IN TITLE VII RETALIATION
FOR MAKING SUCH LAWFUL REPORT TO AUTHORITIES . O Dismissed without prejudice on October
20, 2005.
Case No. 8: Hamrick v. United Nations, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, Northern
Division, Filed September 11, 2006 as Hamrick v President Bush, et al. Amended as
Hamrick v. United Nations, January 2007.
10
112A
Unanimously Approved by ABA House of Delegates August 7, 2006
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE

SECTION OF BUSINESS LAW
COMMISSION ON INTEREST ON LAWYERS’ TRUST ACCOUNTS
COMMISSION ON LAW AND AGING
SECTION OF LITIGATION
STEERING COMMITTEE ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION
STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
KING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION (WASHINGTON)
MAINE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION
THE PHILADELPHIA BAR ASSOCIATION
NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE
WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
BOSTON BAR ASSOCIATION
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
CONNECTICUT BAR ASSOCIATION
MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
LOS ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
RECOMMENDATION
1 RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges federal, state, and territorial
2 governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income
3 persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake,
4 such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody, as determined by
5 each jurisdiction.
112A
ABA House of Delegates - August 2006
REPORT
This Resolution is the Logical Next Step in the ABA’s Long History of Support for
Achieving Equal Justice in the United States
The ABA has long held as a core value the principle that society must provide equal access to
justice, to give meaning to the words inscribed above the entrance to the United States Supreme
Court – “Equal Justice Under Law.” As one of the Association’s most distinguished former
Presidents, Justice Lewis Powell, once observed:
“Equal justice under law is not just a caption on the facade of the Supreme Court
building. It is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our society . . . It is fundamental that
justice should be the same, in substance and availability, without regard to economic
status.”
The ABA also has long recognized that the nation’s legal profession has a special obligation to
advance the national commitment to provide equal justice. The Association’s efforts to promote
civil legal aid and access to appointed counsel for indigent litigants are quintessential
expressions of these principles.
In 1920, the Association created its first standing committee, “The Standing Committee on Legal
Aid and Indigent Defendants,” with Charles Evans Hughes as its first chair. With this action, the
ABA pledged itself to foster the expansion of legal aid throughout the country. Then, in 1965,
under the leadership of Lewis Powell, the ABA House of Delegates endorsed federal funding of
legal services for the poor because it was clear that charitable funding would never begin to meet
the need. In the early 1970s, the ABA played a prominent role in the creation of the federal Legal
Services Corporation to assume responsibility for the legal services program created by the
federal Office of Economic Opportunity. Beginning in the 1980s and continuing to the present,
the ABA has been a powerful and persuasive voice in the fight to maintain federal funding for
civil legal services.
These actions are consistent with and further several of the ABA’s key goals including:
GOAL II To promote meaningful access to legal representation and the American system of
justice for all persons regardless of their economic or social condition.
When the ABA adopted this Goal, the following objectives for achieving it were listed:
1. Increase funding for legal services to the poor in civil and criminal cases.
2. Communicate the availability of affordable legal services and information to
moderate-income persons.
3. Provide effective representation for the full range of legal needs of low and middle
income persons.
4. Encourage the development of systems and procedures that make the justice system
easier for all persons to understand and use.
The ABA Has Adopted Policy Positions Favoring a Right to Counsel
The ABA has on several occasions articulated its support for appointing counsel when necessary
to ensure meaningful access to the justice system. In its amicus brief in Lassiter v. Dept of Social
2
112A
Services of Durham County, 425 U.S. 18 (1981), the ABA urged the U.S. Supreme Court to rule
that counsel must be appointed for indigent parents in civil proceedings that could terminate their
parental rights, “[I]n order to minimize [the risk of error] and ensure a fair hearing, procedural
due process demands that counsel be made available to parents, and that if the parents are
indigent, it be at public expense. Id. at 3-4. The ABA noted that “skilled counsel is needed to
execute basic advocacy functions: to delineate the issues, investigate and conduct discovery,
present factual contentions in an orderly manner, cross-examine witnesses, make objections and
preserve a record for appeal. . . . Pro se litigants cannot adequately perform any of these tasks.”
In 1979 the House of Delegates adopted Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Parties, as
part of the Juvenile Justice Standards. The Standards state “the participation of counsel on behalf
of all parties subject to juvenile and family court proceedings is essential to the administration of
justice and to the fair and accurate resolution of issues at all stages of those proceedings.” These
standards were quoted in the Lassiter amicus brief. Also, in 1987, the House of Delegates
adopted policy calling for appointment of counsel in guardianship/conservatorship cases.1
The ABA stated these positions some years ago, but its continuing commitment to the principles
behind the positions was recently restated when it championed the right to meaningful access to
the courts by the disabled in its amicus brief in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). The case
concerned a litigant who could not physically access the courthouse in order to defend himself.
In terms that could also apply to appointment of counsel, the brief states, “the right of equal and
effective access to the courts is a core aspect of constitutional guarantees and is essential to
ensuring the proper administration of justice.” ABA Amicus Brief in Tennessee v. Lane at 16.
Echoing the Association’s stance in Lassiter, the brief continued “the right of access to the courts
. . . is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the
opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental
constitutional rights . . . [W]hen important interests are at stake in judicial proceedings, the Due
Process Clause requires more than a theoretical right of access to the courts; it requires
meaningful access. . . To ensure meaningful access, particularly when an individual faces the
prospect of coercive State deprivation through the judicial process of life, liberty, or property,
due process often requires the State to give a litigant affirmative assistance so that he may
participate in the proceedings if he effectively would be unable to participate otherwise.” Id. at
17-18 (internal citations omitted).
Despite 130 Years of Legal Aid in the United States, Existing Resources Have Proven
Inadequate to Fulfill the Promise of Equal Justice for All.
The right to representation for indigents in civil proceedings goes back to the earliest days of the
common law when indigent litigants had a right to appointment of counsel so they could have
access to the civil courts. Most European and Commonwealth countries have had a right to
counsel in civil cases for decades or even centuries, entitling all poor people to legal assistance
1
See House of Delegates Resolution adopted in August, 1987 offered by the Special Committee on Legal Problems
of the Elderly: “BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports efforts to improve judicial
practices concerning guardianship, and adopts the following Recommended Judicial Practices and urges their
implementation for the elderly at the state level: … I. Procedure: Ensuring Due Process Protections … C.
Representation of the Alleged Incompetent … 1. Counsel as advocate for the respondent should be appointed in
every case…”
3
112A
when needed. The United States, in contrast, has relied principally on supplying a fixed number
of lawyers and providing representation only to however many poor people this limited resource
is able to serve. As of today, the level of resource does not approach the level of need2 and only a
fortunate few of those unable to afford counsel enjoy effective access to justice when facing
serious legal problems
For the first 90 years of legal aid in this country, the only financial support for civil legal aid
came from private charity. It started in 1876 with a single legal aid society serving German-
American immigrants in New York City. Bar associations and social service organizations later
established legal aid programs in a few cities elsewhere in the country. Starting in 1920,
prompted by the publication of Reginald Heber Smith’s landmark expose of injustice in
America, JUSTICE AND THE POOR, and under the leadership of Charles Evans Hughes, the ABA,
as noted above, sought to nurture development of such programs and managed to foster legal aid
societies in most major cities and many smaller communities around the nation. But those
societies were grossly underfunded and understaffed.
It was not until 1965 that government funding first became available for civil legal aid as part of
the War on Poverty. In 1974, the federal Legal Services Corporation was established as the
central funding entity for legal aid programs nationwide. During the early years the federal
government expanded legal aid funding considerably. But the expansion of federal
appropriations soon stalled, when LSC proved vulnerable to political attack. Thus, local legal aid
agencies began to more aggressively seek diversified funding from other sources including
Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA), state and local governments and private sources.3
Despite these innovative and often heroic efforts, however, taking account of inflation and the
growth in numbers of poor people civil legal aid funding is no higher today in real terms than it
was a quarter century ago.4
Given this persistent shortage of legal aid resources, it is not surprising to find a vast and
continuing unmet need for the services of lawyers among those unable to afford counsel. While
the nationwide Legal Services Corporation-funded system for providing legal services assists as
many as one million poor people with critical legal problems each year, a recent survey shows
that the legal aid programs within that system have to turn away another million people who
come to their offices5. Millions more are discouraged and don’t bother seeking legal aid because
2
See Documenting the Justice Gap in America, A Report of the Legal Services Corporation (2005) documenting the
percentage of eligible persons that LSC funded-programs are unable to serve due to lack of sufficient resources.
3
Some of these funding sources also have come under attack. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,
538 U.S. 216 (2003); Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998); Wieland v. Lawyers Trust
Fund of Illinois, Docket # 5-03-0419, App. Ct. of Ill, 5th Jud Dist. (2003).
4
Expenditures of public resources to address the legal needs of the poor in the United States compare poorly with
funding in many other industrialized nations. At the lower end, Germany and Finland invest over three times as
much of their gross domestic product as the United States in serving the civil legal needs of lower income
populations. At the upper end, England spends 12 times as much of its GDP as the U.S. does to provide civil legal
aid to its citizens. In between, New Zealand spends five times more than the U.S and the Netherlands over seven
times as much. Even Hong Kong, now a part of the People’s Republic of China, invests more than six times as much
as the U.S.
5
See n. 1, Documenting t he Justice Gap at p. 5. It also should be noted that many of the cases in which local
programs reported they provided services were ones where limited resources meant they only were able to supply
4
112A
they know help is not available. Despite all the efforts of legal aid programs and pro bono
lawyers, an ABA nationwide legal needs study in 1993 showed that legal help was not obtained
for over 70% of the serious legal problems encountered by poor people.
More than ten years have passed since that ABA research, and matters have only gotten worse.
Poverty has not significantly abated and indeed has increased since the 2000 census. Similarly,
the civil legal needs of the poor remain substantially unfulfilled. For example, a September 2003
report by the District of Columbia Bar Foundation estimates that less than 10% of the need for
civil legal assistance is being met in that jurisdiction. A similar study in Washington State, also
released in September 2003, found that 87% of the state's low-income households encounter a
civil legal problem each year, and that only 12% of these households are able to obtain assistance
from a lawyer. In Massachusetts - a state with significant legal services resources - the
occurrence of civil legal problems among the poor increased significantly in the period 1993-
2002. By 2002 at least 53% of the poor households in the state had at least one unmet civil legal
need and only 13% of those households were able to resolve all the problems they experienced.6
Both Constitutional Principles and Public Policy Support A Legally Enforceable Right to
Counsel to Achieve Effective Access to Justice in Many Civil Cases
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) the U.S. Supreme Court held:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us
to be an obvious truth. . . . That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities,
not luxuries....From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed
to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands
equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged
with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
It appears just as difficult to argue a civil litigant can stand “equal before the law . . . without a
lawyer to assist him.” Indeed just a year after Gideon, the Supreme Court made a similar
observation about civil litigants. “Laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights
when dealing with practiced and carefully counseled adversaries....” Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). Yet, in 1981, the Supreme Court, in a civil matter,
said that there is no absolute right to court appointed counsel for an indigent litigant in a case
brought by the state to terminate parental rights. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 425
self-help assistance, but believed full representation would have led to a better outcome for the clients. (Id. at p. 6, fn
8.)
6
Seven additional states have recently examined the kinds of legal problems experienced by low-income residents
of the state and what they do about them: Oregon (2000), Vermont (2001), New Jersey (2002), Connecticut (2003),
Tennessee (2004), Illinois (2005) and Montana (2005). These studies, too, demonstrate that only a very small
percentage of the legal problems experienced by low-income people (typically one in five or less) is addressed with
the assistance of a private or legal aid lawyer.
5
112A
U.S. 18 (1981). While the Court recognized that the complexity of a termination of parental
rights proceeding might “overwhelm an uncounseled parent,” the Court found--by a 5-4 vote--
that the appointment of counsel was not required in every case. Id. at 30. Instead, trial courts
were instructed to balance three factors to determine whether due process requires that a parent
be given a lawyer: “the private interest at stake, the government’s interest and the risk that the
procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.” Id. at 27. The court went on to apply the
standard in such a way that it virtually excluded the appointment of counsel except in the most
extraordinary circumstances, in particular by overlaying on the three-part due process test an
additional presumption against appointed counsel where there is no risk of loss of physical
liberty.
It is to be hoped that the U.S. Supreme Court will eventually reconsider the cumbersome Lassiter
balancing test and the unreasonable presumption that renders that test irrelevant for almost all
civil litigants. There would be precedent for such a reversal, as seen in the evolution of the
criminal right to counsel from Betts v Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) to Gideon in 1963. In Betts,
the Court said the appointment of counsel was required in criminal cases only where, after a
case-by-case analysis, the trial court determined that counsel is necessary to ensure that trial is
not “offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right.” Id. at 473. But by
1963, the Court realized that the Betts approach was unworkable, and overturned it in Gideon.
Powerful common law, constitutional, and policy arguments support a governmental obligation
to ensure low income people are provided the means, including lawyers, to have effective access
to the civil courts. These arguments have equal and sometimes greater application at the state
level than they do at the federal level.
Common Law Antecedents Support a Right to Counsel in Civil Matters
The common law has a long history of granting indigent litigants a right to counsel in civil cases.
As early as the 13th and 14th centuries English courts were appointing attorneys for such litigants,
a right that Parliament codified in 1495.7 Several American colonies imported this statute and its
right to counsel as part of the common law they adopted from the mother country and, it has
been argued, this nascent right continues to the current day.8 But at a minimum the venerable age
and persistence of this right9 in the common law tradition suggests the fundamental importance
7
The critical language from the Statute of Henry VII, which also relieved indigent civil litigants from the obligation
to pay fees and costs, reads as follows: “[T]he Justices…shall assign to the same poor person or persons
counsel,…which shall give their counsel, nothing taking for the same;…and likewise the Justices shall appoint
attorney and attorneys for the same poor person or persons….” II Hen VII, c. 12 (1495), An Act to Admit Such
Persons as Are Poor to Sue in Forma Pauperis, reprinted in 2 Statutes of the Realm 578 (1993). .
8
See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 1000 (2003) at pp. 33-42, arguing the Statute of Henry
VII is part of the English common law the colony and later the state of Maryland adopted as its own and this right to
counsel remains part of Maryland law in the current day. Nor is this common law argument limited to the original 13
states. Many if not most other states expressly incorporated the English common law as it existed at the moment of
their statehood as the common law of those states. See Johnson, Beyond Payne: The Case for A Legally Enforceable
Right to Representation in Civil Cases for Indigent California Litigants, 11 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L. REV. 249,
251-259 (1978) for an explanation why the Statute of Henry VII the California Supreme Court used as the basis for
finding a common law right to waiver of fees and costs also appears to justify the provision of free counsel to those
same indigent litigants.
9
The Statute of Henry VII was not replaced until 1883, when it was succeeded by a law designed to make the right
more effective. In 1914 the English Parliament passed another reform of legal aid. Then in 1950 it enacted a
6
112A
that tradition, which is the basis of American law, accords guaranteeing poor people equality
before the law and furnishing them the lawyers required to make that guarantee a reality.
Other European and commonwealth countries also have come to recognize a statutory right to
counsel in civil cases. France created such a statutory right in 1852, Italy did so when Garibaldi
unified the country in 1865, and Germany followed suit when it became a nation in 1877. Most
of the remaining European countries enacted right to counsel provisions in the late 19th and early
20th century. Several Canadian provinces, New Zealand and some Australian states have
provided attorneys to the poor as a matter of statutory right for decades, although the scope of the
right has changed in response to legislative funding and priorities.10
As of this time, no American jurisdiction has enacted a statutory right to counsel at public
expense nearly as broad as these other countries. But many states have passed laws conferring a
right to counsel in certain narrow areas of the law. The most common are those guaranteeing
counsel to parents – and sometimes children -- in dependency (often called neglect) proceedings,
and to prospective wards in guardianship and similar proceedings in which interference with
personal liberties are at stake. A handful of states also have extended a statutory right to counsel
in other situations. It is encouraging that state legislatures have recognized the truth that poor
people cannot have a fair hearing in these particular adversarial proceedings. Yet many other
proceedings that threaten loss of basic human needs are equally adversarial and often more
complex. In those cases, just like dependency proceedings, no civil litigant can be “equal before
the law…without a lawyer.”
Courts perhaps more than legislatures are familiar with the truth of this principle embodied in the
common law right to counsel and implemented, to a limited degree in many state statutes in the
U.S., and to a broader extent, in the laws of many other countries. On a regular basis, the
judiciary witnesses the helplessness of unrepresented parties appearing in their courtrooms and
the unequal contest when those litigants confront well-counseled opponents. Judges deeply
committed to reaching just decisions too often must worry whether they delivered injustice
instead of justice in such cases because what they heard in court was a one-sided version of the
law and facts. Nearly a decade ago, one trial judge, U.S. District Court Judge Robert Sweet, gave
voice to this concern in a speech to the Association of the Bar of New York, and also tendered a
solution. “What then needs doing to help the courts maintain the confidence of the society and to
perform the task of insuring that we are a just society under a rule of law? . . . To shorthand it,
we need a civil Gideon, that is, an expanded constitutional right to counsel in civil matters.
Lawyers, and lawyers for all, are essential to the functioning of an effective justice system.”11
State and Federal Constitutional Principles Support a Civil Right to Counsel
sophisticated civil legal aid program that remains the most comprehensive and generously funded legal aid system in
the world.
10
These developments in other countries are surveyed in Johnson, The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An
International Perspective, 19 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 341 (1985). Several of the foreign statutes are
translated in Cappelletti, Gordley and Johnson, TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN
MODERN SOCIETIES (Milan/Dobbs Ferry: Giuffre/Oceana, 1975, 1981).
11
Sweet, Civil “Gideon” and Justice in the Trial Court (The Rabbi’s Beard), 42 THE RECORD 915, 924 (Dec.
1997).
7
112A
In the years between Gideon and Lassiter, a few state supreme courts took some promising steps
toward a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases. The Maine and Oregon Supreme Courts
declared the constitutional right to due process required that their state governments provide free
counsel to parents in dependency/neglect cases.12 The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that counsel
must be appointed at public expense to an indigent party in a child custody proceeding if the
other party was provided free representation.13 The California Supreme Court found a due
process right to counsel for defendants in paternity cases14 and an equal protection right for
prisoners involved in civil litigation.15 The New York Court of Appeal fell only one vote short
of declaring a constitutional right to free counsel for poor people in divorce cases.16
During that era, between Gideon and Lassiter, academic articles also frequently appeared
discussing the many legal theories which would support a constitutional right to counsel in civil
cases.17 In common with the state supreme court decisions mentioned above, these articles
usually articulated arguments based on the due process clauses found in the federal and state
constitutions and their implicit guarantees of a fair hearing in civil proceedings. But they carried
the argument beyond the narrow categories of cases covered by the then existing state court
decisions to embrace a far broader range of civil litigation. They emphasized the serious
consequences losing litigants face in many other civil cases poor people commonly experience –
and the empirical and other evidence suggesting the lack of counsel virtually guarantees these
people in fact would lose those cases.
Some of these articles likewise found strong support for a right to counsel in the equal protection
clauses common to the federal and most state constitutions. Some pointed to the fundamental
interest all citizens have in enjoying “like access to the courts” for the protection of their rights –
as the essential handmaiden of the right to vote without which laws enacted to give them
substantive rights cannot be enforced. As a fundamental interest, it warrants the “close scrutiny”
to which the courts are to subject any policies denying that access. It also was observed that
some states have made “poverty” a “suspect class.” This again would mandate close scrutiny of a
state’s denial of counsel to poor people in judicial proceedings structured in a way that requires a
lawyer if one is to have effective access to those courts.
Over the years after Gideon, lawyers continued to pursue litigation seeking to establish the right
to counsel in civil cases, with considerable success, initially on traditional notions of due
12
Danforth v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); State v. Jamison, 444 P.2d 15 (Ore.
1968).
13
Flores v. Flores, 598 P. 2d 893 (Ak, 1979).
14
Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal.3d 22, 593 P.2d 226 cert. den. 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
15
Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.3d 908 (1976).
16
In re Smiley, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (N.Y. 1975).
17
See, e.g., Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 Colum.L.Rev. 1322 (1966); O’Brien, Why Not
Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss Approach, 28 Ohio St. L.J. 5 (1967); Note, The Indigent’s Right to
Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yale L.J. 545 (1967); Note, The Indigent’s Right ot Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 Fordham
L. Rev. 989 (1975), Note, The Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9
U.Mich.J.L. Ref. 554 (1976), Comment, Current Prospects for an Indigent’s Right to Appointed Counsel and Free
Transcript in Civil Litigation, 7 Pac. L.J. 149 (1976), Johnson, Beyond Payne: The Case for a Legally Enforceable
Right to Representation for Indigent California Litigants, 11 Loyola of Los Angeles L..Rev. 249 (1978).
8
112A
process. In Michigan and other states, a detailed blueprint was developed to take a series of cases
through the appellate courts to establish the right to counsel in various circumstances. After
several victories, the initiative was set aside in part because of the Lassiter decision.
After Lassiter and its narrow construction of due process, most of the possible constitutional
