Bangladesh in 1973: Management of Factional Politics Author(s): Rounaq Jahan Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol.

14, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1973: Part II (Feb., 1974), pp. 125-135 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643085 . Accessed: 26/11/2011 05:48
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey.

http://www.jstor.org

IN BANGLADESH 1973: OF MANAGEMENT FACTIONAL POLITICS

/ RounaqJahan

sucBangladesh showed considerable In thefirst yearfollowing liberation, a long termpolitical cess in establishing stablepolityand evenundertook The Indian "model"ofpolitical development appearedto be the planning.' modeland the regimewentabout in a AwamiLeague regime'spreferred of witha a briskfashionto introduce system parliamentary government the In consingle dominant party.2 thesecondyearafter liberation, regime to tinued commitment the Indian "model" but facedmanymorechalits The opposition againstthe regimebecame lengesto its proposedsystem. in victory volublein 1973. In spiteof theAwamiLeague's overwhelming the erosionofpopular theMarch1973 national election, yearsaw a marked supportfrom ;the Awami League regime. Sheikh Mujibur PRahman's The regime's also waneda little. frontcharisma failureon theeconomic high prices ,of its mismanagement the economyand the continuing of in economichardshipforthe essential commodities-resulted tremendous massesof the people. But when the masses feltthe economicsqueeze, a smallminority coupled withthe gained.3Unequal sharingof austerity, in of led popular allegation widespread corruption theregime, to growing Armed attack on police stations, disenchantment the government. with after June1973,was an indication which increased alarming in proportion oftheregime's loss of support thecountryside. in its The regimestrengthened multiplied law and orderenforcing and but in agencies, mereuse ofitscoercive machinery, theabsenceofmobilizationof peoplebehindits policies and programs, undermined support the the organization base of theregime. The task of strengthening grassroots oftheparty the spentmost was givenlittle priority 1973; rather regime in ofitstimeand energy managing factional conflicts theparty in and in the so theadministration.theparty powerwas factionalized, too werethe If in
'Rounaq Jahan,"Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Buildingin a New State," Asian Survey, XIII:2, (February1973). 'For an elaboration of this argumentsee my "The Emerging Political System of Bangladesh,"an unpublishedpaper presentedat a seminaron Political Developmentin South Asia held at the University Rajasthan, Jaipur,India, February 5-9, 1973. of 'In 1973 Bangladeshsaw the emergence a small groupof new rich-usually Awami of League supporters-whomade quick moneyas recipientsof the regime's patronage. 125

126

BANGLAD ES H

to and they failedto providea viable alternative the parties opposition; in auIn was regime. 1973 the regime'sauthority erodedbut no substitute thority emerged.
THE ECONOMY

The economy. The year1973 proved be a bad yearfortheBangladesh to in production bothagriculture work reconstruction laggedbehindschedule, before there were and industry failedto reachthelevelachieved liberation, and exports, and pricesand the cost of livingindex shortfalls imports in to soared. GrossDomesticProduct (GDP) in 1972-73was estimated be thantheGDP in 1969-70and GDP per capita 12-14% lowerin real terms lowerthantheGDP percapitaofpreliberation to was estimated be one-fifth in days.4Rice production 1972-73 was about 15% lower than that of in 1969-70and industrial output 1972-73was 30% lowerthanthenormal was The output 28% lessthanthe1969-70 output 1969-70.5 juteindustry's of to production.6 Exportsin 1972-73wereestimated be 30% lowerthanthe in was also about of items levelachieved 1969-70and theimport non-food in together This 30% less thannormalrequirements.7 shortfall imports, led witha sharpincreasein money supplyand a declinein production, to of from base to the a doubling averagepricelevels.According one study, the worker rose to of 100 in 1969-70, cost of livingindexof an industrial also lagged behindand it 200.31 at the end of 1972.8 Revenuecollection of expenditure thegovernment. failedtomatcheventherecurrent in sector 1973 was theintroduction The onlybright spotin theeconomic of ,an oftheFirstFive Year Plan. The Plan envisages expenditure 44.55 bilsources.The First by liontakas,60% of whichis to be financed domestic the GDP Five Year Plan sets a modestobjectiveof increasing country's on While introducing by 5.5% per year and it putspriority agriculture.9 announced thatthe theplan,the DeputyChairmanPlanningCommission to would attempt hold the 1972-73price line but that it would planners notbe possibleto go back to the 1969-70prices. of The AnnualPlan publishedby the government Bangladeshargues the and that shortfalls theeconomy thehighpricesare largely result the in of inefficient management, lack of coordinationlabor-management i.e., of The in middlemen themarket.10 plan problems thecreation multiple and
'Planning Commission, Annual Plan 1973-74,(Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1973), p. 1. 5Ibid,p. 9. 'Ibid, p. 9. 'Ibid, p. 10. 8SawdeshR. Bose, "The Price Situationin Bangladesh," The Bangladesh Economic Review,Vol. 1, No. 3, July1973, p. 244. 9The BangladeshObserver,(Dacca), November28, 1973. 10Planning Commission, Government the People's Republic of Bangladesh,Annual of Plan 1973-74, 1-10. pp.

