MahaThuriya

NEWS, VIEWS & OPINIONS

BY YE KYAW SWA
No 6 - Wednesday, November 23, 2011

This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named

http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/News,Views&Opinions

Wednesday, November 23, 2011 NO 6

 Collectors Items

- Clinton to become first U.S. secretary of state to visit Burma in 50 years - By David
Nakamura, Published: November 18, 2011

- 2011-11-18
Radio Free Asia

- 2011 voanews

- Testimony of Dr. Kurt M. Campbell - Foreign Policy On North Korea ( March 1, 2011)

- Testimony Philip H. Gordon -Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian

Affairs U.S. Russian Relations (July 28, 2009)

- Prepared Testimony by Dr Thant Myint-U ,before the East Asia Sub-Committee

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - Washington DC (30 September 2009)

- - ( )
(The Political Ideology of Democratic General Reformation) by Ye Kyaw Swa

..
Clinton to become first U.S. secretary of state to visit
Burma in 50 years
By David Nakamura, Published: November 18, 2011

1.

BALI, Indonesia Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton will visit Burma next month, in a
thawing of diplomatic ties between the United States and the Southeast Asian nation whose strong-
arm government has outraged the West.

The two-day trip, starting Dec. 1, would mark the first visit by a U.S. secretary of state in 50 years.

President Obama says Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will travel to Burma as the U.S. looks to
seize what could be an historic opportunity for progress in the repressed country. (Nov. 18)

President Obama made the announcement Friday shortly after he began a series of meetings here
with Southeast Asian leaders about regional security, including disaster relief. Obama is the first
U.S. president to participate in a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
whose chairmanship recently was awarded to Burma, also known as Myanmar. The main summit
meetings will take place on Saturday.

Burmas military rulers, who have held power since a 1962 coup, have taken a hard anti-
democratic line, cracking down on opposition leaders including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung
San Suu Kyi, who had been under house arrest for years.

But she was freed last year, and hundreds of other political prisoners have been released since
then, suggesting that Burma might be signaling an opening to the West as a hedge in its
relationship with China.

At the urging of the United States, Burmese President Thein Sein recently began talks with Suu
Kyis National League for Democracy.

Her party decided Friday to rejoin politics and register for future elections in view of the
governments overtures. The NLDs decision to register again officially as a political party was
reached unanimously in a meeting of senior members from across Burma, the Associated Press
reported. Among the members who spoke in favor of reentering Burmese politics was Suu Kyi.

Personally I am for re-registration, Suu Kyi told NLD delegates at the party headquarters in
Rangoon, AP reported.
The NLD refused to register last year because of a government restriction that barred Suu Kyi
from running for office, and the party boycotted Burmas November 2010 elections. The new
government that took office after the elections lifted the restriction this year.

NLD spokesman Nyan Win said Suu Kyi likely would run for office, AP reported. He said the
party would file registration papers with the Election Commission as soon as soon possible.

The NLD decisively won a 1990 general election, but the ruling junta refused to honor the results
and placed Suu Kyi under house arrest for most of the next two decades.

Among its other recent overtures, the new government has created a human rights commission,
lifted media restrictions and proposed a new labor organization to represent the rights of workers,
senior Obama administration officials said.

Burma also suspended work on a controversial Chinese-sponsored dam on a legendary river inside
the country, the officials said.

In his remarks, Obama said he called Suu Kyi on Thursday night from Air Force One as he flew
into Bali, and she welcomed Clintons visit. Obama said he has seen flickers of progress in
recent weeks from Thein Sein, whom Obama saw during the ASEAN meeting Friday.

..

2.

We remain concerned about Burmas closed political system, its treatment of minorities and
holding of political prisoners, and its relationship with North Korea, Obama said. But we want to
seize what could be an historic opportunity for progress, and make it clear that if Burma continues
to travel down the road of democratic reform, it can forge a new relationship with the United
States of America.

On her trip, Secretary Clinton will press Burma to pursue more reforms and assess how the United
States can help begin a new chapter between our countries, Obama said.

View all Items in this Story

The president arrived in Bali on the final leg of his nine-day Asia-Pacific tour, during which he has
aimed to reestablish the United States as a leader on economics and security in the region. The trip
has been marked by tension with China as Obama has called on Beijing to play by the rules on
international trade and in disputes involving military confrontations in the South China Sea and
elsewhere.

Burma is located between India and China and has long had strong bilateral relations with Beijing.
But the United States has interpreted the countrys recent actions as signals that Burmas rulers are
interested in improving their ties with the West.

In 2009, Obama asked Clinton to initiate a review of U.S. policy toward Burma, one senior White
House official said.
We came to conclusion that a policy of sanctions-only was not addressing our strategic interests,
the official added. At that point, the administration began trying to open a dialogue with the
government and Suu Kyi.

During Obamas phone conversation with the Nobel winner, which lasted 20 minutes, they
discussed the importance of reconciliation and how to stop violence in ethnic regions. There was
also a lighter moment when Suu Kyi asked how Obamas dog Bo was doing.

In a speech to Australias Parliament on Thursday before heading to Bali, Obama said the United
States will lead in Asia based on the principle that there are universal human rights, including
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion and the
freedom of citizens to choose their own leaders.