theories remain untested in either the federal or state courts. But they have been reinforced by
constitutional decisions abroad. As early as 1937, a quarter century before Gideon and over four
decades before Lassiter, the Swiss Supreme Court found the analog of our constitution’s equal
protection clause, the “equality before the law” provision of that nation’s Constitution, mandated
appointment of free counsel for indigent civil litigants.18 Then in 1979 the European Court of
Human Rights issued a historic decision, Airey v. Ireland19, based on an analog of due process--a
provision in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which
guarantees civil litigants a “fair hearing.”20 In a decision that now applies to 41 nations and over
400 million people, the court held indigents cannot have a “fair hearing” unless represented by
lawyers21 and required member states to provide counsel at public expense to indigents in cases
heard in the regular civil courts.22 As a direct result of this decision, the Irish legislature created
that nation’s first legal aid program which is now funded at three times the level of America’s.
The Airey decision and its progeny also have influenced the scope of legal aid legislation in
several other European countries.23
Policy Considerations Support Recognition of a Civil Right to Counsel
Underlying all the constitutional theories are several undeniable truths. The American system of
justice is inherently and perhaps inevitably adversarial and complex. It assigns to the parties the
primary and costly responsibilities of finding the controlling legal principles and uncovering the
relevant facts, following complex rules of evidence and procedure and presenting the case in a
cogent fashion to the judge or jury. Discharging these responsibilities ordinarily requires the
expertise lawyers spend three years of graduate education and more years of training and practice
acquiring. With rare exceptions, non-lawyers lack the knowledge, specialized expertise and skills
to perform these tasks and are destined to have limited success no matter how valid their position
18
Judgment of Oct. 8, 1937, Arrets du Tribunal Federal (ATF) 63, I, 209 (1937), discussed in O’Brien, Why Not
Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss Approach, 28 Ohio St. L.J. 5 (1967).
19
Airey v Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) 305 (1979).
20
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations…everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time.” Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6,
para.1, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
21
As the court explained: “The Convention was intended to guarantee rights that were practical and effective,
particularly in respect of the right of access to the courts, in view of its prominent place in a democratic
society….The possibility of appearing in person before the [trial court] did not provide an effective right of access. . .
[I]t is not realistic,…to suppose that,…the applicant could effectively conduct her own case, despite the assistance
which,…the judge affords to parties acting in person….” (Id. at p. 315, emphasis supplied.) .
22
A constitutional “fair hearing” guarantee likewise formed the basis for the Canadian Supreme Court’s recent
declaration of a right to counsel at public expense for indigent litigants, in this instance parents involved in
dependency/neglect cases. New Brunswick v J.G. 177 D.L.R. (4th) 124 (1999).
23
See, e.g., Steel and Morris v. The United Kingdom, Eur.Ct.H.R. (Judgment of Feb. 15, 2005) which found
England’s legal aid statute denying counsel to indigent defendants in defamation cases violated the right to counsel
required to satisfy the European Convention’s guarantee of a “fair hearing.”.
9
112A
may be, especially if opposed by a lawyer. Not surprisingly, studies consistently show that legal
representation makes a major difference in whether a party wins in cases decided in the courts.24
There are other problems, too, when parties lack counsel in civil proceedings. In seeking to
insure that justice is done in cases involving pro se litigants, courts must struggle with issues of
preserving judicial neutrality (where one side is represented and the other is not), balancing
competing demands for court time, and achieving an outcome that is understood by pro se
participants and does not lead to further proceedings before finality is reached. Meantime large
numbers of pro se litigants lose their families, their housing, their livelihood, and like
fundamental interests, losses many of them would not have sustained if represented by counsel.
Furthermore, the perception the courts do not treat poor people fairly has consequences for the
system itself. As California Chief Justice Ronald George recently observed, “[E]very day the
administration of justice is threatened…by the erosion of public confidence caused by lack of
access.”25
Whether cast as a constitutional imperative or a policy finding compelling a legislative remedy,
when litigants cannot effectively navigate the legal system, they are denied access to fair and
impartial dispute resolution, the adversarial process itself breaks down and the courts cannot
properly perform their role of delivering a just result. Absent a systemic response, access to the
courts will continue to be denied to many solely because they are unable to afford counsel.
Considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a State's failure to provide
individuals with a right of meaningful access to the courts.
Current Efforts to Establish a Civil Right to Counsel
For over two decades, the Lassiter decision appeared to paralyze serious consideration of a right
to counsel in civil cases. But in the last few years advocates around the country have taken up the
challenge with renewed vigor and strategic thinking.26 Some are exploring state law common law
24
See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in the
Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L.Rev. 533 (1992); Seron et al, The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor
Tenants in New York City's Housing Court: Results of A Randomized Experiment, 35 Law & Soc'y Rev. 419 (2001).
25
Chief Justice Ronald George, State of Judiciary Speech to California Legislature, 2001.
26
This renewed interest also is reflected in the academic literature. Marvy, Paul and Gardner, Debra, A Civil Right
To Counsel For the Poor, 32 Human Rights 8 (Summer 2005); Boyer, Bruce, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the
Right to Free Counsel For Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of
Durham, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 363 (2005); Nethercut, John, 'This Issue Will Not Go Away…': Continuing to Seek the
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 38 Clearinghouse Review 481 (2004); Smith, Jonathan, Civil Gideon, 18 MIE
Journal 4:3 (2004); Perluss, Deborah, Washington’s Constitutional Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Access to
Justice v. Fundamental Interest, 2 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 571 (2004); Klienman, Rachel, Housing Gideon: The
Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1507 (2004); Johnson, Earl, Will Gideon's Trumpet Sound
a New Melody? The Globalization of Constitutional Values and Its Implications for a Right to Equal Justice in Civil
Cases, 2 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 201 (2003); Johnson, Earl, Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in
the United States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. 83 (2000); Sweet, Robert, Civil Gideon
and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 503 (1998); Sweet, Robert, Civil Gideon and Justice in
the Trial Court (the Rabbi's Beard), 52 The Record of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 915 (1997); Young,
Rosalie, The Right to Appointed Counsel In Termination Of Parental Rights: The States' Response to Lassiter, 14
Touro L. Rev. 247 (1997); Scherer, Andrew, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for
Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 557 (1988); Werner, F. Toward a Right to
Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings, 17 Housing L. Bull. 65 (1987). Estrelle, Mark, Gideon's
Trumpet Revisited: Providing Rights of Indigent Defendants in Paternity Actions, 29 J. Fam. L. 1, 9 (1985);
10
112A
rights and constitutional guarantees of open courts and access to the courts as well as due process
and equal protection, through appellate advocacy and litigation. Others are pursuing a range of
legislative approaches. In each of what is already a significant number of states, a local broad-
based team of advocates has determined the route they believe is most likely to achieve success.
Many of those advocates have come together as the National Coalition for a Civil Right to
Counsel (NCCRC). The coalition provides information-sharing, training, networking,
coordination, research assistance, and other support to advocates pursuing, or considering
pursuing, a civil right to counsel. It includes well over a hundred advocates from legal services
programs, private law firms, state bar associations, law schools, national strategic centers and
state access to justice commissions, representing over 30 states. At present, there are active civil
right to counsel projects underway in at least eight jurisdictions and discussions are taking place
in a number of others.
Courts are also now being asked to revisit the issue. For example, a nonprofit poverty and civil
rights program and two major private firms in Maryland are actively pursuing recognition of the
civil right to counsel through an appellate strategy raising claims under the state’s constitution as
well as the common law this state imported from the mother country. In 2003, in the case of
Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 1000 (2003), they brought the question whether a poor person has
the right to appointed counsel in a civil case before Maryland’s highest appellate court. As part
of a coordinated effort, the state bar association and legal services programs filed amicus briefs
in support of the appellant’s right to counsel. The court avoided ruling on the issue by a 4-to-3
vote, finding in favor of the unrepresented litigant without reaching the issue. But an
impassioned 3-judge concurrence would have declared a civil right to counsel for the indigent
mother who faced a contested custody dispute without the assistance of counsel.
In Washington, advocates from the private bar, legal services, the state's three law schools, and
others have joined together to pursue judicial recognition of the civil right to counsel under the
state's constitution. To date, the group has litigated two cases. One involved a local city seeking
to remove a 77-year old disabled man from the home he built nearly 50 years earlier for alleged
building code violations. The other case involved an abusive husband asserting false allegations
through his attorney in order to obtain sole custody of his children. Both cases were ultimately
resolved in the appellate courts in ways that did not result in rulings on the right to counsel issue.
In Wisconsin advocates have filed appeals on behalf of indigent mothers seeking to retain
custody of their children from their abusive estranged husbands, contending the Wisconsin state
constitution guarantees them the right to counsel to defend their custodial rights. In Georgia, the
federal District Court, relying in part on the Georgia state constitution’s due process clause,
recently held that foster children have a right to counsel in all deprivation cases (elsewhere
known as dependency cases, abuse and neglect proceedings, etc.).27 And, in a recently filed test
case the Canadian Bar Association is seeking to establish a national right under their Constitution
to obtain civil legal aid in certain types of cases and challenging British Columbia’s current legal
aid plan as inconsistent with required standards for legal aid delivery for low-income Canadians.
Besharov, Douglas, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent’s Right to Counsel After Lassiter v. North
Carolina, 15 Fam. L. W. 205, 219, 221 (1981).
27
Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (D. Ga. 2005).
11
112A
In other states, new focus on legislative recognition of a right to counsel has emerged. In
California an effort is underway to draft a “model” statute, with alternative provisions regarding
certain key issues, which creates and defines the scope of a statutory entitlement to equal justice
including a right to counsel in appropriate circumstances. Recently, the State Bar of Texas
sought legislation providing a civil right to counsel for low income tenants in certain eviction
appeals cases. In New York this past June, the City Council appropriated $86,000 for a study of
the need for counsel in eviction proceedings and the costs and benefits of providing counsel to
tenants facing eviction. In addition, the New York State Equal Justice Commission has made
advocacy for a civil right to counsel a prominent part of its agenda.
The effort to establish a right to court appointed counsel is a part of the struggle to make justice a
matter of substance over form. More than 50 million people have incomes so low that they are
eligible for legal services from Legal Services Corporation-funded programs28 and millions more
survive on incomes so low they cannot afford lawyers when in serious legal jeopardy. Many also
have physical or mental disabilities or experience other barriers to navigating the legal system
without a lawyer. Yet over the past quarter century the federal government has reduced its
commitment to legal services by over 50%.
There is a crisis in equal justice, as documented above, and advocates are pursuing litigation and
legislative strategies that might force a change in prevailing practices. The resolution voices the
ABA’s support for these primarily state-law-based approaches. While it remains important to
look for the right in federal due process and equal protection law as the ultimate objective, the
resolution seeks to foster the evolution of a civil right to counsel on a state-by-state basis, rooted
in the unique provisions of each state’s constitution and laws. This approach is likely to achieve
significant results and provide doctrinal support for a future reconsideration of the right to civil
counsel under the federal constitution.
The Proposed Resolution Offers a Careful, Incremental Approach to Making Effective
Access to Justice a Matter of Right, Starting with Representation by Counsel in those
Categories of Matters in which Basic Human Needs Are at Stake.
The right proposed in this resolution is long overdue and deeply embedded in the nation’s
promise of justice for all. But it also represents an incremental approach, limited to those cases
where the most basic of human needs are at stake. The categories contained in this resolution are
considered to involve interests so fundamental and critical as to require governments to supply
lawyers to low income persons who otherwise cannot obtain counsel.
The resolution does not suggest that jurisdictions should limit their provision of counsel and
other law-related services to these high-priority categories. Rather it indicates that in these
categories they should guarantee no low income person is ever denied a fair hearing because of
their economic status. In other categories of legal matters, it is expected that each jurisdiction
will continue to supply legal services on the same basis as they have in the past. This includes
jurisdictions where courts have the constitutional, statutory, or inherent power to appoint counsel
in other categories of cases or for individuals who suffer impairments or unique barriers which
28
“CPS Annual Demographic Survey, March Supplement,”
http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032005/pov/new01_125_01.htm
12
112A
make it impossible for them to obtain a fair hearing in any cases unless they are represented by
lawyers.
The right defined in this resolution focuses on representation in adversarial proceedings; it does
not propose a generalized right to legal advice or to legal assistance unrelated to litigation in such
forums. “Adversarial proceedings” as defined in the resolution are intended to include both
judicial and some quasi-judicial tribunals, because many of the disputes involving the basic
human needs described below are, in one jurisdiction or another, allocated to administrative
agencies or tribunals. Indeed the label is often arbitrary. Cases a forum labeled a court would
hear in one jurisdiction will be heard by a tribunal labeled an administrative agency or hearing
officer or something else in other jurisdictions. The emphasis of the right articulated here is on
the adversarial nature of the process, not what the tribunal is called. Some courts as well as some
tribunals bearing another name function in an inquisitorial manner and without legal counsel. (In
many states, for instance, parties in the small claims court are not allowed to be represented by
lawyers and judges are expected to take an active role in developing the relevant facts. Similarly,
some states have created pro se processes through which litigants can quickly and effectively
access legal rights and protections without the need for representation by an attorney, for
example in simple uncontested divorces.)
The basic human needs identified in this resolution as most critical for low income persons and
families include at least the following: shelter, sustenance, safety, health and child custody.
• “Shelter” includes a person or family’s access to or ability to remain in an apartment or
house, and the habitability of that shelter.
• “Sustenance” includes a person or family’s sources of income whether derived from
employment, government monetary payments or “in kind” benefits (e.g., food stamps).
Typical legal proceedings involving this basic human need include denials of or
termination of government payments or benefits, or low-wage workers' wage or
employment disputes where counsel is not realistically available through market forces.
• “Safety” includes protection from physical harm, such as proceedings to obtain or
enforce restraining orders because of alleged actual or threatened violence whether in the
domestic context or otherwise.
• “Health” includes access to appropriate health care for treatment of significant health
problems whether that health care is financed by government (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid,
VA, etc.) or as an employee benefit, through private insurance, or otherwise.
• “Child custody” embraces proceedings where the custody of a child is determined or the
termination of parental rights is threatened.29
The above categories are considered to involve interests so fundamental and important as to
require governments to supply low income persons with effective access to justice as a matter of
right. There is a strong presumption this mandates provision of lawyers in all such cases. Trivial
threats, however, even to a basic human need would not warrant such an investment of legal
29
See generally, ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Children in Custody Cases (2003) which
includes suggested criteria to decide when counsel should be appointed for children in custody cases.
13
112A
resources. Nor need counsel be supplied at public expense in cases where a lawyer is available to
the litigant on a contingent fee basis. Furthermore, in some instances, there are informal
proceedings, such as welfare fair hearings, in which government expressly permits trained and
supervised non-lawyer advocates to represent both sides and where providing such
representation is often sufficient. In still other instances, jurisdictions have redesigned a few
select proceedings so they are not adversarial and also furnish self-help assistance sufficient to
permit a litigant to have a fair hearing without any form of representation before the court. In
such proceedings, the test is whether it can be honestly said the litigant can obtain a fair hearing
without being represented by a lawyer. With rare exceptions, this will be true only when certain
conditions are met: the substantive law and procedures are simple; both parties are
unrepresented; both parties are individuals and neither is an institutional party; both parties have
the intellectual, English language, and other skills required to participate effectively; and, the
proceedings are not adversarial, but rather the judge assumes responsibility for and takes an
active role in identifying the applicable legal standards and developing the facts.
This resolution focuses the right on “low income persons,” but leaves to each individual
jurisdiction the flexibility to determine who should be considered to fit within that category.
Rather than being bound by the current national LSC eligibility guidelines (which are widely
considered to be under-inclusive), it is anticipated jurisdictions will create their own criteria
taking account of the applicant’s income, net assets (if any), the cost of living and cost of legal
services in the state or locality, and other relevant factors in defining the population to which this
right attaches.
Because a civil right to counsel is likely to evolve in different ways in different jurisdictions, and
also because states presently invest at very different levels, it is difficult to estimate how much a
given jurisdiction will have to spend in additional public resources in order to implement such a
right. It is possible to estimate the maximum possible exposure at the national level, however,
from two sources – legal needs studies in the U.S. and the experience in other countries which
have implemented a right to counsel in civil cases. Although there are major disparities among
states, the United States is estimated to provide on average less than $20 of civil legal aid per
eligible poor person. Most needs studies conclude the U.S. is already meeting roughly 20 percent
of the need. This suggests the full need could be met if the U.S. raised the average to $100 per
eligible person. But the right advocated in this resolution is substantially narrower and thus could
be funded for substantially less than that. This conclusion is reinforced by the experience in
England which has a much broader right to counsel than proposed in this resolution and the most
generously funded legal aid program in the world, and furthermore uses a more costly delivery
system than the U.S.30 Yet it only spends in the neighborhood of $100 per eligible poor person.
Thus, it is reasonable to anticipate the narrower right advocated in this resolution at the worst
would result in a tripling of a jurisdiction’s current investment in civil legal aid – although it
might require somewhat more for states well below the national average and somewhat less for
those presently above that average.
30
England provides partially-subsidized counsel to those above its poverty line. But completely free civil legal aid
is available for the approximately 26 percent of the population below its poverty line, which amounts to
approximately 13.5 million people. The English legal aid program currently spends about 1.36 billion dollars
providing civil legal services to those in this lowest income stratum who are entitled to free legal services. That
amounts to slightly more than $100 per eligible person in this income category.
14
112A
In any event, put in perspective the increase would be a comparatively minor budgetary item in
most states. Compared to Medicaid, for example, which nationally costs over $200 billion a year
and spends nearly $4,200 per eligible person,31 devoting even as much as $60 to $100 per
eligible poor person in order to give them meaningful access to justice in their most urgent cases
appears to be a minimal and justifiable investment. Funding this right also would only bring the
total civil legal aid investment to about 1.5 percent of what American society currently spends on
lawyers in this country, about the same share as they had in 1980.32
It is often difficult to obtain clear public understanding of the needs of the justice system. The
third branch has historically struggled to obtain sufficient resources to fulfill its constitutional
mandates.33 Yet a peaceful and orderly society depends upon the effective functioning of the
justice system. Within the sphere of justice system funding, there is a hierarchy of poor and
poorer agencies. The courts are frequently under-funded. Even more resource starved are
systems for providing constitutionally-mandated services to indigent persons accused of crimes.
Last on the list are programs supplying civil legal aid. Implementation of a civil right to counsel
as proposed herein is not intended to set up a struggle for the crumbs of finite resources between
deserving, but oft-ignored constituencies. The result should not be a diminution of current or
future funds allocated for public defense, which is an area that has all too often been
inadequately supported by states and counties. Rather, it will be necessary for bar and judicial
leaders to assist in educating the public and policy-makers about the critical functions of these
parts of the justice system, and the need for our society to guarantee true access to justice for all.
Conclusion
In a speech at the 1941 meeting of the American Bar Association, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Wiley Rutledge observed:
“Equality before the law in a true democracy is a matter of right. It cannot be a matter of
charity or of favor or of grace or of discretion.”
If Justice Rutledge’s self-evident statement required proof, the past 130 years of legal aid history
have demonstrated its truth. Not only has equality before the law remained merely a matter of
charity in the United States, but that charity has proved woefully inadequate. The lesson from the
past 130 years is that justice for the poor as a matter of charity or discretion has not delivered on
31
2006 Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 136, reflecting Medicaid alone provided $213 billion in
health care to low income people. (This does not include the Medicare funds devoted to elderly poor in addition to
their Medicaid benefits. Nor does it include other public funds used for health clinics and other special health care
programs for low income patients. In 2003, a total of $279 billion was spent on the combination of Medicaid and
other health care for the nation’s low income residents. Table 122. This figure still did not include Medicare
payments for the elderly poor, however.)
32
According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 1263, individuals and institutions spent $194
billion on the services of lawyers in 2002. $3 billion would represent only 1.5 percent of that total societal
expenditure on lawyers. This 1.5 percent would be about the same share of total legal resources as low income
Americans had in FY 1980. That year the LSC budget was $321million with other public and private resources
supplying several million more in civil legal aid, while the total societal investment in lawyer services was $23
billion. This gave civil legal aid roughly 1.5 percent of the nation’s legal resources in that year.
33
See Funding the Justice System, A Report by the American Bar Association Special Committee on Funding the
Justice System (August, 1992).
15
112A
the promises of “justice for all” and “equal justice under law” that form the foundation of
America’s social contract with all its citizens, whether rich, poor, or something in between. The
Task Force and other proponents of this resolution are convinced it is time for this nation to
guarantee its low income people equality before the law as a matter of right, including the legal
resources required for such equality, beginning with those cases where basic human needs are at
stake. We are likewise convinced this will not happen unless the bench and bar take a leadership
role in educating the general public and policymakers about the critical importance of this step
and the impossibility of delivering justice rather than injustice in many cases unless both sides,
not just those who can afford it, are represented by lawyers.
Howard H. Dana, Jr., Chair

