Wallen Cases

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v.
Wallen : index
Supreme Law Library : Court Cases
U.S.A. v. Wallen
[Note: Small numbers indicate number of bytes in ASCII portion of files (sans HTML)]
Table of Contents
1. 13592 AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT DOCUMENTING CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ARREST
2. 11892 MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
3. 3686 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST FOR CREDENTIALS OF JOELYN D. MARLOWE
4. 3737 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST FOR VARIOUS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS
5. 3356 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST FOR VARIOUS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS
6. 3275 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST FOR CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF USDC
7. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST FOR STANDING OF USA TO SUE AS

3603
PLAINTIFFS
8. 2311 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT APPEAL
9. 2318 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT APPEAL
10. 4388 NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE
11. 8644 NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE
12. NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR THE RIGHT TO ENJOY THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OF
5356
CHOICE
13. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO

61490
JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
14. MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH GRAND JURY
16431
SELECTION POLICY AND CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
15. VERIFIED STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY

105465
AND ITS FEDERAL STATUTE
16. 9487 NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE
17. 5081 FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PROOF OF POWER, STANDING, AND JURISDICTION
18. MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF

120533
COURT
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/ (1 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:12:54 PM]

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : index
19. 11911 CLOSING STATEMENT TO THE JURY
20. 3144 NOTICE OF APPEAL
21. 4379 REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS FROM ALL QUALIFIED ARTICLE III FEDERAL JUDGES
22. 39707 NOTICE AND DEMAND TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
23. 8736 AFFIDAVIT OF NON-WAIVER OF EXTRADITION
24. 9343 NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
25. 9228 NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
26. NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGE OF THE COURT OF
13668
INTERNATIONAL TRADE TO PRESIDE OVER THE DCUS
27. 4246 NOTICE OF FORMAL OBJECTION TO TRANSCRIPT FEE IMPOSED
28. NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AGAINST WILLIAM D.

5220
BROWNING
29. 28594 COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
Return to Table of Contents for
Supreme Law Library: Court Cases
[Home] [Write Us] [Library] [School] [Forum] [Subscribe] [Donate]
Common Law Copyright

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 A.D.:
Supreme Law Firm
email: supremelawfirm@yahoo.com
Last Update: August 5, 2002 A.D.
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/ (2 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:12:54 PM]

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : affidav
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris

c/o General Delivery
Arivaca [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona
Under Protest, Necessity, and

by Special Visitation Only
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Case No. 95-484-WDB

)
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
)
v. ) DOCUMENTING CIRCUMSTANCES
)
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) SURROUNDING ARREST:
)
Defendant. ) 28 U.S.C. 1746(1)
________________________________)
COMES NOW Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris, Citizen of Arizona
state and Defendant in the above entitled matter (hereinafter
"Defendant"), being duly sworn upon oath, to depose and to affirm
as follows:
1. My entire 20-acre property is fenced and secured with
two gates; "No Trespassing" signs (3 on front gates alone) are
posted all around my property; these can be clearly seen from
any angle or position upon approaching my property (see attached
pictures, incorporated herein as EXHIBIT "A").
2. On or about September 29, 1995, at approximately 8:30
a.m. in the morning, I was in bed in my house at the end of
Wedgeford Road in the town of Arivaca, Arizona state. At that
time, my front gate was closed and bolted shut.
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/affidav.htm (1 of 9) [4/8/2007 2:13:02 PM]

Affidavit of Defendant Documenting Arrest Circumstances:

Page 1 of 8
3. I was startled awake to hear people shouting, "Hello!
Hello! Is there anybody home?" These same people were banging
their hands on the side of my house while they were shouting.
4. I opened the window to my bedroom and asked them,
"Who's there?" They responded by saying, "We need to talk to you
for a minute." They then instructed me to come out of the house
by saying, "Come out here?"
5. At that point, I got out of bed, put on my bathrobe and
went out the front door to the screened porch, to see what they
wanted. I could see that there were three (3) armed men in plain
clothes with heavy builds. The guns were strapped onto their
waists, and I could see their clearly exposed handles.
6. They flashed what appeared to be badges and introduced
themselves as agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") by saying, "My name is Dave Lowe. I'm with the DEA." He
then introduced me to Alan and Terry. They told me that someone
had called them to tell them that I had marijuana growing on my
property.
7. I then asked them, "Do you have a warrant?"
8. Dave Lowe then said, "You can either tell us about it,
or we can wait for a warrant." Then Terry Evans added, "We will
stand here, and you will stand there until it [the warrant]
comes, along with a swarm of people and we will tear this place
apart." I paused for a long time before saying anything,
contemplating my situation. I was very frightened by the
presence of these unexpected, armed visitors. I could feel my
heart beating in my throat.

9. They violated my home and my Person without a warrant,
in spite of my "No Trespass" signs.

Page 2 of 8
10. Dave Lowe then said, "If you will cooperate and show us
where it is, everything will be OK."
11. I asked them, "Are you going to arrest me?" Dave Lowe
answered, "If it's just a few plants, we'll just take 'em and go.
We probably won't even have to arrest you." I said, "I need to
get some clothes on." I was naked under my bath robe, and
without shoes or socks, at that moment. I was intimidated,
filled with fear, both because of strange men with guns, as well
as federal agents, if they were, in fact, federal agents.
12. I asked them if they could wait outside and they said,
"Why don't you just show us?" They seemed insistent about my
coming outside immediately, at that second, without any delay.
It seemed like they wanted to come into the house. They also
asked to come inside to wait. I told then, "It will just take me
a second to get dressed."
13. Then they asked me, several times, if I had any guns on
the premises. I responded by saying, "No, I don't allow guns on
my property." At that moment, my back was turned towards them,
so I could not see what their response was. But they were still
wearing their guns when I came back out of the house.
14. I went back into the house to get my shoes, where I put
on some shorts and a T-shirt, and I carried my shoes out onto the
porch, where I put them on. I felt very pressured by them to
hurry, otherwise I felt sure that they might invade my house
while I was dressing.


Page 3 of 8
15. We walked outside, where Officer Dave Lowe read me my
rights by saying, "You have the right to remain silent. Anything
you say or do can and will be held against you." He asked me if
I understood my rights. I said, "I thought you said you wouldn't
arrest me." He said, "You are not under arrest." I never told
him that I understood my rights. I was confused by this
statement, after he just finished reading me my rights. He then
asked me if there were any more plants on the property. He said,
"You'd better tell me now, because we are going to search the
property anyway, and it will be a lot easier for you if you just
tell me."
16. At this point, I felt the threat of jail hanging over
my head, and that there was nothing I could do to stop them from
searching.
17. Then my brother David walked up, and the agents started
to interrogate him, asking him who he was and what was he doing
there?
18. I assured the agents that he was not involved in any
way.
19. Terry and Alan stood there talking with David.
20. He then asked me if he could use my phone. I said,
"You can use my phone if I am allowed to make a cup of coffee."
21. While he was talking on the telephone, I stood nearby,
brewing a cup of coffee.
22. When he finished his telephone conversation, he
proceeded to search other parts of my house. After he finished
searching the rest of my house, he went back outside and joined

his companions. They were out there a long time, about two (2)
hours. During this period of time, I waited with my brother
David inside the screened porch.

Page 4 of 8
23. While we were waiting on the porch, two (2) Sheriff's
deputies arrived. They told us not to go anywhere; they would
not even let us go to the bathroom. When we did, they watched.
24. During this time, a helicopter arrived and landed on my
property. The pilot and Dave Lowe, the DEA agent, then entered
my porch. Together, we went into my house, into the dining room,
and they said, "We need to get this right."
25. Dave Lowe turned on his tape recorder and asked me
several questions. Then he showed me a form entitled "CONSENT TO
SEARCH" and handed it to me, saying, "This is just a formality,
since you told us everything anyway." The form said that I have
not been threatened nor forced in any way.
26. When I read that phrase, I said, "I certainly have been
threatened. You said that you were going to tear my house apart.
You stand there with guns. I am practically naked. I have been
threatened!" The helicopter pilot said, "That wasn't a threat;
it was a promise." I couldn't sign the paper and still respect
myself, so I initialed the CONSENT TO SEARCH form, out of fear
and intimidation, because I still didn't want to go to jail and
they acted as if they might still just go away if I signed it.
Throughout the entire day, I was lead to believe that, if I would
cooperate, then I wouldn't be arrested.
27. Then they told me that I was going to jail. By that
time, two (2) female DEA agents had arrived, and one watched me

while I took a shower and changed into other clothes. They then
put handcuffs on me and put me in the front seat of their van.

Page 5 of 8
28. During our trip to Tucson, I told them about my job in
Los Angeles, where I worked for a publisher of magazines about
parrots. One of the female agents mentioned that she owns a
parrot and we talked for quite some time about Amazon behavior I
told them that I had been in L.A. for about ten (10) years, and
that I had worked in publishing for most of that time. At no
time during this trip to Tucson did I ever admit, in any way, to
having violated any law.
29. First they took me to a jail on Valencia Avenue, where
they took my finger prints. Then they moved me to Wilmot prison,
where I was subjected to a strip search. Then they poked me with
a needle, and the man who poked me with a needle told me that it
was a Tuberculosis test. He did draw some of my blood with the
needle.
30. Approximately two and one-half (2.5) months after my
arrest, I came to discover a police report in which one of the
female agents stated that, . "En route to Tucson, WALLEN told
TF/A Wright that she made anywhere from 70 to 80 thousand dollars
a year in California selling marijuana. TF/A Wright asked WALLEN
how long she had been selling marijuana. WALLEN said 'ten
year.'"
31. This statement, as found in the Police Report dated 09-
29-95, is utterly false, because I never made any such statement,
either in the truck, while the agents were searching my property,
nor after I was taken from the truck to be finger-printed.

33. I was released from jail when my brother and father
posted a surety bond to guarantee my appearance in court.

Page 6 of 8
34. Therefore, I firmly believe, based on all of the above
statements of fact, that the DEA agents involved in my arrest are
guilty of trespass without a valid search or arrest warrant,
kidnapping, conspiracy to kidnap, assault for prodding and poking
my Person in unspeakable places, all of which violate the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution for the United States of
America, as lawfully amended.
Further Affiant Sayeth Naught.
I hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws
of the United States of America, without the "United States",
that the above statements of mine are true and correct, to the
best of my current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me
God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: ______________________
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Sheila Wallen

________________________________
Citizen of Arizona state
________________________________ Dated: ________________________
________________________________ (printed name)

First Witness to Signature
________________________________ Dated: ________________________
________________________________ (printed name)

Second Witness to Signature

Page 7 of 8
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18 years
of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and
that I personally served the following document(s):
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
DOCUMENTING CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING ARREST:
28 U.S.C. 1746(1)
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly
addressed to the following:
Office of the United States Attorney

110 South Church Avenue, Suite 8310
Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Solicitor General
Washington
Executed on: _____________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


Page 8 of 8
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : dismiss

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona


)
Plaintiff, ) MOTION TO DISMISS
) WITH PREJUDICE
v. ) FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
) OF COUNSEL
Sheila Terese, Wallen, )
)
Defendant. )
________________________________)
"Defendant"), to move this honorable Court to dismiss the instant
action with prejudice on grounds of ineffective assistance of
Counsel, i.e. the licensed bar member appointed by the Court to
represent the Defendant (hereinafter the "Bar Member").
Defendant hereby incorporates by reference to two previously
filed briefs entitled: (1) NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR RIGHT TO ENJOY
THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OF CHOICE and (2) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO
JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATING THE FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEE OF EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: Sixth Amendment, as if they were set forth
fully herein. See Haynes v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519.
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/dismiss.htm (1 of 7) [4/8/2007 2:13:03 PM]

Motion to Dismiss for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:

Page 1 of 7
This Court will please take formal judicial notice of the
fact that the Bar Member failed to appear on Defendant's behalf
during a scheduled status conference. The U.S. Supreme Court
authority in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938), has
made it very clear that it is the obligation of this Court to
ensure that effective assistance of Counsel is available to a
criminal defendant at every point of all criminal proceedings.
In the event that effective assistance of Counsel is not
available to a criminal defendant at every point of a criminal
proceeding, even if only for a moment, then the Court is ousted
of jurisdiction to proceed. Quoting, "If this requirement of the
Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has
jurisdiction to proceed." Johnson v. Zerbst supra. See Exhibit
"A" attached hereto (Status Conference).
Furthermore, during the evidentiary hearing to determine
whether or not the search and seizure in the instant case were
lawful in the first instance, the Prosecutor questioned an
alleged government agent as to why no search warrant had been
obtained. The alleged government agent responded by saying that
he (the government agent) had petitioned a United States
Magistrate for a lawful search warrant, and said Magistrate
refused to issue a lawful search warrant because, in the
Magistrate's opinion, there was not probable cause to issue said
warrant because there was insufficient evidence to support same.
See attached Exhibit "B," attached hereto (Transcript of
Evidentiary Hearing). Nevertheless, the alleged government agent
did proceed, with several accomplices, to conduct an unlawful

search and seizure, without any lawful warrant having been
obtained by any of these alleged government agents. See also
Defendant's AFFIDAVIT DOCUMENTING CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
ARREST: 28 U.S.C. 1746(1), already lodged, but not filed, in the
instant case, pursuant to this Court's Order dated July 17, 1996.
Defendant hereby formally objects to said Order, for the reasons
stated herein.

Page 2 of 7
The Bar Member failed diligently to pursue this blatant
violation of a fundamental Right guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment in the Constitution for the United States of America,
as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"). Under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United States
(federal government) is a signatory under affirmative
obligations, both legal and moral, to provide effective judicial
remedies for violations of fundamental Rights, even when those
violations were committed by persons acting in their official
capacities, and also to develop the possibilities of effective
judicial remedies. These treaties are supreme Law pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution.
The Bar Member is an officer of this Court and, as such, is
legally bound by these two treaties, because they bind all
branches of the federal government, specifically including the
federal judiciary. See 42 U.S.C. 1986. His failure to assert
Defendant's fundamental Immunity against unreasonable search and
seizure constitutes ineffective assistance of Counsel, and clear
and present violation of said treaties. Couple this with the

fact that neither the Bar Member nor the Defendant was present at
the status conference in question, leaving Defendant entirely
bereft of any representation or Counsel whatsoever. The Court
was denied jurisdiction to proceed with that status conference,
and yet it did so anyway.

Page 3 of 7
In the event that this Court should refuse Defendant's
NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR THE RIGHT TO ENJOY THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL OF CHOICE and accompanying documents, Defendant hereby
places all interested parties on formal notice of Her intent to
appeal this case immediately to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on grounds of Fourth and Sixth
Amendment violations, on grounds of arbitrary and capricious
judgments issued by this Court in the instant case, specifically
the Order dated July 17, 1996, in which the presiding Judge ruled
that there was nothing of any legal significance which would
support an attack on the constitutional infirmity of 28 U.S.C.
1865(b)(1), and on other grounds not mentioned herein but already
raised in the formal Court record.
Moreover, said Order held that an Affidavit is hearsay not
subject to cross-examination. On the contrary, it is a basic
maxim of commercial law that an affidavit is the highest form of
truth and must be answered by affidavit, point-for-point.
Furthermore, said Order fails the test of reductio ad absurdum.
Defendant's challenge to the federal jury selection statute was
supported by a separate affidavit which contained numerous,
standing decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Evidently, this Court has ruled that the decisions cited therein

are also hearsay, and have no legal significance. This is an
absurd result, which places the Defendant in an impossible
situation (lex non cogit impossibilia), because that very same
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that no one should be punished for
relying upon their decisions. See U.S. v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391,
399-400 (1973).

Page 4 of 7
If the doctrine of stare decisis has any meaning at all, it
requires that People in their everyday affairs be able to rely
upon decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and not be needlessly
penalized for such reliance. See U.S. v. Mason supra. It will
be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of a government
outside of the supreme Law of the Land finds lodgment in our
constitutional jurisprudence. "No higher duty rests upon this
Court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violation
of the principles of the U.S. Constitution." Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901), Harlan dissenting.
Finally, Defendant cannot proceed to trial without the
benefit of Her discovery efforts, including but not limited to
several Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests already made
but not received, and without the benefit of final review of Her
challenge to the federal jury selection statutes. The problem
which She raised with the federal grand jury that issued the
indictment against Her also exists with the federal procedure for
selecting petit (trial) jury candidates. Specifically, there is
class discrimination in all jury selection processes, which
discrimination constitutes a violation of the fundamental Rights
of the Defendant. Moreover, said grand jury was not lawfully

convened, and it was denied facts which now show that the alleged
government agents proceeded without any lawful warrants to search
and seize Defendant's private property.

Page 5 of 7
RELIEF SOUGHT
Wherefore, Defendant moves this honorable Court for an
immediate dismissal with prejudice, on grounds of violating the
Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Amendments in the U.S. Constitution. In
the alternative, Defendant places all interested parties on
formal notice of Her immediate appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals on grounds of violations of Her fundamental Rights,
contrary to the Bill of Rights and two international treaties
which are all supreme Law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.
Executed on July 22, 1996
/s/ Sheila Wallen

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Citizen of Arizona state and
Counselor at Law and federal witness

Page 6 of 7
PROOF OF SERVICE

America, without the United States, that I am at least 18 years
of age and a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and
that I personally served the following document:
MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
by placing said document in first class U.S. Mail, with postage
prepaid and properly addressed to the following individuals:
Office of the United States Attorney [hand-delivered]

Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Washington
Solicitor General
Washington
Dated: July 22, 1996
/s/ Sheila Wallen

________________________________________
Sheila Terese, Wallen,

Page 7 of 7
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : marlfoia
Certified U.S. Mail c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776

Serial Number #Z-736-061-376 Tucson [zip code exempt]
Return Receipt Requested ARIZONA STATE
July 26, 1996
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST
Disclosure Officer
Office of the Attorney General
Washington [zip code exempt]
Subject: Credentials of Joelyn D. Marlowe

"Assistant United States Attorney"
Tucson, Arizona state
Dear Disclosure Officer:
This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.

552 et seq., and regulations thereunder. This is My firm promise
to pay fees and costs for locating, duplicating, and mailing to
Me certified copies of the records requested below.
If some of this request is exempt from release, please furnish Me

with those portions reasonably segregable. I am requiring
certified copies of the documents requested, in lieu of personal
inspection of same.
Admissible documents requested:
1. Certified copy of the solemn oath of office of Joelyn

D. Marlowe, as required by Article VI, Clause 3, of the
Constitution for the United States of America, as
lawfully amended.
2. Certified copy of her fidelity bond or surety bond.
3. Certified copy of her formal delegation of authority,

beginning with the President, through the Attorney
General, linking all officials in the chain of command
between her and them.
4. Certified copy of her license to practice law in the

State of Arizona.
The requested records are not exempt from disclosure because

they:
(A) could not reasonably be expected to interfere with law

enforcement proceedings;
(B) would not deprive a person of a right to a fair trial
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/marlfoia.htm (1 of 3) [4/8/2007 2:13:04 PM]

or an impartial adjudication;
(C) could not reasonably be expected to constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal property;
(D) could not reasonably be expected to disclose the

identity of a confidential source;
(E) would not disclose techniques and procedures for law

enforcement investigations or prosecutions, and would
not disclose guidelines for law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions;
(F) could not reasonably be expected to endanger the life

or physical safety of any individual.
[see Exemption 7 in FOIA]
If you are not the correct person to whom this Freedom of

Information Act Request should be directed, kindly forward it to
the correct person.
Time is of the essence. If you have any questions about your

rights and obligations under 5 U.S.C. 552, may we recommend that
you contact the office of the Attorney General in Washington,
D.C., for immediate assistance.
Thank you very much for your consideration, and for your timely
obedience to the controlling laws in this matter, specifically
the Freedom of Information Act and the Constitution for the
United States of America, as lawfully amended.

email: supremelawfirm@altavista.net
website: http://supremelaw.com
copy: Joelyn D. Marlowe

Office of United States Attorney
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen


Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : foia01
c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776

Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
July 26, 1996
Disclosure Officer
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington, D.C.


inspection of same.
Documents requested:
1. Implementing regulations, as published in the Federal

Register pursuant to the Federal Register Act, for the
following United States Codes:
(a) 18 U.S.C. 3231
(b) 26 U.S.C. 7402
(c) 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)
(d) 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.

(Jury Selection and Service Act)
(e) 4 U.S.C. 104 et seq.

(The Buck Act)

they:



http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/foia01.htm (1 of 3) [4/8/2007 2:13:05 PM]




Moreover, the blanket FOIA exemption for the federal judiciary is

unconstitutional, under the original Thirteenth Amendment,
because said amendment bars federal officers and employees from
exercising privileges which are not specifically enumerated in
the Constitution. See U.S. v. Lopez, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995).
Under the common law, and under commercial law, we are all equal
before the law. This maxim is fundamental.

the correct person.


Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
and Counselor at Law
# # #

U.S.A. v. Wallen


ARIZONA STATE
July 26, 1996
Disclosure Officer
Washington, D.C.


inspection of same.
Documents requested:
1. Implementing regulations, as published in the Federal

Register pursuant to the Federal Register Act, for the
following United States Codes:
(a) 18 U.S.C. 3231
(b) 26 U.S.C. 7402
(c) 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)
(d) 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.

(e) 4 U.S.C. 104 et seq.

(The Buck Act)

they:







Under the common law, and under commercial law, we are all equal
before the law. This maxim is fundamental.

the correct person.

/s/ Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

amd Counselor at Law
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : renofoi2

Serial Number #P-332-390-904 Tucson [zip code exempt]
August 6, 1996
Disclosure Officer
Subject: Criminal Jurisdiction of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS


inspection of same.
1. Certified copies of all Acts of Congress, with

implementing regulations (if any), granting criminal
jurisdiction to United States District Courts, as
distinct from district courts of the United States.

they:





http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/renofoi2.htm (1 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:13:07 PM]

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : renofoi2


the correct person.



# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/renofoi2.htm (2 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:13:07 PM]

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : renofaoi

Serial Number #Z-736-061-377 Tucson [zip code exempt]
July 26, 1996
Disclosure Officer
Subject: standing of "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"

to sue as Plaintiff in district courts


inspection of same.
1. Certified copies of all Acts of Congress, with

implementing regulations (if any), granting standing to
the "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" [sic] to bring civil
and/or criminal actions as Plaintiff before district
courts of the United States and/or United States
District Courts, as distinct from the Plaintiff "UNITED
STATES" [sic]. See Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S.
652 (1945); cf. "Union" in Bouvier's Law Dictionary,
Sixth Edition (1856).

they:



http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/renofoia.htm (1 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:13:07 PM]

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : renofaoi



the correct person.



# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/renofoia.htm (2 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:13:07 PM]

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : foiapp01

zip code exempt
August 19, 1996
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT APPEAL
Disclosure Officer
This is an appeal under the Freedom of Information Act.
On July 26 and again on August 6, 1996, I requested documents

under the Freedom of Information Act (see attached). To date,
the requested documents have not been produced.
I hereby appeal your failure to produce the requested documents.
The documents that were withheld must be disclosed under the FOIA
because the original Thirteenth Amendment prevents government
officials from exercising privileges of a nobility class, such as
being exempt from the principles of open government and freedom
of information. Evidence of the original Thirteenth Amendment
has been filed with the Foreperson of the Grand Jury and with the
Clerk of the United States District Court in Tucson, Arizona
state (a Republic). See Colorado Records Custodian.
Disclosure of the documents which I requested is in the public

interest because the information, and the procedure for obtaining
the information, are likely to contribute significantly to public
understanding of the operations and activities of government and
are not primarily in My commercial interest.
Moreover, the information requested will help to improve public

confidence in the integrity of the United States (federal
government), or to confirm that there are persons attempting to
exercise executive and judicial branch powers in America without
any authority or jurisdiction whatsoever. See U.S. v. Lopez.
Thank you for your careful consideration of this appeal.

http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/foiapp01.htm (1 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:13:08 PM]

copy: Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen


zip code exempt
August 19, 1996
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT APPEAL
Disclosure Officer
This is an appeal under the Freedom of Information Act.
On July 26, 1996, I requested documents under the Freedom of

Information Act (see attached). To date, the requested documents
have not been produced.
I hereby appeal your failure to produce the requested documents.
The documents that were withheld must be disclosed under the FOIA
because the original Thirteenth Amendment prevents government
officials from exercising privileges of a nobility class, such as
being exempt from the principles of open government and freedom
of information. Evidence of the original Thirteenth Amendment
has been filed with the Foreperson of the Grand Jury and with the
Clerk of the United States District Court in Tucson, Arizona
state (a Republic). See Colorado Records Custodian.
Disclosure of the documents which I requested is in the public

interest because the information, and the procedure for obtaining
the information, are likely to contribute significantly to public
understanding of the operations and activities of government and
are not primarily in My commercial interest.
Moreover, the information requested will help to improve public

confidence in the integrity of the United States (federal
government), or to confirm that there are persons attempting to
exercise executive and judicial branch powers in America without
any authority or jurisdiction whatsoever. See U.S. v. Lopez.
Thank you for your careful consideration of this appeal.


copy: Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : judnoti2

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona


)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE AND DEMAND
) FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL
v. ) NOTICE:
) Federal Rules of
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) Evidence 201(d)
)
Defendant. )
________________________________)
NOTICE AND DEMAND
"Defendant"), to provide formal Notice to all interested parties
of Her Demand, made hereby pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, for mandatory judicial notice of the following
attached documents:
(1) AFFIDAVIT OF DEFAULT AND OF PROBABLE CAUSE [cites

omitted] submitted by Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A.,
M.S., Counselor at Law, in Case No. GJ-95-1-6: In re:
Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New Life Health Center
Company with PROOF OF SERVICE;
(2) FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND from Paul Andrew, Mitchell,

Counselor at Law, to the District Court Executive and
Clerk of Court, dated June 24, 1996, and attached to
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFAULT AND OF PROBABLE CAUSE supra;
(3) Two letters from Bonnie L. Gay, Attorney in Charge,
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/judnoti2.htm (1 of 3) [4/8/2007 2:13:10 PM]

U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for United

States Attorneys, Freedom of Information/Privacy Act
Unit, both dated July 8, 1996, concerning FOIA requests
and appeals for credentials of ROBERT L. MISKELL and
JANET NAPOLITANO.
Notice and Demand for Mandatory Judicial Notice:

Page 1 of 3
The above-mentioned documents are incorporated by reference as if
set forth fully herein.
VERIFICATION
The Undersigned hereby certify, under penalty of perjury,
under the laws of the United States of America, without the
"United States", that the above statements of fact are true and
correct, to the best of Our knowledge, materially complete, and
not misleading, so help Us God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Executed on August 13, 1996
/s/ Sheila Wallen

________________________________________

________________________________________

Page 2 of 3
PROOF OF SERVICE

NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR

MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE:
Federal Rules of Evidence 201(d)

Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Washington
Solicitor General
Washington
Executed on: August 13, 1996
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________

Page 3 of 3
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : judnotic

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona


)
) FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL
v. ) NOTICE:
) Federal Rules of
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) Evidence 201(d)
)
Defendant. )
________________________________)
NOTICE AND DEMAND
"Defendant"), to provide formal Notice to all interested parties
of her Demand, made hereby pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, for mandatory judicial notice of the four (4)
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests, all mailed on July
26, 1996, on Her behalf by Her Counsel of choice, Mr. Paul
Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S., to wit:
(a) TO: Disclosure Officer

http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/judnotic.htm (1 of 5) [4/8/2007 2:13:12 PM]


Page 1 of 5
(a) FOR: 1. Certified copies of all Acts of Congress,

with implementing regulations (if any),
granting standing to the "UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA" [sic] to bring civil and/or criminal
actions as Plaintiff before district courts
of the United States and/or United States
District Courts, as distinct from the
Plaintiff "UNITED STATES" [sic]. See Hooven
& Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945); cf.
"Union" in Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition (1856).
(b) TO: Disclosure Officer

(b) FOR: 1. Certified copies of all Acts of Congress,

with implementing regulations (if any),
granting criminal jurisdiction to United
States District Courts, as distinct from
district courts of the United States.
(c) TO: Disclosure Officer

(c) FOR: 1. Certified copy of the solemn oath of office

of Joelyn D. Marlowe, as required by Article
VI, Clause 3, of the Constitution for the
United States of America, as lawfully
amended.
2. Certified copy of her fidelity bond or surety

bond.
3. Certified copy of her formal delegation of

authority, beginning with the President,
through the Attorney General, linking all
officials in the chain of command between her
and them.
4. Certified copy of her license to practice law

in the State of Arizona.
(d) TO: Disclosure Officer


Washington, D.C.

Page 2 of 5
(d) FOR: 1. Implementing regulations, as published in the

Federal Register pursuant to the Federal
Register Act, for the following United States
Codes:
(A) 18 U.S.C. 3231

(B) 26 U.S.C. 7402
(C) 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)
(D) 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.
(E) 4 U.S.C. 104 et seq.
(The Buck Act)
(e) TO: Disclosure Officer

Washington, D.C.
(e) FOR: 1. Implementing regulations, as published in the

Federal Register pursuant to the Federal
Register Act, for the following United States
Codes:
(A) 18 U.S.C. 3231

(B) 26 U.S.C. 7402
(C) 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)
(D) 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.
(E) 4 U.S.C. 104 et seq.
(The Buck Act)
Defendant also attaches a copy of Her Counsel's written
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AND DEMAND to William D. Browning, presiding
judge in the instant case, dated July 25, 1996, and sent via
first class United States mail on the same day. See attached.
Defendant wishes to place all interesed parties on formal notice
that the deadline for response from William D. Browning to said
NOTICE AND DEMAND was August 8, 1996 (25+14-31 = 8).
Copies of the above-mentioned FOIA requests, and of the

letter from Defendant's Counsel to William D. Browning, are
attached and incorporated by reference as if set forth fully
herein. See attached. Allowing for weekends and an extra day of
grace, the deadlines for responses to said FOIA requests will
fall on Monday, August 12, 1996.

Page 3 of 5
VERIFICATION
"United States", that the above statements of fact are true and
correct, to the best of Our knowledge, materially complete, and
not misleading, so help Us God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
/s/ Sheila Wallen

________________________________________

________________________________________

Page 4 of 5
PROOF OF SERVICE

NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR

MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE:
Federal Rules of Evidence 201(d)

Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Washington
Solicitor General
Washington
Executed on: August 13, 1996
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________

Page 5 of 5
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : counnad

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona


)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR
) THE RIGHT TO ENJOY
v. ) THE ASSISTANCE OF
) COUNSEL OF CHOICE:
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) Sixth Amendment
)
Defendant. )
________________________________)
"Defendant"), to demand this honorable Court to recognize Her
fundamental Right to enjoy the assistance of either Counsel(s) or
Co-Counsel(s) of Her choice who are not necessarily members of
the State Bar of Arizona and who are not necessarily licensed
attorneys, for the following reasons:
Notice and Demand to Enjoy the Assistance of Counsel:

Page 1 of 4
1. The Constitutional guarantee of right to "assistance of
counsel" is not qualified.
2. The Constitution of the State of Arizona, ordained and
established by the People for Their protection, shall not be
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/counnad.htm (1 of 4) [4/8/2007 2:13:13 PM]

superseded or amended by any act of the Legislature or by
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State.
3. Defendant has the fundamental Right to the effective
assistance of Counsel of Her choice, to stand by, and to advise
the Defendant while proceeding In Propria Persona. People v.
Hill, (1969) 70 C.2d 678, 76 Cal.Rptr. 225, 452 P.2d 329, cert.
denied 406 U.S. 971; People v. Zamora, (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d
166, 152 P.2d 180.
4. Within the unambiguous language of the Constitution,
the assistance of Counsel does not restrict it to any state bar
associations.
5. Defendant refuses to waive any fundamental Rights or
Immunities in order to assert another Right or Immunity.
6. The Right to Counsel has been deeply embedded in true
American tradition since the foundation of this Republic, and has
been most recently set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in Faretta v. State of California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled as follows: "If this
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the
court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed." Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
In addition, if this Court fails to notify the Defendant of
its fundamental "Rights Sua Sponte" or those declared or demanded
by the Defendant, then the Court of its own volition denies
itself jurisdiction.

Page 2 of 4
RELIEF REQUESTED
Therefore, the Defendant moves the Court to grant this

demand for the right of assistance of Counsel or Co-Counsel,
whichever the Defendant wishes to have, to insure to the
Defendant fair proceedings and justice, which Rights are more
fully set forth in the attached brief in support of the absolute,
unalienable Right to unfettered Counsel.
/s/ Sheila Wallen


Citizen of Arizona state,

Page 3 of 4
PROOF OF SERVICE
NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR THE RIGHT TO ENJOY

THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OF CHOICE:
Sixth Amendment


Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Washington
Solicitor General
Washington
/s/ Sheila Wallen

________________________________________

Page 4 of 4
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : counpa1

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona


)
Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
v. ) DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO
) JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATING
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) THE FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEE
) EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
Defendant. ) COUNSEL: Sixth Amendment
________________________________)
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right ... to have the assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Defendant asks the Court to take Judicial Notice of the fact that
many of the men who contributed to the writing or ratifying of
the Constitution were attorneys, such as John Jay, first Chief
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and John Marshall, a later
Chief Justice. John Adams, James Wilson, John Blaire, and Oliver
Ellsworth were among the many fine attorneys who assisted in
approving the language used in the Constitution for the United
States of America (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution").
Are we to believe that the word "COUNSEL" was selected by
these "attorneys" with no thought whatsoever to its Common Law
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/counpa1.htm (1 of 33) [4/8/2007 2:13:17 PM]

meaning at that time?
Points and Authorities on Assistance of Counsel:

Page 1 of 32
In discussing a defendant's Right to Counsel, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held:
... [H]is right to be heard through his own counsel is

UNQUALIFIED. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 [emphasis
added]
In consulting Noah Webster's 1828 dictionary, the word
"unqualified" is defined as:
Not modified, limited, or restricted by conditions or

exceptions; .... (Noah Webster's First Edition of an
American Dictionary of the English Language, 1828,
republished in facsimile edition by Foundation for American
Christian Education, San Francisco, California, second
edition, 1980)
It is undeniable that the explicit use of the word "Counsel"
in the Sixth Amendment was intended to mean someone other than an
attorney, as well as an attorney. This view is upheld by a U.S.
District Court when it recognized an accountant as Counsel, and
reprimanded an IRS employee:
Yet while he was informing the prospective defendant of his

Right to Counsel, he was simultaneously requesting that the
Defendant's Counsel leave the interrogation. In effect, the
investigator informed Tarlowski that he might have his
attorney present, but not his accountant.
Ruling in favor of Tarlowski's motion to suppress, the Court
said:
For a government official to mouth in a ritualistic way part

of the warning about the right to counsel, while excluding
the person relied upon as counsel is, in effect, to reverse
the meaning of the words used. U.S. v. Tarlowski, 305
F.Supp. 112 (1969)
Defendant also asks the Court to take Judicial Notice of the
use of the word "Counsel" in the 17th century:

... and in all courts persons of all persuaisions [sic] may

freely appear in their own way, and according to their own
manner and there plead their own causes themselves, or if
unable, by their friends .... Fundamental Constitution for
the Province of East Jersey (1683) [emphasis added].

Page 2 of 32
To have a "friend" act as Counsel was a Common Law Right and was
recognized as such in the Bill of Rights when the term "Counsel"
was used instead of the term "attorney."
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted

safely, except by reference to common law and to British
institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and
adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the convention who
submitted it to the ratification of conventions of the
thirteen states, were born and brought up in the atmosphere
of the common law and thought and spoke in its vocabulary
... when they came to put their conclusions into the form of
fundamental law in a compact , they expressed them in terms
of common law, confident that they could by shortly and
easily understood. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108
(1925)
[emphasis added]
No limit or qualification was ever intended to be put upon
the Right to "assistance of Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment and
Defendant submits the word "Counsel" was used in recognition of
the Common Law Right to have one's "friends" speak for a
Defendant, if he so chose. Reference to the Common Law is
mandatory in a proper interpretation of the U.S. Constitution,
but most particularly in the Bill of Rights. There is a
preponderance of U.S. Supreme Court cases which uphold the
position of Defendant on interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.
... as men whose intentions require no concealment,

generally employ the words which most directly and aptly
express the ideas they intend to convey: the enlightened
patriots who framed our constitution and the people who
adopted it must be understood to have employed the words in
their natural sense, and to have intended what they have
said. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).

And,
... In the construction of the constitution, we must look to

the history of the times, and examine the state of things
existing when it was framed and adopted. 12 Wheat 354; 6
Wheat 416; 4 Peters 431-2; to ascertain the old law, the
mischief and the remedy. State of Rhode Island v. The State
of Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657 (1938)

Page 3 of 32
And also, in speaking further of Constitutional provisions, we
find:
We agree, it is not to be frittered away by doubtful

construction, but like every clause in every constitution it
must have reasonable interpretation, and be held to express
the intention of the framers. Woodson v. Murdock, 89 U.S.
351, 369 (1874)
And further,
The necessities which gave birth to the Constitution, the

controversies which precede its formation and the conflicts
of opinion which were settled by its adoption, may properly
be taken into view for the purposes of tracing to its
source, any particular provision of the Constitution, in
order thereby, to be enabled to correctly interpret its
meaning. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429, 558
History shows conclusively that it was a Common Law Right to
be represented in court by a "friend" rather than an attorney, if
one chose. Defendant claims that right herein, which the Sixth
Amendment did indeed secure, and is not subject to "revision" by
the American Bar Association.
Undoubtedly what went before the adoption of the

Constitution may be resorted to for the purpose of throwing
light on its provisions. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521,
533 (1971)
Each word has a particular meaning and was deliberately
chosen. The word "Counsel" was not idly set down as the law of
this land, but, on the contrary, was selected with great skill

and meaning.
To disregard such a deliberate choice of words and their

natural meaning, would be a departure from the first
principle of Constitutional interpretation. "In expounding
the Constitution of the United States," said Chief Justice
Taney in Holmes v. Jennison, 14 540, 570, 571, "every word
must have its due force and appropriate meaning; for it is
evident from the whole instrument, that, no word was
unnecessarily used, or needlessly added." The many
discussions which have taken place upon the construction of
the Constitution, have proved the correctness of this
proposition; and shown the high talent, the caution and the
foresight of the illustrious men who framed it. Every word
appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation
and its force and effect to have been fully understood.
Wright v. U.S., 302 U.S. 583 (1938)
[emphasis added]

Page 4 of 32
Little did the Framers of Our Constitution, who labored so
long and hard to fashion it, realize that the day might come when
it would be ridiculed by law professors, snickered at by law
clerks, and consigned to the wastebasket by attorneys, the bar,
and the Judiciary.
To narrowly interpret the word "Counsel" to mean only
"licensed attorneys" is an infringement of Defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to Counsel, which even the U.S. Supreme Court has
held is "unqualified." See Chandler supra.
The words of the Amendment are simple, clear, and not
ambiguous, and were obviously written by Our Forefathers to be
understood by The People, as the following citation undeniably
indicates:
The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters;

its words and phrases were used in their normal and
ordinary, as distinguished from technical meaning; where
the intention is clear, there is no room for construction,
and no excuse for interpolation or addition. Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat 304; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1;
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat 419; Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet.
10; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 139; Lake County v.

Rollins, 130 U.S. 662; Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1;

Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U.S. 628; The Pocket Veto Case,
279 U.S. 655 (justice) Story on the Constitution, 5th ed.,
sec. 451; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 2nd ed., P.
61, 70.
And further,
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is

intended to be without effect .... Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137, 174 (1803)
In passing, it might be noted that Chief Justice John
Marshall, who principally was responsible for the holding in the
above cited Marbury case, and who seems to be looked upon by most
attorneys and judges as the greatest of Our Supreme Court
justices, is reported to have had two weeks law school
preparation, at which time half his study was philosophy. Also:
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, its

meaning does not alter. That which it meant when it was
adopted, it means now. South Carolina v. United States, 199
U.S. 437, 448 (1905).

Page 5 of 32
Defendant is deeply perturbed at the erosion of his
fundamental Right to Counsel by the very legal profession itself.
The restriction of the Courts to professional attorneys only, is
the result of attorneys who sat in Our legislatures and voted
upon laws which involved, for them, a conflict of interest and
which were, and are, upheld by their brother attorneys, who sit
on the benches of Our Courts, ruling in violation of the
Sovereign will of The People, which it is their sworn duty to
obey.
Any State law which prohibits laymen from speaking on behalf
of another, when sought for that purpose, is a violation of the
Sixth Amendment. Any implementation of such State laws also

violates Defendant's rights to freedom of speech, wherein he may
speak through whom he chooses; to freedom of association wherein
he may associate with whom he pleases; to due process of law,
wherein he is denied Counsel of his choice and therefore as a
consequence, he is denied a fair trial, and he is also denied an
impartial jury by being unable to speak, as he knows he should,
through Counsel of trust to the jury.
To be denied a layman to assist him with advice, and to act
as a spokesman at Defendant's request, is to subject Defendant to
unequal treatment under the law. As an unconvicted Citizen,
Defendant has less Rights and worse treatment than inmates in
state and federal prisons, who are permitted "jailhouse" lawyers
-- laymen who practice law on behalf of their fellow prisoners
with the approval of many Courts.

Page 6 of 32
As an unconvicted Citizen, Defendant is denied the right to
contract when he is forbidden the assistance of one who is
willing to speak for him at his request. The denial of
Defendant's right to contract, it is respectfully submitted,
occurs because attorneys, who are, in this State, members of a
bar association (a monopoly they have promoted through their
controlled legislature) have purported to make a "law" for the
protection of the "public"; whereas, they have actually
instigated a self-serving franchise, in great part at the expense
of the public and, in Defendant's view, to the detriment of
Constitutional government.
Again, Defendant is denied a "fair trial" and an impartial
jury when a so-called "law" prohibits him from contracting with

someone of his choosing for Defendant's legal defense against a
hostile government, bent on punishing Defendant for the exercise
of the very fundamental Rights which the government should be
upholding rather than attacking.
The aforementioned rights are infringed, abridged, and
denied when the word "Counsel" is qualified to mean only
attorneys may speak for the defense in a Court of Law. This was
not the case in Tarlowski, where the "Counsel" referred to by the
Court was an accountant.
It appears to Defendant that a careful consideration of the
words of the Sixth Amendment, securing his fundamental Right to
Counsel of CHOICE must be undertaken here. Since no words were
idly selected by the Forefathers, let us emphasize them here and
now so that there can be no misunderstanding as to their meaning,
for Defendant believes his stand in this matter is
constitutionally correct. The vital words here are:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused SHALL ENJOY the

RIGHT ... to have the ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL for his defence.

