Aznar v. Garcia G.R. No.

L-16749 January31, 1963

Edward E. Christensen left behind a will acknowledging Maria Lucy Christensen as his only child and bequeathing to her the entire estate. Aside from that, he also awarded P3600 to Helen Christensen Garcia. The oppositor, Helen Christensen Garcia, opposed the partition of the estate. Her grounds for opposing the partitions are as follows: (1) the partition of the estate should be governed by Philippine Laws; and (2) the partition deprives her, an acknowledged natural child of the deceased, her half of the estate. In furtherance, oppositor, claims that although the deceased was a Californian citizen, the internal laws of California alone should not govern; instead it should be the entire law taking into consideration several foreign elements involved. In addition, the forum is in the Philippines and according to Section 946 of the California Civil Code, the domicile of the decedent should apply. The CFI of Davao ruled that the deceased was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California; therefore, the succession rights and the intrinsic validity of the provisions of his will are to be governed by the laws of California. According to these laws, the testator has the right to dispose of his property as he desires. Since their motions for reconsiderations have been denied, hence this appeal. Issue: (1) Whether Philippine laws are to govern the execution of the estate, taking into consideration the Renvoi doctrine (2) Whether Helen Christensen Garcia is entitled to half of the estate of the deceased Held: During the time of his death, there is no dispute that the deceased was a Californian citizen, domiciled in the Philippines. Although the deceased was born in New York and migrated to California where he acquired his citizenship, he did not own a home or properties in that state. There is no indication that he had intention to abandon the Philippines to live in California, which he rarely visited and if when did, were only short visits. As cited by the SC:
Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. (Goodrich, p.69)

The pertinent provision of our Civil Code reads as follows:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where

it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Appellee claims that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form he desires.; and that the internal law of California should prevail. Meanwhile appellant relies on Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which provides:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile

And that according to the doctrine of renvoi, the Philippine laws should govern the partition of the estate. Since there exists a Conflict of Laws and to enforce jointly the conflict of laws and law of succession, the principle cited In re Kaufman therefore applies to citizens living in the State; consequentially, Article 946 applies to Californian citizens that are domiciled elsewhere. Therefore, internal laws of California, should apply to those residing in the State of California and the conflict of law rules are enforceable to those residing elsewhere. Applying those rules to the case, the partition of the estate; henceforth, should be governed by Philippine laws. Accordingly, Article 887(4) and 894 of the Civil Code, provides that acknowledged natural children are forced heirs of their parents.

Ruling: The case is reversed and returned to the lower courts to be partitioned in accordance with Philippine laws.

Miciano v Brimo G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927 50 Phil 867 Facts: Joseph G. Brimo was a Turkish citizen who resided in the Philippines. Upon his death, Juan Miciano, the administrator, filed a scheme for partition for the estate. The brother of the deceased, Andre, one of the persons designated in the will, contested the scheme of partition for being contrary to Turkish Laws and requested for postponement of the approval of the scheme for the partition. He claims that claims that the will is invalid for not complying with Turkish laws and for violating Article 10 of the Civil Code (now Article 16 par. 2 of the NCC) which provides, Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated. Since the brother also contested the validity of the will, he is excluded as successor for violating one of the conditions on the will, which provides as follows Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in denying him the opportunity to prove a violation of Turkish Laws Whether the will is invalid, hence entitling the brother a partition in the estate of the deceased Held: The Supreme Court held that in for the first assignment of error, the lower court did not err in denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Such a decision is discretionary on the part of the lower court. The petitioner was also not denied his opportunity to prove the existence of the Turkish Laws claimed to have been violated because he was given ample opportunities. In the absence of proof to the contrary, foreign laws are presumed to be the same as Philippine laws (Lim v Collector of Customs, 36 Phil 742). Therefore, in that regards the will is valid. In the second issue, the Supreme Court citing Art 792of the Civil Code (now Art 1183) held that the condition resulting to the disqualification of the brother is invalid, being contrary to

good morals. The condition is against good morals for violating Article 10 (now Art 16) of the Civil Code. Such a condition is considered not imposed and non-existent, therefore, the brother, Andre Brimo stands to inherit from the estate of the deceased.