Task Force on Access to Civil Justice
August 2006
16
NORTHERN DIVISION
Don Hamrick )
5860 Wilburn Road )
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179 )
CLEBURNE COUNTY )
Plaintiff ) No. 4:06MC00025 WRW
) No. 4:06MC00026 GH
v. )
)
President George W. Bush, et al. )
Defendants )
"CIVIL GIDEON" MOTION

FOR A COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY
COMPETENT & PROFICIENT WITH THE RICO ACT
AND
WITH SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
I hereby proffer my Civil Gideon motion for a court-appointed attorney
competent and proficient with the RICO Act and with Second Amendment jurisprudence
and Constitutional Law. If no attorney competent and proficient in both areas of law is
available then I hereby motion for two court-appointed attorneys, one attorney
competent and proficient with the RICO Act and the other attorney competent and
proficient with Second Amendment jurisprudence and Constitutional Law because my
case is for the enforcement of laws enacted for the safety of seafarers under 28 U.S.C. §
1916 to which it falls under the American Bar Association's new "Civil Gideon" standard
for civil justice for the unrepresented civil plaintiff.
My case is intrinsically complex and as such I will be relying on David F. Herr's,
Annotated Manual for Complex Litigation, 4th Ed., 2006, $77.00, published by West
Group; and Paul A. Batista, Civil RICO Practice Manual, 2nd Edition, $220, by Aspen
Publishers with automatic supplementation and many other sources. I will also be filing
a Motion for Case Management due to the complexity of my case. It will be not only in
my best interest but there is a governmental interest that I be appointed competent
representation because my case could be considered as a case of first impression on the
distribution of power under the Tenth Amendment as an integral part of the checks and
balance of our system of government and as an integrated system for the Common
Defence through the Second Amendment rights of the People, especially under the
American Bar Associations new standard for "Civil Gideon" representation when State of
Federal government actions are contrary to the Bill of Rights and to the Common
Defence.
On August 7, 2006 the American Bar Association's Task Force on Access to Civil
Justice, et al, unanimously urged, "federal, state, and territorial governments to
provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons in
those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake,
such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody, as
determined by each jurisdiction."
Conclusion
In a speech at the 1941 meeting of the American Bar Association, U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Wiley Rutledge observed:
"Equality before the law in a true democracy is a matter of right. It cannot be a

matter of charity or of favor or of grace or of discretion."
If Justice Rutledge's self-evident statement required proof, the past 130 years of
legal aid history have demonstrated its truth. Not only has equality before the
law remained merely a matter of charity in the United States, but that charity
has proved woefully inadequate. The lesson from the past 130 years is that
justice for the poor as a matter of charity or discretion has not delivered on the
promises of "justice for all" and "equal justice under law" that form the
foundation of America's social contract with all its citizens, whether rich, poor,
or something in between. The Task Force and other proponents of this
resolution are convinced it is time for this nation to guarantee its low income
people equality before the law as a matter of right, including the legal resources
required for such equality, beginning with those cases where basic human needs
are at stake. We are likewise convinced this will not happen unless the bench
and bar take a leadership role in educating the general public and policymakers
about the critical importance of this step and the impossibility of delivering
justice rather than injustice in many cases unless both sides, not just those who
can afford it, are represented by lawyers.
Howard H. Dana, Jr., Chair
Task Force on Access to Civil Justice

August 2006
It is now the new legal standard that pro se civil plaintiffs do, in fact and law,
have a right to counsel on equal standing with criminal defendants.
The August 7, 2006, ABA Resolution countermands the August 1, 2006 letter
from James McCormark, Deputy clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Distri ct
of Arkansas, Office of the Clerk, Little Rock, Arkansas stating:
"Pro se litigants are not entitled to have counsel appointed to represent them in
a civil action. A judge has the authority to appoint counsel in exceptional
circumstances. If yhou want a judge to consider appointing counsel to
represent you, you may file a motion for appointment of lcounsel. In the motion,
you should explain why you think you need an attorney and any efforts you
have made to obtain counsel."
The significance of the ABA Resolution means that the federal judges will be less
likely to jerk me around the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as was done to me in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia with the anti-gun Judge Reggie B. Walton
when I have a court appointed attorney as a matter of right.
The full 16 page ABA Report to the House of Delegates is appended to this Civil
Gideon Motion for the courts education on Equal Rights Under the Law and the Right to
Substantial and Procedural Due Process.
Also appended are other documents of equal import to this subject matter.
Even if the ABA did not unanimously approve the Civil Gideon Resolution my
case is chock full of exceptional circumstancdes:
1. My case employes the RICO Act against the U.S. Government to allege
racketeering an unlawful and an unconstitutional protection scheme over the Second
Amendment. Had it not been for judicial bigotry/bias and misconduct against my case
because of its subject matter, and the fact that the DC Circuit, in Case No. 04-5316,
remanded my case for further proceedings on Second Amendment grounds my case has
constitutional merit not only on Second Amendment grounds but also on RICO Act
grounds, that is if I had a virtuous judge not biased by personal ideologies and political
influences.
2. My case has a lengthy series of Federal Questions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 such
as what role are U.S. seafarers supposed to have in homeland security when the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security has general superintendence over the U.S. merchant
marine under 46 U.S.C. § 2103 in regard to the Second Amendment and the Common
Defence clause of the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution?
3. Continuing retaliation and harassment of me by the U.S. Government for

exercising First Amendment rights to free speech, to petition, and freedom of assembly
for posting on the Internet an article criticising the U.S. Coast Guard for actions taken
against me regarding a criminal investigation of me by by U.S. Naval Criminal
Investigative Service at the request of the U.S. Coast Guard over a First Amendment
"free speech" and "freedom of the press" Second Amendment article on what innocent
murder victims see just before they are murdered by a criminal with a gun.
4. My Second Amendment case from a merchant seaman's point of view takes the
Second Amendment and views it through the Common Defence clause (Defence is the
original spelling as used) in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, and through the
Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments such that it could be consider a
case of first impression.
5. Because I have been an unrepresented civil plaintiff in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia (one of the most anti-Second Amendment locations in the
United States) and becuase my case was assigned to an anti-Second Amendment judge,
Reggie B. Walton who ruled that the Second Amendment does not apply to the District of
Columbia, the judge jerked me around the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unecessarily
delaying my case and causing me greater expense apparently hoping to bust me
financially and thereby unconstitutionally denying my right to substantial due process.
6. The list of judicial irregularities are too numerous to list here even though they
are worthy of a criminal investigation by the FBI and the Inspector General of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
I deserve fair treatment from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, Northern Division, if for no other reason than because I was treated as a
second class citizen with no First Amendment right to petition the government for
redress of grievances.
Respectfully
submitted
Don Hamrick
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas,
Northern Division 1, Batesville, Arkansas
Don Hamrick )
5860 Wilburn Road )
Wilburn, AR 72179 ) Is there any interest in justice?
PLAINTIFF ) Or does corruption and judicial
v. ) activism govern the rule of law?
President George W. Bush )
White House )
28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1)
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. ) 28 U.S.C.§ 1404(a)
)
Michael Chertoff, Secretary ) 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
Department of Homeland Security ) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; § 1985; § 1986; § 1988
Washington, DC )
) Civil Action No. _______________
Secretary ) Jury Trial Demanded
U.S. Transportation Security Administration ) Damages Sought: $9 million
Washington, DC )
)
Commandant (G-C) Nine Justices )
U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Supreme Court )
Washington, DC 1 First St., NE )
(1) Judge Reggie B. Walton )
(2) Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle Dennis Barghaan )
(3) Calendar Committee U.S. Attorney’s Office )
U.S. District Court for DC 2100 Jamieson Ave. )
333 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 22314 )
Washington, DC )
Anthony Campos, Dep. Marshal )
Chief Judge U.S. Marshals Service )
U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit 333 Constitution Ave., NW )
333 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC )
Washington, DC )
DEFENDANTS )
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION

A GAINST THE U.S. D EPARTMENT OF T RANSPORTATION (D O T),
THE U.S. D EPARTMENT OF H OMELAND S ECURITY ,
THE U.S. C OAST G UARD , THE FAA, AND THE CSM I/WSS, L TD .
P ERMANENTLY P ROHIBITING THE E NFORCEMENT OF THE D O T’S
“ACTION: DO NOT ADMIT” (B AR N OTICE)
A GAINST THE P LAINTIFF D ON H AMRICK
A ND FOR A P ERMANENT INJUNCTION A GAINST A NY O THER F EDERAL
A GENCY WITH S IMILAR A CTIONS (IF A NY )
On Thursday, August 10, 2006 I visited to U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters at 2100 2nd Street SW,
in the District of Colum bia as the unrepresented civil plaintiff and as a docum ented U.S. merchant seaman
unsuspecting that their was a U.S. Department of Transportation Bar Notice (ACTION: DO NOT ADM IT
DONALD HAM RICK File Number #04008 issued by Michael Prendergast, Associate Director of Security
Operations.
As a result my luggage was searched and a pair of scissors were confiscated without a giving me a
receipt on the basis that the scissors were a weapon. This constitutes theft of private property under color
of law. There was no reason to confiscate the scissors because the Plaintiff’s entrance into the Coast Guard
Headquarters was prohibited by the DoT. In addition to the confiscation of the scissors, a crowd of
lookyloos gathered around to watch the spectacle. This constitutes public humiliation and defamation.
That Bar Notice is attached herein. The notice does not detail any offense that would cause such a
notice to be issue. The only clue is the photo that is included in the Bar Notice. This photo is shows the
plaintiff Don Hamrick sitting in front of a computer. That photo is of poor reproduction quality from a copy
machine such that the face cannot be seen. There is no clue as to when or where that photograph was
taken. The Plaintiff had himself photographed at an Internet Café in Klapeida, Lithuania in 2002 after the
Capt. J. P. Brusseau of the U.S. Coast Guard in Washington, DC had the Plaintiff taken off the U.S.
Government vessel anchored off the coast of Lithuania in an ignorant and misguided act of retaliation over
the Plaintiff’s emailing of a publishable article and what innocent murder victims see the split moment
they are killed by a crim inal with a gun. The article was intended to be a Second Amendment article in
support of the Plaintiff’s application for “National Open Carry Handgun” endorsement on his Merchant
M ariner’s Document.
The Capt. Brusseau dispatched two civilian special agents of the European Branch of the U.S.
Naval Criminal Investigative Service to conduct a criminal interview with the Plaintiff. The duration of the
interview was 2 hours and was held the Plaintiff’s hotel room in Klapeida, Lithuania. The NCIS special
agents were satisfied that the Plaintiff intended no harm toward Capt. Brusseau or anyone in the U.S. Coast
Guard so the Plaintiff was led to believe.
Now comes this DoT Bar Notice that is now 2 years old. The Plaintiff was never inform ed of this
action against him. He was given no opportunity to respond to any allegations causing the issuance of the
Bar Notice.
Retaliating Against the Plaintiff for

Exercising His First Amendment Right to Petition
This Bar Notice violates the Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to petition the government for
redress of grievances. It violates my right to travel. It violates my duty to visit the Coast Guard on merchant
marine business. It is retaliatory in nature for criticisms against the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S.
Government over the Second Amendment.
The Plaintiff was instructed that he would be arrested if he again attem pt to enter the U.S. Coast
Guard Headquarters, the DoT, the FAA facilities in the District of Columbia without approval from OST
Security Operations. That alone in conjunction with the photograph in the Bar Notice establishes a
tortuous retaliatory action relating to his lawsuit for defamation and damages against the U.S. Coast Guard
ii
in 2002.
42 U.S.C. § 1981. Equal rights under the law.

(a) Statem ent of equal rights.
(b) ''M ake and enforce contracts'' defined.
(c) Protection against impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights.

(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror.
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges.
42 U.S.C. § 1986. Action for neglect to prevent.
42 U.S.C. § 1987. Prosecution of violation of certain laws.
42 U.S.C. § 1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights.
The Plaintiff had a First Amendment right to petition incursion with the U.S. Marshals Service and
was told not to enter the District of Columbia. Presuming there may be a connection with the DoT’s
retaliatory Bar Notice the Plaintiff requests the Permanent Injunction to include any and all federal
agencies prohibiting any enforcement orders prohibiting the Plaintiff from free and unfettered access to
federal buildings and agencies.
This incident will be included as evidence of an ongoing conspiracy to harass the Plainiff over his
Second Amendment case. I will soon be filing my amended Civil RICO Act Complaint with the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Northern Division. The amended complaint is now more
than 2,000 pages.
iii
The Original Photo! The Plaintiff’s location here was at an Internet café in Klapeida, Lithuania
wrongfully detained for 12 days because Capt. Brusseau had the Plaintiff above taken from his
employed ship for questioning aboard the attached Second Amendment article. The very next
day after being taken from the ship the Plaintiff’s ship departed for a 10-day U.S. naval exercise.
The Plaintiff nearly lost his employment over this incident but he persuaded his employment
company (managing the U.S. Government pre-position ship) to allow him to return to the ship
because the incident occurred due to no fault or wrongdoing by the Plaintiff. The Capt.
Brusseau’s vivid imagination perceived a threat where none existed. Common sense and
reasoning are the the casualties of war against terrorism. An innocent Second Amendment
article is snowballing into an national U.S. Government retaliation against the Plaintiff for
simply criticizing Capt. Brusseau specifically and the U.S. Government generally. The the rate
of escalation of this snowball effect the Plaintiff fears that he may be facing arrest on some
trumped up charges sometime in the future. Is Plaintiff’s Second Amendment case for National
Open Carry Handgun somehow the real source of the U.S. Government’s retaliation? The
Plaintiff seeks a cease and desist order from the Court prohibiting the U.S. Government from
harassing the Plaintiff when there is no probable cause for any stop & search or any arrest
resulting therefrom.
The only way the Department of Transportation could have gotten this photo was from the
Internet. The
iv
The Plaintiff hereby m otions for the Perm anent Injunction and for such other relief the Court my
deem necessary.
Respectfully submitted.
Don Hamrick
5860 W ilburn Road
W ilburn, Arkansas 72179
Em ail: ki5ss@ yahoo.com
Em ail: 4donhamrick@ gmail.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On August 10, 2006, I, Don Hamrick, hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the above by Federal
Express Ground to:
M Paul D. Clement, Solicitor General

Room 5614;
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave.
NW ; W ashington, DC 20530-0001
M M ichael Chertoff, Secretary

Department of Homeland Security
W ashington, DC
M Executive Secretary
M arine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection
Comm andant (G-LRA)
U.S. Coast Guard
2100 Second St.
W ashington, DC 20593
M M ichael Prendergast
Associate Director of Security Operations
Department of Transportation
Don Hamrick, Petitioner, Pro Se

5860 W ilburn Road
W ilburn, Arkansas 72179
(501) 728-4235
4donhamrick@ gmail.com
v
PLAINTIFF' DISCLAIMER: I did not commit any offense to which this DOT Bar Notice falsely alleges.
This DOT Bar Notice is pure and simple harassment in retaliation for my lawsuit that includes the U.S.
Coast Guard. Motion for Permanent Injunction pending, but the judge is sitting on it.
PLAINTIFF' DISCLAIMER: I did not commit any offense to
which this DOT Bar Notice falsely alleges. This DOT Bar
Notice is pure and simple harassment in retaliation for my
lawsuit that includes the U.S. Coast Guard. Motion for
Permanent Injunction pending, but the judge is sitting on it.
NORTHERN DIVISION (BATESVILLE)
Don Hamrick )
5860 Wilburn Road )
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179 )
CLEBURNE COUNTY )
Plaintiff ) No. 4:06MC00025 WRW
) No. 4:06MC00026 GH
v. )
)
President George W. Bush, et al. )
Defendants )
MOTION FOR TEMPARY/PERMANENT INJUNCTION
MOTION FOR SUBPOENA OF EVIDENCE
FOLLOW UP
I previously submitted a Motion for a Permanent Injunction to this Court that I

had earlier submitted to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The DC
Court has yet to rule on the motion but I suspect the motion will be denied as the DC
Court has continuously shown a hostile bias against my Second Amendment case. Even if
the DC Court denies or even grants my motion, the DC Court does not have jurisdiction
and the case in that court is VOID even though Judge Reggie B. Walton is now acting in
defiance of 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1) since he has denied my motion to transfer my case to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Northern Division.
Last week or so I visited the U.S. Coast Guard on intended maritime business for
the purpose of inquiry into public documents that could be used as evidence supporting
my case. I do not have an attorney and must to the work of an attorney myself. I was
unaware of any 2004 Bar Notice against me prohibiting me from entering any DOT,
FAA, or U.S. Coast Guasrd buildings in Washington, DC. I was never notified. I was
given a faxed copy of that 2004 Bar Notice by security personnel at the U.S. Coast Guard
Headquarters in Washington, DC.
Now comes Michael Prendergast, Associate Director, Security Operations, U.S.