They stir in every soul, as weve seen in the democracies that have succeeded here in Asia,
Obama said. Other models have been tried and they have failed fascism and communism, rule
by one man and rule by committee. And they failed for the same simple reason: They ignore the
ultimate source of power and legitimacy the will of the people.

On Friday, in addition to announcing the Burma visit, Obama met one-on-one with Indonesian
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh; Malaysian Prime
Minister Najib Razak; and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines.

Ref:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/clinton-to-become-first-us-secretary-of-state-
to-visit-burma-in-50-years/2011/11/18/gIQAh2DtWN_story_1.html

.
2011-11-18

RFA

Hillary Clinton

Copyright 1998-2011 Radio Free Asia. All rights reserved.

http://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/us-burma-china-11182011105932.html
.
 2011

http://www.voanews.com/burmese/news/NLD-11-18-11-134156553.html

Dr. Kurt M. Campbell

Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Before the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

March 1, 2011

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to
testify today on North Korea, one of our most enduring foreign policy challenges. I would also
like to personally thank this committee for its leadership in advancing discussion and
opportunities for American engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Today, I would like to use
this occasion to focus on the Administrations North Korea policy through a broader regional
context.

Introduction:

The primary strategic objective for U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region is to promote a
peaceful and stable security environment that advances the interests of the United States, our
allies, and partners in the region. Essential to this approach is the security and stability that our
alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines
provide. These relationships underwrite peace and security in the region and provide a context
for the regions tremendous economic dynamism and vitality. In addition, our alliances are
buttressed by a network of partnerships ranging from Indonesia to New Zealand and an evolving
regional political and security architecture that will help create rules of the road for this rapidly
evolving and strategically critical region. China is also a key U.S. partner in promoting peace
and security in the Asia-Pacific region and globally, and the Joint Statement issued during
President Hus January 2011 to Washington underscored that in coordination with other parties,
the United States and China will endeavor to increase cooperation to address common concerns
and promote shared interests.
Despite the tremendous opportunities in Asia that have become part of our popular discourse,
one country stands out as an outlier, and in fact an impediment, to the regions promising future:
the Democratic Peoples Republic of Koreas (DPRK). The DPRKs brazen attack on the ROK
corvette Cheonan in March of last year, its recent disclosure of a uranium enrichment program,
its shelling of Yeonpyong Island that resulted in the tragic loss of South Korean lives, and its
ongoing human rights violations underscore the threat that the DPRKs policies and
provocations, including its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities,
pose to regional stability and global security.

The verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which is the core objective of the 2005
Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, is an essential ingredient to the Asia-Pacific regions
long-term success and to our own security. Progress toward this goal requires close coordination
 -2-

between the ROK, Japan, and the United States, as well as with China and Russia. Our
Northeast Asian alliances play an essential role in maintaining regional security, deterring North
Korean provocations, providing a reliable and robust strategic deterrent posture, and bringing
maximum leverage to bear on the DPRK to change its current course and become a member of
the community of nations. To this end, we have actively engaged our regional partners to ensure
robust implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1718 and 1874 on North
Korea, and though there is still work to be done, strong regional cooperation, particularly with
Japan and South Korea, has made it more difficult for North Korea to successfully engage in
proliferation and other illicit activities. We will continue to take steps to enhance and broaden
our bilateral political, economic, and security relations, as well as make progress on key alliance
modernization initiatives. We will also work to develop a more integrated trilateral framework
for cooperation and coordination between Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. Furthermore, we are
taking steps to enhance coordination with China and Russia both of which have important
relationships with North Korea to create a more favorable context for denuclearization and
peace and security. In addition to the aforementioned five key parties, we are working more
closely with other stakeholders like the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), India, and
Australia to broaden region-wide efforts to compel North Korea to abide by its denuclearization
commitments and obligations, as well as with the UN Security Council.

The Republic of Korea:

The U.S.-ROK alliance is grounded in the threat that North Korea poses to the ROK. However,
over the course of the past few years, the United States has undertaken steps to expand alliance
cooperation in both regional and global settings. In 2011, we will aggressively pursue initiatives
to increase collaboration in the peninsular, regional, and global contexts.

The ROKs security is critically affected by North Korea due to their complex historical
relationship, geographic proximity, and the tangible threat that North Koreas conventional
military capabilities, nuclear programs, and ballistic missile developments pose to South Korea.
As President Obama stated during his November 2010 visit to Seoul, In the face of these
threats, the U.S.-ROK alliance has never been strongerThe United States will never waver in
our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea. Following the attack on Yeonpyong
Island, President Obama stated that we will stand shoulder to shoulder with the ROK and
reaffirmed our commitment to its defense. This commitment is being translated through efforts
to bolster ROK defensive capabilities. For example, last November the ROK participated in USS
George Washington Carrier Group exercises. We continue to hold regular joint military
exercises to enhance extended deterrence, interoperability, and the readiness of alliance forces to
respond to threats to peace.

