PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTIONOF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS vs. COA.

G.R. No. 169752 September 25, 2007 Austria-Martinez, J

Facts:The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Important to note is that the nature of the petitioner as a corporate entity is distinguished from the Sociedadanonimas under the Spanish Code of Commerce. For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the protection of animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto. As originally worded, Sections 4and 5 of Act No. 1285 provide: Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 148, which reads, in its entirety, thus: Immediately thereafter, then President Manuel L. Quezon issued Executive Order(E.O.) No. 63 dated November 12, 1936, portions of which provide: Whereas, during the first regular session of the National Assembly, Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty Eight was enacted depriving the agents of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of their power to arrest persons who have violated the laws prohibiting cruelty to animals thereby correcting a serious defect in one of the laws existing in our statute books .Whereas, the cruel treatment of animals is an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the Government is duty bound to enforce; By this when the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that they are a private entity and not under the said commission. On the other hand the COA decided that they are a government entity. Issue: is the said petitioner a private entity? Ruling:

First , the Court agrees with the petitioner that the charter test cannot be applied. Essentially, the charter test as it stands today provides:[T]he test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System. The petitioner is correct in stating that the charter test is predicated, at best, on the legal regime established by the 1935 Constitution, Section 7, Article XIII, which states: Sec. 7. The National Assembly shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. During the formulation of the 1935 Constitution, the Committee on Franchises recommended the foregoing proscription to prevent the pressure of special interests upon the lawmaking body in the creation of corporations or in the regulation of the same. To permit the lawmaking body by special law to provide for the organization, formation, or regulation of private corporations would be in effect to offer to it the temptation in many cases to favor certain groups, to the prejudice of others or to the prejudice of the interests of the country. And since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the 1935Constitution and not earlier, it follows that the test cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905.Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. There are a few exceptions. Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1) when the law itself so expressly provides; (2) in case of remedial statutes; (3) in case of curative statutes; (4) in case of laws interpreting others; and(5) in case of laws creating new rights. None of the exceptions is present in the instant case.

As a curative statute, and based on the doctrines so far discussed, C.A. No.148 has to be given retroactive effect, thereby freeing all doubt as to which class of corporations the petitioner belongs, that is, it is a quasi-public corporation, a kind of private domestic corporation, which the Court will further elaborate on under the fourth point. The general principle of prospectivity of the law likewise applies to Act No. 1459,otherwise known as the Corporation Law, which had been enacted by virtue of the plenary powers of the Philippine Commission on March 1, 1906, a little over a yearafter January 19, 1905, the time the petitioner emerged as a juridical entity. Eventhe Corporation Law respects the rights and powers of juridical entities organizedbeforehand Second , a reading of petitioners charter shows that it is not subject to controlor supervision by any agency of the State, unlike government-owned and -controlledcorporations. No government representative sits on the board of trustees of thepetitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members aredetermined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in accordance

with its by-laws,and may exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such asthe powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and soforth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner shall bemanaged or operated by its officers in accordance with its by-laws in force. Thepertinent provisions of the charter provide: Section 1. Anna L. Ide, Kate S. Wright, John L. Chamberlain, William F. Tucker,Mary S. Fergusson, Amasa S. Crossfield, Spencer Cosby, Sealy B. Rossiter, RichardP. Strong, Jose Robles Lahesa, Josefina R. de Luzuriaga, and such other persons asmay be associated with them in conformity with this act, and their successors, arehereby constituted and created a body politic and corporate at law, under the nameand style of The Philippines Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. As incorporated by this Act, said society shall have the power to add to itsorganization such and as many members as it desires, to provide for and choosesuch officers as it may deem advisable, and in such manner as it may wish,and to remove members as it shall provide.It shall have the right to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, to receivelegacies and donations, to conduct social enterprises for the purpose of obtaining funds, to levy dues upon its members and provide for their collection tohold real and personal estate such as may be necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes of the society, and to adopt such by-laws for its government as maynot be inconsistent with law or this charter.xxxxSec. 3. The said society shall be operated under the direction of its officers, inaccordance with its by-laws in force, and this charter.xxxxSec. 6. The principal office of the society shall be kept in the city of Manila, and thesociety shall have full power to locate and establish branch offices of the societywherever it may deem advisable in the Philippine Islands, such branch offices to beunder the supervision and control of the principal office. Third . The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by theSocial Security System at the latters initiative, and not through the GovernmentService Insurance System, which should be the case if the employees are consideredgovernment employees. This is another indication of petitioners nature as a privateentity. Section 1 of Republic Act No.1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 8282,otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, defines the employer:Employer Any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on inthe Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind anduses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards theemployment,except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branchesor instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government :Provided, That a self-employed person shall be both employee and employer at thesame time. (Emphasis supplied)

Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a body politic because its primary purpose is to secure the protection and welfare of animals which,in turn, redounds to the public good.This argument, is, at best, specious. The fact that a certain juridical entity isimpressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entitya public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be private although its chartercontains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for the public good.This class of corporations may be considered

quasi-public corporations, which areprivate corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue othereleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of itsmembers, they are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit.Examples of these corporations are utility, railroad, warehouse, telegraph, telephone,water supply corporations and transportation companies. It must be stressed that aquasi-public corporationis a species of private corporations, but the qualifyingfactor is the type of service the former renders to the public: if it performs a publicservice, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation.Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation cannot betaken as a safe guide, for the fact is that almost all corporations are nowadayscreated to promote the interest, good, or convenience of the public. A bank, forexample, is a private corporation; yet, it is created for a public benefit. Privateschools and universities are likewise private corporations; and yet, they arerendering public service. Private hospitals and wards are charged with heavy socialresponsibilities. More so with all common carriers. On the other hand, there mayexist a public corporation even if it is endowed with gifts or donations from privateindividuals.The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public orprivate is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If thecorporation is created by the State as the latters own agency or instrumentality tohelp it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that corporation is consideredpublic; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces, chartered cities,and barangayscan best exemplify public corporations. They are created by theState as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own publicworks.It is clear that the amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 revoked thepowers of the petitioner to arrest offenders of animal welfare laws and the power toserve processes in connection therewith.

Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner requiresthe latter to render periodic reports to the Civil Governor, whose functions have beeninherited by the President, the petitioner is, therefore, a governmentinstrumentality.This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporationsowe their very existence and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement isapplicable to all corporations of whatever nature, whether they are public, quasipublic, or private corporationsas creatures of the State, there is a reserved right inthe legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to determine whether itacted within its powers. In other words, the reportorial requirement is the principalmeans by which the State may see to it that its creature acted according to thepowers and functions conferred upon it. These principles were extensively discussedin Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government . Here, the Court, in holding that the subject corporation could notinvoke the right against self-incrimination whenever the State demanded theproduction of its corporate books and papers, extensively discussed the purpose of reportorial requirements,viz :xxx The corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated forthe benefit of the public. It received certain special privileges and franchises, andholds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Itspowers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Itsrights to act as a corporation are only

preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserve[d] right in the legislature to investigate its contractsand find out whether it has exceeded its powers.

It would be a strange anomaly tohold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises,could not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had beenemployed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of thecorporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to this, that anofficer of the corporation which is charged with a criminal violation of the statutemay plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. Tostate this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse toanswer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation vested with special privileges and franchises may refuse toshow its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges . (Wilson v. UnitedStates, 55 Law Ed., 771, 780.) EN BANC G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents. Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner. Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.: Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the

Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. EN BANC

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondents. Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners. R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by Presidential Decree 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines (the constitutionality of the decree was sustained in Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gambling Corporation). Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16. Its Sangguniang Panglungsod derives its powers, duties and functions under Section 458 of said Code. In 1992, following its success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On 7 December 1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of Casino). On 4 January 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance 3375-93 (An Ordinance prohibiting the operation of Casino and providing penalty for violation therefore). Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of the decision was denied on 13 July 1993. Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro can prohibit the establishment of a casino, or gambling, operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.

Held: The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Further, there are two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The suggestion that the Local Government Code (LGC) authorize Local Government Units (LGUs) to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of legislature. Ordinances should not contravene a statute as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA Date: December 7, 1995 Petitioner: Laguna Lake Development Authority Respondents: CA, Hon. Judge Herculano Tech, Fleet Development Inc and Carlito Arroyo Ponente: Hermosisima Jr Facts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This agency was supposed to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development. PD 813 amended certain sections RA 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. To effectively perform the role of the Authority under RA 4850, the Chief Executive issued EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of EO 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees:

Sec 2: xxx the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. SEC. 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following manner: 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234.

Then came Republic Act No. 7160. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides: "Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals; Fees and Charges (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages occupied almost onethird the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 ha in 1990 to almost 21,000 ha in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that:

1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal. 2. All fishpens; fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing. 3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court. All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled." One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected. The fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were denied. Meanwhile, TRO/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA from

demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question. Hence, the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. The CA dismissed the LLDAs consolidated petitions. It ruled that (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to respective local government units concerned. Issue: Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region - should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? Held: LLDA

Ratio: Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters. The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law. It is basic is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly that the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied

repeals are not favored and as much as possible, given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.

