PRATS & COMPANY, a registered mercantiIe partnership, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY, of HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, a corporation, defendant-appellee.

1. This action was instituted in the CF MANLA by Prats for the purpose of recovering from the Phoenix, the sum of P117,800.60, with
interest, by reason of a loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, from a fire, it being alleged that said loss was covered by
policy of insurance for the sum of P200,000, issued by the defendant company to the plaintiff.

2. For answer, PHX admitted the insurance of the policy of insurance but, by way of special defense, alleged, among other things, that
the fire in question had been set by the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and that the plaintiff had submitted under oath to the defendant
a fraudulent claim of loss, in contravention of the express terms of the policy.

3. Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint with respect to the obligation created by the policy
which was the subject of the suit, but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P11,731.93, with interest from the filing of
the complaint, upon account of moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant, of remnants of the insured stock.
Plaintiff appelaed.

*Defenses of Phx:
a. that the fire was set by the procurance or connivance of the plaintiff for the purpose of defrauding the insurer;
b. that the plaintiff, after the fire, submitted to the defendant a fraudulent claim supported by the false proof, in violation of the
terms of the policy.

FACTS:
On July 10, 1923, Prats, Hanna and Bejar registered 2 mercantile partnerships in the Bureau of Commerce and ndustry for
the purpose of engaging in mercantile business. The articles of co-partnership of these two entities were the same except in the firm
names. t was apparently contemplated, in so far as any legitimate function may have been intended, that Prats & Co. should be an
importing firm, while Hanna, Bejar & Co. should engage in retail business. As events show, the existence of the parallel entities,
controlled by the same individuals, supplied, undeniably, suitable engines for accomplishing an exploit of the kind that was here
attempted. Of the three individuals mentioned Hanna and Bejar were Turkish subjects of unsavoury reputation in insurance circle of
Manila, while Prats was a Spanish subject who had had some success as a merchant and, prior to his connection with the two
associates above mentioned, apparently enjoyed a fair reputation. Another individual, who figures in the case as an instrument of the
three partners, is one Domingo Romero, who at that the time which we are here concerned, was an employee of the BR, with a salary
of P150 per month. Ramon Prats, a son of Francisco Prats, was united in marriage to a daughter of Domingo Romero, with the result
that social relations between Prats and Romero were close. Prats appear to have acted as manager for both Prats & Co. and Hanna,
Bejar & Co.
On May 1924, Prats, acting for Hanna, Bejar & Co., purchased a one-story building at 95 Plaza Gardenia, Manila; and soon
thereafter he begun to assemble in this place the stock of merchandise which was the subject of insurance in this case. The building
referred to was purchasd outright for the sum of P1,600. t was old and was scarcely more than a shed but had been used in times past
for human habitation. t was located in a part of the city which was inconvenient of success to traders and out of the ordinary channels
of business activity. A sign was then set up over the entrance bearing the firm name "Hanna, Bejar & Co." n effecting the purchase of
this building Prats availed himself of the service of Romero, who lived only two doors away at 97 Plaza Gardenia.
By August 1924, there had been assembled and stored by Prats in the place above described a stock of goods which,
according to the documents exhibited by him, had a valuation of P211,329.72, on which he had taken out insurance to the extent of
P410,000. At midnight of the day mentioned a fire occurred at 95 Plaza Gardenia, which destroyed the building and ruined its contents,
the amount realized from the salvage of the stock being P11,731.93.
*With respect to the insurance upon this stock at the time of the fire, the foIIowing facts appear:
1. n the month of June preceeding the fire, nine policies aggregating P160,000 were taken out by Prats in the name
of Hanna, Bejar & Co. on merchandise stored at 95 Plaza Gardenia. At the time these policies were taken out the valuation of
the goods then in said store could not have been more than P68,753.
2. On June 28, 1924, Prats procured from the agent of the defendant in this case policy of insurance No. 600217 in
the amount of P200,000 on merchandise stored in the same place. The nine policies already procured had been taken out, as
we have seen, in the name of Hanna, Bejar & Co.; but when Prats applied to the agent of the defendant for the P200,000
policy last above mentioned, the agent told him that if Hanna or Bejar had any interest in the stock to be insured the policy
could not be issued for the reason that, in such case, the defendant would not be able to obtain reinsurance for any part of the
policy, owing to the bad reputation of Hanna and Bejar. AccordingIy, at the request of Prats & Co.; and Prats at the same
time assured the agent that Hanna and Bejar were not partners in Prats & Co. With the writing of this policy the amount of
insurance on the merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia was increased to P360,000, while the value of the stock at that time was
not probably much in excess of P158,000.
3. On August 11, 1924, or just ten days before the fire, Prats took out an additional policy for P50,000 in the name of
Prats & Co. on the same stock. This made a total insurance of P410,000 on the contents of the store at 95 Plaza Gardenia. At
the time, according to Prats himself, the evaluation of the merchandise then in the place was not in excess of P230,000.
Furthermore, Prats, about this time, caused the first nine poIicies which had been taken out in the name of Hanna,
Bejar & Co. to be indorsed to Prats & Co., thereby making this firm the soIe insured firm with respect to this stock of
merchandise.
With respect to the origin of the stock thus assembled, we find that part had been purchased in Europe by Prats; and in
connection with its importation from abroad it is noteworthy that on June 18, 1924, Prats & Co. procured a policy of marine insurance to
be issued by Meerkamp & Co., Ltd., as agents of the ndia nsurance Co., Ltd., Upon twenty-two cases of silk, of a supposed value of
P43,400. at the time this policy was procured Prats informed the insurer that the goods were soon to arrive from France by the
steamer $uwa Maru. For this policy of insurance Prats paid out the sum of P736.25. NevertheIess, it now appears that the 22 cases
of siIk covered by this marine poIicy were fictitious, as no such purchase of siIk had been made by Prats & Co. in France or
eIsewhere. This fact was offered in evidence by the defendant, as tending to reveaI a scheme by which, if a destructive fire
shouId occur, the pIaintiff wouId be abIe to misIead the defendant as to the quantity of goods stored in the -4/0,. This item
of proof, though circumstantiaI in its nature, was undoubtedIy competent and shouId have been admitted by the triaI court.

**The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure manipulations were used by the plaintiff in the storing of
merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of the contents of the bodega before the fire. n this connection it appears
that forty-five cases of old stock of Hanna, Bejar & Co., at Legaspi, P. ., were shipped to Manila before the fire, but instead of being
taken directly to 95 Plaza Gardenia, they were housed for a time in the back part of the lower floor of the Bazar Filipino in which Prats &
Co. and Hanna, Bejar & Co. had their offices.

**Moreover, a quantity of merchandise purchased from place shortly before the fire, instead of directly to 95 Plaza Gardenia; and it is
the theory of the defendant that new merchandise purchased from Talambiras Brothers was substituted for the old stock in boxes from
Hanna, Bejar & Co. at Legaspi, leaving the old goods to be deposited in the bodega to swell the debris of the fire.

**There is evidence also, which was credited by the court, to the effect that on various occasions before the fire goods were removed
from the bodega to the store of B. Abolafia, at Manila, where they were received without invoice. Some of these goods were
subsequently sent away by Abolafia for sale in the provinces.

If overinsurance and the assembIage of goods at infIated vaIues in the -4/0, at 95 PIaza Gardenia, together with the
surreptitious abstraction of goods therefrom by the insured, have suggested a possibIe intention on the part of its manager to
reaIize improperIy on its insurance poIicies, this inference is, in our opinion, but beyond reach of reasonabIe doubt by facts
reIative to the destruction of the pIace. n this connection we note that about the time the bodega at 95 Plaza Gardenia had been
purchased, Domingo Romero assisted one Ramon Osete to rent No. 69 Calle Gardenia, which was close to the rear of the building at
95 Plaza Gardenia. Osete appears to have been the individual chose for the role of incendiary, and he slept at the place mentioned
until the night of the fire. A night or two before the fire this Osete, accompanied by one Antonio Prats, appears to have brought two cans
of petroleum to his lodging place at 69 Calle Gardenia. After these cans had been taken to Osete's bathroom by his muchacho, the
latter was sent out on an errand; and while he was gone the petroleum disappeared. After the fire had been started in the
plaintiff's bodega shortly after midnight on August 21, 1924, Osete conveyed this boy in his automobile to the fire alarm box on Plaza
Gardenia. Reaching this place, Osete planted the boy there with instructions to stop anyone who might attempt to turn in the alarm by
telling him that he (the boy) had already done so; and in fact, after the fire had gained some headway, one Joaquin Silos, who lived
near the bodega, ran to the box to turn on the alarm but was stopped in the act by a person who stated that he had already given the
alarm. Nevertheless, when Fire Chief Vanderford reached the scene of the fire a few minutes later, he found that the box had not been
disturbed and he himself turned on the alarm. The boy stated that when he was on the way with Osete to the alarm box, as just stated,
an explosion took place in the bodega and a dull sound was emitted. Vanderford says that upon his arrival he saw that the smoke
issuing from the bodega black, suggesting the combustion of some inflammable material like petroleum. He also noted the odor of
petroleum, as did also some of the firemen who reached the scene. t may be added that when the debris of the fire was subsequently
searched, merchandise soaked with petroleum was found in the ruins.
Domingo Romero, who had been living at 97 Plaza Gardenia, had before the fire taken his family temporarily to the home of Prats in
Pasay. But after the fire was over the family moved back to 97 Plaza Gardenia, although that place had been considerably damaged by
the flames.
Among those who suffered from the fire were the members of the Artigas family and Juan Ataydee. Soon after the fire
Domingo Romero quietly passed a 100-peso bill into the hand of Maria Luisa Artigas, a daughter belonging to the Artigas family.
Romero likewise gave the same amount to Juan Atayde. It is seIf-evident that the gifts thus made by Romero to Luisa Artigas and
Juan Atayde had other motives than pure charity and that the money probabIy came from some other source than his own
modest earnings.
**After the fire that a speciaI investigation was made by the poIice department with the resuIt that Deputy Chief
Lorenzo came to the concIusion that the fire had originated from an intentionaI act. Reflection upon the proof before the court
engenders in us the same belief and conducts us to the further conclusion that Prats & Co. was not alien to the deed.