Department of Transportation again issuing another Bar Notice on August 11, 2006
citing 41 C.F.R. 102-74.390 What is the Policy Concerning Disturbances? and the
District of Columbia code IV DC Code § 22-3302. Unlawful Entry on Property.
I attach herein a copy of Mr. Prendergast's letter dated August 11, 2006. In that
letter as with his letter from 2004 he does not state any offense that I am alleged to have
committed under the cited laws. He does not offer instructions for any appeals procedure
or any rights to appeal that I may have to refute the Bar Notice.
The 2004 Bar Notice used a photograph of me that was only available on the
Internet as part of a "news bulletin" criticizing the U.S. Coast Guard for actions taken
against me over an emailed article on the Second Amendment on what innocent
murdered victims see just before they are shot to death because they did not have a
handgun for personal protection under the Second Amendment.
On August 11, 2006, Mr. Prendergrast issues another Bar Notice against me
because I had peaceably visited the U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, DC
as the unrepresented civil plaintiff pursuing my case for evidence from available public
documents in addition to maritime business related to my occupation as a merchant
seaman. At no time did I conduct myself in a disorderly fashion. The security personnel
conducted themselves in the imaginary belief that I as causing a disturbance and in fact
confiscation my scissors on the preposterous accusation that the scissors wear a weapon.
The security personnel clearly over reacted to whatever was in their database under my
name.
----------------------------
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

Title 41 -- Public Contracts and Property Management
Chapter 102 -- Federal Management Regulation
Part 102-74 -- Facility Management -- Table of Contents
Subpart C -- Conduct on Federal Property
41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390 What is the policy concerning disturbances?
All persons entering in or on Federal property are prohibited from loitering, exhibiting
disorderly conduct or exhibiting other conduct on property which:
• (a) Creates loud or unusual noise or a nuisance;

• (b) Unreasonably obstructs the usual use of entrances, foyers, lobbies, corridors,
offices, elevators, stairways, or parking lots;
• (c) Otherwise impedes or disrupts the performance of official duties by
Government employees; or
• (d) Prevents the general public from obtaining the administrative services
provided on the property in a timely manner.
----------------------------
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE

Division IV. Criminal Law and Procedure and Prisoners.
Title 22. Criminal Offenses and Penalties. (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle I. Criminal Offenses.
Chapter 33. Trespass; Injuries to Property.
IV DC Code § 22-3302. Unlawful entry on property.
Any person who, without lawful authority, shall enter, or attempt to enter, any public or
private dwelling, building, or other property, or part of such dwelling, building, or other
property, against the will of the lawful occupant or of the person lawfully in charge
thereof, or being therein or thereon, without lawful authority to remain therein or
thereon shall refuse to quit the same on the demand of the lawful occupant, or of the
person lawfully in charge thereof, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on
conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $100 or imprisonment in
the Jail for not more than 6 months, or both, in the discretion of the court.
----------------------------
Mr. Prendergast's citing from the U.S. Code and from the DC Code does not make
for allegations supportive for any Bar Nodes. That is no different than me citing the law
on Fraud and False Statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 as an allegation against Mr. Prendergast
without providing any evidence to support the crime. Hence my motion for a subpoena
so that I can gather the evidence to defend myself against the Mr. Prendergast's Bar
Notice and reclaim my reputation.
Since I initiated my lawsuits in 2002 I have made it a personal goal to conduct

myself in a professional, cordial, respectful, and a dignified manner as an unrepresented
plaintiff with a potential landmark Second Amendment case. It is because my Second
Amendment case has the potential to be a landmark case that I would be doing
everything, from filing pleadings to visiting federal agencies, in a lawful, respectfull, and
dignified manner.
If there was any perceived disturbances as presumed to be the basis of Mr.

Prendergast's Bar Notices the would have had to be frabricated out of whole cloth in
order to subvert my efforts at proving my civil case against the U.S. Coast Guard. What
better way that to concoct false allegations of a disturbance at the U.S. Coast Guard
building? Who is to know the real truth if such a Bar Notice contested in front of a
federal judge?
Compounding the direct relationship between the U.S. Coast Guard and I the
U.S. Department of Justice through Assistance U.S. Attorney Dennis Barghaan, U.S.
Attorney's Office in Alexandria have done much to employ every dirty trick in the book to
prevent my case from proceeding past their Motion to Dismiss. Then when I win my
Second Amendment part of my case on appeal at the DC Circuit and my case is
remanded to the U.S. District Court for DC (even though I did not know I had filed my
case in the wrong U.S. District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1)) for further
proceedings the the District Court Judge Reggie B. Walton pulled a "Let's redo Rule 7"
with his deceptive "Scheduling Order" instead of issuing a proper "Scheduling Order"
under Rule 16 and Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The U.S. District Court for DC and the U.S. Department of Justice have been
jerking me around the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as if I am too ignorant as an
unrepresented civil plaintiff to know what is going on. Now, the U.S. Department of
Transporation, the U.S. Coast Guard are exacerbating the situation with false allegation
such that the Department of Transportation is interjecting itself as gatekeeper on when
and where I can exercise my First Amendment right to petition as an unrepresented civil
plaintiff with a federal civil rights case. The Department of Transportation is violating
my right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and my Fifth Amendment
right by issuing their Bar Notice without any opportunity for me to attend a hearing to
defend myself against any allegations (if any allegation ever existed).
The U.S. Coast Guard is clearly acting in retaliation over my exercising my First
Amendment rights to free speech in publicizing my criticism of the U.S. Coast Guard and
my right to petition in filing a civil case for mandamus, for damages, and in subsequently
filing a civil RICO Act case against the U.S. Coast Guard and against other parties.
This is why the federal courts are supposed to be fair tribunals guarding against
any transgressions from the Federal and State Governments against the rights of the
People. It is the degree and the repetition of the Federal Courts deferring to the
Executive Branch that determines whether or not the Judicial Branch is truly
independent from the whims of the Executive Branch. As an unrepresented civil plaintiff
I pray that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Northern Division
will remain fair and impartial in my RICO Act case against the United States
Government over the Second Amendment.
I hereby motion for the Court to issue a temporary injunction and subsequently if
there is determined to be no basis in fact and law for Mr. Prendergast's Bar Notices
against me that the temporary injunction becomes a permanent injunction.
I further motion for the Court to issue a subpoena to the Department of

Transportation and the U.S. Coast Guard for any and all evidence alleged to have been
used as the basis for Mr. Prendergast's Bar Notices.
Respectfully submitted
Don Hamrick
United States District Court For the District of Columbia
DON HAM RICK , U.S. MERCHANT SEAMAN )
5860 Wilburn Road ) Should have read "Wrong Venue"
Wilburn, AR 72179 )
PLAINTIFF, pro se ) CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
v. )
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH ) 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988
White House )
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. ) CIVIL ACTION #: 03-2160 RBW
)
ALBERTO GONZALES , ATTORNEY GENERAL )
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
)
)
This Case Is Void for
Washington, DC 20530-0001 )
)
Lack of Jurisdiction
MICHAEL CHERTOFF , SECRETARY ) 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1)
Department of Homeland Security )
Washington, DC 20528 ) UNITED STATES AS DEFENDANT
) Any civil action in a district court against the
ADM . THOM AS H. COLLINS ) United States under subsection (a) of section
1346 of this title may be prosecuted only:
Commandant (G-C) )
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in the
U.S. Coast Guard )
judicial district where the plaintiff resides;
CAPT . SALERNO , DIRECTOR ,

Field Activities, Marine Safety, Sec, &
)
)
)
The Plaintiff Resides
Environmental Protection
Commandant (G-MO)
)
) in Arkansas!
U.S. Coast Guard )
)
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
REP . FRANK LO BIONDO (R-NJ) ) CHANGE OF VENUE
House Subcommittee on Coast Guard )
and Maritime Transportation )
Washington, DC )
RESPONDENTS )
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS

BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF IS A RESIDENT OF ARKANSAS THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR DC DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
Plaintiff’s Cases Nos. 02-1434, 02-1435, 03-2160, and all
Subsequent Appeals are Void for Lack of Jurisdiction
P LAINTIFF’S M OTION FOR C URE U NDER 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),
IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE T HE P LAINTIFF D EMANDS T HAT H IS
C ASE B E IMMEDIATELY T RANSFERRED T O T HE U.S. D ISTRICT C OURT
FOR THE E ASTERN D ISTRICT OF A RKANSAS , N ORTHERN D IVISION 1
NOTICE!
The Plaintiff will immediately re-file his updated (new) Mandamus
& Civil RICO Act cases with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, Northern Division (Little Rock/Batesville,
Arkansas) whether or not Judge Reggie B. Walton recognizes that
this case (No. 03-2160) is VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION under
28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1). “In the interest of justice,” Judge Walton,
among others, will be named as co-defendants in Plaintiff’s new
Civil RICO Act case.
CASE LAW FOR THIS MOTION

“It is said that absolute judicial immunity is favored as public policy, so that judges may
fearlessly, and safe from retribution, adjudicate matters before them. True. But equally important,
is the public expectation that judicial authority will only be wielded by those lawfully vested
with such authority.”
MY CASE IS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION judicial immunity of judicial acts. See:
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 98 L.Ed.2d
Under federal Law, which is applicable to
555, 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988); Atkinson-Baker &
all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
Assoc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d 1452 at 1454, (9th Cir.
“if a court is without authority, its judgments
1993).
and orders are regarded as nullities. They are
not voidable, but simply void, and form no JUDICIAL ACTION WITHOUT JURISDICTION IS
bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a LAW LESS VIOLENCE
reversal in opposition to them. They
“No judicial process, whatever form it
constitute no justification and all persons
may assume, can have any lawful authority
concerned in executing such judgments or
outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the
sentences are considered, in law, as
court or judge by whom it is issued; and an
trespassers.” Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340,
attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries
26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
is nothing less than lawless violence.”
JUDGE WALTON HAS NO JUDICIAL IM M UNITY Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859).
FROM RICO ACT CIVIL LAW SUIT
JUDGE WALTON IS NOT ABOVE THE LAW
When a judge knows that he lacks
“No man in this country is so high that he
jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid
is above the law. No officer of the law may set
statutes expressly depriving him of
that law at defiance, with impunity. All the
jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost. Rankin
officers of the government, from the highest to
v. Howard, (1980) 633 F.2d 844, cert den.
the lowest, are creatures of the law are bound
Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939,
to obey it.
68 L.Ed 2d 326. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct.
2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326 It is the only supreme power in our system
of government, and every man who, by
Administrative-capacity torts by a judge
accepting office participates in its functions, is
do not involve the “performance of the
only the more strongly bound to submit to
function of resolving disputes between
that supremacy, and to observe the limitations
parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating
which it imposes on the exercise of the
private rights,” and therefore do not have the
authority which it gives.” United States v. Lee,
12
106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed Federal Courts and ultimately, disrespect for
171 (1882) the law.” Roadway Express v. Pipe, 447 U.S.
752 at 757 (1982)
THE CORRUPT U.S. DEPARTM ENT OF JUSTICE
PLEADING FOR PROPER JUSTICE
“It is deeply distressing that the
Department of Justice, whose mission is to “Pleadings are intended to serve as a
protect the constitutional liberties of the means of arriving at fair and just settlements
people of the United States, should even of controversies between litigants. They
appear to be seeking to subvert them by should not raise barriers which prevent the
extreme and dubious legal argument.” United achievement of that end. Proper pleading is
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I at 16 (1976) important, but its importance consists in its
effectiveness as a means to accomplish the
“I do not understand the government to
end of a just judgment.” Maty v. Grasselli
contend that it is any less bound by the
Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938)
obligation than a private individual would
be...” “It is not the function of our government “The assertion of federal rights, when
to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is plainly and reasonably made, are not to be
the function of the citizen to keep the defeated under the name of local practice.”
government from falling into error.” Perry v. Davis v. Wechler, 263 U.S. 22, 24; Stromberb
United States, 204 U.S. 330, 358 v. California, 283 U.S. 359; NAACP v.
Alabama, 375 U.S. 449
“Crime is contagious. If the Government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for Pro se pleadings are to be considered
law; it invites every man to become a law unto without regard to technicality; pro se litigants’
himself; it invites anarchy.” Olmstad v. pleadings are not to be held to the same high
United States, (1928) 277 U.S. 438 standards of perfection as lawyers. Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking
“Due to sloth, inattention or desire to seize
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240;
tactical advantage, lawyers have long engaged
Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233
in dilatory practices... the glacial pace of
much litigation breeds frustration with the
“Even where the shoot ‘em up TV News is concerned, any highjacked plane
whatsoever is considered big news, but when a ship is taken forever, and
its crew murdered — no one seems to care.”
Eric Ellen
Society’s commitment to institutional justice requires that judges

be solicitous of the rights of persons who come before the court.
Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1973) 10 Cal.3d
270, 286
13
T HE B IAS OF JUDGE R EGGIE B. W ALTON !
Written directly to Judge Reggie B. Walton in the first person:
To use an analogy from the old western cowboy movies there is presently a litigious bar
room brawl going on in the federal courts over the Second Amendment and I am in the midst of
it fighting for the American merchant seamen’s perspective. But while everyone else, judges and
lawyers, are volleying their legal arguments point blank like civil war canon fire I am ignored, left
with no one to engage with my own legal artillery simply because I am an unrepresented plaintiff.
This is judicial bigotry of the most egregious kind.
Your SCHEDULING ORDER , Judge Walton, whether written by you or your clerk, displays an
incorrect date of August 16, 2006, for the Court’s dismissal of the Plaintiff’s case with prejudice.
The correct date is August 26, 2004. Because August 16, 2006 is more than a month into the future
the lack of attention to accuracy this exemplifies is more than a simple typo. This Freudian slip
indicates, you have a general bias against Second Amendment cases and/or against unrepresented
plaintiffs. You have allowed an simple chronological error to be entered into the record of my
case. This error is evidence of a sloppiness with which my present case and my original cases
under Judge Edith Segal Huvelle have been handled.
Judge Edith Segal Huvelle dismissed my original cases with prejudice in 2002. But the
Docket Report for my case No. 02-1435, shows that the case was dismissed “without” prejudice.
Just how sloppy is the U.S. District Court for DC?
On January 26, 2006 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit issued their order
affirming the lower Court’s dismissal of my RICO Act claims but “remanded for further
proceediongs” on Second Amendment grounds. The following is excerpted from the DC Circuit’s
FURTHER ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that appellant’s Second

Amendment claims against the non-judicial defendants, challenging federal
firearms statutes and the denial of his “National Open Carry Handgun”
endorsement be remanded for further7 proceedings. Compare United States
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), and United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161
(10th Cir. 2001), with U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227, 260-61 (5th Cir.
2001). The evidence suggests appellant filed an opposition to appellees’
motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Case No. 03cv2160, Docket No. 64, Appellees’
Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, these Second
Amendment claims are not barred by res judicata. See Hoffman v. Blaski,
363 U.S. 335, 340 n.9 (1960); United States v. Dean, 752 F.2d 535, 541 (11th
7
My emphasis.
14
Cir. 1985); see also SEC v. Bilzerian, 378 F.3d 1100, 1102 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
2004). It is
Definition of “Further”
Oxford Diction defines “further” to be:
used as comparative of far.
>adverb (also farther)
1 at, to, or by a greater distance.
2 over a greater expanse of space or time.
3 beyond the point already reached.
4 at or to a more advanced or desirable stage.
5 in addition; also.
>adjective
1 (also farther) more distant in space.
**2 additional.**
>verb
help the progress or development of.
The DC Circuit used the phrase “remanded for further proceedings” in their order. The
word “proceedings” is a noun. That makes the word “further” an adjective synonymous with the
word “additional.” Therefore, my case is “remanded for additional proceedings.”
To my understanding I beat the Government’s Motion to Dismiss on

Second Amendment grounds. And to my understanding “further
proceedings” (additional proceedings) means that my case moves forward
to the Discovery Phase if the U.S. District Court for DC had jurisdiction.
Your SCHEDULING ORDER clearly subjects me to REPEATING RULE 7 PROCEEDINGS

as the following excerpt from your Scheduling Order undeniably proves:
ORDERED that the defendants shall file an answer or otherwise respond to

the plaintiff’s complaint by August 4, 2006. The plaintiff shall file an
opposition to any motion filed by the defendants by September 1, 2006 and
the defendants reply shall by filed by September 15, 2006.
You are violating not only my right to due process but the Canons of ethics as a judge. How
corrupt can you get jerking around an unrepresented civil plaintiff preventing me from
proceeding to the Discovery Phase by giving the United States another chance to file a Motion to
Dismiss?
15
You are corruptively using Rule 7(a) Pleadings when you should be using Rule 16
Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management and Rule 26 Discovery. You are bending over
backwards to let the defendant United States have its way. You are pulling another dirty trick in
a long chronology of dirty tricks between the bench and bar in the belief that the Plaintiff is too
ignorant with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to know what is going on. The sentiments that
I have just expressed above falls under Canon 1. All this if you had jurisdiction!
CANON 1
A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY
A. An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high
standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of
this Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective.
Commentary:
Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence8
in the integrity and independence of judges. The integrity and independence of
judges depends in turn upon their acting without fear or favor. A judiciary of
integrity9 is one in which judges are known for their probity, fairness, honesty,
uprightness, and sound-ness of character. An independent judiciary is one free of
inappropriate outside influences. Although judges should be independent, they
must comply with the law, including the provisions of this Code. Public confidence
in the impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the adherence of each judge to
this responsibility. Conversely, violation of this Code diminishes public confidence
in the judiciary and thereby does injury to the system of government under law.
The evidence I have shows that you have no integrity. You were selected or you got
yourself select to preside over my case by questionable methods. Because my opinion and lack
of confidence in you are reasonably based on the record contained in my Docket Report you are
obligated by law and ethics to recuse yourself. I vehemently demand that you immediately recuse
yourself without hesitation or at least grant my MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE in the interest of
justice to the Eastern District of Arkansas, Northern Division 1, Batesville, Arkansas, in
accordance with the following federal laws:
28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1), UNITED STATES AS DEFENDANT :

