ADMIN LAW CASES MALAGA vs PENACHOS Malaga vs. Penachos Case.

It is all about the public bidding conducted by Iloilo School College of Fisheries inviting prospective applicants that whoever is the lowest bidder may award the contract to such bidder for the construction of Micro-Laboratory of Iloilo. The cause of action is the validity of bidding since the changes in date (deadline of submission) has been made without the benefit of notice and through publication. Petitioners, among others aside from Malaga, who were prospective bidders, petitioned to the court to restrain the conduct of bidding as it was null and void. But respondents through Bids and Awards Committee of Iloilo challenged the validity of injunction because invoking PD 1818 prohibits injunction in case of government projects. The Supreme Court ruled in favor petitioners, except the one who is filed out of time. De la Llana vs. Alba [GR 57883, 12 March 1982]En Banc, Fernando (J): 2 concur, 1 concurs with condition, 7 concur in separate opinions, 1 dissents in separate opinion Facts: De la Llana, et al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition (considered by this Court as an actionfor prohibition), seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Ministerof Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. BP 129 mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and theCourt of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated fromthe judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being allegedthat thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Issue: Whether the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbentJustices and judges Under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. Held: The Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process toabolish existing ones. The termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardlydistinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in the Supreme Court. Removal is,of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant whowould thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, itwould be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judgesare concerned, the Supreme Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need beentertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that the Supreme Court does not render advisoryopinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly the Supreme Court could not have its say prior tothe action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where thematter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created bythe reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departuretherefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberalinterpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing theinferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. Thechallenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to thosepredisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that inthe choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to bepreferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act toavoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. Further, it is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from actingwithin the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutionalsystem we have adopted that the Supreme Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. It is acardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which agovernment is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certainpowers. Those they exercise not

for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in thelanguage of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. Thelaw may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill hisresponsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul BP 129 would be attendedwith deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of theexisting inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Norshould there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing power vested in the Executive.It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well andtruly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the threedepartments are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill the hopes of the sovereignpeople as expressed in the Constitution.3. DE LA LLANA vs ALBA De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982) > The issue in this case is whether or not B.P. 129, An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, is unconstitutional, considering that in the time-honored principle protected and safeguarded by the constitution the judiciary is supposed to be independent from legislative will. Does the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution? HELD: Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. What is really involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a nonexistent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. DE LA LLANA vs ALBA (G.R. No. L-57883: Judge Gualberto De La Llana vs Minister of Budget Manuel Alba) Political Question - if there is no question of law involved BP 129 In 1981, BP 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes", was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to

accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987] Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogramindustry.A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code providedthat:"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject tosales tax.""Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price orrental rate, as the case may be, for every sale,lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shallaccrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be sharedequally by the City/Municipality and the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including,among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced theoperations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendanceby at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and othertaxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry. Issues: (1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional. Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. Itwas imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy,the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographicvideo tapes. And while it was alsoan objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 asunconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there isno question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant filmpiracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified andunreviewedvideo tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in governmentrevenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments arevirtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage inbusiness."WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs. -- G.R. No. 75697: Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board (1) Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject. HELD: The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. The express purpose of the PD to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of the said PD which explain the motives of the lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title of the PD, which is the creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD. --- TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987] Facts: Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following grounds: 1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof; 2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution; 3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6; 4. There is undue delegation of power and authority; 5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and 6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not. We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim. 1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 2 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." 3 The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be given practical rather than technical construction. 5 Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia: Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission. xxx xxx xxx The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as

expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation 6 it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. 2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. 8 The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. 11 It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. 13 At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature. 3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of the DECREE by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that "whenever in the judgment of the President ... , there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land." In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th "whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch. Whatever the reasons "in the judgment" of the then President, considering that the issue of the validity of the exercise of legislative power under the said Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the question raised at the proper time. 4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." 14 Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law. 5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto law is, among other categories, one which

"alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense." It is petitioner's position that Section 15 of the DECREE in providing that: All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five (45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram business and to register with the BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found in the possession of any person engaged in the videogram business without the required proof of registration by the BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the possession of such videogram be for private showing and/or public exhibition. raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE when the required proof of registration of any videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes of the nature of an ex post facto law. The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et al. ... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence" (People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience". Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a rational connection between the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character. 6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business. The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the "demise" of the video industry. On the contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed. In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and expediency of the DECREE. These considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative concern. Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained. 18 In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a challenged statute. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

CIR vs CA GR # 119322, June 4, 1996 On June 1, 1993, the President of the Philippines issued a Memorandum creating a Task Force

to investigate the tax liabilities of manufacturers engaged in tax evasion scheme, such as selling productsthrough dummy marketing corporations to avoid payment of correct internal revenue tax, to collect fromany tax liabilities discovered from such investigation and to file the necessary criminal actions againstthose who may have violated the tax code.The task force was composed of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a representative of the Department of Justice and a representative of the Executive S ecretary.On July 1, 1993, the Commissioner issued a Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93reclassifying best selling cigarettes bearing the brands Hope, More and Champion as cigarettes of foreign brands subject to a higher rate of tax without notice of hearing to Fortune Tobacco Corporationwho sells the mentioned brands.On August 3, 1993, Fortune questioned the validity of thereclassification of said brands as violative of its right to due process and equal protection of law.Parenthetically, the Court of Appeals ruled on S eptember 8, 1993 that the reclassification made by theCommissioner is of doubtful legality and enjoined its enforcement. ISSUE: Whether or not Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 is valid despite the lack of notice of hearing to Fortune Tobacco Corporatio 5. RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents. G.R. No. 73140May 29, 1987 Facts: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group asa casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having beenappointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, withoutchange in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 amonth. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month pluscost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made aninspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardinessand unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in aDecision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with backwages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, theinstant petition. Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing pe technicality. Held: Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides: SECTIO executory unless appealed to the C ommission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof. SECTIO shall be entertained. The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1,1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandumof Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaidmotion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed forhaving been filed out of time.The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation.Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted byadministrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled togreat respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become finaland executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasionallapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded.WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.