Over the last 60 years, our alliance with the ROK has continued to expand from its military roots
into one of the most vibrant, full-spectrum strategic partnerships in modern history,
encompassing dynamic political, economic, and social cooperation. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade
Agreement is a way not only to strengthen U.S.-ROK economic ties and increase American jobs
through exports to Korea but also to enhance the enduring strength of this strategic relationship.
Regionally, we are working closely with the ROK on a number of key issues, such as improving
maritime security through the ASEAN Regional Forum and advancing the capacities of countries
 -3-

in the Lower Mekong region. We welcome and support the ROK governments efforts to realize
its Global Korea vision, expanding its global reach to be commensurate with its economic
status. We applaud the ROKs leadership in addressing global concerns, such as proliferation,
counter-piracy, and development assistance. Last years G20 Summit in Seoul and the upcoming
Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012 are a testament to the ROKs global leadership.

Close coordination and the broadening and deepening of our security commitments with the
ROK are key guiding principles for how we approach North Korea. The steps that our two
militaries are taking, for example, to enhance our joint interoperability and strategic deterrent,
are critical to creating a security environment that deters North Korean provocations, increases
our collective leverage on Pyongyang to change course, and maintains peace and stability in the
broader East Asia environment. A U.S.-ROK relationship that will only grow stronger and
continued close bilateral coordination on our strategies for the way forward on North Korea will
reinforce our common message to Pyongyang that taking irreversible steps toward
denuclearization, abiding by the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and improving relations with
the ROK and its other neighbors is the only way for the DPRK to break free from its isolation
and enjoy the security, political, and economic benefits that come with integrating into the
international community.

In the short-term, the United States supports direct talks between the DPRK and the ROK to
address the Souths legitimate grievances, including North Koreas sinking of the Cheonan and
its shelling of Yeonpyong Island. We believe that North-South dialogue is an important initial
step toward the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. North Koreas decision to walk out of the
recent colonel-level North-South military-to-military talks squandered a valuable opportunity to
improve North-South relations and demonstrate its commitment to dialogue. We will carefully
monitor events on the Korean Peninsula for evidence of a North Korean commitment to
improving inter-Korean relations.

Japan:

President Obama underscored the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance during his November
2010 trip to Japan: As allies for over half a century, the partnership between Japan and the
United States has been the foundation for our security and our prosperity not only for our two
countries, but also for the region. Last year, we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-
Japan alliance. This year, we are working to create a roadmap for the next 50 years to broaden
and deepen this cornerstone alliance. In this context, Secretaries Clinton and Gates will co-host
their Japanese counterparts in Washington, D.C. for a 2+2 Security Consultative Committee
meeting. This meeting will focus on reaffirming the core mission of our alliance the security
of Japan and maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific as well as articulating new
common strategic objectives and approaches that demonstrates the expanse of our relationship.
Progress on key issues associated with modernizing our military relationship will continue and is
essential to adapt our alliance to better manage the complex evolutions in the Asia-Pacific
strategic environment, as well as promote and protect the global commons. We think that Japan
should follow the ROK and take steps to accede to the Hague Convention on International
Parental Child Abduction.
 -4-

North Korea remains Japans most immediate national security concern and a key feature of our
diplomatic engagement with Tokyo. North Koreas nuclear and ballistic missile programs and
past abduction of Japanese citizens underscore the tangible threat the DPRK poses to Japans
national security. North Koreas recent provocative actions have reinforced Japans concerns
and led to enhanced ROK-Japan cooperation and closer trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan coordination.
We welcome the commitment of ROK and Japanese leaders to deepen the ROK-Japan bilateral
relationship. We appreciate Japans key role in working to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue
peacefully and its commitment to implementing unilateral and multilateral sanctions against the
DPRK to curb its proliferation activities. The United States fully supports Japanese efforts to
resolve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea.

Trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan Coordination:

In addition to strengthening U.S. alliances with the ROK and Japan, we will take ambitious steps
to increase trilateral cooperation to further develop a more integrated Northeast Asia security
architecture. Robust trilateralism is essential to deal with the DPRKs provocative behavior and
to shape the emerging regional strategic environment. Trilateral engagement demonstrates to
North Korea that its reckless actions will be met with collective resolve. The benefits of
trilateral coordination were on full display when Secretary Clinton hosted Japanese Foreign
Minister Maehara and ROK Foreign Minister Kim in a historic U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral
Ministerial meeting in December 2010. At this meeting, the three countries jointly affirmed the
importance of unity and ways to enhance policy coordination on myriad issues from ASEAN to
North Korea. On North Korea, they declared that the DPRKs belligerent actions threaten all
three countries and will be met with solidarity from all three countries. The United States
reaffirmed its security alliances with both Japan and the ROK, and all three countries jointly
condemned the DPRKs uranium enrichment facility as a violation of the DPRKs commitments
under the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations under
UNSCR 1718 and 1874. Institutionalization of trilateral cooperation will be an important focus
of U.S. diplomatic efforts in the coming year and a point of conversation when Secretary Clinton
meets with the ROK and Japanese Foreign Ministers in the coming year. Additionally, with our
Japanese and South Korean allies, we are continually working to enhance cooperation with
China and Russia on ways to deal with the DPRK underscoring the strategic benefits of strong
Five-Party unity and coordination in denuclearization negotiations.