ROUNAQ

JAHAN

127

affected further that,"the difficult situation seriously ... admits economic the and the daily lives of our people particularly landlessrural workers social and . generally urbanpopulation . . (and) generated the widespread political tension.""1 Indeed its failure economic in management multiplied theregime's problems thepoliticalfront. on
POLITICS ANDADMINISTRATION

In 1973 the regimecontinuedon its course of establishing secular a in elections parliamentary politicalsystem Bangladesh. were Parliamentary heldearlyand on schedule legitimize system. in thepost-election to the But in undermined periodpervasivefactionalism politicsand administration the regime's capabilitiesfor long termplanning.In spite of its massive electoral the lost its grip on the country. the In victory regimegradually months following election, the opposition theregime to mounted threats and and counterthreats "civil war" and "class struggle" becamefrequent.12 of Electionand the containment factionalfeuds,however, of remainedthe regime's major achievements theyear. of Election:The Awami League regimewantedto hold an early election to renewits mandatefromthe people. Parliamentary elections were held on March 7, 1973. Fourteenpartiesand 1075 candidatescontested the electionfor 288 seats.'3 Eleven Awami League candidateswere elected unopposed. Since the electionresultswere a forgone election conclusion, campaigning generated little publicinterest. Whatis significant thatnonis issuesfeatured in Therewas littlecontroversy prominently the campaign. over fundamental issues of socio-economic-political policies. The major campaignissue for all partieswas "conspiracy."'4 Everypartyincluding theparty powerbranded other in the partiesas foreign agentsindulging in againsttheinterests thecountry. conspiracy of ThoughtheAwamiLeague was expected win handsomely, marginof victory to its came as a surprise
1lbid, p. 1. 12Surprisingly enough the threatsof "civil war" and "armed struggle"are more frequently being used by the Awami League and the Parties supporting Awami League the -i.e., NAP(M) and CommunistParty (CPB). Opposition political parties complain thattheregimeis using the bogeyof civil war to eliminatethe opposition.See Badruddin Umar,"The United Front of 'Patriotic' Parties," Holiday, September9, 1973. 13Election one constituency in could not be held in March due to the death of one of thecandidates.In a later by-election Awami League won the seat. the 1"Acontent analysis of the pre-election speeches by the leaders of various partiesreveals thatthe issues of corruption, high prices,political repressionand conspiracyfeatured prominently the campaign. Conspiracy,however,was the most frequently in discussedissue. The Awami League branded the oppositionparties as agents of "USChineseimperialists," conspiringto underminethe sovereignty and integrity Banglaof desh.NAP(M) and Communist Partyof Bangladesh (CPB) also called the otherparties agents of "US-Chinese imperialism"indulging in conspiracy against the "socialist" policyof Bangladesh. The National Awami Party,Bhashani group (NAP-B) and JSD warnedthatthe Awami League, NAP(M) and CPB were tools of "Soviet-IndianSocial Imperialists."

