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Securing and Holding Rural Territory:

Use of Pseudo Teams and Airmobile Very-Light Infantry Quick Reaction Forces in Rhodesia Counter-Insurgency Operations
by Timothy Bax and Steven Hatfill The aim of this paper is to outline the proven doctrine of concentrating a highly mobile, instantly deployable, powerful light strike force combining air and ground assets under a single command to kill or capture terrorists in COIN operations. Used with outstanding success during the most intense phase of the Rhodesian Bush War (1972-1980), this doctrine was referred to as Fire Force.

Background
An extensive study of previous counter-insurgency/anti-terrorist campaigns conducted by western armies in the past three decades clearly illustrates the limited success these forces have had in killing terrorists, neutralizing the insurgency, and winning the campaign using classical infantry techniques. In addition to the sociopolitical aspects of counter-insurgency warfare, there are 5 primary war-fighting ingredients to winning these conflicts: Killing and disrupting both new and well-established local terrorist groups. Capturing terrorists for local area intelligence and elucidating larger terrorist C3I networks. Interdicting terrorist resupply capability. Identifying terrorist safe training bases both internal and external to the host country and destroying them. Demonstrating government superiority over terrorist groups to help win the support of the local population. The conventional counter-insurgency tactics of foot patrols, ambushes, tracking, aerial reconnaissance and local interrogation/interdiction techniques have proven largely ineffective in locating and killing terrorists during past campaigns. With the exception of the successful use of tracker-combat teams during the early stages of the Rhodesian counter-insurgency campaign, these tactics have not been cost effective and the ratio of terrorists killed against those contacted has been unacceptably low. During counter-insurgency operations the enemy is fleet footed, elusive, and able to blend into the background population, especially in an environment where the local population may be co-opted or sympathetic to their cause. It is therefore vital that where terrorists are found and engaged, a maximum kill ratio be achieved. Anything under a 70% kill rate is unacceptable. In the nine years that the British SAS were involved fighting insurgents during the Malayan campaign, they accounted for only 108 enemy dead out of an estimated 800 contacted during

2011, Small Wars Foundation

August 12, 2011

some 280 recorded fire-fights. This constituted a kill rate of only 13%. By contrast, an airborne commando unit of the Rhodesian Light Infantry utilizing the newly developed Fire-Force tactics developed in 1974 killed 1,680 terrorists out of 2,218 contacted over a period of nine months for an astonishing kill rate of 84%. Previous to the utilization of the Fire-Force tactic, contact with the terrorists was fleeting, with an average kill rate of only 18.5%. The Fire-Force doctrine and Pseudo Team concepts described in this paper were used by the Rhodesian Army during its successful counter-insurgency campaign from April 1974 to April 1980. During that period, Fire-Force units achieved an overall kill ratio of 80% per engagement, and it was not unusual for a Fire-Force to be engaged in a number of separate combat deployments during the course of a single day. In this paper, the terms terrorist, insurgent, guerrilla and enemy are used. These terms are loosely applied and are interchangeable. They refer to the same thing..irregular forces whose aim is the violent overthrow of a legitimately elected government by means of terror, intimidation and armed conflict.

The Fire-Force Concept

Fire-Force refers to the vertical envelopment of an enemy position by small contingents of airmobile assault troops and paratroopers to rapidly encircle an identified terrorist group. The terrorists are thereby forced into a decisive confrontation with the security forces which are deployed in sweep and stop-groups to effectively block all conceivable enemy escape routes. The Fire-Force concept utilizes five primary principles of war: Concentration of available forces. Firepower Mobility Speedy utilization of airborne reserves. Effective command and control combining air and ground forces under a unified airborne command. This includes continuous real-time input from the ground operating sticks directly to supporting aircraft and the airborne commander via lightweight ground VHF radios.