We are on all fours with the manifestation of LLDA that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the 8 major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km2 basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resourcea very limited one-which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance. Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the regionwith due regard to the intergenerational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law-the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources. Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power of LGUs.

On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected. THIRD DIVISION G. R. No. 136809.July 27, 2004 DEMOCRITO D. PLAZA II and VIRGINIA V. TUAZON, Petitioners, v. CAROLINA M. CASSION, ALBERTA M. SAMPAYAN, JOSEPHINE NATALIA U. LOPEZ, JOCELYN M. ALMANZOR, LUZVIMINDA G. ARDECER, MAGDALENA S. BALACUIT, WINDELYN B. CABUSAO, JULIETA R. JANDAYAN, NERI O. SAMUYA, INES V. YAOYAO, TERESITA I. ROSALES, MARIA DEBRA M. LANAJA, RUTH O. NICOLASURA, Respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991, aims to transform local government units into self-reliant communities and active partners of the national government in the attainment of effective services to the people.As a result of the devolution of concerned personnel from the national government to the various local government units pursuant to the same Code, the interest of the service demands that their working relations with the local employees should be harmonious. This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated February 14, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 9, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55052, Carolina M. Cassion, et al. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al. Before the passage of Republic Act No. 7160, the task of delivering basic social services was dispensed by the national government through the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Upon the promulgation and implementation of the Local Government Code, some of the functions of the DSWD were transferred to the local government units. The City of Butuan, through its Sangguniang Panglungsod (Sanggunian) passed SP Resolution 427-92,3 entitled Resolution Authorizing the City Mayor, Honorable Democrito D. Plaza II, to Sign the Memorandum of Agreement for the Devolution of the DSWD to the City of Butuan. Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)4 entered into between the City of Butuan, through then Mayor Democrito Plaza II, Petitioner, and the DSWD, the latters services, personnel, assets and liabilities, and technical support systems were transferred to its city counterpart.

By virtue of the same MOA, Mayor Plaza issued Executive Order (EO) No. 06-925 dated October 5, 1992 reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding thereto 19 national DSWD employees headed by petitioner Virginia Tuazon, Social Welfare Officer V. Mayor Plaza designated her Officer-in-Charge of the reconstituted CSSDO.Its office was transferred from the original CSSDO building to the DSWD building. The CSSDO was originally composed of herein respondents, headed by Carolina M. Cassion, Social Welfare Officer IV. Aggrieved by such development, they refused to recognize petitioner Tuazon as their new head and to report at the DSWD building.They contended that the issuance of EO No. 06-92 by Mayor Plaza and the designation of petitioner Tuazon as Officer-in-charge of the CSSDO are illegal. Despite Mayor Plazas series of orders to respondents to report for work at the DSWD building, they failed to do so. On January 18, 1993, Mayor Plaza issued a memorandum to the City Legal Officer directing him to conduct an administrative investigation against respondents.They then submitted their respective explanations.Thereafter, they were charged administratively for grave misconduct and insubordination and were preventively suspended for 60 days.This prompted them to file with the Civil Service Regional Office No. 10 a complaint against Mayor Plaza for violation of the Civil Service Law.However, their complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. Upon expiration of their preventive suspension, respondents informed Mayor Plaza that they are willing to return to work, but to their old office, not to the DSWD building. For the last time, or on April 14, 1993, Mayor Plaza notified respondents to report to petitioner Tuazon at the new office in the DSWD building, but they remained obstinate. On February 9, 1994, Mayor Plaza inquired from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on what appropriate action could be taken against respondents for their continued refusal to report for work since April 1993.In turn, the CSC, through Atty. Lorea, Director II, informed the Mayor that respondents could be dropped from the rolls pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993. On February 16, 1994, Mayor Plaza issued an Order dropping respondents from the rolls pursuant to the said CSC Memorandum Circular. Forthwith, respondents appealed to the CSC. On August 22, 1994, the CSC issued Resolution Nos. 94-4626 and 94-6243 dismissing respondents appeal.In affirming Mayor Plazas Order dropping respondents from the rolls, the CSC held: CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993 dated September 10, 1993 provides as follows:

Officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave are considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) and may be dropped from the service without prior notice. A notice or order of the dropping from the rolls of an employee shall be issued by the appointing authority and submitted to the CSC Office concerned for record purposes. Based on the above-quoted provision, it is undeniable that the appointing authority has the legal right to drop from the rolls a civil service officer or employee.Nowhere in the quoted provision is it stated that only the Commission has the exclusive authority to drop from the rolls civil service officers or employees.Hence, contrary to the first contention of the appellants, Mayor Plaza acted in conformity with the law when he ordered the dropping from the rolls of herein Appellants.The records of the case show the fact that appellants did not report for work from April 1993 up to the time they were dropped from the rolls.Although they manifested intention to return to work upon expiration of their preventive suspension, still they adamantly insisted that they would report only in their old office and not in the new one created by Executive Order No. 06-92.The legal excuse being given by the appellants is highly untenable.The Executive Order issued by the Mayor is presumed valid until annulled by the proper authorities.The same presumption shall also apply insofar as the designation of Mrs. Tuazon as OIC is concerned.The proper course of action for the appellants is to comply with the Mayors directives and then challenge the questioned Executive Order before the proper forum, otherwise, the appellants should suffer the consequence of their acts. We find without merit the contention of the appellants that they were denied due process for lack of notice and opportunity to be heard before they were dropped from the rolls.The separation of an employee who is dropped from the rolls is a non-disciplinary action wherein the respondent is entitled to notice and hearing.In the above-quoted provision, an officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls if he was continuously absent without official leave for a period of at least thirty days.Prior notice is not necessary. As to the last contention of the appellants that it was really the intention of the mayor to systematically remove them, the Commission likewise finds it without merit.No evidence was submitted by the appellants to support such contention. Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. On February 14, 1996, the Appellate Court rendered its Decision setting aside the assailed CSC Resolutions and EO No. 06-92 issued by Mayor Plaza and reinstating respondents to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and emoluments with full back wages and other benefits corresponding to the period from January 1993 up to actual reinstatement.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated as follows: The fundamental rule of due process, on the other hand, requires that a person be accorded notice and opportunity to be heard (Rebuena v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 115942, 31 May

1995; Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Palmos, 232 SCRA 448 [1994]).Ample opportunity contemplated by law connotes every kind of assistance which must be accorded to the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation (Segismundo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 112203, 13 December 1994, 329 SCRA 167, citing Abiera v. NLRC, 215 SCRA 476 [1992]).Non-compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing is fatal because these requirements are conditions sine qua non before a dismissal may be validly effected (Maneho v. NLRC, 229 SCRA 240 [1994], citing Tiu v. NLRC, 215 SCRA 540 [1992]).In fact, notice and hearing must be accorded an employee even though the employee does not affirmatively demand it (Century Textile Mills v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 528 [1988]). A circumspect scrutiny of the record leaves Us unconvinced that petitioners were accorded this opportunity to be heard when they sought relief before respondent CSCs Regional Office No. X which dismissed their complaint, docketed as ADM. Case No. ND 93-023, against respondents City Mayor and Virginia V. Tuazon for violation of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations. x x x xxx As regards the validity of the issuance of E.O. No. 06-92, there can be no dispute over the power of the government to reorganize, whether traditional, progressive or whatever adjective is appended to it.However, the essence of constitutional government is adherence to basic rules.The rule of law requires that no government official should feel free to do as he pleases using only his avowedly sincere intentions and conscience to guide him.The fundamental standards of fairness embodied in the bona fide rule can not be disregarded (Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108 [1990]; see also Romualdez-Yap v. CSC, 225 SSCRA 285 [1993]. In the main, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the CSC Resolutions dropping respondents from the rolls and EO No. 06-92 directing the devolution of 19 national DSWD employees to the local or city DSWD to be headed by petitioner Virginia Tuazon. Private respondents, on the other hand, aver that their refusal to report for work is justified since EO No. 06-92 is not valid as it was issued without prior approval by the Sanggunian in violation of Article 164, Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code. Section 17 of the Local Government Code authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets and liabilities, records of basic services, and facilities of a national government agency to local government units.Under this Code, the term devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. As a consequence of the devolution of national agencies, Executive Order No. 503 was enacted by then President Corazon C. Aquino to govern and ensure the efficient transfer of responsibilities to the local government unit concerned.Section 2 (g) provides:

The local chief executive shall be responsible for all devolved functions.He may delegate such powers and functions to his duly authorized representative whose position shall preferably not be lower than the rank of a local government department head.In all cases of delegated authority, the local chief executive shall at all times observe the principle of command responsibility. Section 2 (a) states that: Except as herein otherwise provided, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992. Likewise, Section 22 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1992, specifies that: The positions absorbed by the local government units from the national government agencies shall be automatically created upon transfer of their corresponding budgetary allocation. Devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer. However, pending the completion of the new organizational structure and staffing pattern, the local government executives may assign devolved personnel to divisions/sections/units where their qualifications are best suited or appropriate. It is thus clear that Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the Local Government Code.As the local chief executive of Butuan City, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee to take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head, as was done by the Mayor here. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1992, provides further that heads of departments appointed by the local chief executive must have the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sanggunian concerned.While initially, the Sanggunian rejected petitioner Tuazons appointment as the City Government Department Head II of the CSSDO, however, it later confirmed her appointment. The Court Appeals erred in ruling that EO No. 06-92 violated respondents security of tenure as they were transferred to another office without their consent.There was no such transfer.Transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service and may be imposed as an administrative penalty.6 The change of respondents place of work from the original CSSDO office to the DSWD building is not a transfer.It was only a physical transfer of their office to a new one done in the interest of public service.There were no new movements or appointments from one position to another. Private respondents argue that they were denied due process when they were dropped from the rolls.

CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993, provides: VI. Requirements For Certain Mode of Separation. Dropping from the Rolls Non-disciplinary in nature, executory but appealable to the CSC office concerned within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order or notice. Officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave are considered on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) and may be dropped from the service without prior notice. A notice or order of the dropping from the rolls of an employee shall be issued by the appointing authority and submitted to the CSC office concerned for record purposes. Pursuant to the above provisions and as ruled by the CSC, the dropping from the rolls of private respondents is not disciplinary in nature.Thus, their assertion that they were denied due process is untenable.Since the dropping from the rolls is not an administrative sanction, they need not be notified or be heard. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 14, 1996 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED.The CSC Resolution No. 94-4626 dated August 22, 1994, and Resolution No. 946243 dated November 17, 1994 dropping private respondents from the rolls are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000] METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent. DECISION PUNO, J.:

MMDA vs Bel Air Village Association Date: March 27, 2000 Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

Respondent: Bel Air Village Association Inc Ponente: Puno Facts: MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village. On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. BAVA was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. On January 2, 1996, BAVA instituted against petitioner before the RTC a civil case for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day. After due hearing, the trial court denied the issuance of preliminary injunction. On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. Issue: WON the MMDA has authority to open Neptune Road to the public Held: No Ratio: MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. IAC. From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National

Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units -i .e ., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of RA 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA.

The implementatio n of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units, national government agencies, accredited peoples organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila.

Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government

units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power. The firstSang alang decision was on the merits of the petition, while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals. Contrary to petitioners claim, the twoSang alang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Misjuris

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC inSang alang . Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.J jle x

In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were

passed to the MMA. The MMAs power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila." The MMAs governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power. Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMAs jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have

legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly."

When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.

Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso

We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our peoples productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent. PARAS, J.:p G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991 Basco vs. PAGCOR H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR Facts: The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067- A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated

January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order Petitioners claim that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is in violation of the principle of local autonomy. o Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local." Issue: Does the local Government of Manila have the power to impose taxes on PAGCOR? Held No, the court rules that The City government of Manila has no power to impose taxes on PAGCOR. Reason: The principle of Local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state; the principle of local autonomy within the constitution simply means decentralization. It cannot be an Imperium in imperio it can only act intra sovereign, or as an arm of the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.

The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. EN BANC [G.R. No. 152774. May 27, 2004]

THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, represented by its Governor, HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary and Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Devolution; HON. EMILIA BONCODIN, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Relevant Background: It was a case filed by Hon. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, Governor of Batangas petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked (allocated) for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof. It started in 1998 when then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 48 entitled ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION to facilitate the process of enhancing the capabilities of local government units in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them pursuant to the Local Government Code. Included in the EO No. 48 is the appointment of the Oversight Committee authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the LGUs.. Subject of the case are the resolutions passed by the Oversight Committee (Chaired by the Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora). These are the resolutions with numbers OCD-99- 005, OCD-99-006, and OCD-99-003. Further, these OCDs were approved by then Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines along with these OCDs as formulated by the Oversight Committee requires the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of corresponding funds. For the year 2000 and 2001, the same LGSEF of 1999 GAA were adopted due to failure of

Congress to enact general appropriation laws. The standing point was when Gov. Mandanas received the LGSEF in the GAA of 1991. The 5Billion LGESF for 2001 were as follows: Modified Codal Formula

P3.0Billion Priority Projects P1.9 Billion Capability Building Fund P0.1 Billion, Total = P5Billion Furthere, the P3.0Billion of the abovementioned LGESF shall be allocated according to the modified codal formula and be released to the four levels of LGUs., ie., provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays as follos: Provinces, 25% P0.750Billion Cities, 25% 0.750 Municipalities, 35% 1.050 Barangays, 15% 0.450, Total = P3Billion Resolved Further, the P1.9Billion earmarked for Priority Projects shall be distributed according to the following criteria: 1. For projects of the 4th, 5th, and 6th class LGUs, or 2. Projects in consonance with the Presidents SONA Upon Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to the individual members of the Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of Resolution No. OCD- 2002-