Page 7 of 32
Defendant requests the Court's indulgence and patience for a
brief analysis of the words capitalized above because, where his
Life, Liberty, or Property are involved, it is not a matter which
he takes lightly.
For the source of the common meaning of common words in use
when the U.S. Constitution was written, we refer to Noah
Webster's First Edition of an American Dictionary of the English
Language, 1828, republished in facsimile edition by the
Foundation for American Christian Education, San Francisco,

California, Second Edition, 1980.
ALL: a. Every one ... the whole quantity, extent, duration,

amount, quality, or degree; ... This word signifies the
whole or entire thing ....
It is obvious on its face that the word "all" allows for no
exceptions and is all-inclusive, and it is also obvious that the
Sixth Amendment, therefore, allows for no criminal trial where it
does not apply.
SHALL: v.i. In the present tense, shall ... forms the

future tense; ... informs another that a fact is to take
place .... In the second and third persons, shall implies a
promise, command or determination. "You shall receive ...."
The word "shall," in legal contemplation, is mandatory; it is a
word "of command ... must be given a compulsory meaning." It is
clearly so stated on page 1233 of Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth
Edition, 1979.
ENJOY: v.t ... To feel or perceive with pleasure; to take

pleasure or satisfaction in the possession or experience of
.... We enjoy a free constitution and inestimable
privileges.

Page 8 of 32
Defendant has informed the Court that he has little
confidence in the legal profession of Haldeman, Erlichman,
Mitchell, Dean, Nixon and Agnew, and not to mention many others.
He is defending himself out of necessity, not out of desire.
Defendant is aware of a few attorneys whom he trusts, but their
multi-thousand dollar fees are out of the question for this
Defendant. He does not trust just any attorney out of a grab-bag
whom the government is willing to furnish; neither would this
defendant be satisfied with such an "attorney's" concept of the
U.S. Constitution. The average attorney, full of law-school

brainwashing, thinks that the U.S. Constitution is what the
judges say it is, rather than what the Constitution itself says
it is.
If Defendant cannot "enjoy" the "assistance of Counsel" from
the Bar (i.e. the legal establishment), then he has the
undeniable Right of Counsel which he can enjoy. To deny this
Right is to deny his Rights under the Sixth Amendment to Counsel.
It is the use of the word "ENJOY," as well as "COUNSEL," which
gives a Defendant the Right to the Counsel of his choice,
licensed or unlicensed, as was provided for by the Founding
Fathers, and of which the Ninth Amendment clearly prohibits any
denial or disparagement:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,

shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.

Page 9 of 32
What honest attorney or judge can fail to see that in the
denial of Counsel of choice to a Defendant in court, that he is
not "denying" or "disparaging" both enumerated and non-enumerated
rights?
And what honest attorney or judge can fail to see that in
enforcing a so-called statute denying a layman the opportunity to
speak in defense of a friend at the friend's request, that said
lawyer or judge is rendering infidelity to his oath of office to
support the Constitution which states, in Article VI, Clause 2?
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which

shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
[emphasis added]

Attorneys are called "officers of the court," and they are
required to take oaths to support the U.S. Constitution. When
the attorneys attempt to prevent the exercise of the Rights of
defendants in court to speak through lay friends of confidence,
the attorneys are involved in denying that which they swear to
uphold -- to their eternal discredit and dishonor.
The fact that the attorneys have been successful for a long
time, and that colleagues in judicial robes have upheld them,
does not make it right; it does not make it constitutional; and
it certainly does not enhance the Rights of the grass-roots
American People who are tired of being subjected to the
exorbitant legal fees of a closed-shop union which says, "If you
exercise your fundamental Rights, we will see to it that you go
to jail," and now, "You have to go our route because the loss of
your fundamental Rights is a settled matter."
How could any decent person uphold such a system? How can
the legal and the judicial profession escape tarnished "images?"
Is the denial of fundamental Rights to the Defendant "frivolous?"
Is it not better to restore fundamental Rights than to have a
restless People rise up? Must we have "government of attorneys,
by attorneys, and for attorneys?" Especially, after Watergate,
the People are not going to stand for it.

Page 10 of 32
It is important to note that the Sixth Amendment word
"enjoy" follows the word "shall," and it would therefore be a
command of the sovereign power that the ability to enjoy the
right to Counsel is mandatory. The words "shall ... enjoy" make
this very clear.

The judgment as to what Counsel the Defendant can "enjoy" is
left entirely in his hands, and nowhere in the Sixth Amendment is
this prerogative given to the Courts; it remains the fundamental
"Right" of the Defendant.
RIGHT: n. Conformity to the will of God, or to His law, the

perfect standard of truth and justice ... Just claim;
immunity; privilege. All men have the right to the secure
enjoyment of life, personal safety, liberty, and property.
We deem the right of trial by jury invaluable, particularly
in the case of crimes.
The "right" to "enjoy" Counsel is claimed by Defendant by
law, nature, and tradition, and may not be infringed or
disparaged by any private association, its members, or by its
sympathizers employed in government. It is a right which the
People retained for themselves and it is to be protected by their
Judiciary. It is not a function of the People's Courts to
protect the vested interests of any private monopoly as against
the rights of The Sovereign People. Non-attorneys have as much
right to speak for a Defendant in Our Courts as attorneys.
Otherwise, the Courts are run only for "special interests" and
are, in fact, protecting a monopoly, in violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. Such a monopoly acts to restrain interstate
commerce and to restrain competition and trade; without such
monopoly practices, the cost of justice to The People would be
substantially lower. Attorneys could still ply their trade, but
they would have to be competent and deserve more fully the
business which they would acquire from those who voluntarily
trusted them.
ASSISTANCE: on. Help; aid; furtherance; succor; a

contribution of support in bodily strength or other means.

Page 11 of 32

The common understanding of the word "assistance" is that it
comes from one who acts in a secondary capacity. For example,
assistance is given to a President by a Vice President who
"assists" him. We find a definition of "assistant" which follows
the word "assistance." The above mentioned dictionary defines an
assistant as one who serves in a subordinate position, as a
helper. The common practice today of the Defendant "assisting"
the defense attorney is one to which Defendant objects. It is an
erosion of the original right which this motion is aimed at
reestablishing. Defendant may also promote assistant Counsel to
co-Counsel wherein they share in the defense and maintain that
such a decision is theirs, not the Court's. It is theirs by
Common Law and may not be denied or infringed by either the
Courts or the Bar Association. It is also their fundamental
Right.
COUNSEL: n. Advice; opinion or instruction ... Those who

give counsel in law; any counselor or advocate, or any
number of counselors, barristers, or sergeants; as the
plaintiff's counsel, or the defendant's counsel.
COUNSELOR: Gan. Any person who gives advice; .... One who
is consulted by a client in a law case; one who gives
advice in relation to a question of law; one whose
profession is to give advice in law and manage causes for
clients.

Page 12 of 32
If the men who framed the Bill of Rights meant by "COUNSEL"
a licensed attorney, they would have said "licensed attorney".
Surely, the Court cannot refuse to recognize this. In the
interest of fairness, let the Court grant the Defendant's motion.
Neither the President of the United States nor the Governors
who head the executive branches of government are required to be

attorneys in order to administer and enforce the laws. Federal
judges are not required by the U.S. Constitution, or by valid
statute, to be attorneys. Congressmen, Senators, and other
Legislators who pass legislation, statutes, and "laws" do not
have to be "attorneys." Magistrates do not have to be
"attorneys." Does it not seem strange that a Defendant cannot
represent himself in Court without being an "attorney?" Are we
playing games with the meaning of "represent"?
Why then, the Defendant asks, must the Defendant's
representative in Court be a licensed attorney? Why must the
Defendant's representative have a title which the lawmaker, the
enforcer, the federal law adjudicator, and the Defendant himself
do not need? Speak, Oh Learned Ones! And please speak without
attempting to turn white into "black," and black into "white," as
the graduates of law schools seem so gifted at doing. And please
speak without being in contempt of the Constitution for the
United States, as lawfully amended.

Page 13 of 32
THE WILL OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER
The U.S. Constitution is the will of The People, clearly set
down for their agents, elected and appointed, to follow. No law
supersedes the U.S. Constitution and only those in "pursuance" of
it may stand. Even treaties must be made "in Pursuance" of the
U.S. Constitution.
We the People ... do ordain and establish this Constitution

for the United States of America. Preamble to the U.S.
Constitution (1789)
In establishing this government, the People said that:

This Constitution, and the Laws ... made in Pursuance

thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....
Article VI, Cl. 2, U.S. Constitution.
And they also commanded that:
... [A]ll ... judicial Officers, both of the United States

and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution; .... Article VI,
Clause 3, U.S. Constitution
It is clearly the will of the bar associations, not of the
People, to close the Courts to all but licensed attorneys. Use
of the word "Counsel" rather than "attorneys" denotes the will of
the Sovereign Power, which cannot be lawfully overridden.
In the United States, Sovereignty resides in the people, who

act through the organs established by the Constitution.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 471; Penhallow v. Doane's
Administrators, 3 Dall. 54, 93; McCullock v. Maryland, 4
Wheat 316, 404, 405; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370;
... Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people
to override their will as thus declared. Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935)
In the Sixth Amendment, the People declared their will as to
the rights of the Accused in all criminal prosecutions and the
right of the Defendant to "enjoy" the "assistance of Counsel"
was purposely couched in the Common Law term, "Counsel," so as
to include those friends upon whom Defendants may depend for
advice and protection.
In a speech by Judge Learned Hand at the Mayflower Hotel in
Washington, D.C., on May 11, 1929, entitled, "Is There a Common
Will?" in speaking of judges, he said:
He is not to substitute even his juster will for theirs;

otherwise it would not be the "common will" which prevails,
and to that extent, the people would not govern.

Page 14 of 32

Defendant has the right to be foolish as well as wise, and his
liberty is his to do with as he pleases. To deny him his freedom
of choice in this matter of Counsel is unduly to interfere with
the defense, and constitutes a denial of the will of The People,
from whom the Courts' authority is derived, and a substitution in
lieu thereof is being used -- that of the "will of attorneys."
Bills of rights are, in their origin, reservations of rights

not surrendered to the prince. Hamilton, Federalist Papers,
No. 84.
The right to have a "friend" plead one's case, or to assist one
in Court, is a Common Law right secured by the Sixth Amendment.
History is clear that the first ten amendments to the

Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law
rights of the people against invasion by the Federal
Government. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp., 813, 816 (1947)
U.S.D.C., So. Dist. Calif.
Our Founding Fathers spoke and wrote in the vernacular of the
Common Law, and "Counsel" was the word they chose. The facts are
conclusive on this point, and the record supports this
contention. Interpretation of the word "Counsel" to mean
"attorney only" is a departure from the safeguards of the Bill of
Rights.
The Bill of Rights was provided as a barrier, to protect the

individual against arbitrary exactions of ... legislatures,
(and) courts ... it is the primary distinction between
democratic and totalitarian way. Re Stoller, Supreme Court
of Florida, en banc, 36 So.2d 443, 445 (1948).
A more recent confirmation of fundamental Rights of the Accused
says:
Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there

can be no rule-making or legislation which would abrogate
them. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1968)
Even though the Miranda decision referred to the Fifth
Amendment right in toto, the above stated principle is of general

application, wherein the word "rights" is not qualified.

Page 15 of 32
II
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
In Tarlowski supra, the Court said, in suppressing evidence
at the request of Tarlowski's motion:
When a federal official's interference with the right of

free association takes the form of limiting the ability of a
criminal suspect to consult with and be accompanied by a
person upon whom he relies for advice and protection, he
gravely transgresses. For these reasons, the Motion to
suppress must be granted.
It was in this case that Tarlowski was denied the Counsel of an
accountant, not of a lawyer.
Defendant has a right under the First Amendment freely to
associate with whom he pleases in his defense and in its
preparation and presentation, so long as such is respectful,
with decorum, and without contempt for orderly rules of
procedure which do not deprive one of Rights guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution. To deny this Right is also to deny his Fifth
Amendment Right to Due Process of Law, which is actually a
guarantee of fundamental fairness.

Page 16 of 32
III
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PETITION

FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
The First Amendment states, in pertinent part:
Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of

the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

Defendant asks, "How can I maintain my maximum Right to petition
for redress of grievances, if that person whom I choose to speak
for me is not permitted to do so?"
If Congress passes a statute requiring a federal court to
abide a statute of the State in which it sits, and said statute
of a state purports to make it a crime for a Defendant to be
represented by a non-attorney, then Congress has effectively done
not only what the U.S. Constitution does not authorize it to do,
but it has done what is also expressly forbidden.
If such is the case, then Congress has made a "law" which
frustrates the Right of The People, and the Defendant, "to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
Of what use is the Right to Petition for Redress of
Grievances if the Defendant is personally handicapped by
government? This handicap arises because the Defendant needs
assistance in his petitioning, and yet the he is limited by a bar
association, or a state, or a court which says that a competent
"friend" cannot be permitted to speak for the Petitioner because
said "friend" has not been brainwashed in certain "approved" law
schools. In is in such law schools that the deprivation of the
fundamental Rights, although set forth in plain and unambiguous
language in the U.S. Constitution itself, is not "settled
doctrine."
The "licensed attorneys" and "attorney-judges" say that "The
Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is." What if the
Congress passes a law saying that any bureaucrat can rape any
layman's wife and the Supreme Court says, "Yes, that's perfectly
in harmony with the Constitution?"


Page 17 of 32
Then, are we The People to stand for it? Who gave them said
authority? Now, what should The People do who have such a
Congress and such a Supreme Court? Are the lower court judges
brave enough to challenge it, or are they "bound" to follow the
higher Court judges?
And where is the member of the bar, the licensed attorney,
who now steps forward and announces that the Supreme Court is
mistaken? Where does his license go to? Now, who is going to
permit him to appear in Court if he doesn't buckle down and stop
rocking the establishment?
Obviously, an extreme example has been used; but it is
significant. Laymen would not have to stand for such nonsense.
Licensed attorneys ... who knows?
That laymen should be subjected to a "drifting" and
"unstable" Constitution -- which happens to be what some justices
"think it is" at the moment -- can be very frustrating, and that
a jury cannot hear a "Counsel" who is not beholden to such a
damnable floating doctrine, are indeed a denial of "the Right to
Petition (effectively) for Redress of Grievances." To preserve
justice, to preserve the semblance of a fair trial and an
impartial jury, let the Defendant petition for Redress of
Grievances to the jury through "Counsel of his choice," who is
not beholden to a corrupt and degenerate system which has
perverted the very Law by which it pretends to rule and which it
pretends to protect and uphold.

Page 18 of 32

Defendant believes that true religion guarantees freedom of
choice, or freedom to choose, to elect, and to select, taking
responsibility for the consequences of said choices.
Defendant further believes that he has the right to help
others and, in turn, to be helped by those willing voluntarily to
answer his call for assistance. In this case, he particularly
means in the Courtroom where a hostile government is violating
its own laws and trampling upon the Rights of the Sovereign
People, which its officers are sworn to protect.
When all the mighty force of an all powerful government is
arrayed against a lone individual who has the courage to point
out the government's inequities, said individual should be
entitled, most of all, to the protection of his religious
convictions and rights.
Under the First Amendment, the right of conscience and the
right to believe, as long as the same does not trample upon the
rights of others, is the number one right protected by
government. In pertinent part, the First Amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ....
Defendant's religious conviction, again, calls for freedom from
oppression and freedom from soul-stifling special interest
legislation slapped on a freedom-loving individual on behalf of
self-serving perpetrators of special advantages to the legal
profession, at the expense of the long-suffering victims of the
same. Let the legal profession compete like men with the Counsel
Defendant chooses for his defense, and for the proper exercise of
his religious Rights, chief among which is the freedom of any
choice which does not trample upon the Rights of others.


Page 19 of 32
IV
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
Defendant's right to equal protection of the laws is guaranteed
through the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment:
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees to

each citizen the equal protection of the laws and prohibits
a denial thereof by any Federal official. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 327 U.S. 497
Defendant asks the Court to take Judicial Notice of an article
from Newsweek, September 2, 1974, which tells how a layman, James
Yager, handled the legal problems of 3,500 clients (see paragraph
1). The same paragraph also speaks of "His most recent court
appearance," which took place in Atlanta. It describes how
"Yager paced the courtroom floor," as he addressed the jury. Mr.
Yager is engaging in the practice of law, which is his Right as a
Layman, or laymen, to assist him in his defense, if they so
desire. To deny this motion is to give prisoners more Rights
than to a Free and Natural Person. Such inequity before the law
is intolerable.
Said article mentions various others who have adopted law as
an avocation and goes on to mention a Mr. Green, another former
inmate now on parole, and says that: "Green is a familiar face
in the Boston courtrooms, where he maintains his legal activities
by submitting amicus briefs for other felons." It would be
interesting to know if Mr. Green and Yeager, like Mr. Jefferson
and James X, are also black men, and if therefore, fundamental
Rights are only available to black men.
In both United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 389
U.S. 217, and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, and also in

Brotherhood of Railhood Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S.
1 (1964), it was held that a State may not pass statutes
prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law or to interfere with
the Right to freedom of speech, secured by the First Amendment.

Page 20 of 32
Defendant is entitled to equal protection of the laws and
that includes his right to speak through whom he pleases, when he
pleases. The only reasonable condition is that the decorum of
the Court and the rules not in conflict with individual Rights be
maintained; otherwise there can be no valid denial of this
inalienable and legal Right. Defendant is agreeable to this, and
has every intention of obeying the proper rules and maintaining
the decorum of the Court. To do otherwise is unthinkable.
Defendant herein also believes that it is vital to his
defense to seek whatever assistance he can trust, and that if he
decides to be assisted by either licensed or unlicensed Counsel,
he has every Right to do so. If the Defendant believes that a
combination of both may be to his advantage, to deny him this
Right would constitute an unreasonable and arbitrary interference
with his defense, by denying him his fundamental Rights freely to
associate with whom he chooses; to freedom of speech; to
freedom to Petition for Redress of Grievances; and his religious
Right of conscience and freedom of choice, without which religion
is worth but little.
Defendant also asks the Court to take Judicial Notice that
other Defendants in criminal cases are allowed to plan their
defenses without interference by the Courts, and Defendant herein
claims that same Right.


Page 21 of 32
Surely, we cannot have special laws for attorneys and
special grants of privilege to them as a class when these very
same privileges are denied all other citizens. The
Constitutional prohibitions against Titles of Nobility in Article
I, Section 9, clause 7, and in the original Thirteenth Amendment,
are violated when "attorney" becomes a Title of special
privileges, i.e. "Nobility." We must all have equal access to
the Courts. Presently, only those attorneys have access to the
Courts whom the Courts approve and, as a result, all "approved"
attorneys are considered Officers of the Court.
Where does the defendant go when he does not wish to be
defended by an Officer of the Court? To use the power of the
Court to force the defense to retain an Officer of the Court at
the defense table offends the sensibilities of the Defendant to
the very core. Defendant may wish voluntarily to select an
attorney among his Counsels, but this Defendant believes that he
should not be forced to do so. Defendant is simply seeking
freedom of choice in the matter of whether he has no Counsel and
represents himself, or uses licensed legal Counsel (attorney),
mixed Counsel (attorneys and laymen) or lay Counsel only.
The "stealthy encroachment" upon Defendant's Right to a
Counsel who is not licensed by the Bar is the result of a
monopoly of the legal establishment, both in and out of
government, State and Federal, to "protect" their "price fixing";
to maintain artificially high legal fees; to educate the chosen
few in law schools maintained largely at public expense; to
protect attorneys from competition from those who know that

attorneys have obstructed the U.S. Constitution and left the
People at the mercy of a swarm of bureaucrats with endless
attorney-promoted regulations and laws which make "crimes" out of
the exercise of natural and Constitutionally protected Rights,
wherein the attorney-controlled government can prosecute the
Sovereign Citizen and force him into the waiting, outstretched
arms of his attorney "brotherhood," who will "advise" and
"defend" him for a considerable fee.

Page 22 of 32
Little wonder that People are fed up with the profession
when it is full of licensed "Haldemans, Erlichmans, Mitchells,
and Deans." Little wonder many People almost vomit when
contemplating what attorneys have done to this once mighty,
powerful, and independent Republic.
Legal fees come too high for many average Citizens. Yet,
the same average Citizen cannot turn to laymen who may be well
versed in the necessary legal area, and this restricts the Courts
to attorneys and those who can afford them. Laymen who cannot
afford attorneys must suffer along as best they can. It is as
unjust a system of justice as one could conjure up. Of course,
some persons may qualify for a Public Defender. That is like
being alone in a pit of cobras, and someone comes along and wants
to throw in another cobra. Under those circumstances, what is
needed is a mongoose (read "Counsel of Choice"), not another
cobra. Perhaps the STAR CHAMBERS weren't so bad after all.
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Defendant has not only the Right to speak for himself, but
also to speak through whom he pleases. This is inherent in the
First Amendment Right to freedom of speech. It is also self-
evident as a part of the Natural Rights Doctrine. Those Rights
which are called inherent and inalienable are outlined in the
Declaration of Independence, which antedates all government.
They are natural or God-given, rather than government-given,
rights. Defendant points out that he does not claim any
"attorney-given" rights, but demands that his God-given, Natural
Rights not be infringed upon.

Page 23 of 32
This fundamental Right of freedom of speech has been
referred to previously, but Defendant wishes to set it out
separately to emphasize it to the Court, and herein refers again
to United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association supra, NAACP
v. Button supra, and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Virginia State Bar supra, in support of said Right.
It is indicative that the words in the First Amendment
embrace freedom "of" speech, and not just freedom "to" speak, and
while Defendant does not wish to prolong this Brief by a detailed
discussion of the difference between the two terms, he simply
wishes to bring to the Court's attention that there is a
difference, and that its application is obvious.
VI
DENIAL OF FREEDOM OF COUNSEL

RESULTS IN A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Defendant's request for the Court to recognize his Right to
non-attorney Counsel in lieu of, or in addition to, attorney

Counsel, would mean that the Court would have to rule during
trial on a motion regarding Defendant's Right to non-attorney
assistance, including that of assistant spokesman.
If presiding Judge of this Honorable Court has, in the past,
ever been a member of any Bar Association or is, at present, a
member of a Bar Association, or has close friends or associates
connected with a Bar Association, then Defendant finds it
difficult to see how the Court could possibly render an
unprejudiced and impartial ruling on Defendant's motion regarding
his Right to non-attorney Counsel.

Page 24 of 32
It appears to Defendant that the Court would find itself at
variance with his own standards, mainly the Cannons of Judicial
Ethics, No. 29, which states:
A judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any

judicial act in which his personal interests are involved.
If he has a personal litigation in the court of which he is
judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that account, but
he should, of course, refrain from any judicial act in such
controversy.
It is apparent to the Defendant that the denial of
Defendant's motion herein would call for the thinking, on the
part of most reasonable persons, that the denial was based, at
least in part, on a conflict of interest and upon a "hardship of
the case," meaning upon the unfortunate Bar Associations.
Granting the motion, however, could not be interpreted as
being a conflict of interest, but rather, granting the motion
would occur despite personal interest and in favor of fairness,
of due process, and the justice to which the Sovereign Citizen of
this Republic is entitled under the Sixth Amendment.


Page 25 of 32
VII
FEDERAL COURT'S ENFORCEMENT

OF PRACTICE-OF-LAW STATE STATUTE
ABRIDGES FIRST, NINTH, AND TENTH AMENDMENTS
The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the

Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
The power to abrogate the Rights mentioned herein has not been
delegated to the United States nor to any State through the U.S.
Constitution. Such a power is an undelegated colorable "office."
Nothing in the U.S. Constitution of this Union state
authorizes a delegation of power to the state to thwart and
frustrate the foregoing Rights, i.e. freedom of speech, of
religion, of assembly, of petitioning for redress of grievances,
of due process, of the Right to contract, and of equal treatment
under the law.
Therefore, assuming the foregoing is true, then the "power"
remains with the People, who are the Sovereigns in this country
as heretofore pointed out. Therefore, the Defendant retains the
power for his choice of a spokesman in Court, "any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." See Article VI, Clause 2. Regardless of this
state's statutes or any arbitrary rule making, it cannot
invalidate the Defendant's fundamental Rights protected by the
U.S. Constitution. Said pretended right to "regulate" the
"practice of law" must fall, or recede, when placed alongside the
Defendant's fundamental Right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury, with due process, freedom of speech, and freedom of

contract, as heretofore demonstrated.
It is impossible to delegate to another that which the
delegator does not himself possess. Defendant does not have the
right to compel the inadequate representation of another and,
therefore, this Defendant is powerless to delegate such a
tyrannical power to a legislature, whether or not controlled by
attorneys or any Bar association.

Page 26 of 32
To summarize the foregoing, the Tenth Amendment prohibits
this State and its Courts from restricting Defendant's
fundamental Right to a non-attorney spokesman in court. Such
power is not given to the State by either the U.S. or by the
State Constitutions. Therefore, in civil cases, the Legislature
has usurped, at the prodding of attorneys, the so-called Right
to institute a statute prohibiting a Defendant, in a prosecution
against him by his government, from relying upon a preferred
spokesman of trust and confidence. In criminal cases, there is
no valid reason, statute, or Court ruling that can alter the
fundamental Right to Counsel, and the Courts, in denying said
spokesman, are arbitrarily usurping Defendant's Right.
The Ninth Amendment reserves all non-enumerated Rights.
They are not to be denied or disparaged, though not enumerated.
The mention and enumeration of the Right to Counsel under the
Supreme authority of the Sixth Amendment cannot be construed to
deny or disparage the Right to that Counsel being a non-attorney,
or a non-member of any Bar Association licensed to only plea
bargain and lose.
It would appear that any decent person would have no

difficulty agreeing with the above, and that any other ruling
would indeed be "frivolous" and without constitutional authority.
Again, imposing restrictions on Defendant's Counsel violates
and circumvents Defendant's Fifth Amendment Rights. In addition,
it imposes cruel and unusual punishment upon the Defendant by
forcing him to seek legal assistance, when and if he needs it,
from those whom he either does not trust or cannot afford.

Page 27 of 32
VIII
DENIAL OF NON-ATTORNEY COUNSEL

VIOLATES CIVIL RIGHTS
Denial of Defendant's desire for a non-attorney of his
choice is also a deprivation of his Civil Rights under color of
law, in violation of Defendant's fundamental Rights as protected
by 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986. See Owens v. The City of
Independence.
CONCLUSION
Any denial of Counsel is an attempt to accomplish that which
is specifically prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. The Right
recognized therein says nothing about only "court-approved
counsel," and that fundamental Right is in no way qualified or
limited.
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S.
713, 715, that if a statute is part of an unlawful scheme to
reach a prohibited result, then "... the statute must fail ...."
This was again upheld in McCallen v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620,
630. Legislators, whether Federal or State, may not restrict the
Courts only to attorneys in order to deny effective assistance of

Counsel to any Defendant who evinces a desire to be represented
or assisted by a "friend," in preference to a licensed
"attorney." What cannot be done by the front door cannot be
lawfully done by way of the back door.
Legislators who pass laws do not have to be attorneys, nor
do those who execute the law, i.e. Sheriffs, Governors,
Presidents, etc. Even the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
need not be licensed attorneys. To exclude the People from
defending their "friends" in the Courts turns said Courts into a
playground for the legal establishment, and is a blatant
violation of the Defendant's fundamental Right to Counsel of
choice, due process of law, and equal protection under the law.
Justice Brandeis said:
Discrimination is the act of treating differently two

persons or things under like circumstances. National Life
Insurance Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508, 630.

Page 28 of 32
As far back as 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court was concerned
with the unjust and illegal discriminations which were running
rampant. The Court frowned upon law administered with an
"unequal hand":
... [S]o as practically to make unjust and illegal

discrimination between persons in similar circumstances
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is
still within the prohibition of the Constitution. Yick Wo
v. Hopkins supra.
Therefore, the Courts cannot be the exclusive territory of a
legal "elite corps," but must be open to all the Sovereign People
alike -- on an equal basis, providing due process of Law and
equal protection under that Law.
The Ninth and Tenth Amendments also prohibit the denial of

Counsel of choice. Nowhere has Defendant or his predecessors
delegated such restrictive powers to the United States or to any
of the Union states, and if the Court will closely examine the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, it will find that the Right to
Counsel of choice, such as Defendant herein claims, is also
secured in the penumbra of these Amendments, particularly the
Ninth Amendment, which is protected in the states. Roe v. Wade,
41 L.W. 4213 (1973); Shapiro v. U.S., 641, 394 US 618 (1966);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964).

Page 29 of 32
Speaking of controlling constitutional law, as opposed to
mere statute law, Chief Justice Marshall said:
Those then, who controvert this principle, that the

Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount
law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts
must close their eyes on the Constitution and see only the
law.
And the Court concluded that:
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all

written constitutions. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176
The United States Supreme Court also pointed out in this decision
that, in declaring what should be the supreme Law of the Land,
the U.S. Constitution itself was first mentioned and "... not the
laws of the United States generally ...."
The attorneys who sit in Our State legislatures and in Our
Congress have no right to pass laws which infringe upon, or
abolish, Our fundamental Rights under the U.S. Constitution for
the United States of America, as lawfully amended, and such
unconstitutional laws which purport to do so must be declared

null and void and not binding upon the Courts. See Miranda v.
Arizona supra, at 491.
VERIFICATION
"United States," that the above statements of fact are true and
correct, to the best of My current information, knowledge, and
belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).

Page 30 of 32
/s/ Sheila Wallen



Page 31 of 32
PROOF OF SERVICE
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION

FOR VIOLATING THE FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEE
OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
Sixth Amendment

Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Washington
Solicitor General
Washington
/s/ Sheila Wallen

________________________________________
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris,

Page 32 of 32
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : jurychal

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona


)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF MOTION AND
) MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
v. ) FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
) GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND
) CHALLENGE TO
Defendant. ) CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
) 28 U.S.C. 297, 517, 518,
) 1861, 1865, and 1867(d),(e),
________________________________) F.R.Cr.P. Rule 6(b)(2)
"Defendant"), to Petition this honorable Court for a stay of the
instant proceedings, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
1867(d), pending proper review of the Defendant's challenge to
the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 1865, to wit:
1865. Qualifications for jury service
(a) The chief judge of the district court, or such other

district court judge as the plan may provide ... shall
determine solely on the basis of information provided
on the juror qualification form and other competent
evidence whether a person is unqualified for, or
exempt, or to be excused from jury service. ...
(b) In making such determination the chief judge of the

district court, or such other district court judge as
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/jurychal.htm (1 of 9) [4/8/2007 2:13:18 PM]

the plan may provide, shall deem any person qualified

to serve on grand and petit juries in the district
court unless he --
(1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen

years old who has resided for a period of one
year within the judicial district; ....
[28 U.S.C. 1865, emphasis added]
Motion to Stay Proceedings:

Page 1 of 8
In stark contrast, it is the policy of the United States
that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered
for service on grand juries in the district courts of the United
States. To be constitutional, and to be consistent with its
legislative intent, the term "all citizens", as that term is
used in 28 U.S.C. 1861, must be construed to include also
Citizens of the freely associated compact states who are not
also citizens of the United States (a/k/a "federal citizens"):
1861. Declaration of policy
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in

Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the
right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a
fair cross section of the community in the district or
division wherein the court convenes. It is further the
policy of the United States that all citizens shall have
the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and
petit juries in the district courts of the United States,
and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when
summoned for that purpose.
[28 U.S.C. 1861, emphasis added]
Defendant hereby provides notice to all interested parties
of Her sworn (verified) statement of law and facts which
constitute a substantial failure to comply with the Constitution
for the United States of America, as lawfully amended
(hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), and with the provisions of
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1861: Declaration of

Policy. See 28 U.S.C. 1867(d) and (e). The indicting Grand
Jury consisted of members all of whom were citizens of the
United States, not necessarily Citizens of Arizona state. See
Dyett v. Turner and State v. Phillips infra; Right of Election;
voter registration affidavits.

Page 2 of 8
By way of introduction to the crucial matters of fact and
law which are discussed at length in Defendant's sworn
(verified) statement, which is hereby incorporated by reference
as if set forth fully herein, this honorable Court is hereby
respectfully requested to take formal judicial notice of the
additional standing authorities on this question:
We have in our political system a Government of the United

States and a government of each of the several States.
Each one of these governments is distinct from the others,
and each has citizens of its own .... Slaughter-House
Cases
[United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)]
[emphasis added]
A person who is a citizen of the United States** is

necessarily a citizen of the particular state in which he
resides. But a person may be a citizen of a particular
state and not a citizen of the United States. To hold
otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest
exercise of its sovereignty, -- the right to declare who
are its citizens.
[State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]
[6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]
There are, then, under our republican form of government,

two classes of citizens, one of the United States and one
of the state. One class of citizenship may exist in a
person, without the other, as in the case of a resident of
the District of Columbia; but both classes usually exist in
the same person.
[Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155]

[48 S. 788, 791 (1909), emphasis added]
There are over 100,000 elementary and secondary schools in

the United States. ... Each of these now has an invisible

federal zone extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often
irregular) boundaries of the school property.
[U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995)]

Page 3 of 8
As a Party to the instant case, the Defendant hereby
challenges the indicting Grand Jury on the ground that such jury
was not selected in conformity with section 1861 of Title 28,
because Citizens of Arizona state who are not also citizens of
the United States (a/k/a federal citizens) are disqualified from
serving by virtue of their chosen Citizenship status. See 28
U.S.C. 1867(e); Right of Election; 15 Statutes at Large,
Chapter 249 (Section 1), enacted July 27, 1868; jus soli; jus
sanguinis. Specifically, the offensive statute forces the
following unconstitutional result upon Citizens of Arizona state
who choose not also to be citizens of the United States (a/k/a
federal citizens):
citizen of Citizen of Qualified

United States Arizona state to serve
Yes Yes Yes

Yes No Yes
No No No
No Yes No **
This result ("**") violates the Tenth Amendment by disqualifying
Citizens of Arizona state from serving on federal grand juries
when they are not also federal citizens, thus denying to accused
Citizens of Arizona state a grand jury of Their Peers when a
grand jury consists only of federal citizens.
An intentional discrimination against a class of persons,
solely because of their class, by officers in charge of the
selection and summoning of grand jurors in a criminal case, is a

violation of the fundamental Rights of an accused. See Cassell
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282; Atkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398; Pierre
v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354. Such a violation is not excused by
the fact that the persons actually selected for jury service
otherwise possess the necessary qualifications for jurors as
prescribed by statute. See State v. Jones, 365 P.2d 460.

Page 4 of 8
Discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, as
prohibited by the U.S. Constitution, means an intentional,
systematic noninclusion because of class. There are two (2)
classes of citizenship in America. E.g. Gardina supra. The
statute 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1) specifically excludes those classes
of Citizens who are not mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. The following statute dramatically demonstrates that
Congress appreciates the difference between the two classes, and
knows how to discriminate between "white citizens" (read "state
Citizens") and "citizens of the United States" (a/k/a federal
citizens). The Act of Congress called the Civil Rights Act, 14
U.S. Statutes at Large, p. 27, which was the forerunner of the
so-called 14th Amendment, amply shows the intent of Congress, as
follows:
... [A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject
to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and
such citizens, of every race and color ... shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States ... to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens.
[emphasis added]
Once a prima facie case for the existence of purposeful

discrimination is made out, the burden shifts to the prosecution
to prove otherwise. See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545.
Reliance on the so-called Fourteenth Amendment to resolve this
matter is moot, because the Fourteenth Amendment was never
lawfully ratified, and because the authorities cited supra allow
for the possibility that a Person can be a state Citizen without
also being a federal citizen, whether or not the Fourteenth
Amendment was lawfully ratified. See State v. Phillips, 540
P.2d 936, 941 (1975); Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d
266, 270 (1968); Full Faith and Credit Clause; 28 Tulane Law
Review 22; 11 South Carolina Law Quarterly 484; House
Congressional Record, June 13, 1967, p. 15641 et seq.

Page 5 of 8
As such, there is no constitutional provision which makes a
federal citizen also a citizen of the Union state in which s/he
resides, nor is there any constitutional provision which states
that the validity of the public debt shall not be questioned.
The judicial history of American citizenship is a subject
which is rich in nuance and detail, as demonstrated in
Defendant's sworn (verified) statement. For example, at a time
when those Islands were in the federal zone, the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands found that "citizenship," strictly
speaking, is a term of municipal law and, according to that
Court, it is municipal law which regulates the conditions on
which citizenship is acquired:
Citizenship, says Moore on International Law, strictly

speaking, is a term of municipal law and denotes the
possession within the particular state of full civil and
political rights subject to special disqualifications, such
as minority, sex, etc. The conditions on which citizenship
are [sic] acquired are regulated by municipal law. There

is no such thing as international citizenship nor

international law (aside from that which might be contained
in treaties) by which citizenship is acquired.
[Roa v. Collector of Customs]

[23 Philippine 315, 332 (1912)]
Indeed, international law is divided roughly into two groups:
(1) public international law and (2) private international law.
Citizenship is a term of private international law (also known
as municipal law) in which the terms "state", "nation" and
"country" are all synonymous:

Page 6 of 8
Private international law assumes a more important aspect

in the United States than elsewhere, for the reason that
the several states, although united under the same
sovereign authority and governed by the same laws for all
national purposes embraced by the Federal Constitution, are
otherwise, at least so far as private international law is
concerned, in the same relation as foreign countries. The
great majority of questions of private international law
are therefore subject to the same rules when they arise
between two states of the Union as when they arise between
two foreign countries, and in the ensuing pages the words
"state," "nation," and "country" are used synonymously and
interchangeably, there being no intention to distinguish
between the several states of the Union and foreign
countries by the use of varying terminology.
[16 Am Jur 2d, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 2]

[emphasis added]
Congress does refer to the Union states as "countries." See 28
U.S.C. 297.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Wherefore, Defendant petitions this honorable Court for an
indefinite stay of the proceedings in the instant case, pending
proper review of the substantial issues of law and fact which
are alleged in this Motion and which are contained in
Defendant's sworn (verified) statement which is attached hereto

and incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
Executed on: _________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen


Page 7 of 8
PROOF OF SERVICE
America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18
years of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America,
and that I personally served the following document(s):
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY,
AND NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF STATUTE: 28 U.S.C. 297, 517, 518, 1861, 1865, and 1867(d)
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in
first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and
properly addressed to the following:

Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Washington
Solicitor General
Washington

Executed on: _____________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________

Page 8 of 8
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : swornaff

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], ) Case No. 95-484-WDB

)
Plaintiff, ) VERIFIED STATEMENT
) IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO
v. ) GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY
) AND ITS FEDERAL STATUTE:
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) 28 U.S.C. 1746(1), 1861,
) 1865
Defendant. )
________________________________)
"Defendant"), to record Her Verified Statement in Support of
Challenge to Grand Jury Selection Policy and its Federal
Statute. "We are no longer subjects of a government." See "The
Meaning of American Citizenship" by the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization infra and EXHIBIT "A" attached.
VERIFICATION
The Undersigned hereby verifies, under penalty of perjury,
"United States," that the following Statement is true and
correct, to the best of My current information, knowledge, and
belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1):
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/swornaff.htm (1 of 37) [4/8/2007 2:13:27 PM]

Verified Statement Challenging Grand Jury Selection Policy:

Page 1 of 36
Chapter 11:
Sovereignty
The issue of sovereignty as it relates to jurisdiction is a

major key to understanding our system of government under the
Constitution. In the most common sense of the word,
"sovereignty" is autonomy, freedom from external control. The
sovereignty of any government usually extends up to, but not
beyond, the borders of its jurisdiction. This jurisdiction
defines a specific territorial boundary which separates the
"external" from the "internal", the "within" from the "without".
It may also define a specific function, or set of functions,
which a government may lawfully perform within a particular
territorial boundary. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition,
defines sovereignty to mean:
... [T]he international independence of a state, combined

with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs
without foreign dictation.
On a similar theme, Black's defines "sovereign states" to be

those which are not under the control of any foreign power:
No foreign power or law can have control except by

convention. This power of independent action in external
and internal relations constitutes complete sovereignty.
It is a well established principle of law that the 50

States are "foreign" with respect to each other, just as the
federal zone is "foreign" with respect to each of them (In re
Merriam's Estate, 36 NE 505 (1894)). The status of being
foreign is the same as "belonging to" or being "attached to"
another state or another jurisdiction. The proper legal
distinction between the terms "foreign" and "domestic" is best
seen in Black's definitions of foreign and domestic
corporations, as follows:
Foreign corporation. A corporation doing business in one

state though chartered or incorporated in another state is
a foreign corporation as to the first state, and, as such,
is required to consent to certain conditions and
restrictions in order to do business in such first state.
Domestic corporation. When a corporation is organized and

chartered in a particular state, it is considered a
domestic corporation of that state.
The federal zone is an area over which Congress exercises

exclusive legislative jurisdiction. It is the area over which
the federal government exercises its sovereignty. Despite its

obvious importance, the subject of federal jurisdiction had been

almost entirely ignored outside the courts until the year 1954.
In that year, a detailed study of federal jurisdiction was
undertaken. The occasion for the study arose from a school
playground, of all places. The children of federal employees
residing on the grounds of a Veterans' Administration hospital
were not allowed to attend public schools in the town where the
hospital was located. An administrative decision against the
children was affirmed by local courts, and finally affirmed by
the State supreme court. The residents of the area on which the
hospital was located were not "residents" of the State, since
"exclusive legislative jurisdiction" over this area had been
ceded by the State to the federal government.

Page 2 of 36
A committee was assembled by Attorney General Herbert

Brownell, Jr. Their detailed study was reported in a
publication entitled Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the
States, April 1956 (Volume I) and June 1957 (Volume II). The
committee's report demonstrates, beyond any doubt, that the
sovereign States and their laws are outside the legislative and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States** federal
government. They are totally outside the federal zone. A
plethora of evidence is found in the myriad of cited court cases
(700+) which prove that the United States** cannot exercise
exclusive legislative jurisdiction outside territories or places
purchased from, or ceded by, the 50 States of the Union.
Attorney General Brownell described the committee's report as an
"exhaustive and analytical exposition of the law in this
hitherto little explored field". In his letter of transmittal
to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Brownell summarized the two
volumes as follows:
Together, the two parts of this Committee's report and the

full implementation of its recommendations will provide a
basis for reversing in many areas the swing of "the
pendulum of power * * * from our states to the central
government" to which you referred in your address to the
Conference of State Governors on June 25, 1957.
[Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States]

[Letter of Transmittal, page V, emphasis added]
Once a State is admitted into the Union, its sovereign

jurisdiction is firmly established over a predefined territory.
The federal government is thereby prevented from acquiring
legislative jurisdiction, by means of unilateral action, over
any area within the exterior boundaries of this predefined
territory. State assent is necessary to transfer jurisdiction
to Congress:
The Federal Government cannot, by unilateral action on its

part, acquire legislative jurisdiction over any area within
the exterior boundaries of a State. Article 1, Section 8,

Clause 17, of the Constitution, provides that legislative

jurisdiction may be transferred pursuant to its terms only
with the consent of the legislature of the State in which
is located the area subject to the jurisdictional transfer.