Fire- Force Composition

The Fire-Force comprises the following: A company (or commando) strength body of light infantry soldiers. 3 to 4 troop carrying light helicopters, each armed with twin .30 caliber machine guns and each capable of carrying and deploying four light infantry soldiers. For the purpose of this paper, these airmobile troops are referred to as sticks and the helicopters are referred to as Gun-Cars (G-Cars). The 4-man sticks deployed by the G-Cars are considered to be very-light infantry, made up of a stick leader with day/night target marking devices and a lightweight VHF radio, two riflemen with light assault weapons and 4-6 magazines each, and one SAW gunner carrying 550 rounds. One of the riflemen is trained as a combat medic 2 smallwarsjournal.com

and carries a lightweight medic pack. These soldiers carry water and rations for only 24 hours, and are capable of moving as fast as the enemy over rough or mountainous terrain. One helicopter capable of firing heavy caliber (minimum 20 mm high explosive) rounds at a high rate of fire. This helicopter is referred to as the Kill Car (K-Car). A light fixed-wing ground attack aircraft referred to as a Fire-Bird and is typified by an armed Cessna Skymaster (O-2) with full target marking and FAC capability. In ideal circumstances, a Fire-Force should contain or have access to a readied medium-sized fixed-wing transport plane capable of carrying and air-dropping a minimum of 5 sticks containing 4-5 paratroopers each. In addition, this plane is also capable of air-dropping reserves of ammunition and aviation fuel to allow for a protracted engagement with the enemy. This plane is referred to as a Para-Dak and is typified by a DC-3 equivalent aircraft.

Fire- Force Objectives

A deployed Fire-Force has two principle objectives: To contain and eliminate terrorists by forcing them to retain weapons and fight, thus denying them opportunity to hide weapons, assume civilian disguise, and escape. To deny terrorists the protective advantages of cover by thick walls, rock formations, river banks and multiple points of dispersion. This is done via ground encirclement by aggressive troops and steep-angled, heavy caliber fire from the air. There are two secondary objectives: 1. To actively display to local tribal clans the strength of Government forces and thereby counter claims to the contrary initiated by insurgents. 2. To deter tribesmen from opting voluntarily to join the ranks of terrorists through visible successes and dead terrorist bodies.

Fire- Force Location

Because of its fixed-wing air component, the Fire-Force should ideally be located at a rough airfield situated as close as possible to the area in which reconnaissance teams have been deployed. The suitability of a particular airfield will be determined by the type of fixed-wing aircraft used for ground attack and parachute drops. However, because of the greater speed of fixed- wing over rotary aircraft, the fixed-wing assets can be based on stand-by at an airfield away from the main helicopter assets. Ideally, an additional army unit should be attached so that the Fire-Force is not burdened with its own protection duties. Fire-Force air assets should never be positioned further away than thirty minutes flying time from the furthest ground reconnaissance team.

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Figure 1: Forward Fire Force Base situated on a narrow dirt road on the margin of a frozen area where Rhodesian Army pseudo guerilla teams have been inserted for reconnaissance and covert area observation.

Detailed Tasks
The detailed tasks of each individual component of Fire-Force can now be explained. Reconnaisance Teams. In any counter-insurgency war it is more difficult to find the terrorists than to kill them. Finding the terrorists requires exceptionally well trained, small group Special Forces teams operating under the most arduous and painstaking conditions for long periods of time. Operating in groups of one, two (optimal), three or four men (maximum), these reconnaissance specialists must excel in bush-craft, anti-tracking, camouflage and concealment. Theirs is a patient game of cat and mouse. Each team must have an excellent knowledge of local customs (and language, if possible) of the area in which they are deployed. Often the teams may not actually be able to see the insurgents but will know of their close proximity by observing local patterns such as crap paths and the feeding and cooking patterns of the indigenous population. It is not necessary to have terrorists visual before calling in a Fire-Force.

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Figure 2: 4-man covert hilltop observation point surveying an area of the Chesa Tribal Trust Land, Rhodesia, after a covert 10-kilometer walk-in.

