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No 5 - Sunday, October 30, 2011

This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named


Sunday, October 30, 2011

NO 5

You could not step twice into the same river; for other waters are ever flowing on to you. Heraclitus, On the Universe

Greek philosopher (540 BC - 480 BC)

Collectors Items

Briefing by Ambassador Mitchell, New U.S. Special Envoy for Burma -- Washington, D.C. (October 17, 2011) Testimony by Daniel J. Kritenbrink -- US Policy Toward the Peoples Republic of China PRC (April 13, 2011) Testimony of Kurt M. Campbell - the vital importance of Asia-Pacific countries to the United States (March 31, 2011) Testimony of David C. Williams U.S. Policy toward Burma: Its Impact and Effectiveness (Executive Director, Center for Constitutional Democracy ) --(September 30, 2009) THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN (1947) (based on the English Edition by Government Printing Bureau )


Briefing by Ambassador Mitchell, New U.S. Special Envoy for Burma

The U.S. special envoy and policy coordinator for Burma, Derek J. Mitchell, briefs reporters in Washington on his trip to Burma in his new position as special representative for Burma. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesperson October 17, 2011 ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING Special Briefing with Ambassador Derek J. Mitchell on Burma October 17, 2011 Washington, D.C. MS. FULTON: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Department of State. Today we have a special guest with us, our special representative and policy coordinator for Burma, Derek Mitchell, who was recently appointed to this position and he has recently traveled to the region. So we are very happy to have an opportunity for him to provide us with an update on our diplomacy with Burma. Without further ado, Derek Mitchell. MR. MICHELL: Thank you. Well, thank you all. Its a pleasure to finally see you. I took my first trip early September and I meant to come do a brief up here for some time, but its been rather busy of late and Im moving around, so Im glad I have the opportunity. As suggested, I am the first in this position of special representative and policy coordinator for Burma. Its a position that is mandated by Congress under the JADE Act. And I took over in mid August. My first trip was early September, and weve been very active in engagement every since.

Its a position that essentially was intended to continue the policy that we have, that the Obama Administration has pursued, of a dual-track approach, which talks about both engagement and sanctions, pressure, on the regime, on the government in Burma. But it is meant also to provide a sort of senior-level face focusing on the issue 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, as I do. So it is, in that sense, a new beginning. And I was able, I think, in my trip to Burma back in September, able to establish a good baseline for the relationship. I had very, very productive and candid meetings, and we have proceeded to have a number of interactions since then that I think have been equally productive. I was very, as I said, candid there. And if you all were able to see the press statement I put out leaving Rangoon at that time, I laid out, in essence, the gestures that we saw from the government that were welcome. And weve seen, I think since then, even more gestures and more moves by the government that seems to be a trend towards greater openness, as well as some of the views from ourselves and others of skepticism, of questioning about whether, in fact, we are seeing something fundamentally different in the country. Are we seeing a real path to reform as they laid out their goals of democracy, human rights, national reconciliation, and development, national development for the country? Those who have followed Burma for many years, as I have, have seen stops and starts. Im not sure weve seen anything necessarily exactly like weve seen over the past several months. And in talking to people inside the country, they themselves say that they are seeing something that is a bit different than theyve seen before. But there are still questions about how far theyre going to go and where this is going to lead. And we laid out I laid out in my statement and in the dialogues that we have privately, that if, in fact, we do see change, reform along those lines of democracy, human rights, national reconciliation, and development, they will have a partner in the United States; that we will be with them as a partner in that reform effort because, in fact, that is what we have sought to pursue for many years now. So we have seen encouraging signs over time, and but of course, there are some things that havent changed, and we should be noting those. As much as weve seen some changing of dynamics in between Naypyidaw and Rangoon with some of the democratic opposition, we, of course, have not seen similar progress in the relationship between the government and the ethnic minorities, the

ethnic nationalities in the north and the east and elsewhere. Violence continues. Credible reports of human rights abuses, including against women and children, continue. And this remains an issue of great concern to the United States and to others in the region and around the world. And in fact, we made it very clear that we could not have a transformed relationship as long as these abuses and credible reports of abuses occur and as long as there is not dialogue with these groups and with the opposition. If violence remains, then that will be a constraint on the relationship. We also talked a bit about accounting for past abuses that have occurred as a step towards reconciliation, that something that could be done to represent a credible commitment to national reconciliation to give voice to some of whats occurred in the past. And we also talked a bit about with them about transparency in their relationship with other nations. And particularly with North Korea, there have been reports that weve seen of concern about that relationship, and we continue to follow that very, very closely. So even as we see some progress in some areas, there are other areas that we remain concerned about. And the dialogue continues, and I think weve set a very good as I say, a good baseline for a very candid relationship between the two sides that we really havent seen, I would say, in many, many years. So with that, maybe Ill open it up for some questions, if people have particular issues. QUESTION: Was the release of the political prisoners as part of the general amnesty last week of a sufficient magnitude to incline the Administration to take any kinds of reciprocal gestures toward Burma? Im not talking about peeling off all the sanctions, but perhaps smaller steps, waivers, other kinds of gestures. MR. MITCHELL: Well, first of all, we have taken steps and made gestures in return. We have lifted travel restrictions for those who have traveled to New York to UNGA to come to Washington. And at that time, we met with the foreign minister here in the State Department, the first time in some time. I couldnt even tell you the last time there was a foreign minister meeting here. And that was a good opportunity to have the direct dialogue on the issues that I raised here, but also to build the relationship and build the trust and build the confidence between the two sides.

Weve invited a Burmese delegation to be an observer at the Friends of the Lower Mekong Initiative. So were bringing them into some of the international dialogues that occur and looking at other gestures in turn. So its not as if were standing still and were not sending signals. Of course, rhetorically, were saying we welcome whats going on. They really value that rhetorical appreciation of what weve seen to date. So we continue to do that. All these are steps. But our position is pretty clear and its reflective of what we hear from inside the country as well, which is political prisoners any political prisoners there are too many political prisoners and that what were looking for is a release of all political prisoners without condition to really send the signal of genuine commitment to democracy in the country. The people that are of probably most concern to them, the people that have been in the streets and maybe led some of the movements and such, some of the names I think are known to folks here, Ko Ko Gyi, Min Ko Naing, Gambiri, and others. I said directly to the leadership that these are the people that if youre serious about democratic reform you would see as allies, because they actually are seeking the same goals you are. They are seeking for a credible democratic Burma. So weve heard reports, weve seen reports, suggesting that they say be patient with us, that more is to come. And we will watch for whether they, in fact, follow up with action on the release of political prisoners just in total. QUESTION: Just to be clear, none of the steps that you mentioned as gestures took place post October the 12th, correct? I mean, the foreign minister was here well before that, the invitation to be an observer at the Lower Mekong Delta. So is it then fair for us to conclude, or will you say, that what they did in terms of a prisoner release last week is not, in and of itself, sufficient to yield any actions on the U.S. part? MR. MITCHELL: Well, were constantly we dont were thinking in terms of how do we develop the relationship and build the confidence between the two sides. Its not linked to any specific action at any point like that. We obviously welcome the release of some political prisoners and of other prisoners as part of an amnesty. We certainly welcome that. But were thinking more broadly what other what are the steps that we can take, whether theyre linked to a particular action or not, but that we see them take that suggests theyre on the path to reform.

And that means provide certain types of advice and assistance in that regard. And we continue the dialogue. So there are things that we discuss in private that also can be productive in terms of the relationship over time instead of simply the public gestures. MS. FULTON: Okay, next question. QUESTION: Whats your understanding of how many political prisoners were released during this previous amnesty? And also, what further sort of reciprocal steps could the U.S. take? What would you see as the other things that you could do looking forward that could sort of reward Myanmar, reward Burma for the steps it takes? MR. MITCHELL: Well, on the second I dont want to I dont think its appropriate here to start going through hypotheticals; if they do this, then do that. Suffice to say that if we see that kind of movement on the political prisoners released fully and unconditionally, among other things that have been discussed as well about potentially theres now in parliament a discussion of amending the political party registration law that could open up the opposition, particularly the NLD, to take part in the political process. Those are obviously very, very important moves that would lead to American gestures, steps in return. But Im not going to get into what for what. In terms of the numbers, were not were still working on that. Its still being looked at. Its some are saying its in the low 200s or 220s, some are saying 250, in terms of political prisoners. But were still trying to figure out exact numbers, and I think inside theyre also trying to figure out exactly what the number is. But I cant give you a perfect number today. MS. FULTON: Next question, Goyal. QUESTION: Sir, thank you. Three points. One, in the past, Burmas military was being supported by the Chinese to keep in power. Second I mean, what role China is playing now or will play? And second, what role will be playing Aung San Suu Kyi, her Democratic Party which won elections 20 years ago and shes still on and off under house arrest or in jail and all that? And finally, do we see now real democracy in Burma?

MR. MITCHELL: Ill make sure I get these all down so I dont forget. QUESTION: Thank you. MR. MITCHELL: On the issue of China, Burma has an extensive border with China. I think they make it clear that they that all those nations in Asia want to have a good relationship with China, and they should have a good relationship with or a productive, constructive relationship with China. And thats between the Burmese and the Chinese. Thats not an issue for the United States to be engaged in or to comment on. So thats all I would say, I think, about that. On the issue of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, they still are relevant. As I said when I was there, they are very relevant to the future of the country. They still represent a substantial segment of the Burmese population. She still is looked on as a unifying figure and as an important political figure. And they will decide themselves how they play within the new system or that the system that is evolving. Whether I say its new, I would say its an evolving system there. And I would leave that to them to determine how best to engage in that regard. But they clearly see themselves having a future and an important part of the future in Burma. Real democracy; I think its too soon to tell what were seeing. I think what were seeing are is a positive trend line, encouraging signs. I think its raising expectations both inside and outside the country. And therefore, its incumbent on the government, therefore, to follow up and to meet those expectations. And if so, I think itll be a win-win. I think they will benefit from that, I think the region will benefit from that, I think the United States will benefit from that, and the people of Burma will benefit from that in terms of their overall development and their come out of the shadows. I think as of, what right now, I think there are a lot of restrictions that make them into a pariah state; and Burma is a proud country with a tremendous history, and they deserve to come out of the shadows and be and take their prideful place in the region. MS. FULTON: Okay. Next question, Lauren. QUESTION: You said that you talked to them about how to be more transparent in their relations with other countries, including North Korea. Did they give any indication that they would be willing to do that, to do any information sharing? Or if they havent, do you think they will in the future?

MR. MITCHELL: Its an ongoing dialogue. They are they say that there is nothing untoward going on between them and North Korea. And well continue to have the dialogue as we go. So I would say everything is on the table in terms of dialogue. I think that theyd be willing to engage. Whenever I raised anything when I was in Naypyidaw, they were willing to address that subject and talk about it. And hopefully, we can establish the kind of trust that will allow us to continue that dialogue in a productive fashion. So Im very hopeful in that regard, and well see simply as we go whether we can get the kinds of reactions and responses that were looking for. MS. FULTON: I think we have time for just one more question. Bob. QUESTION: Does the U.S. see signs that there is resistance to this liberalizing trend within the power structure of the country? Are there some hardliners who are pushing back? MR. MITCHELL: Its I cant say that were seeing them actively, but we hear about I think its probably predictable that there are going to be those who think we are moving too quickly or maybe this is not the path to go. The dynamics right now are difficult to read entirely. We dont have a perfect sense of how its working internally. There is a sense that probably some believe that at least it may be going too fast in some regard, but we dont know. What were going to follow though, what were going to respond to, are actions and what they do. And they will work out themselves what is the best for the future of their country. What we want to do is provide incentives and to give them a sense of what the possibilities are if they move in a positive direction. If they move in a reformist direction, its going to be good for the people of Burma, good for their country; and that to go in a different direction will not be good, will not be itll mean some more of the same in terms of their position in the world and the region and in the relationship with the United States. So I dont think you can I wouldnt classify people as purely hardline, purely reformist. I think its probably more complex than that. But what were trying to do is understand better how things work and then encourage the reform as they move forward. So, thank you very much. Appreciate the time. QUESTION: Thank you.