Any civil action in a district court against the United States
under subsection (a) of section 1346 of this title may be
prosecuted only:
8
My em phasis.
9
My em phasis.
16
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in the judicial district
where the plaintiff resides;
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), CHANGE OF VENUE :
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), CURE OR W AIVER OF DEFECTS :
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in
the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or
division in which it could have been brought.
M The Plaintiff resides in the State of Arkansas.
M The Plaintiff’s case names the United States as Defendant.
M The “interest of justice” has priority over “convenience of parties
and witnesses” under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
On January 13, 2004, Judge Richard W. Reynolds, the original judge, granted my Motion
for Recusal with his “ORDER OF RECUSAL .”
On January 14, 2004, Judge Walton issued his Order dismissing Seegars v. Ashcroft, Case
No. 03-834, a Second Amendment case challenging gun control laws of the District of Columbia,
in which he ruled that “the Second Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia.”
On January 20, 2004, just one week later, Judge Reynolds revised his “ORDER OF RECUSAL ”
by denying my Motion for Recusal but magnanimously recusing himself sua sponte as if to save
face procedurally for the record at the expense of my right to due process.
17
JUDGE R EYNOLDS’ O RDER OF R ECUSAL JUDGE R EYNOLDS’ R EVISED O RDER OF R ECUSAL
January 13, 2004 January 20, 2004
Plaintiff Don Hamrick has filed an action against United Plaintiff Don Hamrick has filed an action against United
States Attorney General John Ashcroft and others, and the States Attorney General John Ashcroft and others, and the
action was randomly assigned to me. Plaintiff has filed a action was randomly assigned to me. Plaintiff has filed a
motion for recusal, alleging that an appearance of motion for recusal, alleging that an appearance of
impropriety exists because I was appointed by former impropriety exists because I was appointed by former
President Clinton. Plaintiff offers no evidence that could President Clinton. Plaintiff offers no evidence that could
reasonably call into question my impartiality in these reasonably call into question my impartiality in these
proceedings on the basis of my status as a Clinton proceedings on the basis of my status as a Clinton
appointee. appointee. Accordingly, his motion will be denied.
However, there is now pending in the United States Court of However, there is now pending in the United States Court of
Federal Claims a class action lawsuit filed by a class of Federal Claims a class action lawsuit filed by a class of
present and former Department of Justice attorneys seeking present and former Department of Justice attorneys seeking
damages against the United States for alleged violations of damages against the United States for alleged violations of
the Federal Employees Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541-97 the Federal Employees Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541-97 (1994).
(1994). See John Doe, et al., on behalf of themselves and all See John Doe, et al., on behalf of themselves and all other
other similarly situated v. United States, Civil Action No. similarly situated v. United States, Civil Action No. 98-896C.
98-896C. I am currently a member of that class. Since I am currently a member of that class. Since Canon 3C(1) of
Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Conduct for United States the Code of Conduct for United States Judges requires a
Judges requires a judge to “disqualify himself . . . in a judge to “disqualify himself . . . in a proceeding in which the
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” the
be questioned,” the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference
Judicial Conference of the United States has opined that of the United States has opined that recusal is required from
recusal is required from any proceeding in which the any proceeding in which the Attorney General appears as a
Attorney General appears as a real party in interest, unless real party in interest, unless a waiver of such disqualification
a waiver of such disqualification pursuant to Canon 3D1 is pursuant to Canon 3D 1 is submitted by all parties involved in
submitted by all parties involved in the suit. the suit.
Plaintiff’s motion for recusal makes plain that he would not Plaintiff’s motion for recusal makes plain that he would not
waive my disqualification under Canon 3C(1). Thus, my waive my disqualification under Canon 3C(1). Thus, my
recusal from this case is now appropriate. For the reasons recusal from this case is now appropriate. For the reasons
stated above, it is therefore stated above, it is therefore
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for recusal [4] be, and ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for recusal [4] be, and
hereby is, GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to hereby is, DENIED. However, I am recusing myself sua
reassign this matter to the Calendar Committee. Because sponte. The Clerk of the Court is directed to reassign this
United States District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle of this matter to the Calendar Committee. Because United States
Court is also a named defendant in this suit, I District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle of this Court is also a
recommend to the Calendar Committee that it seek to named defendant in this suit, I recommend to the
have a judge from another district assigned to this Calendar Committee that it seek to have a judge from
matter. another district assigned to this matter.
1. 1.
When the general provisions of Canon 3C(1) serve as the When the general provisions of Canon 3C(1) serve as the
basis for disqualification, Canon 3D permits a judge to basis for disqualification, Canon 3D permits a judge to
continue to participate in a proceeding if all of the parties and continue to participate in a proceeding if all of the parties and
lawyers, after notice of the basis for the disqualification, lawyers, after notice of the basis for the disqualification,
agree in writing to waive the disqualification under a agree in writing to waive the disqualification under a
procedure independent of the judge’s participation. procedure independent of the judge’s participation.
18
EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION WITH JUDGE REGGIE B. WALTON
The Plaintiff notes that Judge Roberts recommended to the Calendar Committee that they
“seek to have a judge from another district assigned to this matter.” This recommendation is
in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1), UNITED STA TES AS DEFENDANT ; 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
CHANGE OF VENUE ; and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), CURE OR W AIVER OF DEFECTS .
However it happened that you got yourself assigned to my case in defiance of Judge
Roberts’ recommendation to the Calendar Committee and in defiance of my questioning your
suitability to preside over my case because federal laws were broken and this criminal conduct
deserves an investigation by the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Justice.
On February 27, 2004, in denying my Motion for Recusal you patently lied (perjured
yourself) about the facts for recusal in your Order. Excerpted from your Order:
. . . In addition, the Court notes that it appears that the plaintiff is seeking
for this judge to recuse himself from this case because of an opinion that
this judge issued in Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2004),
involving a challenge pursuant to the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution.1 The plaintiff apparently seeks for this judge to recuse
himself because his claims either involve or are related to the Second
Amendment. Because such a request has no merit, the Court would also
deny this request. Accordingly, it is hereby this 27th day of February 2004
You noted the existence of my November 10, 2003 Motion for Recusal against Judge
Roberts containing my apprehension about your impartiality because of the Seegars case in
footnote 1 on page 1 of your Order denying recusal.
The truth isthat Judge Reynolds recommended “to the Calendar Committee that it seek to
have a judge from another district assigned to this matter” and this recommendation is in
compliance with federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1), UN ITED STATES AS DEFENDANT . How you got
assigned to my case is cause enough for change of venue to Arkansas!
1
The Court notes that in a November 10, 2003 motion, the plaintiff requested that Judge Richard Roberts
of this Court recuse himself from this case and that this case not be assigned to this judge because of the Seegars
case.
19
CANON 3
A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IM PARTIALLY AND
DILIGENTLY
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those
in which disqualification is required.
(2) A judge shall be faithful to the law* and maintain professional
competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public
clamor or fear of criticism.
(3) A judge shall require* order and decorum in proceedings before the
judge.
CONTEMPTUOUS DENIAL OF STATUTORY RIGHT UNDER 28 U.S.C § 1916.

You, and every other judge of the U.S. District Court for DC and the DC Circuit have
refused to rule on my Motions concerning the statutory right of the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1916 and whether or not Docket Report fees of PACER Service, Inc. are including in that
statutory right. This too is judicially criminal behavior when viewed with all the other dirty tricks
pulled by the bench and bar to keep my case from proceeding to trial.
My statutory right as a seaman to file cases without prepaying filing fees or court costs
under the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916, has been denied by the DC Circuit and the U.S.
Supreme Court on more than one occasion. I have taken every conceivable recourse to correct
this injustice. I have filed motions with the U.S. District Court/DC, the U.S. District Court in
Charlotte, NC, the DC Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court for a determination on whether
compulsory payment of filing fees at the time of filing at the DC Circuit and the U.S. Supreme
Court is extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 872.
Every motion filed is either denied, ignored or ruled moot upon dismissal. I have pursued
this matter by filing complaints with the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, House and Senate Judiciary
Committees all without success of governmental action.
The U.S. Government has taken and continues to take full advantage of the my extremely
limited finances to the extent that I have gone broke from time to time having to ship out again
and again earning wages solely for the purpose of continuing my case. Apparently the
U.S. Department of Justice’s agenda is to win by out-spending a financially strapped
unrepresented civil plaintiff. This is not the way justice is suppose to work.
20
TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
PART V - PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 123 - FEES AND COSTS

“In all courts of the United States, seamen may institute and prosecute suits and
appeals in their own names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the
enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees or
costs or furnishing security therefor.”
Clarifications:
(1) “In all courts of the United States” = includes the DC Circuit and the U.S.
Supreme Court.
(2) “the enforcement of laws enacted for their . . . safety” = includes civil lawsuits
for Second Amendment rights of the American seafarer at sea aboard U.S. flag
vessels and ashore in the United States in intrastate and interstate travel.
(3) “without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing security therefor.” = means not
to pay the filing fees of the DC Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court AND the billing
fees of PACER for access to the Docket Report.
Extorted Fees
The DC Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court extorted from the Appellant a
combined about of $1,065 in filing fees in violation of the above noted federal law
from 2002 to the present.
DC Circuit, Case No. 02-5334 $105.00
U.S. Supreme Court, Case No. 03-145, 300.00
U.S. Supreme Court, (DC Circuit Case No. 04-5316) 300.00
U.S. District Court, Little Rock, Arkansas 350.00
Extorted Payment of PACER Fees Paid to Date 348.00
----------
TOTAL: $1,763.00 2
2
Updated for current totals
21
Case Law
Hobbs Act Extortion under Color Of Official Right
(DC Circuit & U.S. Supreme Court
Re: Filing Fees & 28 U.S.C. § 1916)
“In order to prove Hobbs Act extortion ‘under color of official right,’ the
[plaintiff / prosecutor] need only show that a public official has obtained
a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was
made in return for official acts.” United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 768
(3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992)).
Federal tort law: judges cannot invoke judicial immunity for acts that
violate litigants civil rights; Robert Craig Waters. TORT & INSURANCE LAW
JOURNAL, Spr. 1986 21 n3, p509-516
A Judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely
Administrative, non-judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. at
227-229, 108 S.Ct. at 544-545; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 380, 98 S.Ct.
at 1106. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286 at 288 (1991).
Administrative-capacity torts by a judge do not involve the “performance
of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of
authoritatively adjudicating private rights,” and therefore do not have
the judicial immunity of judicial acts. See: Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
98 L.Ed.2d 555, 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988); Atkinson-Baker & Assoc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d
1452 at 1454, (9th Cir. 1993).
PREDICATE ACTS OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITIES

UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B):
(1) 18 U.S.C. § 1028 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Identification Documents
(2) 18 U.S.C. § 1512 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE: Tampering with a Victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1),
(b)(2)(A), and (b)(3).
(3) 18 U.S.C. § 872 Extortion by officers or employees of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1916
(4) 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) W hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce . . . by
. . . extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(5) 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) “enterprise” includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;
(6) 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,
one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity;
22
STATUTORY WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
TITLE 46--SHIPPING
CHAPTER I: COAST GUARD , DEPARTM ENT OF HOM ELAND SECURITY
PART 1: ORGANIZATION , GENERAL COURSE AND METHODS
GOVERNING MARINE SAFETY FUNCTIONS
SUBPART 1.01 ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL FLOW OF FUNCTIONS
46 CFR § 1.01-30 JUDICIAL REVIEW .

(a) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any
party from seeking judicial review of any Commandant’s
decision or action taken pursuant to the regulations in this part
...
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
Don Hamrick
5860 Wilburn Road
Email: ki5ss@yahoo.com
Email: 4donhamrick@gmail.com
C ERTIFICATE OF S ERVICE
I, Don Hamrick, unrepresented Plaintiff, hereby certify that on Thursday, July 26, 2006, I FedEx’d
the above to Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, to Dennis Barghaan,
Assistant U. S. Attorney.
___________________________________
Don Hamrick
5860 Wilburn Road
Email: ki5ss@yahoo.com
Email: 4donhamrick@gmail.com
23
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT WITHHELD EVIDENCE FROM
MY CASE AT THE DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTN, DC
THE CHRONOLOGY
OCTOBER 21, 2003. I filed my RICO Act case for the Second Amendment at the U.S. District Court
for DC (No. 03-2160). Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney from the U.S. Attorney’s Office in
Washington, DC (555 4TH ST., NW).
JUNE 2, 2004. Almost 7.5 months since I filed my case Alan Burch is “Terminated” (word used in the
Docket Report) and was replaced by Dennis Barghaan, “Special Attorney” from the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Virginia in Alexandria under 28 U.S.C. 515 (out of
jurisdiction U.S. Attorney). The Plaintiff alleges that the switch of defense attorneys has a direct
bearing on the impending internal release of the Justice Department’s MEMORANDUM OPINION
TITLED , WHETHER THE SECOND AMENDM ENT SECURES AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT ON AUGUST 24, 2004,
just 83 days away. Something had to be done to prevent the Plaintiff from using that
Memorandum Opinion as evidence in the District Court. So, the Justice Department brounght
in a hatchet man to expedite the dismissal of Plaintiff’s case before the expected release date of
the Memorandum Opinion. This implies a conspiracy against the due process rights of the
Plaintiff in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. Plaintiff alleges that the sole purpose for the switch in
defense attorneys is to effectively deny the Plaintiff his right to use the Justice Department’s
upcoming Memorandum Opinion on the Second Amendment as evidence supporting his case.
JUNE 21, 2004. Dennis Barghaan filed the Motion to Dismiss just 19 days after replacing Alan Burch.
Plaintiff observes that the Department of Justice was going to internally release their
Memorandum Opinion on August 24, 2004 which is just 64 days from June 21. Plaintiff has 60
days to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. If Dennis Barghaan had prior knowledge of the
Department of Justice’s Memorandum Opinion it is the Appellant’s belief that he had a duty to
inform the court of the impended release of this Memorandum Opinion because it had a direct
impact upon the case at hand. If Dennis Barghaan did not have prior knowledge then the duty
fell upon the Department of Justice to inform Dennis Barghaan of the impending release of the
Memorandum Opinion because it was and is admissible evidence affecting the integrity of the
governments argument against the Plaintiff/Appellant. The fact that the existence of the
Memorandum Opinion was never made known to the District Court or to the DC Circuit or even
to the Plaintiff, that the Plaintiff learned of the Memorandum Opinion through his Internet news
links implies a deliberate attempt to subvert justice. The Appellant alleges that the timing of
Dennis Barghaan’s Motion to Dismiss occurring jut 64 days before the internal release o the
Memorandum implies prior knowledge calculated to unjustly defeat Appellant’s case at the
District Court. The Appellant further alleges that Dennis Barghaan’s obstructive tactics are meant
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation and Dennis
Barghaan’s denials of factual contentions are not warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief because the Appellant has
now identified the Memorandum Opinion as admissible evidence and there can be no lack of
information on the Second Amendment as an individual right because it was the duty of the
Justice Department to inform Dennis Barghaan of the Memorandum Opinion. That fact that this
was not done implies an intentional violation of Rule 11(b)(1) and Rule 11(b)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
JULY 12, 2004. The Justice Department issues a press release stating that Paul D. Clement was will
serve as acting Solicitor General.
24
JULY 15, 2004. The judge, Reggie B. Walton, denies my Motion for Change of Venue.
AUGUST 10, 2004. My Objection to Motion to Dismiss filed out of time (because Kinkos lost my
emailed Objection due to a virus attack. But Dennis Barghaan in a footnote in his rebuttal did
not oppose my filing out of time).
AUGUST 16, 2004. Dennis Barghaan files his rebuttal to my objection.
AUGUST 16, 2004. Wasting no time Judge Reggie B. Walton grants Motion to Dismiss just 8 days
before the internal release of the Justice Department’s Memorandum Opinion. A job well done
by Dennis Barghaan. Does Judge Walton actually read these motions?
AUGUST 24, 2004. RELEVANT EVIDENCE CONCEALED FROM THE COURT & PLAINTIFF .3
U.S. Department of Justice internally published their Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney
General John Ashcroft titled, Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right. The
Department of Justice did not release the Memorandum Opinion to the public until
mid-December 2004, for obvious political gain until well after the presidential election in
November. That Memorandum Opinion is documentary evidence, a government record under
28 U.S.C. § 1733 and is admissible as evidence because under Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence the Memorandum Opinion becomes an Opinion on an Ultimate Issue because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. [Rule 406 Habit/Routine Practice]
AUGUST 27, 2004. Plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal.
AUGUST 27, 2004. On this date President Bush issues Executive Order 13353 ESTABLISHING THE
PRESIDENT ’S BOARD ON SAFEGUAR DIN G AMERICANS ’ CIVIL LIBERTIES . The Deputy
Attorney General James Comey is appointed as Chairman. However, there may exist a conflict
of interest with this appointment. In the May 21, 2001 edition of U.S. News & World Report
then U.S. Attorney James Comey is reported to have said “To us gun possession itself is a
crime of violence” in discussing Virginia’s Project Exile program. James Comey’s position
against the Second Amendment as an individual right back then does not exactly square with his
appointment to the President’s Board on Safeguarding American Civil Liberties. At best it
compares more accurately to a Trojan Horse tactic for an undisclosed agenda.
SEPTEMBER 9, 2004. Appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief at the DC Circuit.
SEPTEMBER 14, 2004. Appellant filed MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION BY THE
PRESIDENT ’S BOARD ON SAFEGUARDING AMERICANS ’ CIVIL LIBERTIES AND OTHER THIRD
PARTIES & MOTION FOR APPEAL CON FERENCE . The DC Circuit has not yet ruled on this
motion or any motion for judicial notice of adjudicative facts or presumptions in general that the
Plaintiff has filed. Copy of this motion was FedEx’d to the Deputy Attorney General James
Comey as Chairman of that civil liberties board. No response has yet been received. This is not
a very good track record for the Government on protecting the civil liberties of the American
people when the federal courts and the Executive Branch treats a pro se Plaintiff in such a
manner.4
3
Plaintiff’s Em phasis. “T H E S M ALL C APS ” segment was not part of the email but was included herein
for clarification of its importance to Plaintiff’s allegation of misconduct.
4
Plaintiff’s Note: This entry was not in the original email. It is provided herein for clarification on the
apparent reluctance on the DC Circuit to rule on motions by the Plaintiff when the judicial history of Plaintiff’s
cases continues the pattern of the federal courts favor granting motions from the Government by deny motions
from the Plaintiff. This implies a judicial bias against the Plaintiff.
25
OBSERVATION FROM TIMELINE: Alan Burch was almost 7.5 months (225 days) as defense
counsel and hadn’t filed the Motion to Dismiss. He was under Ted Olson as Solicitor General.
Dennis Barghaan took a fast 2 months, 3 weeks, 4 days (75 days total) to get Judge Reggie B.
Walton to dismissed the Plaintiff’s case with prejudice. It is the Appellant’s understanding that
if evidence does not get admitted into the record at the District Court then that evidence cannot
be submitted at the Appellant level. However, the ethical conduct of Dennis Barghaan and the
Justice Department can be submitted as evidence of a conspiracy to subvert justice and for other
allegations which can lead the DC Circuit in overturning the District Courts dismissal with
prejudice.
26
Evidence of U.S. Supreme Court Bias Against Second Amendment Cases
and Against Pro Se Plaintiffs with a Second Amendment Case
Silveira, et al v. Lockyer, No. 03-51 Hamrick v. President Bush, et al, No. 03-145
AUGUST 7, 2003 Waiver of right of

respondent Bill Lockyer, Attorney
General of California to respond filed.
AUGUST 19, 2003 Waiver of right of

respondent George W. Bush, President
of the United States, et al. to respond
filed.
AUGUST 20, 2003 DISTRIBUTED for AUGUST 20, 2003 DISTRIBUTED for
Conference of September 29, 2003. Conference of September 29, 2003.
SEPTEM BER 22, 2003 Response

Requested . (Due October 22, 2003)
OCTOBER 6, 2003 Petition DENIED
O C T O B E R 22, 2003 Brief of

respondents Bill Lockyer, Attorney
General of California, and Gray Davis,
Governor in opposition filed.
O C T O B E R 27, 2003 Reply of

petitioners Sean Silveira, et al. filed.
NOVEMBER 5, 2003 DISTRIBUTED for

Conference of November 26, 2003.
DECEMBER 1, 2003 Petition DENIED.
27
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG
HAILING FROM THE TOWER OF BABEL
©2005 Don Hamrick
On April 1, 2005 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg gave a speech at the 99th Annual Meeting of The American Society of International Law on
V ALUE OF A C OM PARATIVE P ERSPECTIVE IN C ONSTITUTIONAL A DJUDICATION . 1 Her first words cited Deuteronomy 16:20 that is not from the King
James Bible. April 1, 2005 is the same day the U.S. Supreme Court denied Hamrick, (pro se) v. President Bush, et al, No. 04-1150
(DC Circuit, No. 04-5316), a Second Amendm ent case em ploying the RICO Act against the U.S. Government for not hearing a Second
Amendment case sine 1939’s United States v. Miller. In light of her political activism I wrote this poem in defiance of her goals to bastardize
our Constitution with foreign court opinions in matters having no jurisdiction to foreign courts.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg chanting from an uncommon Writ

“Justice, justice shall you pursue, that you may thrive!”
“Where, o’ where may our justice be found?” Says the twit,
“But in the security of foreign lands to contrive!”
O’ what Bible does this Supreme Court Justice follow?