If a reconnaissance team is reasonably certain of guerilla presence, the Fire-Force should be deployed so that troops can search the area and flush-out any terrorists who may be hiding or taking cover. The use of specialist pseudo gangs, or terrorist counter-gangs (own forces dressed and armed to look like terrorists) has proven extremely effective in being able to locate genuine terrorist groups. (The use of these counter-gangs is explained later). Once the recon team has located the terrorists, all available information regarding their numbers, dress, and weapons are to be relayed to the Fire-Force. In addition, the following information must be conveyed: Topography and ground description including salient features to be used as reference points, likely DZs for helicopters and paratroopers and likely terrorist escape routes. The location of any civilian population in the area. Method the team will use in marking a target. Fire-Force Commander. The company commander of the troops being utilized for Fire-Force duties will be the Fire-Force Commander (FFC). He commands the operation seated next to the K-Car pilot. In the event that the K-Car is required to leave the area to re-fuel, the FFC will temporarily re-position Himself in a G-Car until the K-Car returns. The Fire Force Commander represents one of the most difficult Command and Control positions in any theatre of war as he is responsible for continually assessing a constantly changing 3-dimensional picture of the battlefield, coordinate ground stop-groups, troop sweeps through the AO, various air support efforts, the location of dispersed and running enemy forces, and force casualties, all at the same time. The FFC is responsible for the tactical deployment of all components of the Fire-Force, including the deployment and re-deployment of stop-groups, paratroopers, and aircraft. In addition, he is responsible for issuing deployment and preliminary orders to stick commanders and pilots. Further orders may be issued in-flight as may become necessary. The K-Car pilot will usually be the senior helicopter pilot and is responsible for the safety, refueling, and functionality of the helicopter component. However, the FFC remains 5 smallwarsjournal.com

ultimately responsible for their tactical deployment and achieving an acceptable kill rate. The FFC will only be able to formulate a detailed plan of attack and issue final orders once he has arrived at the target. These orders will include the deployment of preliminary ground stopgroups and whether paratroopers will be utilized as assault troops or held in reserve. After troop drop-off, the FFC continually monitors and reviews the position of the troops on the ground in accordance with the developing battle picture. It is his responsibility to keep the ground sticks informed of each others positions and to order the re-positioning of ground stop-groups using the maneuverability of the orbiting G-Cars to outflank the terrorists and press home the momentum of the attack. In conjunction with the K-Car commander, the FFC will assess the need for additional drums of aviation fuel drops for helicopters, alleviating their having to leave the area for long periods to refuel at base. In the event of a breakout of terrorists from within the cordon of stop-groups, the FFC will issue orders for immediate follow-up and, if necessary, order additional tracker-combat teams flown in. Following the end of the contact the FFC will issue instructions for the uplift of casualties, prisoners, fuel drums, and equipment including parachute recovery. Fire-Bird. A vital component of Fire-Force is the deployment of an armed fixed-wing light aircraft to initiate the attack with maximum fire-power and be available to engage any strongholds that may develop during the attack.

Figure 3: Fire Bird Armed Rhodesian Air Force O-2 Skymaster used for the initial overfly and target marking of the guerilla positions observed by the deployed covert reconnaissance teams.

On approach the aircraft is used to disguise the noise of the helicopters by flying ahead of them and at a higher altitude. In areas where there is a lot of daily fixed-wing activity, terrorists seldom know when to run and when to ignore their presence. It is important that the Fire-Bird aircraft approach the target from overhead of the reconnaissance teams position, so that the pilot observes the terrain from the ground team leaders perspective. In this way the pilot can more accurately be talked on to the target and can be in a better position to judge when to instruct the reconnaissance team to mark the target. After completing its initial strike with smoke rockets or napalm, the Fire-Bird awaits instructions from the Reconnaissance Team as to whether his strike was on target. If not, the pilot must make a necessary adjustment and a further strike initiated. The Fire-Bird remains in an orbit over the target, flying at an altitude of 1,500 feet to act as an observation platform and FAC, and await further orders to attack with guns or wing hard-point munitions. In the event that the pilot sees targets of opportunity and can maintain air separation

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from the other air assets, he can engage these targets without waiting for instructions from the FFC. The K-Car. The purpose of the K-Car (Command-Car) is to provide a platform from which the Fire-Force Commander can control the battle as well as to provide a mobile gunplatform to engage the terrorists with high angle, high caliber, rapid-fire explosive head ammunition. Experience has shown that anything less than 20mm rounds has a propensity to be deflected by foliage, trees, walls, or dykes or miss the target completely. To mitigate the tendency of 20mm shells to embed in sandy or soft soil, the gunner will intentionally try to hit rock outcroppings next to the fleeing terrorists, to detonate the rounds above the ground. Typically, the K-Car accounts for most terrorist kills in a Fire-Force engagement. The KCar pilot is normally the senior pilot of the helicopter component of Fire-Force.

Figure 4: Rhodesian Air Force Allouhette-3 Helicopter armed with a 20mm Hispano Suza cannon firing high explosive shells.