Washington Updated: 2011-01-17 20:38:53 GMT Distributed by the Embassy of the United States of America, Brussels, Belgium. Web sites:;


US Policy Toward the People's Republic of China PRC

Testimony Daniel J. Kritenbrink Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Statement before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission Washington, DC April 13, 2011

Commissioner Bartholomew, Commissioner Brookes, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss U.S. policy toward the Peoples Republic of China (P.R.C.). As is well known, the United States is committed to pursuing a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to our principles and interests. We welcome a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs, and we are committed to working with China and the international community on critical global issues. Moreover, we believe that a strong U.S.-China relationship serves to bolster stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, we have no illusions about the many obstacles to our cooperation and the many differences that continue to exist between us. While we have made progress in some important areas, it is clear that much more needs to

be done. As Secretary Clinton has said, You cannot build a relationship on aspirations alone. We therefore are engaging with the Chinese leadership to emphasize the steps we believe are necessary to bring us closer to our shared goals of regional stability and increased prosperity. U.S.-China Relationship I would first like to comment generally on the U.S. approach to China. Contrary to claims by some commentators, the United States is not attempting to contain or counter Chinas rise. Our approach to China is multifaceted. We encourage China to play a greater role internationally in ways supportive of international development and stability and in ways consistent with prevailing international rules, norms and institutions. As others have noted, U.S. global influence and our active presence in East Asia have, in fact, helped create the stable environment for Chinas remarkable economic transformation of the past few decades. The United States has a strong interest in continuing its tradition of economic and strategic leadership, and Asia has a strong interest in the United States remaining a dynamic economic partner and a stabilizing military influence. The United States is an Asia-Pacific power, and there should be no doubt about our commitment to defending U.S. interests and values in the region. But while the United States and China will inevitably have differences from time to time, it is far from pre-ordained that Chinas rise should lead to conflict. As Secretary Clinton has stated, in the 21st century, it does not make sense to apply zero-sum theories of how major powers interact. We need new ways of understanding the shifting dynamics of an increasingly complex international landscape a landscape marked by emerging centers of influence, but also by non-traditional, even non-state actors, and the unprecedented challenges and opportunities created by globalization. We believe this is especially applicable to the U.S-China relationship. As Secretary Clinton outlined in her January 14 speech, one important element of our policy is to work with allies and partners in Asia to foster a regional environment in which Chinas rise is a source of prosperity and stability for the entire region. Or, as some others have said, to get China right, you have to get the region right. By practicing what Secretary Clinton has called forward-deployed diplomacy, the United States has expanded its presence in the region, beginning by renewing and strengthening bonds with our allies and partners in the region.

At the same time, we have strengthened our engagement and cooperation with regional and multilateral fora, which we believe contributes to regional stability and prosperity. The Obama Administration has made a renewed effort to expand our engagement with institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, and the East Asia Summit, which President Obama will attend later this fall in Indonesia. This engagement is important both because of the centrality of the issues of Asia to our own security and prosperity, and because of the regions increasingly global significance. The engagement with ASEAN member states is important in its own right, but these multilateral institutions also offer a unique opportunity for cooperation with China. Having ASEAN at the center of each of these institutions should allow us to more effectively promote cooperation and innovative solutions to problems. A second critical element of our policy is focused on building bilateral trust with China. We need to form habits of cooperation and respect that help us work together more effectively and weather disagreements when they do arise. The most notable of these efforts is the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, or S&ED, a whole of government dialogue with participation from hundreds of experts from dozens of agencies across both of our governments. The goal of these meetings is not only to discuss an unprecedented range of subjects, but as Secretary Clinton has said, to inculcate that ethic or habit of cooperation across our two governments. We look forward to hosting our Chinese counterparts at the next round of this dialogue in May in Washington. The United States engages in broad outreach to all elements of Chinese government and society as part of our effort to gain greater trust and understanding. This is all part of what Secretary Clinton has described as a steady effort over time to expand the areas where we cooperate and to narrow the areas where we diverge, while holding firm to our respective values. This approach includes building a healthy, stable, continuous, and reliable military-to-military relationship, which President Obama and President Hu have affirmed is an essential part of their shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. The two leaders have also agreed to expand people-topeople exchanges between our countries and emphasized the importance of continued interaction between our legislatures, including institutionalized exchanges between the National Peoples Congress of China and the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. We have also developed ways to expand the ties

between our governments at the sub-national level, including through launching the U.S.-China Governors Forum. This broad interaction with Chinese society will be increasingly important as the P.R.C. leadership turns over in 2012 and a new group of civilian and military officials assume power. This sort of bilateral engagement also involves managing issues over which we have significant differences. For example, on Taiwan, we have been encouraged by the progress between the Mainland and Taiwan in terms of greater dialogue and economic cooperation. At the same time, however, our approach continues to be guided by our one China policy based on the three Joint Communiqus and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). We frequently reiterate that, while we encourage greater dialogue and exchange between the two sides, we also seek a reduction in P.R.C. military deployments, and remain committed to meeting our responsibilities under the TRA. We also continue to have significant differences over human rights. As Secretary Clinton stated on April 8 in releasing the 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, we remain deeply concerned about continuing reports that, since February, dozens of people, including public interest lawyers, writers, artists, intellectuals, and activists have been arbitrarily detained and arrested. We continue to urge China to release all of those who have been detained for exercising their internationally recognized right to free expression and to respect the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all of the citizens of China. Promotion of human rights will remain an essential element of U.S. foreign policy, and we will continue to raise human rights in our meetings with Chinese officials, including at the next round of our bilateral human rights dialogue. A third critical element of our policy toward China is expanding our cooperation with China to address common global and regional challenges, ranging from Iran and North Korea to climate change and economic growth. Through the S&ED and other regular bilateral engagement, as well as through work in international and other fora, we intend to continue expanding to the maximum extent possible our practical cooperation with China to meet a range of common global interests. I plan to expand on these efforts further below.

Chinas Diplomacy

At this point, I would like to turn to addressing some of the specific questions on Chinas foreign policy that the Commission would like to explore in this hearing and that will also provide an opportunity to expand on U.S.-China cooperation to deal with common global challenges that I mentioned above. In our view, Chinas foreign policy continues to be driven primarily by its desire to sustain its economic growth and maintain social and political stability at home. As part of this effort, China has sought to develop a wide range of relationships with regional and rising powers, as well as traditional world powers. At the same time, China has used its growing role in global affairs to enhance its diplomatic stature. China has played an important role in the diplomatic efforts to address the threat posed by Irans nuclear program. We have been pleased with the unity that China and other P5+1 partners have maintained in our negotiations with Iran, and we continue to jointly insist that Iran comply with its international obligations. We worked closely with China to pass UN Security Council resolution 1929 last June, which placed tough new sanctions on Iran. We have called upon China to ensure that this resolution is fully implemented and to take additional steps to restrict any new economic activity with Iran that might provide support to its nuclear program. Irans nuclear program was a key topic of President Obamas talks with President Hu, and it was the also the focus of several senior-level meetings with the Chinese in the lead-up to President Hus visit. China reiterated during the State visit that it is committed to implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1929 and other resolutions on Iran fully and faithfully. We welcome that assurance and look forward to continuing to consult with China on these subjects. China has also been an important diplomatic player on North Korea (the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, or D.P.R.K.), including playing a central role as chair of the Six-Party talks, and has repeatedly stated that it shares our goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We have worked closely with China in recent years to pass UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, which imposed additional sanctions against the D.P.R.K. and called for the international community to take steps to curb D.P.R.K. proliferation activities. The United States is committed to standing with our allies the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) and Japan in the face of North Koreas threats. Our alliance was exemplified in the historic December 2010 U.S.-Japan-R.O.K. Trilateral Ministerial in which the three ministers affirmed that a D.P.R.K. threat to one of the countries will be met by solidarity from all three nations.

Our ability to work together on North Korea is an important sign that we can cooperate to address issues of common concern. We expect China to use its close relationship with North Korea to persuade the D.P.R.K. regime to cease its reckless behavior. President Obama discussed North Korea with President Hu, during Hus state visit in January. In their joint statement, the two Presidents sent an important signal to North Korea and the region that U.S. and China agree on the critical importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the need for sincere and constructive inter-Korean dialogue, and the crucial importance of denuclearization of the Peninsula. China also took the important step of expressing concern regarding the D.P.R.K.s claimed uranium enrichment program. We urge China to press North Korea to take appropriate steps to improve relations with South Korea, to denuclearize, and to abide by its international commitments and obligations. We also continue to work with China on full and transparent enforcement of sanctions against North Korea adopted by the Security Council. Regarding Russia, in the face of Chinas remarkable economic growth of the past decades, Russias main exports to China, energy and raw materials, are rising rapidly. The countries share many overlapping interests and have cooperated on political and economic matters as BRIC nations and permanent members of the UN Security Council and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The United States engages closely with both China and Russia on a range of issues including the challenges posed by North Korea and Iran. We look forward to continued cooperation on important multilateral issues such as nonproliferation, arms control, counter-terrorism, and regional security. China in recent years has also been active in pursuing what it sees as its maritime rights. The United States has made clear our views on the principles of freedom of navigation. As Secretary Clinton stated at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi last year, the United States has enduring national interests in the South China Sea, including continued peace and stability and respect for international law, as well as freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce. We oppose the use of force or threat of force by any claimant to advance its claim. While the United States does not take sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the South China Sea, the United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by the claimants for addressing the territorial disputes.

Like the United States and our allies, China appears to have been watching closely recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa. China has a strong interest in protecting its citizens in the region and ensuring that crucial energy supply lines are maintained. Nevertheless, we are concerned that Chinas reaction to these events has caused it to take harsh measures to silence political debate. Over the past few weeks, as Secretary Clinton stated last Friday, we have seen a large number of forced disappearances, extralegal detentions, and arrests and convictions of human rights activists, artists, writers, and lawyers, as well as tightened restrictions on foreign journalists. We have repeatedly raised our concerns with Chinese officials and urged them to end this crackdown. And we will continue to make our position clear publicly and privately. The United States respects Chinas extraordinary achievements in economic reform and in lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty in the past 30 years. During the recent visit of President Hu, President Obama emphasized our belief that human rights are essential to building a stronger, more prosperous and resilient society. For instance, freedom of expression fosters the open exchange of ideas that is essential to economic innovation and productivity. An effective legal system can protect citizens property and guarantee that inventors can profit from their ideas. And a robust civil society can help to ensure that citizens concerns about everyday issues like food safety, the environment, and urban development are addressed. All societies benefit from the free exchange of ideas, and all governments benefit from the feedback of their citizens. Conclusion In closing, I would like to reiterate that our engagement with China is part of a wider strategy that seeks to reaffirm the United States commitment to the AsiaPacific region and encourage China to reach its full potential as partner in addressing global issues. President Obama has underscored that the rise of a strong, prosperous China can be a source of strength for the community of nations, and clearly this is a bilateral relationship of critical importance to the United States, and to China. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I welcome your questions.