The finding of the triaI court in the effect that the pIaintiff had submitted faIse proof in the support of his cIaim is aIso, in our
opinion, weII founded. That conclusion appears to have been based upon three items of proof, and with respect to at least two of
these, we think that the conclusion of his Honor was correctly drawn. These two facts are,
1. , that the plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of P12,800 when the rule value of said
jewelry was about P600; and,
2. that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the insurance company the value of goods which had been surreptitiously
withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire.

**Neither of these two facts are consistent with good faith on the part of the plaintiff, and each constituted a breach of the stipulations of
the policy against the use of fraudulent devices and false proof with respect to the loss.
The other point relied upon by his Honor to sustain the conclusion that the plaintiff had attempted to deceive the defendant with respect
to the extent of the loss was at least competent in its general bearing on the good faith of the plaintiff, even if, as is probably true, not
alone sufficient to constitute a breach of the same stipulations.
3.The point is this: After the fire the pIaintiff presented to the adjuster certain cost sheets and copies of supposed
invoices in which the prices and expenses of importation of a quantity of goods were stated at doubIe the true
amount. The adjuster soon discovered the artificiaI nature of these documents, and, with his consent, they were
withdrawn by Prats and subsequentIy destroyed. At the hearing Prats stated that these documents had been fabricated in
order that they might be exhibited to intending purchasers of the goods, thereby making it appear to them that the cost of the
mercahndise had been much greater than it in fact was a ruse which is supposed to have been entirely innocent or at least
not directed against the insurer. But a question naturally arises as to the purpose which these documents might have been
made to serve if the fire, as doubtless intended by its designers, had been so destructive as to remove all vestiges of the stock
actually involved. Upon the whoIe we are forced to state the concIusion, not onIy that the pIaintiff caused the fire to be
set, or connived therein, but aIso that it submitted frauduIent proof as the triaI judge found.

Before concluding this opinion we are constrained to make a few observations with reference to the trial of this case and the inordinate
amount of time consumed in the proceedings. We are told in the appellant's brief that the trial of this case covered a period of almost
two years, in which fifty separate sessions were held, without counting the numerous hearings upon the taking of the deposition of
Francisco Prats, a partner in the plaintiff firm, whose testimony was taken at the instance of the defendant. Taken all together, the time
thus consumed was out of all proportion to the difficulties of the case. An examination of the voluminous transcript reveals at least part
of the reason for this inordinate consumption of time; since we find that far too much of the space in the transcript is taken up with the
record of petty skirmishes in court resulting from objections over the admission of evidence. n the course of long experience we have
observed that justice is most effectivly and expenditiously administered in the courts where trivial objections to the admission of proof
are received with least favor. The practice of excIuding evidence on doubtfuI objection to its materiaIity or technicaI objection to
the form of the questions shouId be avoided. n a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early
stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication
of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of
the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he
presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in
fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of error without returning the case for a new trial, -- a step which this court is
always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its
form, materiaIity, or reIevancy is doubtfuI, can never resuIt in much harm to either Iitigant, because the triaI judge is supposed
to know the Iaw; and it is its duty, upon finaI consideration of the case, to distinguish the reIevant and materiaI from the
irreIevant and immateriaI. f this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then
has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.
n this connection it should be remembered that many of the technical rules of evidence which are often invoked in our courts were
originally worked out in England and the United States, where the jury system prevails. These rules were adopted for the purpose of
keeping matter from juries which it was supposed might unduly influence them in deciding on the facts. They have little pertinence
to a system of procedure, like ours, in which the court is judge both of law and facts, and in which accordingly it is necessary for the
court to know what the proof is before it rules upon the propriety of receiving it. Apart from these considerations is the circumstance
mentioned above that the time consumed in the trial on such collateral points is generally many times greater than would be consumed
if the questionable testimony should be admitted for what it is worth. What has been said above finds special relevancy in this case in
view of the action of the trial court in refusing to consider the proof referred to in the opinion showing that the plaintiff, while engaged in
assembling its stock, procured maritime insurance upon a fictitious importation of silk. We earnestly commend the maintenance of
liberal practice in the admission of proof.
Our examination of the case Ieads to the concIusion that the resuIt reached by the triaI court was correct.
The appealed decision will therefore be affirmed, and it is also ordered, with costs against the appellant.

Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
concur in the result and agree with the clear decision of the trial judge sustaining the defense of false proof, but desire to make of
record my nonconfirmity as to a discussion of questions not involved in the disposition of the assignment of errors.
-------------------------

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (Maribeth Quinto), plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDGARDO MACEDA, accused-appellant.

For review is the decision

of the RTC-QC, Maceda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the rape of Maribeth Quinto, a mental retardate,
and sentencing him to death and to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages plus the costs of the suit.

Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon he was tried. The prosecution presented
complainant Maribeth Quinto, her mother Editha Quinto, and Medico-Legal Officer Emmanuel Reyes, as its witnesses, while the
defense presented accused-appellant, his sister Rosa Dantes, and his cousin Owen Santos.

Facts:
1. Quinto is a 32-year old mental retardate. She lived with her mother Editha at Payatas, Quezon City, while her siblings lived
elsewhere in the neighborhood.
2. Feb 18, 1998, Maribeth's mother went to wash clothes for her employer in Caloocan City. Maribeth was left in the care of her sister,
Veronica. When night came, Veronica left the victim alone in the house as she expected her mother to arrive soon. Editha, however,
was unable to go home that night because her employer had some problems
3. Alone in the house, Maribeth fell asleep while waiting for her mother to arrive but awakened by the barking of the dog. She heard
someone knocking at the door. When she went to open the door, she found it was Maceda, asking where complainant's youngest
brother Nonoy was. When complainant answered that her brother was not there, Maceda got inside the house, closed the door behind
him, and told Mbeth not to make any noise. Maceda then RAPED her----forced her to lie down and started kissing her on the lips and
neck, pulled down her panty, spread her legs, and had sexual intercourse with her.
Afraid, complainant covered herself with a blanket as soon as accused-appellant left.
4. Mbeth's mother arrived home at around 11 o'clock in the morning on February 19, 1998. She noticed that the victim was quiet, but,
thinking that the latter was just being moody did not pay attention to her. Buyt when Mbeth was crying, her Editha asked her what had
happened. Describing what she felt while being raped, complainant told her mother, "9:4 n :, k4. Hir,5 ir,5 ,k4."
5. On the same day, Editha took her daughter to the barangay captain and reported the incident. Following the advice of the barangay
captain, they went to Camp Crame and had complainant physically examined by a medico-legal officer. The following day, February 20,
1998, they went to the police station and gave their sworn statements on the basis of which accused-appellant was arrested and
detained at the Quezon City Jail.

MED FINDINGS: **Dr. Reyes explained that the abraded posterior fourchette and congested vestibule were probably caused either by
a rough or dry surface, such as an erect penis, or, if the sexual intercourse was forcibly made, the absence of lubrication. He added that
the findings of an abraded posterior fourchette, congested vestibule, and hymenal lacerations indicate that the victim is no longer a
virgin. However, no spermatozoa was found in the victim's vagina. Lastly, Dr. Reyes observed an ecchymosis or a "kiss mark," located
at the right lateral part of complainant's neck.

DEFENSES:
1. Accused-appellant testified that the victim and her family had been his neighbors for 15 years. n fact, the victim's youngest brother,
Nonoy, would sometimes accompany him during his trips. He said that he did not have any quarrel with complainant's family, although
he had some misunderstandings with Nonoy's wife.
2. A defense witness, Owen Santos, corroborated the testimony of accused-appellant. Santos testified that he was living with accused-
appellant's family at the time of the incident. At around 9:30 p.m. on February 18, 1998, he slept beside accused-appellant, and he was
sure that the latter did not leave the house that night. He woke up at around 4:30 a.m., took a bath, and went out with accused-
appellant.
3. Accused-appellant's sister, Rosa Dantes, who also lived with accused-appellant and her parents, likewise testified in his behalf. She
testified that she was the gatekeeper in the family. When every member of the household was already inside the house, usually at
around 9 p.m., she would close the main door and would not open it until around 4:00 a.m. of the next day. She explained that no one
could leave the house without her permission because she alone had the key to the main door and it could only be opened from the
outside with this key. She was therefore sure that accused-appellant did not leave the house at the time of the incident.

COURT decided Maceda guiIty of rape with the aggravating circumstance that the offender knew of the mentaI disabiIity.
Hence, the APPEAL.