During the initial approach to target, the K-Car leads the helicopter formation by flying Nap of the Earth to minimize the noise of the helicopters approach. The arrival of the K-Car over the target area should coincide with the Fire-Bird completing its preliminary attack. It is imperative that the K-Car gunner identify and engage the terrorists as quickly as possible. Every minute wasted in finding the terrorists allows them to flee a distance of 500 yards. This will mean that the orbit of the searching aircraft has to be widened accordingly. The K-Car makes an initial gun run on the target and then climbs to an altitude of 800 feet to commence an orbit of the target area while continuing to lay down direct and suppressive 20mm fire. The late climb of the K-Car from its low approach prevents terrorists from bomb-shelling (radial escape at high running speed) prior to the arrival of Fire-Force. The continuous orbit of the K-Car over the target area enables it to give covering fire for assault troops sweeping the terrorist position and gives the FFC a continuous birds-eye view of the terrain and the unfolding battle. The G-Car. The primary function of the G-Car (General Use-Car) is to conduct a vertical envelopment of the terrorists position and block their routes of escape by deploying their 4-man ground stop-groups. The three G-Cars approach the target immediately behind the K-Car. As the K-Car climbs to 800 feet over the target, the G-Cars commence a low altitude wide orbit of the target area at an altitude of 500 feet while engaging the enemy with their twin .30 caliber Browning machine guns. Their presence keeps the terrorists under cover and 7 smallwarsjournal.com

prevents them from fleeing. Once the Fire-Force Commander has made his appreciation and plan and has transmitted his final orders to stick commanders and pilots, the G-Cars drop their 4man sticks in their designated locations followed by a series of dummy drops to deceive and confuse the terrorists. The G-Cars continue to orbit the target area ready to re-deploy troops on instructions from the FFC or to provide close air support with their on-board armament. The flexibility of the helicopters in being able to uplift and re-deploy sticks of troops to counter and outflank terrorist movements and maintain the momentum of the attack is critical to the success of Fire- Force. The Stop-Group Sticks. The function of the stop-groups is to prevent terrorists from escaping the target area, thus containing them within the orbit pattern of the overhead aircraft. As previously described, these troops are extremely light and mobile, carry a minimum of equipment, and are aggressive in closing with the enemy. In the event that the Fire-Force Commander decides to keep his paratroopers airborne as a tactical reserve, one of these stopgroups will be ordered to act as an assault group to clear the primary terrorist position. In the event that some terrorists are able to flee the area, the stop-groups must have the capability to immediately adjust their role into that of a tracker-combat/hunter-killer team moving fast to close with the fleeing insurgents and kill them. It is accepted that some of the stop-group sticks will be commanded by noncommissioned officers; sometimes by very junior non-commissioned officers. Therefore, their training must be of sufficient caliber to enable them to act independently, calling in air support, and to continually relay clear, concise situation reports to the FFC. In the event that the FFC is focused on other critical engagement matters, the young stick commander must possess sufficient initiative to act independently and decisively without jeopardizing the FFCs overall battle plan.

Figure 5: Rhodesian Air Force Allouette-3 deploying Army Stop Groups around a located terrorist guerilla position.

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The Para-Dak. The function of the Para-Dak is to convey and deploy reserves of troops and equipment to the target area. It is the last fixed-wing aircraft that arrives over the target. The Para-Dak will normally contain 2030 fully equipped paratroopers to be used either as assault troops to clear the primary enemy position, or as a tactical reserve of additional stopgroups in the event that the area of operations widens. The aircraft orbits on station at 1,000 feet close to the contact area to avoid altitude confliction with the other aircraft. Paratroopers are dropped between 350 and 500 feet to minimize their exposure to fire and to prevent excessive drift. The aircraft also carries air-droppable reserve ammunition and drums of aviation fuel for the helicopters in the event of a prolonged fire-fight.