Her read is certainly not from the King James!
She will have us pursue justice as some elusive swallow
Always beyond our reach, to spite her claims.
THE BASIS FOR THE
“We can ignore our Constitution,” she implies, COD E OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
“Because it no longer controls our authority. “The Canons of Ethics”
Comparative analysis, will protect us,” she belies
“Against all threats in the global fratority.”
The King James Bible
“O’ contraire!” We, the People say, Deuteronomy 16:18-20,
“Our Constitution is altogether just!
18: Judges and officers shalt thou
We shall follow the Constitution for our sake!
We say what it means, as we must!” make thee in all thy gates, which
the L ORD thy God giveth thee,
From Deuteronomy to Genesis, my comparative analysis throughout thy tribes; and they shall
The Supreme Court today is our Tower of Babel. judge the people with just judgment.
We are held in this awkward state of paralysis,
Because there is no sense to Ginsburg’s rabble. 19: Thou shalt not wrest judgment;
thou shalt not respect persons, neither
Defiant lines are drawn! Is civil war sensed? take a gift; for a gift doth blind the
Our highest court split by globalists’ sophistry. eyes of the wise, and pervert the
Judicial review in league to conspire against,
words of the righteous.
Popular constitutionalism finding its place in history.
20: That which is altogether just
Oh! Dear God, I pray to thou! shalt thou follow, that thou mayest
For answers in these troubled days.
live, and inherit the land which
Why hast thou judges forsaken thou?
With no force of arms we are as slaves. the L ORD thy God giveth thee.
Amen.
1
http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401.html
5
A MERICAN L EGAL S YSTEM IS C ORRUPT B EYOND
R ECOGNITION, J UDGE T ELLS H ARVARD L AW S CHOOL
By Geraldine Hawkins
March 7, 2003
“The Question of What Is Morally Right Is Routinely

Sacrificed to What Is Politically Expedient. The Change
Has Come Because Legal Philosophy Has Descended to
Nihilism.”
The American legal system has been this original.’ The
corrupted almost beyond recognition, Judge Framers created a
Edith Jones of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the government of limited
Fifth Circuit, told the Federalist Society of pow er with th is
Harvard Law School on February 28. understanding of the
rule of law - that it was
She said that the question of what is morally
dependent on
right is routinely sacrificed to what is politically
transcendent religious
expedient. The change has come because legal
obl i g a t i o n , ” s a i d
philosophy has descended to nihilism.
Jones.
Judge Edith H. Jones of the U.S. Court of
She said that the business about all of the
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit talks to members of
Founding Fathers being deists is “just wrong,” or
Harvard Law School’s Fed-eralist Society. Jones
“way overblown.” She says they believed in
said that the question of what is mor-ally right is
“faith and reason,” and this did not lead to
routinely sacrificed to what is politically
intolerance.
expedient.
“This is not a prescription for intolerance or
“The integrity of law, its religious roots, its
narrow sectarianism,” she continued, “for
transcendent quality are disappearing. I saw the
unalienable rights were given by God to all our
movie ‘Chicago’ with Richard Gere the other
fellow citizens. Having lost sight of the moral and
day. That’s the way the public thinks about
religious foundations of the
lawyers,” she told the
rule of law, we are
students.
vulnerable to the
“The first 100 years destruction of our freedom,
of American lawyers were our equality before the law
trained on Blackstone, and our self-respect. It is
who wrote that: ‘The law my fervent hope that this
of nature … dictated by new century will experience
God himself … is binding a revival of the original
… in all counties and at understanding of the rule of
all times; no human laws law and its roots.
are of any validity if
“The answer is a
contrary to this; and such
recovery of moral principle,
of them as are valid
the sine qua non of an
derive all force and all
orderly society. Post 9/11,
their authority … from
many events have been
clarified. It is hard to remain a moral relativist Others seem uninhibited about making
when your own people are being killed.” misstatements to the court or their opponents or
destroying or falsifying evidence,” she claimed.
According to the judge, the first
“When lawyers cannot be trusted to observe the
contemporary threat to the rule of law comes
fair processes essential to maintaining the rule of
from within the legal system itself.
law, how can we expect the public to respect the
Alexis de Tocqueville, author of Democracy process?”
in America and one of the first writers to observe
Lawsuits Do Not Bring ‘Social Justice’
the United States from the outside looking-in,
“described lawyers as a natural aristocracy in Another pernicious development within the
America,” Jones told the students. “The legal system is the misuse of lawsuits, according
intellectual basis of their profession and the study to her.
of law based on venerable precedents bred in
“We see lawsuits wielded as weapons of
them habits of order and a taste for formalities
revenge,” she says. “Lawsuits are brought that
and predictability.” As Tocqueville saw it, “These
ultimately line the pockets of lawyers rather than
qualities enabled attorneys to stand apart from
their clients. … The lawsuit is not the best way to
the passions of the majority. Lawyers were
achieve social justice, and to think it is, is a
respected by the citizens and able to guide them
seriously flawed hypothesis. There are better
and moderate the public’s whims. Lawyers were
ways to achieve social goals than by going into
essential to tempering the potential tyranny of the
court.”
majority.
Jones said that employment litigation is a
“Some lawyers may still perceive our
particularly fertile field for this kind of abuse.
profession in this flattering light, but to judge from
polls and the tenor of lawyer jokes, I doubt the “Seldom are employment discrimination suits
public shares Tocqueville’s view anymore, and it in our court supported by direct evidence of race
is hard for us to do so. or sex-based animosity. Instead, the courts are
asked to revisit petty interoffice disputes and to
“The legal aristocracy have shed their
infer invidious motives from trivial comments or
professional independence for the temptations
work-performance criticism. Recrimination,
and materialism associated with becoming
second-guessing and suspicion plague the
businessmen. Because law has become a
workplace when tenuous discrimination suits are
self-avowed business, pressure mounts to give
filed … creating an atmosphere in which many
clients the advice they want to hear, to pander to
corporate defendants are forced into costly
the clients’ goal through deft manipulation of the
settlements because they simply cannot afford to
law. … While the business mentality produces
vindicate their positions.
certain benefits, like occasional competition to
charge clients lower fees, other adverse effects “While the historical purpose of the common
include advertising and shameless self-promotion. law was to compensate for individual injuries, this
The legal system has also been wounded by new litigation instead purports to achieve
lawyers who themselves no longer respect the redistributive social justice. Scratch the surface of
rule of law,” the attorneys’ self-serving press releases,
however, and one finds how enormously
The judge quoted Kenneth Starr as saying, “It
profitable social redistribution is for those lawyers
is decidedly unchristian to win at any cost,” and
who call themselves ‘agents of change.’”
added that most lawyers agree with him.
Jones wonders, “What social goal is achieved
However, “An increasingly visible and vocal
by transferring millions of dollars to the lawyers,
number apparently believe that the strategic use
while their clients obtain coupons or token
of anger and incivility will achieve their aims.
rebates.”
The judge quoted George Washington who Jones quoted Roger C. Cramton, a law
asked in his Farewell Address, “Where is the professor at Cornell University, who wrote in the
security for property, for reputation, for life, if the 1970s that “the ordinary religion of the law
sense of religious obligation desert the oaths … in school classroom” is “a moral relativism tending
courts of justice?” toward nihilism, a pragmatism tending toward
an amoral instrumentalism, a realism tending
Similarly, asked Jones, how can a system
toward cynicism, an individualism tending toward
founded on law survive if the administrators of
atomism, and a faith in reason and democratic
the law daily display their contempt for it?
processes tending toward mere credulity and
“Lawyers’ private morality has definite public idolatry.”
consequences,” she said. “Their misbehavior
No ‘Great Awakening’ In Law School
feeds on itself, encouraging disrespect and
Classrooms
debasement of the rule of law as the public
become encouraged to press their own The judge said ruefully, “There has been no
advantage in a system they perceive as Great Awakening in the law school classroom
manipulatable.” since those words were written.” She maintained
that now it is even worse because faith and
The second threat to the rule of law comes
democratic processes are breaking down.
from government, which is encumbered with
agencies that have made the law so complicated “The problem with legal philosophy today is
that it is difficult to decipher and often contradicts that it reflects all too well the broader
itself. post-Enlightenment problem of philosophy,”
Jones said. She quoted Ernest Fortin, who wrote
“Agencies have an inherent tendency to
in Crisis magazine: “The whole of modern
expand their mandate,” says Jones. “At the same
thought … has been a series of heroic attempts to
time, their decision-making often becomes
reconstruct a world of human meaning and value
parochial and short-sighted. They may be
on the basis of … our purely mechanistic
captured by the entities that are ostensibly being
understanding of the universe.”
regulated, or they may pursue agency self-interest
at the expense of the public welfare. Citizens left Jones said that all of these threats to the rule
at the mercy of selective and unpredictable of law have a common thread running through
agency action have little recourse.” them, and she quoted Professor Harold Berman
to identify it: “The traditional Western beliefs in
Jones recommends three books by Philip
the structural integrity of law, its ongoingness, its
Howard: The Death of Common Sense, The
religious roots, its transcendent qualities, are
Collapse of the Common Good and The Lost Art
disappearing not only from the minds of law
of Drawing the Line, which further delineate this
teachers and law students but also from the
problem.
consciousness of the vast majority of citizens, the
The third and most comprehensive threat to people as a whole; and more than that, they are
the rule of law arises from contemporary legal disappearing from the law itself. The law itself is
philosophy. becoming more fragmented, more subjective,
geared more to expediency and less to morality.
“Throughout my professional life, American
… The historical soil of the Western legal
legal education has been ruled by theories like
tradition is being washed away … and the
positivism, the residue of legal realism, critical
tradition itself is threatened with collapse.”
legal studies, post-modernism and other
philosophical fashions,” said Jones. “Each of Judge Jones concluded with another thought
these theories has a lot to say about the ‘is’ of from George Washington: “Of all the dispositions
law, but none of them addresses the ‘ought,’ the and habits which lead to prosperity, religion and
moral foundation or direction of law.” morality are indispensable supports. In vain
would that man claim the tribute of patriotism yard man illegal?’
who should labor to subvert these great pillars of
“In those circumstances, who is going to go
human happiness - these firmest props of the
out to be a federal judge?”
duties of men and citizens.”
Judge Edith H. Jones has a B.A. from Cornell
Upon taking questions from students, Judge
University and a J.D. from the University of
Jones recommended Michael Novak’s book, On
Texas School of Law. She was appointed to the
Two Wings: Humble Faith and Common Sense.
Fifth Circuit by President Ronald Reagan in
“Natural law is not a prescriptive way to solve 1985. Her office is in the U.S. Courthouse in
problems,” Jones said. “It is a way to look at life Houston.
starting with the Ten Commandments.”
The Federalist Society was founded in 1982
Natural law provides “a framework for when a group of law students from Harvard,
government that permits human freedom,” Jones Stanford, the University of Chicago and Yale
said. “If you take that away, what are you left organized a symposium on federalism at Yale
with? Bodily senses? The will of the majority? Law School. These students were unhappy with
The communist view? What is it - ‘from each the academic climate on their campuses for some
according to his ability, to each according to his of the reasons outlined by Judge Jones. The
need?’ I don’t even remember it, thank the Federalist Society was created to be a forum for
Lord,” she said to the amusement of the students. a wider range of legal viewpoints than they were
hearing in the course of their studies.
“I am an unabashed patriot - I think the
United States is the healthiest society in the world From the four schools mentioned above, the
at this point in time,” Jones said, although she Society has grown to include over 150 law school
did concede that there were other ways to chapters. The Harvard chapter, with over 250
accommodate the rule of law, such as members, is one of the nation’s largest and most
constitutional monarchy. active. They seek to contribute to civilized
dialogue at the Law School by providing a
“Our legal system is way out of kilter,” she
libertarian and conservative voice on campus and
said. “The tort litigating system is wreaking
by sponsoring speeches and debates on a wide
havoc. Look at any trials that have been
range of legal and policy issues.
conducted on TV. These lawyers are willing to
say anything.” The Federalist Society consists of libertarians
and conservatives interested in the current state
Potential Nominee to Supreme Court
of the legal profession. It is founded on three
Judge Edith Jones has been mentioned as a principles: 1) the state exists to preserve freedom,
potential nominee to the Supreme Court in the 2) the separation of governmental powers is
Bush administration, but does not relish the idea. central to our Constitution and 3) it is
emphatically the province and duty of the
“Have you looked at what people have to go
judiciary to state what the law is, not what it
through who are nominated for federal
should be.
appointments? They have to answer questions
like, ‘Did you pay your nanny taxes?’ ‘Is your
The news report on Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (now Chief Judge) lecture,
"American Judicial System is Corrupt Beyond Recognition" inspired me to write the political poem above.
C OMMENTS ON THE N INTH C IRCUIT PRO SE T ASK F ORCE R EPORT ,
Charles W. Heckman, Dr. Sci.,
A Matter of Justice Coalition (AMOJ)
Committee for the Ninth Circuit
I. BASIC SUM M ARY OF THE TASK FORCE ’S REPORT