. THE TRAL COURT ERRED N CONVCTNG ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE ABSENT ANY SHOWNG THAT FORCE
OR NTMDATON WAS EMPLOYED, OR THAT THE MENTAL AGE OF THE COMPLANNG WTNESS WAS
EQUVALENT TO THAT OF A GRL BELOW TWELVE YEARS OF AGE.
. THE LOWER COURT ERRED N NOT ACQUTTNG THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AT LEAST ON THE GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT.
. THE LOWER COURT ERRED N ORDERNG ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO PAY CVL DAMAGES AND COSTS.
13

These contentions are without merit.
First. Accused-appellant puts up the defense of alibi and alleges that he was at home sleeping at the time of the incident. To
corroborate his testimony, accused-appellant's sister and his cousin testified that accused-appellant did not leave the house on the
night of February 18, 1998. However, both witnesses failed to show that it was physically impossible for accused-appellant to have
been at the place where the incident took place at around 1:30 a.m. of February 19, 1998.
Owen admitted that although he slept in the same room as accused-appellant, he could not say for sure that accused-appellant did not
leave the house at the time of the incident since he did not guard the latter's movements that night. Owen testified during cross-
examination:
FSCAL SANTOS:
Q: You said that accused slept at about 9:30 in the evening?
A: Yes, sir.
. . . .
Q: So, if you slept at 9:30 in the evening and woke up at 4:30 a.m., you will not see if Buboy left the house between those
intervening hours because you were then sleeping?
A: He did not leave the house.
Q: How do you know that? Were you guarding him?
A: was sleeping beside him.
Q: So, what if you were sleeping beside him? You were not guarding him?
A: No, sir.
Q: So, based on your answer that he did not leave the house, it is because you were sleeping beside him?
A: Yes, sir.
14

Thus, Owen could not account for accused-appellant's whereabouts during the time that he was asleep.
Similarly, accused-appellant's sister, Rosa, did not categorically state that she saw accused-appellant inside the house on the night of
February 18, 1998 until early morning of the following day. She testified that she was the gatekeeper and that nobody could leave the
house at night without her permission. But she never stated that accused-appellant did not leave the house at the time of the incident
because the door and the gate were locked.
Even if accused-appellant was inside the house from 9:00 p.m. on February 18, 1998 to 4:30 a.m. the following day, it is not improbable
that he sneaked out of their house that night and proceeded to complainant's house, considering its proximity to his house. As accused-
appellant himself admitted, his house was only 35 meters from complainant's house.
This Court has consistently ruled:
Alibi as a means of defense is weak when not substantiated by the testimony of a credible witness. Courts have always looked
upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have always received it with caution not only because it is inherently weak and
unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated. Alibi as basis for acquittal must be established with clear and convincing
evidence. The accused must convincingly demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. And, where accused was positively identified by the victim herself who harbored no ill
motive against the rapist, as in this case, the defense of alibi must fail.
15

n the case at hand, accused-appellant failed to substantiate his defense of alibi. The testimonies of his witnesses, Owen and Rosa, are
rendered suspect because his relationship to them makes it likely that they would freely perjure themselves for his sake. The defense of
alibi may not prosper if it is established mainly by the accused himself and his relatives, and not by credible persons.
16
Correctly then
did the trial court state:
Against this overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, the accused and witnesses could only offer denials and the supposed
impossibility of his having committed the crime because the keys to the house were kept by the sister and that he could not
have gone out without her knowing it.
17

Second. Contrary to the claim of accused-appellant, the prosecution evidence clearly shows that he had carnal knowledge of
complainant Maribeth Quinto.
On direct examination, complainant testified:
FSCAL SANTOS:
Q: Do you know the accused in this case, [Edgardo]
18
Maceda alias Boboy?
A: Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to the accused)
. . . .
FSCAL SANTOS:
Q: s the nickname of [Edgardo] Maceda, Boboy?
A: Yes, sir.
. . . .
Q: On February 19, 1998, you were in your house at about 1:30 in the morning?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was your mother then at the time?
A: She was working.
Q: So you were alone in your house on said date and time?
A: Yes, sir.
. . . .
Q: Why did you open the door?
A: Someone was outside the door.
Q: And who was outside the door?
A: saw a certain person who was asking me to keep quiet.
COURT:
Witness motioning.
FSCAL SANTOS:
Q: Who was the person who motioned you to keep quiet?
A: (Witness pointing to the accused)
Q: So, you are saying the person who was outside the door motioning you to keep quiet was the person you just identified
now, [Edgardo] Maceda alias Boboy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So what happened after that?
A: was raped.
Q: How were you raped?
A: He pulled down my panties and then kissed me on the lips and neck and then he inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: What did you feel?
A: was afraid.
Q: What happened after that?
A: He left me and then covered myself with a blanket.
. . . .
COURT:
Q: When your mother arrived, what did you tell your mother?
A: She arrived at noontime. reported the incident to my mother.
FSCAL SANTOS:
Q: What did your mother tell you?
A: was crying and was afraid.
COURT:
Witness showing her clenched fist.
FSCAL SANTOS:
Q: What else?
A: (Witness demonstrating her reaction)
19

And on cross-examination, she testified:
ATTY. CATOLCO:
Q: What did he do to you?
A: He spread . . . resisted and covered myself with a blanket and cried.
COURT:
Q: Why were you crying? What did he do to you?
A: He was embracing me and was afraid. He tried to remove my panties.
ATTY. CATOLCO:
Q: Did your mother teach you about what you will say here?
A: No.
Q: After that, what did Boboy do?
A: He took off my panties.
. . . .
COURT:
Q: Where was Boboy then?
A: He went home.
ATTY. CATOLCO:
Q: Who was with Boboy on that night?
A: He was alone.
20

Complainant never wavered when examined by the trial court:
COURT:
want to ask the complainant some questions.
(Maribeth Quinto on clarificatory questions from the court)
Q: You will tell the truth, okay?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Who molested you?
A: was raped one evening.
Q: Point to the person who raped you.
A: (Witness pointed to accused Edgardo Maceda)
Q: Are you sure he was the one who raped you?
A: Ni-rape niya ako nung gabi.
Q: Are you not mistaken? Maybe it was another man who came to you that night?
A: t was him. covered my face with a blanket.
Q: When did you cover your face?
A: was raped that night.
Q: Do you know the meaning of rape?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: What do you do when you are raped?
A: He pulled down my panties.
Q: And then what did he do?
A: He told me to keep quiet (Witness gesturing to keep quiet)
Q: And then?
A: covered myself with a blanket.
Q: And then?
A: He raped me that night.
Q: What do you mean by rape? What did he do to you?
A: He spread my legs.
Q: And then?
A: (Witness making a push and pull movement)
21

While the testimony of complainant alone is sufficient to convict accused-appellant of rape, the corroborative testimonies of her mother
and the examining physician sealed accused-appellant's fate. The mother, Editha, testified:
Q: What happened when you arrived?
A: When arrived, noticed my child was not speaking which was not her usual behavior. "Walang kibo."
Q: Who is the daughter of yours who you said was "walang kibo?"
A: Maribeth Quinto.
Q: So what did you do?
A: noticed she was quiet and did not mind her anymore thinking she was in one of her moods but when was resting,
she approached me.
Q: What happened when Maribeth approached you?
A: She was crying when she told me someone knocked at the door and when she opened the door, it was our neighbor
Boboy.
Q: What else did she tell you?
A: According to her, Boboy asked her if Nonoy was sleeping and she said, "Wala. Tulog siya kabilang bahay."
. . . .
Q: What else was confided to you by Maribeth?
A: Then Boboy told her to keep quiet and pulled her into the room and closed the door.
Q: What else?
A: She was forced to lie down and he kissed her on the neck and lips and she called it "kagat" and while holding her both
arms, he undressed her and inserted his penis into her vagina. She called his penis as "bayag."
COURT:
Q: What else?
A: While she was crying, she was saying, "Tulo ng luha ko. Hirap hirap ako" and Boboy was showing her his clenched fist.
FSCAL SANTOS
Q: You were saying while she was narrating that, she was crying, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
22

On cross-examination, Editha Quinto remained firm as to the identity of her daughter's assailant. Thus, she stated:
ATTY. CATOLCO:
Q: When the alleged victim confided to you about a certain Buboy who raped her, you already concluded that that Buboy is
Edgardo Maceda. s that correct?
A: mmediately she pointed to him as the one who raped her. Siya mismo si Buboy kapatid ni Rollie.
. . . .
Q: Aside from Buboy, do you know [any] other Buboy in that area?
A: There is no other Buboy except him.
. . . .
Q: Do you know the nickname of Edgardo Maceda, Madame witness?
A: His name is Buboy.
23

There is nothing in the record to show that either complainant or her mother had any ulterior motive to falsely testify against accused-
appellant. As the trial court observed:
Considering that the complainant who can (sic) hardly make sense of what she says, it is unimaginable that she could invent a
story of rape and point to the accused with such certainty as the perpetrator if it did not indeed happen.
24