Outline of a Fire-Force Attack

A Fire-Force attack involves first locating the insurgents by the use of small teams of Special Operations Reconnaissance Specialists. Once the insurgents have been located, their position together with other relevant detail is transmitted by radio to the Fire-Force Commander waiting on the ground at the nearby Fire-Force Base. On the ground the FFC issues quick, preliminary orders to stick commanders and pilots and orders final instructions on specialist weapons, maps and equipment to be carried. The FFC then positions himself in the K-Car while the sticks of troops emplane into the G-Cars and paratroopers emplane into the Para-Dak. Once all troops and pilots have emplaned, the FireForce becomes airborne for the target area. The fixed-wing aircraft will normally depart last because of its superior airspeed and the fact that the flight times are calculated so that all aircraft arrive at the target area at roughly the same time. The elapse time between the initial report of a terrorist sighting and the Fire-Force becoming airborne should be no longer than twenty minutes. The FFC should not delay his deployment because of insufficient detail from the Reconnaissance Team, but should endeavor to obtain further information in-flight to the target. From the time the Fire-Force is airborne, it is vital for stick commanders and pilots to monitor the common radio network for adjustments made by the FFC to his battle plan from the late information he receives from the on-site ground Reconnaissance Team. Of vital importance to the success of the mission is the timing of air assets over the target. The sequence of events once the Fire-Force approaches target is as follows: Fire-Force approaches the target area overhead from behind the ground Recon Team, so that the FFC, pilots, and stick commanders are able to view the target from the same perspective as the Recon Team leader. Five minutes from target, the position and altitude of air assets in-flight are as follows: Fire-Bird in the lead at +- 2,000 ft. The function of the Fire-Bird on approach to the target is to mask the noise of the helicopters. K-Car is positioned one-minute behind Fire-Bird at tree-top level for noise and visual suppression. G-Cars are positioned 10-seconds astern of the K-Car in an inverted V formation at the same altitude. Para-Dak is 3-minutes behind the G-Cars at an altitude of 1,000 feet.

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Thirty seconds from target the ground Reconnaissance Team will identify the insurgent position by direct radio talk-on of target or by marking it with smoke or tracer. The target is immediately engaged by Fire-Bird using a choice of guns, rockets, smoke, or napalm on its first overfly of the target. The ground Reconnaissance Team confirms the target marking and marks its own position to the Fire-Bird and arriving K-Car with signal mirror and day-glow panels. As Fire-Bird commences its air-strike, the K-Car climbs to an altitude of 800 ft, orbits the target area and begins to engage with 20mm cannon fire. The Fire-Force Commander makes a quick battle appreciation and issues last minute changes to his battle plan.

The G-Cars arrive and climb to between 300 and 500 feet and start a wide orbit of the target area. G-Cars engage any opportunity targets with their side-mounted machine guns.

G-Cars engage G-Cars land and de-plane their sticks as stop-groups or sweep groups on the orders issued from the FFC to block likely terrorist escape routes. Once the sticks have de-planed, the G-Cars commence a series of dummy drops in other locations to deceive and confuse the 10 smallwarsjournal.com

terrorists. G-Cars to continue orbiting target area to keep the terrorists lying low and to enable them to be quickly utilized to re-position the stop-groups, if and when necessary, upon orders from the Fire-Force commander.

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G-Cars Encircle the Target and Deploy Their Ground Stop Groups

Provides cl support with

G-Car-3

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After vertical envelopment is achieved, the FFC makes a final decision/battle plan on how to launch his ground assault. This plan is transmitted to the Para-Dak pilot and paratroop stick commanders. Orders include the location of drop-zones (DZ), altitude and direction of the Para-drop. G-Car-3 deploys its stop-group, then moves and lands to decrease engine RPM and conserve fuel. This G-Car is used by the orbiting FFC to up-lift and reposition select stopgroups in front of any fleeing enemy, or to handle a TACEVAC call for a wounded soldier. If ordered, the Para-Dak will deploy its paratroopers at an altitude of between 350 to 400 feet AGL. In the event of a suitable DZ not being available in close proximity to target, G-Cars will uplift paratroopers from the DZ and deploy them closer to target. Paratroopers land, deploy into assault formation and immediately form stop-groups or perform line-sweeps. K-Car will engage targets ahead of paratroopers advance. Fire-Bird continues to orbit target area at 1,500 feet and slightly away from the AO to be available to launch further air strikes at the FFCs discretion, and to act as an additional observation platform.