China:

North Korea remains a key foreign policy issue in our bilateral relationship with China. We
share the same goals of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, as well as North Koreas
verifiable denuclearization in a peaceful manner. China is uniquely positioned to influence the
DPRK because of its significant economic and humanitarian aid to the DPRK, its shared border
with the DPRK, and historical ties. We have urged China to press North Korea to take
appropriate steps to improve relations with South Korea and to denuclearize. We also continue
to work with China to enhance effective implementation of sanctions under UNSCR 1718 and
1874.
 -5-

During the January 2011 China state visit, President Obama emphasized to President Hu that
North Koreas nuclear and ballistic missile programs are increasingly a direct threat to the
security of the United States and our allies. The President also expressed appreciation for
Chinas role in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula but underscored the need for China to
leverage its unique relationship with North Korea to compel Pyongyang to abide by its
commitment to the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks as well as its obligations under
UNSCR 1718 and 1874. Both leaders agreed that the complete denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula remains our paramount goal and that North Korea must avoid further provocations.

The Joint Statement issued during President Hus visit also reflects our shared concern over the
DPRKs claimed uranium enrichment program. The United States and China jointly expressed
concern regarding the DPRKs claimed uranium enrichment programopposed all activities
inconsistent with the 2005 Joint Statement and relevant international obligations and
commitmentsandcalled for the necessary steps that would allow for the early resumption of
the Six-Party Talks process to address this and other relevant issues. We are working closely
with China and our other partners and allies at the UN to develop an appropriate UN response to
the DPRKs uranium enrichment program.

Russia:

We value our continuing cooperation with Russia, another key partner in the Six-Party Talks, to
achieve our shared goal of denuclearization in North Korea. As a result of its historical
relationship with the DPRK and its status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council,
like China, Russia is well positioned to influence the DPRK through both direct bilateral
diplomacy and multilateral efforts.

In the wake of the DPRKs provocations over the last year, we welcome the constructive role
that Russia has played to press Pyongyang to refrain from further destabilizing actions, to abide
by its international commitments and obligations, and to take irreversible steps toward
denuclearization. Russia has publicly stated that it backs UN Security Council discussion of the
North Korean uranium enrichment program, and we seek further cooperation from Russia in our
efforts to affirm unequivocally that the DPRKs uranium enrichment activities violate the
relevant UNSCR.

Other Key Regional Players: ASEAN, India, Australia:

Due to the security threats posed by North Korea to the entire Asia-Pacific region, our deep
diplomatic activity and coordination on North Korea extend beyond the Five Parties to other key
partners in the region. As a fulcrum of regional multilateralism, ASEAN has been actively
engaged on regional security issues. The ASEAN-centered East Asia Summit presents a unique
opportunity to engage with traditional allies and new partners on a range of areas central to U.S.
interests in Asia, which may grow to include North Korea. We will continue to work closely
with ASEAN to identify ways for the organization to play a more engaged role in
denuclearization discussions.
 -6

India and Australia also share our goal of enhancing peace and security in the Asia-Pacific.
The United States and India have discussed North Korea in our Strategic Dialogue and other
bilateral and multilateral exchanges. Indias growing security and political relations with Japan
and South Korea will also enhance prospects for security and stability in Northeast Asia.
Australia has strongly supported international implementation of UNSCR 1718 and 1874,
participated in the international investigation of the sinking Cheonan, and supported efforts to
bring the issue before the UN Security Council.

Conclusion:

The goal of the United States and our allies and partners remains a stable, peaceful Korean
Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. To achieve this goal, the United States intends to maintain
strong solidarity with South Korea, Japan, and other states with a vested interest in the future
of the Korean Peninsula and the stability and prosperity of Northeast Asia. We will continue
to encourage the DPRK to engage in meaningful negotiations on denuclearization and to honor
its commitments and international obligations. At the same time, we will work to ensure the
implementation of U.S. and international sanctions against North Koreas nuclear, missile, and
proliferation networks and its involvement in other illicit activities. We will also carefully
watch internal political and economic developments in North Korea, particularly as they relate
to succession and the promotion of heir apparent Kim Jong-un, the third son of Kim Jong-il.

The Obama Administration has repeatedly stressed that there remains a positive path open to
North Korea. North Korea has the choice to take a path that will lead to security and
economic opportunity or to continue in its pattern of confrontation and isolation. The United
States remains committed to meaningful dialogue, but we will not reward North Korea for
shattering the peace or defying the international community. If North Korea improves
relations with South
Korea and demonstrates a change in behavior, including taking irreversible steps to
denuclearize, complying with international law, and ceasing provocative behavior, the United
States will stand ready to move toward normalization of our relationship. However, if it
maintains its path of defiance and provocative behavior and fails to comply with its obligations
and commitments, it stands no chance of becoming a strong and prosperous nation.

Our concerns with North Korea are not limited to the threat it poses to regional stability and
global security. Human rights violations harm the North Korea people and violate
international norms for the rule of law and respect for individual rights. Respect for human
rights by North Korea will also be necessary for it to fully participate in the international
community. Human rights are a top U.S. priority and an addressing of human rights issues
by the DPRK will have a significant impact on the prospect for closer U.S.-DPRK ties.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I welcome any questions that
you may have.

http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Campbell_Testimony.pdf
U.S.-Russian Relations

Testimony

Philip H. Gordon
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

Statement before the House Foreign Relations Committee

Washington, DC

July 28, 2009

As prepared

Chairman Wexler, Congressman Gallegly, members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak to you today about the Administration's achievements in Moscow as a
result of the summit meeting of President Obama and President Medvedev July 6-8. I would like
to submit my full testimony for the record, and would like to take this opportunity to make a
few brief remarks.