Testimony of Kurt M. Campbell Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs U.S. Department of State Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific March 31, 2011 Mr. Chairman, Mr. Faleomavaega, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you very much for inviting me here today to testify about the vital importance of AsiaPacific countries to the United States and for the opportunity to underscore key aspects of our engagement strategy for the region.

I want to also use this opportunity to underscore the United States unwavering commitment to Japan. Twenty days ago today, Japan experienced a triple blow from an earthquake, tsunami, and the subsequent challenges associated with the Fukashima Daichi nuclear reactors. By themselves, any of these incidents would have been enough to bring a country to its knees. In Japan, we have seen the opposite. The Government and people have responded bravely and, with the help of the United States and the international community, committed to building an even stronger Japan in the future. Japan is the cornerstone of our strategic engagement in East Asia, and we are committed to standing side-by-side with our ally in its time of need.

It is clear that Americas success in the 21st century is tied to the success of the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. As Secretary Clinton has noted, much of the history of the 21st century will be written in Asia. There is no question that the regions influence is growing and holds the key to our shared future. Asian nations are vital to the life-blood of the global economy. Their opinions and decisions have profound influence from Latin American to the Middle East and Africa on addressing complex and emerging transnational challenges, like climate change. Despite the Asia-Pacific regions tremendous growth, the region still faces some of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century. North Korea and Burma remain outliers to the regions prosperity and continue to be sources for insecurity and instability. Many of todays most critical issues -- military competition, nuclear proliferation, violent extremism, financial crises, poverty, weak and ineffective governments, unresolved territorial disputes, growing competition over energy and natural resources, climate change, and disease -- transcend national borders and pose a common risk in the region. The rapid emergence of transnational security risks and threats demands collective action, and it is critical for the United States to work with our allies and partners in the region to address and meet these significant challenges. Essential to our long-term national interests is to make sure that the United States remains true to its identity as a Pacific power. The Obama Administration, following a long history of bipartisan commitment to Asia, has articulated a fivepart framework for our engagement in the Asia-Pacific: First, deepen and modernize our alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, (2) Thailand and the Philippines. Second, broaden our engagement with increasingly important partners like Indonesia, Vietnam, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, and most notably India. Third, develop a predictable, stable, and comprehensive relationship with China. Fourth, engage and invest in the regions burgeoning multilateral architecture. And, fifth pursue a confident and aggressive trade and economic strategy. Underpinning our strategy is a steadfast commitment to our belief in the universality of democracy and our respect for human rights. The U.S. commitment

to these values defines the unique aspect of U.S. relations with Asia-Pacific nations and is an intrinsic and indispensable aspect of our character as a nation. It is one of the best and most important contributions that we can offer the region. We are working to promote fundamental human rights in the region and support the regions own efforts to promote and protect human rights, democratic principles, and freedom of religion and of expression. In order to ensure that the promotion of human rights and the rule of law as well as the development of civil society remain strong pillars of our engagement, we will continue to adopt new and creative approaches that seize the opportunities presented by advances created in our dynamic information age. The freedom to speak ones mind and to choose ones leaders, the ability to access information and worship how one pleases are the bases of stability. The United States will continue to speak for those on the margins of society, encouraging countries in the region to respect the internationally recognized human rights of their people while undertaking policies to further liberalize and open their states. We will continue to work with countries to combat the scourge of trafficking in persons, to promote the rights of women and children, and foster greater religious dialogue among the many communities of faith in the region. We continue to press for the restoration of democracy in Fiji, as well as to promote good governance, rule of law, and respect for human rights in Vietnam and China. We have already seen positive signs reflecting greater internalization of human rights with the recent establishment of such institutions as Indonesias Bali Democracy Forum and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), which we welcomed for an official visit to the United States last November. In Burma, we have intensified efforts to promote human rights and democracy both through diplomatic engagement with key stakeholders in Southeast Asia and by delivering our message to the Burmese government via direct engagement. At the same time, we maintain extensive financial, trade, and visa sanctions that target regime authorities and their cronies who thwart democracy and disrespect human rights. Our message remains clear and consistent: absent concrete progress in key areas of democracy and human rights, our sanctions will remain in place. I will use the remainder of my testimony to describe how we are implementing this strategy through an aggressive forward-deployed diplomacy, and the steps we are taking to ensure U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific.

U.S. Strategic Framework for Engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region The pace of
our engagement in this critical region signals the renewed emphasis we place on developing and deepening partnerships. As Secretary Clinton has articulated, our forward-deployed diplomacy in Asia seeks to leverage these relationships to underwrite regional security, heighten prosperity, and support stronger democratic institutions and the spread of universal human rights in the Asia-Pacific region. The region offers the United States tremendous opportunities in a number

(3) of areas, including expanding markets for U.S. economic interests and forming new strategic partnerships. First, our alliances remain the foundation for our strategic engagement in the region, and the Obama Administration is committed to strengthening and modernizing our alliances to address both continuing and emerging challenges. Also, we must recognize that those alliances are, at their core, security alliances. . Our alliances have underwritten peace and stability for over a half-century and continue to provide a context for the regions tremendous economic growth and vitality. Our treaty alliance with Japan remains a cornerstone of our strategic engagement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan relationship is both strong and comprehensive; it links two of the worlds three largest economies and is supported by our people-to-people exchanges and our shared commitment to democracy and human rights. The cooperation between the Government of Japan and the United States in the aftermath of the March 11 events demonstrates the value of our security alliance with Japan. The United States stands resolved to assist Japan in its reconstruction efforts and to taking steps to further strengthen our alliance relationship. The pictures on the front-pages of Japanese newspapers that show U.S. military forces and Japanese soldiers working hand-in-hand to assist those in need is a potent symbol of the importance of this relationship. As we help Japan in its time of need, our two governments will continue to conduct open and direct discussions on a number of important strategic and alliance issues, including the roadmap for realigning U.S. forces in Japan. In addition, we are working to create a durable and forward-looking vision for the alliance that builds upon Japans important global role in several areas, including climate change, non-proliferation, and

humanitarian and development assistance programs. We have intensified highlevel engagement between our two governments to address regional and global security challenges, and Japan is a lead contributor to the efforts to bring reconciliation and reconstruction to Afghanistan. Secretaries Clinton and Gates look forward to hosting their Japanese counterparts this year for an important 2+2 meeting where both sides will issue a detailed framework statement for the alliance going forward. We are also working vigorously with our other critical ally in Northeast Asia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), both to modernize our defense alliance and to achieve a partnership that is truly global and comprehensive. The United States remains steadfastly committed to the defense of the ROK and to an enduring military presence on the Peninsula. The relationship continues to evolve from one solely focused on peninsular challenges to an ever more global and dynamic partnership that builds on our shared values and strategic interests. The ROK now has forces deployed overseas in over a dozen countries, with 200-to-300-person peacekeeping and reconstruction contingents in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. The ROK understands that global challenges such as counter-piracy, nuclear nonproliferation, and development fundamentally affect Koreas interests and involve an obligation to be actively engaged around the world. Our respective alliances with the ROK and Japan, as well as increasing trilateral coordination, play an essential role in maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia, including responding to the destabilizing policies and provocations of North Korea (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, DPRK). The DPRKs sinking of the ROK corvette Cheonan in March 2010, its (4) November 2010 disclosure of a uranium enrichment program, and its November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyong Island underscore the threat that the DPRKs misguided policies and provocations, including its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities, pose to regional stability and global security. Effective trilateral engagement in the wake of these provocations demonstrated to North Korea that its belligerent actions will be met with collective resolve. During an important U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Ministerial meeting in December 2010, the three countries jointly declared that the DPRKs belligerent actions threaten all three countries and will be met with solidarity. The three countries jointly condemned the DPRKs uranium enrichment program as a violation of the DPRKs commitments under the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations under UNSCR 1718 and 1874.

We have also worked closely with Japan, the ROK, and our other partners in the Six-Party Talks to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. We are working closely with our partners and allies to make clear to the DPRK that its uranium enrichment program violates its commitments and obligations. We continue to urge the international community to fully and transparently implement UNSCR 1718 and 1874 to curb the DPRKs conventional and WMD-related proliferation efforts, as well as its illicit activities. Australia remains a strategic anchor for regional stability and plays an incredibly important role in maintaining global security. U.S. and Australian forces fight sideby-side, extending a legacy of cooperation that goes back a century, and Australia is the largest non-NATO contributor to the coalition effort in Afghanistan. The U.S. commitment to Australia was on clear display during the visit of Prime Minister Gillard to Washington last month. Prime Minister Gillard had a very productive meeting with President Obama, in which they reviewed the many areas in Asia and around the world in which our two countries work together. She demonstrated Australias respect for our past joint efforts through a generous contribution to the new Vietnam Veterans Memorial education center here in Washington. In addition, Secretaries Clinton and Gates visited Australia for the 25th Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) in November. That meeting was essential to our objective of modernizing and deepening our alliance, and our two governments announced the launch of the Australia-U.S. Force Posture Review Working Group, which is now exploring the potential for expanded U.S.-Australia military cooperation to optimize our U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region. We are also working to invigorate the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan and Australia, as well as to deepen security partnerships throughout the region. Our alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, our long-time Southeast Asian treaty allies, continue to evolve to meet modern challenges from violent extremism to infectious disease. We are working closely with our Philippine partners to improve maritime security and disaster response capabilities. In January of this year, we launched the first ever joint State-DOD strategic dialogue with the Government of the Philippines to help create a framework to enhance our alliance partnership. In Thailand, our oldest treaty ally in East Asia, we partnered to deploy Thai naval vessels, with U.S. Navy personnel aboard, to join Combined Task Force-151 to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. Thailand has also provided a full battalion of peacekeepers to Darfur to assist with UN humanitarian relief operations. Our

robust and mutually beneficial military relationships with both allies include joint exercises, ship visits, information sharing, logistics assistance, and a (5) broad slate of training and capacity-building activities in such areas as peacekeeping and antipiracy operations. Second, the Obama Administration is committed to broadening our relations with growing powers like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam, and most notably India. - India: The Administration has taken significant steps to enhance our engagement with India, which is playing a key role in the Asia-Pacific. We have launched a dialogue on Asia-Pacific strategic issues, and I will travel to New Delhi next week to have further discussions and consultations. As a growing international player, engagement with India on a wide array of global issues is increasingly in the strategic interests of the United States. - Indonesia: Our engagement with Indonesia continues to mature. The Presidents historic trip to Jakarta last fall highlighted the broadening and deepening of the U.S.-Indonesia relationship. The launch of the Comprehensive Partnership by President Obama and President Yudhoyono will further boost our growing partnership on bilateral, regional, and global issues. We look forward to working with Indonesia this year in its role as ASEAN chair and host of the East Asia Summit and value its emerging, positive voice on global topics, such as democracy and climate change. - Malaysia: In addition, the Administration is working hard to enhance our bilateral relationship with Malaysia. We are in the process of launching a major Englishlanguage initiative that will place more young Americans in Malaysia to teach English and expose primarily rural Malay students to American culture. The Malaysian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Najib, has also taken a number of steps to create more stringent export controls and play a constructive role in the international non-proliferation regime. Medical personnel from the Malaysian Armed Forces are currently deployed to Afghanistan. Our two countries are also working together closely in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. - Mongolia: Recently, I visited Mongolia, an ancient country yet a relatively young

democracy on the verge of an economic boom that offers opportunities for American companies. According to some estimates, Mongolia has about $400 billion worth of minerals in the ground. Mongolia provides 190 troops to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and hosts training for peacekeeping operations. Mongolia also cooperates closely with us in international organizations such as the UN and International Atomic Energy Agency. And, Mongolia will chair the Community of Democracies starting this year. Mongolia is a reliable, democratic partner with a bright future. - Vietnam: Over the last several years, we have broadened and deepened our engagement with Vietnam on a wide ranges of issues, including trade, security, nonproliferation, health, education, and the environment. Vietnam is also among our eight negotiating partners in the TPP talks. During their meetings in Hanoi last year, Secretary Clinton and Prime Minister Dung agreed to elevate the relationship further by moving toward a strategic partnership. However, we remain deeply concerned about the lack of progress in the human rights front. We continue to make it very clear to the Vietnamese government that political freedoms are not a source of instability but of strength.