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Ground sweeps are conducted through the contact area. In the event of any terrorists having escaped, their line-of-flight is established, tracks are located and one of the stop-groups is ordered to commence an immediate follow-up as a tracker/combat team. This follow-up will continue until contact is made with the fleeing terrorists. If a likely destination or discernable line-of-flight of the fleeing terrorists can be determined, the G-Cars can uplift select stop-groups and leapfrog them ahead to form hasty ambush positions on the terrorists projected line of travel. FFC assesses whether there is a need for the Para-Dak to drop drums of aviation fuel to refuel the helicopters. Decision is made in conjunction with the pilot of K-Car, and once the target area is cleared the G-Cars are deployed to uplift the dead and wounded terrorists and return them to the Fire-Force Base for collection by Special Branch Intelligence. Troops, parachutes and equipment are cleared from the contact area by helicopter and Fire- Force is re-deployed back to base to re-equip and prepare for further deployment. Reequipping of troops (including paratroopers), re-arming and refueling of aircraft should only take a maximum of thirty minutes from their arrival time back at base. The numbers of terrorists engaged during each Fire-Force operation in Rhodesia, averaged between six and twenty. However, it was not uncommon for larger groups of one hundred to two hundred well- armed terrorists to be encountered. Owing to the training of the troops, the use of fire-power from the air assets, and the flexibility afforded by helicopters in quickly re-deploying and re-positioning troops, no Fire-Force was ever defeated in the field or forced to withdraw.

Modernizing the Rhodesian Fire-Force Doctrine

The concept of multiple small, highly trained ground reconnaissance teams operating on high ground and supported by a series of small self-contained Fire-Force assets, set up in a remote area with unprepared HLZs, is a concept that may prove effective in denying territory to insurgent guerilla groups within Afghanistan. A relative small number of US troops and air assets could be used with high cost effectiveness, to continuously provide surveillance and dominate large areas of terrain. While the terrorists are normally difficult to find, their supporting population is both fixed and easily identifiable as people are tied to their homes, businesses, farms and relatives. This suggests a population-centric approach for Fire-Force operations by protecting the population and severing its connectivity with the insurgent movement. After regular military forces drive the insurgents out of a geographical area, small numbers of local security forces are inserted into villages with economic and political development efforts and National Government reforms are initiated to undermine the insurgents mass base. The villages remain protected by the continuous over-watch by small numbers of covert reconnaissance teams linked to an area Fire-Force. Engagements with enemy forces (when they occur), are done in full view of the rural population which acts to demonstrate the governments military superiority over the insurgents. A modern Fire-Force operation should maintain the original premise of using small, relatively inexpensive helicopters in the role of G-Cars. An ideal candidate to replace the Alouette III helicopter used in Rhodesia would be the Hughes 500 airframe with an armament 14 smallwarsjournal.com

consisting of a 7.62 mini-gun with the possibility of side-mounted rocket pods if density-altitude conditions were favorable. The firepower of the 4-man stop-groups deployed by these upgraded G-Cars could be increased by the soldiers carrying assault rifle-mounted grenade launchers and using 2 SAW gunners instead of one.

The UH-60 airframe would be an ideal replacement for the Rhodesian Alouette III helicopter modified with the addition of a 20mm Cannon ( K-Car). A variety of weapons packages are available for the Blackhawk including a 30mm Chain Gun, 7.62 Mini-gun and 3.5 rocket pods, any of which would add devastating firepower to a modern Fire-Force operation. The role of the Fire-Bird could be upgraded by using a turboprop aircraft such as the OV10 or equivalent, or simply upgrading the armament of an O-2 FAC aircraft. As the main role of the Fire-Bird is for initial target marking and observation, it is conceivable that this role might even be performed by a Predator RPV with Hellfire missiles. The availability and deployment of reserve paratroop forces can be accomplished with a number of aerial platforms, although the closest modern equivalent to the Rhodesian DC-3 Dakota airframe is probably the Caribou. Again, because of the higher speed of a fixed-wing aircraft, the paratroop platform can even be located some distance away from the more forward and remote helicopter section of the Fire-Force. It must be remembered that the primary role of the Fire-Force is to fix the enemy in one position before he can escape, and force him to fight then and there. Small numbers of ground troops with an endogenous and integrated helicopter close-air support can easily accomplish this task. Once the enemy has been fixed and is on the defensive, even large numbers of enemy forces can be destroyed with the proper application of troop reserves and airpower. The use of a modern upgraded Fire-Force would provide a number of important capabilities: Attack of targets/insurgents that are located by the hidden, covert reconnaissance teams. Supporting compromised reconnaissance teams involved in a fire-fight. Immediate availability of a deadly airborne quick reaction force for isolated units involved in contact with insurgent forces. Rapid mobility of a self-contained quick reaction force while avoiding IEDs and mines. 15 smallwarsjournal.com