[Volume II, page 46, emphasis added]

Page 3 of 36
Under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution,

States of the Union have enacted statutes consenting to the
federal acquisition of any land, or of specific tracts of land,
within those States. Secondly, the federal government has also
made "reservations" of jurisdiction over certain areas in
connection with the admission of a State into the Union. A
third means for transfer of legislative jurisdiction has also
come into considerable use over time, namely, a general or
special statute whereby a State makes a cession of specific
functional jurisdiction to the federal government.
Nevertheless, the Committee report explained that "... the
characteristics of a legislative jurisdiction status are the
same no matter by which of the three means the Federal
Government acquired such status" [Volume II, page 3]. There is
simply no federal legislative jurisdiction without consent by a
State, cession by a State, or reservation by the federal
government:
It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has been a

transfer of jurisdiction (1) pursuant to clause 17 by a
Federal acquisition of land with State consent, or (2) by
cession from the State to the Federal Government, or unless
the Federal Government has reserved jurisdiction upon the
admission of the State, the Federal Government possesses no
legislative jurisdiction over any area within a State, such
jurisdiction being for exercise entirely by the State ....

The areas which the 50 States have properly ceded to the

federal government are called federal "enclaves":
By this means some thousands of areas have become Federal

islands, sometimes called "enclaves," in many respects
foreign to the States in which they are situated. In
general, not State but Federal law is applicable in an area
under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the United
States**, for enforcement not by State but Federal
authorities, and in many instances not in State but in
Federal courts.


These federal enclaves are considered foreign with respect to

the States which surround them, just as the 50 States are
considered foreign with respect to each other and to the federal
zone: "...[T]he several states of the Union are to be
considered as in this respect foreign to each other ...."
Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1 (1885). Once a State surrenders
its sovereignty over a specific area of land, it is powerless
over that land; it is without authority; it cannot recapture any
of its transferred jurisdiction by unilateral action, just as
the federal government cannot acquire jurisdiction over State
area by its unilateral action. The State has transferred its
sovereign authority to a foreign power:

Page 4 of 36
Once a State has, by one means or another, transferred

jurisdiction to the United States**, it is, of course,
powerless to control many of the consequences; without
jurisdiction, it is without the authority to deal with many
of the problems, and having transferred jurisdiction to the
United States**, it cannot unilaterally capture any of the
transferred jurisdiction.

Once sovereignty has been relinquished, a State no longer

has the authority to enforce criminal laws in areas under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States**. Privately owned
property in such areas is beyond the taxing authority of the
State. Residents of such areas are not "residents" of the
State, and hence are not subject to the obligations of residents
of the State, and are not entitled to any of the benefits and
privileges conferred by the State upon its residents. Residents
of federal enclaves usually cannot vote, serve on juries, or run
for office. They do not, as matter of right, have access to
State schools, hospitals, mental institutions, or similar
establishments.
The acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction by the Federal

Government renders unavailable to the residents of the affected
areas the benefits of the laws and judicial and administrative
processes of the State relating to adoption, the probate of
wills and administration of estates, divorce, and many other
matters. Police, fire-fighting, notaries, coroners, and similar
services performed by, or under, the authority of a State may
result in legal sanction within a federal enclave. The "old"
State laws which apply are only those which are consistent with
the laws of the "new" sovereign authority, using the following
principle from international law:
The vacuum which would exist because of the absence of

State law or Federal legislation with respect to civil
matters in areas under Federal exclusive legislative

jurisdiction has been partially filled by the courts,

through extension to these areas of a rule of international
law that[,] when one sovereign takes over territory of
another[,] the laws of the original sovereign in effect at
the time of the taking[,] which are not inconsistent with
the laws or policies of the second[,] continue in effect,
as laws of the succeeding sovereign, until changed by that
sovereign.

[Volume II, page 6, commas added for clarity]
[emphasis added]

Page 5 of 36
It is clear, then, that only one "state" can be sovereign

at any given moment in time, whether that "state" be one of the
50 Union States, or the federal government of the United
States**. Before ceding a tract of land to Congress, a State of
the Union exercises its sovereign authority over any land within
its borders:
Save only as they are subject to the prohibitions of the

Constitution, or as their action in some measure conflicts
with the powers delegated to the national government or
with congressional legislation enacted in the exercise of
those powers, the governments of the states are sovereign
within their territorial limits and have exclusive
jurisdiction over persons and property located therein.
[72 American Jurisprudence 2d, Section 4]

[emphasis added]
After a State has ceded a tract of land to Congress, the

situation is completely different. The United States**, as the
"succeeding sovereign", then exercises its sovereign authority
over that land. In this sense, sovereignty is indivisible, even
though the Committee's report documented numerous situations in
which jurisdiction was actually shared between the federal
government and one of the 50 States. Even in this situation,
however, sovereignty rests either in the State, or in the
federal government, but never both. Sovereignty is the
authority to which there is politically no superior. Outside
the federal zone, the States of the Union remain sovereign, and
their laws are completely outside the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction of the federal government of the United States**.
This understanding of the separate sovereignties possessed

by each of the State and federal governments was not only valid
during the Eisenhower administration; it has been endorsed by
the U.S. Supreme Court as recently as 1985. In that year, the
high Court examined the "dual sovereignty doctrine" when it
ruled that successive prosecutions by two States for the same
conduct were not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The "crucial determination" turned on whether

State and federal powers derive from separate and independent

sources. The Supreme Court explained that the doctrine of dual
sovereignty has been uniformly upheld by the courts:
It has been uniformly held that the States are separate

sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government because
each State's power to prosecute derives from its inherent
sovereignty, preserved to it by the Tenth Amendment, and
not from the Federal Government. Given the distinct
sources of their powers to try a defendant, the States are
no less sovereign with respect to each other than they are
with respect to the Federal Government.
[Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1985)]

Page 6 of 36
Now, if a State of the Union is sovereign, is it correct to

say that the State exercises an authority to which there is
absolutely no superior? No, this is not a correct statement.
There is no other organized body which is superior to the
organized body which retains sovereignty. The sovereignty of
governments is an authority to which there is no organized
superior, but there is absolutely a superior body, and that
superior body is the People of the United States*** of America:
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are

synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both
describe the political body who, according to our
republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold
the power and conduct the government through their
representatives. They are what we familiarly call the
"sovereign people," and every citizen is one of this
people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856)]

[emphasis added]
The source of all sovereignty in a constitutional Republic like

the 50 States, united by and under the Constitution for the
United States of America, is the People themselves. Remember,
the States, and the federal government acting inside those
States, are both bound by the terms of a contract known as the
U.S. Constitution. That Constitution is a contract of delegated
powers which ultimately originate in the sovereignty of the
Creator, who endowed creation, individual People like you and
me, with sovereignty in that Creator's image and likeness.
Nothing stands between us and the Creator. I think it is fair
to say that the Supreme Court of the United States was never
more eloquent when it described the source of sovereignty as
follows:
Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for

it is the author and source of law; but in our system,
while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of

government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by

whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the
law is the definition and limitation of power. It is
indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged
somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of
final decision; and in many cases of mere administration
the responsibility is purely political, no appeal except to
the ultimate tribunal of the public judgement, exercised
either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the
suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional
law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress
of the race in securing to men the blessings of
civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so
that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of
Rights, the government of the commonwealth "may be a
government of laws and not of men." For, the very idea
that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
the essence of slavery itself.
[Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)]

[emphasis added]

Page 7 of 36
More recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the fundamental

importance of US the People as the source of sovereignty, and
the subordinate status which Congress occupies in relation to
the sovereignty of the People. The following language is terse
and right on point:
In the United States***, sovereignty resides in the people

who act through the organs established by the Constitution.
[cites omitted] The Congress as the instrumentality of
sovereignty is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on
behalf of the people in the manner and with the effect the
Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the
sovereign power of the people to override their will as
thus declared.
[Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935)]

[emphasis added]
No discussion of sovereignty would be complete, therefore,

without considering the sovereignty that resides in US, the
People. The Supreme Court has often identified the People as
the source of sovereignty in our republican form of government.
Indeed, the federal Constitution guarantees to every State in
the Union a "Republican Form" of government, in so many words:
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every

State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and

shall protect each of them against Invasion; ....
[United States Constitution, Article 4, Section 4]

[emphasis added]
What exactly is a "Republican Form" of government? It is one in

which the powers of sovereignty are vested in the People and
exercised by the People. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition,
makes this very clear in its various definitions of
"government":
Republican government. One in which the powers of

sovereignty are vested in the people and are exercised by
the people, either directly, or through representatives
chosen by the people, to whom those powers are specially
delegated. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35
L.Ed. 219; Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 22
L.Ed. 627.

Page 8 of 36
The Supreme Court has clearly distinguished between the

operation of governments in Europe, and government in these
United States*** of America, as follows:
In Europe, the executive is almost synonymous with the

sovereign power of a State; and generally includes
legislative and judicial authority. ... Such is the
condition of power in that quarter of the world, where it
is too commonly acquired by force or fraud, or both, and
seldom by compact. In America, however, the case is widely
different. Our government is founded upon compact.
Sovereignty was, and is, in the people.
[Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall 6 (1794)]

[emphasis added]
The federal Constitution makes a careful distinction

between natural born Citizens and citizens of the United
States** (compare 2:1:5 with Section 1 of the so-called 14th
Amendment). One is an unconditional Sovereign by natural birth,
who is endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable rights;
the other has been granted the revocable privileges of U.S.**
citizenship, endowed by the Congress of the United States**.
One is a Citizen, the other is a subject. One is a Sovereign,
the other is a subordinate. One is a Citizen of our
constitutional Republic; the other is a citizen of a
legislative democracy (the federal zone). Notice the
superior/subordinate relationship between these two statuses. I
am forever indebted to M. J. "Red" Beckman, co-author of The Law
That Never Was with Bill Benson, for clearly illustrating the
important difference between the two. Red Beckman has delivered
many eloquent lectures based on the profound simplicity of the

following table:
Chain of command and authority in a:
Majority Rule Constitutional

Democracy Republic
X Creator
Majority Individual
Government Constitution
Public Servants Government
Case & Statute Law Public Servants
Corporations Statute Law
individual Corporations
In this illustration, a democracy ruled by the majority

places the individual at the bottom, and an unknown elite, Mr.
"X" at the top. The majority (or mob) elects a government to
hire public "servants" who write laws primarily for the benefit
of corporations. These corporations are either owned or
controlled by Mr. X, a clique of the ultra-wealthy who seek to
restore a two-class "feudal" society. They exercise their vast
economic power so as to turn all of America into a "feudal
zone". The rights of individuals occupy the lowest priority in
this chain of command. Those rights often vanish over time,
because democracies eventually self-destruct. The enforcement
of laws within this scheme is the job of administrative
tribunals, who specialize in holding individuals to the letter
of all rules and regulations of the corporate state, no matter
how arbitrary and with little if any regard for fundamental
human rights:

Page 9 of 36
A democracy that recognizes only manmade laws perforce

obliterates the concept of Liberty as a divine right.
[A Ticket to Liberty, November 1990 edition, page 146]

[emphasis added]
In the constitutional Republic, however, the rights of

individuals are supreme. Individuals delegate their sovereignty
to a written contract, called a constitution, which empowers
government to hire public servants to write laws primarily for
the benefit of individuals. The corporations occupy the lowest
priority in this chain of command, since their primary
objectives are to maximize the enjoyment of individual rights,
and to facilitate the fulfillment of individual
responsibilities. The enforcement of laws within this scheme is
the responsibility of sovereign individuals, who exercise their
power in three arenas: the voting booth, the trial jury, and
the grand jury. Without a jury verdict of "guilty", for
example, no law can be enforced and no penalty exacted. The
behavior of public servants is tightly restrained by contractual

terms, as found in the written Constitution. Statutes and case

law are created primarily to limit and define the scope and
extent of public servant power.
Sovereign individuals are subject only to a Common Law,

whose primary purposes are to protect and defend individual
rights, and to prevent anyone, whether public official or
private person, from violating the rights of other individuals.
Within this scheme, Sovereigns are never subject to their own
creations, and the constitutional contract is such a creation.
To quote the Supreme Court, "No fiction can make a natural born
subject." Milvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. 598 (1808). That
is to say, no fiction, be it a corporation, a statute law, or an
administrative regulation, can mutate a natural born Sovereign
into someone who is subject to his own creations. Author and
scholar Lori Jacques has put it succinctly as follows:
As each state is sovereign and not a territory of the

United States**, the meaning is clear that state citizens
are not subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the
United States**. Furthermore, there is not the slightest
intimation in the Constitution which created the "United
States" as a political entity that the "United States" is
sovereign over its creators.
[A Ticket to Liberty, November 1990 edition, page 32]

[emphasis added]

Page 10 of 36
Accordingly, if you choose to investigate the matter, you

will find a very large body of legal literature which cites
another fiction, the so-called 14th Amendment, from which the
federal government presumes to derive general authority to treat
everyone in America as subjects and not as Sovereigns:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United

States**, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States** and of the State wherein
they reside.
[United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment [sic]]

[emphasis added]
A careful reading of this amendment reveals an important

subtlety which is lost on many people who read it for the first
time. The citizens it defines are second class citizens because
the "c" is lower-case, even in the case of the State citizens it
defines. Note how the amendment defines "citizens of the United
States**" and "citizens of the State wherein they reside"! It is
just uncanny how the wording of this amendment closely parallels
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) which promulgates Section
1 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Can it be that this
amendment had something to do with subjugation, by way of taxes
and other means? Yes, it most certainly did. Section 1 of the

IRC is the section which imposes income taxes. The

corresponding section of the CFR defines who is a "citizen" as
follows:
Every person born or naturalized in the United States** and

subject to its jurisdiction is a citizen.
[26 CFR 1.1-1(c), emphasis added]
Notice the use of the term "its jurisdiction". This leaves no

doubt that the "United States**" is a singular entity in this
context. In other words, it is the federal zone. Do we dare to
speculate why the so-called 14th Amendment was written instead
with the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof"? Is this
another case of deliberate ambiguity? You be the judge.
Not only did this so-called "amendment" fail to specify

which meaning of the term "United States" was being used; like
the 16th Amendment, it also failed to be ratified, this time by
15 of the 37 States which existed in 1868. The House
Congressional Record for June 13, 1967, contains all the
documentation you need to prove that the so-called 14th
Amendment was never ratified into law (see page 15641 et seq.).
For example, it itemizes all States which voted against the
proposed amendment, and the precise dates when their
Legislatures did so. "I cannot believe that any court, in full
possession of its faculties, could honestly hold that the
amendment was properly approved and adopted." State v. Phillips,
540 P.2d. 936, 941 (1975). The Utah Supreme Court has detailed
the shocking and sordid history of the 14th Amendment's
"adoption" in the case of Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439
P.2d 266, 270 (1968).

Page 11 of 36
A great deal of written material on the 14th Amendment has

been assembled into computer files by Richard McDonald, whose
mailing address is 585-D Box Canyon Road, Canoga Park,
California Republic (not "CA"). He requests that ZIP codes not
be used on his incoming mail (use "ZIP code exempt (DMM 122.32)"
instead). Richard McDonald has done a mountain of legal
research and writing on the origins and effects of the so-called
14th Amendment. He documents how key court decisions like the
Slaughter House Cases, among many others, all found that there
is a clear distinction between a Citizen of a State and a
citizen of the United States** . A State Citizen is a
Sovereign, whereas a citizen of the United States** is a subject
of Congress. The exercise of federal citizenship is a statutory
privilege which can be taxed with excises. The exercise of
State Citizenship is a Common Law Right which simply cannot be
taxed because governments cannot tax the exercise of a right,
ever.
The case of U.S. v. Cruikshank is famous, not only for

confirming this distinction between State Citizens and U.S.**

citizens, but also for establishing a key precedent in the area

of due process. This precedent underlies the "void for
vagueness" doctrine which can and should be applied to nullify
the IRC. On the issue of citizenship, the Cruikshank court
ruled as follows:
We have in our political system a government of the United

States** and a government of each of the several States.
Each one of these governments is distinct from the others,
and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and
whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect.
The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the
United States** and a citizen of a State, but his rights of
citizenship under one of these governments will be
different from those he has under the other. Slaughter-
House Cases
[United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)]

[emphasis added]
The leading authorities for this pivotal distinction are,

indeed, a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions known as the
Slaughter House Cases, which examined the so-called 14th
Amendment in depth. An exemplary paragraph from these cases is
the following:
It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the

United States** and a citizenship of a State, which are
distinct from each other and which depend upon different
characteristics or circumstances in the individual.
[Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 16 Wall. 36]

[21 L.Ed. 394 (1873), emphasis added]

Page 12 of 36
A similar authority is found in the case of K. Tashiro v.

Jordan, decided by the Supreme Court of the State of California
almost fifty years later. Notice, in particular, how the
California Supreme Court again cites the Slaughter House Cases:
That there is a citizenship of the United States** and a

citizenship of a state, and the privileges and immunities
of one are not the same as the other is well established by
the decisions of the courts of this country. The leading
cases upon the subjects are those decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States and reported in 16 Wall. 36, 21
L. Ed. 394, and known as the Slaughter House Cases.
[K. Tashiro v. Jordan, 256 P. 545, 549 (1927)]

[affirmed 278 U.S. 123 (1928)]
[emphasis added]
The Slaughter House Cases are quite important to the issue

of citizenship, but the pivotal case on the subject is the

famous Dred Scott decision, decided in 1856, prior to the Civil
War. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote one of the
longest decisions in the entire history of American
jurisprudence. In arriving at their understanding of the
precise meaning of Citizenship, as understood by the Framers of
the Constitution, the high Court left no stone unturned in their
search for relevant law:
We have the language of the Declaration of Independence and

of the Articles of Confederation, in addition to the plain
words of the Constitution itself: we have the legislation
of the different States, before, about the time, and since
the Constitution was adopted; we have the legislation of
Congress, from the time of its adoption to a recent period;
and we have the constant and uniform action of the
Executive Department, all concurring together, and leading
to the same result. And if anything in relation to the
construction of the Constitution can be regarded as
settled, it is that which we now give to the word "citizen"
and the word "people."
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856)]

[emphasis added]
In the fundamental law, the notion of a "citizen of the

United States" simply did not exist before the 14th Amendment;
at best, this notion is a fiction within a fiction. In
discussing the power of the States to naturalize, the California
State Supreme Court put it rather bluntly when it ruled that
there was no such thing as a "citizen of the United States":
A citizen of any one of the States of the union, is held to

be, and called a citizen of the United States, although
technically and abstractly there is no such thing. To
conceive a citizen of the United States who is not a
citizen of some one of the States, is totally foreign to
the idea, and inconsistent with the proper construction and
common understanding of the expression as used in the
Constitution, which must be deduced from its various other
provisions. The object then to be attained, by the
exercise of the power of naturalization, was to make
citizens of the respective States.
[Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855)]

[emphasis added]

Page 13 of 36
This decision has never been overturned!
What is the proper construction and common understanding of

the term "Citizen of the United States" as used in the original
Constitution, before the so-called 14th Amendment? This is an
important question, because this status is still a qualification

for the offices of Senator, Representative and President. No

Person can be a Representative unless he has been a Citizen of
the United States for seven years (1:2:2); no Person can be a
Senator unless he has been a Citizen of the United States for
nine years (1:3:3); no Person can be President unless he is a
natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States (2:1:5).
If these requirements had been literally obeyed, there could
have been no elections for Representatives to Congress for at
least seven years after the adoption of the Constitution, and no
one would have been eligible as a Senator for nine years after
its adoption. Author John S. Wise, in a rare book now available
on Richard McDonald's electronic bulletin board system (BBS),
explains away the problem very simply as follows:
The language employed by the convention was less careful

than that which had been used by Congress in July of the
same year, in framing the ordinance for the government of
the Northwest Territory. Congress had made the
qualification rest upon citizenship of "one of the United
States***," and this is doubtless the intent of the
convention which framed the Constitution, for it cannot
have meant anything else.
[Studies in Constitutional Law:

[A Treatise on American Citizenship]
[by John S. Wise, Edward Thompson Co. (1906)]
[emphasis added]
This quote from the Northwest Ordinance is faithful to the

letter and to the spirit of that law. In describing the
eligibility for "representatives" to serve in the general
assembly for the Northwest Territory, the critical passage from
that Ordinance reads as follows:
... Provided, That no person be eligible or qualified to

act as a representative, unless he shall have been a
citizen of one of the United States*** three years, and be
a resident in the district, or unless he shall have resided
in the district three years; ....
[Northwest Ordinance, Section 9, July 13, 1787]

[The Confederate Congress, emphasis added]

Page 14 of 36
Without citing the case as such, the words of author John

S. Wise sound a close, if not identical parallel to the argument
for the Respondent filed in the case of People v. De La Guerra,
decided by the California Supreme Court in 1870. The following
long passage elaborates the true meaning of the Constitutional
qualifications for President and Representative:
As it was the adoption of the Constitution by the

Conventions of nine States that established and created the
United States***, it is obvious there could not then have

existed any person who had been seven years a citizen of

the United States***, or who possessed the Presidential
qualifications of being thirty-five years of age, a natural
born citizen, and fourteen years a resident of the United
States***. The United States*** in these provisions, means
the States united. To be twenty-five years of age, and for
seven years to have been a citizen of one of the States
which ratifies the Constitution, is the qualification of
a representative. To be a natural born citizen of one of
the States which shall ratify the Constitution, or to be a
citizen of one of said States at the time of such
ratification, and to have attained the age of thirty-five
years, and to have been fourteen years a resident within
one of the said States, are the Presidential
qualifications, according to the true meaning of the
Constitution.
[People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870)]

[emphasis added]
Indeed, this was the same exact understanding that was reached
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Dred Scott decision. There,
the high Court clearly reinforced the sovereign status of
Citizens of the several States. The sovereigns are the Union
State Citizens, i.e. the Citizens of the States United:
It is true, every person, and every class and description

of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution recognized as citizens in the several States,
became also citizens of this new political body; but none
other; it was formed by them, and for them and their
posterity, but for no one else. And the personal rights
and privileges guarantied [sic] to citizens of this new
sovereignty were intended to embrace those only who were
then members of the several state communities, or who
should afterwards, by birthright or otherwise, become
members, according to the provisions of the Constitution
and the principles on which it was founded.
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 404 (1856)]

[emphasis added]

Page 15 of 36
Thus, the phrase "Citizen of the United States" as found in

the original Constitution is synonymous with the phrase "Citizen
of one of the United States***", i.e., a Union State Citizen.
This simple explanation will help to cut through the mountain of
propaganda and deception which have been foisted on all
Americans by government bureaucrats and their high-paid lawyers.
With this understanding firmly in place, it is very revealing to
discover that many reprints of the Constitution now utilize a
lower-case "c" in the sections which describe the qualifications
for the offices of Senator, Representative and President. This
is definitely wrong, and it is probably deliberate, so as to

confuse everyone into equating Citizens of the United States

with citizens of the United States, courtesy of the so-called
14th Amendment. There is a very big difference between the two
statuses, not the least of which is the big difference in their
respective liabilities for the income tax.
Moreover, it is quite clear that one may be a State Citizen

without also being a "citizen of the United States", whether or
not the 14th Amendment was properly ratified! According to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, the highest exercise of a State's
sovereignty is the right to declare who are its own Citizens:
A person who is a citizen of the United States** is

necessarily a citizen of the particular state in which he
resides. But a person may be a citizen of a particular
state and not a citizen of the United States**. To hold
otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest
exercise of its sovereignty, -- the right to declare who
are its citizens.
[State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380]

[6 S. 602 (1889), emphasis added]
In a book to which this writer has returned time and time again,
author Alan Stang faithfully recites some of the other relevant
court authorities, all of which ultimately trace back to the
Slaughter House Cases and the Dred Scott decision:
Indeed, just as one may be a "citizen of the United States"

and not a citizen of a State; so one apparently may be a
citizen of a State but not of the United States. On July
21, 1966, the Court of Appeal of Maryland ruled in Crosse
v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 221 A.2d 431; a
headnote in which tells us: "Both before and after the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, it has
not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the
United States in order to be a citizen of his state ...."
At page 434, Judge Oppenheimer cites a Wisconsin ruling
in which the court said this: "Under our complex system
of government, there may be a citizen of a state, who is
not a citizen of the United States in the full sense of the
term ...."
[Tax Scam, 1988 edition, pages 138-139]
[emphasis added]

Page 16 of 36
Conversely, there may be a citizen of the United States** who is

not a Citizen of any of the 50 States. In People v. De La
Guerra quoted above, the published decision of the California
Supreme Court clearly maintained this crucial distinction
between the two classes of citizenship, and did so only two
years after the alleged ratification of the so-called 14th
Amendment:

I have no doubt that those born in the Territories, or in

the District of Columbia, are so far citizens as to entitle
them to the protection guaranteed to citizens of the United
States** in the Constitution, and to the shield of
nationality abroad; but it is evident that they have not
the political rights which are vested in citizens of the
States. They are not constituents of any community in
which is vested any sovereign power of government. Their
position partakes more of the character of subjects than of
citizens. They are subject to the laws of the United
States**, but have no voice in its management. If they are
allowed to make laws, the validity of these laws is derived
from the sanction of a Government in which they are not
represented. Mere citizenship they may have, but the
political rights of citizens they cannot enjoy until they
are organized into a State, and admitted into the Union.
[People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 342 (1870]

[emphasis added]
Using language that was much more succinct, author Luella

Gettys, Ph.D. and "Sometime Carnegie Fellow in International
Law" at the University of Chicago, explained it quite nicely
this way:
... [A]s long as the territories are not admitted to

statehood no state citizenship therein could exist.
[The Law of Citizenship in the United States]

[Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 7]
This clear distinction between the Union States and the

territories is endorsed officially by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Using language very similar to that of the California Supreme
Court in the De La Guerra case, the high Court explained the
distinction this way in the year 1885, seventeen years after the
adoption of the so-called 14th amendment:
The people of the United States***, as sovereign owners of

the national territories, have supreme power over them and
their inhabitants. ... The personal and civil rights of the
inhabitants of the territories are secured to them, as to
other citizens, by the principles of constitutional
liberty, which restrain all the agencies of government,
state and national; their political rights are franchises
which they hold as privileges in the legislative discretion
of the congress of the United States**. This doctrine was
fully and forcibly declared by the chief justice,
delivering the opinion of the court in National Bank v.
County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129.
[Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885)]

[italics in original, emphasis added]

Page 17 of 36

The political rights of the federal zone's citizens are

"franchises" which they hold as "privileges" at the discretion
of the Congress of the United States**. Indeed, the doctrine
declared earlier in the National Bank case leaves no doubt that
Congress is the municipal authority for the territories:
All territory within the jurisdiction of the United States*

not included in any State must, necessarily, be governed by
or under the authority of Congress. The Territories are
but political subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the
United States**. They bear much the same relation to the
General Government that counties do to the States, and
Congress may legislate for them as States do for their
respective municipal organizations. The organic law of a
Territory takes the place of a constitution, as the
fundamental law of the local government. It is obligatory
on and binds the territorial authorities; but Congress is
supreme and, for the purposes of this department of its
governmental authority, has all the powers of the People of
the United States***, except such as have been expressly or
by implication reserved in the prohibitions of the
Constitution.
[First National Bank v. Yankton, 101 U.S. 129 (1880)]

[emphasis added]
This knowledge can be extremely valuable. In one of the

brilliant text files on his electronic bulletin board system
(BBS), Richard McDonald utilized his voluminous research into
the so-called 14th Amendment and related constitutional law when
he made the following pleading in opposition to a traffic
citation, of all things, in Los Angeles county municipal court:
17. The Accused Common-Law Citizen [Defendant] hereby

places all parties and the court on NOTICE, that he is not
a "citizen of the United States**" under the so-called 14th
Amendment, a juristic person or a franchised person who can
be compelled to perform to the regulatory Vehicle Codes
which are civil in nature, and challenges the In Personam
jurisdiction of the Court with this contrary conclusion of
law. This Court is now mandated to seat on the law side of
its capacity to hear evidence of the status of the Accused
Citizen.
[see MEMOLAW.ZIP on Richard McDonald's electronic BBS]

[see also FMEMOLAW.ZIP and Appendix Y, emphasis added]

Page 18 of 36
You might be wondering why someone would go to so much

trouble to oppose a traffic citation. Why not just pay the fine
and get on with your life? The answer lies, once again, in the
fundamental and supreme Law of our Land, the Constitution for

the United States of America. Sovereign State Citizens have

learned to assert their fundamental rights, because rights
belong to the belligerent claimant in person. The Constitution
is the last bastion of the Common Law in our country. Were it
not for the Constitution, the Common Law would have been history
a long time ago. The interpretation of the Constitution is
directly influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed
in the language of the English common law:
There is, however, one clear exception to the statement

that there is no national common law. The interpretation
of the constitution of the United States is necessarily
influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in
the language of the English common law, and are to be read
in the light of its history.
[United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 891, 893 (1898)]
[emphasis added]
Under the Common Law, we are endowed by our Creator with

the right to travel. "Driving", on the other hand, is defined
in State Vehicle Codes to mean the act of chauffeuring
passengers for hire. "Passengers" are those who pay a "driver"
to be chauffeured. Guests, on the other hand, are those who
accompany travelers without paying for the transportation.
Driving, under this definition, is a privilege for which a State
can require a license. Similarly, if you are a citizen of the
United States**, you are subject to its jurisdiction, and a
State government can prove that you are obligated thereby to
obey all administrative statutes and regulations to the letter
of the law. These regulations include, of course, the
requirement that all subjects apply and pay for licenses to use
the State and federal highways, even though the highways belong
to the People. The land on which they were built, and the
materials and labor expended in their construction, were all
paid for with taxes obtained from the People. Provided that you
are not engaged in any "privileged" or regulated activity, you
are free to travel anywhere you wish within the 50 States.
Those States are real parties to the Constitution and are
therefore bound by all its terms.
Another one of your Common Law rights is the right to own

property free and clear of any liens. ("Unalienable" rights are
rights against which no lien can be established precisely
because they are un-lien-able.) You enjoy the right to own your
vehicle outright, without any lawful requirement that you
"register" it with the State Department of Motor Vehicles. The
State governments violated your fundamental rights when they
concealed the legal "interest" which they obtained in your
vehicle, by making it appear as if you were required to register
the vehicle when you purchased it, as a condition of purchase.
This is fraud. If you don't believe me, then try to obtain the
manufacturer's statement of origin (MSO) the next time you buy a
new car or truck. The implications and ramifications of driving
around without a license, and/or without registration, are far
beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to say that effective
methods have already been developed to deal with law enforcement
officers and courts, if and when you are pulled over and cited

for traveling without a license or tags. Richard McDonald is

second to none when it comes to preparing a successful defense
to the civil charges that might result. A Sovereign is someone
who enjoys fundamental, Common Law rights, and owning property
free and clear is one of those fundamental rights.

Page 19 of 36
If you have a DOS-compatible personal computer and a 2400-

baud modem, Richard McDonald can provide you with instructions
for accessing his electronic bulletin board system (BBS). There
is a mountain of information, and some of his computer files
were rather large when he began his BBS. Users were complaining
of long transmission times to "download" text files over phone
lines from his BBS to their own personal computers. So,
McDonald used a fancy text "compression" program on all the text
files available on his BBS. As a consequence, BBS users must
first download a DOS program which "decompresses" the compressed
files. Once this program is running on your personal computer,
you are then free to download all other text files and to
decompress them at your end. For example, the compressed file
"14AMREC.ZIP" contains the documentation which proves that the
so-called 14th Amendment was never ratified. If you have any
problems or questions, Richard McDonald is a very patient and
generous man. And please tell him where you read about him and
his computer bulletin board (voice: 818-703-5037, BBS: 818-888-
9882).
As you peruse through McDonald's numerous court briefs and

other documents, you will encounter many gems to be remembered
and shared with your family, friends and associates. His work
has confirmed an attribute of sovereignty that is of paramount
importance. Sovereignty is never diminished in delegation.
Thus, as sovereign individuals, we do not diminish our
sovereignty in any way by delegating our powers to State
governments, to perform services which are difficult, if not
impossible for us to perform as individuals. Similarly, States
do not diminish their sovereignty by delegating powers to the
federal government, via the Constitution. As McDonald puts it,
powers delegated do not equate to powers surrendered:
17. Under the Constitutions, "... we the People" did not

surrender our individual sovereignty to either the State or
Federal Government. Powers "delegated" do not equate to
powers surrendered. This is a Republic, not a democracy,
and the majority cannot impose its will upon the minority
because the "LAW" is already set forth. Any individual can
do anything he or she wishes to do so long as it does not
damage, injure, or impair the same Right of another
individual. This is where the concept of a corpus delicti
comes from to prove a "crime" or a civil damage.
[see MEMOLAW.ZIP on Richard McDonald's electronic BBS]

[see also FMEMOLAW.ZIP and Appendix Y, emphasis added]


Page 20 of 36
Indeed, to be a Citizen of the United States*** of America

is to be one of the Sovereign People, "a constituent member of
the sovereignty, synonymous with the people" [see 19 How. 404].
According to the 1870 edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary, the
People are the fountain of sovereignty. It is extremely
revealing that there is no definition of "United States" as such
in this dictionary. However, there is an important discussion
of the "United States of America", where the delegation of
sovereignty clearly originates in the People and nowhere else:
The great men who formed it did not undertake to solve a

question that in its own nature is insoluble. Between
equals it made neither superior, but trusted to the mutual
forbearance of both parties. A larger confidence was
placed in an enlightened public opinion as the final
umpire. The people parcelled out the rights of sovereignty
between the states and the United States**, and they have a
natural right to determine what was given to one party and
what to the other. ... It is a maxim consecrated in public
law as well as common sense and the necessity of the case,
that a sovereign is answerable for his acts only to his God
and to his own conscience.
[Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 14th Edition, 1870]

[defining "United States of America"]
[emphasis added]
We don't need to reach far back into another century to

find proof that the People are sovereign. In a Department of
Justice manual revised in the 1990 (Document No. M-230), the
meaning of American Citizenship was described with these
eloquent and moving words by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization: "You are no longer a subject of a government!"
The Meaning of American Citizenship

Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization
Today you have become a citizen of the United States

of America. You are no longer an Englishman, a Frenchman,
an Italian, a Pole. Neither are you a hyphenated-American
-- a Polish-American, an Italian-American. You are no
longer a subject of a government. Henceforth, you are an
integral part of this Government -- a free man -- a Citizen
of the United States of America.
This citizenship, which has been solemnly conferred on

you, is a thing of the spirit -- not of the flesh. When
you took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the
United States, you claimed for yourself the God-given
unalienable rights which that sacred document sets forth as
the natural right of all men.
You have made sacrifices to reach this desired goal.

We, your fellow citizens, realize this, and the warmth of

our welcome to you is increased proportionately. However,
we would tincture it with friendly caution.
As you have learned during these years of preparation,

this great honor carries with it the duty to work for and
make secure this longed-for and eagerly-sought status.
Government under our Constitution makes American
citizenship the highest privilege and at the same time the
greatest responsibility of any citizenship in the world.
The important rights that are now yours and the duties
and responsibilities attendant thereon are set forth
elsewhere in this manual. It is hoped that they will serve
as a constant reminder that only by continuing to study and
learn about your new country, its ideals, achievements, and
goals, and by everlastingly working at your citizenship can
you enjoy its fruits and assure their preservation for
generations to follow.
May you find in this Nation the fulfillment of your

dreams of peace and security, and may America, in turn,
never find you wanting in your new and proud role of
Citizen of the United States.
[Basic Guide to Naturalization and Citizenship]

[Immigration and Naturalization Service]
[U.S. Department of Justice]
[page 265, emphasis added]

Page 21 of 36
Executed on ___________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen

_______________________________________

Page 22 of 36
EXHIBIT "A":
"The Day Our Country Was Stolen:"
"How the 14th Amendment" [sic]

"Enslaved Us All"
"Without a Shot Fired"

Page 23 of 36

The Day Our Country Was Stolen:
How the 14th Amendment [sic]

Enslaved Us All
Without a Shot Fired
by
L. C. Lyon
Most Americans would agree that we, as a people, are

treated by our public servants -- the judges, politicians, law
enforcement and bureaucrats who are paid their salaries by our
taxes -- as if we were in complete bondage to them. When we
joke about being slaves to the Government, we don't realize that
we are exactly correct, joke or not. In fact, all those 99% of
Americans who call themselves "U.S. citizens" are actually
subjects of the corporate United States Government -- not the
sovereign states of the Union. The moment you uttered your
first cry on American soil, you became the chattel property of
the corporation known as the United States of America which,
because of the federal debt, handed title (Birth Certificate) to
your body and soul to the Federal Reserve Bank, to be held in
the archives of the Department of Health and Human Services.
As incredible as this sounds, it is sadly true. The next

question is: How did I automatically become subject to a
government, when I'm supposedly a free American? How did this
all come about, that I should be made to register myself, my
family, and all that I own; be made to obey oppressive laws;
and forfeit almost half of my earnings upon threat of jail?
Only those who are "subject" to a government can be made to do
these things. Free American Inhabitants are subject to no one
but God, and all the laws and responsibilities which that Divine
allegiance entails.
Which "United States" Do You Live In?
The answer to the above questions goes back to the American

Civil War. The war that was supposedly fought to free the
slaves from bondage actually did just the opposite -- for all
Americans then and in the future. By enacting the 14th
Amendment (which technically is an Article, not a true
amendment, but that's a topic for another discussion), a whole
nation of newly freed slaves and free-born white American
Inhabitants became "citizens of the United States", i.e. of a
federal government corporation, at the stroke of a pen and
without a shot being fired.
Because we Americans are a different breed and demand the

right to personal freedom, those who had planned decades ago to
enslave us (even if it took generations to do so) knew that, as
long as we were armed and willing to fight to maintain our
freedom, the only way to accomplish this enslavement was by
deception.


Page 24 of 36
To proceed further, we must understand that there are two

"United States". There is the "united States" (note the small
"u" in "united") which describes the ideological and
geographical position of the sovereign states of America. An
individual was the voluntary inhabitant of the state in which he
resided. If he did not like the laws or practices of that
state, he could simply move to another state. Each state was
sovereign to itself, and could not be forced to accept the laws
and practices of any other state.
The "United States of America", however, is the name of the

corporate entity (note the capital "U" in "United") that exists
to carry out the functions delegated to it by the States for the
protection of the Union. This corporate entity's jurisdiction
is supposed to be (according to the Constitution) confined to
the District of Columbia, the federal territories and the
federal enclaves. Enclaves are areas within a State's
boundaries which are ceded to the Federal Government by the
State Legislature.
Anyone can come under the direct jurisdiction of the

corporate United States in three ways: (1) by living in one of
its territories (Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, etc.),
(2) by living in the District of Columbia, or (3) simply by
choice. Back when America still had vast territories not-yet-
become states and several thousands of people lived in these
territories, these people had no rights protected by state
sovereignty. They lived under federal jurisdiction, which was
the reason why people living in territories were so anxious to
achieve statehood. The President could order federal troops
into any territory and enact any edicts he wanted. Once a
territory became a state, it had sovereignty and, from that
point on, the state's rights prevailed.
So, if you don't live in a territory or enclave, and you

don't live in the District of Columbia, then the only way you
could have fallen under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government is by choice. But neither I, nor anyone I know,
voluntarily or knowingly surrendered their personal sovereignty
to the Government, which means that it (our sovereignty) was
taken from us by deception.
This deception, which took place in the year 1868, is what

this article will explain -- how our ancestors were tricked and
coerced into giving up their rights (and ours!) to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Government.

Page 25 of 36
Civil War Sets the Stage for Takeover

The Constitution for the United States of America specifies

in the opening paragraph that the Constitution was written for
the newly formed corporation, not for us, the People living in
America. Our rights come from God and are inalienable. They do
not come from a piece of paper. And, because the Federal
Government exists only on paper -- a man-created entity -- it
can also be dismantled anytime We the People decide it has
become a threat to our inalienable God-given rights of
sovereignty.
The Constitution is the contract between those who

administer the Government's affairs and the People of the united
States. In essence, it states that the People will give the
Government certain powers necessary to administer the defense of
the States, and control the commerce into the States from
foreign countries. In exchange, the State governments (not the
individual people -- direct taxation by the Federal Government
is unconstitutional) would provide the Federal Government the
money it needs to operate. The Federal Government had limited
powers; in fact, the Bill of Rights was hotly debated at the
time of its passage because there were several people who wisely
cautioned that the Bill of Rights would eventually be construed
as rights endowed by the Constitution, not protected by it
(which is exactly what has happened).
How often do you hear patriots mistakenly vow to defend

"their Constitutional rights"? This thinking reflects the
decades of public school brainwashing to which we have all been
subjected. We need to correct each other and understand that
our rights are God-given, not constitutional.
So, how does the Civil War enter into this present-day
power struggle between the Federal Government and Us the People?
Slavery was not the true underlying reason for the war. It was
an emotional, social issue that was used as an excuse to incite
people to go to war, people who did not realize that foreign
agencies were responsible for that conflict. International
bankers, seeing the slavery issue as an opportunity not only to
divide the country, but make millions of dollars as well, fanned
the flames of debate until, under cover of the most bloody war
in the history of the world, they were to accomplish that very
objective -- the complete takeover of America. They almost
succeeded years sooner, except for the intervention of one man
-- President Abraham Lincoln.
"Honest Abe" Knew the Truth
President Lincoln was against slavery, but he understood

that it was wrong to force the southern States to give up
slavery -- to force Federal jurisdiction over the issue of
States' Rights. Four of the southern States were already
considering the abolition of slavery, but they couldn't just
abandon it overnight. It would take time. After all, their
whole economy was built upon slavery; a sudden disruption would
bankrupt the South. Lincoln understood this. But, it wasn't
until Lincoln got into office that he began to see the whole
picture. He learned that the war was begun by the International

Bankers as a means of dividing the country in two, forcing both

sides to borrow heavily from the Bankers to pay war debts.
Then, when failing to repay those loans, the divided America
would be forced into bankruptcy. The Rothschilds and other
bankers could then simply foreclose on the corporations known as
the United States of America and the Confederate States of
America. President Lincoln knew he had to keep the nation
together at all costs -- including war.