(6) - New Zealand: Last fall, Secretary Clinton visited New Zealand where she launched the Wellington Declaration. This visit effectively culminated the thaw in our relationship with New Zealand, after a 25-year freeze since the mid-1980s. New Zealand is an important friend and partner of the United States, especially in the South Pacific, and the Wellington Declaration establishes a framework for a new United States-New Zealand strategic partnership that will enhance our practical cooperation and political dialogue. Likewise, the United States and New Zealand are working to deepen our economic relationship through the TPP negotiations. In response to the tragic earthquake that struck New Zealand earlier this year, the United States deployed a USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) that included the Los Angeles County and the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue teams (USAR), transferred equipment and supplies, and committed more than $1 million for humanitarian assistance to support relief and recovery efforts.

- Singapore: The Administration is also taking steps to enhance our bilateral engagement with Singapore. In addition to being a strong partner on nonproliferation and other regional security matters, Singapore has participated in global security operations, including in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gulf of Aden counter-piracy efforts for which Singapore will chair the International Contact Group in July. Singapore is hosting the sixth round of TPP negotiations this week. Third, an important component of our efforts in the Asia Pacific is an approach to China that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to our principles and interests. Through this approach, we are pursuing a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China. As Secretary Clinton has said, the U.S.China relationship is at a critical juncture; how we manage the relationship today with its elements of both competition and cooperation will have a large impact on the future of the region. Over the past year, we have taken solid, tangible steps to translate these words into action. Through steady diplomacy, we worked with Beijing to move the relationship in a positive direction, with President Hu attending the Nuclear Security Summit in April and China voting in favor of strengthened sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council in June. The success of our approach is most clearly illustrated by President Hus January state visit to Washington. Through that visit, China for the first time expressed concern about the DPRKs uranium enrichment program; we also gained Chinese agreement to respect the results of the referendum in southern Sudan, and strengthened cooperation with the Chinese on Iran through both the P5+1 process and enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions. We also held firm to the principles that are important to us as Americans, making strong statements in both public and private about our concerns on Chinas human rights record. President Hus visit was a success in large part because of our concerted effort since the beginning of the Administration to get this relationship right in a manner that ensures U.S. interests are protected and advanced. Related to our interactions with China is our consistent approach to Taiwan. As Secretary Clinton has noted, we are encouraged by the greater dialogue and economic cooperation between the Mainland and Taiwan as witnessed by the historic completion of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement last year. Our approach continues to be guided by our One China policy based on the three joint communiqus and the Taiwan Relations Act. In the

period (7) ahead, we seek to encourage more dialogue and exchanges between the two sides, as well as reduced military tensions and deployments, and we have and will continue to meet our responsibilities under the TRA. We will continue to make clear our views on the principles of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Recent events in China, including the forced disappearances of rights lawyers and crackdowns on Chinese and foreign journalists, have only further increased our concerns about human rights. And we continue to press China for further action on the DPRKs actions in violation of the September 2005 Joint Statement and UN Security Council Resolutions, as well as the need to more tightly enforce sanctions on Iran. On the economic front, we continue to make lowering trade barriers a high priority in all our engagements with China, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), the U.S.- China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), and the G-20. Our embassy in Beijing and consulates throughout China reinforce the importance of maintaining a level playing field for U.S. companies on a regular basis and at all levels of the Chinese government. The State Department also works closely with other federal agencies to monitor China's compliance with U.S. and international trade rules. In 2010, the Department of Commerce initiated six investigations against imports from China (three antidumping and three countervailing duty) in order to provide relief for U.S. companies from unfair trade practices. Moreover, following consultations with the State Department and other Executive Branch agencies, USTR initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings against China in three separate cases. As a result of these efforts, during the December 2010 meeting of the JCCT and the January visit of President Hu, China made significant commitments on key trade issues, agreeing to ensure that Chinese government agencies use legitimate software, delink innovation policies from government procurement preferences, and include sub-central entities in its revised offer to join the WTO Government Procurement Agreement. China is a key export market for U.S. goods and services and a focus of President Obamas National Export Initiative that calls for doubling U.S. exports in five years to support millions of American jobs. In 2010, exports from the United States to China approached $92 billion, an increase of 32 percent from 2009. An important element of our engagement with China is the S&ED, which brings together cabinet members and agency heads across both of our governments, not only to discuss a range of issues critical to our bilateral

relationship, but also to inculcate the habit of cooperation across our two governments. Secretaries Clinton and Geithner will host the third S&ED in Washington in May and will build on the successes of the second S&ED last May, including cooperation in addressing the global economic crisis in the framework of the G20. In our preparation for the next S&ED, the U.S. Government will continue to press China for demonstrable progress on economic issues, including further advancements on trade and investment and full implementation of commitments it made during President Hus visit on trade, investment, and economic rebalancing, including exchange rate reform. Fourth, the Obama Administration is committed to enhancing engagement in AsiaPacific multilateral organizations. In her speech in Hawaii in January 2010, Secretary Clinton highlighted the importance of the United States involvement in the development of the regional institutions and architecture. APEC remains the premier economic organization in the Asia-Pacific region, and the United States remains committed to it. We have also taken a series of (8) steps to deepen U.S. engagement in regional institutions such as ASEAN, which the Secretary Clinton calls the fulcrum for the regions emerging architecture, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (Plus), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF). U.S. membership in the EAS will allow us to work with ASEAN and other EAS members to foster engagement on pressing strategic and political issues of mutual concern, including nuclear nonproliferation, maritime security, and disaster assistance. Last year, Secretary Clinton attended the EAS as the first-ever U.S. representative to the organization. This year, President Obama will attend the EAS in Indonesia and will focus on steps the organization can take to advance regional maritime security, capacity of countries to respond to humanitarian and natural disasters, and non-proliferation. In addition, we will seek to work with ASEAN to identify ways we can supports its Plan of Action. The President will also co-host the third U.S.-ASEAN summit, a regularized feature of our bilateral engagement with ASEAN. Regional engagement can also be an effective way to enhance our efforts to deal with transnational security challenges such as climate change, pandemics, or environmental degradation, and disaster management. Humanitarian assistance and disaster preparedness will continue to play a role in the regions economic well-being. With the cooperation of the ARF, we supported the ARF Disaster

Exercise in Indonesia earlier this month. We are looking at ways for the ARF to strengthen its capacity in managing crises, which is critically important in light of the spate of recent natural disasters that have battered the region. Another regional effort is the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), one of Secretary Clinton's signature priorities for U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia. Over the last year, the Secretary convened several meetings of the LMI with her counterparts from Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam to chart the way forward to advance shared goals for the region in environment, education, health, and infrastructure. In August 2010, I led the largest-ever U.S. delegation to the Pacific Islands Forum Post-Forum Dialogue in Vanuatu. The delegation included not only Department of State officials, but also key defense and development personnel. We plan to take an even larger delegation to the 2011 meeting this September in Auckland to demonstrate our whole-of-government approach to addressing shared concerns in the Pacific. Building on the urgent request for support from the Pacific Small Island States, we have committed funds specifically for climate adaptation projects and related programs in Pacific Island countries. To help administer these new programs, USAID is finalizing plans for a new office in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea this year. Funding to address climate adaptation will be an essential component of our strategy and a critical element in the regional effort both to meet increasingly severe climate-related challenges and to maintain American preeminence in a region wooed by other suitors with deep pockets. In this regard, the Compact of Free Association between the United States and Palau is a vital component of our growing presence and engagement in the Western Pacific. Our existing defense arrangement with Palau makes a valuable contribution to U.S. and international security. The Administration has submitted to the Congress legislation covering the results of the recently concluded fifteen-year review of the Compact. Enacting the proposed legislation will uphold our partnership under the Compact, underscore the United States renewed (9) commitment to the region, and keep Palau allied with the United States at a time when other, international interests are aggressively courting Pacific Island countries. Fifth, we are pursuing an aggressive economic and trade agenda in Asia. 2011 is a year of consequence for the United States to demonstrate economic leadership in the region and shape the agenda for future years to accelerate regional economic integration. We are taking a three-pronged approach to driving successful

engagement with the region: securing ratification of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, achieving milestone progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, and concluding a successful APEC host year. Today, the 21 APEC economies, with approximately 2.7 billion consumers, purchase almost 60 percent of U.S. goods exports. Seven of the United States top fifteen trading partners are in APEC. Strong Asian participation in APEC, the WTO, and the G-20 reflects the increasing importance of Asian economies and their centrality to strengthening the multilateral trading system and sustaining our own economic recovery. We must ensure our competitiveness in this vital region and promote continued integration of the U.S. economy with APEC economies, which will benefit workers, consumers, and businesses in the region and create jobs back here in the United States. The region is essential to the success of President Obamas National Export Initiative, and our goal of doubling U.S. exports by 2015 to create new American jobs. In the first year of the National Export Initiative, U.S. exports to APEC members grew much faster than U.S. exports to the rest of the world (non-APEC member economies). U.S exports to APEC economies last year totaled $774 billion, up 25 percent from 2009, while U.S. exports to non-APEC member economies grew only about 15 percent to reach $503 billion. We are working with governments in the region to ensure an environment in which this trend can continue. As we seek to achieve the Presidents goal of doubling exports over the next five years, a tremendously important concrete step toward reaching this goal is the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). In December the Administration achieved important new commitments from the Koreans on outstanding issues that will level the playing field for U.S. automakers and autoworkers, and the Administration will submit the agreement to Congress soon. This agreement represents a major accomplishment for both countries and is an historic opportunity to boost exports, create jobs, and bolster our economy. It eliminates tariffs on 95 percent of U.S. consumer and industrial exports to Korea within five years and significantly reduces tariffs on our agricultural exports to Korea. KORUS is expected to increase exports of American goods by up to $11 billion based on the tariff cuts alone of KORUS and to support at least 70,000 additional jobs on the U.S. side alone. In addition, this agreement will support many more American jobs by opening Koreas $580 billion services market to U.S. companies in express