 Limiting the enemy warning capability by the Fire-Force moving rapidly through sparsely populated areas. Supporting isolated units involved in ambushes. Attacking insurgent forces reported by tribesmen. Neutralizing the enemy being able to take cover behind walls, irrigation canals, high ground, and rock screens. Blocking the enemy from escaping to attack another day. Probability of capturing wounded terrorists for local intelligence is increased. Equipping troops and pilots with night vision equipment would enable deployment at night, with night leap froggingof stop-groups ahead of terrorists attempting to make a night escape. Cross-border Interdiction by Fire-Force callout from covert reconnaissance teams or Hot Pursuit cross-border operations during Fire-Force follow-ups. There will always be the possibility of trying to replace the paratroopers in a Fire-Force element by transporting reserve troops in large troop-carrying helicopters. However, using the larger helicopters in inventory acts to decrease the cost effectiveness of the Fire-Force operation, and increases the maintenance, support requirements and personnel at the far forward Fire-Force Base. In addition, the larger helicopters are not as robust as fixed-wing aircraft and they present a large slow moving target to the enemy with a greater risk for mass casualties if the helicopter is brought down by enemy fire; not withstanding the cost of these more expensive helicopter airframes. In addition, the shock effect of using paratroopers and their ability to deploy quickly into almost any terrain cannot be overlooked. The use of paratroopers also lessens the likelihood of insurgents ambushing likely landing zones.

The Pseudo-Gang Concept for Improved Fire-Force Operations

Containment of an insurgency is made difficult by the terrorists ability to blend in with the local population. In an effort to disrupt the terrorists life-line with the rural population, Colonial British Forces developed the doctrine of gang-counter gang. This pseudo-gang concept was originally tested in Malaysia (1948-1958) and in Kenya (1952-1960), and finally developed by the Rhodesian Security Forces into an operational doctrine that when combined with Fire-Force operations, accounted for the majority of all terrorist kills within the countrys borders. Gang-counter gang operations are conducted by creating mixed race pseudo-gangs using special operations personnel, friendly indigenous fighters, and captured and turned enemy insurgents. The indigenous element of the pseudo-gang acts as the front, while Special Forces operators are disguised as indigenous gang members. Pseudo-operations are most suited for rural areas where the terrorists require the indigenous villages for support. The primary goal of the pseudo-gang is to gain intelligence about actual terrorist groups in a given area and their local support network. The pseudo-gangs dress in terrorist clothing, carry terrorist weapons, and clone the terrorist and his tactics. Pseudo-gangs insert into an area and enter the villages and hamlets posing as actual insurgents, in an attempt to identify the local contact man for the terrorists in the region.

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They then try to set up a meeting with the real terrorist groups operating in the area. The doctrine is one based on deception, and once a particular area is selected for pseudo-operations, the area is frozen and no other military forces are allowed into the area until the pseudo-gangs are extracted. This avoids potential Blue on Blue contacts between the pseudo-gangs and the Security Forces.

HQ-OP System
During the Rhodesian War it was soon discovered that it was impossible for Special Operations personnel to pass close scrutiny as an indigenous tribesman. Therefore, the doctrine was changed so that after the pseudo-gang enters a frozen area, the Spec Ops members split off from the group and set up a covert Observation Position (OP) overlooking the village or area in question. There, they act as a hidden HQ element for the indigenous patrolling pseudo-gang members.

The combined Headquarter-Observation Point and Pseudo-Gang Team can conduct area combat patrols, perform covert reconnaissance activity, undertake information gathering in the villages, identify and make contact with terrorist sympathizers and informants, and set up potential future meetings with actual terrorist groups in the area.