The report of the Task Force summarizes the many problems faced by the United States courts
when persons not educated or trained as attorneys attempt to present their own legal arguments in
various kinds of proceedings. It then introduces a variety of proposals to reduce the problems identified
by the Task Force members, ranging from simplifying procedures to enlisting the assistance of pro bono
attorneys or law students to minimize procedural errors, present arguments in an objective way without
introducing the emotional responses typically elicited when a person discusses personal conflicts, and
give litigants a better understanding of legal and practical limitations to the actions of a court. It takes
note of the fact that prior discussions of legal aspects of a lawsuit with an attorney often disabuse a litigant
of misunderstandings of the law before the court is required to instruct the litigant about erroneous
principles on which a lawsuit is based.
The recommendations of the task force are practical and include suggested improvements that
would alleviate many of the problems addressed. Most of these suggestions can be accepted, and it is
hoped that resources can be found to effect the improvements.
What must be faulted in this report is not the solutions proposed for the problems presented but
rather the failure to address the most frequent complaints of pro se litigants, which are similar to
complaints frequently voiced by litigants represented by attorneys with average or less than average
capabilities.
II. FUNDAM ENTAL ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
In 1947, Justice William O Douglas wrote that the basic function of any court is to judge the case
on the merits. That means that two factors and only two should influence the decision: the law and the
facts. If all is functioning as it should, then any case in which the facts indicate that one party must
prevail under the law should have only one outcome. This is true regardless of whether or not the party
whose case is supported by the law and the facts is represented by counsel.
Justice should not depend upon whether or not a person can afford a lawyer. While it is true that
a litigant acting pro se might be less likely to present a clear case than an experienced lawyer and might
not be able to cite all of the laws that might support his case, if the facts support any claim he makes
under any law, he should prevail. If a litigant arguing his own case lets his emotions show, thereby
provoking a negative reaction, or if the litigant lacks skill in expressing himself, it is understandable that
he may suffer disadvantage where the facts are not altogether clear. However, it is the function of a
court, especially the jury, to sort through the evidence presented and provide a decision in accord with
the law and facts, even if some extra effort has to be exerted. Any court that permits factors other than
the law and the facts to influence the outcome of any proceeding has failed in its fundamental duty.
III. PRO BLEM S NOT ADDRESSED IN THE REPORT
A. THE ROLE OF BIAS
One of the many serious complaints often voiced by litigants but not seriously addressed in the
report of the Task Force is bias by the judge. However, the report clearly expresses a common attitude
toward pro se litigants, starting of p. 6 of the report:
28
“Some judges and lawyers are convinced, for example, that pro se litigants as a class generally
bring meritless claims, and that any program designed to educate or assist them would only increase the
number of meritless claims in the court system. This point of view is doubtless influenced by those pro
se cases that are brought by individuals suffering from a mental disability or for purposes of harassment.
Closely related to that thought is the belief that appointing attorneys for pro se clients is a waste of
resources and in the long run simply complicates efforts to keep the system clear of meritless cases.”
The Task Force fails to identify who holds this opinion, but both lawyers and judges have
frequently expressed it or opinions very much like it. The main focus of this task force should not be with
methods by which unbiased judges can make the submissions of pro se litigants easier for the court to
deal with but rather with developing methods to assist a pro se litigant who has been the victim of a judge
with the preconception that whatever he submits to the court is without merit, and his lawsuit must be
dismissed before any unnecessary time of the court is wasted.
If all judges were perfect human beings, we could assume that the private opinion of a lawyer
or a judge would not be reflected the judge’s rulings. However, we know that few people approach
perfection, and prejudice by decision-makers against members of certain groups has been the cause of
continuous, bitter conflict since the civil rights movement first brought the effects of biases of many kinds
to public view.
Prejudices often have a greater impact on the outcome of administrative hearings and lawsuits
than parties with an obligation to be impartial like to admit. Whether the prejudice is deliberate and
malicious or entirely unintended, decisions colored by personal biases can be just as devastating to the
victims of the resulting injustice.
An even more enlightening articulation of the prejudice litigants often face appeared in numerous
discussions on the decision of a Washington State appeals court in Hill v. BCTI Income Fund, 97 Wn.
App. 657 (1999), later upheld by the Washington State Supreme Court. Although it is the decision of
a state court, it draws on the en banc opinion of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1437 (2d Cir.). The opinion in Hill v. BCTI defends a
school of thought within the legal profession, which has been having a revolutionary effect on American
jurisprudence. It parallels the controversial theory of a “living constitution,” which condones the
“updating” of the United States Constitution by the courts to conform to the personal opinion of judges
concerning what the public wants and will accept. On a more mundane level, this revolution in judicial
theory is interpreted by many judges as a mandate to quickly dismiss any lawsuit that can be dismissed
without causing a public outcry, regardless of the merits of the case.
One of the main innovations introduced by the decision in Fisher v. Vassar is the acceptability
and utility of lying to the court. This was discussed at length in a dissenting opinion by the Chief Judge
of the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, who pointed out the implications of the decision reached
by his colleagues. Briefly stated, a jury of the trial court had determined that the spokesmen for Vassar
had lied about the reason Fisher was denied tenure. It therefore concluded that the prima facie case
Fisher had established had not been rebutted, and the relief she had demanded was granted. The
Second Circuit, en banc, reversed the decision of the trial court by a single vote, ruling that the
non-discriminatory reason given for not granting Fisher tenure had eliminated her prima facie case, even
though the reason was shown unequivocally to be a lie. With the case in favor of Fisher eliminated, the
court opined that she was required to meet a higher level of proof, which was not defined by the court
and was apparently not humanly possible to meet, at least without the services of a certified mind-reader.
Expanding on this legal opinion, the Washington State courts in Hill v. BCTI set an unattainable
burden of proof on a plaintiff who has alleged discrimination as soon as the defendant lies to the court
and alleges that the motivation was not to discriminate against the plaintiff. According to the opinion of
the Washington courts, proving conclusively that the defendant’s allegation was a lie is not enough for
a plaintiff to prevail. He must prove that the motive of the plaintiff was to discriminate against him for
29
the reason alleged in the complaint. Hence, if age discrimination is alleged, the plaintiff must prove that
the real reason for the discriminatory action and the subsequent lie by the defendant was actually the age
of the plaintiff and not, for example, his religion, race, or gender. The judges of the Washington State
Court of Appeals were well aware of the fact that the opposite decision had been reached by the United
States Supreme Court, but they reasoned that the Supreme Court was wrong and the State of
Washington was free to decide contrary to the highest Federal court because the State of Washington
has its own constitution and its courts are therefore not bound by the United States Constitution, as
interpreted by the Federal judiciary.
What is interesting about this case in the context of pro se litigation is not the decision itself but
rather the opinion of an author who defended the decision as vital to preserve the integrity of the judicial
system. He stated clearly in his article that if one person came to a court with a discrimination complaint
and obtained relief, this would encourage other litigants to file similar lawsuits, and there are already too
many lawsuits being filed. There is a strong undercurrent within the legal profession, as well as among
corporations that are frequently sued, propagating the opinion that filing civil lawsuits is somehow sinister
and un-American. They wish to discourage most lawsuits by denying justice to litigants and thereby
discouraging other litigants from seeking justice in a court.
While there is a tradition from the Old West that a man settles his disputes by shooting it out with
his adversary or settles lesser disputes with his fists, it was long thought that this was a less desirable
alternative to letting a jury decide which party should prevail. Apparently, some members of the legal
profession think otherwise and wish to close off the courts to ordinary citizens, returning dispute
resolution to the means available in the “Wild West.” It would be well to determine how closely the
decrease in justice provided in civil suits has paralleled the increase in crimes of violence between people
with no civilized means available to settle their dispute. How many of the civil disputes wrongfully
dismissed or inequitably settled come back to the court as a criminal case?
The treatment of pro se litigants reflects the desire expressed by many politicians and judges that
the number of lawsuits be reduced. Showing litigants who lack strong financial resources, the services
of a first-class law firm, backing by an influential organization, or attention in the press that they have no
chance of prevailing in a lawsuit or even of presenting their cases to a jury might well discourage other
litigants from seeking redress in the courts but it also encourages persons in positions of authority to
deliberately break the law, knowing that there is almost no chance that the victim would be able to obtain
redress in a court of law.
It seems obvious to me that the flood of lawsuits is the result of a massive increase in white collar
crime in the United States, most of which is ignored by law enforcement authorities on the excuse that
their time is needed to combat crimes of violence. The victims are therefore forced to attempt to obtain
redress in a civil lawsuit, and most are unable to obtain legal counsel. A recent estimate made by a group
in Iowa suggested that 70% of the population of that state did not have enough money to retain the
services of an attorney. Because most white collar criminals have learned the applicable law very well
before embarking on their criminal careers and many seem to have the active assistance of local civil
servants or even judges, attorneys do not see much chance of immediate success before a court and will
therefore refuse to represent an indigent litigant on a contingency basis. Furthermore, many attorneys
working out of small offices without a major law firm behind them hardly do better in court than pro se
litigants. Therefore, as the white collar criminals, deliberate abusers of civil rights, unscrupulous business
firms, and corrupt public officials become bolder, the victims have no way of protecting their property
and livelihoods other than by representing themselves in a lawsuit. Even though an increasing number
of pro se litigants see the courts as hostile to them and their needs for redress under the law, the flood
of lawsuits grows because of the massive increase in the crimes that the current attitude of the courts has
engendered.
30
Missing from the report by the Task Force is any adequate remedy for the actions of judges who
adhere to the belief that pro se litigants do not deserve full consideration by the court. This can be
justified by the self-fulfilling prophesy that pro se litigants never win. As a result, many judges believe
that any time given to a lawsuit in which a litigant represents himself is wasted. Therefore, pro se litigants
really do not win simply because the prophesy that they will lose is self-fulfilling.
B. REMEDIES THAT FAIL
If a district judge summarily dismisses the civil lawsuit of a pro se plaintiff without reviewing any
of the facts and writes a short opinion that fails to address the fundamental complaint, indicating that the
judge barely knew what issues the complaint addressed, the plaintiff can appeal the dismissal to the court
of appeals. In a great many cases, the plaintiff receives a brief affirmation of the district judge’s opinion,
which also fails to address the issues in the complaint and almost always contains the notation that the
opinion cannot be cited as a precedent and should not be published.
The plaintiff can then file an appeal with the United States Supreme Court with near certainty
that certiorari will not be denied. Many litigants lack the money to have their petitions for certiorari
correctly printed and bound to the satisfaction of the clerk, and others fail to present the legal issues in
an understandable manner. Even if all submissions are perfect, however, the petition will almost certainly
be denied in favor of appeals that are given considerable publicity in the press, are promoted by major
organizations, or are otherwise likely to bring fame and praise to the justices. The problems of ordinary
citizens, no matter how devastating to them and their families, are ignored, and they find that they would
have little more chance of success in getting a justified complaint before a jury than they would have of
winning a lottery.
For example, after the courts in several circuits had summarily dismissed hundreds and perhaps
thousands of lawsuits alleging employment discrimination at the complaint stage because the plaintiff had
failed to provide enough hard evidence to establish a prima facie case when the complaint was
submitted, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear one of the appeals from the Second Circuit.
In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. (2002), it decided unanimously that it is a gross violation of
procedures to dismiss a lawsuit at this stage of the proceedings. Among the points the justices made were
that a plaintiff can prevail without establishing a prima facie case at all, that a judge’s opinion of whether
or not a litigant will prevail before a jury is irrelevant to decision to dismiss a lawsuit, and that it is
fundamentally unfair to dismiss a lawsuit before the whole body of facts can be revealed through
discovery. While this decision provided the plaintiff with a chance to have his lawsuit heard by a jury
on the merits, it affirmed that thousands of litigants whose lawsuits had been improperly dismissed over
the many years during which the appeals courts had been violating procedures had been left without any
access to justice.
Still more perverse was the continued dismissal of lawsuits at the complaint stage, even after the
Supreme Court had denounced this practice. It was well known to the judges guilty of this practice that
any subsequent petitions for certiorari citing this issue would be denied on the grounds that the Supreme
Court had already decided the issue and would not agree to decide it again. This would leave a litigant
no way of redressing violations of his civil rights just because he had the bad luck of coming before a
judge who is trying to discourage lawsuits by issuing non-precedential dismissals at the complaint stage
and appeals court judges who affirm decisions of the lower court with a rubber stamp. Citing the clear
opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Swiercewicz v. Sorema N.A. would have no effect on the outcome
before a judge who assumes that anything filed pro se is without merit.
In case of particularly severe violations of the law, procedures, or ethics by a judge, a litigant is
limited to filing a complaint with a judicial board established for hearing such complaints. Other avenues
of redress are closed off because judicial immunity from civil liability was made absolute during the
1990s, even if corruption or malice motivated the judge’s actions. Experience shows that the boards
31
investigating misconduct by judges move extremely slowly, and a litigant has roughly one chance in a
thousand of having a rogue judge censured, even mildly.
It can be concluded that a litigant whose lawsuit has been dismissed because of the bias of a
judge against him, a class to which he belongs, pro se litigants in general, or the kind of lawsuit he has
filed has almost no chance of redress, either on appeal or in complaint proceedings against a judge.
Human nature clearly dictates that when members of any group are permitted to perform illegal,
immoral, and unjust actions against other persons with complete impunity, many of them will do so,
some because of laziness, others because of malice, and still others in anticipation of gratuities from a
favored party. A pro se litigant has no recourse against a judge who does not want his complaint heard
due to bias of any kind, and the fact that a judge has the power to deny him access to a jury effectively
eliminates an important civil right supposedly guaranteed by Amendment VII of the United States
Constitution.
C. COM MO N EXPERIENCES OF PRO SE LITIGANTS
The solutions proposed by the Task Force presume good will by the judges and conformity with
the standards of ethics and behavior traditionally held by our society. Unfortunately, in speaking and
corresponding with many pro se litigants, I have learned that there are common problems that reflect an
erosion of human values and are often accompanied by abusive behavior by judges. These problems
are less likely to arise when a litigant is represented by a lawyer, whose status as an “insider” in the legal
profession might tend to restrain the opposing attorney and presiding judge from improper conduct.
Such conduct is difficult for pro se litigants to cope with, but it is readily recognized when it occur.
Eventually, pro se litigants make their opinions of the court public, and the increasing criticism leads to
a general loss of faith in courts. The growing dissatisfaction of the public with the judicial system is rooted
in the negative opinions developed by many litigants who know they have been improperly or illegally
treated. Losing a lawsuit is fundamentally different from being denied due process and a fair hearing,
and even pro se litigants without formal education in a law school can immediately tell the difference.
The most common complaints by litigants of misconduct by the courts include the following:
1. Perjury is tolerated by the judge
This complaint has been made by the great majority of pro se litigants with whom I have
spoken. Very often, the false testimony is given by one or more government employees.
Even when parts of the testimony are shown to be false, judges continue to give full
credence to the witness in the remaining parts of the testimony. The judge then dismisses
the lawsuit of a pro se litigant citing the perjured testimony as evidence that the lawsuit
has no merit. Usually there are documents in the file clearly showing that the testimony
was false, but these are simply disregarded by the judge.
Prosecutions for perjury have become rare to non-existent. Government employees
have been given complete immunity for perjury they commit “in the line of duty,” even
if it is given with malice. Government prosecutors may suborn witnesses to perjury by
promising them immunity for crimes they have been accused of. It has even been
alleged that government employees can be fired for refusing to give false testimony at the
behest of their supervisors. Many cases are known where civil servants have advanced
their own careers by deliberately misleading courts, administrative boards, and even
Congress to advance a political agenda espoused by the their supervisors.
2. Records submitted to the court disappear from the files
This complaint has frequently been made. Some litigants note that the entries of the
documents are still in the court records but the documents themselves have disappeared.
32
Even if copies of the records are retained by the litigant, they usually cannot be added
to a record on appeal unless they are still in the file of the lower court.
3. Judges’ opinions fail to address the issues of the lawsuit
Many litigants complain that orders for dismissal address issues that were never raised in
the lawsuit and fail to address the issues that were. In light of the fact that most judges
have earned a law degree, some decisions have convinced the litigants that the legal
issues were deliberately misconstrued by the judge. For example, if a plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act and monetary relief citing
the Federal Tort Claim Act, a judge may deny the injunctive relief on the grounds that
there are no provisions for such relief in the Federal Tort Claim Act and that the
Administrative Procedures Act does not authorize monetary relief. Similarly, a lawsuit
alleging failure of the Department of Labor to investigate a discrimination complaint
against a private university was dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff was seeking
Federal employment through the courts. Even a law professor from Hofstra University
complained in a speech that he was tired of reading decisions that did not address the
issues of the case. At best, this means that the law professor was able to understand the
issues of the lawsuit from the submissions, while the judge allegedly was not. At worst,
this indicates that the judge was deliberately falsifying the issues in order to justify an
obviously faulty decision. According to the law professor, after he finished his speech,
a judge leaned over to him and said, “You don’t know the half of it.”
4. Certain litigants must always win
One of the most harmful practices of the courts becomes most evident when statistical
surveys of the outcomes of litigation are conducted. Some judges have apparently
developed strong biases for or against certain kinds of lawsuit or litigant and lose sight
of the fact that each case deserves a separate analysis. The outcomes of these lawsuits
most frequently favor government agencies as defendants and major special interest
groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, as representatives of a plaintiff.
Decisions are reached without jury trial to assure that the favored litigant wins. The trend
to summarily dismiss lawsuits without trials is reflected in surveys showing that more than
11% of all civil lawsuits were decided by juries in the early 1960s, while less than 2%
reach a jury now.
It is not only the courts that are guilty of denying due process to protect favored litigants.
Congress has also established special means of adjudication to remove the proceedings
against certain agencies from the normal judicial channels. Some of the agencies
established for administrative adjudication have earned a reputation for extreme bias in
favor of the government agencies they are supposed to treat impartially. For example,
the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB), which adjudicates complaints filed by
veterans because their preference rights in the civil service have been violated, has never
decided in favor of a veteran in any appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, which is the only court with jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB, has
never decided in favor of a whistleblower, after hearing 71 appeals citing the
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. It is also doubtful whether it has ever decided in favor
of a veteran, although I have yet to find records on this point. It is noteworthy that under
the law, the burden of proof is on the agency, and in the case of appeals filed by
whistleblowers, clear and convincing evidence is required, giving whistleblowers a clear
benefit of the doubt. Nevertheless, the agency always wins in such appeals, as well as
those brought under veterans’ laws.
33
The Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS) accepts employment
discrimination complaints from veterans. All complaints it receives are not maintained
in the agency files, but of 1029 complaints it did place in its records in 2001, five were
brought to the courts, but only one was adjudicated as a civil lawsuit.
Any lawsuits brought by a plaintiff pro per fall into the category of “thousand to one
shots,” but so do discrimination lawsuits brought against government agencies with the
assistance of “B” or “C-class” lawyers. Similarly, civil rights and employment
discrimination lawsuits routinely fail, unless a major special interest group supports one
of the parties.
Any time lawsuits that depend on an individual interpretation of the facts are decided so
preponderantly in favor of one party without the assistance of a jury, suspicion of bias
is justified. In conflicts between human beings, rank, job title, or affiliation do not
determine which party has followed the law and which party has broken it. If the
supervisor prevails one thousand times in whistleblower appeals for every time the
whistleblower prevails, it is clear that the adjudication has not been impartial. This
conclusion is given great support by the findings of Congress that reprisal against
whistleblowers is a problem of massive proportions in the civil service, requiring several
amendments to make the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act considerably stronger. That the
efforts of Congress have been consistently undermined by the judges on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reflects an imbalance that has been
developing between the powers of the legislative and judicial branches in recent years.
5. Different standards are applied to different litigants
Powerful plaintiffs seek to delay litigation until the opponent dies or is forced to end the
litigation for financial reasons. Some well-represented litigants do not respond to the
summons until a motion for default has been entered, and judges routinely excuse the
failure and refuse to enter a default judgment. The same judges are quick to dismiss
lawsuits because a pro se plaintiff has missed a deadline by one or two days, even when
the cause of the delay was beyond the control of the litigant. The lack of impartiality is
plainly evident when one party is permitted unlimited delays, in spite of the fact that the
United States Department of Justice or a major law firm with a large staff of lawyers is
representing that party, while a pro se litigant forced to act alone is held to the strictest
standards stipulated in the FRCP and local rules. Allowing one litigant unlimited delays
while the other is facing severe financial difficulties as long as the lawsuit remains
unsettled is a tactic that clearly violates judicial fairness and at least the spirit of the
United States Constitution, which demands a speedy trial in criminal matters and, by
implication, reasonable speed in settling civil disputes, as well.
6. Recent handling of civil lawsuits by the courts have instigated a white
collar crime wave
Many successful white collar criminals have obtained the cooperation of local courts to
defraud private citizens out of large sums of money, often leaving the victim destitute.
A few of the methods frequently used include abuse of bankruptcy procedures to loot
estates, illegal foreclosures on real estate, seizure of cash or property without due process,
and fraud during divorce proceedings.
Federal courts should have jurisdiction over obvious frauds perpetrated by state courts
under the RICO statute and civil rights laws. However, failure of effective action by
Federal judges to stop obvious fraud perpetrated by colleagues employed by state and
local government encourages larcenous state officials, including judges, to conclude that
34
their positions allow them to illegally enrich themselves at the expense of selected victims
with complete impunity.
Litigants who have sought protection from state and local criminal gangs in Federal
courts have encountered many years of delays, denial of jury trials, and refusals to issue
decisions justified by the facts of the case. Many abuses have come to public attention
in recent years, but the crime wave has grown so rapidly, many of the practices have not
received sufficient publicity to warn potential victims. Crimes like identity theft,
fraudulent foreclosure, fraud in stating fees and interest charges, and abuses of eminent
domain have become epidemic throughout the United States. They can financially ruin
victims, who have not found effective protection through either criminal or civil
procedures.
7. Court orders go unheeded
Failure of courts to enforce their own orders granting relief to litigants may eventually
result in more difficulties than adjudicating the initial petition for relief. Plaintiffs may
prevail but gain no redress from the decision because judges refuse to issue effective
orders mandating the remedies demanded by a jury. This is a problem that often arises
when the delinquent party is a government agency. Common examples of deliberate
resistance to court orders include ignoring orders to produce documents requested under
the Freedom of Information or Privacy Act and failure of public officials to obey orders
to return money or property unlawfully taken from citizens by law enforcement agencies.
8. Judges give orders contrary to law and accepted standards of behavior
Opposite the failure to enforce just orders for relief is issuing orders demanding illegal or
obviously impractical relief from litigants. Examples of practices that have become
common during the past few years include demands for support payments from one
party to divorce proceedings that exceed the total earnings of the person ordered to pay,
jailing of indigent litigants who cannot pay what the court has demanded of them for
other reasons, removal of children from their natural parents without due process, and
imposition of medical treatment on minor children without informing their parents.
9. Judges refuse to take actions required by law
Many routine actions required of judges have created barriers to the enforcement of laws
as intended by Congress. An excellent example of this is the action usually taken after
a litigant complaints that he cannot obtain documents requested pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act. This law was passed by Congress because of the great
resistance shown by Federal civil servants to making their unclassified documents
available to the general public. Records created through the use of tax money should
belong to the public and be made available on request.
Congress obviously intended that documents formally requested be made available
immediately. It therefore specified a waiting period of no more than ten working days
and permitted a person who requested the records to file a lawsuit to obtain the
documents if the agency is not forthcoming. It requires agencies to assist people making
requests to identify the documents and to provide the documents after charging only
minimal copying fees.
Obviously, to uphold this law as Congress intended, a judge must order immediate
release of the records to the court for distribution to the plaintiff after the court has ruled
on any objections the agency has made to their release. Because obtaining records as
quickly as possible is often necessary for a litigant to obtain some benefit to which he is
35
entitled, complete an article for publication in a newspaper or periodical, or protect
himself of a relative from the consequences of false information about him being
distributed with official records, the rapid availability of records is vital.
Instead of upholding the high standards demanded by the Freedom of Information Act,
judges have consistently permitted lawsuits to obtain public information to drag on for
several years, often making the intended use of the documents impossible. Judges seem
to attempt to avoid issuing orders to government agencies, even when the law mandates
this. They fail to review contested records in camera, as provided for in the law, and
simply hope the plaintiff will eventually withdraw his demand for the documents.
Although obtaining documents often costs plaintiffs excessive amounts of money for the
litigation, judges seldom offer the monetary relief specified in the law. They also fail to
impose the requirement of the law that photocopy fees be reasonable. While private
shops provide photocopies for 5 cents or less, agencies may charge exorbitant amounts
to copy their documents. For example, about two years ago, one agency demanded 31
cents for each copy, or more than 6 times the price on the private market.
The failure of the courts to impose sanctions on civil servants who make it a sport to defy
the Freedom of Information Act has led to the development of procedures to keep public
documents out of the hands of citizens who want to obtain them.
10. Courts have become inconsistent and arbitrary
Courts have recently begun to establish very confusing precedents, reverse their own
decisions, and ignore real issues rather than settling them. In recent years, different
Courts of Appeals have issued opposite interpretations of the same law, making one
action legal under the jurisdiction of one circuit and illegal under the jurisdiction of
another. Because the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari each time a litigant
attempted to obtain a definitive decision on some of these matters, Federal law can mean
one thing in one circuit and the opposite in another. For example, whether or not
Federal law permits factory workers to speak with each other in a language other than
English depends upon the area of the country in which the factory is located.
Changing public opinion or even an unusual personal opinion held by the judge to
whom the case has been assigned may result in a lawsuit being decided in a manner
contrary to other recent decisions in nearly identical cases. When judicial opinions on
the interpretation of a law are continually fluctuating because one judge approves of the
law while another does not, whichever litigant loses will feel cheated by the court because
other litigants in exactly in the same position won their lawsuits. This situation causes
more litigants to risk a lawsuit rather than settling the dispute out of court because
winning or losing depends only on the whim of the judge hearing the case rather than
on a consistent and unambiguous interpretation of the law. An advantage of being
represented by counsel is often the knowledge he brings concerning which judges will be
sympathetic to the litigant’s case and which will favor the other party. In an impartial
system, such considerations would not be a factor. The founding fathers hoped to
eliminate this problem by insisting that decisions be rendered by juries, but by
increasingly usurping the duties of the jurors, judges have permitted their own beliefs on
the wisdom of individual laws to override the stated intentions of Congress. Because all
judges do not hold the same opinions, an increasing inconsistency in decisions is
becoming an increasing problem for pro se litigants and lawyers, alike.
11. Federalism theory interferes with practical justice
36
In recent history, Federal courts have intervened in many disputes between citizens and
individual states, where the state court system was clearly violating or assisting in the
violation of civil rights. Since the first Civil Rights statutes were passed in 1871, Congress
has shown a clear intent to place the guarantees in Amendments XIII, XIV, and XV
above the limitations on suits against states in Amendment XI. Federal courts belatedly
struck down state laws deliberately passed to bar Americans of African descent from
voting, attending schools with white children, and using public facilities. These rulings
have clearly focused the attention of the nation on the fact that states are prone to
commit actions against their citizens that violate Federal guarantees defined as civil and
human rights by our Constitution.
Recently, the theory of federalism has been revived, and Federal courts have become less
willing to interfere with the actions of state courts, no matter how unjust and
reprehensible. One of the most important reasons for Federal courts to exist is to provide
citizens with a final recourse against clearly illegal actions committed by state and local
government, which are much more likely to fall under the influence of criminal
conspirators than the much more diverse Federal system. If the Federal courts disqualify
themselves from settling disputes between citizens and state governments, they have
clearly left the citizens vulnerable to losing their civil rights through clearly illegal actions
by small, corrupt political machines.
IV. REMEDIES
What is the court supposed to do?
The basic reason for establishing a judicial system is to settle disputes that are addressed by
existing laws. It has been repeatedly stated by experts on matters judicial in the United States that the
ultimate goal is to decide all matters on the merits. That means to most reasonable persons that the court
should concern itself with two factors and only two factors: the law and the material facts. The blindfold
on the statue of Justice is there to keep attention on the scales and not on the race, color, national origin,
age, gender, appearance, financial condition, social position, or friends of the litigants.
It stands to reason that a pro se litigant has as much chance of being entitled to relief according
to the law and the facts as the litigant with enough money to afford the services of the best law firm in
the country. The reason everyone who can afford it will seek the services of a class A law firm is that the
presentation of the law and facts of the case in the arguments is reputed to sway judges and juries toward
the side of one client where the issues are not entirely clear. However, if skill in arguing becomes the sole
criterion for determining who prevails in a lawsuit, then the courts have failed in their duty to provide a
fully impartial forum for presenting the facts.
The Task Force must address one primary problem: a failure of the court to be impartial. This
failure is usually apparent from the outcome of lawsuits. If pro se litigants always or almost always lose,
then the courts have failed. No class of litigants is right or wrong 100% of the time. If one person comes
to the court for revenge after being fired for poor performance, the court cannot conclude that the next
person raising the same claim was not fired for failing to become an accomplice to illegal actions his boss
is engaged in, for belonging to a race that the boss does not like, or for being too old when the boss
wants only youthful employees. If a father must be kept away from children he is abusing, that does not
mean that the next father who seeks custody of his children is abusing them as well. If personal property
was seized from one person because of his refusal to pay taxes, it cannot be concluded that there is no
merit in the lawsuit of the next person who complains that his property was illegally confiscated by
corrupt public officials.
As already discussed, pro se lawsuits are increasing for several reasons, which have nothing to
do with the law or the facts in each individual case. These include:
37
1) a white collar crime wave encouraged by the failure of prosecutors and judges to focus on
anything but violent crime;
2) a breakdown in government accountability resulting in civil servants wasting funds on a
massive scale and abusing the rights of citizens;
3) an increasing resistance by large corporations to being held accountable for the harm they do
to ordinary citizens;
4) the continual erosion of traditional values, which formerly placed limits on the excesses society
would tolerate; and
5) the combination of lower earnings by the average American and the increasing fees demanded
by competent lawyers. A strict enforcement of the law and increasing penalties for wrongdoing would
do much to eliminate all of these reasons. Misconduct will increase as long as most perpetrators escape
all consequences for their actions and penalties remain inconsequential. Supply and demand regulate
what lawyers charge and will result in lower fees when the causes for the increasing number of lawsuits
are eliminated.
If the courts were functioning fairly and efficiently, the outcome of a lawsuit would be relatively
easy to predict according the circumstances and not dependent on non-merit factors. That means that
a pro se litigant showing that his rights under any law had been violated and that he had suffered some
kind of harm because of the violation would face no reduction in his chances of success because he was
not represented by a lawyer. Only the law, which he would not necessarily have to cite correctly, and
the facts of the case would determine the outcome. Any reduction in the chances of his success with a
meritorious claim would indicate that the court has not fulfilled its function. The Task Force need only
focus on a pro se litigant’s chance of success with a meritorious claim to have performed its duties to the
complete satisfaction of all.
If a pro se litigant fails to prevail in spite of the fact that his claim is meritorious, the system has
failed. The Task Force should seek remedies assuring that each meritorious claim results in the relief
prescribed by law regardless of whether or not the litigant is represented by counsel. It should seek a
review process by which sufficient attention is given to each lawsuit to assure that the prejudice of one
judge cannot perpetrate a miscarriage of justice for any reason. This may well require an increase in the
personnel assigned to review each appeal and an increased recruitment of jurors. If so, then Congress
should be forcefully informed that increased funding will be required.
It should not be the concern of the Task Force that baseless claims, lawsuits filed to harass, or
esoteric challenges to established institutions are not given an appreciable amount of legal aid. It should
also not concern the Task Force that jury decisions are challenged by the litigants who do not prevail.
However, if almost every lawsuit filed pro se is dismissed without a trial, it should be clear that due
process is not being provided by the courts.
V. THE SOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The Constitution of the United States includes all necessary ingredients for making the courts
function fairly and efficiently. In clear and concise English, it is demanded that every person accused of
a crime and every litigant in a lawsuit involving more than $20 has a right to a trial by jury. It does not
provide for judges substituting their opinions for the decision of a jury of peers. It requires speedy trial
of persons indicted for crimes and assures that the common law rights enjoyed by the English colonists
at the time the United States declared its independence are respected. Later amendments guaranteed
every citizen equal treatment under the law.
Determining whether any claim is meritorious after the facts have been presented belongs to a
jury. It is a basic right of every litigant to have a jury decide whether or not he prevails based on the
evidence presented. A judge may rig the outcome of a jury trial by refusing to let a litigant present
38
material evidence or by giving false instructions to the jury. However, most complaints by pro se litigants
result from their being denied any trial by jury at all.
Any litigant, with or without counsel, must provide a complaint alleging that a specific law was
violated causing him some form of damage or denying him some right. As an example, we can take the
typical outcome of what should be an open and shut case to see whether the Constitution is being
followed. The Privacy Act requires correction of false records concerning any citizen, and a citizen files
a complaint that an agency is maintaining records about him that he alleges are false. The Court is
empowered to review the record and the evidence that the person presents and order correction or
removal of the record. It also authorizes damages to the person who demanded the change and
reasonable legal costs. Congress expressed the demand that agency responses be prompt.
In a typical case, the agency would respond to the complaint by claiming various immunities and
file a motion for dismissal based on irrelevant claims of privilege and sovereign immunity. The matter
would remain on the docket for more than a year without any action being taken, and finally the judge
would dismiss the lawsuit. There would be no review of the records by either a judge or a jury, no review
of the evidence, no discovery to reveal other relevant matters, and no consideration of the material facts.
The judge would simply have assumed that the case would have no merit because it was filed pro se and
any attention given to it would be a waste of time.
In such a case, there would be no question that the plaintiff alleged a violation of a law and that
the law specifically waived sovereign immunity and authorized specific relief. That records existed would
not be challenged, and neither would the existence of evidence calling the accuracy of the records into
question. What was lacking is a review of the challenged records, a review of the evidence, and an
impartial hearing to determine whether the preponderance of evidence indicates that the records are
false.
Such a decision would naturally be unpublished, keeping it from the scrutiny of the legal
profession, and the judge would enjoy absolute immunity whether or not the decision was in accord with
the letter and spirit of the law. It should be obvious that the simple demands made of the judiciary by
the Constitution were not followed. There was no due process, no fact-finding, no review by a jury, and
different treatment given to the plaintiff than he would have received if he had been represented by a
major law firm or an influential organization. The remedy in this case would be simply for a judge to
follow the procedures outlined in the Constitution. The improvement of the treatment of pro se litigants
would simply entail following the procedures spelled out in the Constitution and in the wording of the
Privacy Act, itself. By not doing this, the judge was deliberately producing a chilling effect to keep other
citizens from filing lawsuits under the Privacy Act. If any government agent maliciously creates a false
record after a dispute with a citizen, the record must remain to mislead anyone who reads in the future.
The Privacy Act has therefore been repealed at the whim of one judge without any allegation that the
statute violates the Constitution in any way, and it is made clear that the repeal by judicial fiat applies
only in the case of the one plaintiff and may be reversed in the next decision if the plaintiff is deemed
worthier by the judge. Equal treatment under the law therefore becomes another casualty of the court.
Another example of a failure to meet the Constitutional mandates would be a lawsuit involving
employment discrimination based on age. It is evident from the wording of the law and earlier decisions
of the Supreme Court that proof of motive is irrelevant in such cases because motive can be implied from
circumstances. If a government agency passes over the 50-year-old plaintiff in spite of his 25 years of
relevant experience and high examination score in favor of a 30-year-old applicant with three years of
experience and a low examination score, the decision should provide relief for the plaintiff unless the
agency can show that there was a valid reason for the choice. However, judges routinely dismiss such
cases without a jury trial on the defense of a simple denial by the agency, even though any ordinary
person would consider the denial to be without merit and contrary to the fact presented in the documents
filed with the court. Again, the decision is unpublished, and appeal results in a rubber-stamped
39
affirmation. With absolute immunity, the judge has nothing to fear even though a clear issue of fact
remained to be decided by a jury under the Constitutional formula, and he illegally usurped the functions
of the jury to create a chilling effect on the public and thereby discourage other people from filing what
he regards as litigation that is too time-consuming.
In the examples given here, no problem exists with the laws cited, the issues are clear, and the
relief is spelled out in the statutes. All submissions are timely, and no requirements for further fact-finding
are recognized by the judge. The problem for the pro se litigants in such cases could not be remedied
by better instruction on preparing submissions, assistance of law school students, or more helpful clerks.
The problem is the failure of a judge to proceed according to common law and recognize the
Constitutional rights of one of the litigants. It could only be remedied by making the judges follow
established procedures without allowing their own personal opinions or prejudices to interfere with due
process.
VI. THE SEARCH FOR REMEDIES BY THE TASK FORCE
The remedies to the problems not addressed by the Task Force involve changing the attitudes
of judges toward litigants. While there are people who attempt to convince the court to make
fundamental changes rightfully belonging to the legislative branch and others who use litigation for
revenge or to vex an enemy, most people seeking the assistance of a court to settle a dispute do so
because necessity demands it. Some people are forced to file several lawsuits because unscrupulous
office holders are able to create multiple problems for them, motivated by personal dislike, political
disputes, or a desire to obtain a coveted piece of property. The civil rights movement clearly revealed
the extent to which officers of state and local government, including judges, are willing to go to violate
the rights of individuals because of their political activities or because they belong to certain minorities.
Federal courts are the last resort of many people who find themselves robbed of their fundamental rights.
The remedies suggested by the Task Force might be sufficient if all judges and court officials were
competent, honest, and incorruptible. If one judge does not live up to the high standards demanded of
him, there must be some kind of machinery established to undo the damage he does. However, a litigant
soon finds that if he is unfortunate enough to have his case assigned to a less than competent,
opinionated, or dishonest judge, his chances for redress of his grievances have been eliminated even
before the proceedings start. The eclipse of the jury trial as the main means of settling lawsuits has
brought about a preponderance of “fast track” summary judgements, rubber stamped by inattentive
appeals court judges, and deemed unworthy of consideration by the Supreme Court. Judges have made
themselves impervious to complaints of misconduct and have even provided immunity to anyone
employed by any government agency. The pro se plaintiff is therefore left without legal, civil, or human
rights for wont of a means of having those rights recognized and upheld.
Short of setting up an entirely new system of courts to pass judgement on the ones we already
have, remedies will have to entail a more impartial treatment of lawsuits by judges. A person’s social
standing must no longer have an impact on a court’s decision. The best way of preventing lawsuits from
being rigged in favor of an influential or political powerful litigant is to leave decisions to a jury. If
individual jurors are biased, there should hopefully be other jurors on the same jury who will hold
different opinions. It is also much more difficult to influence 12 randomly selected citizens than it is to
improperly influence one judge. Jury trials are made mandatory by the Constitution in most cases, so
there is no reason for them to be denied short of a litigant’s obvious failure to demonstrate any law that
might authorize relief of any kind.
The overriding factor that will eliminate almost all genuine problems faced by pro se litigants is
a restoration of strict ethics and impartiality to members of the court. If a person’s legal rights have been
violated, it is an absolute duty of the judge to provide him with a fair hearing and every opportunity to
present the evidence that he has. If the judge does this, allows the issues of fact to be decided by an
impartial jury, and provides equitable relief to the prevailing party, the recommendations of the Task
40
Force would be sufficient to provide fairness to pro se litigants. If, however, any judge fails to live up to
his responsibilities, there must be another means of redress provided to correct the injustice created by
the court when it denies due process. An oversight body would have to be sufficiently independent,
unbiased, and competent to determine not only the merits of the original lawsuit but also the fairness of
the presiding judge. A special grand jury composed of ordinary citizens might be established to pre-sort
all lawsuits in order to recommend those that lack merit for early dismissal and refer all others to the
judge for trial by jury. It might also be given oversight of the actions of judges that may be prejudicial
to one of the parties.
An alternative to this would be to remove all civil immunity from judges. This might result in a
flood of lawsuits against judges, but it would be a deterrent to unjustified dismissal of lawsuits prior to jury
trial. Aside from obviously doctoring the evidence or giving the jury false information about the laws
under which the lawsuit was brought, no failure by the judge could result in his being found liable for
misconduct as long as he permitted the decision to be made by a jury.
Other effective remedies might also be found, but it is suggested here that the Task Force should
consider the worst case scenario, in which all judges handling the initial proceedings and the appeals fail
to perform their duties in the prescribed way. It should then consider the best methods to
1) uphold the litigant’s legal rights by overturning the initial decision against him;
2) take action against the judge who rendered the decision to prevent the incident from repeating
itself during actions brought by other litigants;
3) hold a trial by jury unless waived by all litigants;
4) provide suitable relief, and
5) see to it that the orders of the court are promptly carried out.
VII. CLOSING WORDS
No demands are made here other than that the courts function as close to the system foreseen
by the founding fathers as humanly possible. A decision for a lawsuit on the merits with consideration
given only to the law and the material facts has become an unattainable dream for the majority of
American citizens. Errors cannot be avoided, but it is the duty of all judges sitting on a court to minimize
errors to the point that they become extremely rare. Many of the cases tossed out of the courts based
on flimsy technicalities involve the life savings, health, or even the survival of one of the litigants. The
Task Force is in an excellent position to insist on a review of the court’s actions, and it should do so. If
bias for or against members of any one group is found, swift action should be taken to correct the
injustice. In the long run, it will depend upon the court itself to determine whether or not it wants to bring
justice under the law to all people who seek relief from it. If the court takes effective action, the
improvement will surely quiet all criticism. If it does not, public indignation is sure to increase to the point
that Congress will be required to take some decisive action.
Prepared by Charles W. Heckman, Dr. Sci.