Accused-appellant himself told the trial court that he never had serious misunderstandings with the victim or her family. He said:
FSCAL SANTOS:
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, before February 19, 1998, there was no occasion whatsoever that you did something to Maribeth
Quinto that would provoke her ire?
A: No, sir, because come home late at night.
Q: What about the immediate members of your family or the family of Maribeth Quinto, you have not done anything
untoward to them before February 19, 1998?
A: None, sir.
Q: Are you saying your relationship with the family of Maribeth Quinto was cordial?
A: t is only Abel Quinto who is my friend.
Q: Your relationship with Abel was pleasant?
A: Sometimes no because his wife sometimes get angry whenever he comes with me.
Q: But this sometimes, which you referred to, Mr. Witness, were just minor or petty manners between friends?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: f as you say there was no untoward incident between you and Maribeth and that of her family before February 19,
1998, and you are now professing innocence, do you know of any reason why Maribeth would point to you as the one who
raped her?
A: do not know of any reason, sir.
25

ndeed, it is difficult to believe that complainant, whose intelligence is admittedly low, could have concocted so grave a charge against
accused-appellant or that she and her mother would go into the trouble of having her medically examined and undergo trial had she
merely invented the charge.
26

Dr. Emmanuel Reyes' findings further corroborated complainant's testimony. His medical examination showed the presence of an
abraded fourchette and congested vestibule on the victim's vagina, indicating forcible entry of a hard object, possibly an erect penis. An
ecchymosis or "kiss mark" was also found on the victim's neck. To be sure, the results of complainant's medical examination could only
prove that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her without her consent.
Third. Accused-appellant says that complainant's mental condition rendered her testimony so vague, uncertain, and incoherent that it
cannot be understood. This is not so. Her testimony is understandable. Nor is there any question that she is competent to testify on
what she had experienced.
RuIe 130 of the Revised RuIes on Evidence provide:
Sec. 20. itnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to another, may be witnesses.
. . . .
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental conditions, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others;
. . . .
**The defense and the prosecution stipulated during pre-trial that complainant is a mental retardate. But, although the trial court
observed that she had some difficulty expressing herself, she was nonetheless able to intelligently and clearly make known to the court,
beyond dispute, that she was raped by accused-appellant. It has been heId that the mentaI unsoundness of the witness at the
time the fact to be testified to occurred affects onIy her credibiIity. As long as the witness can convey ideas by words or signs and
give sufficiently intelligent answers to questions propounded, she is a competent witness even if she is a mental retardate.
Accused-appellant likewise claims that there were several inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victim. He cites the following
excerpts of complainant's testimony:
COURT:
Q: What did Boboy do to you before he went home?
A: He entered our room. The door was closed.
Q: Was he able to enter the room?
A: No.
28

However, accused-appellant failed to mention that after the above statements, the victim further stated as follows:
COURT:
Q: You said he was taking off your panty?
A: Yes, was sleeping and he tried to remove my panty.
Q: After taking off your panty, what did he do?
A: (No answer)
COURT:
The witness is getting impatient and crying. . . .
29

Accused-appellant likewise cited the following testimonies of the complainant:
Q: Did you shout for help?
A: No, because was sleeping.
Q: Did you fight?
A: No.
Q: Why?
A: Because was sleeping.
30

But, immediately preceding this testimony, complainant also said:
Q: What did Boboy do to you?
A: He raped me.
Q: What kind of rape did he do to you? Did he force you?
A: Yes, sir.
31

A reading of complainant's testimony in its entirety shows that she repeatedly stated what accused-appellant had done to her. Only if
such testimony is read in parts and the portions thereof are isolated or taken out of context and no allowance is made for complainant's
mental condition can accused-appellant's reading of it be justified.

nconsistencies or lapses in her testimonies do not affect the
substance of her statements. They do not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole nor reflect adversely on
complainant's credibility.


Fourth. Accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation was used against complainant.
This contention is unmeritorious. To begin with, under Art. 266-A (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
34
the crime of rape
may be committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation. The force necessary in
rape is relative. t has been held in one case that for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in
accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. It is onIy necessary that the force or intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. ndisputably, her mental faculties are different from those
of a fully-functioning adult; hence, the degree of force or intimidation needed to overwhelm her is less than what it would take to frighten
an ordinary woman. Accused-appellant's acts may not have intimidated a normal person but he succeeded in instilling fear in the mind
of the victim in this case.
Based on the evidence on record, force and intimidation was employed to perpetuate the offense charged. As complainant narrated,
accused-appellant, upon entering the house, closed the door and told her to keep quiet. Complainant was then made to lie down.
Complainant resisted but accused-appellant succeeded in overpowering her and having sexual intercourse with her.
Furthermore, it is erroneous for accused-appellant to contend that no rape was committed because the prosecution failed to prove that
the mental age of the victim was equivalent to a girl below 12 years old. t must be emphasized that this requirement is necessary if the
charge is statutory rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d).
In this case, compIainant was deprived of reason, and, under Art. 266-A, par. 1(b) of the Revised PenaI Code, having sexuaI
intercourse with her, even if accompIished without the use of force or intimidation, constitutes rape.
Under the law, the crime of rape is committed when a man has carnal knowledge of a woman who is deprived of reason. There is no
requirement to prove the mental age of the offended party for this provision to apply. The term "deprived of reason" has been construed
to include those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency; or some form of mental retardation; the feebleminded but coherent; or
even those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency of reason. As this Court has ruled:
The offense committed by appellant is rape described under par. 2 of Art. 335 [Rape] of the Revised Penal Code, that is, the
offender having carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason. The deprivation of reason contemplated by law does not
need to be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough. So it was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that a man
having carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental faculties are not normally developed or who is suffering from hemiplegia
and mentally backward or who is an idiot commits the crime of rape. . . .
Being feeble-minded, complainant is incapable of thinking and reasoning like any normal human being and not being able to
think and reason from birth as aforesaid, and undoubtedly devoid or deficient in those instincts and other mental faculties that
characterize the average and normal mortal, she really has no will that is free and voluntary of her own; hers is a defective will,
which is incapable of freely and voluntarily giving such consent so necessary and essential in lifting coitus from the place of
criminality.
37

Fifth. Accused-appellant's contention that no rape could have been committed as shown by the deep healed lacerations and the
absence of spermatozoa cannot be given serious consideration. The fact that the lacerations found were healed, and not fresh, does
not necessarily negate rape. A freshIy broken hymen is not an essentiaI eIement of rape. For that matter, the medical examination
of the victim in rape cases is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime as her testimony alone, if
credible, is sufficient to convict the accused thereof. As regards the absence of spermatozoa, suffice it to say that Dr. Reyes explained
that this could be due to the fact the victim may have washed herself several hours after she had been raped.
After a scrutiny of the records of the case at bench, the Court finds that the triaI court did not err in giving fuII faith and credence
to the testimonies of compIainant and the other prosecution witnesses. For this reason, we find no reason to disturb the factual
conclusions of the trial court, consistent with the established rule that -
**The assessment of the credibiIity of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the triaI court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude
under griIIing examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing
the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court
can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to disbelieve. Verily,
findings of the trial court on such matter will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
39

However, the trial court erred when it imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant under Art. 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which provides in pertinent parts:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating qualifying
circumstances:
......
(10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder, and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the
time of the commission of the crime.
True enough, accused-appellant knew of the mental condition of the victim prior to and at the time of the incident, evidenced by his own
admission in open court as follows:
FSCAL SANTOS:
Q: You are also known as Buboy.
A: Yes, sir.
......
Q: Would you also know the complainant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, she was your neighbor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How long have you been residing thereat?
A: About 18 years, sir.
Q: n the said place where you and Maribeth Quinto reside, you have observed or you personally know that Maribeth
Quinto has a low mental capacity or she is retarded?
A: Yes, sir.
40

Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot be meted the death penalty. Under Art. 266-B in relation to Art. 266-A, par. (1), of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. When rape is committed by an assailant who has
knowledge of the victim's mental retardation, the penalty is increased to death. This circumstance must, however, be alleged in the
information because it is a qualifying circumstance which increases the penalty and changes the nature of the offense. n this case,
while accused-appellant admitted that he knew complainant to be a mental retardate, this fact was not alleged in the information.
Therefore, even if it was proved, it cannot be appreciated as a qualifying, but only as a generic aggravating, circumstance. Accordingly,
accused-appellant must be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of simple rape.
41

The award of damages by the trial court should likewise be modified. Aside from the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
complainant is entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, which must be given even if there is neither allegation nor
evidence presented as basis therefor.
42

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Edgardo Maceda guilty of
rape is AFFRMED with the MODFCATON that the death sentence imposed on him is reduced to reclusion perpetua. Accused-
appellant is likewise ordered to pay complainant Maribeth Quinto the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, in addition to the award
of P50,000.00 for moral damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
---------------------------------------

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ZACARIAS TEGRADO, defendant-appellant.