Page 26 of 36
Saved by the National Banks
Near the end of the war, the South was on its knees and the
U.S. Government was nearly bankrupt. Seeing their opportunity,
the Bankers offered to loan the U.S. Government enough to see it
through. Lincoln said no. He would find another way.
What he did then was to ask Congress for permission to

print paper money. Even though he knew it was unconstitutional
(only gold and silver are lawful U.S. money), it was the only
way he knew to buy provisions for the Army -- but only if the
U.S. banks would accept it. They did. When Lincoln gave his
word that the Government would redeem those notes for gold and
silver at a later time, they believed him and honored the notes.
By doing this, the planned takeover by the Bankers was averted
-- at that time.
The Bankers' Revenge -- Assassination
Because he had given his word to the nation's bankers;

because he had promised the South that, upon surrender, the
Government would help them rebuild; and because he had promised
the Southerners there would be no recriminations or punishments
if they again swore loyalty to the Union, Lincoln knew he had to
get re-elected, though he was tired, tormented by migraine
headaches, and worried about his suffering family life. He had
to make sure those promises were kept.
Lincoln's complete thwarting of the International Bankers'

plans doomed him to assassination at their hands. Papers found
in Booth's locker show communications with an agent hired by the
Rothschild family.
Weeks before he was killed, Lincoln knew he would die in

office. His spies were reporting plots to kill him; it was
only a matter of who got to him first. So, he met regularly
with his Vice President, Andrew Johnson, and educated him as
quickly as he could so that he could follow through on Lincoln's
promises. Johnson listened carefully and understood what was
expected of him, and why. Then, after Lincoln's murder, he did
exactly as he was supposed to do.
In school, when we were taught this part of American

history, we were told that Andrew Johnson was uneducated and

ignorant, and fumbled continuously in office, which was

supposedly why he was impeached. Johnson was of humble origin,
but he was an honest, self-educated man who stood firmly for
what he saw clearly were the best interests of his country.
This is what got him impeached.

Page 27 of 36
Impeachment!
At this time, the only men in Congress were those

representing the northern States. After Fort Sumter, all the
southern States had seceded. After Lincoln's death, Congress
began passing laws to punish the South, in contradiction to
Lincoln's promise. Johnson began vetoing them, sometimes three
and four times, until Congress began passing them over his veto.
One particular bill that he vetoed, the Civil Rights Bill, was
intended to make all former slaves automatic citizens of the
Federal Government, and under its direct jurisdiction (and
protection). This seemed like a compassionate and generous
gesture to the newly freed slaves but, as Johnson pointed out,
it would have serious consequences for the Negroes. In his veto
message in March of 1866, Johnson pointed out the pitfalls of
this bill:
He [the Negro] must, of necessity, from his previous

unfortunate condition of servitude, be less informed as to
the nature and character of our institutions than he who,
coming from abroad, has to some extent at least,
familiarized himself with the principles of a government to
which he voluntarily entrusts "life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness".
The 1st Section of the bill also contains an

enumeration of the rights to be enjoyed by these classes so
made citizens "in every state and territory in the United
States". These rights are "to make and enforce contracts;
to sue, be parties, and give evidence; to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property"; and to have "full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens". So too, they are made
subject to the same punishment, pains and penalties, in
common with white citizens ....
[emphasis added]
Johnson could clearly see that to immediately place a

string of governmental "rights and benefits" upon a totally
naive and uneducated people as the Negroes, would also make them
easy prey for every carpetbagger who would trick them into
contracts, in which they would have no knowledge of the legal
ramifications. This bill would, in effect, make the former
slaves as slaves again to different masters: unscrupulous
businessmen, attorneys and judges.


Page 28 of 36
Johnson saw that this bill was also a means of foisting

unconstitutional jurisdiction of the Federal Government in every
state:
Thus a perfect equality of the white and colored races

is attempted to be fixed by federal law in every state of
the Union over the vast field of state jurisdiction covered
by these enumerated rights.
If Congress can declare by law who shall hold lands,

who shall testify, who shall have capacity to make a
contract in a state, then Congress can by law also declare
who, without regard to color or race, shall have the right
to sit as a juror or as a judge, to hold any office, and
finally, to vote "in every state and territory of the
United States".
The legislation thus proposed invades the judicial

power of the state. It says to every state court or judge:
if you decide that this act is unconstitutional; if you
refuse, under the prohibition of a state law, to allow a
Negro to testify; if you hold that over such a subject
matter the state law is paramount ... your error of
judgment, however conscientious, shall abject you to fine
and imprisonment.
The Legislative Department of the government of the

United States thus takes from the Judicial Department of
the states the sacred and exclusive duty of judicial
decision and converts the state judge into a mere
ministerial officer, bound to decide according to the will
of Congress.
[emphasis added]
Johnson then continued with an additional warning as to the

virtually unlimited power given to appointed agents:
The Section of the bill provides that officers and

agents of the Freedman's Bureau shall be empowered to make
arrests and also that other officers may be specially
commissioned for that purpose by the President of the
United States. It also authorizes circuit courts of the
United States and the superior courts of the territories to
appoint, without limitation, commissioners, who are to be
charged with the performance of quasi-judicial duties.
These numerous agents are made to constitute a sort of

police, in addition to the military, and are authorized to
summon a posse comitatus, and even to call to their aid
such portion of the land and naval forces of the United
States or of the militia ....

This extraordinary power is to be conferred upon

agents irresponsible to the government and to the people,
to whose number the discretion of the commissioners is the
only limit and in whose hands such authority might be made
a terrible engine of wrong, oppression and fraud.
The 7th Section provides that a fee ... shall be paid

to each commissioner in every case brought before him, and
a fee ... to his deputy or deputies for each person he or
they may arrest and take before any such commissioner ....
All those fees are to be "paid out of the Treasury of

the United States" whether there is a conviction or not;
but in the case of conviction they are to be recoverable
from the defendant. It seems to me that under the
influence of such temptations, bad men might convert any
law, however beneficent, into an instrument of persecution
and fraud.
To me, the details of the bill seem fraught with evil.

It is another step, or rather stride, toward centralization
and the concentration of all legislative powers in the
national government.
[emphasis added]

Page 29 of 36
It is plain to see here that President Johnson saw far into

the future as to the potential for legal and political abuse of
such arbitrary powers -- powers that had never before been
placed into the hands of a bureaucracy that had not been
subjected to referendum by the people or constitutional question
by any federal court. This bill (which was passed over
Johnson's veto) did, in fact, set the precedent for hundreds of
federal, state and local bureaucracies that have since choked
the lifeblood of millions of Americans.
Also, this bill blatantly usurped all States Rights and

opened a very wide door for the further usurpation of these
rights, using other social agendas.
The reason Andrew Johnson was impeached was because he

fought so hard against this bill and the subsequent 14th
Amendment. His enemies purposely did not mention to the press
(nor to the public) the legal and political ramifications of
this bill which Johnson had so succinctly pointed out; but
instead they broadcasted the notion that he was reneging on
Lincoln's promises to "heal the wounds" of the nation by
fighting full rights for the Negro -- thus making it an
emotional social issue.
In fact, Johnson was keeping Lincoln's promises by trying

to protect the rights of the newly freed slaves, as well as the
rights of those states which knew their own former slaves better
than anyone, and knew the Negroes were not yet ready for the
responsibilities of citizenship. As Johnson had predicted,

after passage of the bill, so many of the Negroes had indeed

been robbed of goods and property by white charlatans and/or
thrown into jails for breaking commercial laws they did not
understand that, when the Negroes did come to full awareness of
the massive duplicity perpetrated by these scoundrels, a racial
hatred and mistrust of all whites became a nationwide phenomenon
that has never been erased to this day.

Page 30 of 36
The Final Axe Falls
After the bill was passed over Johnson's veto, and there
was no general hue and cry from the public, Congress then
proceeded with the next step -- the 14th Amendment. In order to
understand the ramifications of this heinous act of Congress, it
must be analyzed section-by-section:
ARTICLE XIV. Section 1. All persons born or naturalized

in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
[emphasis added]
In the very first line, the amendment states that all

persons born (all babies from this point on) or naturalized (the
newly freed slaves who were then just inhabitants of America)
are now citizens of the United States (the Federal Government)
and of the State (the State Government) where they lived. From
the Declaration of Independence on, all people in America who
lived here were Americans, residing in a particular geographical
state, and free to move from state to state, or even to another
country. The Federal Government, according to the Constitution,
is a corporate fiction that does the bidding of the body of
collective states called Congress. At this time, the state
governments had similar limited jurisdiction over their
inhabitants, as did the federal government. The state
government's primary function was to act as a collective voice
of all its inhabitants to convey their wishes to Congress.
Congress controlled the federal government.
The rule of Common Law, which was the law of the land at
that time, was carried out exclusively by the County Sheriff --
the Common Law concept of Posse Comitatus. Neither the State
nor the Federal Government had any jurisdiction in the County,
where Home Rule was the law. Only by permission or invitation
by the Sheriff could either of the other two governments step
foot in his County. The Civil Rights Bill, in one bold act,
forced Federal Government jurisdiction into the sanctity of

State rule. But Posse Comitatus still reigned in each state,

and the conspirators found the way to usurp jurisdiction here
through the 14th Amendment.

Page 31 of 36
Citizens, Subjects = Slaves
In order for any government to grab power and maintain it,

it must have "subjects" or "citizens". According to Black's Law
Dictionary (Sixth Edition), "Citizens are members of a political
community who, in their associated capacity, have established or
submitted themselves to the dominion of a government for the
promotion of their general welfare and the protection of their
individual as well as collective rights. (Herriot v. City of
Seattle, 81 Wash.2d. 48, 500 P.2d. 101, 109)"
So, by declaration of the 14th Amendment, all persons born

from that point forward, and all naturalized people, had just
become citizens (i.e. subjects) of the United States Government,
obviously without their knowledge (babies) or understanding (the
Negroes). The Federal Government had just reached past the
jurisdictional boundaries of the state and county lines and
claimed all its babies and all Negroes.
In Section 2, it then states that only males 21 years of

age who are citizens of the United States may be allowed to vote
in Federal and State elections. That means that only those men
who willingly claimed U.S. citizenship on voter's registration
cards (though they didn't realize the implications) were also
brought in as subjects of the Federal Government. (The Federal
Government's power and control are growing fast!) However, it
stipulated that those who had participated in rebellion (the
South) were excluded.
The Back Door
At this point, any intelligent person can figure out that

the Conspirators who were using this Amendment to claim all
Americans as its citizens -- by deception -- were obviously
performing an illegal and unconstitutional act. The
conspirators in Congress (and every Congressman knew what was
being perpetrated, and either promoted it or simply pretended
not to notice) established a "loophole" for themselves and to
cover themselves in case people began to catch on. This
loophole was 15 Statutes at Large, Chapter 249 (Section 1),
enacted July 27, 1868, one day before the 14th Amendment was
declared "ratified". You will not see this statute published
anywhere except in very old books. The Conspirators do not want
their "citizens" to know it exists, and it has never been
repealed. The text follows:
CHAP. CCXLIX. -- An Act concerning the Rights

of American Citizens in foreign States

Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and

inherent right of all people, indispensable to the
enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness; and whereas in the recognition of this
principle this government has freely received emigrants
from all nations, and invested them with the rights of
citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such American
citizens, with their descendants, are subjects of foreign
states, owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and
whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace
that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly
and finally disavowed: Therefore,
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of

Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That any declaration, instruction, opinion,
order, or decision of any officers of this government which
denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of
expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of this government.

Page 32 of 36
On the surface, this seems to guarantee that "foreigners"

who live in the borders of America cannot be forced to claim
citizenship. But, what this also says is that anyone who wishes
to expatriate (i.e. renounce their U.S. citizenship) may do so,
by inherent right, and no one can deny him this right.
The Conspirators knew that, the "letter of the law" having

been satisfied with this exemption from compelled performance
(having U.S. citizenship thrust upon us), they could then hide
the exemption from general view, start promoting the "benefits"
of U.S. citizenship in the media (and later, in public schools)
and begin setting up all of us for manipulation to obey millions
of codes, statutes, and laws; exacting fines for breaking these
laws; and extracting license fees and taxes upon penalty of
seizure or jail.
Free American Inhabitants are not subject to the Federal

Government by virtue of their not claiming U.S. citizenship.
Those of us who have renounced our U.S. citizenship and declared
our status as American Inhabitants, using 15 Statutes at Large
as the legal foundation for this Declaration of Status, are the
only ones living in the united States of America. The rest of
America (U.S. citizens -- about 99%) are living in a 4th
dimension, i.e. in a fictitious corporation called the United
States of America. As far as America is concerned (except that
1%), there's nobody home!
Slavery by Election
We can see that, in the 14th Amendment, those Southerners

who had participated in the Civil War were excluded from this
"benefit" (U.S. Citizenship) on purpose -- to punish them so

severely with sanctions, punishing fines and terrorism from the

newly formed Freeman's Bureau, that a few years later, the
Southerners would be grateful for any consideration the Federal
Government would extend to them. When the opportunity was ripe,
such a consideration was enacted -- the 15th Amendment. It
reads (in part):
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to

vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
By this gracious gesture, Congress extended full

forgiveness to the South, and restored their right to vote (at
that time, considered to be the most sacred right of an
American). At the next national election after the enactment of
this amendment, there was the largest turnout of voters this
nation had ever seen. The South wanted desperately to be
restored to the Union and heal their wounds. When they heard
that, in order to vote, they had to swear allegiance to the
United States of America and thus become a "citizen of the
United States" (as required by the 14th Amendment), they did so
willingly and without a clue as to what they had just done to
themselves and to their posterity.
With the stroke of a pen, the 14th Amendment, and the

subsequent 15th Amendment, had just enslaved an entire nation
without a shot being fired.

Page 33 of 36
The "Forgotten" Clause
Obviously, this treacherous act by Congress was enough to

have all of them hanged as traitors; but, there was one more
act of treachery that has been overlooked by most people.
Section 4 of the 14th Amendment reads:
The validity of the public debt of the United States,

authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts,
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
[emphasis added]
At that time, a hue and cry was raised concerning Lincoln's

promises to "forgive" the South's debts as part of
Reconstruction, with good reason. But mainly overlooked was the
first part of Section 4, which says that the debts incurred by

the U.S. government were not to be questioned, that the

enforcers whom the Government hired to quell insurrection
(today, the CIA, FBI, BATF, DEA, U.S. Marshals, etc.) would be
paid by the Government. And where was the Government's money to
come from? Answer: Its newly acquired subjects -- U.S.
citizens. The States had just signed into constitutional
amendment the permission for the Federal Government to hire
thugs and thieves to control us, to pay them with our own money,
and that no question could be brought to court about the
constitutionality of these actions. This is why any effort to
bring a suit against the Government about the Federal debt will
never be entertained by the Supreme Court!
A Dangerous Game
In Europe, Africa and other places in the world, a despot

simply took over a country by waging war. Here in America,
however, as long as Americans were armed and prepared for
hostile armed takeover, the Conspirators knew that a different
technique -- a grand deception by manipulation of the laws, the
courts, the schools, the media -- must be employed to obtain the
same results. They waged war on us long ago, but we've been too
naive to see it. There are many who are waking up now, but they
don't see the whole picture. They think that if they reverse a
certain portion of Government abuse, we can take our country
back. Tax protestors (as IRS calls them) have perfectly correct
reasons to point out that they are not required to file -- but
they forget they are still U.S. citizens (i.e. subjects). Home
schoolers fight bravely for their right to protect their
children against Government control -- but they forget they are
still U.S. citizens. Legal eagles have found many statutory
"loopholes" to win a few battles in court -- but they forget
they are still U.S. citizens.

Page 34 of 36
Playing the "patriot game" without fully understanding the

constitutional hold the Federal, State and local governments
have over them is playing a dangerous game. They may win a few
skirmishes in their battles with Government (the Government
allows these "wins" to encourage us to continue wasting our
energies in useless effort), but they will never win the war,
and will only bring the wrath of Government down upon the head
of yet another one of its subjects.
For now, at least, the Government is respecting the status

of American Inhabitants. We (your publisher L. C. Lyon and
writer George Sibley) have not had any legal hassles from any
Government entity, because we are no longer U.S. citizens. We
are the same as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin
Franklin and all the other patriots were in their time -- free
American Inhabitants. Any U.S. citizen can give up this
enslaving status at any time, but it must be done properly.
If everyone in America were to take back their rights as

free Americans again, through the revocation process, the

Government would have no more subjects, and no more power!
IT'S TIME TO TAKE OUR COUNTRY BACK!
[Minor grammatical and spelling edits were done to this essay by

John E. Trumane. These edits were done without permission of
the author, because Mr. Trumane did not have the author's
mailing address at the time the edits were done.]

Page 35 of 36
PROOF OF SERVICE
America, without the "United States," that I am at least 18
years of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America,
and that I personally served the following document(s):
VERIFIED STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE

TO GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY
AND ITS FEDERAL STATUTE:
28 U.S.C. 1746(1), 1861, 1865
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in
first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and
properly addressed to the following:

Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Washington
Solicitor General
Washington

Executed on: _____________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________

Page 36 of 36
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : refusal

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) Case No. 95-484-TUC

)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE:
)
v. ) FRCP Rules 9(a); 9(b);
) 12(b)(1),(2),(4),(5)
United States, )
and Does 1-99, )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________)
state and Plaintiff in the above entitled matter (hereinafter
"Plaintiff"), to provide formal Notice to all interested parties
that She has refused William D. Browning's ORDER dated August 15,
1996, for the following causes (refused copy attached).
Her previous NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND PETITION FOR ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE [cites omitted] JURY TRIAL DEMANDED (hereinafter
"NOTICE OF REMOVAL") was filed with the Clerk of the "DISTRICT
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES", not with the "CLERK U S DISTRICT
COURT", as shown by the Clerk's file stamp dated "AUG 13 1996" on
said NOTICE OF REMOVAL (see copy attached). The Clerk of Court
erred by stamping Plaintiff's NOTICE OF REMOVAL in this manner.
See FRCP Rule 9(b).
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/refusal.htm (1 of 6) [4/8/2007 2:13:28 PM]

Notice of Refusal for Cause:

Page 1 of 6
Furthermore, Mr. Browning is not presiding over the action
now proceeding in the District Court of the United States
("DCUS"), nor has Mr. Browning demonstrated that he has any
jurisdiction in said DCUS over the subject matter, or over the
Person of the Plaintiff, in the above entitled action. See FRCP
Rules 12(b)(1),(2),(4), and (5). Accordingly, without the
requisite jurisdiction having been demonstrated as a matter of
record, he has no authority to deny any of Plaintiff's pleadings,
motions, or demands as filed in the DCUS or in the USDC, except
to dismiss the alleged criminal action for want of jurisdiction,
as required by Law.
Mr. Browning, as an Article IV judge, is a "taxpayer" whose
compensation is diminished during his continuance in office. See
Internal Revenue Code, Section 7701(a). As such, Mr. Browning
cannot preside over any proceeding in a District Court of the
United States ("DCUS"), because to do so violates Article III,
Section 1, of the Constitution for the United States of America,
as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), to wit:
The Judges ... shall ... receive for their Services, a

Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
[Art. III, Sec. 1, U.S. Constitution, emphasis added]
The United States has never demonstrated jurisdiction, as a
matter of record, to bring any criminal case against the
Plaintiff in the United States District Court ("USDC"). On the
contrary, Plaintiff's NOTICE AND DEMAND TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (hereinafter "NOTICE AND DEMAND") and Her

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT (hereinafter "MEMORANDUM OF LAW"),
i.e. the USDC, plainly prove that the USDC, as distinct and
different from the DCUS, has no criminal jurisdiction whatsoever
to prosecute Plaintiff, unless the alleged crime was committed
within the federal zone. See cites in Plaintiff's NOTICE AND
DEMAND and MEMORANDUM OF LAW.

Page 2 of 6
Mr. Browning also claims to have "denied" two (2) separate
NOTICE's AND DEMAND's FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE, filed
pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(d), to wit:
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if

requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information.
[Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(d)]
[emphasis added]
Said Rule leaves no room for any judicial discretion in the
matter of the evidence submitted thereby. The language of the
terms "when mandatory" and "a court shall take judicial notice"
is indicative of their imperative meaning. Mr. Browning has no
authority whatsoever to "deny" mandatory judicial notice when
invoked pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Furthermore, as a matter of evidence, Plaintiff enjoys the
fundamental Right to incorporate by reference all prior pleadings
filed or lodged in the USDC, no matter who filed them, as if
those pleadings were set forth fully in Her NOTICE OF REMOVAL.
Plaintiff argues that, for Mr. Browning to deny this essential
evidentiary material in the above entitled action is to obstruct
justice, in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1506 , to wit:
1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies,

or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other
proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any
judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect;
...
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
[18 U.S.C. 1506]

Page 3 of 6
Moreover, the alleged United States Attorneys who attempted
to bring a criminal action against Plaintiff in the USDC have
failed to demonstrate on record any power of attorney to
represent the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] in said action; the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA have not been shown on record to have
any standing to bring a criminal action before the USDC; and the
USDC has not been shown to have any criminal jurisdiction over a
crime alleged to have been committed inside the state zone (the
Arizona Republic) and outside the federal zone.
Lastly, Mr. Browning's ORDER was improperly served upon
Plaintiff via United States Mail, because it was addressed to:
Sheila Terese Wallen [sic]

PO Box 335 [sic]
Arivaca, AZ 85601 [sic]
Plaintiff has previously notified all interested parties that She
will refuse all mail unless it is directed to the mailing
location as shown on the face page of this pleading. Plaintiff
hereby reiterates Her intent to refuse all U.S. Mail which
exhibits "AZ" or unqualified zip codes and which fails to exhibit
her proper mailing location as shown supra, and of Her intent to
receive (but not necessarily accept) all U.S. Mail which is
directed to Her proper mailing location.
Notice to agents is notice to principals.

Notice to principals is notice to agents.

Page 4 of 6
SUMMARY
Wherefore, Plaintiff refuses Mr. William D. Browning's ORDER
dated August 15, 1996, for all the reasons stated above.
Executed on August 20,1996
/s/ Sheila Wallen


Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness
Counselor at Law, and Counsel of Record

Page 5 of 6
PROOF OF SERVICE
NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE:

FRCP Rules 9(a); 9(b); 12(b)(1),(2),(4),(5)


ARIZONA STATE
William D. Browning, Doe No. 1

44 East Broadway
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Solicitor General
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________

Page 6 of 6
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : finalnad

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona

)
Plaintiff, ) FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND
) FOR PROOF OF POWER,
v. ) STANDING, AND JURISDICTION
) IN THE PARTICULARS
United States, )
and Does 1-99, )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________)
"Plaintiff"), to make this formal Demand upon Defendant "United
States", and upon Defendant "William D. Browning" (Doe No. 1), to
enter into the official Court record of the above entitled case,
certified documentary evidence of the following, and to provide
formal Notice to all interested parties of same:
1. Lawful Powers of Attorney for "JANET NAPOLITANO" and

"JOELYN D. MARLOWE" to represent the "UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA" in a criminal action before a "UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT".
2. Statutory, regulatory, and constitutional authority

which grants legal standing to the "UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA" to bring a criminal action before a "UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT".
3. Statutory, regulatory, and constitutional authority
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/finalnad.htm (1 of 4) [4/8/2007 2:13:29 PM]

which grants jurisdiction to a "UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT", as opposed to a "DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES", to hear a criminal case against a Union State
Citizen when the alleged crime was committed inside the
state zone and outside the federal zone.
Final Notice & Demand for Proof of Power/Standing/Jurisdiction:

Page 1 of 3
NOTICE OF DEADLINE
Formal notice is hereby given to all interest parties that
the Plaintiff in the above entitled case will require the above
named certified evidentiary documents to be entered into the
official Court record of the instant case, and to be served upon
Plaintiff by transmitting said documents to Her via first class
United States Mail directed to the following mailing location:

ARIZONA STATE
no later than 5:00 p.m. on Friday, August 30, 1996. Failure to
do either (filing and service) will constitute an open admission,
for all the world to see, that the requested proofs of power,
standing, and/or jurisdiction do not exist in the first instance.
/s/ Sheila Wallen


Counselor at Law and Counsel of Record

Page 2 of 3

PROOF OF SERVICE
FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PROOF OF

POWER, STANDING, AND JURISDICTION
IN THE PARTICULARS

ARIZONA STATE

44 East Broadway
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Solicitor General
Executed on: _____________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________

Page 3 of 3

# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : judicary

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona


)
Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM OF LAW
) IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE
v. ) TO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
) OF THIS COURT
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) [i.e. There is none.]
)
Defendant. ) Rules 301, 302:
) Federal Rules of Evidence
) Rule 54: Federal Rules
) of Criminal Procedure
________________________________)
"Defendant"), to present this Her Memorandum of Law in Support of
Her Challenge to the Jurisdiction of this Court, i.e. there is no
jurisdiction in a United States District Court [sic], as distinct
from a District Court of the United States [sic], to bring a
criminal prosecution for alleged violations of Title 21, United
States Code, Section 841(a)(1). Defendant now presents a
detailed Memorandum of Law on the subject of Federal Judicial
Authority within the several States of the Union (hereinafter
"the several States"), to wit:
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/judicary.htm (1 of 42) [4/8/2007 2:13:36 PM]

Memo of Law Supporting Challenge to Criminal Jurisdiction:

Page 1 of 40
Federal Judicial Authority within the Several States
This memorandum will be construed to comply with provisions

necessary to establish presumed fact (Rules 301 and 302, Federal
Rules of Evidence, and attending State rules), should interested
parties fail to rebut any given allegation of fact, or matter of
law, addressed herein. This position will be construed as
adequate to meet all requirements of judicial notice, thus
preserving fundamental Law. Matters addressed herein, if not
rebutted, will be construed to have general application. This
memorandum addresses jurisdiction of United States District
Courts and related agencies of the United States (federal
government).
Part I: Foundation of Law, Jurisdiction, Principles & History
In the American system of Government, the Separation of Powers

Doctrine works in two ways: First, it assures separation between
the three branches of government, the branches being legislative,
executive, and judicial. Second, the Doctrine effects vertical
separation between the operations of the state and federal
governments, or put another way, operations of the government of
the United States and the governments of the several States which
are parties to the Constitution for the United States of America,
as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution").
In this system, as asserted by American Founders in the

Declaration of Independence, all Men (and Women) are created
equal, and are equally endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable or inherent Rights, those listed in the Declaration
of Independence being the Rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness, or in the less poetic phrasing of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: life, liberty and property.
This list, of course, is not exhaustive, as articulated in the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and all,
individually and collectively, are accountable in the framework
of "the laws of Nature and Nature's God." The phrase, in modern
terms, is better understood as physical and moral law. Man
cannot author or amend the laws of Nature and Nature's God, but
is directly accountable in the framework of cause and effect, or
where moral law is concerned, cause and consequence.
By establishing these principles prior to addressing the

reasons for, and the power and operation of, government, American
Founders preserved the essence of English and American-lineage
Common Law which evolved and was proven by cultural experience
over many hundreds of years. The Magna Charta, drafted and
signed by King John in 1215, is commonly recognized as the point
of demarcation so far as a formal proclamation of common rights
is concerned. The foundation was basically biblical, with the
understanding that People are individually created and are,
therefore, individually accountable to God. Even when
governments encroache on the special relationship between Man and
God, Man is still accountable, individually and collectively, and

s/he invariably suffers the consequences of tyranny.

Page 2 of 40
The Founders went on to say that governments are established

among Men for the sole purpose of securing inherent Rights, and
governments so established may rule only by the consent of the
Governed.
In July 1776, the notion of specifically delegated authority

conveyed by constitutions was well understood, because the
English considered the Magna Charta and subsequent similar
documents to be elements of their unwritten constitution. On the
other hand, American colonies had continuing experience with
written constitutions for civil government which began in 1636
(Massachusetts).
Lowell H. Becraft, Jr., an attorney from Huntsville, Alabama,

addresses historical events leading to the American Revolution,
in his privately distributed memorandum on federal jurisdiction,
as follows:
The original thirteen colonies of America were each

separately established by charters from the English
Crown. Outside of the common bond of each being a
dependency and colony of the mother country, England, the
colonies were not otherwise united. Each had its own
governor, legislative assembly and courts, and each was
governed separately and independently by the English
Parliament.
The political connections of the separate colonies to

the English Crown and Parliament descended to an unhappy
state of affairs as the direct result of Parliamentary
acts adopted in the late 1760's and early 1770's. Due to
the real and perceived dangers caused by these various
acts, the First Continental Congress was convened by
representatives of the several colonies in October, 1774,
the purpose of which was to submit a petition of
grievances to the British Parliament and Crown. By the
Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental
Congress, dated October 14, 1774, the colonial
representatives labeled these Parliamentary acts of which
they complained as "impolitic, unjust, and cruel, as well
as unconstitutional, and most dangerous and destructive
of American rights," and the purpose of which were
designs, schemes and plans "which demonstrate a system
formed to enslave America." Revolution was assuredly in
the formative stages absent conciliation between the
mother country and colonies.
Between October, 1775, and the middle of 1776, each of

the colonies separately severed their ties and relations
with England, and several adopted constitutions for the
newly formed States. By July, 1776, the exercise of
British authority in any and all colonies was not

recognized in any degree. The capstone of this actual

separation of the colonies from England was the more
formal Declaration of Independence.

Page 3 of 40
The legal effect of the Declaration of Independence was

to make each new State a separate and independent
sovereign over which there was no other government of
superior power or jurisdiction. This was clearly shown
in M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 212
(1808), where it was held:
This opinion is predicated upon a principle

which is believed to be undeniable, that the
several states which composed this Union, so far
at least as regarded their municipal regulations,
became entitled, from the time when they declared
themselves independent, to all the rights and
powers of sovereign states, and that they did not
derive them from concessions made by the British
king. The treaty of peace contains a recognition
of their independence, not a grant of it. From
hence it results, that the laws of the several
state governments were the laws of sovereign
states, and as such were obligatory upon the
people of such state, from the time they were
enacted.
And a further expression of similar import is found in

Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 526, 527
(1827), where the Court stated:
There was no territory within the United States

that was claimed in any other right than that of
some one of the confederated states; therefore,
there could be no acquisition of territory made
by the United States distinct from, or
independent of some one of the states.
Each declared itself sovereign and independent,

according to the limits of its territory.
[T]he soil and sovereignty within their

acknowledged limits were as much theirs at the
declaration of independence as at this hour.
Thus, unequivocally, in July, 1776, the new States

possessed all sovereignty, power, and jurisdiction over
all the soil and persons in their respective territorial
limits.
This condition of supreme sovereignty of each State

over all property and persons within the borders thereof

continued notwithstanding the adoption of the Articles of

Confederation. In Article II of that document, it was
expressly stated:
Article II. Each state retains its

sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by
this confederation expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress assembled.

Page 4 of 40
As the history of the confederation government

demonstrated, each State was indeed sovereign and
independent to the degree that it made the central
government created by the confederation fairly
ineffectual. These defects of the confederation
government strained the relations between and among the
States and the remedy became the calling of a
constitutional convention.
The representatives which assembled in Philadelphia in

May, 1787, to attend the Constitutional Convention met
for the primary purpose of improving the commercial
relations among the States, although the product of the
Convention produced more than this. But, no intention
was demonstrated for the States to surrender in any
degree the jurisdiction so possessed by the States at
that time, and indeed the Constitution as finally drafted
continued the same territorial jurisdiction of the States
as existed under the Articles of Confederation. The
essence of this retention of state jurisdiction was
embodied in Art. I, 8, Cl. 17 of the U.S. Constitution,
which reads as follows:
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases

whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten
Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular
States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become
the Seat of the Government of the United States,
and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of
the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-
Yards, and other needful Buildings; ....
The necessity for granting federal government sovereignty over

land which would serve as the seat of that government became
conspicuous during the Revolution, when a contingent of irate
folks from the Continental Army beleaguered Congress while it was
in session in Philadelphia. Members of Congress fled
Philadelphia to Princeton, New Jersey, and from there to
Annapolis, Maryland. Philadelphia and Pennsylvania governments
were unable, or unwilling, to disperse the rebels who taunted and
insulted Members of Congress. Problems persisted for the weak

government under the Articles of Confederation following the

Revolution, and it was in this framework that the Constitutional
Convention was called in 1787. The purpose for establishing a
seat of government under Congress' exclusive legislative
jurisdiction was addressed in Essay No. 43 of The Federalist:
The indispensable necessity of complete authority at

the seat of government carries its own evidence with it.
It is a power exercised by every legislature of the
Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general
supremacy. Without it not only the public authority
might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with
impunity, but a dependence of the members of the general
government on the State comprehending the seat of the
government for protection in the exercise of their duty
might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe
or influence equally dishonorable to the government and
dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy.
This consideration has the more weight as the gradual
accumulation of public improvements at the stationary
residence of the government would be both too great a
public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State,
and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the
government, as still further to abridge its necessary
independence. The extent of this federal district is
sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of
an opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to
this use with the consent of the State ceding it; as the
State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights
and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the
inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest
to become willing parties to the cession; as they will
have had their voice in the election of the government
which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal
legislature for local purposes, derived from their own
suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the
authority of the legislature of the State, and of the
inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to concur in the
cession will be derived from the whole people of the
State in their adoption of the Constitution, every
imaginable objection seems to be obviated.
The necessity of a like authority over forts,

magazines, etc., established by the general government,
is not less evident. The public money expended on such
places, and the public property deposited in them,
require that they should be exempt from the authority of
the particular State. Nor would it be proper for the
places on which the security of the entire Union may
depend to be in any degree dependent on a particular
member of it. All objections and scruples are here also
obviated by requiring the concurrence of the States
concerned in every such establishment.

Page 5 of 40

Becraft cites several early court cases which addressed the

matter of State versus "United States" (federal government)
jurisdiction, with each of the decisions reinforcing the
principle of State sovereignty, unless or until land is ceded by
a State legislature to the United States:
Perhaps one of the earliest decisions on this point was

United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818),
which involved a federal prosecution for a murder
committed on board the Warship, Independence, anchored in
the harbor of Boston, Massachusetts. The defense
complained that only the state had jurisdiction to
prosecute and argued that the federal Circuit Courts had
no jurisdiction of this crime supposedly committed within
the federal government's admiralty jurisdiction. In
argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for the United
States admitted as follows:

Page 6 of 40
The exclusive jurisdiction which the United

States have in forts and dock-yards ceded to
them, is derived from the express assent of the
states by whom the cessions are made. It could
be derived in no other manner; because without
it, the authority of the state would be supreme
and exclusive therein, 3 Wheat., at 350, 351.
In holding that the State of Massachusetts had

jurisdiction over the crime, the Court held:
What, then, is the extent of jurisdiction which

a state possesses?
We answer, without hesitation, the jurisdiction

of a state is co-extensive with its territory;
co-extensive with its legislative power, 3
Wheat., at 386, 387.
The article which describes the judicial power

of the United States is not intended for the
cession of territory or of general jurisdiction.
... Congress has power to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over this district, and over all
places purchased by the consent of the
legislature of the state in which the same shall
be, for the erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful
buildings.
It is observable that the power of exclusive

legislation (which is jurisdiction) is united
with cession of territory, which is to be the
free act of the states. It is difficult to
compare the two sections together, without

feeling a conviction, not to be strengthened by

any commentary on them, that, in describing the
judicial power, the framers of our constitution
had not in view any cession of territory; or,
which is essentially the same, of general
jurisdiction, 3 Wheat., at 388.
Thus in Bevans, the Court established a principle that

federal jurisdiction extends only over the areas wherein
it possesses the power of exclusive legislation, and this
is a principle incorporated into all subsequent decisions
regarding the extent of federal jurisdiction. To hold
otherwise would destroy the purpose, intent and meaning
of the entire U.S. Constitution.
The decision in Bevans was closely followed by

decisions made in two state courts and one federal court
within the next two years. In Commonwealth v. Young,
Brightly, N.P. 302, 309 (Pa. 1818), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania was presented with the issue of whether
lands owned by the United States for which Pennsylvania
had never ceded jurisdiction had to be sold pursuant to
state law. In deciding that the state law of
Pennsylvania exclusively controlled this sale of federal
land, the Court held:

Page 7 of 40
The legislation and authority of congress is

confined to cessions by particular states for the
seat of government, and purchases made by consent
of the legislature of the state, for the purpose
of erecting forts. The legislative power and
exclusive jurisdiction remained in the several
states, of all territory within their limits, not
ceded to, or purchased by, congress, with the
assent of the state legislature, to prevent the
collision of legislation and authority between
the United States and the several states.
A year later, the Supreme Court of New York was

presented with the issue of whether the State of New York
had jurisdiction over a murder committed at Fort Niagara,
a federal fort. In People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225, 233
(N.Y. 1819), that court held that the fort was subject to
the jurisdiction of the State since the lands therefor
had not been ceded to the United States. The rationale
of its opinion stated:
To oust this state of its jurisdiction to

support and maintain its laws, and to punish
crimes, it must be shown that an offense
committed within the acknowledged limits of the
state, is clearly and exclusively cognizable by

the laws and courts of the United States. In the

case already cited, Chief Justice Marshall
observed, that to bring the offense within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the union, it must
have been committed out of the jurisdiction of
any state; it is not (he says,) the offense
committed, but the place in which it is
committed, which must be out of the jurisdiction
of the state.
The case relied upon by this court was U.S. v. Bevans

supra.
At about the same time that the New York Supreme Court
rendered its opinion in Godfrey, a similar fact situation
was before a federal court, the only difference being
that the murder committed in the case occurred on land
which had been ceded to the United States. In United
States v. Cornell, 25 Fed.Cas. 646, 648 No. 14,867
(C.C.D.R.I., 1819), the court held that the case fell
within federal jurisdiction, describing such jurisdiction
as follows:

Page 8 of 40
But although the United States may well

purchase and hold lands for public purposes,
within the territorial limits of a state, this
does not of itself oust the jurisdiction or
sovereignty of such State over the lands so
purchased. It remains until the State has
relinquished its authority over the land either
expressly or by necessary implication.
When therefore a purchase of land for any of

these purposes is made by the national
government, and the State Legislature has given
its consent to the purchase, the land so
purchased by the very terms of the constitution
ipso facto falls within the exclusive legislation
of Congress, and the State jurisdiction is
completely ousted.
Through the first half of the 19th century, State and United
States territorial jurisdiction was reasonably clear-cut, as
accounts above evidence. But, during the Civil War and
afterwards, entrenched powers concluded that Congress, on behalf
of the United States, has a unique role in and through the
territorial United States in those lands, whether ceded by
legislatures of the several States, or acquired, by war or
otherwise, by the United States. This alleged authority is at
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 (4:3:2) of the U.S. Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make

all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the

Territory and other Property belonging to the United
States ....
During the Reconstruction period immediately following the

Civil War, an Imperial Congress postured to make an end run
around the U.S. Constitution. One of the first important
measures was promulgation in their proposal for a Fourteenth
Amendment. This amendment, secured at bayonet point, created a
colorable citizenship known as a "citizen of the United States".
To that point, People generally thought of themselves as United
States citizens just as they do today; and the body of the U.S.
Constitution even makes rhetorical use of the term "Citizen of
the United States", but People were Citizens of their respective
Union States, and this term could have referred to no other
status, since there was no such thing as "federal citizenship"
when the U.S. Constitution was written. The distinction between
separate classes of citizens is best demonstrated by comparing
court decisions, the first in 1855, the second in 1875:
A citizen of any one of the States of the union, is

held to be, and called a citizen of the United States,
although technically and abstractly there is no such
thing. To conceive a citizen of the United States who is
not a citizen of some one of the States, is totally
foreign to the idea, and inconsistent with the proper
construction and common understanding of the expression
as used in the Constitution, which must be deduced from
its various other provisions. The object then to be
attained, by the exercise of the power of naturalization,
was to make citizens of the respective States. (Ex Parte
Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855))

Page 9 of 40
We have in our political system a Government of the

United States and a government of each of the several
States. Each one of these governments is distinct from
the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it
allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it
must protect. The same person may be at the same time a
citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State,
but his rights of citizenship under one of these
governments will be different from those he has under the
other. (United States v. Cruikshank, 95 U.S. 542 (1875))
Where the State Citizen, identified in the Preamble of the

U.S. Constitution and in 1:2:2, 1:3:3, 3:2:1, and 4:2:1, is a
Sovereign or Principal, the Fourteenth Amendment citizen of the
United States belongs to a subject, or subordinate class, as
demonstrated by Section 1 of that "amendment":
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the

United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,

are citizens of the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The citizen of the United States (a/k/a "federal citizen") was

distinct from the State Citizen, or there wouldn't have been any
need to restate due process rights already articulated in the
Fifth Amendment. In the framework of what has already been
covered, it is clear that Citizens of the States (a/k/a State
Citizens) were not then, and are not now, "subject to the
jurisdiction" of the United States within the several States.
This matter was addressed by Thomas Jefferson by way of "The
Kentucky Resolutions" in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts
in 1798. The second of nine resolutions addressed the matter of
United States authority to punish crimes:
2. Resolved, That the Constitution of the United

States, having delegated to Congress a power to punish
treason, counterfeiting the securities and current coin
of the United States, piracies, and felonies committed on
the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations,
and no other crimes whatsoever.
Where Jefferson articulated the limited, direct authority

which the United States could exercise over State Citizens, the
Fourteenth Amendment citizen of the United States appears to be
subject to United States authority wherever s/he might be,
whether in the geographical United States (a/k/a "the federal
zone"), or in any of the several States which are parties to the
U.S. Constitution (a/k/a "the state zone"). More to the point,
however, the subject class of citizens of the United States would
be viewed on a par with corporations, associations, and other
artificial entities created, franchised, and/or sanctioned by
government, and United States authority would reach into the
States under the auspices not of inherent or unalienable Rights
-- Rights which American Founders proclaimed to be the direct
endowments from God, but under the notion of civil rights --
rights granted by government to its subject classes.