delivery, telecommunications, insurance, and other services industries. The economic benefits for the ROK are also considerable. This trade agreement will deliver immediate, significant economic benefits, but will also deepen our engagement and strengthen our partnership with a central ally in a volatile and rapidly growing region. In strategic terms, it will underscore our commitment to prosperity and security in the Asia Pacific and fortify our leadership role and influence in the region. Another important pathway to expanding U.S. economic engagement in Asia, and increasing U.S. exports to dynamic Asian markets, is the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, or TPP. The nine (10) APEC economies involved Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States represent almost 40 percent of APECs total goods and services exports. With these economies we are negotiating a new template for a high-quality, high ambition, 21st century trade agreement. This is a strategic agreement that is central to enhancing the 21st century supply chain and new economies of IT and green growth, and one that supports high labor standards and the environment. We have now had a number of rounds of TPP negotiations, and we look forward to working in partnership with Congress as we continue towards realizing this important agreement. And, in 2011, the United States is hosting APEC for the first time in 18 years, providing us with unique opportunities to demonstrate our commitment to and engagement in the region and to shape the organizations agenda in ways that reflect our values, promote regional economic integration, and create opportunities for U.S. businesses and workers in this dynamic region. The first round of Senior Officials Meetings took place here in Washington earlier this month, and we will have a busy APEC schedule as we build to the APEC Leaders Meeting, which President Obama will host in Hawaii in November. We have set an ambitious agenda that challenges APEC to maximize tangible, practical results, particularly in the area of removing trade barriers, promoting green growth, and building regulatory convergence among APEC economies. To that end, the President has laid out three priority areas to guide APECs agenda in 2011 to build towards a seamless regional economy: (1) strengthening regional economic integration and expanding trade; (2) promoting green growth; and (3) expanding regulatory cooperation and advancing regulatory convergence. We are looking to conclude specific and ambitious initiatives in each of these three priority areas this year. We want to ensure that APEC will continue to benefit American businesses, especially

small and medium size enterprises, and will remain focused on specific, practical outcomes. Through APEC, we can continue to advance regional economic integration, and by reducing barriers to trade and investment in the region, we can increase U.S. exports and support jobs at home at the same time.

American leadership in the Asia-Pacific is essential to our long-term national interests. The Administration is committed to investing in and playing an engaged and active role in the region.The shift of geopolitical forces from the West to the East is a defining feature of the 21st centurys international landscape and Asia will be the main stage for these transformations. These changes will present both tremendous challenges and opportunities for the United States. We are committed to meeting these challenges and seizing opportunities through high-intensity and comprehensive engagement. We have demonstrated to the region that as a global power, we can walk and chew gum at the same time. We can, and will continue to be forced to, juggle multiple challenges at once. We are committed to taking steps to further strengthen our linkages to the Asia-Pacific region to ensure the preservation and promotion of our interests. I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and with Members of this Subcommittee and Congress to seek opportunities to influence positively the future direction of the region to deliver more benefit to more of our people. Thank you for extending this opportunity to me to testify today on this vitally important issue. I am happy to respond to any questions you may have. N.B., Numbers in brackets are referred to original pages.

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U.S. Policy toward Burma: Its Impact and Effectiveness Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs September 30, 2009 Hearings Testimony of David C. Williams Executive Director, Center for Constitutional Democracy John S. Hastings Professor of Law Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Page 2 of 7 Chairman Webb, Senator Inhofe, I thank you for the opportunity to testify during this second anniversary of the Saffron Revolution. Chairman Webb, please let me congratulate you on your trip to Southeast Asia. I am grateful that you want to consider the many ways that the US might promote democracy in Burma, beyond just the issue of sanctions. Finally, and on a more personal note, please let me thank you for trying to secure the release of Le Cong Dinh, who is the secretary general of the Democratic Party of Vietnam. I advise the DPV on constitutional reform. Dinh hosted my family for a two week visit in the spring, and on the day we left, he was arrested and remains in prison. We pray for his well-being and thank you for your efforts. But we are here to talk about Burma, not Vietnam, which is a very different place. And when thinking about US policy toward Burma, it is important to focus on the realities, even when they are uncomfortable. I would like to highlight two realities that I know from personal experience. Here is the first reality: the SPDC is committing mass atrocities against the ethnic minorities. I know this because I advise many of the ethnic groups on constitutional reform, and Ive spent a lot of time with them, witnessing conditions on the ground. Here is the second reality: even if the 2010 elections are free and fair, which they wont be, they wont bring about civilian rule because the constitution does not provide for it--a partially civilian government, yes, but civilian rule, no. I teach constitutional law, and I consult in a number of countries, and this is one of the worst constitutions I have ever seen. The SPDC has done a good job of disguising what theyve done, but underneath the attractive labeling, there is a blueprint for continued military rule. Regarding the ethnic minorities, when you leave Rangoon and get up into the hills, things seem very different. I work a lot with the Karen, who are the Scots-Irish of Southeast Asia.1 They are a hill people, musical, clannish, and tough. They have long been dominated by a distant government, which they have learned to distrust. As a group, they are the gentlest and most loving people I know. But all of them were born fighting, because their government is slaughtering them as we speak. And they need our help. Burmas problems began in ethnic conflict, and they will continue until the underlying issues are addressed. Some people seem to think that Burmas struggle is between one woman, Aung San Suu Kyi, who wants democracy, and one man, Than Shwe, who doesnt. But even if democracy comes to Burma, the troubles will not end until the needs and demands of the minorities have been answered. The resistance groups are not strong enough to overthrow the regime, but the regime is not strong enough to crush the resistance. Conditions in central Burma are bad, but in the ethnic areas there is suffering on a biblical scale, in every way comparable to Darfur. The military is making war on a

For more on the Scots-Irish, see James Webb, Born Fighting: How the Scots-Irish Shaped America (2005).

Page 3 of 7 civilian population, and its actions likely constitute crimes against humanity. The United Nations has found that soldiers routinely commit rape with impunity, and rape appears to be a policy for population control.2 By one UN estimate, officers commit 83% of these rapes, and 61% are gang rapes.3 When outsiders try to investigate, officers commonly threaten to cut the tongues and slice the throats of any villager who speaks to them.4 But these bald statistics cannot tell the human dimension of the suffering; reading the individual accounts is excruciating. As just one example: Ms. Naang Khin, aged 22, and her sister, Ms. Naang Lam, aged 19, were reportedly raped by a patrol of SPDC troops . . . when they were reaping rice at their farm . . . Their father was tied to a tree. Afterwards, the two sisters were taken to a forest by the troops. Their dead bodies were found by villagers some days later dumped in a hole.5 The Tatmadaw also uses forced labor6 and is probably the greatest conscriptor of child soldiers in the world.7 The military does not generally attack the armed resistance forces; instead, it burns or mortars villages, over 3000 villages since 1996.8 And this has been going on for years, creating one of the worst refugee crises in the worldone million plus between 1996 and 2006 and one half million still displaced today.9 One woman had to run for days through the jungle immediately after giving birth, carrying her baby in her arms. That baby grew up, got an American law degree, and she is now a research fellow in my Center. And she is a miracle of survival. China cannot ignore the ethnic minorities, because it has had to deal with a wave of refugees, driven there by the SPDCs attacks. Beijing publicly rebuked the regime for creating regional instability, which of course would be grounds for Security Council intervention. In other words, on this point, China and the US appear to be on the same page with respect to Burma: we all want the attacks to end. So what policy recommendations follow from this reality? First, the US should supply humanitarian aid not just through Rangoon but also across the borders to the ethnic minority areas. The programs in central Burma cannot get out into the hills, and as a result, the people who are suffering the most are receiving the least. Second, the State Department has told us that the regime wants closer relations and will appoint an interlocutor. But if we are going to enter dialogue with the junta, we must

See Crimes in Burma: A Report by International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School at 5164. This definitive report analyzes and synthesizes the United Nations reports documenting human rights abuses in Burma. 3 See id. at 59. 4 See id. at 60. 5 See id. at 55. 6 See id. at 15-16. 7 See Human Rights Watch, My Gun was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma (2002). 8 See Crimes in Burma, supra note 1, at 40. 9 See id.

Page 4 of 7 first demand an immediate end to the attacks on civilian populations. Otherwise, we will be directly dealing with murderers still in the midst of a killing spree. Third, Burma will never know peace or justice until there are trilateral talks between the SPDC, the democracy forces, and the ethnic minorities. The international community has long known this truth, but the regime has proved unwilling. If we are going to open dialogue with the regime, we must insist that they engage not just with the NLD but also with the minorities. My second subject is the 2010 elections. We all would like to hope that they will usher in a new era of possibility. But in fact, they wont bring peace or civilian rule. The runup to the elections has already brought more violence, not less. Overwhelmingly, the resistance armies have rejected the SPDCs demand that they become border guard units after the elections, and the SPDC has responded by attacking the Kokang. The conflict will only increase when the regime moves against larger groups: we will soon see fighting with the United Wa State Army, the Kachin Independence Army, and others. We know for a fact that the Burmese military is gearing up for offensives around the country and that the resistance groups are getting ready to resist attacks. The mountains will run with blood. So the elections wont bring peace; they also wont bring civilian rule. Some think that we should try to ensure that the elections are free and fairbut that really matters only if the elections will actually lead to civilian rule, which they wont. The constitution allows the Tatmadaw to keep however much control it likes. I clerked for Ruth Bader Ginsburg years ago, and she always taught us to read laws very closely. This constitution bears particularly close reading, because it is much worse than is generally reported. A lot of people worry that the Tatmadaw will dominate the government because they will appoint 25% of the various legislative bodies. But theres a much bigger problem: under the constitution, the the Tatmadaw is not subject to civilian government, and it writes its own portfolio. It can do whatever it wants. The Constitution guarantees the power of the Tatmadaw in its section on Basic Principlesa clear sign that the framers thought the role of the Defence Services to be fundamental. Article 20(b) provides that the military will run its own show without being answerable to anyone: The Defence Services has [sic] the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces. The constitution defines the affairs of the armed forces so broadly as to encompass anything that the Tatmadaw might want to do. Article 6(f) provides that among the Unions consistent objectives is enabling the Defence Services to participate in the National political leadership role of the State. Article 20(e) further assigns the Tatmadaw primary responsibility for safeguarding the non-disintegration of the Union, the non-disintegration of National solidarity and the perpetuation of sovereignty. This regime has frequently found a threat to National solidarity when people merely disagree with it; it is prepared to slaughter peacefully protesting monks. There is no reason to think that after 2010, the Tatmadaw will think differently.

Page 5 of 7

Because the Tatmadaws responsibilities are so broadly and vaguely defined, the question of who will have the power to interpret their scope is critical. The constitution answers that question clearly: the Tatmadaw will have the power to determine the powers of the Tatmadaw. Article 20(f) assigns the Tatmadaw primary responsibility for safeguarding the Constitution. But if the military is the principal protector of the constitution, then the military will presumably have the final authority to determine its meaning, so as to know what to protect. And indeed, Article 46 implicitly confirms this conclusion: it gives the Constitutional Tribunal power to declare legislative and executive actions unconstitutional, but it conspicuously omits the power to declare military actions unconstitutional. In other words, the Tatmadaw has the final authority to interpret the scope of its own constitutional responsibilities. Most first year law students have read a famous portion of Bishop Hoadlys Sermon, preached before the King in 1717: Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first spoke or wrote them.10 And under the Burmese constitution, the Tatmadaw will be truly the lawgiver, not the people elected in 2010. The Constitution further ensures that the Tatmadaw will have the power to control the citizenry on a day-to-day basis. Under Article 232(b)(ii), the Commander-in-Chief will appoint the Ministers for Defence, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs. The militarys control over home affairs is especially ominous because it gives the Defence Services broad power over the lives of ordinary citizens in their daily lives. The militarys control over Home Affairs (as well as Defence and Border Affairs) will constitute a military fiefdom, not part of the civilian government in any meaningful sense. The Commander-in-Chief will have power to name the ministers without interference from any civilian official. The President may not reject the Commander-inChiefs names; he must submit the list to the legislature. See Article 232(c). The legislature may reject those names only if they do not meet the formal qualifications for being a minister, such as age and residence. See Article 232(d). Theoretically, the legislature could impeach those ministers under Article 233, but the Commander-in-Chief would merely re-appoint a new minister acceptable to him. In addition, these ministers will continue to serve in the military, so they will be under orders from the Commander-in-Chief, not from the President. See Article 232(j)(ii). In other words, the Commander-in-Chief will be administering home affairs, immune from interference by the civilian government. Theoreticallyagainthe legislature might try to pass statutes controlling the Tatmadaw, but recall again--that under Article 20(b), the Tatmadaw has the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces. The independent power of the Tatmadaw over ordinary citizens includes the power to impose military discipline on the entire population. Article 20 provides: The Defence

See Choper, Fallon, Kamisar, and Shiffrin, Constitutional Law: Cases CommentsQuestions, page 1 (Ninth Edition 2001).