A colt valued at P34 was stolen from Valeriano Blanca. t was subsequently found in the possession of Agapito Partolan. The latter
testified that he bought the animal from Zacarias Tegrado, the accused. The accused, however, claimed that the colt was raised from a
mare belonging to him and then sold to Partolan. dentification of the colt to determine if its mother was a mare belonging to the
complainant Valeriano Blana or if its mother was a mare belonging to the accused Zacarias Tegrado is, therefore, the determining
factor.
The colt was identified by a number of witnesses as the property of Blanca. Other witnesses testified to having seen the colt following a
mare belonging to the accused. Whom shall we believe? We could, of course, rest our conclusion on the findings of the trial court. We
could, in addition, point out grave discripancies in the testimony of the witnesses for the defense, which argues against its reliability. But
there was present as in interested, spectator, another witnesses, who, without being sworn, could tell the truth and nothing but the truth.
This was the colt. The colt was separated from the mare of the complaining witness and turned loose; it at once went back to this mare.
The colt was then taken to the mare of the accused; but showed its dislike for the mare and tried to find the mare of the complaining
witness. Another colt was placed near the mare of the complaining witness; thereupon the mare and that colt both resisted. This was a
practical demonstration worthy of a Solomon by which the colt was able to testify by manifesting all the signs of the young, whether
human or not, on finding a long lost mother. (U. S.vs. Caralipio and Fernando [1911], 18 Phil. Rep., 421.)
f we are to accept the evidence of the prosecution as true, then we must conclude that the defendant stole the colt. The presumption of
stolen property prima facie proof of guilt, would work against the accused. (U. S. vs. Soriano [1907], 9 Phil. Rep., 445; U. S. vs. Lopez
[1914], 25 Phil. Rep., 589) We are convinced that the defendant is guilty as charged.
The lower court found that the accused had previously been convicted of the same crime. The court thereupon in view of the value of
the colt, P34, which would bring the facts within the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 518 of the Penal Code, in view of article 520 of
the same Code as amended which would raise the penalty to the one next higher in degree, and in view of the fact that the accused
was a recidivist which would raise the penalty to the maximum, sentenced the accused to four years two months and one day
of presidio correccional, to the accessories of the law, and to pay the cost. This judgment is affirmed with the addition of an order to
return the property stolen to its owner if not already done, or to reimburse the owner in the amount of P34, or to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, with the costs of this instance. So ordered.
-------------------------------------------

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO GUTIERREZ y GATSO, Accused-Appellant.

On appeal is the Decision
1
dated January 22, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01688, affirming the decision
in Criminal Case No. 12318 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65 in Tarlac City. The RTC found accused-appellant Fernando
Gutierrez guilty of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs punishable under Section 11, Article of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
An Amended nformation
2
charged accused-appellant Fernando with violation of Sec. 11, Art. of RA 9165, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about September 12, 2002 at around 4:45 o'clock in the afternoon at Purok Jasmin, Poblacion North, Municipality of Ramos,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess two (2) small plastic [sachets] containing white crystalline substance weighing more or less
14.052 grams of shabu.
Contrary to law.
Arraigned on December 12, 2002, Fernando, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of "not guilty." After pre-trial, trial on the
merits ensued.
To substantiate the accusation, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the arresting police officers. Offered in evidence too was
Exhibit "B," captioned Chemistry Report No. D-186-2002 and prepared and signed by Ma. Luisa G. David, forensic chemist of the
Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. Exhibit "B" contains the following entries, among others: the precise time and date the
specimen confiscated from Fernando was submitted for examination by the requesting party, the time and date of the examination's
completion, and the results of the examination.
Culled from the challenged CA decision, the People's version of the incident is synthesized as follows:
At around 4:45 p.m. on September 12, 2002, the police station of Ramos, Tarlac acting on a tip regarding a shabutransaction (drug-
pushing) taking place somewhere in Purok Jasmin, Poblacion Norte, dispatched a three-man team composed of PO3 Romeo Credo,
P/nsp. Napoleon Dumlao, and SPO1 Restituto Fernandez to the place mentioned. Arriving at the target area, the three noticed
Fernando and one Dennis Cortez under a santol tree handing plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance to certain
individuals. At the sight of the police officers, Fernando and the others scampered in different directions. After a brief chase, however,
one of the three police operatives caught up with and apprehended Fernando, then carrying a bag.
When searched in the presence of the barangay captain of Poblacion Norte, the bag yielded the following, among other items: plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance weighing 15 grams or less, one small plastic sachet/bag containing white powdered
substance, one set of pipe tooter tube glass, one laptop computer, one Motorola cell phone, one rolled aluminum foil, three bundles of
plastic used for repacking, one weighing scale, a Metrobank deposit slip in the name of Dhen Bito, and cash amounting to PhP 1,500 in
different denominations. Forthwith, Fernando and the seized items were brought to the Ramos police station and the corresponding
request for examination was then prepared. The following day, the confiscated sachets were sent to and received by the Tarlac
Provincial Crime Laboratory Field Office. When subjected to qualitative examination, the substances in the plastic sachets and plastic
bags were found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
For its part, the defense offered in evidence the sole testimony of Fernando. His defense relied on denial and alleged fabrication of the
charge by the police, thus:
At around 4:35 in the afternoon of September 12, 2002, while at home in Anao, Tarlac resting, Fernando was asked by a neighbor,
Cortez, to accompany him to Ramos, Tarlac to buy a duck. At that time, Cortez had with him a backpack, the contents of which
Fernando knew nothing about.
n Ramos, Tarlac, the two, after buying a duck, repaired to a house whose owner was not known to Fernando. Cortez went inside the
house with his backpack, leaving Fernando outside the front yard. Not long thereafter, the police arrived, fired a warning shot, and went
inside the house. After a while, the policemen emerged from the house accompanied by two individuals who pointed to Fernando as
Cortez's companion, a fact Fernando readily admitted. The policemen then proceeded to arrest Fernando on the pretext he and Cortez
were earlier peddlingshabu in the town of Paniqui. As they were not able to apprehend Cortez, the arresting officers had Fernando hold
and admit ownership of Cortez's backpack earlier taken from inside the house. Fernando denied ownership of the backpack that
contained items belonging to Cortez, such as but not limited to the cell phone, laptop computer, driver's license, and wallet. A bank
book and Metrobank deposit slip signed by Cortez were also inside the bag.
The RuIing of the RTC and CA
After due proceedings, the RTC, invoking, among other things, the presumptive regularity in the performance of official duties,
rendered, on September 1, 2005, its judgment
3
finding Fernando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of 14.052 grams of the
prohibited drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay the fine of P400,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory who has custody of the 14.052 grams of shabu, subject of this case is hereby ordered to
transmit the same to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition and furnish the court proof of compliance.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, Fernando went on appeal to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01688.
Eventually, the CA issued the assailed decision dated January 22, 2007, affirming that of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 1, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65 of Tarlac City in
Criminal Case No. 12318 finding accused-appellant Fernando Gutierrez y Gatso GULTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 11, Rule of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 is hereby AFFRMED.
SO ORDERED.
4

The Issues
Undaunted, Fernando is now with this Court via the present recourse raising the very same assignment of errors he invoked before the
CA, thus:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED N GVNG WEGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTMONY OF THE PROSECUTON WTNESSES.

THE TRAL COURT ERRED N FNDNG THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GULTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VOLATON
OF SECTON 11, ARTCLE , R.A. NO. 9165.
5

The foregoing assignment of errors can actually be reduced and summarized to one: the credibility of the testimonies of the three police
officers as prosecution witnesses and the weight to be accorded on said parol evidence.
The parties chose not to file any supplemental briefs, maintaining their respective positions and arguments in their briefs filed before the
CA.
The Court's RuIing
The appeal is bereft of merit.
n prosecution proceedings involving illegal possession or sale of prohibited drugs, credence is usually accorded the narration of the
incident by the prosecution witnesses, especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive on the part of the police officers
to falsely ascribe a serious crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the
trial court's assessment on the credibility of the apprehending officers, shall prevail over the accused's self-serving and uncorroborated
claim of frame-up.
6

n the case at bench, there is nothing in the records that would dictate a departure from the above doctrinal rule as far as the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Credo, SPO1 Fernandez, and P/nsp. Dumlao are concerned. We see no valid reason, in
fine, to discredit the veracity of their narration. And as aptly noted by the trial court, there is no evidence of any ill motive on the part of
the police officers who merely responded to a tip about a drug-pushing incident in their area.
The prosecution's evidence established the fact that a bona fide follow-up operation was undertaken following a phone call, reporting
some drug-pushing activities in Poblacion Norte. To recall, PO3 Credo, SPO1 Fernandez, and P/nsp. Dumlao, Chief of the Ramos
police station, made up the team that proceeded to the reported area to check the veracity of the drug-related call. Upon reaching the
target site, they espied Fernando passing sachets of white crystalline substance. And Fernando, upon noticing the arrival of policemen,
lost no time in fleeing from the scene. PO3 Credo gave chase and eventually collared the bag-carrying Fernando and conducted an
immediate search on the bag. The search led to the discovery of two sachets and one small plastic bag containing suspicious-looking
crystalline substance and drug paraphernalia, among other items.
Thereafter, the police team brought Fernando to the Ramos police station and a request was immediately made for the examination of
the seized items. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance contained in the sachets was found positive for shabu.
Fernando now questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the weight the trial court gave to their narration of events,
laying stress on the inconsistencies and/or discrepancies of their respective accounts. The adverted inconsistencies/discrepancies
relate to the place where the police initially spotted and apprehended Fernando and where the confiscated bag was searched.
Fernando urges the Court to consider: (1) SPO1 Fernandez and P/nsp. Dumlao testified first seeing Fernando and the three others
under a santol tree exchanging sachets of drugs, while PO3 Credo testified that they (Fernando and three others) were under a kubo;
and (2) PO3 Credo testified that, immediately upon apprehending Fernando, he searched the latter's bag and found the contraband
inside. On the other hand, SPO1 Fernandez and P/nsp. Dumlao placed the search as having been effected in the police station in the
presence of the barangay captain of Poblacion Norte.
The inconsistencies Fernando cited relate to extraneous matters that do not in any way affect the material points of the crime charged.
The seeming inconsistency with regard to where Fernando and Cortez exactly were when the sachets of shabu changed handsbe
they in a kubo, as PO3 Credo mentioned,
7
or under a santol tree, as SPO3 Fernandez
8
and P/nsp. Dumlao
9
assertedis of little
moment and hardly of any bearing on the central fact of the commission of the crime. n context, the more important occurrence relates
to Fernando and his companions scampering in different directions when the policemen chanced upon them, and that Fernando, when
apprehended, was holding a bag which contained shabu and drug paraphernaliafacts categorically confirmed by the prosecution
witnesses. t is perhaps too much to hope that different eyewitnesses shall give, at all times, testimonies that are in all fours with the
realities on the ground. Minor discrepancies in their testimonies are in fact to be expected; they neither vitiate the essential integrity of
the evidence in its material entirety nor reflect adversely on the credibility of witnesses. nconsistencies deflect suspicions that the
testimony is rehearsed or concocted. And as jurisprudence teaches, honest differing accounts on minor and trivial matters serve to
strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime.
10