Let me begin by putting the results of the summit into a somewhat wider context. The Obama
Administration entered office seeking to put an end to the dangerous drift in our bilateral
relations with Russia. Last December, then President-elect Obama called for a reset in our
relations with Russia. He argued that the United States and Russia have mutual interests in a
number of areas including nuclear nonproliferation, terrorism, and Afghanistan for example
and argued that it should be possible to cooperate practically in these areas even as we
disagreed on other issues. The results of the Moscow Summit demonstrate that the Presidents
instincts were correct.

In the six months since President Obama took office, the United States and Russia worked hard
to achieve such a fresh start. Not only have our leaders made progress in improving the tone of
our relations and helping to build goodwill between our two countries, but as the Moscow
Summit demonstrates, we have succeeded in translating the rhetoric about potential
collaboration into identifiable, concrete actions that are fundamental to the security and the
prosperity of both our countries.

This significant progress in our relations with Russia, moreover, did not in any way come at the
expense of our principles or partnerships with friends and allies. There are still many areas
where the United States and Russia disagree and will continue to disagree. Nevertheless, in
Moscow we demonstrated in real terms our shared desire to build a relationship based on
respect, cooperation, and common interests.

First and foremost, the United States and Russia took important steps to increase nuclear
security and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, beginning with the reduction of our own
nuclear arsenals. The two Presidents signed a Joint Understanding for a follow-on agreement to
START that commits both parties to a legally binding treaty that will reduce our nuclear
warheads and delivery systems by at least one third of our current treaty limitations. They also
agreed to participate in a joint threat assessment of the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st
century, including those posed by Iran and North Korea. Wasting no time in launching this
effort, an interagency team of experts is heading out to Moscow this week to begin discussions.

Second, we made concrete commitments to deepen security cooperation, including by working

together to defeat violent extremists and to counter transnational threats, including those of
piracy and narcotics trafficking. At the summit, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
Mullen and Russian Chief of the General Staff General Makarov agreed to work plan for
resuming military-to-military cooperation in areas such as coutner-terrorism, search and rescue,
and counterpiracy.
Another very tangible result of the summit was Russias agreement to allow the United States to
transport its military personnel and equipment across Russia in support of the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force as well as our Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. This
agreement will add flexibility and further diversify our crucial supply routes, resulting in a
potential savings of up to $133 million in fuel, maintenance, and other transportation costs. The
significance of this contribution to our efforts to bring about peace and stability to Afghanistan,
which is also of strategic benefit to Russia as well, should not be understated. It is an excellent
example of how the two countries can cooperate in the pursuit of common interests, without
any quid pro quos.

We also agreed to strengthen cooperation in non-strategic areas. For example, the United
States and Russia took steps to build cooperation in public health, which could include
strengthening work between U.S. and Russian scientific research institutions on HIV/AIDS and
tuberculosis and prevention and treatment of cardiovascular disease. And we agreed to restore
the work of the Joint Commission on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.

Finally, President Obama and President Medvedev recognized the need for a more structured
foundation for advancing our cooperation in key areas across our respective inter-agencies. The
Bilateral Presidential Commission to be chaired by the two presidents and led by Secretary
Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov will provide a mechanism for sustaining and expanding on
the progress we achieved in Moscow, while also proving a for a in which we can work together
effectively to narrow our differences.

Notwithstanding all of these positive developments, we have no illusions that our reset of
relations will be easy, or that we will not continue to have differences with Russia. Nonetheless,
we are confident that the United States and Russia can still work together where our interests
coincide while at the same time seeking to narrow our differences in an open and mutually
respectful way be it on issues of human rights or Russias unlawful recognition of Georgias
separatist regions. In this regard, the President was unequivocal in his message that the reset
in our bilateral relationship will not come at the expense of our friends and allies. More than in
words, but in actions, we have demonstrated our commitment to the territorial integrity and
independence of Russias neighbors including Ukraine and Georgia. President Obama made
very clear in Moscow that we will continue to support their sovereignty and their right to choose
their own security alliances a message reinforced by the Vice Presidents trip to those two
countries just last week. The President also stressed both privately and publicly Americas
enduring support for democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

To conclude, at the Moscow Summit the United States and Russia took significant steps
forward in translating the reset in relations into concrete achievements to benefit both
our nations and our global partners. Without abandoning our principles or our friends
and allies, we demonstrated that the United States and Russia can work effectively
together on a broad range of issues where our interests coincide.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Gallegly, members of the Committee, I am grateful for the
opportunity to speak before you today, and I welcome the opportunity to respond to your
questions.

http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2009/126537.htm

Prepared Testimony by Dr Thant Myint-U

before the East Asia Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington DC 30 September 2009

The policies of the United States and other Western governments over the past twenty years
towards Burma have failed. They have not been helpful in moving the country towards
meaningful democratic change and at the same time have largely neglected the countrys
multiple ethnic and armed conflicts as well as its pressing humanitarian challenges.