Page 6 of 7 Services has the right to administer for participation of the entire people in Union security and defence. In other words, the military may forcibly enlist the whole citizenry into a militia so as to maintain internal security. And, again, the civilian government has no control over the militarys operations. After the elections, Burma will be a military dictatorship just as much as now. In short, during normal times, the Tatmadaw has constitutional power to do anything it wants without interference from the civilian government. But if it ever tires of the civilian government, it can declare a state of emergency and send everyone else home. On this subject, the constitution uses a bait and switch approach: in one section, it creates a process for declaring a state of emergency in which the civilian government will have a role; but in another section, it specifies that the military may re-take power entirely on its own initiative. Thus, in Chapter XI, the constitution provides for the declaration of a state of emergency in which the military would assume all powers of government, see Article 419, but it would require presidential agreement before the fact, see Article 417, as well as legislative ratification afterwards, see Article 421. But in Chapter I on Basic Principles, Article 40(c) provides for a very different, alternative process in which the Commander-in-Chief can act at his own discretion: If there arises a state of emergency that could cause disintegration of the Union, disintegration of national solidarity and loss of sovereign power or attempts therefore by wrongful forcible means such as insurgency or violence, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services has the right to take over and exercise State sovereign power in accord with the provisions of this Constitution . (emphasis supplied). To be sure, the Tatmadaw may seize power only if national solidarity is threatened, but as already shown, the military has unreviewable authority to decide whether such a threat exists. In other words, the Tatmadaw can seize control just as it did in 1962, and this time it will be legal. The whole constitution is based on a wait and see strategy: if the civilian government does what the Tatmadaw wants, then it will be allowed to rule; if not, then not. This constitution is not a good faith gesture toward democracy; its a cynical attempt to buy off international pressure. So what policy recommendations follow from this reality? We should certainly try to ensure that the elections are free and fair, unlike the referendum on the constitution, if the regime will permit us. But our greatest focus should be on constitutional change, so that someday Burma might witness civilian rule. That change should occur before the elections, but if it must wait until after, then we should hold the SPDC to its word: it has always claimed that it could not negotiate with the opposition because it was only a transitional governmentfor twenty years. After the elections, that excuse will be gone. If the US opens dialogue with the regime, it must demand that the regime simultaneously open dialogue with its own citizens. But in order to make demands, we must be able to give the regime something. If we relax sanctions now, rather than in response to real progress, then we will have that much less to offeras Secretary Clinton and the sixtysix co-sponsors of the sanctions have recognized. And let us speak plainly: if we try to compete with China for influence over a military autocracy, we will always be at a

Page 7 of 7 disadvantage because there are some things we just wont do. We win only if we can shift the game, only if through multilateral diplomacy we can get the regime to stop killing its people and to allow civilian rule. Making premature concessions wont shift the game; it will only give the game away.

The Constitution of Japan

based on the English Edition by Government Printing Bureau


Chapter I. The Emperor (Article 1-8) Chapter II. Renunciation of War (Article 9) Chapter III. Rights and Duties of the People (Article 10-40) Chapter IV. The Diet (Article 41-64) Chapter V. The Cabinet (Article 65-75) Chapter VI. Judiciary (Article 76-82) Chapter VII. Finance (Article 83-91) Chapter VIII. Local Self-Government (Article 92-95) Chapter IX. Amendments (Article 96) Chapter X. Supreme Law (Article 97-99) Chapter XI. Supplementary Provisions (Article 100-103)

I rejoice that the foundation for the construction of a new Japan has been laid according to the will of the Japanese people, and hereby sanction and promulgate the amendments of the Imperial Japanese Constitution effected following the consultation with the Privy Council and the decision of the Imperial Diet made in accordance with Article 73 of the said Constitution. Signed : HIROHITO, Seal of the Emperor This third day of the eleventh month of the twenty-first year of Showa (November 3, 1946)

Countersigned: Prime Minister and concurrently Minister for Foreign Affairs YOSHIDA Shigeru Minister of State Baron SHIDEHARA Kijuro Minister of Justice KIMURA Tokutaro Minister for Home Affairs OMURA Seiichi Minister of Education. TANAKA Kotaro Minister of Agriculture and Forestry WADA Hiroo Minister of State SAITO Takao Minister of Communications HITOTSUMATSU Sadayoshi Minister of Commerce and Industry HOSHIJIMA Niro Minister of Welfare KAWAI Yoshinari Minister of State UEHARA Etsujiro Minister of Transportation HIRATSUKA Tsunejiro Minister of Finance ISHIBASHI Tanzan Minister of State KANAMORI Tokujiro Minister of State ZEN Keinosuke

The Constitution of Japan

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

Chapter I. The Emperor

Article 1.The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power. Article 2.The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the Imperial House Law passed by the Diet. Article 3.The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor. Article 4.The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government. (2) The Emperor may delegate the performance of his acts in matters of state as may be provided by law. Article 5.When, in accordance with the Imperial House Law, a Regency is established, the Regent shall perform his acts in matters of state in the Emperor's name. In this case, paragraph one of the preceding article will be applicable. Article 6.The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as designated by the Diet. (2) The Emperor shall appoint the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet. Article 7.The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following acts in matters of state on behalf of the people: 1. Promulgation of amendments of the constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties. 2. Convocation of the Diet. 3. Dissolution of the House of Representatives. 4. Proclamation of general election of members of the Diet. 5. Attestation of the appointment and dismissal of Ministers of State and other officials as provided for by law, and of full powers and credentials of Ambassadors and Ministers. 6. Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights. 7. Awarding of honors. 8. Attestation of instruments of ratification and other diplomatic documents as provided for by law.

9. Receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers. 10. Performance of ceremonial functions. Article 8.No property can be given to, or received by, the Imperial House, nor can any gifts be made therefrom, without the authorization of the Diet.

Chapter II. Renunciation of War

Article 9.Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Chapter III. Rights and Duties of the People

Article 10.The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law. Article 11.The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights. Article 12.The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare. Article 13.All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. Article 14.All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin. (2) Peers and peerage shall not be recognized. (3) No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction, nor shall any such award be valid beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it. Article 15.The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them. (2) All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof. (3) Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials. (4) In all elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be answerable, publicly or privately, for the choice he has made. Article 16.Every person shall have the right of peaceful petition for the redress of damage, for the removal of public officials, for the enactment, repeal or amendment of laws, ordinances or regulations and for other matters; nor shall any person be in any way discriminated against for sponsoring such a petition.

Article 17.Every person may sue for redress as provided by law from the State or a public entity, in case he has suffered damage through illegal act of any public official. Article 18.No person shall be held in bondage of any kind. Involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, is prohibited. Article 19.Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated. Article 20.Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. (2) No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice. (3) The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity. Article 21.Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. (2) No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated. Article 22.Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare. (2) Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of their nationality shall be inviolate. Article 23.Academic freedom is guaranteed. Article 24.Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis. (2) With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes. Article 25.All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living. (2) In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health. Article 26.All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability, as provided by law. (2) All people shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law. Such compulsory education shall be free. Article 27.All people shall have the right and the obligation to work. (2) Standards for wages, hours, rest and other working conditions shall be fixed by law. (3) Children shall not be exploited. Article 28.The right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively is guaranteed. Article 29.The right to own or to hold property is inviolable. (2) Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare. (3) Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation therefor. Article 30.The people shall be liable to taxation as provided by law. Article 31.No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law. Article 32.No person shall be denied the right of access to the courts.

Article 33.No person shall be apprehended except upon warrant issued by a competent judicial officer which specifies the offense with which the person is charged, unless he is apprehended, the offense being committed. Article 34.No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once informed of the charges against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel; nor shall he be detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of any person such cause must be immediately shown in open court in his presence and the presence of his counsel. Article 35.The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects against entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued for adequate cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized, or except as provided by Article 33. (2) Each search or seizure shall be made upon separate warrant issued by a competent judicial officer. Article 36.The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel punishments are absolutely forbidden. Article 37.In all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal. (2) He shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses, and he shall have the right of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his behalf at public expense. (3) At all times the accused shall have the assistance of competent counsel who shall, if the accused is unable to secure the same by his own efforts, be assigned to his use by the State. Article 38.No person shall be compelled to testify against himself. (2) Confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention shall not be admitted in evidence. (3) No person shall be convicted or punished in cases where the only proof against him is his own confession. Article 39.No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in double jeopardy. Article 40.Any person, in case he is acquitted after he has been arrested or detained, may sue the State for redress as provided by law.

Chapter IV. The Diet

Article 41.The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole lawmaking organ of the State. Article 42.The Diet shall consist of two Houses, namely the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. Article 43.Both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people. (2) The number of the members of each House shall be fixed by law. Article 44.The qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors shall be fixed by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property or income.

Article 45.The term of office of members of the House of Representatives shall be four years. However, the term shall be terminated before the full term is up in case the House of Representatives is dissolved. Article 46.The term of office of members of the House of Councillors shall be six years, and election for half the members shall take place every three years. Article 47.Electoral districts, method of voting and other matters pertaining to the method of election of members of both Houses shall be fixed by law. Article 48.No person shall be permitted to be a member of both Houses simultaneously. Article 49.Members of both Houses shall receive appropriate annual payment from the national treasury in accordance with law. Article 50.Except in cases provided by law, members of both Houses shall be exempt from apprehension while the Diet is in session, and any members apprehended before the opening of the session shall be freed during the term of the session upon demand of the House. Article 51.Members of both Houses shall not be held liable outside the House for speeches, debates or votes cast inside the House. Article 52.An ordinary session of the Diet shall be convoked once per year. Article 53.The Cabinet may determine to convoke extraordinary sessions of the Diet. When a quarter or more of the total members of either House makes the demand, the Cabinet must determine on such convocation. Article 54.When the House of Representatives is dissolved, there must be a general election of members of the House of Representatives within forty (40) days from the date of dissolution, and the Diet must be convoked within thirty (30) days from the date of the election. (2) When the House of Representatives is dissolved, the House of Councillors is closed at the same time. However, the Cabinet may in time of national emergency convoke the House of Councillors in emergency session. (3) Measures taken at such session as mentioned in the proviso of the preceding paragraph shall be provisional and shall become null and void unless agreed to by the House of Representatives within a period of ten (10) days after the opening of the next session of the Diet. Article 55.Each House shall judge disputes related to qualifications of its members. However, in order to deny a seat to any member, it is necessary to pass a resolution by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present. Article 56.Business cannot be transacted in either House unless one-third or more of total membership is present. (2) All matters shall be decided, in each House, by a majority of those present, except as elsewhere provided in the Constitution, and in case of a tie, the presiding officer shall decide the issue. Article 57.Deliberation in each House shall be public. However, a secret meeting may be held where a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present passes a resolution therefor. (2) Each House shall keep a record of proceedings. This record shall be published and given general circulation, excepting such parts of proceedings of secret session as may be deemed to require secrecy.