001. He also wrote to Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said resolution as it violates the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 but otherwise, approved by Pres. Arroyo on January 25, 2002. The Petitioner Points the Following Issues: 1. Unconstitutionality and void provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001. 2. Unlawful and illegal imposition of conditions issued by the Oversight Committee requiring project proposals and documentary requirements prior to the release of LGUs just share in the IRA is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 (and that the possible disapproval by the Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs is a diminution to then latters share in the IRA). The petitioner contends the following: In issue No.1 & 3, the respondent theorized that Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides for the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs was not intended to be a fixed determination of share in the national taxes as the Congress may enact other laws, including the aforementioned oppropriations law providing for a different sharing formula. Section 285 merely intended to be the default share of the LGUs to do away with the need to determine annually. Further, the respondent avers that the petition has already been rendered as moot and academic as it no longer presents a justifiable controversy because the IRAs of the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 have already been released and therefore, nothing more to prohibit, aside from the fact that the petition should not have been filed with the Supreme Court because this court is not a trier of facts, but, the lower courts of jurisdiction. In issue No.2, the assailed resolutions issued by the Oversight Committee are not constitutionally infirm. The respondents stands that Section 6 of Article X of the Constitution does not specify the just share of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the Local Government Code of 1991 and that the phrase to be determined by law in the same provision means that there exists no limitation on the power of Congress to determine what is the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. In effect, the Congress serves as the arbiter of what should be the just share. Courts Ruling: The Court finds the petition to involve a significant legal issue. Issue No.1 is the crux of the instant controversy as contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 and undoubtedly a legal question. However, the earmarking of the LGSEF, the promulgation of the assailed OCD resolutions and the release of the LGSEF to the LGU following the requirements are not disputed.

Substantive issues stated above, in the course of the argument, although the supervening events as the IRA including the LGSEF for 1999, 2000 and 2001 had already been released, still, there was a compelling reason to resolve the substantive issue raised in the instant petition, whether intended or incidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if grave violation of the Constitution is proved even where the supervening events had made the cases moot in order to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public. The court held that, the state shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. (Art. II Sec. 25 of the Constitution). Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision and has no power to control The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted to flesh out the mandate of the Constitution. The State policy on local autonomy is amplified in Section 2 thereof: Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now determine whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, earmarking for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF and the OCD resolutions promulgated pursuant thereto, transgress the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. To the Courts mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the just share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee. That the automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to guarantee and promote local autonomy can be gleaned from the discussion below between Messrs. Jose N. Nolledo and Regalado M. Maambong, then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 152675 April 28, 2004

BATANGAS POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BATANGAS CITY and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents. x--------------------x G.R. No. 152771 April 28, 2004

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 66, Makati City; BATANGAS CITY GOVERNMENT; ATTY. TEODULFO DEGUITO, in his capacity as Chief Legal Officer, Batangas City; and BENJAMIN PARGAS, in his capacity as City Treasurer, Batangas City, respondents. DECISION PUNO, J.: Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the rulings of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in its February 27, 2002 Decision in Civil Case No. 00-205. The facts show that in the early 1990s, the country suffered from a crippling power crisis. Power outages lasted 8-12 hours daily and power generation was badly needed. Addressing the problem, the government, through the National Power Corporation (NPC), sought to attract investors in power plant operations by providing them with incentives, one of which was through