Page 10 of 40
From this point forward, the American dialogue concerning Law

was to change, departing the biblical base of Common Law where
God is Sovereign and Man is endowed directly by His Creator, to
embrace a secular view of man whereby the individual is little
more than a chattel property, and exists solely for the
convenience and exploitation of entrenched powers (read
"Oligarchy"). This change is easily demonstrated in the Roe v.
Wade decision which threw the door open to abortion on demand.
Even though medical science long ago demonstrated that life

begins at conception, the U.S. Supreme Court did not consider

either the existence or sanctity of life in the landmark
decision. The unborn baby, conveniently referred to as a
"fetus," does not qualify as a "person" in the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment definition promulgated by Congress, so,
since the unborn lacks legal standing, the law is indifferent to
his existence; whether or not life has intrinsic value or unborn
babies have God-given rights wasn't and isn't even considered.
The so-called Fourteenth Amendment effected a subtle

perversion of first causes. Where State Citizens, being
Sovereign, have God-given rights which are merely secured by the
state and federal constitutions, the subject citizen of the
United States falls under Congress' Article IV legislative
jurisdiction; the list of his constitutionally assured rights is
itemized in the Fourteenth Amendment. Beyond that, he is
dependent on Congress for grants of privilege; rather than God,
government is the federal citizen's prime mover.
The next important move was incorporation of the District of

Columbia as a municipal corporation and political subdivision of
the geographical, or self-interested, United States (federal
government). Original incorporation was in 1871, with several
re-organizations during that decade and since. Thereafter, the
corporate federal government became increasingly important,
particularly through late-century westward development, as the
United States (federal government) managed settlement territory
simultaneously with post-Civil War reconstruction -- the days of
Carpet Bagger plunder. Then, in 1884, the Supreme Court gave way
to powerful influences in the Julliard case when it reversed
Justice Fields from four years earlier by concluding that
Congress could print paper money because the U.S. Constitution
does not expressly prohibit United States paper money.
Considering provisions of Article I, Sec. 8, Clause 5 (1:8:5),

and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 (1:10:1), of the U.S.
Constitution, which stipulate that Congress will mint coin and
regulate value, and the several States cannot make anything but
gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt, the Julliard
decision was conspicuously contrary to constitutional intent, but
as Naval Academy founder George Bancroft pointed out in a
detailed rebuttal to the decision (A Plea for the Constitution of
the United States: Wounded in the House of Its Guardians),
Julliard was based on Congress' legislative jurisdiction under
Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, in the geographical United
States. Thus, manifestation of Congress' dual role -- exercise
only of delegated power under Article I within the several
States, and exercise of any power not specifically prohibited by
the U.S. Constitution within the geographical United States (the
federal zone) under Article IV. So far as lawful implication,
the People and the governments of the several States had the
Right to reject United States paper money, as several court
decisions confirm; but, as a practical matter, the nation was
largely changed over to paper money, rather than gold and silver
coin, by the time the Federal Reserve Act established the Federal
Reserve System in 1913. By 1933, the Federal Reserve Note, not
to be confused with the current Federal Reserve Bank Note, was
backed 60% by obligations of the United States, and by 40% gold.


Page 11 of 40
Congress also engaged in massive land-grabs both within the

Continental United States and abroad. Takeover of the Hawaiian
Islands, going to war with Spain to take the Philippines, Puerto
Rico, etc., and nearly all States admitted to the Union after the
Civil War were blackmailed into land concessions. Oklahoma,
admitted in 1907, adopted the following provision at Article I,
Section 3 of the state constitution:
The people inhabiting the State do agree and declare

that they forever disclaim all right and title in or to
any unappropriated public lands lying within the
boundaries thereof.
Even though the U.S. Constitution grants authority for the

United States (federal government) to establish nothing more than
forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings
within the several States, from the time of the Civil War, well
into this century, including mineral-rich Alaska, Congress
indulged its greed for land; whereas the intent of American
Founders, via the U.S. Constitution, the "Ordinance of 1887: The
Northwest Territorial Government", and other such instruments,
was clearly to keep the federal beast locked soundly within its
box which was, for the most part, limited to the ten miles square
(100 square miles) authorized for the seat of the federal
government.
Toward the end of the 19th century, some of the retained

federal lands within the several States were declared to be
national parks. Development of federally owned resources
accelerated in the 1930's via public works programs, such as
building dams for flood control and electrical generation, and a
multitude of other enterprises.
On the enforcement and judicial fronts, there was a

corresponding re-organization. The Department of Justice was
created by Act of Congress on June 22, 1870 (Forty-First
Congress, Session II, Chapter 150, pages 162 et seq.), with the
Attorney General at the head of this organization. To that
point, each government agency or department pretty well took care
of its own legal affairs, but the Act establishing the Justice
Department consolidated authority over most enforcement and legal
matters, including those of the Department of the Interior.
Changing United States courts around was a somewhat longer

process, but it was managed over time. The United States Circuit
Courts became United States Courts of Appeal via Act of Congress
on March 3, 1891, and organization of United States District
Courts, with amendments since, was accomplished by Act of
Congress on March 3, 1911 (Sixty-First Congress, Session III,
Chapter 231, pages 1087 et seq.).

Page 12 of 40
Part II: Current Federal Jurisdiction in the States
While some of the seemingly unrelated history conveyed in Part

I of this memorandum might appear not to address United States
judicial authority within the several States, it will fall into
place when the office of "federal magistrate" is addressed.
Magistrates in United States District Courts are simply federal
park commissioners and nothing more. The name was changed, but
the character and jurisdiction of the office did not.
The territorial jurisdiction of federal magistrates, which is

easily demonstrated by way of two statutes, is concurrent with
jurisdiction of United States District Courts within the several
States. Or at least it would appear so. The first definition,
in relative part, comes from Title 18 of the United States Code,
the Code of Criminal Procedure, at Section 7, with particular
attention to 7(3) (U.S.C., 1979 edition):
7. Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of

the United States defined
The term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction

of the United States", as used in this title [18 U.S.C.
1 et seq.], includes:
(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the

United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise
acquired by the United States by consent of the
legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for
the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or
other needful building.
The second comes from the so-called Buck Act, at 4 U.S.C.

110 (1995 Lawyer's Cooperative CD-ROM edition):
110. Same; definitions
As used in sections 105-109 of this title -- ...
(d) The term "State" includes any Territory or

possession of the United States.
(e) The term "Federal area" means any lands or premises

held or acquired by or for the use of the United States
or any department, establishment, or agency of the United
States; and any Federal area, or any part thereof, which
is located within the exterior boundaries of any State,
shall be deemed to be a Federal area located within such
State.
[emphasis added]

Page 13 of 40

Definition of the term "State" as included in the above cite

as used in both the United States Code and in the codes of the
various States is essential to understanding that most statutes
in the United States Code presume application in federal "States"
such as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, etc., and not
within the several States which are parties to the U.S.
Constitution. The distinction in 18 U.S.C. 7(3) is subtle, but
becomes clearer when read very carefully: special territorial
jurisdiction, where the United States Code of Criminal Procedure
is applicable, embraces: (1) "Any lands reserved or acquired for
the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction," (2) "or any place purchased or
otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the
legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the
erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful
building."
In the first instance, the United States (federal government)

has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over any land acquired
for any purpose; whereas, in the second instance, the United
States (federal government) has jurisdiction only over lands
which are acquired for a constitutional purpose, as specified in
Article I, after the land has been ceded to the United States by
the State Legislature. In the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands and other United States (federal government)
possessions classified as "States" in federal municipal law,
Congress has unrestricted and exclusive legislative jurisdiction,
pursuant to Article IV, so purchase of land for United States
(federal government) use automatically comes under Congress'
legislative jurisdiction, with or without consent of the State
Legislative body. In the second instance, legislatures of the
several States must cede jurisdiction over acquired property to
the United States (federal government) before any judicial
authority can be exercised.
The Buck Act definition of "State" is about as straightforward

as any of the various definitions of "State" which refer to the
federal "States":
The term "State" includes any Territory or possession of the

United States.
A similar definition of the term is located in Rule 54 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
"State" includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,

territory and insular possession.

Page 14 of 40
Jurisdiction of United States District Courts, being limited

to federal "States" and to federal enclaves within the several
States, is further reinforced by another Rule 54 application:

"Act of Congress" includes any act of Congress locally

applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in
Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.
The distinction between federal "States" and the several

[Union] States is clarified in the jurisdiction and venue statute
(territorial jurisdiction) governing conduct of United States
District Courts. According to The United States Government
Manual for 1995/96, at page 75, is 18 U.S.C. 3231 (1979
edition, U.S.C.):
3231. District courts
The district courts of the United States shall have

original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of all offenses against the laws of the United
States.
Nothing in this title [18 U.S.C. 1 et seq.] shall be

held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the
courts of the several States under the laws thereof.
If the distinction between the federal "States" and the

several [Union] States is not made clear enough by 3231, proof
of the distinction is found in the legislative history for 18
U.S.C. 3241, again using the 1979 edition of the United States
Code ("U.S.C."):
3241. Jurisdiction of offenses under certain sections
The United States District Court for the Canal Zone and
the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have
jurisdiction of offenses under the laws of the United
States, not locally inapplicable, concurrently within the
territorial jurisdiction of such courts, and
jurisdiction, concurrently with the district courts of
the United States, of offenses against the laws of the
United States committed upon the high seas.
At various times, other territorial courts were included in

this statute. The district court of the Philippines was removed
in 1946 when the island nation became an independent
commonwealth; then "Act July 7, 1958 deleted 'District Court for
the Territory of Alaska'...." In other words, up until the point
at which Alaska was admitted to the Union, that Territory was
considered a federal "State." Once admitted to the Union,
Alaskan courts no longer qualified as courts of the United
States. State courts, because of Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, could not legitimately
exercise any federal authority. The Canal Zone district court
has been removed from this statute since the 1979 U.S.C. edition
was published, so the District Court of the Virgin Islands is the
only remaining federal "State" court that exercises concurrent
jurisdiction with United States District Courts under 18 U.S.C.
3241.


Page 15 of 40
We turn now to the "special territorial" jurisdiction found at

18 U.S.C. 7(3) by way of examining the evolution of what are
today known as "federal magistrate judges", formerly known as
"federal magistrates", and before that, as "national park
commissioners". The first selection comes from historic and
amendment notes following 28 U.S.C. 631, which provides for
appointment and tenure of federal magistrate judges (1995
Lawyer's Cooperative CD-ROM edition of U.S.C.):
1979. Act Oct. 10, 1979, in subsec. (a), substituted

"Where the conference deems it desirable, a magistrate
may be designated to serve in one or more districts
adjoining the district for which he is appointed. Such a
designation shall be made by the concurrence of a
majority of the judges of each of the district courts
involved and shall specify the duties to be performed by
the magistrate in the adjoining district or districts."
for "Where an area under the administration of the
National Park Service, or the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, or any other Federal agency, extends
into two or more judicial districts and it is deemed
desirable by the conference that the territorial
jurisdiction of a magistrate's appointment include the
entirety of such area, the appointment or reappointment
shall be made by the concurrence of a majority of all
judges of the district courts of the judicial districts
involved, and where there is no such concurrence by the
concurrence of the chief judges of such district
courts."; in subsec. (b), in the introductory matter,
inserted "reappointed to", in para. (1), inserted ", and
has been for at least 5 years,", in cl. (A), inserted
"or", in cl. (B), deleted "or" following "Islands;"
deleted cl. (C) which read: "in an area under the
administration of the National Park Service, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, or any other Federal
agency that extends into two or more States, a member in
good standing of the bar of the highest court of one of
those States;"' in para. (4), substituted "; and" for a
period and added para. (5), redesignated subsecs. (f)ü(j)
as subsecs. (g)ü(k) respectively; and added new subsec.
(f).
[emphasis added]
Before examining deletions made in the 1979 amending Act, it

will be useful to import the index from earlier law pertaining to
national park commissioners before all the name changes, with the
current Magistrate Act at 28 U.S.C. 631-639:
Amendments (1995 Lawyer's Cooperative CD-ROM edition of

U.S.C.):


Page 16 of 40
1954. Act Aug. 13, 1954, ch 728, 1(c), 68 Stat. 704,

amended the analysis of this chapter by adding "and
expenses" to item 633.
1968. Act Oct. 17, 1968, P. L. 90-578, Title I, 101,

82 Stat. 1108, amended the analysis of this chapter by
substituting items 632 through 639 for items which read:
"632 .Park commissioners; jurisdiction and powers;

procedure
"633 .Fees and expenses
"634 .Salaries of Park Commissioners; disposition of

fees
"635 .Park Commissioners; residence
"636 .Accounts
"637 .Oaths, acknowledgments, affidavits and

depositions
"638 .Seals
"639 .Dockets and forms; United States Code".
1972. Act Mar. 1, 1972, P.L. 92-239, 3, 86 Stat. 47,

amended the analysis of this chapter by substituting ",
powers, and temporary assignment" for "and powers" in
item 636.
It is also useful to see the evolution of this Act dating to

the last century:
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., 526 and 527,

sections 27, 66, 80e, 100, 117e, 129, 172, 198e, 204e,
256d, 395e, 403c-5, 403h-5, 404c-5, and 408m of title 16,
U.S.C., 1940 ed., Conservation, and section 863 of title
48, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Territories and Insular Possessions
(May 27, 1894, ch. 72, 5, 28 Stat. 74; May 28, 1896,
ch. 252, 19, 20, 29 Stat. 184; Apr. 12, 1900, ch.
191, 34, 31 Stat. 84; Mar. 2, 1901, ch. 814, 31 Stat.
956; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 291, 36 Stat. 1167; Jan.
7, 1913, ch. 6, 37 Stat. 648; Aug. 22, 1914.
Section consolidates section 526 and a portion of 527,

both of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with provisions of
sections 27, 66, 80e, 100, 117e, 129, 172, 198e, 204e,
256d, 395e, 403c-5, 403h-5, 404c-5 and 408m of title 16,
U.S.C., 1940 ed., and provisions of section 863 of title
48, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Territories and Insular
Possessions, relating to appointment of United States
commissioners. For other provisions of said sections see

Distribution Table.

Page 17 of 40
Some of the provisions of section 863 of title 48,

U.S.C., 1940 ed., Territories and Insular Possessions
were retained in that title.
The provision of sections 395e, 403c-5, 404c-5, and

408m of title 16, U.S.C., 1940 ed., for appointment of
the Park Commissioner in the Hawaii National Park,
Shenandoah National Park, Great Smoky Mountains National
Park, Mammoth Cave National Park and Isle Royale National
Park upon "the recommendation of the Secretary of the
Interior" was omitted as inconsistent not only with other
provisions of this title but with other statutes
applicable to other national parks.
All such park commissioners are United States

commissioners and the revision of these sections makes
possible uniformity and consistency in administrative
matters concerning such commissioners. (See, also,
sections 604 and 634 of this title.)
Words "the Director of the Administrative Office of the

United States Courts" were substituted for "Attorney
General" in section 526 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., in
view of the general supervision by the Director over
clerks and commissioners under section 601 et seq. of
this title.
A provision in section 526 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940

ed., that commissioners should have the same powers and
duties as are conferred and imposed by law, was omitted
as superfluous.
[emphasis added]
Jurisdiction provisions relating to federal magistrate

judges/national park commissioners were enacted in definitive
terms for the Grand Canyon National Park Commissioner:
Special commissioner for Grand Canyon National Park;

appointment; jurisdiction; compensation. Act Sept. 14,
1959, P. L. 86-258, 1-3, 73 Stat. 546, provided:
"Sec .1. The United States District Court for the

District of Arizona shall appoint a special commissioner
for the Grand Canyon National Park, Arizona. The
commissioner shall hold office for four years, unless
sooner removed by the district court, and he shall be
subject to the general laws and requirements applicable
to United States commissioners.
"Sec .2. The jurisdiction of the commissioner in

adjudicating cases brought before him shall be limited to

the trial, and sentencing upon conviction, of persons

charged with the commission of those misdemeanors
classified as petty offenses (18 U.S.C. 1) [18 U.S.C. 1]
relating to the violation of Federal laws or regulations
applicable within the park: Provided, That any person
charged with a petty offense may elect to be tried in the
district court of the United States; and the
commissioner shall apprise the defendant of his right to
make such election, but shall not proceed to try the case
unless the defendant, after being so apprised, signs a
written consent to be tried before the commissioner. The
exercise of additional functions by the commissioner
shall be consistent with and be carried out in accordance
with the authority, laws, and regulations of general
application to United States commissioners. The rules of
procedure set forth in title 18, section 3402, of the
United States Code [18 U.S.C. 3402], shall be followed in
the handling of cases by such commissioner. The
probation laws shall be applicable to persons tried by
the commissioner and he shall have power to grant
probation.
[emphasis added]

Page 18 of 40
Now we go to a few court cases to nail the matter down:
Powers and duties were coextensive with limits of

judicial district in which he was appointed. United
States v. Harden, 10 F 802 (D.C. N.C., 1881); United
States v. Stern, 177 F 479 (D.C. Pa. 1910).
Purpose of Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. 631 et

seq., was to provide method to relieve judges of some of
their non-Article III functions. United States v. First
National Bank of Rush, 576 F.2d 852 (10th Cir., 1978),
78-1 USTC 9462, 42 AFTR 2d 78-5049.
Purpose of Federal Magistrates Act (28 U.S.C. 631-

638) is to remove from workload of United States District
Courts matters which are more desirably performed by
lower tier of judicial officers. United States v.
Richardson, 57 FRD 196 (D.C. N.Y., 1972).
Evolution of the federal magistrate judge demonstrates that he

is merely a glorified national park commissioner, who is a bar-
licensed attorney, and his territorial jurisdiction is concurrent
with jurisdiction of the United States District Court where he
serves. As previously demonstrated via analysis of 18 U.S.C.
7(3) and 4 U.S.C.110(d) & (e), there is a gray area where
there might be some discretion. In the federal "States", United
States District Court venue and jurisdiction may extend to
national parks and other lands retained by the United States, but
in the several States which are parties to the U.S. Constitution,
United States judicial authority may be exercised only on federal

enclaves, i.e. lands ceded to the United States by legislatures

of the several States, "for the erection of a fort, magazine,
arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building" (1979 edition,
U.S.C.). There is, and was, no constitutional authority for
Congress to retain land for the United States, as was the case in
Oklahoma, Colorado, Nevada, Alaska, etc., in States admitted to
the Union subsequent to the Civil War. Nevada appears to be
leading the charge on this issue, namely, the right of the United
States (federal government) to retain land in the several States
other than for constitutional purposes; and it is clear, by
distinctly separate authorities pertaining to federal "States"
and to the several States in 18 U.S.C. 7(3) & 3231 and 4
U.S.C. 1001(d) & (e), that application of judicial authority in
the United States Code of Criminal Procedure limits jurisdiction
to federal enclaves which have been ceded by legislatures of the
several States for constitutional purposes only.

Page 19 of 40
Still, this is a vague area which has yet to be thoroughly

explored: Within the several States, the United States has
judicial authority either: (1) on federal enclaves ceded by
legislatures of the several States for constitutional purposes,
or (2) on federal enclaves ceded for constitutional purposes and
in national parks. In his memorandum, Becraft frames his
conclusion concerning United States judicial jurisdiction by
basing it on an 1885 Supreme Court decision, even though the
decision was premised on facts relative to the federal
reservation at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas:
The single most important case regarding the subject of

federal jurisdiction appears to be Fort Leavenworth R.
Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 531, 5 S.Ct. 995 (1885), which
sets forth the law on this point fully. There, the
railroad company property which passed through the Fort
Leavenworth federal enclave was being subjected to
taxation by Kansas, and the company claimed an exemption
from state taxation. In holding that the railroad
company's property could be taxed, the Court carefully
explained federal jurisdiction within the States:
The consent of the states to the purchase of

lands within them for the special purposes named,
is, however, essential, under the constitution,
to the transfer to the general government, with
the title, of political jurisdiction and
dominion. Where lands are acquired without such
consent, the possession of the United States,
unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in
some other way, is simply that of an ordinary
proprietor. The property in that case, unless
used as a means to carry out the purposes of the
government, is subject to the legislative
authority and control of the states equally with
the property of private individuals.

Thus, the cases decided within the 19th century clearly

disclosed the extent and scope of both State and federal
jurisdiction. In essence, these cases, among many
others, hold that the jurisdiction of any particular
State is co-extensive with its borders or territory, and
all persons and property located or found therein are
subject to such jurisdiction; this jurisdiction is
superior. Federal jurisdiction results only from a
conveyance of state jurisdiction to the federal
government for lands owned or otherwise possessed by the
federal government, and thus federal jurisdiction is
extremely limited in nature. And there is no federal
jurisdiction if there be no grant or cession of
jurisdiction by the State to the federal government.
Therefore, federal territorial jurisdiction exists only
in Washington, D.C., the federal enclaves within the
States, and the territories and possessions of the United
States.

Page 20 of 40
During the Eisenhower administration, the matter of federal

jurisdiction within the States was addressed at length by a
specially formed Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of
Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, with both
State and United States (federal government) representatives
participating in the study. Assistant Attorney General Mansfield
D. Sprague chaired the committee. Part I of the report, titled
"The Facts and Committee Recommendations," was submitted to
Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., then transmitted to
President Eisenhower in April, 1956, and Part II, titled "A Text
of the Law of Legislative Jurisdiction," was submitted in June,
1957. The latter report, in particular, affirms the conclusion
that United States judicial authority within the several States
extends only so far as the constitutional grant:
The Constitution gives express recognition to but one

means of Federal acquisition of legislative jurisdiction
... by State consent under Article I, section 8, clause
17. ... Justice McLean suggested that the Constitution
provided the sole mode for transfer of jurisdiction, and
that if this mode is not pursued, no transfer of
jurisdiction can take place. [Page 41]
It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has been

a transfer of jurisdiction (1) pursuant to clause 17 by a
Federal acquisition of land with State consent, or (2) by
cession from the State to the Federal Government, or
unless the Federal Government has reserved jurisdiction
upon the admission of the State, the Federal Government
possesses no legislative jurisdiction over any area
within a State, such jurisdiction being for exercise by
the State, subject to non-interference by the State with
Federal functions. [Id., at 45]
The Federal Government cannot, by unilateral action on

its part, acquire legislative jurisdiction over any area

within the exterior boundaries of a State. [Id., at 46]
On the other hand, while the Federal Government has

power under various provisions of the Constitution to
define, and prohibit as criminal, certain acts or
omissions occurring anywhere in the United States, it has
no power to punish for various other crimes, jurisdiction
over which is retained by the States under our Federal-
State system of government, unless such crime occurs on
areas as to which legislative jurisdiction has been
vested in the Federal Government. [Id., at 107]

Page 21 of 40
The 1957 report appears to accommodate United States (federal

government) retention and/or acquisition of land, and therefore
legislative and judicial jurisdiction, other than that
specifically prescribed in the U.S. Constitution under Article I
authority. Therefore, if the report is correct on this hair-
splitting matter, congressional blackmail of States admitted to
the Union after the Civil War would appear to be legitimized, and
the report seems to accommodate legislative cession of land to
the United States (federal government) for other than
constitutional purposes ... national parks, flood control, and
electrical generation dams, etc.
However, the jury is still out on this matter, because recent

U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as New York v. United States et
al., 505 U.S. ___, 120 L.Ed.2d 120, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992), seem
to condemn this conclusion under authority of the Tenth Amendment
and the Separation of Powers Doctrine. The United States
(federal government) cannot exercise any authority within the
several States which is not specifically enumerated in Article I
of the U.S. Constitution; and officers of the several States
cannot accommodate any United States (federal government)
exercise of power which is not specifically delegated under
Article I, without first securing a constitutional amendment.
Regardless of the Tenth Amendment and the Separation of Powers

issues, any given Act of Congress, under United States judicial
authority, applies only to the extent of the Act and attending
regulations, with territorial limits prescribed at 18 U.S.C.
7(3) and 4 U.S.C. 110(d) & (e).
Generally speaking, territorial bounds for United States

judicial authority are applicable with respect to both civil and
criminal matters, with diversity of citizenship being the only
exception in civil matters. This expansion of United States
judicial authority does not extend to criminal matters, except as
specified by Thomas Jefferson in "The Kentucky Resolutions." The
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly prescribed the limits of
federal criminal jurisdiction in definitive terms. The
conclusive statement is this: "[Federal] legislation applies
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
unless a contrary intent appears [in the legislation] ...." See

Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894), 14 S.Ct. 513;
American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213 U.S. 347
(1909), 357, 29 S.Ct. 511; United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94
(1922), 97, 93, 43 S.Ct. 39; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421 (1932), 437, 52 S.Ct. 252; Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281 (1949), 285, 69 S.Ct. 575; United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S.
217, 222 (1949), 70 S.Ct. 10; and United States v. First
National City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 23 (2nd Cir. 1963).
The matter is addressed in Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure [selected portions, 1978 edition, U.S.C.]:
Rule 54. Application and Exception
(a) Courts. These rules apply to all criminal

proceedings in the United States District Courts ....
(c) Application of terms. As used in these rules the

following terms have the designated meanings.
"Act of Congress" includes any act of Congress locally

applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia,
in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular
possession.
The words "demurrer," "motion to quash," "plea in

abatement," "plea in bar" and "special plea in bar," or
words to the same effect, in any act of Congress shall be
construed to mean the motion raising a defense or
objection provided in Rule 12.
"Federal Magistrate" means a United States magistrate

as defined in 28 U.S.C. 631-639, a judge of the United
States or another judge or judicial officer specifically
empowered by statute in force in any territory or
possession, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the
District of Columbia, to perform a function to which a
particular rule relates.
"Judge of the United States" includes a judge of a

district court, court of appeals, or the Supreme Court.
"Law" includes statutes and judicial decisions.
"Magistrate" includes a United States magistrate as

defined in 28 U.S.C. 631-639, a judge of the United
States, another judge or judicial officer specifically
empowered by statute in force in any territory or
possession, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the
District of Columbia, to perform a function to which a
particular rule relates, and a state or local judicial
officer, authorized by 18 U.S.C. 3041 to perform the
functions prescribed in Rule 3, 4, and 5.
"State" includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,

territory and insular possession.
"United States magistrate" means the officer authorized

by 28 U.S.C.631-639.


Page 22 of 40
Application of Acts of Congress was clearly articulated in

Caha v. United States supra, where the Supreme Court stated as
follows:
The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not

extend into the territorial limits of the states, but
have force only in the District of Columbia, and other
places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
national government.
Application of terms in Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure appears to exclude jurisdiction of United
States courts on national parks within the several States, as has
repeatedly been demonstrated via 4 U.S.C. 110(d) & (e) and 18
U.S.C. 7(3) definitions and applications, and the definition of
"State" cited above; but, regardless of this hair splitting,
United States judicial authority via United States District
Courts, which is concurrent with the jurisdiction of national
park commissioners (now known as federal magistrate judges), does
not extend to the several States in any general way, other than
in territory ceded by the legislatures of the several States,
whether for constitutional purposes or for national parks. Thus,
the law of legislative jurisdiction is preserved in the
convoluted United States Code by tracking the history and
evolution of United States courts and their officers.

Page 23 of 40
Part III: Character of Law & Court Effect on Jurisdiction
Judicial authority of the United States is established in

Article III of the U.S. Constitution:
Article III
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States,

shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2. [1] The judicial Power shall extend to all

Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; --
to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public

Ministers and Consuls; -- to all Cases of admiralty and

maritime Jurisdiction; -- to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party; -- to Controversies
between two or more States; -- between a State and
Citizens of another State; -- between Citizens of
different States; -- between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
[2] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public

Ministers and Counsels, and those in which a State shall
be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned,
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.
[3] The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of

Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be
held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the
Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress
may by Law have directed.
Section 3. [1] Treason against the United States, shall

consist only in levying War against them, or, in adhering
to their Enemies, giving Aid and Comfort. No person shall
be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open
Court.
[2] The Congress shall have Power to declare the

Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall
work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the
Life of the Person attainted. [copied from Black's Law
Dictionary, 6th edition]

Page 24 of 40
The U.S. Supreme Court has classified the judicial authority

which is granted under Article III into three categories: First,
those cases in Common Law and equity which are cognizable within
the framework of the Section 2, Clause 1 "arising under" clause;
second, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction under Section 2,
Clause 1; and third, cases pertaining to ambassadors, etc.
Cases relating to the several States are affected by the Eleventh
Amendment, ratified in 1798, but don't materially affect the
instant matter.
Concern in this context focuses on two types of law and the

originating source. Use of the term "law" in Article III of the
U.S. Constitution, as is the case for due process amendments in
the Bill of Rights (first Ten Amendments, particularly the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh), contemplates the Common Law of
English-American lineage. Equity, also known as chancery,

pertains primarily to commercial or contract law, and is

voluntary on the part of participating parties. In other words,
Common Law was assumed and construed to be the Law of the Land
applicable both within the United States (federal zone) and
within the several States.
Constitutional intent was carried out by the first Congress

via the Judicial act of 1789. In this Act, original cognizance
over admiralty and maritime affairs was vested in courts of the
United States, exclusive of the several States, with a safeguard
built in, known as the "saving to suitors clause." Suitors, or
parties to an action, could remove to Common Law jurisdiction
where the Common Law was competent to provide a remedy. The
saving to suitors clause is retained in the current United States
Code. See 28 U.S.C. 1333(1).
In the beginning, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction applied

only to matters concerning international contracts and affairs on
the high seas, with the law of nations providing a guiding light.
The Supreme Court, early on, concluded that, while admiralty
jurisdiction is conveyed in Article III, 2, Clause 1, it is
distinct from authority pertaining to law and equity and,
therefore, does not fall under authority of the "arising under"
clause See American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26
U.S. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed 242; Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), 3 L.Ed.2d 368, 79 S.Ct. 468,
reh. den. 359 U.S. 962, 3 L.Ed.2d 769, 79 S.Ct. 795.

Page 25 of 40
The nature and origin of admiralty law is set out in Vol. 1 of

Corpus Juris, 1914 edition, p. 1249, as follows:
I. DEFINITION
[1] Admiralty is that branch or department of

jurisprudence which relates to and regulates maritime
property, affairs, and transactions, whether civil or
criminal. In a more limited sense it is the tribunal
exercising jurisdiction over maritime causes and
administering the Maritime law by a procedure peculiar to
itself and distinct from that followed by courts either
of equity or of common law.
II. ORIGIN AND GROWTH
[2] A. Under the Civil Law. Admiralty courts owe

their origin and procedure largely to the civil law,
which prevailed in Italy and along the north coast of the
Mediterranean, where naval commerce was originally most
active, and where, after the fall of the Western Empire,
the merchants and traders by sea brought about the
establishment of a court of consuls in each of the
principal maritime cities to hear causes arising out of
maritime commerce and property. The judges of these

consular courts were chosen on Christmas of each year by

the chief merchants, and they enforced and applied to
controversies the customs of the sea, whose origin is
long anterior to the civil law itself. These courts
gradually developed and extended their jurisdiction as
maritime commerce became more profitable and important,
until ultimately, in most states, they were merged into,
and became known as, courts of admiralty.
[3] B. In England. The admiralty is a court of

ancient origin, traceable back in English jurisprudence
to the reign of Edward I, and exercising a jurisdiction
coeval and coextensive with that of other foreign
maritime courts; indeed, by some authorities it is said
to have existed long before that time. But owing to the
hostility which, from historic causes, gradually
developed in England against the civil law, the
jurisdiction of admiralty was there greatly restricted
and limited, both by statute and by decisions of the
common-law courts interpreting the same. A reaction in
favor of the admiralty courts has now taken place,
however, and by acts of parliament they have regained
much of their lost jurisdiction, and have acquired
jurisdiction over all claims for damages done by any
ship, whether on land or water.
[4] C. In the United States. It is now well settled,

after much controversy, that the jurisdiction of the
courts of admiralty in the United States is not limited
to that of the English admiralty at the time of the
Revolution, but is derived from the early usages of the
statutes and the federal laws and decisions.

Page 26 of 40
The history related above hardly does justice to the continued

English-American battle over imposition of admiralty law which,
as the article suggests, is in the nature of Roman Civil Law,
British feudal law, or simply Civil Law, whereby legislative and
administrative bodies are ultimate authorities without any
reference to an independent judicial body. This kind of rule had
the effect of setting English Barons against King John I, with
the results being the Magna Charta, signed in 1215, and in 1640,
the Popular Rebellion which ended Star Chambers and convoluted
ecclesiastical courts under Charles I. American founders were
fully aware of the effects of admiralty or Civil Law -- the vice-
admiralty courts of George III were largely responsible for the
Revolution. Thus, the "saving to suitors" clause was
incorporated in the Judicial Act of 1789.
However, in the period following the Civil War, Congress found

admiralty rule convenient and, as the geographical United States,
under Congress' alleged Article IV legislative jurisdiction,
became an increasingly powerful influence, admiralty rule was
extended. First, as already noted from The United States
Government Manual of 1995/96, circuit courts were changed to

courts of appeal by Act of March 3, 1891, then United States

District Courts were reorganized and set by Act of March 3, 1911
(Sixty-First Congress, Sess. III, Chap. 231, pp. 1087, et seq.
[Public No. 475]). The nature of United States District Courts
is revealed in the Act at 9: "The district courts, as courts
of admiralty and as courts of equity ...."
In other words, the district courts of the United States, from

the Act of March 3, 1911 on, if not before, have never really had
a Common Law character in federal territories, and their
legitimate relationship to and within the several States has at
best been at arm's length and shaky, where the real party of
interest is the geographical United States (federal government)
under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction, exclusive of
Article I delegated authorities. However, within federal areas
or territories, as described in the Buck Act at 4 U.S.C. 4(e),
and the first part of 18 U.S.C. 7(3), the same limitation does
not apply, as disclosed at 11 of Corpus Juris supra, p. 1251:
[11] 7. Territorial courts. Although admiralty

jurisdiction can be exercised in the states in those
courts only which are established in pursuance of the
third article of the constitution, the same limitation
does not extend to the territories, and congress may vest
admiralty jurisdiction in courts created by a territorial
legislature as well as in territorial courts created by
act of congress, and it has exercised this power in both
instances. [In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 12 Sec. 453, 36
L.Ed 232; The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 25 L.Ed.
1061; American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton
supra ....]

Page 27 of 40
To say that United States district courts didn't have a Common

Law character isn't precisely correct. In diversity suits at law
or in equity, or suits covered by other provisions of the
"arising under" clause, they appear to have had a "law"
character. However, in 1938, via Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
the U.S. Supreme Court declared that there is no longer a
national or general Common Law. Today, they operate exclusively
under "Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States," as defined at 18 U.S.C. sec. 7(3), under
admiralty/civil law rules, which are contrary to the Common Law
indigenous to the several States. In fact, court decisions
disclose that they have only admiralty and vice-admiralty
capacities and, in effect, they either accommodate private
international law or they serve as administrative law courts (see
5 U.S.C. sec, 701 et seq.). The U.S. Supreme Court is the only
remaining United States court which has a true Article III
judicial character and, under Rule 17.1 of the Supreme Court
Rules, has original jurisdiction over actions at law.
The fine line determining applicability of the Article III,

2, Clause 1 "arising under" clause is the real party of interest.
So long as an agent or agency of the United States (federal

government) is carrying out an Article I delegated power within

the several States, courts of the United States have jurisdiction
by way of the "arising under" clause, whether as the complaining
party or defendant. However, if an agent or agency of the United
States operates under Congress' article IV legislative
jurisdiction, which is exclusive to the geographical United
States (read "the federal zone"), or to the United States
(federal government), which is a foreign corporation with respect
to the several States, the "arising under" clause does not apply
because the act is perpetrated under color of law. In other
words, the "Act of Congress" which is locally applicable only in
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, etc., does not
legitimately reach the several States or the population of State
Citizens inhabiting those several States.
For example, in Dan Meador's Public Notice Memorandum

pertaining to the character of the "Internal Revenue Service" and
proper application of the Internal Revenue Code (which to date
has been published as legal notice in Oklahoma, Nebraska and
Montana newspapers), He demonstrated that IRS is an agency of the
Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico (Congress never created a
Bureau of Internal Revenue, predecessor of IRS), and that no
taxing statute in the Internal Revenue Code is applicable to the
several States, save as pertains to import duties on alcohol,
tobacco, and firearms in Subtitle E, and certain items in
Subtitle D of the Internal Revenue code (i.e. Windfall Profits
Tax on off-shore and imported petroleum). In the event that
officers and agents who allege to represent United States
(federal government) laws and interests prove to be operating
under color of law within the several States, then United States
judicial authority cannot spare them from accountability in the
framework of laws and courts of the several States.

Page 28 of 40
Suppose a soldier stationed at Ft. Sill robbed a store or

murdered someone in Lawton, Oklahoma. The fact that he is in
United States military service and might have even used an Army-
issued gun does not affect the law he broke, or the sovereign
territorial authority which originates there, and is responsible
for enforcing the law. In other words, immunity travels only so
far as legislative jurisdiction and the precise limit of any
given law. Under Congress' Article I delegated authority, agents
and officers of the United States have certain legitimate duties
which reach the several States, but under Congress' Article IV
authority in the geographical, self-interested United States
(federal zone), the cloak of immunity is shed at borders of the
several States, except on federal enclaves which have been ceded
by legislatures of the States to the United States (federal
government) for constitutional purposes only.
This distinction between United States "arising under" and

admiralty jurisdiction is territorial in nature, particularly
when admiralty jurisdiction is exercised under authority of
Article IV in the geographical United States and when it
represents United States (federal government) interests outside

of Congress' role as the Article I legislative body for national

government. Even then, this authority must comply with the law
of legislative jurisdiction. If this is not the case, then the
limitations of the Tenth Amendment and of the Separation of
Powers Doctrine are of no effect.
Part IV: Statute Application Determined by Regulation
The Administrative Procedures Act, located at 5 U.S.C. 552

et seq., and the Federal Register Act, located at 44 U.S.C.
1501 et seq., provide the means for determining what statutes in
any given Act of Congress are applicable where. If a statute has
general application, then the agency head responsible for
carrying out whatever duties the statute prescribes is required
to promulgate regulations disclosing the who, what, when, where
and how, and have the regulation published in the Federal
Register, if it has general application. If regulations are not
published in the Federal Register, they have at best limited
application. The controlling statute in the Federal Register Act
is 44 U.S.C. 1505(a):
1505. Documents to be published in Federal Register.
(a) Proclamations and Executive Orders; documents

having general applicability and legal effect; documents
required to be published by Congress.
There shall be published in the Federal Register --
(1) Presidential proclamations and Executive orders,

except those not having general applicability and
legal effect or effective only against Federal
agencies or persons in their capacity as officers,
agents, or employees thereof;
(2) documents or classes of documents that the

President may determine from time to time have
general applicability and legal effect; and
(3) documents or classes of documents that may be

required so to be published by Act of Congress.
For the purposes of this chapter [44 U.S.C. 1501 et

seq.] every document or order which prescribes a penalty
has general applicability and legal effect.

Page 29 of 40
At 44 U.S.C. 1507, the provision is made that, "The contents

of the Federal Register shall be judicially noticed ...", and at
1510, which establishes the Code of Federal Regulations, it
provides at subsection (e) that, "The codified documents [in the
Code of Federal Regulations] of the several agencies published in
the supplemental edition of the Federal Register ... shall be

prima facie evidence of the text of the documents and of the fact
that they are in effect on and after the date of publication."
In other words, where the several States and the general

population are concerned, a statute created by Act of Congress is
somewhat like a hot air balloon that will not get off the ground
until someone pumps hot air into it (as if it does not have
enough hot air already). Regulations are to statutes as hot air
is to the balloon. As stated in 1505(a)(1), if regulations for
any given statute aren't published in the Federal Register,
application is limited to Federal agencies or persons acting in
their capacity as officers, agents, or employees of Federal
agencies.
Provisions of 44 U.S.C.1505(a) are restated at 1 CFR 5.2:
5.2 Documents required to be filed for public

inspection and published.
The following documents are required to be filed for

public inspection with the Office of the Federal Register
and published in the Federal Register:
(a) Presidential proclamations and Executive orders in

the numbered series, and each other document that the
President submits for publication or orders to be
published.
(b) Each document or class of documents required to be

published by act of Congress.
(c) Each document having general applicability and

legal effect.

Page 30 of 40
Citations of authority requirements are as follows:
21.40 General requirements: Authority citations.
Each section in a document subject to codification must

include, or be covered by, a complete citation of the
authority under which the section is issued, including --
(a) General or specific authority delegated by statute;

and
(b) Executive delegations, if any, necessary to link

the statutory authority to the issuing agency.
21.41 Agency responsibility.
(a) Each issuing agency is responsible for the accuracy

and integrity of the citations of authority in the
documents it issues.

(b) Each issuing agency shall formally amend the

citations of authority in its codified material to
reflect any changes thereto.
The character of Federal statutory law, and the need for

regulations, have been addressed time and again by the U.S.
Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of Appeal. Many of the clearer
statements relate to application of the Internal Revenue Code, as
in California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974),
26, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 1500, 39 L.Ed.2d 812:
Because it has a bearing on our treatment of some of

the issues raised by the parties, we think it important
to note that the Act's civil and criminal penalties
attach only upon violation of regulations promulgated by
the Secretary; if the Secretary were to do nothing, the
Act itself would impose no penalties on anyone.
In Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949), the high

court said, "It is a well established principle of law that all
federal legislation applies only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States unless a contrary intent
appears." In order for a contrary intent to be facilitated,
delegations of authority and implementing regulations must be
published in the Federal Register, and/or any given statute must
clearly articulate application.
Fortunately, there is a reasonably easy way to discern what

statutes in the United States Code have general application to
the several States and to the population at large. This is
through the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, which begins
on page 751 of the 1995 Index Volume to the Code of Federal
Regulations. Its authority is located at 1 CFR 8.5(a):
(a) Parallel tables of statutory authorities and rules.

In the Code of Federal Regulations Index or at some other
place as the Director of the Federal Register considers
appropriate, numerical lists of all sections of the
current edition of the United States Code (except section
301 of title 5) which are cited by issuing agencies as
rule-making authority for currently effective regulations
in the Code of Federal Regulations. The lists shall be
arranged in the order of the titles and sections of the
United States Code with parallel citations to the
pertinent titles and parts of the Code of Federal
Regulations.