(3) Upon demand of one-fifth or more of the members present, votes of members on any matter shall be recorded in the minutes. Article 58.Each House shall select its own president and other officials. (2) Each House shall establish its rules pertaining to meetings, proceedings and internal discipline, and may punish members for disorderly conduct. However, in order to expel a member, a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present must pass a resolution thereon. Article 59.A bill becomes a law on passage by both Houses, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution. (2) A bill which is passed by the House of Representatives, and upon which the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present. (3) The provision of the preceding paragraph does not preclude the House of Representatives from calling for the meeting of a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law. (4) Failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within sixty (60) days after receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives, time in recess excepted, may be determined by the House of Representatives to constitute a rejection of the said bill by the House of Councillors. Article 60.The budget must first be submitted to the House of Representatives. (2) Upon consideration of the budget, when the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, and when no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or in the case of failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within thirty (30) days, the period of recess excluded, after the receipt of the budget passed by the House of Representatives, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet. Article 61.The second paragraph of the preceding article applies also to the Diet approval required for the conclusion of treaties. Article 62.Each House may conduct investigations in relation to government, and may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and the production of records. Article 63.The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State may, at any time, appear in either House for the purpose of speaking on bills, regardless of whether they are members of the House or not. They must appear when their presence is required in order to give answers or explanations. Article 64.The Diet shall set up an impeachment court from among the members of both Houses for the purpose of trying those judges against whom removal proceedings have been instituted. (2) Matters relating to impeachment shall be provided by law.

Chapter V. The Cabinet

Article 65.Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet. Article 66.The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be its head, and other Ministers of State, as provided for by law.

(2) The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians. (3) The Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the Diet. Article 67.The Prime Minister shall be designated from among the members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet. This designation shall precede all other business. (2) If the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors disagree and if no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or the House of Councillors fails to make designation within ten (10) days, exclusive of the period of recess, after the House of Representatives has made designation, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet. Article 68.The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However, a majority of their number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet. (2) The Prime Minister may remove the Ministers of State as he chooses. Article 69.If the House of Representatives passes a non-confidence resolution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten (10) days. Article 70.When there is a vacancy in the post of Prime Minister, or upon the first convocation of the Diet after a general election of members of the House of Representatives, the Cabinet shall resign en masse. Article 71.In the cases mentioned in the two preceding articles, the Cabinet shall continue its functions until the time when a new Prime Minister is appointed. Article 72.The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, submits bills, reports on general national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet and exercises control and supervision over various administrative branches. Article 73.The Cabinet, in addition to other general administrative functions, shall perform the following functions: 1. Administer the law faithfully; conduct affairs of state. 2. Manage foreign affairs. 3. Conclude treaties. However, it shall obtain prior or, depending on circumstances, subsequent approval of the Diet. 4. Administer the civil service, in accordance with standards established by law. 5. Prepare the budget, and present it to the Diet. 6. Enact cabinet orders in order to execute the provisions of this Constitution and of the law. However, it cannot include penal provisions in such cabinet orders unless authorized by such law. 7. Decide on general amnesty, special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights. Article 74.All laws and cabinet orders shall be signed by the competent Minister of State and countersigned by the Prime Minister. Article 75.The Ministers of State, during their tenure of office, shall not be subject to legal action without the consent of the Prime Minister. However, the right to take that action is not impaired hereby.

Chapter VI. Judiciary

Article 76.The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law. (2) No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial power. (3) All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution and the laws. Article 77.The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making power under which it determines the rules of procedure and of practice, and of matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts and the administration of judicial affairs. (2) Public procurators shall be subject to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. (3) The Supreme Court may delegate the power to make rules for inferior courts to such courts. Article 78.Judges shall not be removed except by public impeachment unless judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform official duties. No disciplinary action against judges shall be administered by any executive organ or agency. Article 79.The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of judges as may be determined by law; all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be appointed by the Cabinet. (2) The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) years, and in the same manner thereafter. (3) In cases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, when the majority of the voters favors the dismissal of a judge, he shall be dismissed. (4) Matters pertaining to review shall be prescribed by law. (5) The judges of the Supreme Court shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law. (6) All such judges shall receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office. Article 80.The judges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court. All such judges shall hold office for a term of ten (10) years with privilege of reappointment, provided that they shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law. (2) The judges of the inferior courts shall receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office. Article 81.The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act. Article 82.Trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly. (2) Where a court unanimously determines publicity to be dangerous to public order or morals, a trial may be conducted privately, but trials of political offenses, offenses involving the press or cases wherein the rights of people as guaranteed in Chapter III of this Constitution are in question shall always be conducted publicly.

Chapter VII. Finance

Article 83.The power to administer national finances shall be exercised as the Diet shall determine. Article 84.No new taxes shall be imposed or existing ones modified except by law or under such conditions as law may prescribe. Article 85.No money shall be expended, nor shall the State obligate itself, except as authorized by the Diet. Article 86.The Cabinet shall prepare and submit to the Diet for its consideration and decision a budget for each fiscal year. Article 87.In order to provide for unforeseen deficiencies in the budget, a reserve fund may be authorized by the Diet to be expended upon the responsibility of the Cabinet. (2) The Cabinet must get subsequent approval of the Diet for all payments from the reserve fund. Article 88.All property of the Imperial Household shall belong to the State. All expenses of the Imperial Household shall be appropriated by the Diet in the budget. Article 89.No public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public authority. Article 90.Final accounts of the expenditures and revenues of the State shall be audited annually by a Board of Audit and submitted by the Cabinet to the Diet, together with the statement of audit, during the fiscal year immediately following the period covered. (2) The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall be determined by law. Article 91.At regular intervals and at least annually the Cabinet shall report to the Diet and the people on the state of national finances.

Chapter VIII. Local Self-Government

Article 92.Regulations concerning organization and operations of local public entities shall be fixed by law in accordance with the principle of local autonomy. Article 93.The local public entities shall establish assemblies as their deliberative organs, in accordance with law. (2) The chief executive officers of all local public entities, the members of their assemblies, and such other local officials as may be determined by law shall be elected by direct popular vote within their several communities. Article 94.Local public entities shall have the right to manage their property, affairs and administration and to enact their own regulations within law. Article 95.A special law, applicable only to one local public entity, cannot be enacted by the Diet without the consent of the majority of the voters of the local public entity concerned, obtained in accordance with law.

Chapter IX. Amendments

Article 96.Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.

(2) Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.

Chapter X. Supreme Law

Article 97.The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate. Article 98.This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. (2) The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed. Article 99.The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution.

Chapter XI. Supplementary Provisions

Article 100.This Constitution shall be enforced as from the day when the period of six months will have elapsed counting from the day of its promulgation. (2) The enactment of laws necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution, the election of members of the House of Councillors and the procedure for the convocation of the Diet and other preparatory procedures necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution may be executed before the day prescribed in the preceding paragraph. Article 101.If the House of Councillors is not constituted before the effective date of this Constitution, the House of Representatives shall function as the Diet until such time as the House of Councillors shall be constituted. Article 102.The term of office for half the members of the House of Councillors serving in the first term under this Constitution shall be three years. Members falling under this category shall be determined in accordance with law. Article 103.The Ministers of State, members of the House of Representatives, and judges in office on the effective date of this Constitution, and all other public officials who occupy positions corresponding to such positions as are recognized by this Constitution shall not forfeit their positions automatically on account of the enforcement of this Constitution unless otherwise specified by law. When, however, successors are elected or appointed under the provisions of this Constitution, they shall forfeit their positions as a matter of course.

The Constitution of the Empire of Japan

Translated by Ito Miyoji.


Chapter I. The Emperor (Article 1-17) Chapter II. Rights and Duties of Subjects (Article 18-32) Chapter III. The Imperial Diet (Article 33-54) Chapter IV. The Misters of State and the Privy Council (Article 55-56) Chapter V. The Judicature (Article 57-61) Chapter VI. Finance (Article 62-72) Chapter VII. Supplementary Rules (Article 73-76)

Imperial Oath at the Sanctuary of the Imperial Palace

We, the Successor to the prosperous Throne of Our Predecessors, do humbly and solemnly swear to the Imperial Founder of Our House and to Our other Imperial Ancestors that, in pursuance of a great policy co-extensive with the Heavens and with the Earth, We shall maintain and secure from decline the ancient form of government. In consideration of the progressive tendency of the course of human affairs and in parallel with the advance of civilization, We deem it expedient, in order to give clearness and distinctness to the instructions bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of Our House and by Our other Imperial Ancestors, to establish fundamental laws formulated into express provisions of law, so that, on the one hand, Our Imperial posterity may possess an express guide for the course they are to follow, and that, on the other, Our subjects shall thereby be enabled to enjoy a wider range of action in giving Us their support, and that the observance of Our laws shall continue to the remotest ages of time. We will thereby to give greater firmness to the stability of Our country and to promote the welfare of all the people within the boundaries of Our dominions; and We now establish the Imperial House Law and the Constitution. These Laws come to only an exposition of grand precepts for the conduct of the government, bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of Our House and by Our other Imperial Ancestors. That we have been so fortunate in Our reign, in keeping with the tendency of the times, as to accomplish this work, We owe to the glorious Spirits of the Imperial Founder of Our House and of Our other Imperial Ancestors. We now reverently make Our prayer to Them and to Our Illustrious Father, and implore the help of Their Sacred Spirits, and make to Them solemn oath never at this time nor in the future to fail to be an example to our subjects in the observance of the Laws hereby established. May the Heavenly Spirits witness this Our solemn Oath.

Imperial Speech on the Promulgation of the Constitution

Whereas We make it the joy and glory of Our heart to behold the prosperity of Our country, and the welfare of Our subjects, We do hereby, in virtue of the supreme power We inherit from Our Imperial Ancestors, promulgate the present immutable fundamental law, for the sake of Our present subjects and their descendants. The Imperial Founder of Our House and Our other Imperial Ancestors, by the help and support of the forefathers of Our subjects, laid the foundation of Our Empire upon a basis, which is to last forever. That this brilliant achievement embellishes the annals of Our country, is due to the glorious virtues of Our Sacred Imperial Ancestors, and to the loyalty and bravery of Our subjects, their love of their country and their public spirit. Considering that Our subjects are the descendants of the loyal and good subjects of Our Imperial Ancestors, We doubt not but that Our subjects will be guided by Our views, and will sympathize with all Our endeavours, and that, harmoniously cooperating together, they will share with Us Our hope of making manifest the glory of Our country, both at home and abroad, and of securing forever the stability of the work bequeathed to Us by Our Imperial Ancestors.