We took pains in reviewing the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial and found nothing to support Fernando's
allegations of inconsistencies between or among the prosecution witnesses' versions of relevant events. For instance, PO3 Credo
testified that, after arresting Fernando, he immediately searched the bag the latter was carrying.
11
This account does not contradict the
testimonies of SPO3 Fernandez
12
and P/nsp. Dumlao,
13
who both recounted the search made in the police station in the presence of a
barangay captain. As earlier indicated, it was PO3 Credo who arrested Fernando
14
and had the opportunity to make the search at the
scene of the crime.
On the other hand, SPO3 Fernandez and P/nsp. Dumlao ran after Cortez and the two others, eventually arresting Cortez, who was
initially included in the original nformation.
15
What is fairly deducible from the testimonies of the arresting operatives is that there were
two separate searches actually made: (1) the first done by PO3 Credo immediately after he arrested Fernando which is the usual and
standard police practice; and (2) a subsequent one effected at the police station where the bag was apparently marked and its contents
inventoried.
The Court notes that immediately after his arrest, Cortez was also searched but no illegal drugs were found in his person. t was
obviously for this reason that after the original nformation was filed following an inquest, Fernando and Cortez filed a joint Motion for
Preliminary nvestigation and/or Re-nvestigation.
16
The preliminary investigation resulted in the filing of the Amended nformation that
dropped Cortez as accused paving the way for the dismissal of the charge against him, but retained Fernando as the sole accused in
Criminal Case No. 12318.
To reiterate a long-settled rule, the Court will not disturb the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, save when it had
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, when considered, will alter the
assailed decision or affect the result of the case.
17
None of the exceptions obtain in the case at bar.
At the trial, Fernando invoked the defenses of denial and frame-up, claiming at every opportunity that the bag containing
the shabu sachets and drug paraphernalia belonged to Cortez, not to him, as the arresting officers would make it appear. To prove this
point, Fernando testified that among the items found in the bag were Cortez's driver's license and wallet.
The defense thus put up deserves scant consideration, because, off-hand, it stands uncorroborated. Fernando, as may be noted, failed
to present the owner of the house where he and Cortez supposedly went to and where he allegedly was when arrested, to substantiate
his posture about Cortez being really owning the bag. Certainly, Fernando had the right to compel the appearance of persons who he
believes can support his defense, but for reasons known only to Fernando, he did not secure the appearance of the person who could
have plausibly lent credence to his claim of frame-up. As we have time and again held, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has
been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Here, no clear and convincing evidence was adduced to prove Fernando's defense of denial or frame-up. On the contrary, Fernando's
action while the policemen were undertaking follow-up operations was what took him behind the bars. The reference, of course, is to
the fact that Fernando hastily fled from the scene of the crime upon noticing the arrival of the police at the target area.
Fernando's allegation that the bag the police seized contained Cortez's driver's license and walleta futile attempt to avoid culpability
over his possession of the bagwill not save the day for him. First, his assertion on what the bag contained is belied by the Joint
Affidavit
18
of the three apprehending officers. t was stated under paragraph 5 of their joint affidavit that the items found in the bag had
been duly inventoried. The items enumerated clearly did not include any wallet or driver's license of Cortez. Since said joint affidavit
was used in the inquest to indict Fernando and Cortez, the inventoried items would have included the license and wallet adverted to,
the search of the bag conducted in the police station having been made in the presence of the barangay captain of Poblacion Norte.
Second, it bears to stress that Fernando was indicted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. n the prosecution of this offense, the
ownership of the bag where the shabu and drug paraphernalia were found is really inconsequential. The elements necessary for the
prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be
a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.
19
Elucidating on the nature of this offense, the Court in People v. Tira wrote:
x x x This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that
the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession,
but also constructive possession. ActuaI possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physicaI possession or controI of
the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or
when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is
located, is shared with another.
20
(Emphasis ours.)
Without a trace of equivocation, the RTC and later the CA held that the prosecution had discharged the burden of proving all the
elements of the crime charged. Since Fernando was caught carrying the incriminating bag after the police had been tipped off of drug
pushing in the target area, any suggestion that he was not in actual possession or control of the prohibited drug hidden in the area
would be puny. Thus, ownership of the bag is truly inconsequential.
We emphasize at this juncture that in no instance did Fernando intimate to the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of
the seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. He, thus, veritably admits that the crystalline substance in the
sachets found in his bag was the same substance sent for laboratory examination and there positively determined to be shabu and
eventually presented in evidence in court as part of the corpus delicti. n other words, Fernando, before the RTC and the CA, opted not
to make an issue of whether the chain of custody of the drugs subject of this case has been broken. This disposition on the part of
Fernando is deducible from the August 18, 2005 Order
21
of the trial court, pertinently saying, "[The] Acting Provincial Prosecutor x x x
and Atty. Emmanuel Abellera, counsel de officio of the accused manifested that the chain of custody of the searched illegal drug or
shabu is admitted."
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the presentation of the seized prohibited drugs as an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
22
This
would ideally cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, to include, as
much as possible, a description of the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
23

Given the foregoing considerations, particularly the established fact that the crystalline powder in two sachets the police confiscated
from Fernando in the afternoon of September 12, 2002 was shabu, the Court is constrained to affirm the judgment of conviction
appealed from.
We find the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, to be in accordance with law. As aptly pointed out by the appellate
court, Sec. 11, Art. of RA 9165 pertinently provides:
SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
x x x x
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
x x x x
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but Iess than fifty (50) grams.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Fernando was caught in possession of 14.052 grams of shabu. Applying the law, the proper penalty should be life imprisonment and a
fine ranging from PhP 400,000 to PhP 500,000. Hence, Fernando was correctly sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP
400,000.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of accused-appellant Fernando Gutierrez is hereby DENED. Accordingly, the January 22, 2007 CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01688 is AFFRMED.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
-----------------------------------------------

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SPO3 SANGKI ARA y MIRASOL, MIKE TALIB y MAMA, and JORDAN MUSA y BAYAN, Accused-Appellants.

This is an appeal from the December 13, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00025B entitled People
of the Philippines v. SPO3 Sangki Ara y Mirasol, Mike Talib y Mama, Jordan Musa y Bayan, which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9 in Davao City, convicting accused-appellants of violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
Three nformations charged accused-appellants Sangki Ara, Mike Talib, and Jordan Musa, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against Ara
That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without being authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and consciously traded, transported and delivered 26.6563 grams
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu," which is a dangerous drug, with the aggravating circumstance of trading, transporting
and delivering said 26.6563 grams of "shabu" within 100 meters from [the] school St. Peter's College of Toril, Davao City.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
1

Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against Talib
That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without being authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and consciously had in his possession and control one (1) plastic
sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu," weighing 0.3559 gram, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
2

Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against Musa
That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused, without being authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and consciously had in his possession and control five (5) big
plastic sachet[s] of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu" weighing 14.2936 grams, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
3

During their arraignment, accused-appellants all gave a "not guilty" plea.
Version of the Prosecution
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero, PO2 Ronald Lao, SPO1 Bienvenido
Furog, PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr., SPO4 Rodrigo Mallorca, and PO2 Jacy Jay Francia.
n the morning of December 20, 2002, a confidential informant (C) came to the Heinous Crime nvestigation Section (HCS) of the
Davao City Police Department and reported that three (3) suspected drug pushers had contacted him for a deal involving six (6) plastic
sachets of shabu. He was instructed to go that same morning to St. Peter's College at Toril, Davao City and look for an orange Nissan
Sentra car.
4

Police Chief nspector Fulgencio Pavo, Sr. immediately formed a buy-bust team composed of SPO3 Reynaldo Capute, SPO4 Mario
Galendez, SPO3 Antonio Balolong, SPO2 Arturo Lascaos, SPO2 Jim Tan, SPO1 Rizalino Aquino, SPO1 Bienvenido Furog, PO2
Vivencio Jumawan, Jr., PO2 Ronald Lao, and PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr., who would act as poseur-buyer.
5