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 174 SCRA 653 Petitioner and private respondent, Filipina and German, respectively, were married in Germany on September 7, 1979. They had one child during their marriage, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, who was born on April 20, 1980. After only three and a half years of married life, their marriage started to fail such that by April 1982 they were already living apart. Private respondent initiated divorce proceedings in Germany by January 1983, simultaneously, petitioner initiated legal separation proceedings in the RTC of Manila. On January 15, 1986, the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, decreed petitioner and private respondent as divorced due to failure of marriage with custody of the child granted to petitioner. Five months after the decree of divorce, private respondent initiated two criminal charges of adultery against petitioner before the City of Fiscal of Manila. Private respondent claims that during the subsistence of their marriage, the petitioner committed adultery with a William Chia and later on with Jesus Chua. The case was raffled on to two branches of the RTC of Manila. The petitioner files a petition with the Secretary of Justice to have the criminal cases against her dismissed. As a result, the Department of Justice were instructed to defer further proceedings if the accused were not yet arraigned. The first criminal case entitled People v Imelda Pilapil and William Chia was suspended, but the second case People v Imelda Pilapil and James Chua merely rescheduled the arraignment. With her motion o quash for lack of jurisdiction dismissed by respondent judge, petitioner and Jesus Chua entered a plea of not guilty. On October 27, 1987, petitioner instituted a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with a TRO, seeking the annulment of the lower court for her motion to quash. Petitioner claims that the court is without jurisdiction to try her for adultery since the private respondent is not an offended spouse, having obtained a final decree of divorce before instituting the criminal proceedings. Issue: Whether a final decree of divorce constitutes as a bar for filing criminal charges of adultery subsequently Held: The Supreme Court decided in favour of petitioner. The private respondent is no longer an offended spouse within the contemplation of the law. Article 344 of the RPC that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Without such written complaint, the courts cannot acquire jurisdiction to institute the criminal proceedings. Even if the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure vests the State as parens patriae, hence may institute criminal proceedings, such a rule does not apply to crimes of adultery and concubinage. The reason behind the law, is that crimes of adultery and concubinage may be initiated only by the offended spouse who may prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than have a public trial. Citing American jurisprudence (State vs

Loftus), the SC held that after a divorce is decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders. Since the nationality principle is recognized in our civil law, the decree of divorce obtained by private respondent is also recognized in the Philippines; hence, he ceases to be an offended spouse after the decree of divorce notwithstanding that the criminal acts were committed at the time that their marriage was subsisting. Under the same rationale as the case of Van Dorn v Romillo Jr., et al., the private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner, and no longer has legal standing. CASE DISMISSED. Roehr vs. Rodriguez G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003 404 SCRA 495 Petitioner, a German citizen, and private respondent, a Filipina, were married in Germany on December of 1980. Out of their union were borne two children in 1981 and 1987. However, by August 28, 1996, private respondent initiated proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion for dismissal, which was dismissed by the RTC and subsequently by the Court of Appeals. The following year, on December 16, 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the CFI of Hamburg Blankenese. According to the decree of divorce, the custody of the children was awarded to the father, herein petitioner. Hence, the petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999, claiming that the RTC no longer has jurisdiction since a decree of divorce has already been promulgated. Instead of dismissing the case, the public respondent granted private respondents Motion for Partial Reconsideration, to decide the custody of the children as well as the distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner files a special civil action with the SC for alleged grave abuse on the part of public respondent, and lack of jurisdiction since the matter has already been adjudged. Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to determine the legal effects of a foreign decree of divorce, or whether such decree is binding in the Philippine courts Held: The Supreme Court held that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory citing Sanado v CA, more so in the present case where the judgment has not attained finality. According to the cases of Garcia v Recio, Van Dorn v Romillo Jr., and Llorente v CA, a decree of divorce obtained by an alien is recognized as long as such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Similarly in Pilapil v Ibay-Somera, a foreign decree of divorce is recognized in view of the nationality principle of civil law. The general rule, therefore, is that divorce decrees obtained by foreigners are recognized in our jurisdiction but the legal effects of such a decree may still be determined by the courts. Citing Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39 Section 48) actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party, and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.