As we move towards a very welcome review and adjustment of American policy, I think its
important to reflect on the history behind todays challenges, appreciate the critical and complex
watershed Burma now faces, and try to identify pragmatic ways forward.
War and state-building

There is a myth that Burma emerged from British rule in 1948 as a peaceful democracy with all
the attributes necessary for later success, only to fall mysteriously into dictatorship and extreme
poverty. Burma in 1948 was actually already at civil war, its economy in ruins. And this civil
war has continued until today. It is the longest running set of armed conflicts anywhere in the
world, setting the Burmese army against an amazing array of battlefield opponents from the
Mujahedeen along the former East Pakistan/Bangladesh border, to remnants of Chiang Kai-
Sheks Nationalist Army, to drug-lords, to Beijing-backed communist rebels, to Christian-led
ethnic Karen insurgents in the jungles near Thailand.

The Burmese army has been in the field uninterrupted for more than six decades. For the army,
the history of these six decades has been the history of their fighting back, to hold the country
together, from a time when they barely controlled the then capital Rangoon, to today, when they
believe they are within reach of a final victory.

State-building in Burma has gone hand-in-hand with war-making. And the military regime
remains at its core a counter-insurgency operation. It was designed and built-up to identify
enemies, contain them, and crush them when possible. The men in charge may be motivated by
desires for personal power and profit, but they also believe themselves to be patriots. And after
two generations of fighting foreign-backed rebellions, they are primed to see foreign
conspiracies behind all opposition.

In 1962, the army overthrew the last elected government, in part to pursue its counter-insurgency
operations unhindered by civilian oversight. It established what it called The Burmese Way to
Socialism, which nationalized all major businesses, expelled the countrys Indian merchant class,
and sought to isolate Burma from the world, banning nearly all international aid, trade and
investment. The military state grew up and consolidated its rule in this self-created isolation. It is
its default condition.
These twin legacies ethnic conflict and international isolation - have been instrumental for the
consolidation and continuation of military rule. Progress towards peace, inter-ethnic
reconciliation, and the reintegration of Burma into the global community are essential if we are
going to see any sustainable transition to civilian government. Yet not only has there been little
focus on these issues, but key opportunities in recent years have been missed.

The end of Burmese socialism and missed opportunities

The early and mid-1990s provided a unique chance to move Burma in the right direction.
General Ne Win, dictator of Burma since 1962 was old and ailing and a new generation of
generals had come to the fore. The Chinese backed communist insurgency had collapsed and
cease-fires were agreed between the Burmese army and more than two dozen different insurgent
forces.

While rejecting democratic reform, many in the new leadership wanted to end decades of self-
imposed isolation and move towards a more free-market economy. Trade and investment laws
were liberalized and tourism encouraged for the first time in decades. Satellite television soon
brought the world into millions of Burmese households and travel in and out of the country, both
legally and illegally became routine. The government sought development assistance from the
UN and the International Financial Institutions. US and international policy should have been to
lock in these tentative steps, especially the ceasefires and market reforms, rather than ignore
them, impose economic sanctions, cut off assistance, and insist on an immediate democratic
transition.

US policys near singular focus since 1988 on support for the democracy movement led by Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi is understandable, especially given ongoing repression and her partys
decisive win in the 1990 elections. In the early 1990s I was a staunch supporter of the toughest
approach possible towards the regime and argued for comprehensive sanctions. I believe I was
wrong and I had changed mind by 1993 when I saw that sanctions were unlikely to ever really
pressure the regime and were instead impeding the positive momentum that was there.

There was political repression in Burma, but thats been the constant since 1962. What was
different in the 1990s was the end of fighting across the north and northeast and the opening up
of the economy. I am convinced that had we embraced these changes and used them as
opportunities to move towards a just peace while also reconnecting Burma with the world, the
democracy movement would be in a far stronger position today.

The problem with sanctions

Sanctions have not only been ineffective in promoting democratic reform, they have also been
hugely counter-productive in reducing Western influence, reinforcing isolationist tendencies,
constraining moves towards market-reforms, and decimating the position of the Burmese
professional, managerial and entrepreneurial classes. The last generation of US and UK educated
technocrats has now retired or is close to retirement, and very few in the bureaucracy or
universities today have had any foreign
training. The country is far less prepared for a sustainable democratic transition today than it was
in the early 1990s.

We have to remember this: politics in Burma like everything else operates on a landscape
cultivated by over sixty years of war and nearly fifty years of military dictatorship. Little will
change without first transforming that landscape. Focusing on regime-change at the top will
simply not work. Sanctions and related divestment campaigns and campaigns to minimize
tourism have drastically reduced chances for the emergence of new and outward looking
economic forces. The political economy which has emerged under sanctions, based now on a few
extractive industries and trade ties with a handful of regional countries, has proven particularly
easy for the incumbent regime to control. Aid restrictions, restrictions on high-level contacts and
travel by senior Burmese officials, and embargos on trade and investment all have had the direct
if unintended consequence of reinforcing the status quo. And to say that the governments own
policies are also to blame do not absolve the role that US and other Western sanctions have
played in entrenching poverty and engendering a political economy that is the antithesis of one
that could have thrown up positive social change.

We need also to differentiate between punishment and pressure for change. Sanctions may be
seen as a form of punishment, in the sense that the regime doesnt like them. But sanctions do
not constitute pressure for change, quite the opposite, they strengthen the hand of those who are
uninterested in further engagement with the outside world and in particular the West. Real
pressure comes with increasing the regimes international exposure, creating new desires, and
placing tough options on the table. Having to choose between Western sanctions and a handover
of power is simple. But with greater international exposure, a choice between real policy change
and improved governance on the one hand or a future as an impoverished dependency of China
on the other wont be as easy.