the NPCs assumption of payment of their taxes in the Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) Agreement. On June 29, 1992, Enron Power Development Corporation (Enron) and petitioner NPC entered into a Fast Track BOT Project. Enron agreed to supply a power station to NPC and transfer its plant to the latter after ten (10) years of operation. Section 11.02 of the BOT Agreement provided that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of all taxes that may be imposed on the power station, except income taxes and permit fees. Subsequently, Enron assigned its obligation under the BOT Agreement to petitioner Batangas Power Corporation (BPC). On September 13, 1992, BPC registered itself with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a pioneer enterprise. On September 23, 1992, the BOI issued a certificate of registration1 to BPC as a pioneer enterprise entitled to a tax holiday for a period of six (6) years. The construction of the power station in respondent Batangas City was then completed. BPC operated the station. On October 12, 1998, Batangas City (the city, for brevity), thru its legal officer Teodulfo A. Deguito, sent a letter to BPC demanding payment of business taxes and penalties, commencing from the year 1994 as provided under Ordinance XI or the 1992 Batangas City Tax Code.2 BPC refused to pay, citing its tax-exempt status as a pioneer enterprise for six (6) years under Section 133 (g) of the Local Government Code (LGC).3 On April 15, 1999, city treasurer Benjamin S. Pargas modified the citys tax claim4 and demanded payment of business taxes from BPC only for the years 1998-1999. He acknowledged that BPC enjoyed a 6-year tax holiday as a pioneer industry but its tax exemption period expired on September 22, 1998, six (6) years after its registration with the BOI on September 23, 1992. The city treasurer held that thereafter BPC became liable to pay its business taxes. BPC still refused to pay the tax. It insisted that its 6-year tax holiday commenced from the date of its commercial operation on July 16, 1993, not from the date of its BOI registration in September 1992.5 It furnished the city with a BOI letter6 wherein BOI designated July 16, 1993 as the start of BPCs income tax holiday as BPC was not able to immediately operate due to force majeure. BPC claimed that the local tax holiday is concurrent with the income tax holiday. In the alternative, BPC asserted that the city should collect the tax from the NPC as the latter assumed responsibility for its payment under their BOT Agreement. The matter was not put to rest. The city legal officer insisted7 that BPCs tax holiday has already expired, while the city argued that it directed its tax claim to BPC as it is the entity doing business in the city and hence liable to pay the taxes. The city alleged that it was not privy to NPCs assumption of BPCs tax payment under their BOT Agreement as the only parties thereto were NPC and BPC. BPC adamantly refused to pay the tax claims and reiterated its position.8 The city was likewise unyielding on its stand.9 On August 26, 1999, the NPC intervened.10 While admitting assumption of BPCs tax obligations under their BOT Agreement, NPC refused to pay BPCs business tax as it allegedly constituted an indirect tax on NPC which is a tax-exempt corporation under its Charter.11

In view of the deadlock, BPC filed a petition for declaratory relief12 with the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Batangas City and NPC, praying for a ruling that it was not bound to pay the business taxes imposed on it by the city. It alleged that under the BOT Agreement, NPC is responsible for the payment of such taxes but as NPC is exempt from taxes, both the BPC and NPC are not liable for its payment. NPC and Batangas City filed their respective answers. On February 23, 2000, while the case was still pending, the city refused to issue a permit to BPC for the operation of its business unless it paid the assessed business taxes amounting to close to P29M. In view of this supervening event, BPC, whose principal office is in Makati City, filed a supplemental petition13 with the Makati RTC to convert its original petition into an action for injunction to enjoin the city from withholding the issuance of its business permit and closing its power plant. The city opposed on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.14 The Supplemental Petition was nonetheless admitted by the Makati RTC. On February 27, 2002, the Makati RTC dismissed the petition for injunction. It held that: (1) BPC is liable to pay business taxes to the city; (2) NPCs tax exemption was withdrawn with the passage of R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code); and, (3) the 6-year tax holiday granted to pioneer business enterprises starts on the date of registration with the BOI as provided in Section 133 (g) of R.A. No. 7160, and not on the date of its actual business operations.15 BPC and NPC filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari16 assailing the Makati RTC decision. The petitions were consolidated as they impugn the same decision, involve the same parties and raise related issues.17 In G.R. No. 152771, the NPC contends: I RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY RULED THAT PETITIONER NPC HAS LOST ITS TAX EXEMPTION PRIVILEGE BECAUSE SECTION 193 OF R.A. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE) HAS WITHDRAWN SUCH PRIVILEGE DESPITE THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THAT THE ENACTMENT OF A LEGISLATION, WHICH IS A GENERAL LAW, CANNOT REPEAL A SPECIAL LAW AND THAT SECTION 13 OF R.A. 6395 (NPC LAW) WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THE REPEALING CLAUSE IN SECTION 534 OF R.A. 7160, AMONG OTHERS. II RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY OMITTED THE CLEAR PROVISION OF SECTION 133, PARAGRAPH (O) OF R.A. 7160 WHICH EXEMPTS "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, ITS AGENCIES AND