In the present case, the private respondent was not given ample opportunity to challenge the decree of divorce especially since such a decree was issued in accordance with the German Civil Code which requires that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. It did not even consider the unfitness (or fitness) of the private respondent to have custody of the children, and in accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the courts may assume jurisdiction to determine the proper custody. In the matter of the disputed property relations, the private respondent herself admitted that they have not acquired conjugal or community property, as well as debts during the subsistence of their marriage. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof. Therefore, the decision of the RTC is affirmed and modified. The RTC has jurisdiction to determine parental custody but has no jurisdiction in regards to the property of the parties. Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2,2001 366 SCRA 437 Facts: Rederick A. Recio, herein respondent, was previously married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. They were married in Malabon, Rizal and lived in Australia as husband and wife. By 1989, the latter obtained a decree of divorce from the Austrian family court. Respondent thereafter became an Australian citizen and married petitioner in Cabanatuan City on January 12, 1994. In the application for a marriage license respondent claimed to be a Filipino and single. On October 22, 1995, respondent and petitioner began to live separately and had their conjugal assets divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed for a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. According to the petitioner, respondent had a prior subsisting marriage with Editha Samson, which she came to know only on November 1997; but according to respondent, petitioner knew of the marriage by 1993. On July 17, 1998, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia on the grounds that the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down. As a result, trial court declared the marriage dissolved because of the secured decree of divorce, and not because respondent lacked the legal capacity to remarry. Hence this petition to review Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure. Issue: (1) Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven (2) Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to many petitioner Held: On the first issue, the petitioner alleges that according to Article 26, FC, solemnization of marriages are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (lex loci celebrationis), and the respondent has not complied with Articles 11,13 and 52 of the Family

Code. Furthermore, foreign judgments must prove (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce, and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. In our jurisdiction, Philippine laws do not grant divorce, but recognizes foreign divorce, provided it is consistent with the national law of the alien spouse. In the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., the court has already laid down the rule that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in our jurisdiction, the party alleging it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. To prove that the divorce decree is a public or official record of a foreign country it must be in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 24.Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a) Sec. 25.What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson, although appearing to be authentic, must comply with the rules of evidence. Fortunately for the respondent, there was no objection from the counsel of petitioner when the decree was submitted for evidence, hence, is considered as admissible. In relation to petitioners contention that respondent failed to comply with Article 11,13, and 52 of the Family Code, it is important to note that respondent is no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after acquiring Australian citizenship. Petitioner was correct in claiming that the burden of proof is on the respondent. It is well settled in our jurisdiction that out courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. These laws must be alleged and proved. On the second issue, there are two basic types of divorce: (1) a vinculo matrimonii, which results to the termination of the marriage; and (2) a mensa et thoro, which does not result to termination of the marriage, merely its suspension. Respondent failed to establish what type of divorce he was able to secure with Editha Samson. What respondent presented was an interlocutory decree, similar to the second type of divorce. This contention is further bolstered by the decree, which contains a restriction, to wit:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.

And finally, as for the marriage license obtained by respondent, being an Australian citizen, he is not bound by the personal laws of the Philippines.

Ruling: Based on the evidence presented, the SC cannot conclude that respondent was legally capacitated to marry according to Australian law. Neither can they grant that the marriage between respondet and petitioner is null and void, being bigamous as claimed by petitioner. In the interest of justice, the SC remanded the case to the lower court to receive further evidence