The team proceeded to the school where PO1 Ayao and the C waited by the gate. At around 8:45 a.m., an orange Nissan Sentra
bearing plate number UGR 510 stopped in front of them. The two men approached the vehicle and the C talked briefly with an old man
in the front seat. PO1 Ayao was then told to get in the back seat as accused-appellant Mike Talib opened the door. The old man, later
identified as accused-appellant SPO3 Ara, asked PO1 Ayao if he had the money and the latter replied in the positive. Ara took out
several sachets with crystalline granules from his pocket and handed them to PO1 Ayao, who thereupon gave the pre-arranged signal
of opening the car door. The driver of the car, later identified as accused-appellant Jordan Musa, tried to drive away but PO1 Ayao was
able to switch off the car engine in time. The back-up team appeared and SPO1 Furog held on to Musa while PO2 Lao restrained Talib.
PO1 Ayao then asked Ara to get out of the vehicle.
6

Recovered from the group were plastic sachets of white crystalline substance: six (6) big sachets, weighing 26.6563 grams, from Ara by
PO1 Ayao; five (5) big sachets, weighing 14.2936 grams, from Musa by SPO1 Furog; and a small sachet, weighing 0.3559 gram, from
Talib by PO2 Lao.
7

The three suspects were brought to the HCS and the seized items indorsed to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
for examination. Forensic Chemist Austero, who conducted the examination, found that the confiscated sachets all tested positive for
shabu.
8

Version of the Defense
The defense offered the sole testimony of Ara, who said that he had been a member of the PNP for 32 years, with a spotless record.
On December 20, 2002, SPO3 Ara was in Cotabato City, at the house of his daughter Marilyn, wife of his co-accused Musa. He was set
to go that day to the Ombudsman's Davao City office for some paperwork in preparation for his retirement on July 8, 2003. He
recounted expecting at least PhP 1.6 million in retirement benefits.
9
Early that morning, past three o'clock, he and Musa headed for
Davao City on board the latter's car. As he was feeling weak, Ara slept in the back seat.
Upon reaching Davao City, he was surprised to see another man, Mike Talib, in the front seat of the car when he woke up. Musa
explained that Talib had hitched a ride on a bridge they had passed.
10

When they arrived in Toril, Ara noticed the car to be overheating, so they stopped. Ara did not know that they were near St. Peter's
College since he was not familiar with the area. Talib alighted from the car and Ara transferred to the front seat. While Talib was getting
into the back seat, PO1 Ayao came out of nowhere, pointed his .45 caliber pistol at Ara even if he was not doing anything, and ordered
him to get off the vehicle. He saw that guns were also pointed at his companions. As the group were being arrested, he told PO1 Ayao
that he was also a police officer. Ara insisted that he was not holding anything and that the shabu taken from him was planted. He
asserted that the only time he saw shabu was on television.
11

The Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC pronounced accused-appellants guilty of the crimes charged. n its Decision dated March 1, 2003, the trial court held that the
prosecution was able to establish the quantum of proof showing the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. t further
ruled that the "intercept operation" conducted by the buy-bust team was valid.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing the Court finds the following:
n Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002, the accused herein SANGK ARA Y MASOL, Filipino, 55 years old, widower, a resident of
Kabuntalan, Cotabato City, is hereby found GULTY beyond reasonable doubt, and is CONVCTED of the crime of violation of Sec. 5,
1st paragraph of Republic Act 9165. He is hereby imposed the DEATH PENALTY and FNE of TEN MLLON PESOS (PhP
10,000,000) with all the accessory penalties corresponding thereto, including absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office,
in view of the provision of section 28 of RA 9165 quoted above.
Since the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in the area which is only five (5) to six (6) meters
away from the school, the provision of section 5 paragraph 3 Article of RA 9165 was applied in the imposition of the maximum penalty
against the herein accused.
n Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002, the accused herein MKE TALB y MAMA, Filipino, of legal age, single and a resident of Parang,
Cotabato, is found GULTY beyond reasonable doubt, and is CONVCTED of the crime of violation of Sec. 11, 3rd paragraph, Article
of Republic Act 9165. He is hereby imposed a penalty of mprisonment of SXTEEN (16) YEARS and a fine of THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 300,000) with all the accessory penalties corresponding thereto.
n Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 the accused herein JORDAN MUSA Y BAYAN, Filipino, 30 years old, married and a resident of
Cotabato City, is hereby found GULTY beyond reasonable doubt and is CONVCTED of the crime for Violation of Sec. 11, 1st
paragraph, Article of Republic Act No. 9165. He is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of LFE MPRSONMENT and FNE of FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 400,000) with all the accessory penalties corresponding thereto.
SO ORDERED.
12

As the death penalty was imposed on Ara, the case went on automatic review before this Court. Conformably with People v.
Mateo,
13
we, however, ordered the transfer of the case to the CA.
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
Contesting the RTC Decision, accused-appellants filed separate appeals before the CA. Talib claimed that it was erroneous for the trial
court to have used the complaining witnesses' affidavits as basis for ruling that their arrest was valid. He also cited as erroneous the
trial court's refusal to rule that the prosecution's evidence was inadmissible. Lastly, he questioned the failure of the buy-bust team to
follow the requirements of RA 9165 on proper inventory of seized drugs.
Ara and Musa filed a joint brief, alleging the following: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress and/or exclude illegally
obtained evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying the Demurrer to Evidence; (3) the trial court failed to consider that the criminal
informations did not allege conspiracy among the accused; and (4) the trial court erred in ruling that the "intercept operation" was valid.
The CA affirmed the trial court's decision with some modifications on the penalty imposed. t ruled that a majority of the errors raised in
the appeal referred to technicalities in the conduct of buy-bust operations that did not invalidate the police officers' actions. On the issue
of the evidence presented, the CA held that the presumption that police officers performed their duties in a regular manner was not
overturned.
The appellate court resolved the issue of the validity of the buy-bust operation by stating that the law requires no specific method of
conducting such an operation. t ruled that to require a warrant of arrest would not accomplish the goal of apprehending drug pushers in
flagrante delicto. The CA's Decision emphasized that all the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs were
established.
The fallo of the December 13, 2007 CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby DSMSSED and the appealed March 1, 2003 Decision is hereby AFFRMED
subject to the modification insofar as the death penalty imposed upon accused SPO3 Sangki Ara is concerned. Accordingly, his penalty
is hereby reduced to life imprisonment pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
SO ORDERED.
14

On December 17, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The parties, save for Musa,
manifested their willingness to forego the filing of additional briefs.
The ssues
Reiterating the matters raised before the CA, accused-appellants alleged the following:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the arrest of the accused-appellants was valid based on the affidavits of the
complaining witnesses

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the apparent defects and inconsistencies in the affidavits of the complaining
witnesses

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider the suppression or exclusion of evidence
V
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt
Talib also raises the following grounds for his acquittal:

Whether the arrest of Talib was illegal and the evidence confiscated from him illegally obtained

Whether the police officers who conducted the illegal search and arrest also deliberately failed and/or violated the provisions of RA
9165

Whether the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and their respective affidavits were gravely inconsistent
Ara and Musa additionally raise the following issues:

Whether the trial court erred in denying the Demurrer to Evidence

Whether the trial court failed to consider that the criminal informations did not allege conspiracy among the accused

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the "intercept operation" was valid
Accused-appellant Musa also avers that the CA erred in convicting him since the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
offense charged.
The Ruling of this Court
What are mainly raised in this appeal are (1) whether the buy-bust conducted was valid; (2) whether the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of drugs were sufficiently established; and (3) whether the chain of custody over the shabu was unbroken.
Warrantless Arrest and Seizure Valid
n calling for their acquittal, accused-appellants decry their arrest without probable cause and the violation of their constitutional rights.
They claim that the buy-bust team had more than a month to apply for an arrest warrant yet failed to do so.
Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust operation has long been held as a legitimate method of
catching offenders. t is a form of entrapment employed as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of commission of an
offense.
15
We have ruled that a buy-bust operation can be carried out after a long period of planning. The period of planning for such
operation cannot be dictated to the police authorities who are to undertake such operation.
16
t is unavailing then to argue that the
operatives had to first secure a warrant of arrest given that the objective of the operation was to apprehend the accused-appellants in
flagrante delicto. n fact, one of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
is when a person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or
private person.
t is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to arrest accused-appellants. Probable cause, in warrantless
searches, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula for determining probable cause, for its determination varies according to the
facts of each case.
17
Probable cause was provided by information gathered from the C and from accused-appellants themselves when
they instructed PO1 Ayao to enter their vehicle and begin the transaction. The illegal sale of shabu inside accused-appellants' vehicle
was afterwards clearly established. Thus, as we have previously held, the arresting officers were justified in making the arrests as
accused-appellants had just committed a crime when Ara sold shabu to PO1 Ayao.
18
Talib and Musa were also frisked for contraband
as it may be logically inferred that they were also part of Ara's drug activities inside the vehicle. This inference was further strengthened
by Musa's attempt to drive the vehicle away and elude arrest.
Moreover, the trial court correctly denied the Motion to Suppress or Exclude Evidence. We need not reiterate that the evidence was not
excluded since the buy-bust operation was shown to be a legitimate form of entrapment. The pieces of evidence thus seized therein
were admissible. As the appellate court noted, it was within legal bounds and no anomaly was found in the conduct of the buy-bust
operation. There is, therefore, no basis for the assertion that the trial court's order denying said motion was biased and committed with
grave abuse of discretion.
Prosecution Established Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt
For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
19
All these
requisites were met by the prosecution.
n contrast, Ara, the sole defense witness, could only proffer the weak defenses of denial and alibi. He expressed surprise at having
Talib in his car and claimed he was framed and that the shabu confiscated from him was planted. According to the trial court, however,
Ara's lying on the witness stand "was so intense as he tried very hard in vain to win the Court's sympathy."
20