Submitted in behalf of: A Matter of Justice Coalition
Formatted and uploaded to American Family Rights Association website on January 3, 2005
41

8th Circuit Judicial Complaint

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Исходное описание:

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

8th Circuit Judicial Complaint

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Don Hamrick

5860 Wilburn Road

Wilburn, Arkansas 72179

(501) 728-4235 Direct Email: 4donhamrick@gmail.com

Judge George Howard

SEE ATTACHED LETTER.

Unrepresented Civil Plaintiff (pro se)

SEE ATTACHED LETTER.

In the event that I do file a lawsuit against Judge George Howard it

SEE ATTACHED LETTER.

Complaint of Extortion Against Judge George Howard

Courtesy Copy delivered to the FBI, Washington, DC and Little Rock,

I want to see if the FBI considers extortion by a judge, 18 U.S.C.

I want my hard earned $1,763 back!!

JUDICIAL N OTICE OF A DJUDICATIVE FACTS

To imposes such conditions is an unconstitutional act of prior restraint of a statutory

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES ON THE SEAMAN ’S SUIT LAW

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DON HAMRICK PLAINTIFF

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, ET AL. DEFENDANTS

forma pauperis filing to qualify for the statutory exemption.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1916 provides:

completed in forma pauperis application.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of August, 2006.

26 U.S.C. § 1916. Seamen’s Suits

H ISTORICAL AND R EVISION N OTES O N T HE S EAMAN ’S S UIT L AW

COMPLAINANT’S OTHER CASES

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE

REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

Howard H. Dana, Jr., Chair

"CIVIL GIDEON" MOTION

"Equality before the law in a true democracy is a matter of right. It cannot be a

Howard H. Dana, Jr., Chair

Task Force on Access to Civil Justice

3. Continuing retaliation and harassment of me by the U.S. Government for

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Retaliating Against the Plaintiff for

42 U.S.C. § 1981. Equal rights under the law.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.

42 U.S.C. § 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights.

42 U.S.C. § 1987. Prosecution of violation of certain laws.

42 U.S.C. § 1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights.

M Paul D. Clement, Solicitor General

M M ichael Chertoff, Secretary

Don Hamrick, Petitioner, Pro Se

MOTION FOR TEMPARY/PERMANENT INJUNCTION

MOTION FOR SUBPOENA OF EVIDENCE

I previously submitted a Motion for a Permanent Injunction to this Court that I

Now comes Michael Prendergast, Associate Director, Security Operations, U.S.

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390 What is the policy concerning disturbances?

• (a) Creates loud or unusual noise or a nuisance;

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE

IV DC Code § 22-3302. Unlawful entry on property.

Since I initiated my lawsuits in 2002 I have made it a personal goal to conduct

If there was any perceived disturbances as presumed to be the basis of Mr.

I further motion for the Court to issue a subpoena to the Department of

CAPT . SALERNO , DIRECTOR ,

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS

CASE LAW FOR THIS MOTION

Society’s commitment to institutional justice requires that judges

FURTHER ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that appellant’s Second