The present watershed

Burma now faces an historic watershed, and whatever happens, I am certain that the next 12-18
months will be the most important time in Burmese politics since the failed 1988 uprising.
The current watershed has at least three principal components:

(1) First is the civil war. Burmas civil war may either be nearing an end or entering a new and
violent chapter. There still exist more than two dozen distinct ethnic-based insurgent forces,
fielding well over 40,000 troops in total. Vast areas of the country, in particular in the north and
east are ruled by a mix of Burmese army battalions, insurgent armies and local militia. Though
the cease-fire arrangements between the Burmese army and nearly all insurgent forces remain,
many are increasingly tenuous. In recent weeks we have seen the oldest of the cease-fires, the
twenty-year agreement between the Burmese army and the Kokang militia break down. The
coming months may well see successful efforts by the Burmese army to pressure or persuade the
various armed groups to transform themselves into quasi-autonomous militia and accept
the new constitutional order. But a return to full-scale hostilities, though unlikely, is also far from
impossible.

(2) Second is the generational transition within the armed forces. Most if not all the present army
leadership will retire in the coming months to be replaced by officers in their late 40s and early
50s. This new generation will be the first to have risen to senior command on the basis of their
administrative rather than any significant combat experience, the first without training in the
United States, and the first for whom the West, rather than China, has been portrayed as the main
strategic threat.

(3) Third is the political transition under the new constitution. Entirely new political structures,
including fourteen state and regional governments will be established in 2010 under the new
constitution. Central power will at least nominally be bifurcated between a new and powerful
president and a new armed forces commander-in-chief. General elections may or may not create
an opening for more independent political voices, but the transition to the new constitutional set-
up will present at the very least a massive shake-up of existing systems of authority and
patronage. We do not know if the leadership will be able to manage the transition as they wish.
2010 may well throw up unexpected new dynamics, especially as they come at the same as major
changes in the armys top ranks.

Burmas relationships with her neighbors, in particular China, are also changing fast. The
migration of hundreds of thousands if not millions of ethnic Chinese into the country, the rapid
expansion of Chinese business interests, and the construction of huge new infrastructure projects
linking Burma to southwest China, including a massive Chinese oil pipeline, designed to
transport Middle Eastern and African oil across Burma to Chinas Yunnan province, will have an
enormous impact on the Burmese economy and society, especially as there take place during a
period of Western economic withdrawal. Burma is already a major exporter of energy to
Thailand in the form of natural gas. Burma may soon also export large quantities of natural gas
to China and hydroelectric power to China, India and Thailand. How well and how transparently
revenues from energy exports are managed will be a key test of any future government.

On China, we have to remember that the present army leadership grew up fighting the
Communist Party of Burma, a well-armed Chinese-supported insurgent force that once
threatened huge parts of the eastern uplands. There is no love lost between Beijing and
Naypyitaw. The present leadership rose up the ranks seeing China as their number one strategic
threat and the US as their ally. Many see their present dependence on China as an anomaly, a
tactical move that needs correction.

I have visited Burma often in recent years, at least ten times since the beginning of 2007. Ive
travelled extensively around the country, without escort and few restrictions, and have met
hundreds of people, from senior army officers to dissidents to businessmen to local aid workers,
including friends and family, some well-off, others struggling each day to feed their families.
This is a country where political opposition is violently repressed and there is a obvious desire
for greater freedom and government
accountability. But its a also a country where there exists an increasingly vibrant civil society, a
heavily-censored but largely privately-owned media, with dozens of newspapers and magazines,
widespread access to satellite television and foreign movies, an energetic contemporary music
scene, extensive religious freedom, and a weak but resilient private sector. There are literally
hundreds of genuinely independent local non-governmental organizations in Burma today, and
thousands of community-based organizations, all working to improve living conditions for
ordinary people, a young country of 55 million, one of the most ethnically diverse in the world. I
say all this not to deemphasize the political repression that exists. Make no mistake there is
little or no political freedom in Burma and the continued detention of an estimated 2,000
prisoners of conscience is rightly seen as unacceptable. But outrage alone changes little. And to
move to towards a more results-oriented approach we need to see Burma in all its complexity.

I said that Burma is at a watershed. The ceasefires could collapse leading to a new round of inter-
ethnic conflict, a new generation of generals could emerge hostile to the world as well as their
own people, and plight of ordinary people could worsen still, even while the rest of Asia moves
forward. The demise of current leaders could lead to elite fracture and even state collapse.
Alternatively, if more pragmatic views prevail, a freer and more prosperous future may not be so
far away. The difference will be determined inside the country, but I believe that are key areas
where help from the outside will be significant, as outlined below.

The importance of increasing humanitarian assistance

The Administrations support for increased humanitarian assistance is extremely welcome and
scaling up aid should be a top priority. Burma has the 13th lowest per capita GDP in the world
and its child mortality rate is the second-highest rate outside Africa, after Afghanistan. The
average family spends an estimated 75% of its small income on food. Burma has the highest HIV
rate in Southeast Asia, and malaria, a treatable and preventable disease, is the leading cause of
mortality and morbidity.