Given the prosecution's evidence, we rule that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties has not been
overturned. The presumption remains because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did
not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.
21
Ara could not explain why his fellow police officers,
who did not know him prior to his arrest, would frame him for such a serious offense.
Validity of Buy-Bust Operation
Likewise questioned by the defense in the affidavits of the police officers was the allegation that there was a legitimate buy-bust
operation. No marked money was presented to back up the police officers' claims. This argument lacks basis, however. There are
requirements that must be complied with in proving the legitimacy of drug buy-bust operations. Nevertheless, this Court has ruled that
presentation of the marked money used is not such a requirement. n the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of
marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution, as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately
proved and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court.
22
n the instant case, the police officers' testimonies
adequately established the illegal sale of shabu. The shabu was then presented before the trial court. The non-presentation of the
marked money may, thus, be overlooked as a peripheral matter.
Talib further contends that it is incredible that a shabu transaction would be carried out in a very open and public place. Contrary to
Talib's claim, however, judicial experience has shown that drug transactions have been conducted without much care for an
inconspicuous location.
Thus, we observed in People v. Roldan:
Drug pushing when done on a small level x x x belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at anytime and at any place. After
the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties
are in a public place and in the presence of other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade these factors
may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in
a billiard hall, in front of a store, along a street at 1:45 p.m., and in front of a house.
23

t is also argued as impossible to believe that even if there was already a deal between the informant and accused-appellants, it was
the apprehending police officer who acted as the buyer and that he requested to see the shabu first before showing the money. These
claims by Talib are similarly undeserving of consideration. First, there is no uniform method by which drug pushers and their buyers
operate. Second, the choice of effective ways to apprehend drug dealers is within the ambit of police authority. Police officers have the
expertise to determine which specific approaches are necessary to enforce their entrapment operations.
24
Third, as long as they enjoy
credibility as witnesses, the police officers' account of how the buy-bust operation transpired is entitled to full faith and credit.
25
Lastly,
these arguments are merely incidental and do not affect the elements of the crime which have been, in the instant case, sufficiently
established.
Talib also alleges that during his testimony, SPO1 Furog was not certain as to the reason he was apprehending Musa. Another claim is
that SPO1 Furog, when examined by the prosecutor and two different defense lawyers, allegedly made relevant inconsistencies in his
testimony. The pertinent exchange reads:
Direct Examination of SPO1 Furog:
Prosecutor Weis:
Q What was your basis for stopping [Musa] from letting the car go?
A made him [stop] the car[.] [W]e [had] to check them first because think Ayao saw [that] Ara [had] the suspected shabu.
Cross-Examination of SPO1 Furog:
Atty. Estrada
Q When you arrested Musa as you said, it was because he attempted to drive the car away, that was it?
A The most, when SPO3 Sangki Ara told us that he was a PNP member and when we saw the substances from the two of them first.
x x x x
Q You are referring to Musa and Ara?
A Yes sir.
26

x x x x
Atty. Javines
Q Ayao did not arrest [Ara] inside the vehicle?
A Only rushed to the vehicle. don't know if he directly arrested him when he saw the substance and [got] out of the vehicle but saw
him get out from the vehicle.
27

The alleged inconsistencies in SPO1 Furog's "reason for apprehending Musa" are, however, insignificant and do not merit much
consideration as well. The questioned parts in the testimony of SPO1 Furog do not dent the totality of evidence against accused-
appellants. To repeat, the elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs and illegal possession of drugs were both sufficiently
established. Although SPO1 Furog was not categorical in explaining his basis for apprehending Musa, the arrest of the latter must be
considered as part of a legitimate buy-bust operation which was consummated. Musa's arrest came after the pre-arranged signal was
given to the back-up team and this served as basis for the police officers to apprehend all those in the vehicle, including Musa.
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Although alleged by accused-appellants Ara and Musa, no reason was given in the appeal as to why the trial court erred in denying
their Demurrer to Evidence. Whatever their basis may be, an action on a demurrer or on a motion to dismiss rests on the sound
exercise of judicial discretion.
28
n Gutib v. CA,
29
we explained that:
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency
of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent orsufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
Here, the trial court found competent and sufficient evidence to support a conviction of all three accused-appellants. We see no reason
to overturn the trial court's finding.
Allegation of Conspiracy in nformation Not Necessary
We find no merit in accused-appellants' insistence that conspiracy should have been alleged in the separate nformations indicting
them. We agree with the appellate court, which succinctly stated that conspiracy was not alleged "precisely because they were charged
with different offenses for the distinct acts that each of them committed. One's possession of an illegal drug does not need to be
conspired by another who, on his part, also possessed an illegal drug."
30
The three separate indictments against Ara, Musa, and Talib
do not need to allege conspiracy, for the act of conspiring and all the elements of the crime must be set forth in the complaint or
information only when conspiracy is charged as a crime.
31

Requirements of RA 9165 on Proper nventory
Musa contends that since the markings on the seized items were only made at the police station, there is a great possibility that these
were replaced. The result, he argues, would be a lack of guarantee that what were inventoried and photographed at the crime
laboratory were the same specimens confiscated from the accused.
As recently highlighted in People v. Cortez
32
and People v. Lazaro, Jr.,
33
RA 9165 and its subsequent mplementing Rules and
Regulations (RR) do not require strict compliance as to the chain of custody rule. The arrest of an accused will not be invalidated and
the items seized from him rendered inadmissible on the sole ground of non-compliance with Sec. 21, Article of RA 9165. We have
emphasized that what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its RR relative to the custody, photographing, and
drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust
operation.
34

The chain of custody in the instant case did not suffer from serious flaws as accused-appellants argue. The recovery and handling of
the seized drugs showed that, as to Ara, first, PO1 Ayao recovered six plastic sachets of white crystalline substance from Ara and
marked them with both his and Ara's initials. Second, the sachets were likewise signed by property custodian PO3 Pelenio. Third, PO1
Ayao signed a Request for Laboratory Examination then personally delivered the sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
Fourth, SPO4 Mallorca then received the sachets at the crime laboratory.
As to Musa, first, SPO1 Furog seized the sachets from Musa and marked each with his own initials. Second, an nventory of Property
Seized was then made by SPO4 Galendez. Lastly, SPO1 Furog later submitted a Request for Laboratory Examination of the five (5)
sachets weighing a total of 14.2936 grams to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
As to Talib, first, PO2 Lao seized a small sachet from Talib during the buy-bust operation. Second, PO2 Lao delivered a Request for
Laboratory Examination of one (1) sachet of suspected shabu weighing 0.3559 gram. Third, SPO4 Mallorca also received the items at
the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero's examination of the sachets confiscated from all accused-appellants showed that these were positive
for shabu. During trial, the seized items were identified in court. The five (5) sachets taken from Musa were marked Exhibits "A-1" to "A-
5," while the sachet seized from Talib was marked Exhibit "B." The six (6) sachets taken from Ara were marked Exhibits "B1-B6."
We are, thus, satisfied that the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu in all three criminal
cases against accused-appellants.
The rest of the arguments interposed are evidently without merit and do not warrant discussion.
Penalties mposed
Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against Talib
The crime of illegal possession of drugs is punishable by Sec. 11 of RA 9165, as follows:
Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - x x x
x x x x
3) mprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of x x x
methamphetamine hydrochloride x x x.
Talib was sentenced to imprisonment of sixteen (16) years and a fine of PhP 300,000.
Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against Musa
The provision Musa was charged of violating provides the following penalty:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
Musa was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 400,000.
Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against Ara
The crime of illegal sale of shabu is penalized by Sec. 5, Art. 11 of RA 9165:
SEC. 5. $ale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The same section contains the following provision:
f the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in
every case.
Since the sale of shabu was within five (5) to six (6) meters from St. Peter's College, the maximum penalty of death should be imposed
on Ara. Pursuant to RA 9346 or "An Act Prohibiting the mposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," however, only life imprisonment
and a fine shall be meted on him.
Ara was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 10,000,000. He, however, is no longer eligible for parole.
What distinguishes this case from others is that one of the accused-appellants was a police officer himself who should have known
better than to break the law he was duty-bound to enforce. What is more, he is charged with the crime of selling illegal drugs, an
offense so horrendous for destroying the lives of its victims and their families that the penalty of death used to be imposed on its
perpetrators. No one could have been more deserving of such a punishment than someone who should be enforcing the law but caught
pushing drugs instead. As it was, the death penalty was indeed originally imposed on SPO3 Ara, who had been in the service for more
than 30 years.1avvphi1
The ill effects of the use of illegal drugs are too repulsive and shocking to enumerate. Thus, once the charges of sale and possession of
said drugs are established in cases such as this, any errors or technicalities raised by the suspects should not be allowed to invalidate
the actions of those involved in curtailing their illegal activities. The punishments given to drug pushers should serve as deterrent for
others not to commit the same offense. No price seems high enough for drug dealers to pay; it is just unfortunate that the penalty of
death can no longer be imposed because it has been abolished.
As the penalties meted out to all three accused-appellants are within the range provided by RA 9165, we affirm the CA's sentence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00025B entitled People of the Philippines v. SPO3
Sangki Ara y Mirasol, Mike Talib y Mama, Jordan Musa y Bayan is AFFRMED with the modification that accused-appellant Sangki Ara
is not eligible for parole.
SO ORDERED.