Page 31 of 40
This handy finding aid lists United States Code statutes by

title and section in the left-hand column, if implementing
regulations have been published in the Federal Register, and
applicable regulations by title and part, in the right-hand

column. If the statute doesn't appear, it doesn't have

implementing regulations which have been published in the Federal
Register, signifying that, in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
1505(a)(1) provisions, the statute is applicable only to Federal
agencies, or the officers, agents, and employees of Federal
agencies. If the statute number does appear and a regulation is
cited, the regulation must be consulted to determine application.
Where the instant matter is concerned, the table immediately

resolves the matter of territorial jurisdiction for United States
District Courts: there are no implementing regulations for 18
U.S.C. 7 & 3231. The absence of implementing regulations for
these two statutes confirms that the special maritime and
territorial authority of the United States District Court does
not reach into the several States and to the population at large;
the authority applies only on federal enclaves which have been
ceded to the United States for constitutional purposes, and as
the second paragraph of 3231 specifies, the laws and judicial
authority of the several States are superior and govern within
areas of the States which are not within federal enclaves that
have been ceded to Congress by the legislatures of the several
States.
Further, there are no implementing regulations for 28 U.S.C.

631-639, the Federal Magistrate Act. That is to say, these
glorified national park rangers in black robes, known as federal
magistrate judges, have no authority within in the several
States. Therefore, the United States District Courts have no
authority within in the several States, per the following:
Powers and duties were coextensive with limits of

judicial district in which he was appointed. United
States v. Harden, 10 F 802 (D.C. N.C., 1881); United
States v. Stern, 177 F 479 (D.C. Pa., 1910).
Where matters pertaining to alleged offenses under the

Internal Revenue Code are concerned, there are no implementing
regulations to support 26 U.S.C. 7402, which prescribes
jurisdiction for United States District Courts. This confirms
proofs in Meador's Public Notice Memorandum which demonstrate
that there are no implementing regulations for Internal Revenue
Code statutes prescribing taxing, assessment, and collection
authority, save as relates to import duties on distilled spirits,
etc., itemized in Subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code, with
the general authority being 27 CFR, Part 70, which is under
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") exclusive
administration.

Page 32 of 40
Matters relating to United States securities, etc., are

commonly at issue in federal prosecutions, so it is useful to
briefly examine underlying the authorities. The U.S.
Constitution, at Article I, Sec. 8, Clause 1, provides, "The
Congress shall have Power [1:8:5] to coin Money [and] regulate

the Value thereof," and at 10, Clause 1, stipulates that, "No

State shall ... coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts ...."
Since these provisions have never been amended or repealed,

underlying authorities for current United States credit and
monetary systems should be examined for application:
12 U.S.C. 226. "Federal Reserve Act" NO REGULATION

12 U.S.C. 227. "Banking Act of 1933" NO REGULATION
12 U.S.C. 228. "Banking Act of 1935" NO REGULATION
There are no regulations applicable to the several States for

the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.
Use of the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules is probably

easiest to demonstrate by analysis of an actual case issued via
the Department of Justice and/or a United States Attorney. In
order to do this, we will use United States of America v. Kenney
F. Moore, Colleen Moore, and Wayne Gunwall, 96 CR-082C, United
States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma,
Tulsa, under stamped impressions of Neal Kirkpatrick, Assistant
U.S. Attorney, and Fred White, grand jury foreperson.
The same people were charged in 95 CR-129C in the fall of 1995

by the same Assistant U.S. Attorneys, with Mr. White serving as
grand jury foreperson. The case was assigned to the same judge.
However, the grand jury foreperson was presented with some of the
same information included in this memorandum, and subsequently
the Moores and Mr. Gunwall filed criminal complaints against
federal government principals, sending complaints and evidence to
the United States District Court in care of the court Clerk, and
to the Oklahoma Attorney General, W. A. Drew Edmondson. The
complaint was received by the Clerk of the United States District
Court on Friday, Nov. 17, then Assistant U.S. Attorney
Kirkpatrick entered a motion to dismiss charges on Monday, Nov.
20.
Grand jury indictment against the Moores and Mr. Gunwall were
allegedly issued again on May 15, 1996, with a "SUMMONS IN A
CRIMINAL CASE" (96-CR-082-C) issued July 5, 1996, under the
semblance of a signature for Phil Lombardi, allegedly the issuing
officer of some undisclosed rank and horsepower.

Page 33 of 40
This case is interesting for a number of reasons, and would

not be included in this memorandum except that federal government
insiders have chosen to scandalize the Moores and Mr. Gunwall via
statewide Oklahoma media. One of the crucial points is that
after receiving summons for Dr. and Mrs. Moore (the Government
sent the Gunwall summons to the Moores and Moore papers to
Gunwall), Mr. Gunwall drove from Ponca City to Tulsa and
attempted to secure copies of relevant material from the office
of the United States District Court clerk. But, the file was

unavailable, allegedly still at an old office that wasn't open

that particular day. Yet, the information was made available to
Oklahoma print and broadcast media, and principals from the
United States federal government and the office of Oklahoma
Attorney General Edmondson fueled media reporting with comments.
It would be difficult to inflict much more injury on the

Moores and Mr. Gunwall than federal government officials have
already choreographed. The question of the moment, however,
concerns charges issued against Dr. & Mrs. Moore and Mr. Gunwall:
What authority lies behind them?
Government charges rest on four statutes, presented here in

the order in which they appear on the face of the alleged grand
jury indictment: 18 U.S.C. 371: Conspiracy; 26 U.S.C.
7212(a): Interfering with Administration of Internal Revenue
Laws; 18 U.S.C. 1341: Mail Fraud; and 18 U.S.C. 2: Aiding
and Abetting.
By consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules

supra, it is found that there are no implementing regulations
extending general application authority to the several States and
the population at large for any of these statutes. Therefore,
the statutes are applicable only to agencies of the United States
and to officers, agents, and employees thereof, per 44 U.S.C.
1505(a), cited above.
The only charge which might be of some concern would be mail

fraud, because Congress is obligated under Article I, 8 of the
U.S. Constitution with providing mail services for the several
States. However, manipulation of the Postal Service was one of
the first congressional initiatives which, for all practical
purposes, has moved the whole of United States federal government
under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction within the
federal zone (the geographical "United States"). This was done
via Act of Congress by the Thirty-Seventh Congress, Session III,
Chapter 71 (1863). Sections 22 & 23 of this Act distinguish
between "domestic" mail within the federal zone and "drop" mail
elsewhere.
Today, the United States Postal Service, a United States

federal government corporation, handles "domestic" mail in the
federal zone (the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, etc.), and
"non-domestic" mail delivered in the several States and
elsewhere. Regulatory application of 18 U.S.C. sec. 341
demonstrates the paradox for the United States federal
government: even though Congress is charged under Article I of
the U.S. Constitution with responsibility for maintaining mail
service within the several States, alleged Article IV authority
to govern the federal zone in any fashion not specifically
prohibited by the U.S. Constitution confers absolutely no
authority in, and with respect to, the several States which are
parties to the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, where Congress has
elected to incorporate the United States Postal Service under
Article IV authority, statutes prescribing penalties for mail
fraud, etc., are not applicable to, or enforceable in, the
several States.


Page 34 of 40
Part V: Summary and Conclusion
Through the 1930's, evolution of the corporate United States

federal government, under Congress' alleged Article IV
legislative jurisdiction in the federal zone (i.e. the
geographical, self-interested United States), was referred to as
"corporatism". Presently, the U.S. Supreme Court and various
other courts use the term "cooperative federalism" to refer to
the de facto arrangement between the United States federal
government and the governments of the several States (the latter
operating under the presumption that they are federal "States",
rather than independent republics subject only to Congress'
Article I delegated authority). This diabolical scheme, from
control of production and distribution of goods and services, to
the mathematically impossible social welfare system and criminal
enforcement, is premised on the notion that all activity is
commercial in nature. The effect has been to treat the entire
nation as a seamless garment which is under Congress' Article IV
exclusive legislative jurisdiction, rather than as a patchwork of
fifty independent republics which are subject only to Congress'
Article I delegated constitutional authority.
Thankfully, in the last few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has
provided footing which affords the possibility of correction. In
New York v. United States supra, the high Court reiterated
principles framed by the Tenth Amendment and the Separation of
Powers Doctrine: so far as the several States are concerned,
Congress can exercise only those powers specifically delegated by
the U.S. Constitution, and officers of the several States cannot
accommodate a United States (federal government) power which is
not delegated without first securing a Constitutional amendment.
Unrestricted application of the commerce clause has been taken to
task in Lopez and other such cases which are cited in Lopez.
Unfortunately, judicially correcting the problem isn't as easy

as it should be. Through the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has
occasionally conveyed a message by way of decisions, or more
appropriately, non-decisions. The maxim has been articulated
when the Court has been presented with evidences such as the
failed ratifications of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Amendments:
ratification of amendments is a political, rather than a
judicial, matter.
If we read history properly, the nation's high Court attempted

to hold the line prior to acquiescence in Julliard (1884), and
again resisted socialistic New Deal legislation until yielding in
Erie Railroad (1938). The choice in both cases appears to have
been pragmatic, yielding constitutional principles to the
political tide, further enhancing the probability and prospects
of a hidden oligarchy in America.

Page 35 of 40

In light of the current pervasive circumstance, it is

necessary to revisit first causes in order to address the
situation. As set forth in Part I of this Memorandum, American
Founders proclaimed that the "laws of Nature and Nature's God"
govern nations and Men, and that all Men are endowed with certain
unalienable Rights by their Creator. This foundation is
acknowledged in the preambles to state and federal constitutions:
the sovereign American People, by way of their constitutions,
have granted only certain, specifically enumerated powers to
their state and federal governments.
In New York v. United States supra, the U.S. Supreme Court

addressed the matter of authority. In the American system, the
question isn't what power governments should have, but what
powers have actually been delegated. The high Court further
concluded that public servants who usurp powers which are not
delegated invariably do so for self-serving ends. The problem,
of course, is accountability.
As the development history presented in the Becraft memorandum

demonstrates, the several States preceded the "United States".
The original thirteen colonies secured independence from English
rule, and each thereby established sovereignty as an independent
nation. The confederation which they maintained following the
Revolution was, at best, weak, having precious little authority
over the several new States. This arrangement threatened the
harmony, and even the survival, of that Confederation. These
difficulties spawned the Constitutional Convention in 1787, with
the first States convening under the U.S. Constitution and with
the U.S. Constitution vesting the United States (federal
government) with only the authority necessary to carry out its
expressly delegated responsibilities. However, the People and
the several States did not surrender any more power than was
delegated; they retained that which they did not delegate,
including sovereignty over the territories within the respective
States of the Union.
Thomas Jefferson, responding to the Alien and Sedition Acts,

addressed this very problem, and the proper order of things in
the American system of government, in the Kentucky Resolutions:

Page 36 of 40
8th. Resolved, That a committee of conference and

correspondence be appointed, who shall have in charge to
communicate the preceding resolutions to the Legislatures
of the several States; to assure them that this
commonwealth continues in the same esteem of their
friendship and union which it has manifested from the
moment at which a common danger first suggested a common
union; that it considers union, for specified national
purposes, and particularly to those specified in their
late federal compact, to be friendly to the peace,
happiness and prosperity of all the States: that
faithful to that compact, according to the plain intent

and meaning in which it was understood and acceded to by

the several parties, it is sincerely anxious for its
preservation: that it does also believe, that to take
from the States all the powers of self-government and
transfer them to a general and consolidated government,
without regard to the special delegations and
reservations solemnly agreed to in that compact, is not
for the peace, happiness and prosperity of these States;
and that therefore this commonwealth is determined, as it
doubts not its co-States are, to submit to undelegated,
and consequently unlimited powers in no man, or body of
men on earth: that in cases of an abuse of the delegated
powers, the members of the general government, being
chosen by the people, a change by the people would be the
constitutional remedy; but, where powers are assumed
which have not been delegated, a nullification of the act
is the rightful remedy: that every State has a natural
right in cases not within the compact -- to nullify of
their own authority all assumptions of power by others
within their limits: that without this right, they would
be under the domination, absolute and unlimited, of
whosoever might exercise this right of judgment for them:
that nevertheless, this commonwealth, from motives of
regard and respect for its co-States, has wished to
communicate with them on the subject: that with them
alone it is proper to communicate, they alone being
parties to the compact, and solely authorized to judge in
the last resort of the powers exercised under it,
Congress being not a party, but merely the creature of
the compact, and subject as to its assumptions of power
to the final judgment of those by whom, and for whose use
itself and its powers were all created and modified:
That if the acts before specified should stand, these
conclusions would flow from them; that the general
government may place any act they thing proper on the
list of crimes, and punish it themselves whether
enumerated or not enumerated by the constitution as
cognizable by them: that they may transfer its
cognizance to the President, or any other person, who may
himself be the accuser, counsel, judge and jury, whose
suspicions may be the evidence, his order the sentence,
his officer the executioner, and his breast the sole
record of the transaction: that a very numerous and
valuable description of the inhabitants of these States
being, by this precedent, reduced, as outlaws, to the
absolute dominion of one man, and the barrier of the
Constitution thus swept away from us all, no rampart now
remains against the passions and the powers of a majority
in Congress to protect from a like exportation, or other
more grievous punishment, the minority of the same body,
the legislatures, judges, governors and counsellors of
the States, nor their other peaceable inhabitants, who
may venture to reclaim the constitutional rights and
liberties of the States and the people, or who for other
causes, good or bad, may be obnoxious to the views, or
marked by the suspicions of the President, or be thought
dangerous to his or their election, or other interests,
public or personal ....


Page 37 of 40
Jefferson's argument is as valid in 1996 as it was in 1798:

Congress and the other branches of federal government are not
parties to the U.S. Constitution; they are products of it. The
U.S. Constitution vests Congress with certain delegated
authorities under Article I, and nothing more. Within its own
borders, State authority is antecedent to that of the United
States and, as parties to the U.S. Constitution, the several
States have both the right and responsibility to correct their
agent, the United States (federal government), when ambition
seeks to abuse or expand the powers which have been delegated.
Of more immediate importance where the instant matter is
concerned, those who exceed the law, whether in the State
governments or in the United States (federal government), are
accountable to the Law of the Land, and ultimately, to the People
of the Land, within the several States. Operation under color of
law is outlaw and criminal, and accountability must be in Law.
Judges, magistrates, attorneys for the Department of Justice, and
other enforcement people do not have immunity when they exceed
the law as it is written.
This memorandum conclusively demonstrates jurisdiction of

United States District Courts within the several States.
Implicitly, authority of the Department of Justice, and of the
United States (federal government) enforcement agencies attached
to that Department, is concurrent with that of United States
District Courts, because the lawful authority of any given agency
extends only so far as the legislative jurisdiction of the
government it serves. All legislation is territorial in nature.

Page 38 of 40
VERIFICATION
Under penalties of perjury, per 28 U.S.C. 1746(1), I hereby

attest that, to the best of My current information, knowledge,
understanding, and belief, all matters of law and fact as set out
above are true and correct, materially complete, and not
misleading, so help Me God.
/s/ Sheila Wallen

________________________________

_________________________________


Counselor at Law, Counsel of Record

Page 39 of 40
PROOF OF SERVICE
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
[i.e. There is none.]
Rules 301, 302: Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule 54: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Washington
Solicitor General
Washington
Executed on: _____________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________


Page 40 of 40
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : closing
Closing Statement to the Jury
by
Sheila Terese Wallen

Defendant
Ladies And Gentlemen of the Jury. Needless to say, I'm very

scared and very nervous. I don't know what I should know to tell
you in this case. I have been denied assistance of counsel by
the Court. So I'll do the best that I can. I ask your patience
and your indulgence. Please bear with me in this ordeal.
Let me begin with a very basic -- but an apparent long

forgotten -- fact.
When you read the Declaration of Independence it says that

God created each of us, you and me, with unalienable Rights --
natural Rights. The Right to Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Happiness. That Declaration, signed more than 200 years ago,
gave each of us to sovereignty of a King or a Queen. Subject to
no one or to no government.
We The People, like you and me, then created the

Constitution for each of the States. The States then created the
United States Government. The delegation of power, then, comes
to We the People directly from our God-given Rights. We
delegated some of this power to each of the States. The States,
in turn, then delegated very limited power to the federal
government.
This case before you today is not just about a few marijuana
plants, ladies and gentlemen. The State of Arizona, which is
more powerful than the federal government, has stated that one
can buy and sell marijuana in Arizona if you have a license to do
so.
Yet, today, the federal government now says that it has more
power than its creator - the State. How can the created become
more powerful than its creator? Can any one of you become more
powerful than God who created you? Is it now possible for you to
dictate to the God who created you? I think not!
This entire matter goes far beyond a few plants that are a
natural substance placed here by God. This matter really goes
beyond the so-called "Drug war" that was created by the
government, maintained by the government, and controlled by the
government.
The so-called "War on drugs" is actually a "war on civil

liberties and human rights". Nine million people -- nine million
-- have been arrested for possession or sale of marijuana since
1965, when the government started this war.
The National Drug and Crime Emergency Act (HR 4079), and the
anti-drug abuse Act (1988) has thrown many of our civil rights
and due process out the window. This "war" has justified all
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/closing.htm (1 of 5) [4/8/2007 2:17:10 PM]

kinds of unconstitutional and unconscionable police activities,

including illegal search, seizure, and the forfeiture of property
without a trial.
Closing Statement to the Jury:

Page 1 of 5
This is summary punishment, and it is forbidden by the

Constitution for the United States of America.
What is at stake here is the very foundation upon which this

nation was built -- The Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution for the United States of America, and the principle
for which it stands: Freedom from government tyranny -- the
Rights to Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.
Each of these people conducting this trial, -- the police

who testified against me -- the United States Prosecutor -- and
Judge Browning -- all took an oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution for the united States for America. They each must,
by law, take this oath.
Yet, you have heard here, in this courtroom, how each and
everyone of them has violated and broken that oath. Each one of
them has breached their contract with the American people. They
have breached their solemn oath with each one of you.
This case is not about marijuana possession.
This case is about monopoly, just like that old board game
we used to play as kids (and sometimes as adults too). This is
government monopoly, over the practice of law, over drug
smuggling, over automotive fuels, over everything they can
control and get their hands on.
You have heard this judge say that only he can rule on the
law. Then have him explain to you the federal law which makes it
a federal crime to obstruct justice and to commit perjury of
oath.
Then have him explain to you the decision of the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Powell in which that court
was forced to throw out all its prior precedents and allow
defendants to read the law to juries and to explain their
understanding of that law to juries.
You have heard this judge sustain objections to questions

which I have put to my Counsel of Choice. Then have him explain
to you the federal law which makes it a federal crime to deprive
any Citizen of fundamental, unalienable Rights like those
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
You have heard this judge say that he has already ruled on
the matter of unwarranted search and seizure. Then have him read
and explain the Fourth Amendment to you, as I will do right now:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

Page 2 of 5
I say to you that you, Ladies and Gentlemen, have full and
complete power and authority to make that determination yourself,
and your decision will be binding, no matter what this judge says
or wants you to believe.
You have good reason to expect that this judge will uphold
the Law in these United States of America, of which the Arizona
Republic is one. Then have him read and explain the Fifth
Amendment to you, which reads:
No person ... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.
You have watched this Judge deny Me my fundamental Right to

have the effective assistance of My Counsel, at all times and
places of my choosing. Then have him read and explain to you the
Sixth Amendment, which reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right ... to have the assistance of Counsel for her defense.
You have watched this judge proceed as if he has

jurisdiction in this case. Then have him explain to you the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst in which
that court held that if the assistance of Counsel is not
available to a criminal defendant -- at every step in the
proceedings -- then the trial court is ousted of jurisdiction to
proceed, and must dismiss the case, with prejudice.
And while he's at it, have him explain to you how it is that
an affidavit, verified under penalty of perjury, and numerous
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court can be considered as hearsay
and with no legal significance. Ask him to show you a certified
copy of his decision to that effect in this case. And ask him to
explain what motion of mine he denied, and why.
You have a right to all of these things, because the U.S.

Supreme Court, in the year 1995, ruled that juries are empowered
to decide relevance of evidence, to decide materiality of
evidence, and to decide the law itself. That case was U.S. v.
Gaudin.
Let me remind you.
You heard what the one policeman said about the many years
he has been on the police force. He told you that he did not
know what the fourth Amendment stated!

This man has been on the police force for 18 years. He has
arrested, caused the fines, and the imprisonment of who knows how
many people. Who knows how many lives and families he has
destroyed. Yet, he does not know what the fourth Amendment
states!!

Page 3 of 5
The police have admitted they did not have a search warrant.
In spite of the fact that the Fourth Amendment demands that he
has a search warrant. The Judge has ruled in this case -- as he
has stated on numerous occasions -- that the police did not need
a search warrant.
This is a blatant violation of the Constitution. This is a

breach of contract by the police and the Judge.
You have heard the Judge deny me counsel of my choice in

direct violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. The Sixth Amendment reads as follows:
"Shall have the assistance of Counsel for his defense." As

you have all seen and heard here in this courtroom, the Judge has
denied me assistance of Counsel of my choosing. Nowhere in that
Amendment does it state that I must have a licensed bar member to
represent me. It reads: TO HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
HER DEFENCE.
I have been denied assistance of counsel in this case.

Here, again, the Court violates the Constitution, in a blatant
and egregious manner.
Additionally, the Judge has refused to allow you, the jury,

to be fully informed as to your duties, your responsibilities,
and your Rights.
Let me read to you what some of our forefathers have said

concerning your rights and duties as a jury.
"The jury has a right to judge both the law as well as the
fact in controversy." This was stated by John Jay, our first
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1789.
"The jury has the right to determine both the law and the
facts," stated Samuel Chase, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Signer
of the unanimous Declaration of Independence.
"The jury has the power to bring a verdict in the teeth of

both law and fact." Oliver Wendell Holmes. U.S. Supreme Court
Justice, 1902.
"The law itself is on trial quite as much as the cause which

is to be decided." Harlan F. Stone. 12th Chief Justice, U.S,
Supreme Court, 1941.
"The pages of history shine on instances of the jury's

exercise of its prerogative to disregard instructions of the

judge . . .." U.S. vs. Dougherty, 473 Fed second, pages 1113-to
-1139.
You -- as a jury -- armed with a little knowledge, and

knowing what your rights, powers, and duties really are, can do
more to re-establish "Liberty and justice for all" in this State
than all the Senators and Representatives put together.

Page 4 of 5
Why?
Because, even without the concurrence of any of your fellow

jurors in a criminal trial, you, with your single vote of "NOT
GUILTY" can nullify every rule or "law" that is not within the
principles of natural, God-given, or Constitutional Law. It is
precisely this power of nullification that makes trial by JURY
one of the most important of our RIGHTS. It can protect and
preserve all of your Rights -- and all of my Rights.
You, the Jurors, each have the power, the Right, and the
duty to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States
of America. If the government, the police and even the Judge
chooses to violate their Oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution, you can still do so with your vote of not guilty in
this case.
Thank you. God bless each of you. And God bless America.

Page 5 of 5
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : notappel

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona


)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL
)
v. )
)
)
Defendant. )
________________________________)
NOTICE OF APPEAL
"Defendant"), to provide formal notice to all interested parties
in the instant case of Her appeal of this Court's Order dated
July 17, 1996, and of this Court's refusal to dismiss with
prejudice on July 23, 1996, to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, on grounds of violations of Her
fundamental Rights, as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and two
international treaties which are rendered supreme Law by the
supremacy clause in the Constitution for the United States of
America, as lawfully amended. This Court is denied jurisdiction
to proceed solely on the strength of this Notice of Appeal.
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/notappel.htm (1 of 3) [4/8/2007 2:17:11 PM]

Notice of Appeal: Page 1 of 3
/s/ Sheila Wallen


PROOF OF SERVICE
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Washington
Solicitor General


Washington
/s/ Sheila Wallen

________________________________________
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : judgereq
HEAR YE! YEAR YE! HEAR YE!
REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS

FROM ALL QUALIFIED ARTICLE III
FEDERAL JUDGES
This is a general public request for proposals from all

individuals who are qualified, interested, and available to
preside as an Article III Judge on the bench of the District
Court of the United States in Tucson, Arizona state. This is an
Article III district court, pursuant to the holding of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case of Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,
312, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed 627 (1921).
Pursuant to the holding in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920),

your proposals must confirm, under penalty of perjury, that your
compensation is currently not being diminished by any federal or
state income taxes, unless you have chosen knowingly,
intentionally, and voluntarily to contribute a portion of your
compensation to the state and/or federal governments, without any
threat, duress, or coercion.
Pursuant to 31 U.S.C., the "Internal Revenue Service" is not an

agency or bureau of the United States Department of the Treasury.
See Chapter 3, Subchapter I, Organization. Voluntary
contributions to the "Internal Revenue Service" shall be grounds
for disqualification, because of the danger of undue outside
influences as described in the case of Lord v. Kelley, 240
F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965). Plaintiff therefore reserves the Right
to recuse any judge who currently has any contract, or has filed
any tax returns, with the "Internal Revenue Service" or with any
of its agencies, assigns, instrumentalities, or principals.
If you have so chosen to contribute a portion of your

compensation to the state and/or federal governments, please
affirm, under penalty of perjury, that this is the case. The
Plaintiff, who desires a qualified and competent Article III
federal judge, reserves the fundamental Right, under Article III,
Section 1, to a judge whose compensation for the office of
federal judge has not been diminished during his/her Continuance
in office. See Constitution for the United States of America, as
lawfully amended, Article III, Section 1.
Please submit your proposals, with accompanying affidavit, to

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Supreme Court of the United
States, One First Street Northeast, Washington, District of
Columbia. Please use first class or priority United States mail,
Attention: Clerk of Court. Please do not call either the Chief
Justice, or the Clerk of the Supreme Court, concerning this
matter.
Please submit a courtesy copy of your proposal to Judge Alex

Kozinski, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 125 South Grand Avenue,
Suite 200, Pasadena, California state. Please also do not call
Judge Kozinski's office either concerning this matter.
Please also submit a courtesy copy of your proposal to Paul
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/judgereq.htm (1 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:17:11 PM]

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : judgereq
Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Counselor at Law and federal

witness, c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776, Tucson [zip code exempt],
ARIZONA REPUBLIC.
All proposals must be on 8.5 x 11 inch white paper, and be signed

in original with blue ink, and verified pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1746.
It would assist the Plaintiff very much if you were to forward

this request for proposals to as many different email lists as
possible. We are utilizing the Internet exclusively, in order to
expedite the dissemination of this request. Hard copies of this
request for proposals have already been mailed to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and to Judge Alex Kozinski, for their information.
Thank you very much for your consideration. Questions about this
request for proposals should be directed to email address:
pmitch@primenet.com, attention: Mr. Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A.,
M.S., Counselor at Law and federal witness. See 18 U.S.C. 1513.
All communication must be in writing, and will be kept strictly
confidential, as much as possible. Public disclosures of
candidate proposals will happen only under lawful court order(s),
or with the prior written consent of the candidate.
August 31, 1996
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/judgereq.htm (2 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:17:11 PM]

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : nadismis

ARIZONA REPUBLIC
In Propria Persona


)
) TO DISMISS FOR LACK
v. ) OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
)
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) 28 U.S.C. 1359;
) FRCP Rules 9(b),
Defendant. ) 12(b)(1),(2), 12(h)(3)
________________________________)
"Defendant"), to demand an immediate dismissal of the instant
criminal case, with prejudice, for lack of criminal jurisdiction
to proceed in the first instance, either over the subject matter
or over the Person or property of the Defendant, and to provide
formal Notice to all interested parties of same. Defendant
hereby incorporates by reference all authorities cited in Exhibit
"A": Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, and in Her MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
[i.e. There is none.], Rules 301, 302: Federal Rules of
Evidence, as if all were set forth fully herein.
Notice and Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Criminal Jurisdiction:
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/nadismis.htm (1 of 18) [4/8/2007 2:17:12 PM]

Page 1 of 17
KNOW ALL BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris, and Defendant in the
above entitled matter, hereby demand that this territorial
(legislative) tribunal dismiss the instant criminal case with
prejudice because it lacks exclusive jurisdiction over the exact
geographical location where the alleged criminal activity
mentioned in the indictment is alleged to have taken place. I
was not arrested in any fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard,
"needful building", or other federal enclave within the Arizona
Republic, nor was My Person or My private property situated
within any of the aforementioned federal areas (a/k/a the federal
zone).
A very recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, dated April 26,
1995, addressed the issue of exclusive legislative jurisdiction
of the Congress, and the powers of the federal government.
Justice Thomas, in a concurring majority opinion in U.S. v.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), 131 L.Ed.2d 626, very clearly says:
Indeed, on this crucial point, the majority and Justice

Breyer [dissenting] agree in principle: the Federal
Government has nothing approaching a police power. Id. at
page 64.
Justice Thomas went on to discuss "a regulation of police"
at page 86, wherein he stated as follows:
U.S. v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. 41, 9 Wall. 41, 19 L.Ed 593 (1870)

marked the first time the court struck down a federal law as
exceeding the power conveyed by the commerce clause. In a
2 page opinion, the court invalidated a nationwide law
prohibiting all sales of naptha, and illuminating oils. In
so doing, the court remarked that the commerce clause "has
always been understood as limited by its terms; and as a
virtual denial of any power to interfere with the internal
trade and business of the separate states." Id. at page 44.

Page 2 of 17
The law in question was "plainly a regulation of police,"
which could have constitutional application only where Congress
had exclusive authority, such as the territories. Id. pp. 44-45.
Earlier in the text, Justice Thomas, Id. at page 85, said,
"Even before Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat 264, 5 L.Ed 257
(1821), noted that Congress had no general right to punish murder
committed within any of the states," and that Congress could not
punish felonies generally. However, Congress could enact laws
for places where it enjoyed plenary powers, for instance, over
the District of Columbia, and whatever effect ordinary murders,
or robbery, or gun possession might have on interstate commerce
was irrelevant to the question of Congressional power.
The first Federal Criminal Act did not establish a
nationwide prohibition against murder and the like. See Act of
April 30, 1790, Chapter 9 [1 Stat. 112]; rather, only when
committed in United States territories and possessions, or on the
high seas. With the single exceptions of treason and/or
counterfeiting, and notwithstanding any of the effects which
murder, robbery, and gun possession might have on interstate
commerce, Congress understood that it could not establish
nationwide prohibitions.
Justice Thomas summed up his opinion dramatically with the
statement quoted in part herein:
If we wish to be true to a Constitution that does not cede a

police power to the Federal Government ....
(1) "All federal crimes are statutory." Doble, "Venue and
Criminal Cases in the United States District Court," Virginia Law

Review, 287, 289 (1926). " ...[O]n the other hand, since all
Federal Crimes are statutory and all criminal prosecutions in the
Federal territorial courts are based on Acts of Congress,"
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 26, in "taking of
testimony," notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, paragraph 2.

Page 3 of 17
(2) Rule 54, Application and Exception, paragraph (c),
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, "Act of Congress" includes
any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the
District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an
insular possession.
(3) There is no presumption in favor of jurisdiction, and
the basis for jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown. Hanford
v. Davis, 16 S.Ct. 1051, 163 U.S. 273, 41 L.Ed. 157 (1896).
(4) See exact wording of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17,
Constitution for the United States of America, which grant of
authority does not extend over every square inch of the 48
contiguous Union States.
(5) In principle, the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of
the federal government is not addressed to subject matter, but to
geographical location. See U.S. v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 336
(1818).
(6) It is axiomatic that the prosecution must always prove
territorial jurisdiction over a crime in order to sustain a
conviction therefor. U.S. v. Benson, 495 F.2d 475 at 481 (1974).
The jurisdictional challenge issue can never be waived by the
Accused, nor acquiesced by the Accused, in the absence of a
positive showing upon the record that jurisdiction was clearly

and unambiguously established.

Page 4 of 17
(7) Without proof of the requisite ownership or possession
by the United States, the crime has not been made out. U.S. v.
Watson, 80 Fed. Supp. 649 (1948, E.D. Va.). Only in America can
We be forced into the status of subjects of a foreign corporation
by fiat legislation, and the stroke of a CEO's pen, at the point
of a gun, and thereby be immediately divested of standing in
judicio, and declared to be debtors and enemies of our Own
government.
(8) In criminal prosecutions, where the federal government
is the moving party, it must not only establish ownership of the
property upon which the crime was allegedly committed, but it
must also produce documentation that the state has ceded to it
jurisdiction over that property. It was held by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the case of Fort Leavenworth Railway Co. v. Iowa, 114
U.S. 525 at 531 (1885):
Where lands are acquired without such consent, the

possession of the United States, unless political
jurisdiction be ceded to them in some other way, is simply
that of an ordinary proprietor.
(9) No jurisdiction exists in the United States to enforce
federal criminal laws until consent to accept jurisdiction over
acquired lands has been published and filed in behalf of the
United States, as provided in 40 U.S.C. 255, and the fact that
the state authorized the government to take and exercise
jurisdiction was immaterial. See Adams v. United States, 319
U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122, 87 L.Ed. 1421 (1943).
(10) All courts of justice are duty-bound to take judicial

notice of the territorial extent of jurisdiction, although those
acts are not formally put into evidence, nor in accord with
pleadings. Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 11 S.Ct. 80 (1890).

Page 5 of 17
(11) Where a federal court is without jurisdiction of the
offense, judgment of conviction of the court and/or the jury is
void ab initio, on its face. Bauman v. U.S., 156 F.2d 534 (5th
Cir. 1946).
(12) Federal criminal jurisdiction is never presumed; it
must always be proven; and it can never be waived. U.S. v.
Rogers, 23 Fed. 658 (D.C., W.D. Ark., 1885).
(13) The federal courts are limited both by the Constitution
and by Acts of Congress. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
98 S.Ct. 2396, 437 U.S. 365, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978).
(14) The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined in the
Constitution at Article III for judicial courts; in Article I
for legislative courts; and in Article IV for territorial
courts. Some courts created by Acts of Congress have been
referred to as "Constitutional Courts," whereas others are
regarded as "Legislative Tribunals." O'Donoghue v. U.S., 289
U.S. 516 (1933), 77 L.Ed 1356, 53 S.Ct. 74; Mookini v. U.S., 303
U.S. 201 at 205 (1938), 82 L.Ed 748, 58 S.Ct. 543.
(15) Legislative court judges do not enjoy Article III
guarantees; "inherently judicial" tasks must be performed by
judges deriving power under Article III. See U.S. v. Sanders,
641 F.2d 659 (1981), cert. den. 101 S.Ct. 3055, 452 U.S. 918, 69
L.Ed 422.
The United States District Court creation and composition

were accomplished by Acts of Congress on June 25, 1948 [62 Stat.
895], and November 13, 1963 [77 Stat. 331], currently codified at
28 U.S.C. 132; and the jurisdiction thereof, previously
demonstrated herein, i.e. Chapter 85 of Title 28, lists civil,
admiralty, maritime, patent, bankruptcy, etc., and does not once
list, mention, or describe any criminal jurisdiction. It just is
not there, so don't bother looking for it!

Page 6 of 17
(16) Acts of Congress creating the United States District
Courts do not vest said territorial tribunals with any criminal
jurisdiction; these courts have only such jurisdiction as is
conferred upon them by Act of Congress under the Constitution.
See Hubbard v. Ammerman, 465 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir., 1972), cert.
den. 93 S.Ct. 967, 410 U.S. 910, 35 L.Ed.2d 272.
(17) The United States District Court is not a court of
general jurisdiction, and has no other power bestowed upon it
except as prescribed by Congress. See Graves v. Snead, 541 F.2d
159 (6th Cir., 1976), cert. den. 97 S.Ct. 1106, 429 U.S. 1093, 51
L.Ed.2d 539.
(18) It is apparent that the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona was created and established under 28
U.S.C. 132, and its jurisdiction is defined and limited by
Chapter 85 of Title 28, United States Code.
(19) The courts of appropriate jurisdiction for violations
of Title 18 U.S.C. are designated at Section 3231, specifically
naming them as "district courts of the United States" [sic].
(20) There is a distinct and definite difference between a
"United States District Court" and a "District Court of the

United States". The words "District Court of the United States"
commonly describe constitutional courts created under Article III
of the Constitution, not the legislative courts which have long
been the courts of the Territories. See International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342
U.S. 237 at 241 (1952), 72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed. 275, 13 Alaska
536.

Page 7 of 17
(21) The term "District Court of the United States" commonly
describes Article III courts or "courts of the United States",
and not legislative courts of the territories. See American
Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed
242; International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v.
Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir., 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 919, 93
L.Ed. 1082, 69 S.Ct. 641, reh. den. 336 U.S. 971, 93 L.Ed 1121,
69 S.Ct. 936.
(22) Though the judicial system set up in a territory of the
United States is a part of federal jurisdiction, the phrase
"court of the United States" when used in a federal statute is
generally construed as not referring to "territorial courts."
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1921), 42 S.Ct.
343, 66 L.Ed. 627. In Balzac, the High Court stated:
The United States District Court is not a true United States

court established under Article III of the Constitution to
administer the judicial power of the United States therein
conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign
congressional faculty, granted under Article IV, Section 3,
of that instrument, of making all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United
States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true
United States courts in offering an opportunity to
nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local
influence, does not change its character as amere
territorial court.

[emphasis added]
The distinction within the dual nature of the federal court
system is also noted in Title 18 U.S.C. 3241, which states that
the United States District Court for the Canal Zone shall have
jurisdiction "concurrently with the district courts of the United
States, of offenses against the laws of the United States
committed upon the high seas."

Page 8 of 17
This distinction is the reason why federal jurisdiction over
prosecutions is more than a technical concept; it is
Constitutional requirement. See U.S. v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180,
aff'd 383 U.S. 169 (1966), 86 S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681, cert.
den. 87 S.Ct. 44, 134, and 385 U.S. 846, 17 L.Ed.2d 77, 117.
(23) Besides the recent Lopez decision, it is interesting to
note that at least two other courts, i.e. United States District
Courts, have come to the same or similar conclusions. See U.S.A.
v. Wilson, Stambaughr, Skott, Ketchum, Braun, and Ballin, Case
No. 94-CR-140 (March 16, 1995) (U.S.D.C. Wisconsin); and U.S. v.
Kearns, Case No. SA-95-CR-201 (October 6, 1995) (U.S.D.C.,
Texas).
(24) Interestingly enough, in a bankruptcy case in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania (Chapter 13),
Case No. 5-94-00839, titled In re: Francis Patrick Farrell v.
IRS/BATF, the alleged debtor sued out a compulsory counterclaim
against the IRS/BATF after the alleged creditor submitted its
proof of claim.
The counterclaim showed an extent of corruption unparalleled
in American history, to which agencies of the federal government

will often resort, specifically by placing a "T-Code" on
someone's Individual Master File ("IMF").
In this way, the IRS/BATF used Admiralty and Maritime
forfeiture laws to deprive a State Citizen of property and
assets, and to mis-classify Him as a "high level narcotics
trafficker." This occurred on November 17,1995! Why? See U.S.
v. Good, 114 S.Ct. 492 at 502, footnote 2 (1993).

Page 9 of 17
SUMMARY
The United States District Courts have no criminal
jurisdiction whatsoever to prosecute a State Citizen within one
of the 50 States of the Union which comprises the United States
of America, until and unless Congress says so. Until and unless
the federal government can prove ownership over said geographical
land mass, particularly that parcel of land which is the private
real property of the Defendant, the United States District Courts
have no criminal jurisdiction whatsoever within the 50 Union
States. Not a single Act of Congress vests the United States
District Courts, as distinct from District Courts of the United
States, with anything but "civil" authority. There is absolutely
no criminal jurisdiction vested in said territorial tribunals.
REMEDY DEMANDED
Therefore, Defendant hereby demands that this Article IV
legislative tribunal establish exclusive jurisdiction by
producing certified documents consisting of the following:
(a) Documentation showing "United States" (federal
government) ownership of each and every geographical location

mentioned in the instant indictment, wherein the alleged criminal
activity took place;
(b) Documentation from the Arizona Legislature which
provides evidence of a cession by Arizona state surrendering
jurisdiction to the "United States" (federal government) over the
same geographical location as stated in (a) above;
(c) Documentation pursuant to Title 40 U.S.C. 255, wherein
the "United States" (federal government) accepted jurisdiction to
the same geographical location as stated in (a) above, or,
documentation showing concurrent jurisdiction with Arizona state
over the geographical location as stated in (a) above;
(d) Alternatively, absent the requisite documentation,
Defendant hereby demands that this United States District Court
vacate the jury's guilty verdict and dismiss the instant case
with prejudice and in the interests of justice.

Page 10 of 17
/s/ Sheila Wallen


Counselor at Law, federal witness,
and Citizen of Arizona state

Page 11 of 17
Exhibit "A": Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
It is a well established principle of law that "all federal

legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of

the United States unless a contrary intent appears"; see Caha v.

United States, 152 U.S. 211, 215, 14 S.Ct. 513 (1894); American
Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213 U.S. 347, 357, 29
S.Ct. 511 (1909); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97, 98,
43 S.Ct. 39 (1922); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,
437, 52 S.Ct. 252 (1932); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285, 69 S.Ct. 575 (1949); United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217,
222, 70 S.Ct. 10 (1949); and United States v. First National
City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 23 (2nd Cir., 1963). And this principle
of law is expressed in a number of cases from the federal
appellate courts; see McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722
F.2d 582, 589 (9th Cir., 1983) (holding the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act as territorial); Meredith v. United States, 330
F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir., 1964) (holding the Federal Torts Claims Act
as territorial); United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711
(2nd Cir., 1975) (holding federal wiretap laws as territorial);
Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 (2nd Cir., 1978); Cleary v.
United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 609 (3rd Cir., 1984)
(holding federal age discrimination laws as territorial); Thomas
v. Brown & Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir., 1984)
(holding same as Cleary, supra); United States v. Mitchell, 553
F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir., 1977) (holding marine mammals
protection act as territorial); Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley,
Jr., Co., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir., 1985) (holding age
discrimination laws as territorial); Airline Stewards &
Stewardesses Assn. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 F.2d 170, 175
(8th Cir., 1959) (holding Railway Labor Act as territorial);
Zahourek v. Arthur Young and Co., 750 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir.,
1984) (holding age discrimination laws as territorial);
Commodities Futures Trading Comm. v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493
(D.C.Cir., 1984) (holding commission's subpoena power under
federal law as territorial); Reyes v. Secretary of H.E.W., 476
F.2d 910, 915 (D.C.Cir., 1973) (holding administration of Social
Security Act as territorial); and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268
F.Supp. 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y., 1967) (holding securities act as
territorial). But, because of statutory language, certain
federal drug laws operate extra-territorially; see United States
v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th Cir., 1976). The United States
has territorial jurisdiction only in Washington, D.C., the
federal enclaves within the States, and in the territories and
insular possessions of the "United States". However, it has no
territorial jurisdiction over non-federally owned areas inside
the territorial jurisdiction of the States within the American
Union. And this proposition of law is supported by literally
hundreds of cases.
As a general rule, the power of the United States criminally

to prosecute is, for the most part, confined to offenses
committed within "its jurisdiction". This is born out simply by
examination of Title 18, U.S.C. Section 5 which defines the term
"United States" in clear jurisdictional terms. Section 7
contains the fullest statutory definition of the "jurisdiction of
the United States" [sic]. The United States District Courts have
jurisdiction of offenses occurring within the "United States",
pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C., section 3231.