Yet assistance to the Burmese people in 2007 was less than USD 4 per capita. Though this has
increased in response to last years Cyclone Nargis, aid remains the lowest per capita among the
fifty-five poorest countries in the world. By comparison, Zimbabwe receives USD 41 per captia
and Sudan USD 55. Tens of thousands of people a year die from treatable diseases. The United
Nations, international and national non-governmental organizations are all able to deliver aid
directly to needy people. But funding has fallen far short of what is necessary.

Cyclone Nargis opened up the Irrawaddy delta to unprecedented and almost unlimited access by
international organizations and international and national non-governmental organizations.
Almost four thousand aid workers operate there today in over two thousand villages. In addition
to providing life-saving assistance and helping villagers restart their lives and livelihoods, their
work is significantly strengthening local civil society. Yet funding for recovery efforts has been
only a fraction of what is needed. A unique opportunity to help the Burmese people directly and
support local civil society may be squandered without more financial support.
In providing humanitarian assistance, I believe very strongly that we must put all other agendas
aside and simply provide aid as best we can to those who require help most and continuously
press for access to all needy communities. I believe the US should not only significantly increase
humanitarian assistance but actively encourage other donor governments to do the same.

Enabling Change

Though positive change in all areas will have to come from within, the outside world can make a
difference in enabling that change and making it sustainable. I would suggest:

(1) Maximize elite exposure. Every scenario for political change in Burma depends on at least a
degree of support from within the military establishment. Yet virtually nothing has been done to
try to influence the mind-set of the up and coming officer corps or show them that other paths to
stability and development exist. The isolation of the countrys leadership from the rest of the
world is a key pillar of the status quo, its removal is critical for any lasting political change.
Dialogue and cooperation on issues of mutual concern such as disaster risk reduction - should
be used towards this end.

(2) Engage in dialogue on economic reform. Supporters of sanctions are correct when they say
that poverty in Burma is not due primarily to sanctions but to the chronic mismanagement of the
economy. I favor lifting all economic sanctions, but I also favor more robust efforts to press for
economic and related governance reform, separate from any political agenda. This should start
with a removal of all restrictions on the United Nations system and the International Financial
Institutions, especially the World Bank in engaging the government, including at the highest
levels. Efforts to build up the administrative capacity necessary to turn the economy around
should be supported, not hindered. As new ministers take up their positions in 2010, they must at
least understand the need for more broad-based development, the impact of their own policies,
and the options for poverty reduction going forward.

(3) Dont forget the private sector. Humanitarian assistance and other aid is needed now, but
Burma, a country rich in natural resources and situated between Asias emerging economic
giants, should make sure it avoids becoming an aid-dependent country. Scaling up international
assistance makes no sense if at the same time we are holding back through broad economic
sanctions the possibilities for private sector growth. We need to shift the debate away from
sanctions and towards a practical discussion of the kind of trade and investment that would most
benefit ordinary people. US sanctions crippled the emerging textile industry and threw 70,000 or
more people out of work. Removing the ban on the import of garments from Burma would be a
step in the right direction. And if there are specific government obstacles that stand in the way or
direct economic engagement with the Burmese private sector (beyond a few top cronies), than
the removal of these obstacles should be at the center of dialogue with the authorities.
(4) Build capacity. No sustainable shift from a military to civilian rule will be possible without
radically increasing civilian administrative capacity and capacity in society more generally. We
cannot underestimate the impact that decades of self-imposed isolation and external sanctions
have had on education standards and technocratic skills. Efforts to build capacity through
training and scholarships should be actively promoted, including through international
organizations.

A democratic Burma

Nothing I have said should suggest any changes in the long term aims we all share a peaceful,
prosperous and democratic Burma. In a country as ethnically and culturally diverse as Burma,
only a genuinely liberal democracy with strong local government institutions can, I believe,
guarantee lasting stability. A free and economically vibrant Burma at Asias crossroads is a
worthy goal. But we should not underestimate the real and practical challenges that exist
between those aims and the situation today. There can be no grand strategy from the outside,
only efforts to use and build on opportunities as they come along. And seeing those opportunities
depends on being more present on the ground, in direct contact with the Burmese people. This is
what a new engagement-oriented approach should be all about.

Thank you.

END

http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Myint-UTestimony090930p.pdf

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Ye Kyaw Swa

Tuesday, November 22, 2011

mahathuriya.yks@gmail.com
 Collectors Items

- Clinton to become first U.S. secretary of state to visit Burma in 50 years - By David
Nakamura, Published: November 18, 2011

- 2011-11-18
Radio Free Asia

- 2011 voanews

- Testimony of Dr. Kurt M. Campbell - Foreign Policy On North Korea ( March 1, 2011)

- Testimony Philip H. Gordon -Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian

Affairs U.S. Russian Relations (July 28, 2009)

- Prepared Testimony by Dr Thant Myint-U ,before the East Asia Sub-Committee

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - Washington DC (30 September 2009)

- - ( )
(The Political Ideology of Democratic General Reformation) by Ye Kyaw Swa

SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS

COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA
No 6 - Wednesday, November 23, 2011

Contact, Comment & Counsel: mahathuriya.yks@gmail.com