Combined Pseudo-Gang/ Fire- Force Operations

For continued operations in an area, it is essential that the pseudo-gang maintain their cover in the villages as a real terrorist group. Therefore, the primary method for enemy kills and captures is via a Fire-Force callout by the HQ-OP element operating from their covert OP site. Once the pseudo-team is accepted as legitimate terrorists by a village, the pseudo-team will attempt to arrange a meeting with the real terrorists. The date and time for this meeting is communicated to the HQ-OP element which in turn radios the Fire-Force Base to be placed on standby. The indigenous members of the pseudo-group clandestinely rejoin the HQ-OP element and when the actual terrorists arrive for the meeting the Fire- Force is called in to attack. Pseudo-gang doctrine cannot be successful without exceptional and continuing intelligence support, and pseudo-gang operators must have a clear understanding of:

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Normal village life and customs. Village social structure. Village Headman etiquette. Area religious beliefs. Composition of local terrorist units. Terrorist indoctrination and beliefs. Terrorist subversion methods and tactics. Superstitions Passwords and recognition signs between actual terrorist groups.

This requires a continuous intelligence support that is derived from enemy captures. The pseudo-teams must be supported by dedicated military or civilian intelligence teams that will help them to constantly update the situation in their area. In addition to intelligence support, all pseudo-operators must demonstrate exceptional small unit patrolling techniques and clandestine OP field craft together with the ability to work with indigenous team members, and a willingness to work with captured terrorists. Pseudogangs must develop an ability to operate for extended periods of time in the field by living off the villages in the same fashion as real terrorist groups. All members of the HQ-OP element must be able to coordinate a Fire-Force operation and have a comprehensive knowledge of all US and NATO aircraft weapon capabilities, demonstrate some regional linguistic skills, and have expertise with radio communications and all terrorist weapons. By the end of the Rhodesian War in 1980, a retrospective analysis demonstrated that the pseudo-gang doctrine combined with Fire-Force operations, had accounted for roughly 78% of all terrorist kills within the countrys borders. During the later years of the Rhodesian conflict, larger-scale Jumbo Fire-Force operations were combined with bomber and jet air support that resulted in devastating enemy loses numbering in the hundreds to several thousands during a series of cross-border attacks on terrorist training camps in several neighboring countries.

Summary
Battlefield doctrine must constantly be modified to match the changing tactics of the enemy. The successful lessons, tactics and procedures of past conflicts must continue to be studied and merged where applicable, with the present. It becomes all too easy to lose the decisiveness of battle when soldiers are inundated with technology and expected to be discriminatory, yet effective. The proven doctrine of Fire-Force operations is decisive. Its success and effectiveness lies with the fact that the insurgents are denied their primary tactic of being able to flee when confronted by security forces on ground and in circumstances other than their own choosing. Unable to escape, they are forced into a confrontation with security forces that are light, highly mobile and supported by overwhelming fire-power. One of the most difficult aspects of Counter-Insurgency warfare is locating the enemy. In over 65% of engagements between security forces and insurgents, contact has been initiated by the insurgents by way of ambushes. Thus they are able to engage the security forces on ground and in circumstances of their own choosing - often with deadly results. Such engagements lead to 18 smallwarsjournal.com

extremely low ratios of insurgents killed over those contacted. History has shown theses to be as low as between 0% to 12%. This is simply unacceptable and merely leads to the vast majority of the enemy being able to flee, re-group and lay further ambushes, IEDs, land mines and kill more soldiers. The Fire Force doctrine results in terrorists being located in far greater numbers, enables them to be engaged more readily by overwhelming ground and air assets, and results in hitherto unheard of ratios of terrorists killed over those contacted. History has shown that kill rates of in excess of 90% are not uncommon. If the US Military is to become serious about winning the war on terror, it must abandon the shackles of past conventional tactics and become more adaptable at finding, engaging and killing an enemy that is ruthless, cunning, and fleet-footed. It takes a thief to catch a thief, a hyena to catch a hyena. Only by divesting itself of the limited or unsuccessful doctrines and tactics of the past, can the U.S. military begin to train soldiers to outwit the terrorists at their own game. To do that it is essential to learn to think, smell, and taste like the terrorists, watching them in the shadows and waiting, and when found, smashing them with overwhelming force in full view of the surrounding villages. Timothy Bax, is a decorated former officer in the Rhodesian Light Infantry, and was second-incommand of the Selous Scouts Reconnaissance Troop, Rhodesian Army. He was wounded in action on four occasions. Steven Hatfill is a former member of the Selous Scouts / Special Branch.

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