Page 12 of 17

Examples of this proposition are numerous. In Pothier v.

Rodman, 291 F. 311 (1st Cir., 1923), the question involved
whether a murder committed at Camp Lewis Military Reservation in
the State of Washington was a federal crime. Here, the murder
was committed more than a year before the U.S. acquired a deed
for the property in question. Pothier was arrested and
incarcerated in Rhode Island and filed a Habeas Corpus petition
seeking his release on the grounds that the federal courts had no
jurisdiction over an offense not committed in U.S. jurisdiction.
The First Circuit agreed that there was no federal jurisdiction
and ordered his release. But, on appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Rodman v. Pothier, 264 U.S. 399, 44 S.Ct. 360 (1924),
that Court reversed; although agreeing with the jurisdictional
principles enunciated by the First Circuit, it held that only the
federal court in Washington State could hear that issue. In
United States v. Unzeuta, 35 F.2d 750 (8th Cir., 1929), the
Eighth Circuit held that the U.S. had no jurisdiction over a
murder committed in a railroad car at Fort Robinson, the state
cession statute being construed as not including railroad rights-
of-way. This decision was reversed in United States v. Unzeuta,
281 U.S. 138, 50 S.Ct. 284 (1930), the court holding that the
U.S. did have jurisdiction over the railroad rights-of-way in
Fort Robinson. In Bowen v. Johnson, 97 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.,
1938), the question presented was whether jurisdiction over an
offense prosecuted in federal court could be raised in a petition
for Habeas Corpus. The denial of Bowen's petition was reversed
in Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 59 S.Ct. 442 (1939), the Court
concluding that such a jurisdictional challenge could be raised
in a Habeas Corpus petition. But, the Court then addressed the
issue, and found that the U.S. both owned the property in
question and had a state legislative grant ceding jurisdiction to
the United States, thus there was jurisdiction in the United
States to prosecute Bowen. But, if jurisdiction is not vested in
the United States pursuant to statute, there is no jurisdiction;
see Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122 (1943).
And the lower federal courts also require the presence of

federal jurisdiction in criminal prosecutions. In Kelly v.
United States, 27 F. 616 (D.Me., 1885), federal jurisdiction of a
manslaughter committed at Fort Popham was upheld when it was
shown that the U.S. owned the property where the offense occurred
and the state had ceded jurisdiction. In United States v. Andem,
158 F. 996 (D.N.J., 1908), federal jurisdiction for a forgery
offense was upheld on a showing that the United States owned the
property where the offense was committed and the state had ceded
jurisdiction of the property to the U.S. In United States v.
Penn, 48 F. 669 (E.D.Va., 1880), since the U.S. did not have
jurisdiction over Arlington National Cemetery, a federal larceny
prosecution was dismissed. In United States v. Lovely, 319 F.2d
673 (4th Cir., 1963), federal jurisdiction was found to exist by
U.S. ownership of the property and a state cession of
jurisdiction. In United States v. Watson, 80 F.Supp. 649
(E.D.Va., 1948), federal criminal charges were dismissed, the
court stating as follows:
Without proof of the requisite ownership or possession of

the United States, the crime has not been made out. 80

F.Supp., at 651.

Page 13 of 17
In Brown v. United States, 257 F. 46 (5th Cir., 1919),

federal jurisdiction was upheld on the basis that the U.S. owned
the post office site where a murder was committed and the state
had ceded jurisdiction; see also England v. United States, 174
F.2d 466 (5th Cir., 1949); Krull v. United States, 240 F.2d 122
(5th Cir., 1957); Hudspeth v. United States, 223 F.2d 848 (5th
Cir., 1955); and Gainey v. United States, 324 F.2d 731 (5th
Cir., 1963). In United States v. Townsend, 474 F.2d 209 (5th
Cir., 1973), a conviction for receiving stolen property was
reversed when the court reviewed the record and learned that
there was absolutely no evidence disclosing that the defendant
had committed this offense within the jurisdiction of the United
States. And in United States v. Benson, 495 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.,
1974), in finding federal jurisdiction for a robbery committed at
Fort Rucker, the court stated:
It is axiomatic that the prosecution must always prove

territorial jurisdiction over a crime in order to sustain a
conviction therefor. 495 F.2d, at 481.
In two Sixth Circuit cases, United States v. Tucker, 122 F.

518 (W.D.Ky., 1903), a case involving an assault committed at a
federal dam, and United States v. Blunt, 558 F.2d 1245 (6th Cir.,
1977), a case involving an assault within a federal penitentiary,
jurisdiction was sustained by finding that the U.S. owned the
property in question and the state involved had ceded
jurisdiction. In In re Kelly, 71 F. 545 (E.D.Wis., 1895), a
federal assault charge was dismissed when the court held that the
state cession statute in question was not adequate to convey
jurisdiction of the property in question to the United States.
In United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir., 1970), a
case involving a federal burglary prosecution, federal
jurisdiction was sustained upon the showing of U.S. ownership and
cession. And cases from the Eighth and Tenth Circuits likewise
require the same elements to be shown to demonstrate the presence
of federal jurisdiction; see United States v. Heard, 270 F.Supp.
198 (W.D.Mo., 1967); United States v. Redstone, 488 F.2d 300
(8th Cir., 1973); United States v. Goings, 504 F.2d 809 (8th
Cir., 1974) (demonstrating loss of jurisdiction); Hayes v.
United States, 367 F.2d 216 (10th Cir., 1966); United States v.
Carter, 430 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir., 1970); Hall v. United States,
404 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir., 1969); and United States v. Cassidy,
571 F.2d 534 (10th Cir., 1978).

Page 14 of 17
Of all the circuits, the Ninth Circuit has addressed

jurisdictional issues more than any of the rest. In United

States v. Bateman, 34 F. 86 (N.D.Cal., 1888), it was determined

that the United States did not have jurisdiction to prosecute for
a murder committed at the Presidio because California had never
ceded jurisdiction; see also United States v. Tully, 140 F. 899
(D.Mon., 1905). But later, California ceded jurisdiction for the
Presidio to the United States, and it was held in United States
v. Watkins, 22 F.2d 437 (N.D.Cal., 1927), that this enabled the
U.S. to maintain a murder prosecution; see also United States v.
Holt, 168 F. 141 (W.D. Wash., 1909), United States v. Lewis, 253
F. 469 (S.D.Cal, 1918), and United States v. Wurtzbarger, 276 F.
753 (D.Or., 1921). Because the U.S. owned, and had a state
cession of jurisdiction for, Fort Douglas in Utah, it was held
that the U.S. had jurisdiction for a rape prosecution in Rogers
v. Squier, 157 F.2d 948 (9th Cir., 1946). But, without a
cession, the U.S. has no jurisdiction; see Arizona v. Manypenny,
445 F.Supp. 1123 (D.Ariz., 1977).
The above cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and federal
appellate courts set forth the rule that in criminal
prosecutions, the government, as the party seeking to establish
the existence of federal jurisdiction, must prove U.S. ownership
of the property in question and a state cession of jurisdiction.
This same rule manifests itself in state cases. State courts are
courts of general jurisdiction and in a state criminal
prosecution, the state must only prove that the offense was
committed within the state and a county thereof. If a defendant
contends that only the federal government has jurisdiction over
the offense, he, as proponent for the existence of federal
jurisdiction, must likewise prove U.S. ownership of the property
where the crime was committed and state cession of jurisdiction.
Examples of the operation of this principle are numerous.

In Arizona, the State has jurisdiction over federal lands in the
public domain, the state not having ceded jurisdiction of that
property to the U.S.; see State v. Dykes, 114 Ariz. 592, 562
P.2d 1090 (1977). In California, if it is not proved by a
defendant in a state prosecution that the state has ceded
jurisdiction, it is presumed the state does have jurisdiction
over a criminal offense; see People v. Brown, 69 Cal. App.2d
602, 159 P.2d 686 (1945). If the cession exists, the state has
no jurisdiction; see People v. Mouse, 203 Cal. 782, 265 P. 944
(1928). In Montana, the state has jurisdiction over property if
it is not proved there is a state cession of jurisdiction to the
U.S.; see State ex rel Parker v. District Court, 147 Mon. 151,
410 P.2d 459 (1966); the existence of a state cession of
jurisdiction to the U.S. ousts the state of jurisdiction; see
State v. Tully, 31 Mont. 365, 78 P. 760 (1904). The same applies
in Nevada; see State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359, 47 P. 763 (1897), and
Pendleton v. State, 734 P.2d 693 (Nev., 1987); it applies in
Oregon (see State v. Chin Ping, 91 Or. 593, 176 P. 188 (1918) and
State v. Aguilar, 85 Or.App. 410, 736 P.2d 620 (1987)); and in
Washington (see State v. Williams, 23 Wash.App. 694, 598 P.2d 731
(1979)).

Page 15 of 17

In People v. Hammond, 1 Ill.2d 65, 115 N.E.2d 331 (1953), a

burglary of an IRS office was held to be within state
jurisdiction, the court holding that the defendant was required
to prove existence of federal jurisdiction by U.S. ownership of
the property and state cession of jurisdiction. In two cases
from Michigan, larcenies committed at U.S. Post Offices which
were rented were held to be within state jurisdiction; see
People v. Burke, 161 Mich. 397, 126 N.W. 446 (1910) and People v.
Van Dyke, 276 Mich. 32, 267 N.W. 778 (1936); see also In re
Kelly, 311 Mich. 596, 19 N.W.2d 218 (1945). In Kansas City v.
Garner, 430 S.W.2d 630 (Mo.App., 1968), state jurisdiction over a
theft offense occurring in a federal building was upheld, and the
court stated that a defendant had to show federal jurisdiction by
proving U.S. ownership of the building and a cession of
jurisdiction from the state to the United States. A similar
holding was made for a theft at a U.S. missile site in State v.
Rindall, 146 Mon. 64, 404 P.2d 327 (1965). In Pendleton v.
State, 734 P.2d 693 (Nev., 1987), the state court was held to
have jurisdiction over a DUI ("driving under the influence")
committed on federal lands, the defendant having failed to show
U.S. ownership and state cession of jurisdiction.
In People v. Gerald, 40 Misc.2d 819, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1001

(1963), the state was held to have jurisdiction of an assault at
a U.S. Post Office since the defendant did not meet his burden of
showing presence of federal jurisdiction; and because a
defendant failed to prove title and jurisdiction in the United
States for an offense committed at a customs station, state
jurisdiction was upheld in People v. Fisher, 97 A.D.2d 651, 469
N.Y.S.2d 187 (A.D. 3 Dept., 1983). The proper method of showing
federal jurisdiction in state court is demonstrated by the
decision in People v. Williams, 136 Misc.2d 294, 518 N.Y.S.2d 751
(1987). This rule was likewise enunciated in State v. Burger, 33
Ohio App.3d 231, 515 N.E.2d 640 (1986), in a case involving a DUI
offense committed on a road near a federal arsenal.
In Kuerschner v. State, 493 P.2d 1402 (Okl.Cr.App., 1972),

the state was held to have jurisdiction of a drug sales offense
occurring at an Air Force Base, the defendant not having
attempted to prove federal jurisdiction by showing title and
jurisdiction of the property in question in the United States;
see also Towry v. State, 540 P.2d 597 (Okl.Cr.App., 1975).
Similar holdings for murders committed at U.S. Post Offices were
made in State v. Chin Ping, 91 Or. 593, 176 P. 188 (1918), and in
United States v. Pate, 393 F.2d 44 (7th Cir., 1968). Another
Oregon case, State v. Aguilar, 85 Or.App. 410, 736 P.2d 620
(1987), demonstrates this rule. And finally, in Curry v. State,
111 Tex. Cr. 264, 12 S.W.2d 796 (1928), it was held that, in the
absence of proof that the state had ceded jurisdiction of a place
to the United States, the state courts had jurisdiction over an
offense.
Therefore, in federal criminal prosecutions, the government

must prove the existence of federal jurisdiction by showing U.S.
ownership of the place where the crime was committed and state
cession of jurisdiction. If the government contends for the
power criminally to prosecute for an offense occurring outside
"its jurisdiction", it must prove an extra-territorial
application of the statute in question as well as a

constitutional foundation supporting the same. Absent this

showing, no federal prosecution can be commenced for offenses
committed outside "its jurisdiction", i.e. the federal zone.

Page 16 of 17
PROOF OF SERVICE
NOTICE AND DEMAND TO DISMISS

FOR LACK OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION:
28 U.S.C. 1359; FRCP Rules 9(b),
12(b)(1),(2), 12(h)(3)

Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA REPUBLIC
Attorney General
Washington
Solicitor General
Washington
Executed on: _____________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________


Page 17 of 17
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : extradit

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona

)
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF NON-WAIVER
) OF EXTRADITION:
v. ) 28 U.S.C. 1746(1);
) Tenth Amendment;
United States, ) Federal Rules of Evidence,
and Does 1-99, ) Rules 201(d), 301;
) 44 U.S.C. 1505(a)
Defendants. ) THIS IS NOT HEARSAY.
________________________________)
"Plaintiff"), to present this Her Affidavit of Non-Waiver of
Extradition to this honorable Court and to all interested
parties, including but not limited to William D. Browning, Doe
No. 1, and to provide notice of same to all interested parties,
including all Does both named and as yet unnamed.
VERIFICATION
America, without the "United States", that the following
statement is true, correct, and not misleading, according to the
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/extradit.htm (1 of 6) [4/8/2007 2:17:13 PM]

best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me
God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1):
Affidavit of Non-Waiver of Extradition:

Page 1 of 5
AFFIDAVIT OF NON-WAIVER OF EXTRADITION
1. I, Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris, hereby certify,
under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without (outside) the "United States" (federal
government), that I have never waived My fundamental Right to be
extradited out of any and all foreign jurisdictions, into My
proper domestic jurisdiction which is the Arizona Republic and
the Laws of that Republic, including but not limited to the
Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully
amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), which is the supreme
Law of My Land, and the Constitution of Arizona state, and all
laws enacted pursuant to those constitutions.
2. I have studied federal laws and applicable court cases,
and I now know that waivers of fundamental Rights, like the Right
of Extradition, must be knowingly intelligent acts, done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. See Brady v. U.S. Such waivers must be knowing,
intentional, and voluntary, in order to be construed as
enforceable.
3. As against this high standard which the U.S. Supreme
Court has established for any and all waivers of fundamental
Rights, I can honestly and confidently say that I have never ever
waived my fundamental Right, under the Tenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, to be extradited out of a foreign jurisdiction
such as exists under the Article IV territorial jurisdiction of a

United States District Court.

Page 2 of 5
4. It was in such a territorial court that I was
unlawfully indicted by a biased grand jury of federal citizens,
tried and convicted by a biased trial jury of federal citizens,
without any assistance of My Counsel of Choice, for allegedly
violating a federal law for which there are no regulations
published in the Federal Register. See 44 U.S.C. 1505(a).
5. After reading and studying the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v. Lopez, 131 L.Ed.2d 626
(1995), I am now entirely convinced that the Congress of the
United States has no legislative authority to prohibit domestic
trade in the substance which I was unlawfully prosecuted for
possessing, with intent to distribute, even if the State of
Arizona does possess such legislative authority, and even if the
Congress does possess similar authority within the federal zone.
See "Conflict of Laws" in American Jurisprudence.
6. Because of the Lopez case, I now have convincing reason
to believe that, if Congress cannot prohibit the possession of a
loaded firearm on public school grounds, then Congress cannot
prohibit the possession of other "controlled substances" within
the several States of the "Union" known as the "United States of
America". Confer at "Union" and "United States of America" in
Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1856).
7. With the able assistance of my Counsel of Choice, Paul
Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S., I have executed and presented
pleadings to the United States District Court "Under Protest",
which phrase is exhibited prominently on the face page of every

pleading filed in said court. By using this phrase on the face
page of every pleading, I mean to convey to all interested

Page 3 of 5
parties the fact that I have explicitly reserved all of my
fundamental Rights, including the Right of Extradition, without
prejudice to any of my fundamental Rights, and that my explicit
reservation of all My Rights has thus prevented the loss of any
such Rights by application of the legal concepts of waiver or
estoppel.
NOTICE OF DEADLINE
This Affidavit is specifically intended to establish
presumptions of controlling laws and facts in the instant case.
Should other interested parties fail to rebut this Affidavit in a
timely manner, the statements of fact and law as contained herein
will become the truth of the instant case for all time. All
rebuttals must be filed in the official record of the District
Court of the United States in the instant case, and also served
on the Plaintiff by means of first class United States Mail
directed to:

ARIZONA STATE
no later than 5:00 p.m. on Friday, August 30, 1996. Beyond that
deadline, the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence will prevail,
pursuant to the authorities in U.S.v. Tweel, quoting U.S. v.
Prudden, and Carmine v. Bowen.
Further Affiant Sayeth Naught.

/s/ Sheila Wallen


Page 4 of 5
PROOF OF SERVICE
AFFIDAVIT OF NON-WAIVER OF EXTRADITION:

28 U.S.C. 1746(1); Tenth Amendment;
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 201(d), 301;
44 U.S.C. 1505(a)
THIS IS NOT HEARSAY.

ARIZONA STATE

44 East Broadway
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Solicitor General

Executed on: _____________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________

Page 5 of 5
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : removal

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona
Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) Case No. 95-484-WDB

)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND
) PETITION FOR ORDER
v. ) TO SHOW CAUSE:
) 18 U.S.C. 1964(a),
United States, ) 28 U.S.C. 292(b),1331,
and Does 1-99, ) 1332, 1333(1),1359,
) 1367(a),1441(b),(c),
Defendants. ) 1451(2),1631;
) FRCP Rules 9(h),11,38
) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
________________________________)
"Plaintiff"), to petition this honorable Court for an Order to
the United States to show cause why its alleged agents should not
be charged with criminal trespass, piracy, and other crimes upon
Her Person and Her private property, under color of law, and to
provide Notices to all interested parties of same, and of Her
Removal of criminal case number 95-484-WDB (hereinafter "Criminal
Case") from the United States District Court, District of
Arizona, to the District Court of the United States, Judicial
District of Arizona.
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/removal.htm (1 of 6) [4/8/2007 2:17:14 PM]

Notice of Removal and Petition for Order to Show Cause:

Page 1 of 5
JURISDICTION
This District Court of the United States has original
jurisdiction of this action, pursuant to authorities cited in the
above caption, to wit: 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1332,
1333(1), 1359, 1367(a), 1441(b) and (c), 1451(2), and 1631.
Pursuant to the definition at 28 U.S.C. 1451(2), the United
States District Court from which the criminal action is being
removed is a "State" court as defined therein, because said court
is a legislative tribunal domiciled in the District of Columbia.
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 42 S.Ct. 343, 258 U.S. 298 at 312, 66 L.Ed
627 (1921); and compare 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) ("district court of
the United States") and 1964(c) ("United States district court").
In contrast, the District Court of the United States is an
Article III court with authority to hear questions arising under
the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties of the United States,
including but not limited to the First Amendment, Fourth
Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Ninth Amendment,
Tenth Amendment, Thirteenth Amendment, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. See Supremacy Clause.
INCORPORATION OF PRIOR PLEADINGS
Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all pleadings
heretofore filed or otherwise lodged in the Criminal Case,
specifically including but not limited to Her AFFIDAVIT OF
DEFENDANT DOCUMENTING CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ARREST, and all
pleadings previously filed by "JANET NAPOLITANO" [sic] and
"JOELYN D. MARLOWE, Arizona State Bar No. 009206" [sic], who are

alleged agents of the United States who have claimed authority to
represent the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA in the Criminal Case.

Page 2 of 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Alleged agents of the United States have invaded Plaintiff's
private property, without a warrant having been issued to search
or seize said property. Said agents also arrested Plaintiff,
without a warrant having been issued for Her arrest. The search,
seizure, and arrest were all perpetrated by said agents under
color of law, proceeding as in rem actions subject to Rule C of
the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims
(hereinafter "Supplemental Rules").
Said agents violated that portion of the Supplemental Rules
which requires a verified complaint before Plaintiff's goods and
chattels could be attached, and which also requires that no
judgment by default shall be entered except upon proof that the
garnishee has been given notice of the action. Specifically:
Rule C. Actions in Rem: Special Provisions
(2) Complaint. In actions in rem the complaint shall be

verified on oath or solemn affirmation. It shall describe
with reasonable particularity the property that is the
subject of the action and state that it is within the
district or will be during the pendency of the action. In
actions for the enforcement of forfeiture for violation of
any statute of the United States the complaint shall state
the place of seizure and whether it was on land or on
navigable waters, and shall contain such allegations as may
be required by the statute pursuant to which the action is
brought.
(3) Judicial Authorization and Process. ... In actions by

the United States for forfeitures for federal statutory
violations, the clerk, upon filing of the complaint, shall
forthwith issue a summons and warrant for the arrest of the
vessel or other property without requiring certification of
exigent circumstances.

Plaintiff submits that these Supplemental Rules, and others not
yet mentioned herein, were violated when Her private property was
invaded by a band of alleged agents of the United States,
proceeding under color of law and without any warrants having
been issued by either a judge or a clerk in the instant case.

Page 3 of 5
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS DUE TO FRAUD
Plaintiff hereby explicitly reserves Her fundamental Right
to amend this Petition, should future events and/or discoveries
prove that She has failed adequately to comprehend the full
extent of the damage(s) which She has suffered at the hands of
the Defendants, both named and unnamed, now and at all times in
the future.
REMEDY REQUESTED
Wherefore, Plaintiff hereby petitions this honorable Court
to Order the office of the United States Attorney to show cause
why the alleged agents of the United States in the instant case,
both named and unnamed in the Criminal Case, should not be
charged with criminal trespass, grand theft, unlawful arrest,
unlawful detainer, perjury, piracy, fraud, extortion, deprivation
of fundamental Rights, and conspiracy to commit all of the above,
all under color of federal law, and in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2,
241, 242, 872, 1001, 1621, 1622, and 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, 1986.
/s/ Sheila Wallen



Page 4 of 5
PROOF OF SERVICE
NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND

PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE:
18 U.S.C. 1964(a), 28 U.S.C. 292(b), 1331, 1332, 1333(1), 1359,
1367(a), 1441(b),(c), 1451(2), FRCP Rules 9(h), 11, 38

ARIZONA STATE
William D. Browning
44 East Broadway
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Solicitor General

Executed on: _____________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________

Page 5 of 5
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : removal2

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona

)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND OF
) PETITION FOR ORDER
v. ) TO SHOW CAUSE:
) 18 U.S.C. 1964(a),
United States, ) 28 U.S.C. 292(b), 1331,
and Does 1-99, ) 1332, 1333(1), 1359,
) 1367(a), 1441(b), (c),
Defendants. ) 1451(2), 1631;
) FRCP Rules 9(h), 11, 38
)
) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
________________________________)
"Plaintiff"), to petition this honorable Court for an Order to
the United States to show cause why its alleged agents should not
be charged with criminal trespass, piracy, and other crimes upon
Her Person and Her private property, under color of law, and to
provide Notices to all interested parties of same and of Her
Removal of criminal case number 95-484-TUC (hereinafter "Criminal
Case") from the United States District Court, District of
Arizona, to the District Court of the United States, Judicial
District of Arizona.
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/removal2.htm (1 of 6) [4/8/2007 2:17:14 PM]

Notice of Removal & Petition for Order to Show Cause:

Page 1 of 5
JURISDICTION
This District Court of the United States has original
jurisdiction of this action, pursuant to authorities cited in the
above caption, to wit: 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1332,
1333(1), 1359, 1367(a), 1441(b) and (c), 1451(2), and 1631.
Pursuant to the definition at 28 U.S.C. 1451(2), the United
States District Court from which the criminal action is being
removed is a "State" court as defined therein, because said court
is a legislative tribunal domiciled in the District of Columbia.
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 42 S.Ct. 343, 258 U.S. 298 at 312, 66 L.Ed
627 (1921); and compare 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) ("district court of
the United States") and 1964(c) ("United States district court").
In contrast, the District Court of the United States is an
Article III court with authority to hear questions arising under
the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties of the United States,
including but not limited to the First Amendment, Fourth
Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Ninth Amendment,
Tenth Amendment, Thirteenth Amendment, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. See Supremacy Clause.
INCORPORATION OF PRIOR PLEADINGS
Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all pleadings
heretofore filed or otherwise lodged in the Criminal Case,
specifically including but not limited to Her AFFIDAVIT OF
DEFENDANT DOCUMENTING CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ARREST, and all
pleadings previously filed by "JANET NAPOLITANO" [sic] and
"JOELYN D. MARLOWE, Arizona State Bar No. 009206" [sic], who are

alleged agents of the United States who have claimed authority to
represent the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA in the Criminal Case.

Page 2 of 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Alleged agents of the United States have invaded Plaintiff's
private property, without a warrant having been issued to search
or seize said property. Said agents also arrested Plaintiff,
without a warrant having been issued for Her arrest. The search,
seizure, and arrest were all perpetrated by said agents under
color of law, proceeding as in rem actions subject to Rule C of
the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims
(hereinafter "Supplemental Rules").
Said agents violated that portion of the Supplemental Rules
which requires a verified complaint before Plaintiff's goods and
chattels could be attached, and which also requires that no
judgment by default shall be entered except upon proof that the
garnishee has been given notice of the action. Specifically:
Rule C. Actions in Rem: Special Provisions ...
(2) Complaint. In actions in rem the complaint shall be

verified on oath or solemn affirmation. It shall describe
with reasonable particularity the property that is the
subject of the action and state that it is within the
district or will be during the pendency of the action. In
actions for the enforcement of forfeiture for violation of
any statute of the United States the complaint shall state
the place of seizure and whether it was on land or on
navigable waters, and shall contain such allegations as may
be required by the statute pursuant to which the action is
brought.
(3) Judicial Authorization and Process. ... In actions by

the United States for forfeitures for federal statutory
violations, the clerk, upon filing of the complaint, shall
forthwith issue a summons and warrant for the arrest of the
vessel or other property without requiring certification of
exigent circumstances.

Plaintiff submits that these Supplemental Rules, and others not
yet mentioned herein, were violated when Her private property was
invaded by a band of alleged agents of the United States,
proceeding under color of law and without any warrants having
been issued by either a judge or a clerk in the instant case.

Page 3 of 5
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS DUE TO FRAUD
Plaintiff hereby explicitly reserves Her fundamental Right
to amend this Petition, should future events and/or discoveries
prove that She has failed adequately to comprehend the full
extent of the damage(s) which She has suffered at the hands of
the Defendants, both named and unnamed, now and at all times in
the future.
REMEDY REQUESTED
Wherefore, Plaintiff hereby petitions this honorable Court
to Order the office of the United States Attorney to show cause
why the alleged agents of the United States in the instant case,
both named and unnamed in the Criminal Case, should not be
charged with criminal trespass, grand theft, unlawful arrest,
unlawful detainer, perjury, piracy, fraud, extortion, deprivation
of fundamental Rights, and conspiracy to commit all of the above,
all under color of federal law, and in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2,
241, 242, 872, 1001, 1621, 1622, and 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, 1986.
/s/ Sheila Wallen



Page 4 of 5
PROOF OF SERVICE
America, without the "United States", that I am at least 18 years
NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND OF

PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE:
18 U.S.C. 1964(a), 28 U.S.C. 292(b), 1331, 1332, 1333(1), 1359,
1367(a), 1441(b), (c), 1451(2), FRCP Rules 9(h), 11, 38

ARIZONA STATE

44 East Broadway
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Solicitor General

Executed on: _____________________________
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________

Page 5 of 5
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : nadjudge

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona

)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR
) TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF A
v. ) JUDGE OF THE COURT OF
) INTERNATIONAL TRADE
United States, ) TO PRESIDE OVER THIS
and Does 1-99, ) DISTRICT COURT
) OF THE UNITED STATES:
Defendants. ) 28 U.S.C. 293, 296, 297,
________________________________) 461(b)
Greetings to You:
Judge Alex Kozinski

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
125 South Grand Avenue, Suite 200
Pasadena [zip code exempt]
CALIFORNIA STATE
Formal NOTICE AND DEMAND are hereby respectfully made of
You, Judge Kozinski, by Me, Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris,
Citizen of Arizona state, expressly not a citizen of the United
States ("federal citizen"), and Plaintiff in the above entitled
matter (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), to present to the Chief Justice
of the United States a certificate of necessity that the Chief
Justice designate and assign temporarily a competent and
qualified judge from the Court of International Trade to perform
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/nadjudge.htm (1 of 8) [4/8/2007 2:17:15 PM]

judicial duties in this honorable District Court of the United
States. See 28 U.S.C. 293, 296, 297, 461(b); also Evans v.
Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) (never overturned).
Notice & Demand for Temporary Assignment of Article III Judge:

Page 1 of 7
The authority in Evans is particularly poignant. It is
apparent to Plaintiff, because of exhaustive research which Her
Counsel of Record has shared with Her, that all sitting United
States District Judges in America are appointed to serve in
either an Article I or in an Article IV capacity at the present
time. In this capacity, said Judges do not enjoy the explicit
immunity which is found in Article III, Section 1 ("3:1") of the
Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully
amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), to wit:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall

hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
[U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 1]
[emphasis added]
Plaintiff submits that one of the major reasons why said
Judges do not enjoy the explicit immunity at 3:1 is the doctrine
of territorial heterogeneity. Confer in The Federal Zone:
Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue, Fourth Edition, available
on the Internet via the Alta Vista search engine; see also U.S.
v. Lopez, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995):
Each of these [schools] now has an invisible federal zone

[sic] extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often irregular)
boundaries of the school property.
[emphasis added]
Here, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized this term as a common noun,
without any citations or footnotes. The doctrine of territorial

heterogeneity, as such, is summarized as follows in the
Conclusions of The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal
Revenue, to wit:

Page 2 of 7
In exercising its exclusive authority over the federal zone,

Congress is not subject to the same constitutional
limitations that exist inside the 50 States. For this
reason, the areas that are inside and outside the federal
zone are heterogeneous with respect to each other. This
difference results in a principle of territorial
heterogeneity: the areas within the federal zone are
subject to one set of rules; the areas without (or outside)
the federal zone are subject to a different set of rules.
The Constitution rules outside the zone and inside the 50
States. The Congress rules inside the zone and outside the
50 States. The 50 States are, therefore, in one general
class, because all constitutional restraints upon Congress
are in force throughout the 50 States, without prejudice to
any one State. The areas within the federal zone are in a
different general class, because these same constitutional
restraints simply do not limit Congress inside that zone.
[The Federal Zone, electronic Fifth Edition, Conclusions]
In the pivotal case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901), which is discussed at several places in the book The
Federal Zone supra, the U.S. Supreme Court established a doctrine
whereby the Constitution of the "United States", as such, does
not extend beyond the limits of the States which are united by
and under it. This doctrine of territorial heterogeneity is now
commonly identified as the "Downes Doctrine."
This doctrine has been reinforced by subsequent decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court, notably, the case of Hooven & Allison v.
Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high Court ruled that
the guarantees of the Constitution extend to the federal zone
only as Congress has made those guarantees applicable. The
United States District Courts are currently established by

Congress as territorial (federal zone) courts, with
constitutional authority emanating from Article IV, Section 3,
Clause 2, to wit:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all

needed Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States; ....
[U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2, emphasis added]

Page 3 of 7
Plaintiff wishes to litigate Her civil case against the
United States, and against Does 1 thru 99, in an Article III
Court of competent jurisdiction. In particular, She wishes to
invoke the judicial power of the United States of America, among
several reasons, in order to enjoin the Defendant(s) from
withholding the agency records which Plaintiff has requested in
lawful and proper requests under the Freedom of Information Act,
and to order the production of any agency records improperly
withheld from Plaintiff. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), to wit:
On complaint, the district court of the United States ...

has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding
agency records and to order the production of any agency
records improperly withheld from the complainant.
[5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B)]
[emphasis added]
For the convenience of Judge Kozinski, Plaintiff attaches Her
previous NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE:
Federal Rules of Evidence 201(d), and incorporates it by
reference as if set forth fully herein. Said NOTICE AND DEMAND
summarizes some of the outstanding FOIA requests in this case.
In order for this case to proceed forward, and it is
Plaintiff's fundamental Right under the Fifth Amendment that it
do so, this honorable Court must be seated with a competent and

qualified Judge who is not subject to any outside executive
controls whatsoever. This means, among other things, that an
Article III judge must be designated and temporarily appointed to
preside over the instant case, who is not a "taxpayer" and whose
integrity and independence from all other governments and all
other government branches are unassailable and beyond question.

Page 4 of 7
Plaintiff hereby objects strenuously to the existence of any
contract, either verbal or written, either expressed or implied
in fact, between any currently seated United States District
Judge and the "Internal Revenue Service" [sic] or any other
controlling interests, on grounds of conflicts of interest. A
completed "IRS" Form 1040 is an expressed, written contract.
Plaintiff is guaranteed the fundamental right to an
independent and unbiased judiciary. See Evans v. Gore supra.
The existence of a contract between the presiding Judge and any
other branch of the federal government, or any of its agencies,
assigns, or instrumentalities, is evidence of a conflict of
interest and proof of a dependent and biased judiciary. See Lord
v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965) and compare with Evans v.
Gore supra, to measure how far our civilization has degenerated
under the Downes Doctrine. This honorable Court will please take
formal judicial notice of the holding and the dicta in Evans,
which case proves that American courts have an obligation to rule
on matters which properly come before them. Plaintiff's NOTICE
AND DEMAND, as made herein, now comes properly before You, Sir.
REMEDY REQUESTED

Wherefore, Plaintiff hereby makes this formal Demand upon
You, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:
(1) to prepare and present to the Chief Justice of the
United States a certificate of necessity that the Chief Justice
designate and assign temporarily a competent and qualified judge
from the Court of International Trade to perform judicial duties
in this honorable District Court of the United States;
(2) to file said certificate in the official Court record of
the instant case; and
(3) to serve said certificate on all interested parties.
See PROOF OF SERVICE infra.

Page 5 of 7
NOTICE OF DEADLINE
Plaintiff hereby demands that the above requested remedy be
granted no later than 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, September 11, 1996.
Time is of the essence.
Thank you very much for your consideration.
That is all for now.
/s/ Sheila Wallen


Counselor at Law and Counsel of Record

Page 6 of 7

PROOF OF SERVICE
NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT

OF A JUDGE OF THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
TO PRESIDE OVER THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
28 U.S.C. 293, 296, 297, 461(b)
Office of the U.S. Attorney Chief Judge

110 South Church, Suite 8310 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
Tucson [zip code exempt] P.O. Box 193939
ARIZONA STATE San Francisco, California
William D. Browning, Doe No. 1 JOELYN D. MARLOWE [sic]

44 East Broadway 110 South Church, Suite 8310
Tucson [zip code exempt] Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General Chief Justice

Department of Justice United States Supreme Court
10th and Constitution, N.W. 1 First Street, N.E.
Washington [zip code exempt] Washington [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Solicitor General Judge Alex Kozinski

Department of Justice 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
10th and Constitution, N.W. 125 South Grand Ave., Ste. 200
Washington [zip code exempt] Pasadena [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CALIFORNIA STATE
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________


Page 7 of 7
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : feeobj

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona


)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF FORMAL OBJECTION
) TO TRANSCRIPT FEE IMPOSED
v. )
)
)
Defendant. )
________________________________)
"Defendant"), formally to object to the $460 fee imposed upon the
Defendant to obtain a transcript of the evidentiary hearing,
merely because She was proceding In Propria Persona and did not
have Court-appointed Counsel at the time She requested said
transcript. Defendant was told by the Court transcriber that
there would have been no charge for said transcript, had the
Defendant been represented by Court-appointed Counsel. This
practice is blatantly discriminatory against litigants proceeding
In Propria Persona and without Bar licensed representation, in
direct violation of the original Thirteenth Amendment, ratified
in the year 1819 when Virginia voted to amend the U.S.
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/feeobj.htm (1 of 3) [4/8/2007 2:17:15 PM]

Notice of Formal Objection to Transcript Fee Imposed:

Page 1 of 3
Constitution with same. See also Full Faith and Credit Clause;
Haynes v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519; Defendant's NOTICE AND DEMAND
FOR THE RIGHT TO ENJOY THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OF CHOICE; and
Defendant's MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATING THE
FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEE FOR EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL,
already filed in the instant case. Defendant is being penalized
for Her objections to ineffective assistance of Counsel and for
exercising Her fundamental Right to effective assistance of
Counsel. If She had been unable to obtain the transcript in
question, for whatever reason, She would not have been able
adequately to prepare an effective defense in the instant case.
/s/ Sheila Wallen



Page 2 of 3
PROOF OF SERVICE

NOTICE OF FORMAL OBJECTION

TO TRANSCRIPT FEE IMPOSED

Tucson [85701]
ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General
Washington
Solicitor General
Washington
/s/ Sheila Wallen

________________________________________

Page 3 of 3
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : notintnt

ARIZONA STATE
In Propria Persona

)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE
) COMPLAINT
v. ) OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
) AGAINST
United States, ) WILLIAM D. BROWNING
William D. Browning, ) 28 U.S.C. 372(c);
and Does 2-99, ) Federal Rules of Evidence,
) Rule 201(d)
Defendants. )
________________________________)
"Plaintiff"), to provide formal Notice to all interested parties,
and respectfully to request formal judicial Notice, pursuant to
Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, of Her intent, as
expressed herein, to file a Complaint of Judicial Misconduct with
the Clerk, United States Court of Appeals, c/o P.O. Box 193939,
San Francisco, California Republic, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c),
for gross judicial misconduct by Mr. William D. Browning in the
case of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] v. SHEILA TERESE WALLEN
[sic], Case Number 95-484-TUC, United States District Court,
District of Arizona, Tucson.
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/notintnt.htm (1 of 4) [4/8/2007 2:17:16 PM]

Notice of Intent to File Complaint of Judicial Misconduct:

Page 1 of 3
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c), said Complaint of Judicial
Misconduct shall be filed with: (1) the Clerk of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, (2) the Clerk of
the District Court of the United States, Judicial District of
Arizona (Tucson), (3) the Clerk of the United States District
Court, District of Arizona (Tucson), and (4) all interested
parties, on or after Monday, September 2, 1996, in order to allow
the deadline to expire on Plaintiff's FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR
PROOF OF POWER, STANDING, AND JURISDICTION IN THE PARTICULARS
(hereinafter "FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND"). Said deadline was 5:00
p.m. on Friday, August 30, 1996. See attached courtesy copy of
Plaintiff's FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND.
/s/ Sheila Wallen

________________________________

________________________________
Counselor at Law, and Counsel of Record

Page 2 of 3
PROOF OF SERVICE

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE COMPLAINT

OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AGAINST
WILLIAM D. BROWNING:
28 U.S.C. 372(c); Federal Rules of Evidence 201(d)
Office of the U.S. Attorney Chief Judge

110 South Church, Suite 8310 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
Tucson [zip code exempt] P.O. Box 193939
ARIZONA STATE San Francisco, California
William D. Browning, Doe No. 1 JOELYN D. MARLOWE [sic]

44 East Broadway 110 South Church, Suite 8310
Tucson [zip code exempt] Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE ARIZONA STATE
Attorney General Chief Justice

Department of Justice United States Supreme Court
10th and Constitution, N.W. 1 First Street, N.E.
Washington [zip code exempt] Washington [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Solicitor General Judge Alex Kozinski

Department of Justice 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
10th and Constitution, N.W. 125 South Grand Ave., Ste. 200
Washington [zip code exempt] Pasadena [zip code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CALIFORNIA STATE
/s/ Sheila Wallen

__________________________________________

Page 3 of 3
# # #

U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v. Wallen : jdcompla
COMPLAINT FORM
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY
MAIL THIS FORM TO THE CLERK, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, P.O.
BOX 193939, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94119-3939/tdc. MARK THE
ENVELOPE "JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT" OR "JUDICIAL DISABILITY
COMPLAINT". DO NOT PUT THE NAME OF THE JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE ON
THE ENVELOPE.
SEE RULE 2(e) FOR THE NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED FOR FILING.
1. Complainant's name: Paul Andrew, Mitchell
Address: c/o 2509 North Campbell Avenue, #1776

ARIZONA STATE
Daytime telephone: [redacted]

(leave message on voice mail)
2. Judge or magistrate complained about:
Name: William D. Browning

United States District Judge
Court: United States District Court

3. Does this complaint concern the behavior of the judge or

magistrate in a particular lawsuit or lawsuits?
( X ) Yes ( ) No
If "yes" give the following information about each lawsuit

(use the reverse side if there is more than one):
Court: United States District Court
Docket Number: 95-484-TUC
Are (were) you a party or lawyer in the lawsuit?
( ) Party ( X ) Counsel ( ) Neither
If party, give the name, address, and telephone number of

your Counsel:
n/a
Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning:

Page 1 of 6
http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/jdcompla.htm (1 of 12) [4/8/2007 2:17:17 PM]

Docket numbers of any appeals to the Ninth Circuit:
Notice of appeal was filed before trial, but Mr.

Browning refused to stay the trial, and ruled that
Notice of Appeal could not be processed until after
sentencing. Defendant Sheila Wallen objected timely.
4. Have you filed any lawsuits against the judge or magistrate?
( ) Yes ( X ) No (Client has, however.)
If yes, give the following information about each lawsuit

(use the reverse side if there is more than one):
Court: District Court of the United States

Judicial District of Arizona
Present status of suit:
My client, Sheila Terese Wallen, served Formal Notice

and Demand upon Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, to prepare and present to the
Chief Justice of the United States a certificate of
necessity that the Chief Justice designate and assign
temporarily a competent and qualified judge from the
Court of International Trade to perform judicial duties
in the District Court of the United States, pursuant to
authorities in 28 U.S.C. 293, 296, 297, 461(b), and
Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920). Her action cannot
proceed without a competent and qualified judge to sit
on the District Court of the United States.
Name, address, and telephone number of your Counsel:
n/a
Court to which any appeal has been taken:
(see above)
Docket number of appeal:
none
Present status of appeal:
none
5. On separate sheets of paper, no larger than the paper this

form is printed on, describe the conduct or the evidence of
disability that is the subject of this complaint. See rule
2(b) and 2(d). Do not use more than 5 pages (5 sides).
Most complaints do not require that much.
see attached


Page 2 of 6
6. You should either:
(1) check the first box below and sign this form in
the presence of a notary public; or
(2) check the second box and sign the form. You do
not need a notary public if you check the second
box.
( ) I swear (affirm) that --
(X) I declare under penalty of perjury --
I have read rules 1 and 2 of the Rules of the

Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit Governing
Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability,
and the statement made in this complaint are true
and correct to the best of my knowledge.