INSTRUMENTALITIES" FROM THE IMPOSITION OF "TAXES, FEES OR CHARGES OF ANY KIND." III RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY AND CAPRICIOUSLY ADMITTED BPCs SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR INJUNCTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTY (CITY GOVERNMENT OF BATANGAS) SOUGHT TO BE ENJOINED. In G.R. No. 152675, BPC also contends that the trial court erred: 1) in holding it liable for payment of business taxes even if it is undisputed that NPC has already assumed payment thereof; and, 2) in ruling that BPCs 6-year tax holiday commenced on the date of its registration with the BOI as a pioneer enterprise. The issues for resolution are: 1. whether BPCs 6-year tax holiday commenced on the date of its BOI registration as a pioneer enterprise or on the date of its actual commercial operation as certified by the BOI; 2. whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition for injunction against Batangas City; and, 3. whether NPCs tax exemption privileges under its Charter were withdrawn by Section 193 of the Local Government Code (LGC). We find no merit in the petition. On the first issue, petitioners BPC and NPC contend that contrary to the impugned decision, BPCs 6-year tax holiday should commence on the date of its actual commercial operations as certified to by the BOI, not on the date of its BOI registration. We disagree. Sec. 133 (g) of the LGC, which proscribes local government units (LGUs) from levying taxes on BOI-certified pioneer enterprises for a period of six years from the date of registration, applies specifically to taxes imposed by the local government, like the business tax imposed by Batangas City on BPC in the case at bar. Reliance of BPC on the provision of Executive Order No. 226,18 specifically Section 1, Article 39, Title III, is clearly misplaced as the six-year tax holiday provided therein which commences from the date of commercial operation refers to income taxes imposed by the national government on BOI-registered pioneer firms. Clearly, it is the provision of the Local Government Code that should apply to the tax claim of Batangas City against the BPC. The 6-year tax exemption of BPC should thus commence from the date of BPCs registration with the BOI on July 16, 1993 and end on July 15, 1999.

Anent the second issue, the records disclose that petitioner NPC did not oppose BPCs conversion of the petition for declaratory relief to a petition for injunction or raise the issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Makati RTC over the petition for injunction before said court. Hence, NPC is estopped from raising said issue before us. The fundamental rule is that a party cannot be allowed to participate in a judicial proceeding, submit the case for decision, accept the judgment only if it is favorable to him but attack the jurisdiction of the court when it is adverse.19 Finally, on the third issue, petitioners insist that NPCs exemption from all taxes under its Charter had not been repealed by the LGC. They argue that NPCs Charter is a special law which cannot be impliedly repealed by a general and later legislation like the LGC. They likewise anchor their claim of tax-exemption on Section 133 (o) of the LGC which exempts government instrumentalities, such as the NPC, from taxes imposed by local government units (LGUs), citing in support thereof the case of Basco v. PAGCOR.20 We find no merit in these contentions. The effect of the LGC on the tax exemption privileges of the NPC has already been extensively discussed and settled in the recent case of National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan.21 In said case, this Court recognized the removal of the blanket exclusion of government instrumentalities from local taxation as one of the most significant provisions of the 1991 LGC. Specifically, we stressed that Section 193 of the LGC,22 an express and general repeal of all statutes granting exemptions from local taxes, withdrew the sweeping tax privileges previously enjoyed by the NPC under its Charter. We explained the rationale for this provision, thus: In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of state activity, and taxation has become a tool to realize social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection of local industries as well as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assumes even greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, viz: Section 5.- Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the Local Governments. This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of governance. For a long time, the countrys highly centralized government structure has bred a culture of dependence among local government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also "dampened the spirit of initiative, innovation and imaginative resilience in matters of local development on the part of local government leaders. The only way to shatter this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the delivery of basic services, and confer them sufficient powers to generate their own sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal, x x x the 1987 Constitution mandates

Congress to enact a local government code that will, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, set the guidelines and limitations to this grant of taxing powers x x x." To recall, prior to the enactment of the x x x Local Government Code x x x, various measures have been enacted to promote local autonomy. x x x Despite these initiatives, however, the shackles of dependence on the national government remained. Local government units were faced with the same problems that hamper their capabilities to participate effectively in the national development efforts, among which are: (a) inadequate tax base, (b) lack of fiscal control over external sources of income, (c) limited authority to prioritize and approve development projects, (d) heavy dependence on external sources of income, and (e) limited supervisory control over personnel of national line agencies. Considered as the most revolutionary piece of legislation on local autonomy, the LGC effectively deals with the fiscal constraints faced by LGUs. It widens the tax base of LGUs to include taxes which were prohibited by previous laws x x x. Neither can the NPC successfully rely on the Basco case23 as this was decided prior to the effectivity of the LGC, when there was still no law empowering local government units to tax instrumentalities of the national government. Consequently, when NPC assumed the tax liabilities of the BPC under their 1992 BOT Agreement, the LGC which removed NPCs tax exemption privileges had already been in effect for six (6) months. Thus, while BPC remains to be the entity doing business in said city, it is the NPC that is ultimately liable to pay said taxes under the provisions of both the 1992 BOT Agreement and the 1991 Local Government Code. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.