The Constitution of the Empire of Japan

Having, by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give development to the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favoured with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors; and hoping to maintain the prosperity of the State, in concert with Our people and with their support, We hereby promulgate, in pursuance of Our Imperial Rescript of the 12th day of the 10th month of the 14th year of Meiji, a fundamental law of the State, to exhibit the principles, by which We are guided in Our conduct, and to point out to what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform. The right of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants. Neither We nor they shall in future fail to wield them, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution hereby granted. We now declare to respect and protect the security of the rights and of the property of Our people, and to secure to them the complete enjoyment of the same, within the extent of the provisions of the present Constitution and of the law. The Imperial Diet shall first be convoked for the 23rd year of Meiji, and the time of its opening shall be the date, when the present Constitution comes into force. When in the future it may become necessary to amend any of the provisions of the present Constitution, We or Our successors shall assume the initiative right, and submit a project for the same to the Imperial Diet. The Imperial Diet shall pass its vote upon it, according to the conditions imposed by the present Constitution, and in no otherwise shall Our descendants or Our subjects be permitted to attempt any alteration thereof.

Our Ministers of State, on Our behalf, shall be held responsible for the carrying out of the present Constitution, and Our present and future subjects shall forever assume the duty of allegiance to the present Constitution. [His Imperial Majesty's Sign-Manual.] [Privy Seal.] The 11th day of the 2nd month of the 22nd year of Meiji. (Countersigned) Count Kuroda Kiyotaka, Minister President of State. Count Ito Hirobumi, President of the Privy Council. Count Okuma Shigenobu, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Count Saigo Tsukumichi, Minister of State for the Navy. Count Inouye Kaoru, Minister of State for Agriculture and Commerce. Count Yamada Akiyoshi, Minister of State for Justice. Count Matsugata Masayoshi, Minister of State for Finance, and Minister of State for Home Affairs. Count Oyama Iwao, Minister of State for War. Viscount Mori Arinori, Minister of State for Education. Viscount Enomoto Takeaki, Minister of State for Communications.

The Constitution of the Empire of Japan

Chapter I. The Emperor.

Article 1. The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal. Article 2. The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by Imperial male descendants, according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law. Article 3. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable. Article 4. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution. Article 5. The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article 6. The Emperor gives sanction to laws, and orders them to be promulgated and executed. Article 7. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives. Article 8. The Emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial Ordinances in the place of law. (2) Such Imperial Ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve the said Ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future. Article 9. The Emperor issues or causes to be issued, the Ordinances necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws. Article 10. The Emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration, and salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same. Exceptions especially provided for in the present Constitution or in other laws, shall be in accordance with the respective provisions (bearing thereon). Article 11. The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy. Article 12. The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy. Article 13. The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties. Article 14. The Emperor proclaims the law of siege. (2) The conditions and effects of the law of siege shall be determined by law. Article 15. The Emperor confers titles of nobility, rank, orders and other marks of honor. Article 16. The Emperor orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments and rehabilitation. Article 17. A Regency shall be instituted in conformity with the provisions of the Imperial House Law. (2) The Regent shall exercise the powers appertaining to the Emperor in His name.

Chapter II. Rights and Duties of Subjects

Article 18. The conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject shall be determined by law. Article 19. Japanese subjects may, according to qualifications determined in laws or ordinances, be appointed to civil or military offices equally, and many fill any other public offices. Article 20. Japanese subjects are amenable to service in the Army or Navy, according to the provisions of law. Article 21. Japanese subjects are amenable to the duty of paying taxes, according to the provisions of law. Article 22. Japanese subjects shall have the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits of the law. Article 23. No Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried or punished, unless according to law.

Article 24. No Japanese subject shall be deprived of his right of being tried by the judges determined by law. Article 25. Except in the cases provided for in the law, the house of no Japanese subject shall be entered or searched without his consent. Article 26. Except in the cases mentioned in the law, the secrecy of the letters of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate. Article 27. The right of property of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate. (2) Measures necessary to be taken for the public benefit shall be any provided for by law. Article 28. Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief. Article 29. Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations. Article 30. Japanese subjects may present petitions, by observing the proper forms of respect, and by complying with the rules specially provided for the same. Article 31. The provisions contained in the present Chapter shall not affect the exercise of the powers appertaining to the Emperor, in times of war or in cases of a national emergency. Article 32. Each and every one of the provisions contained in the preceding Articles of the present Chapter, that are not in conflict with the laws or the rules and discipline of the Army and Navy, shall apply to the officers and men of the Army and of the Navy.

Chapter III. The Imperial Diet

Article 33. The Imperial Diet shall consist of two Houses, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. Article 34. The House of Peers shall, in accordance with the Ordinance concerning the House of Peers, be composed of the members of the Imperial Family, of the orders of nobility, and of those persons, who have been nominated thereto by the Emperor. Article 35. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members elected by the people, according to the provisions of the Law of Election. Article 36. No one can at one and the same time be a Member of both Houses. Article 37. Every law requires the consent of the Imperial Diet. Article 38. Both Houses shall vote upon projects of law submitted to it by the Government, and may respectively initiate projects of law. Article 39. A Bill, which has been rejected by either the one or the other of the two Houses, shall not be again brought in during the same session. Article 40. Both Houses can make representations to the Government, as to laws or upon any other subject. When, however, such representations are not accepted, they cannot be made a second time during the same session. Article 41. The Imperial Diet shall be convoked every year. Article 42. A session of the Imperial Diet shall last during three months. In case of necessity, the duration of a session may be prolonged by the Imperial Order. Article 43. When urgent necessity arises, an extraordinary session may be convoked, in addition to the ordinary one. (2) The duration of an extraordinary session shall be determined by Imperial Order.

Article 44. The opening, closing, prolongation of session and prorogation of the Imperial Diet, shall be effected simultaneously for both Houses. (2) In case the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, the House of Peers shall at the same time be prorogued. Article 45. When the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, Members shall be caused by Imperial Order to be newly elected, and the new House shall be convoked within five months from the day of dissolution. Article 46. No debate can be opened and no vote can be taken in either House of the Imperial Diet, unless not less than one third of the whole number of the Members thereof is present. Article 47. Votes shall be taken in both Houses by absolute majority. In the case of a tie vote, the President shall have the casting vote. Article 48. The deliberations of both Houses shall be held in public. The deliberations may, however, upon demand of the Government or by resolution of the House, be held in secret sitting. Article 49. Both Houses of the Imperial Diet may respectively present addresses to the Emperor. Article 50. Both Houses may receive petitions presented by subjects. Article 51. Both Houses may enact, besides what is provided for in the present Constitution and in the Law of the Houses, rules necessary for the management of their internal affairs. Article 52. No Member of either House shall be held responsible outside the respective Houses, for any opinion uttered or for any vote given in the House. When, however, a Member himself has given publicity to his opinions by public speech, by documents in print or in writing, or by any other similar means, he shall, in the matter, be amenable to the general law. Article 53. The Members of both Houses shall, during the session, be free from arrest, unless with the consent of the House, except in cases of flagrant delicts, or of offences connected with a state of internal commotion or with a foreign trouble. Article 54. The Ministers of State and the Delegates of the Government may, at any time, take seats and speak in either House.

Chapter IV. The Ministers of State and the Privy Council

Article 55. The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. (2) All Laws, Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the State, require the countersignature of a Minister of State. Article 56. The Privy Councillors shall, in accordance with the provisions for the organization of the Privy Council, deliberate upon important matters of State, when they have been consulted by the Emperor.

Chapter V. The Judicature

Article 57. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to law, in the name of the Emperor. (2) The organization of the Courts of Law shall be determined by law. Article 58. The judges shall be appointed from among those, who possess proper qualifications according to law. (2) No judge shall be deprived of his position, unless by way of criminal sentence or disciplinary punishment. (3) Rules for disciplinary punishment shall be determined by law. Article 59. Trials and judgments of a Court shall be conducted publicly. When, however, there exists any fear that, such publicity may be prejudicial to peace and order, or to the maintenance of public morality, the public trial may be suspended by provisions of law or by the decision of the Court of Law. Article 60. All matters, that fall within the competency of a special Court, shall be specially provided for by law. Article 61. No suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the executive authorities, and which shall come within the competency of the Court of Administrative Litigation specially established by law, shall be taken cognizance of by a Court of Law.

Chapter VI. Finance

Article 62. The imposition of a new tax or the modification of the rates (of an existing one) shall be determined by law. (2) However, all such administrative fees or other revenue having the nature of compensation shall not fall within the category of the above clause. (3) The raising of national loans and the contracting of other liabilities to the charge of the National Treasury, except those that are provided in the Budget, shall require the consent of the Imperial Diet. Article 63. The taxes levied at present shall, in so far as are not remodelled by new law, be collected according to the old system. Article 64. The expenditure and revenue of the State require the consent of the Imperial Diet by means of an annual Budget. (2) Any and all expenditures overpassing the appropriations set forth in the Titles and Paragraphs of the Budget, or that are not provided for in the Budget, shall subsequently require the approbation of the Imperial Diet. Article 65. The Budget shall be first laid before the House of Representatives. Article 66. The expenditures of the Imperial House shall be defrayed every year out of the National Treasury, according to the present fixed amount for the same, and shall not require the consent thereto of the Imperial Diet, except in case an increase thereof is found necessary. Article 67. Those already fixed expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet, without the concurrence of the Government.

Article 68. In order to meet special requirements, the Government may ask the consent of the Imperial Diet to a certain amount as a Continuing Expenditure Fund, for a previously fixed number of years. Article 69. In order to supply deficiencies, which are unavoidable, in the Budget, and to meet requirements unprovided for in the same, a Reserve Fund shall be provided in the Budget. Article 70. When the Imperial Diet cannot be convoked, owing to the external or internal condition of the country, in case of urgent need for the maintenance of public safety, the Government may take all necessary financial measures, by means of an Imperial Ordinance. (2) In the case mentioned in the preceding clause, the matter shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet at its next session, and its approbation shall be obtained thereto. Article 71. When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year. Article 72. The final account of the expenditures and revenues of the State shall be verified and confirmed by the Board of Audit, and it shall be submitted by the Government to the Imperial Diet, together with the report of verification of the said Board. (2) The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall be determined by law separately.

Chapter VII. Supplementary Rules

Article 73. When it has become necessary in future to amend the provisions of the present Constitution, a project to that effect shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order. (2) In the above case, neither House can open the debate, unless not less than two thirds of the whole number of Members are present, and no amendment can be passed, unless a majority of not less than two thirds of the Members present is obtained. Article 74. No modification of the Imperial House Law shall be required to be submitted to the deliberation of the Imperial Diet. (2) No provision of the present Constitution can be modified by the Imperial House Law. Article 75. No modification can be introduced into the Constitution, or into the Imperial House Law, during the time of a Regency. Article 76. Existing legal enactments, such as laws, regulations, Ordinances, or by whatever names they may be called, shall, so far as they do not conflict with the present Constitution, continue in force. (2) All existing contracts or orders, that entail obligations upon the Government, and that are connected with expenditure, shall come within the scope of Article 67.

Collectors Items

Testimony by Daniel J. Kritenbrink -- US Policy Toward the Peoples Republic of China PRC (April 13, 2011) Testimony of Kurt M. Campbell - the vital importance of Asia-Pacific countries to the United States (March 31, 2011) Testimony of David C. Williams U.S. Policy toward Burma: Its Impact and Effectiveness (Executive Director, Center for Constitutional Democracy ) --(September 30, 2009) THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN (1947) (based on the English Edition by Government Printing Bureau )


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