________________________________________________
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, and
Counselor at Law
Executed on: September 16, 1996
copies: Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit

U.S. Marshals, Tucson, Arizona
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tucson, Arizona
Attorney General, State of Arizona
Governor Fife Symington, State of Arizona
Sheila Terese Wallen, Arivaca, Arizona state

Page 3 of 6
Attachment to Complaint of Judicial Misconduct
1. Mr. Browning agreed -- before trial, on record, and before a

gallery of witnesses -- to guarantee all of Sheila Wallen's
fundamental Rights during said trial. He then refused to
allow Her to enjoy the assistance of Her Counsel of Choice,
by ordering Mr. Paul Andrew Mitchell to the back seat of the

gallery, where Mr. Mitchell was forced to stay during the

entire course of the trial and was prevented by U.S.
Marshals from communicating with Miss Wallen. Mr. Mitchell
was allowed to speak with Miss Wallen only during recess
periods. Mr. Browning had been previously briefed, in
detail, as to the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938), which held that
a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of
Counsel at every step in the proceedings, and if the trial
court fails to ensure that this assistance is available at
every step in the proceedings, then the trial court ousts
itself of jurisdiction. Mr. Browning did not care about
this Supreme Court precedent; Mr. Browning does not believe
that U.S. Supreme Court decisions have any legal
significance. Denial of effective assistance of Counsel is
a criminal deprivation of a fundamental Right under color of
law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 242, and perjury of oath, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1621. In My opinion, this matter is
serious enough to be brought to the attention of a qualified
federal grand jury, one whose members are chosen randomly
from a pool that includes State Citizens too, not just
federal citizens.
2. When presented with an Affidavit of Circumstances

Surrounding the Arrest of Sheila Wallen, and also with a
comprehensive Motion to Stay Proceedings pending final
resolution of Sheila Wallen's challenge to the
constitutionality of the Jury Selection and Service Act,
complete with a very detailed Sworn Statement of facts
supporting said Motion, Mr. Browning received these
pleadings at approximately 3:00 p.m. on Wednesday afternoon,
July 17, 1996; Mr. Browning then ruled on these pleadings,
wrote his Order on the same day, placed his Order in U.S.
Mail, and it was delivered to Sheila Wallen's post office 70
miles away in Arivaca, Arizona, by 11:00 a.m. the following
morning, Thursday, July 18, 1996. It was impossible for Mr.
Browning to have read all of these pleadings in such an
extremely short period of time. Furthermore, Mr. Browning's
Order ruled that Wallen's Affidavit was hearsay, and that
there was nothing in the Stay Motion and accompanying Sworn
Statement of any legal significance, despite the fact that
the latter pleadings contained numerous authorities and
rulings by the United States Supreme Court. For example,
see U.S. v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1973), to wit:
nobody should be punished unnecessarily for relying upon the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Refusing to file a
proper and correctly executed Affidavit violates Federal
Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(d), Mandatory Judicial Notice,
and constitutes obstruction of justice in violation of 18
U.S.C. 1506. Miss Wallen's Affidavit contained proof that
the alleged officers of the United States proceeded
criminally to trespass upon Wallen's private property
without a valid warrant to search and seize said property,
and to arrest Her without a valid warrant for Her arrest.
This Affidavit also contained material evidence which proves
the lack of jurisdiction of the United States District Court
over which Mr. Browning presided, since a warrant was
absolutely necessary to execute the search, seizure & arrest
in the first instance; without said warrants, Browning's

court was denied jurisdiction over the subject matter. See

Rule C of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims. This Affidavit also contains evidence of
threats, duress, extortion, and coercion by said alleged
agents of the United States, all in violation of 18 U.S.C.
872 (extortion), making Mr. Browning an accessory to all of
these crimes after the fact, in violation 18 U.S.C. 3. This
matter should be brought before a competent and qualified
federal grand jury.

Page 4 of 6
3. As of 5:00 p.m. on Friday, August 30, 1996, Mr. Browning had

failed to answer Wallen's Final Notice and Demand for Proof
of Power, Standing, and Jurisdiction in the Particulars.
His failure to do so is competent evidence that neither he,
nor the court over which he was presiding, had any criminal
jurisdiction whatsoever to proceed over the case before him.
Specifically, Miss Wallen demanded: (1) proof that the
alleged U.S. Attorneys who were prosecuting Her had powers
of attorney to represent the Plaintiff "UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA"; (2) proof of the statutory, regulatory, and
constitutional authority which grants legal standing to the
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" to bring a criminal action before
a "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT"; and (3) proof of the
statutory, regulatory, and constitutional authority which
grants jurisdiction to a "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT" as
opposed to a "DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES" to hear a
criminal case against a Union State Citizen when the alleged
crime was committed inside the state zone and outside the
federal zone. It is a principle of law that, once
challenged, the one asserting jurisdiction must prove that
jurisdiction exists as a matter of law. The proponent of a
rule carries the burden of proving its application in the
instant case. See 5 U.S.C. 556(d). For judicial support of
this principle, see in particular the following cases:
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533; Griffin v. Matthews, 310
F.Supp. 341, 423 F.2d 272; McNutt vs. G.M., 56 S.Ct. 789,
80 L.Ed 1135; Basso vs. U.P.L., 495 F.2d 906; Thomson vs
Gaskiel, 62 S.Ct. 673, 83 L.Ed 111; Albrecht vs. U.S., 273
U.S. 1; Louisville R.R. v. Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct.
42. Proceeding without jurisdiction, particularly after a
formal notice and demand for proof of jurisdiction have been
completely ignored, is a criminal denial of due process of
law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and 18 U.S.C. 242.
This matter should be brought before a competent and
qualified federal grand jury.

Page 5 of 6
4. Mr. Browning also "DENIED" two pleadings by Miss Wallen

filed in the form of a Notice and Demand for Mandatory
Judicial Notice, pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal

Rules of Evidence. A federal judge has absolutely no

discretion in the matter of mandatory judicial notice. The
rule itself is very clear on this point: "when MANDATORY."
Refusing to file material evidence, and proper and correctly
executed demands for mandatory judicial notice of said
evidence, violates Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(d),
Mandatory Judicial Notice, and constitutes obstruction of
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1506. Miss Wallen was
forced to refuse Mr. Browning's DENIAL Order for fraud. The
proper method for excluding said evidence is for the
opposing party to move the court to strike the evidence;
this was not done by the opposing party, or by any of their
officers, agents, or employees. Claiming to have "DENIED"
Miss Wallen's Notices and Demands for Mandatory Judicial
Notice, absent a proper Motion to Strike by the opposing
party, is proof that Mr. Browning engaged in the practice of
law, a high misdemeanor in violation of 28 U.S.C. 454. This
matter should be brought before a competent and qualified
federal grand jury.
5. Criminal conduct by a United States District Judge, while

presiding over any case, whether it be civil or criminal, is
conduct which is prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the federal
courts. "No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert
its full authority to prevent all violation of the
principles of the Constitution." Harlan dissenting in
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), emphasis added. A
competent and qualified federal grand jury should be given
the opportunity to investigate probable criminal conduct by
William D. Browning in this case, and in others of which I
am aware.

Page 6 of 6

ARIZONA STATE
July 25, 1996
Mr. William D. Browning

44 East Broadway
ARIZONA STATE
Re: U.S.A. v. Wallen, Case No. 95-484-WDB
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AND DEMAND
Dear Mr. Browning:
I am Citizen of Arizona state, a Counselor at Law, and a

part-time student of comparative economic history. I recently

had a lawful contract obligation to attend a court trial over

which you presided. That obligation arose from a contract for
consideration paid in lawful money, i.e. silver dollars. During
that trial, the question of your authority was raised, and you
answered that your authority was the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
It is My understanding that the Constitution for the United

States of America, as lawfully amended, contains a provision
which prevents federal officers from impairing the obligation of
contracts. This provision is in the Constitution as published in
federal depository libraries, and in the official law books upon
which district courts rely for conclusive evidence of the Law.
This Constitution clearly forbids titles of nobility. See

Article I, Section 10, Clause 1. It is My contention, based on
diligent research, that any license is construed by American
courts to be a title of nobility, which is forbidden by this
provision. However, no penalties were mentioned by this
provision and it is for this reason, I believe, that no penalties
currently attach to the exercise of licenses issued by the state
and federal governments. It was the lack of penalties which
motivated Congress to cure this oversight with a proposal to
amend the Constitution with penalties for exercising titles of
nobility.
My research has also uncovered a constitutional amendment,

ratified by the Union states in the year 1819, which penalizes
the exercise of titles of nobility with a forfeiture of
citizenship and with a disqualification from ever serving in any
public office in America (see attached). This Amendment is the
main reason why I am not now a licensed bar member, and have no
intention of ever becoming a licensed bar member, because I do
not want to forfeit My Arizona state Citizenship, and I would
like to serve in public office some day.
Constructive Notice and Demand:

Page 1 of 4
This Amendment supersedes any state "practice of law"

statutes, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, to the extent that
those statutes require the exercise of any titles of nobility.
Moreover, with or without this Amendment, it is My opinion that
membership in a bar association would require that I violate not
only My personal code of conduct, but also numerous provisions in
the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully
amended, including but not limited to the Sixth and Tenth
Amendments, and other laws of the United States, including but
not limited to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Such membership prevents me from diligently protecting the

fundamental Rights of My clients. My first loyalty is to My
Creator, to Myself, My Family, the Citizenship of My state, and
then to My clients and their fundamental Right to maintain that
very same loyalty. Bar membership reverses these priorities and
flatly violates this loyalty, because it requires loyalty to the
court, to the bar, to public policy contrary to the Constitution,

and lastly to My clients, in that order. These priorities

violate the doctrine of separation of powers and, more
importantly, My clients' fundamental Rights.
Accordingly, I have the following important questions for

you, sir: Was the original Thirteenth Amendment a provision in
the Constitution which you took an oath to support, or was it
not? Under rules of equity, I assert My fundamental Right to
know what provisions are in the Constitution which you took an
oath to support. This is matter of your contract with Me.
If you have ever exercised a title of nobility in America,

e.g. esquire, lawyer, attorney, Honor, then the original
Thirteenth Amendment is a constitutional authority which has
disqualified you from ever serving in the office of federal
judge, is it not? Judges occupy public offices, do they not?
I am asking this question specifically because of your

decisions to bar me from assisting My client, Sheila Terese
Wallen, at all times during Her recent criminal trial on charges
of illegal marijuana possession with intent to distribute same.
In fact, you ordered me to the back row of the gallery, with U.S.
Marshals standing between Me and My client, preventing any
communication with My client.
If you have, in fact, taken an oath to support the

Constitution, and the administrative record does appear to
support this fact, does that Constitution not also contain a
provision which bars you from impairing the obligation of
contracts? See Contracts Clause. I had a lawful contract with
Sheila Terese Wallen, and you impaired that contract.
My contract with Sheila was predicated upon My belief that

your oath of office placed you in a valid contract with Me. By
what specific lawful authority do you claim any Right to impair
the obligations of My contract with Sheila Terese Wallen? If you
are upholding the U.S. Constitution, then My contract with Her is
valid and enforceable, under rules of equity, and you are
forbidden from doing anything to impair that contract.

Page 2 of 4
I will look forward to your timely response to this letter.

If I do not hear from you in writing within ten (10) working days
from the date of this letter, I will proceed on the basis of the
conclusive presumption that the original Thirteenth Amendment was
not in the Constitution which you took an oath to support.
I will stipulate that your oath predates the publication of

recent research proving that the original Thirteenth Amendment
has been well hidden from public knowledge (i.e. fraud).
Nevertheless, the original Thirteenth Amendment was lawfully
ratified, pursuant to Article V. This ratification has been
proven conclusively.
Therefore, you are now in the wrong contract with the

American People, because the Constitution which you took an oath

to support does not contain the original Thirteenth Amendment, as
evidenced by the Constitution as it was published in federal
depository libraries, and as it was published in the official law
books upon which district courts relied for conclusive evidence
of the Law, on the day you took your original oath of office.
Furthermore, you are disqualified from serving as a federal

judge for these and other reasons, because you have exercised one
or more titles of nobility or honor (e.g. "Honor", "Esquire")
since ratification of that Amendment. The original Thirteenth
Amendment does not contain any provisions for curing such a
disability or regaining your Citizenship. Your only defense now
is that you, too, were victimized by fraudulent concealment of
this Amendment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1001.
Whether or not the original Thirteenth Amendment was a

provision in the Constitution which you took an oath to support,
the Contracts Clause has been in the organic U.S. Constitution
since its original ratification. You, sir, simply cannot impair
the Right of Contract, pursuant to an explicit prohibition which
is in that Constitution.
One last point: when exactly did the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court become "hearsay," without any legal significance?
You ruled as such on July 17, 1996, in Sheila's case. I really
would like to know, for reasons which should be obvious to anyone
who claims to be a federal judge with expertise in federal law.
Are these decisions which you heard Supreme Court Justices say?
Does that make them "hearsay", in your opinion? If not, then
what does? Before I take any remedial action on this point, I
must have your explanation for what now appears to be gross
judicial misconduct on your part.
If you wish to rebut the presumptions which I have presented

to you in this letter, then please do so. I would welcome them,
sincerely. For the record, I am presenting these facts and laws
to you, pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1986.
Thank you very much for your careful consideration, and I

will look forward to your timely response to this CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE AND DEMAND, before 10 days transpire.

Page 3 of 4
Respectfully yours,

Citizen of Arizona state and federal witness

copies: Clerk of Court

Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit
Joelyn Marlowe, Esquire
U.S. Marshal's office
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 4 of 4
MEMO
TO: Cathy A. Catterson

Clerk of Court
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 193939
San Francisco, California state
FROM: Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Counselor at Law
DATE: March 14, 1997
SUBJECT: Complaint of Judicial Misconduct No. #96-80337

against William D. Browning, USDC, Tucson
Please incorporate this letter, My attached letter to USDC Judge

William D. Browning dated July 25, 1996, and My Notice of Intent
to File a Criminal Complaint dated September 20, 1996, into the
docket file which has been assigned judicial misconduct complaint
number #96-80337 against Judge Browning.
Because I have heard absolutely nothing from the Ninth Circuit,

or from any other government personnel in this matter, I
respectfully request some action on this complaint, which is now
six months old.
As I have already written in a previous letter to you, inquiring

about the unexplained delay(s) in processing My judicial
complaint against John M. Roll, the Chief Judge is required to
give such complaints his expeditious attention. I do not think
you could find anyone in America to preside on a jury who would
conclude that one-half year is expeditious. Do you?
Sincerely yours,

c/o 2509 N. Campbell Avenue, #1776

copy: Procter Hug, Chief Judge
p.s. Please have someone tell Judge Browning to stop picking his
nose during court proceedings.
# # #

ARIZONA STATE
September 20, 1996
NOTICE OF INTENT
TO FILE A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
AGAINST WILLIAM D. BROWNING
Clerk of Court
United States District Court
55 East Broadway
Subject: Criminal Complaint against

Mr. William D. Browning
Dear Clerk:
This is My formal Notice of Intent to File a Criminal

Complaint against Mr. William D. Browning, currently employed by
the United States federal government, for criminal misconduct
described in the attached Judicial Complaint form which has
already been transmitted to the Clerk of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (see attached).
Please notify the appropriate person(s) of this formal

Notice of Intent.
NOTICE TO AGENTS IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS.
NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS IS NOTICE TO AGENTS.
Thank you very much for your consideration.
Sincerely yours,
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness


copies: Governor Fife Symington, Tucson, Arizona

Attorney General, State of Arizona, Tucson
Attorney General, United States, Washington, D.C.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tucson, Arizona
Judicial Conduct Commission, State of Arizona, Phoenix
Clerk, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, San Francisco
Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, Washington, D.C.
Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
President, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
# # #
U.S.A. v. Wallen

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : index
Supreme Law Library : Court Cases
Index by Case Names
Table of Contents
1. MITCHELL v. AOL TIME WARNER, INC. et al., District Court of the United States,
Sacramento
2. MITCHELL v. AOL TIME WARNER, INC. et al., Superior Court of California, San Diego
3. STATE OF ARIZONA v. PAUL ANDREW MITCHELL
4. U.S.A. v. PETER BELLUCCI
5. BENSON v. BENTSEN [draft]
6. PEOPLE OF THE CALIFORNIA REPUBLIC v. REP. BARBARA BOXER
7. U.S.A. v. MARY ELIZABETH BRODERICK et al.
8. In Re CHARGE OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT by JUDGE WILLIAM D. BROWNING
9. In Re BANKRUPTCY OF DR. AND MRS. EUGENE A. BURNS
10. GEORGE W. BUSH v. PALM BEACH CANVASSING BOARD
11. CHRIS CASE v. PIER HOUSE JOINT VENTURE
12. STATE OF ARIZONA v. DAREN JAMES DEAN
13. DIXIANNE HAWKS v. COUNTY OF BUTTE et al.
14. U.S.A. v. DANA DUDLEY et al.
15. U.S.A. v. EVERETT C. GILBERTSON
16. PEOPLE v. UNITED STATES et al., Billings, Montana
17. PEOPLE v. UNITED STATES et al., Fort Davis, Texas
18. PEOPLE v. UNITED STATES et al. (intervention briefs)
19. U.S.A. v. LEROY M. SCHWEITZER (Butte, Montana)
20. SELECTED WORKS OF JOHN E. TRUMANE
21. STATE OF ALABAMA v. WILLIAM MICHAEL KEMP
http://supremelaw.org/cc/index.htm (1 of 3) [4/8/2007 2:17:18 PM]

22. KARL FRANK KLEINPASTE v. UNITED STATES et al.
23. U.S.A. v. VANCE E. KNUDSON
24. U.S.A. v. BARRIE and SUSANNE KONICOV
25. U.S.A. v. RUSSELL DEAN LANDERS
26. U.S.A. v. WILLIAM NEAL LANTER
27. U.S.A. v. FLOYD RAYMOND LOOKER
28. In Re PAUL ANDREW MITCHELL FOIA REQUEST
29. In Re GRAND JURY SUBPOENA SERVED ON NEW LIFE HEALTH CENTER

COMPANY
30. In Re BANKRUPTCY OF NEW LIFE HEALTH CENTER COMPANY
31. MITCHELL v. NEIL AND EVELYN NORDBROCK
32. In Re GRAND JURY SUBPOENA SERVED ON IRWIN HEIL PAUGH
33. U.S.A. v. CHARLES R. PIXLEY
34. PEOPLE v. PIMA COUNTY CONSOLIDATED JUSTICE COURT
35. In Re CHARGE OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT BY JUDGE JOHN M. ROLL
36. In Re CHARGE OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT BY JUDGE WILLIAM B. SHUBB
37. In Re CHARGE OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT BY MAGISTRATE DALE A. DROZD
38. SWAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION v. LEON ULAN et al.
39. In Re BANKRUPTCY OF FIFE SYMINGTON III
40. STATE OF ARIZONA v. CHARLES LEVIS TAYLOR
41. U.S.A. v. LEROY M. SCHWEITZER (Billings, Montana)
42. U.S.A. v. NORMAN LEON VROMAN
43. U.S.A. v. SHEILA TERESE WALLEN
44. ARIZONA v. JANET MARY WALLEN
45. MITCHELL v. CITY OF SAN MARCOS et al.
46. DIME SAVINGS BANK, FSB v. ANNETTE K. HAND et al.
47. U.S.A. v. ROBERT McKENDRICK et al.
48. PEOPLE v. TUCSON
49. U.S.A. v. JEROME T. SCHIEFEN

50. U.S.A. v. WILLIAM R. BARNES
51. U.S.A. v. DONALD E. WISHART
52. DONALD E. WISHART, WHISTLEBLOWER v. PAUL CAMANCHO & BRIAN WATSON
53. STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. CHARLES TIMOTHY SOWERS
54. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. VAZRIK MAKARIAN
55. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RAMONA HOLCOMBE a/k/a Mona Holcombe
56. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION
57. MEREDITH et al. v. ERATH et al. (Ninth Circuit Appeal #01-56873)
58. MEREDITH et al. v. ERATH et al. (Ninth Circuit Cross-Appeal #02-55021)
59. USA v. MEREDITH et al. (USDC #02-00372 DDP)
60. PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA ex rel. BYBEE et al. v. ERATH et al. (DCUS #SA CV 02-0382
GLT(ANx))
61. CITY OF DES MOINES, IOWA v. ROY REHA
[Home] [Contact Us] [Library] [School] [Forum] [Subscribe] [Donate]

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 A.D.:
Supreme Law Firm
email: Contact Us
Last Update: December 7, 2005 A.D.

Supreme Law Firm
Supreme Law Firm

Make a
The Supreme Law Firm holds informative seminars nationwide, and maintains
Donation
the Supreme Law Library. Please honor our copyrights and our trademark
rights, expressly reserved above.
Supreme Law
Email List To order printed hard copies of our classic book "The Federal Zone," click
here. To order signed and embossed copies of our very popular "31 Questions
Support Policy and Answers about the IRS," click here.
Contact Us We no longer provide pro bono answers to questions that arise from this
website. Please read our support policy before sending email questions.
Supreme Law See the Supreme Law Forum for latest Update Highlights.
Library
This website will provide important updates and information about our
Supreme Law distance-learning seminars and the SupremeLaw discussion list and message
School archive.
We also provide a vital depository in our Supreme Law Library.
Supreme Law
Forum Be sure to bookmark and return often as we grow into a vital and essential
Internet resource.
Founder Paul Andrew Mitchell, an advanced systems development

consultant for 35 years, has spent the past sixteen years since 1990
A.D. doing a detailed investigation of the United States
Constitution, federal statute laws, and the important court cases.
Writing under several pen names, Mitchell's work has reached all
the way into the U.S. Supreme Court, which adopted "the federal
zone" as a household word in their sweeping 1995 decision in U.S.
v. Lopez.
His massive book entitled "The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code
of Internal Revenue" was first published in 1992, and became an
instant underground success for its lucid language and indisputable
legal authority. The Appendices are available, for free, right here.
Mitchell has litigated important cases in State and federal courts,

including the case of People v. Boxer, which established that the
so-called Sixteenth Amendment was a massive fraud upon the
American People. U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer fell totally silent in
the face of Mitchell's pleadings in that case.
He has also worked as Vice President for Legal Affairs and
Counsel to an Arizona Trust, in a major confrontation with the
federal government over tax administration policy, and as Counsel
to a trespass and piracy victim whose legal strategy has attracted
nationwide attention on the Internet.
Mitchell is also the Private Attorney General in the case of People

v. United States et al., filed in the Article III District Court of the
United States ("DCUS") in Billings, Montana state.
http://supremelaw.org/index.htm (1 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:17:19 PM]

Supreme Law Firm
Mitchell's work blazed a courageous new trail, on first impression,

in Gilbertson's OPENING BRIEF to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in St. Louis, Missouri. This masterpiece, in 50 pages, has
now withstood the test of time and remains unchallenged, and
without any known errors.
Mitchell most recently re-focused his research on Title 28 -- the
laws which govern the entire federal court system. His Press
Release is an excellent introduction to this topic.
In his copyright and trademark infringement case against AOL
Time Warner, Inc. et al., Mitchell has forged a comprehensive
foundation and nationwide strategy for lawfully restoring the
Article III District Courts of the United States. His findings are
fully documented in his OPENING BRIEF, delivered to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco on March 27, 2002 A.D.
and his REPLY briefs.
His PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI in that case was
delivered to the Supreme Court of the United States on June 6,
2003 A.D. See also the companion PETITION FOR WRITS OF
MANDAMUS in that case.
Judging from the many compliments and positive comments we

have received from numerous Internet users, we have every reason
to expect that the Supreme Law Library will easily become an
essential resource in your list of favorite digital libraries.
[Home] [Contact Us] [Library] [School ] [Forum ]

[Subscribe] [Donate]
Common Law Copyright:

1996-2007 A.D.
Supreme Law Firm
email: Contact Us
Last Update: January 20, 2007 A.D.
Supreme Law Firm

c/o Forwarding Agent
501 W. Broadway #A-332
San Diego 92101
CALIFORNIA, USA
http://supremelaw.org/index.htm (2 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:17:19 PM]

Supreme Law Library
Welcome to the Supreme Law Library
The Supreme Law Firm provides you with crucial information.

Some of the features are long, so be patient when viewing them.
Please allow the browser to load the document completely.
Table of Contents
Latest Additions (links in progress):

● Published Authors
● Court Cases
● Court Decisions
● Letters of Correspondence
● Press Releases and Coverage
● Reference Works
● General Resources
● E-mail Archive (SLS)
● The Federal Zone: Authentic 11th Edition
● The Federal Zone: Appendices
● Internet Server Activity Logs
Court Cases (initial library versions):

● State of Alabama v. William Michael Kemp
● U.S.A. v. Looker
● Hawks v. County of Butte
● U.S.A. v. Wallen
● People v. United States
● U.S.A. v. Knudson
● In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New Life Health Center Company
● U.S.A. v. Gilbertson
http://supremelaw.org/library/index.htm (1 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:17:19 PM]

Supreme Law Library
Articles and Interviews:

● "A Cogent Summary of Federal Jurisdictions" by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. (October 3,
1998)
● "The Cooper File" by William Cooper (September 1995)
● "Esquires" by John E. Trumane (December 1995)

● "Income Taxes and Government Fraud" An Interview with John E. Trumane, by Susan B.
Anthony (April 12, 1992)
● "Karma and the Federal Courts" by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. (November 2, 1996)
● "The Kick-Back Racket: Performance Management and Recognition System" by Paul Andrew
Mitchell, B.A., M.S. (October 4, 1996)
● "Return To Constitutional Money" by Dr. Edwin J. Vieira, Jr. (August 30, 1991)
● "The Two United States and the Law" by Howard Freeman
● "The Lawless Rehnquist" by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. (January 28, 1997)
Press Releases:
● "Anthrax Vaccine Warning" by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. (December 19, 1997)
● "Congresswoman Suspected of Income Tax Evasion" by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
(August 28, 1996)
● "Juries in Check Around the Nation" by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. (July 27, 1998)
● "State Citizens Cannot Vote" by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. (November 2, 1996)
[Home] [Contact Us] [Library] [School ] [Forum] [Subscribe ] [Donate ]

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 A.D.:
Supreme Law Firm
email: Contact Us
http://supremelaw.org/library/index.htm (2 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:17:19 PM]

Supreme Law School
Supreme Law School

● Supreme Law School Registration
● Habeas Project for Political Prisoners
● E-mail Archives
● Free Archive Software (QBASIC)
[Home] [Contact Us] [Library] [School ] [Forum] [Subscribe] [Donate]

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 A.D.:
Supreme Law Firm
email: Contact Us
http://supremelaw.org/lawschool/index.htm [4/8/2007 2:17:20 PM]

Supreme Law Forum : Notice to Users
Supreme Law Forum
Notice to Users
The Supreme Law Forum is presently available in READ ONLY mode,

during a period of extended database updates and routine maintenance.
In addition to all previous documents, a large number of new documents

have been added to the Library, for your reading and study enjoyment.
We expressly reserve our Right to remove all offensive messages

from the Supreme Law Forum, as time and energy permit.
A huge amount of new materials have been added to this website,

for the benefit of the entire nation, pro bono!
Please tell everyone you know.
It's all free! It's all about freedom.
Update Highlights:
● Required Credentials for United States Judges
● 10 Major U.S. Universities Fall Silent (July 16, 2003 A.D.)

Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., U.S. Supreme Court docket #03-5070
● Ninth Circuit "Robes" under Formal Investigation (July 1, 2003 A.D.)

(see probable cause and authorities in re: Presidential Commissions)
● Lloyd D. George under Formal Investigation (June 18, 2003 A.D.)

("Robe" censoring Irwin Schiff's book "The Federal Mafia")
● PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT, (May 26, 2003 A.D.)
Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., U.S. Supreme Court docket #03-5070 (.doc)
● Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al. (March 12, 2003 A.D.) Civil RICO action,
Superior Court of California, San Diego County, docket #GIC807057
● MEMO TO JUDGE ALEX KOZINSKI, (Jan. 12, 2003 A.D.)

Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., Ninth Circuit appeal #02-15269 (.doc)
● MEMO TO DISTRICT COURT CLERK, (Dec. 30, 2002 A.D.)

● MEMO TO CHIEF JUDGE MARY M. SCHROEDER, (Dec. 27, 2002 A.D.)
http://supremelaw.org/wwwboard/index.htm (1 of 6) [4/8/2007 2:17:21 PM]

Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., Ninth Circuit 372(c) #02-89005 (.doc)
● COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AGAINST JUDGE WILLIAM B. SHUBB (Dec.

23, 2002 A.D.)
● COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AGAINST MAGISTRATE DALE A. DROZD

(Jan. 11, 2002 A.D.)
● REFUSAL OF ORDER AND MEMORANDUM FOR FRAUD AND OTHER CAUSES, BY

AFFIDAVIT,
Judicial Council for the Ninth Circuit, 28 U.S.C. 372(c) #02-89005 (Dec. 23, 2002 A.D.) (.doc)
● MEMO TO CHIEF JUDGE MARY M. SCHROEDER, (Dec. 23, 2002 A.D.)

● DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE RECUSAL OF ALFRED T. GOODWIN, (Dec. 20, 2002 A.D.)
● DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE RECUSAL OF PROCTER HUG, (Dec. 19, 2002 A.D.)
● MOTION FOR INTERVENTION OF RIGHT AND

APPLICATION FOR WRIT IN THE NATURE OF QUO WARRANTO,
Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., Ninth Circuit appeal #02-15269 (Dec. 19, 2002 A.D.)
(.doc)
● PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENTS,

Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., Ninth Circuit appeal #02-15269 (Dec. 17, 2002 A.D.)
(.doc)
● MEMORANDUM NOT FOR PUBLICATION, Ninth Circuit (Dec. 13, 2002)

Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., Ninth Circuit appeal #02-15269
● Occurrences of the DCUS in Title 28, U.S.C. (highlighed in bold)
● Occurrences of the USDC in Title 28, U.S.C. (highlighed in bold)
● Brafman v. United States, 384 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1967)

(23C assessment requires signature of assessment officer)
● U.S. v. O'Dell, 160 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1947)

(levy of bank account requires warrant of distraint)
● 1866 Civil Rights Act (origin of federal citizenship)
● Withholding Exemption Certificate by Affidavit

("withholding exemption certificate" occurs 17 times in IRC 3402(n))
● Supreme Law School : Message Archive: 121 mailboxes each with 100 messages
● Detailed Letter to Jon Mummolo, Washington Square News, Nov. 9, 2002 A.D. (.doc)

● U.S. Treasury Secretary Fails to Answer SUBPOENA for Tax Liability Statutes
(See 31 U.S.C. 301. Title 31 has been enacted into positive law.) (.doc)
● The Ghost of Social Security ("a huge tax-funded Ponzi scheme")

The Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2000 A.D., Lead Editorial, Page A26
● 31Q&A Referral Program

(Get the word out, get your money back, and more!)
● Internet Server Activity Logs

(Gaps resulted from witness retaliation.)
● Summary of Damages Quantum Meruit,

Mitchell v. Broderick et al. (pending).
● Racketeering (RICO) Predicate Acts (see 18 U.S.C. 1961(1))
● Letter to President and Mrs. Jimmy Carter (September 28, 2002 A.D.)
● Letter to California Governor Gray Davis (August 28, 2002 A.D.)
● Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States (Vols. I and II)
(Committee convened under Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr.)
● Portable version of "31 Questions and Answers about the IRS,"

(all hyperlinks are absolute, to facilitate file portability) (.doc)
● Easy directions for subscribing to the SupremeLaw discussion list

and message archive at Yahoo! Groups
● Application for ORDER Dissolving the Internal Revenue Service as filed in

People ex rel. Bybee et al. v. Andrew Erath et al., DCUS Santa Ana, California
● Motions for Preliminary Injunction against IRS and to Freeze IRS Assets
as filed in Ninth Circuit appeals #01-56873 and #02-55021
● Tables of Contents for all pleadings and related documents

as filed in Ninth Circuit appeals #01-56873 and #02-55021
● Pleadings on behalf of Lynne Meredith and associates as filed in

U.S.A. v. Lynne Meredith et al., USDC Los Angeles, California
● Pleadings on behalf of Teresa Giordano, dba Quality Paralegal Services:

see Tables of Contents for #SA CV 02-0382 GLT(ANx) and #CR 02-00372 DDP
● Autographed copies of "The Federal Zone" are now available.
● Table of Contents: Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
● America and the International Covenant: A Research Proposal to Amnesty International

June 18, 2001 A.D.
● Legislative Proposal to Congressman George Radanovich, June 5, 2001 A.D.
● The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue, authentic 11th edition
(please do not traffic in any stolen or modified derivatives)
● AntiCounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996 (.pdf)

(criminal copyright infringement is now a RICO predicate act)
● People's Application for Intervention of Right, George W. Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Board
(November 2000 A.D. general election)
● People's Application for Intervention of Right, U.S.A. v. Konicov (federal income taxes)
● Supreme Law Seminar Outline, with links to Supreme Law Library
● Initial COMPLAINT: Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
● First SUPPLEMENT: Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
● Second SUPPLEMENT: Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
● Third SUPPLEMENT: Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
● Supreme Law Library: Development Cost (1990-2002 A.D.)
● Recent additions from Charles Adams, Norman Dodd, and Roscoe Pound.
● A.L.E.R.T. on Voluntary Nature of Social Security
● IRS Strategic Plan 1984 (PDF format)
● 31 Questions about the IRS: Can you answer them all correctly?
● 31 Answers about the IRS: Certified by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
(now fully linked: please report link errors to the Webmaster) (.doc)
● Bank Levy Procedure for challenging IRS levies on bank accounts.
● IRS Intelligence Activities: Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Senate Resolution 21, Vol. 3, Oct. 2, 1975.
● Free appendices from "The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue,"
electronic Ninth Edition; hypertext links are in progress.
● Archive of 12,000+ e-mail messages broadcasted to the Supreme Law School

and other Internet users, indexed by alphabetical subject and date.
See Index 1, Index 2, Index 3 and Index 4.
● Active links are being added to many documents.

A good entry point is the Press Releases,

e.g. the jury verdict in Mitchell v. Nordbrock.
● OPENING BRIEF in U.S.A. v. Gilbertson is fully linked

to the United States Code at Cornell's Internet website
and to all internal topic headings.
● Winning brief by John E. Trumane in opposition to

an Order to Show Cause to appear at an IRS audit hearing.
This case was quietly dismissed by a federal judge.
● People v. Boxer (16th amendment fraud)

makes its debut on the Internet here.
These pleadings are rare and hard to find.
● The transcript of a lecture by Lt. Col. James "Bo" Gritz

at St. Mary's Cathedral in San Francisco, June 1, 1990.
Learn about the "Golden Triangle" and why children are addicts.
● Criminal complaint against Mr. Procter Hug,

Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in connection with In Re Grand Jury Subpoena and
the well documented downfall of the IRS [sic].
● Evidence of criminal interstate racketeering in the

U.S. Department of Justice, downtown Los Angeles.
● Paul Andrew Mitchell's Texas State lawsuit

against organized government abuses of the SSN.
(Some exhibit URL's will be added later.)
● Paul Andrew Mitchell's Arizona state cross-complaints

against 45 criminal co-conspirators.
● Collected works of Dan Meador, arranged in four sets:

file set one, file set two, file set three, file set four.
● and much, much more!
We appreciate your courteous participation in this Forum,

and we will do our best to maintain a high level of database
integrity at all times.
All constructive comments are always encouraged and reviewed

by our experienced leaders in constitutional litigation and
computer systems development.
Most of all, we give our sincerest thanks to the Most High --

Creator of this universe, our home, to His living Son -- the King of Kings
and to the Holy Spirit -- who inspires and supports this project.
As agents of the Most High, we came here to establish justice.

We shall not leave until our mission is accomplished
and justice reigns eternal in our hearts and in our souls.

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year, everyone!
Amen.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law, Federal Witness,

Private Attorney General, and
Supreme Law Webmaster

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 A.D.:
Supreme Law Firm
email: Contact Us

SupremeLaw Email Group : Subscription Directions
SupremeLaw Subscriptions
User Directions
Welcome!
To subscribe to the SupremeLaw discussion list and message archive,

send subscription fees and your email address to the mailing location
at the bottom of our home page:
http://www.supremelaw.org/index.htm
The SupremeLaw subscription fees are:
$120.00 if subscription is paid in January

$110.00 if subscription is paid in February
$100.00 if subscription is paid in March
$90.00 if subscription is paid in April
$80.00 if subscription is paid in May
$70.00 if subscription is paid in June
$60.00 if subscription is paid in July
$50.00 if subscription is paid in August
$40.00 if subscription is paid in September
$30.00 if subscription is paid in October
$20.00 if subscription is paid in November
$10.00 if subscription is paid in December
You may prepay in U.S. cash or blank money order to:
http://supremelaw.org/egroups/subscribe.htm (1 of 3) [4/8/2007 2:17:22 PM]

Forwarding Agent
501 W. Broadway, #A-332
San Diego 92101
CALIFORNIA, USA
After we confirm your prepayment, we will add your

email address to the “pending” list at Topica.
You should receive a confirmation message from Topica.
Just reply to that confirmation message, to activate your

subscription.
The Donation Worksheet itemizes the costs we incur
to maintain the Supreme Law Library and email group.
If you do not wish to join the SupremeLaw Group,

please ignore this invitation.
Regards,
Moderator,
SupremeLaw
Thank you!

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 A.D.:
Supreme Law Firm
email: Contact Us

Last Update: April 9, 2006 A.D.

Supreme Law Library : Donation Worksheet
Supreme Law Library:
Donation Worksheet
Please apportion your generous donations among

the following expense categories:
1. Internet service provider fees _________
2. domain name registration fees _________
3. local ISP connection fees _________
4. office lease/rental fees _________
5. office utility fees (electricity, gas) _________
6. office telephone expenses _________
7. office stationery and misc. supplies _________
8. computer hardware maintenance/upgrades _________
9. computer software acquisition/upgrades _________
10. copy center/document reproduction costs _________
11. postage and shipping expenses _________
12. book purchases/library acquisition costs _________
13. library legal/historical research _________
14. periodical/magazine subscriptions _________
http://supremelaw.org/egroups/donate.htm (1 of 3) [4/8/2007 2:17:22 PM]

15. pro bono legal assistance to indigents _________
16. donations to public interest litigation _________
17. donations to support prison ministry _________
18. development of distance-learning curricula _________
19. conference attendance and related travel _________
20. political action to dismantle IRS _________
21. personnel salaries and benefits _________
22. other (please specify):
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________ _________
Total Amount Enclosed:

=========
Please mail your donations, in cash or blank Money Orders, to:
Forwarding Agent
501 W. Broadway #A-332
San Diego 92101
CALIFORNIA, USA
Thank you very much for supporting the Supreme Law Library,

a public domain project of the Supreme Law Firm.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General and
Webmaster, Supreme Law Library:
http://www.supremelaw.org
It’s Free! It’s all about Freedom.

Wallen Cases

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Wallen Cases

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases : U.S.A. v.

Supreme Law Library : Court Cases

1. 13592 AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT DOCUMENTING CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ARREST

2. 11892 MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

3. 3686 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST FOR CREDENTIALS OF JOELYN D. MARLOWE

4. 3737 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST FOR VARIOUS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS

5. 3356 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST FOR VARIOUS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS

6. 3275 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST FOR CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF USDC

7. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST FOR STANDING OF USA TO SUE AS

8. 2311 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT APPEAL

9. 2318 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT APPEAL

10. 4388 NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE

11. 8644 NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE

13. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO

15. VERIFIED STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO GRAND JURY SELECTION POLICY

16. 9487 NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE

18. MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF

http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/ (1 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:12:54 PM]

19. 11911 CLOSING STATEMENT TO THE JURY

20. 3144 NOTICE OF APPEAL

23. 8736 AFFIDAVIT OF NON-WAIVER OF EXTRADITION

27. 4246 NOTICE OF FORMAL OBJECTION TO TRANSCRIPT FEE IMPOSED

28. NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AGAINST WILLIAM D.

29. 28594 COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT

Return to Table of Contents for

Supreme Law Library: Court Cases

[Home] [Write Us] [Library] [School] [Forum] [Subscribe] [Donate]

Common Law Copyright

Last Update: August 5, 2002 A.D.

http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/ (2 of 2) [4/8/2007 2:12:54 PM]

Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris

Under Protest, Necessity, and

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Case No. 95-484-WDB

COMES NOW Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris, Citizen of Arizona

state and Defendant in the above entitled matter (hereinafter

"Defendant"), being duly sworn upon oath, to depose and to affirm

1. My entire 20-acre property is fenced and secured with

two gates; "No Trespassing" signs (3 on front gates alone) are

posted all around my property; these can be clearly seen from

any angle or position upon approaching my property (see attached

pictures, incorporated herein as EXHIBIT "A").

2. On or about September 29, 1995, at approximately 8:30

a.m. in the morning, I was in bed in my house at the end of

Wedgeford Road in the town of Arivaca, Arizona state. At that

time, my front gate was closed and bolted shut.

http://supremelaw.org/cc/wallens/affidav.htm (1 of 9) [4/8/2007 2:13:02 PM]

Affidavit of Defendant Documenting Arrest Circumstances:

3. I was startled awake to hear people shouting, "Hello!

Hello! Is there anybody home?" These same people were banging

their hands on the side of my house while they were shouting.

4. I opened the window to my bedroom and asked them,

"Who's there?" They responded by saying, "We need to talk to you

for a minute." They then instructed me to come out of the house

by saying, "Come out here?"

5. At that point, I got out of bed, put on my bathrobe and

waists, and I could see their clearly exposed handles.

6. They flashed what appeared to be badges and introduced

themselves as agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration

then introduced me to Alan and Terry. They told me that someone

had called them to tell them that I had marijuana growing on my

7. I then asked them, "Do you have a warrant?"

apart." I paused for a long time before saying anything,