128

BAN GLADES

to political In observers. a house ofthree the hundred, AwamiLeague won 291 seats."5 NationalAwamiParty, The Muzaffar faction(NAP-M), Jatiya League (JL) and Jatiya Samajtantrik (JSD) won one seat each, and Dal the independents fiveseats;16 56% of the voterscast theirvote and won theAwamiLeague polled 73% of votescast.17 The Awami League followedan electoralstrategy overkilling of the Its opposition. policy of putting maximum pressure win everyparliato seat virtually mentary wiped out the opposition partiesfromthe parliament.18 had a The marginalrepresentation opposition parliament of in disfunctional impacton the fledgling parliamentary system. diminished It theopposition's stake thesystem. in After parliamentary the the election, regimealso held the local bodies on and election schedule. Election thechairmen, chairman members for vice of 4249 UnionParishads(local bodiesin ruralareas) and 69 Paurashavas (municipalities) expected be held betweenDecember19 and Deare to cember For the post of 4220 chairmen, totalof 18,558 candidates; 31. a for4215 postsofvice chairmen, 17,860; and for38,326members, 121,070 candidatesare contesting.19 scheduled The local bodies elections are different from past practices thatforthe first the in timethe chairmen and vice chairmen be directly elect will will simultaneously elected;the voters a chairman, vice chairman a and threemembers the local body. None of of theparties, including AwamiLeague, nominated the candidatesforthe local bodieselection. This indicates weak organization thepartiesat the of thegrassroot levels.Factional rivals, often thesameparty, supporting of are their separate candidates thelocal elections; in and partiesdecidedto withholdnominations orderto avoid factional in revolt. present regime's At the strategy appearsto be thatofclaiming winning the candidate after electhe tion-a strategy worked that successfully theBasic Democracies in election duringthe Ayub decade.20

"Apart from 300 generalseats, 15 seats are reservedforwomenin Parliament.These womenmembers are "elected" by the threehundredmembersof Parliament.Since the Awami League is the majoritypartyin Parliament all fifteen women membersbelong to the Awami League. 1"Ina later by-election JSD won one moreseat and one of the independents the joined the NAP(B). "Source: Election Commission,Bangladesh. 18Inthe parliamentary electionmany top leaders of the oppositionpartieslost. Thus Major Jalil, (JSD), Rashed Khan Menon, Kazi Jafar Ahmad, Dr. Aleem Al Razee (NAP-B), and Suranjit Sen (NAP-M) lost the election. Jalil, Menon, Razee and Sen lost in closelycontested electionsand theycomplainedthatthe regimeused unfairmeans to win the election. "The BangladeshObserver,(Dacca), December 19, 1973. "0IntheBasic Democracieselection,the Ayub regimedid not give any partynomination; rather strategy its was to win over the candidates who were victorious the elecin tion.

ROUNAQ

JAHAN

129

a tion; and as beforethe regimeshowedgreatskill in holdingtogether divided and administration. Factionaltension the AwamiLeague, in party successor to already visiblein 1972, becameacutein 1973. An acceptable SheikhMujibur Rahman as the partychiefcould not be foundand the a of AwamiLeague councilsessionwas postponed number timesto avoid Thereare factional schisms amongold Awami an opensplitin theparty.22 Leaguers(i.e., between Tajuddin Ahmedand Syed NazrulIslam), as well SheikhFazlul Haq as among moreyouthful the Partyleaders(i.e., between and Moni and TofailAhmad). These schisms downto the district subgo levelsoftheparty. divisional in werecontained 1973 either Sheikh The intra-party factional fights by or of MujiburRahman'spersonalintervention by the accommodation facThus soon afterelection, whenthe Yubo tionalleadersin powerposition. League of Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni and the Sramik League of Abdul Mannanstarted theirmuch publicizedSuddhi Avijan (purification campaign), sometimes againsttheirrival factionswithinthe party,Sheikh the But Mujib had to mediatepersonally between factions.23 meremediationwas not enough.In September regimehad to expandthecabinet the and appointfourteen stateministers keep the supportof some of the to factionalleaders. In Decembertwo more ministers were added to the cabinet.Thus Sheikh Mujib avertedan open division of the partyby judiciously balancing variousfactions distributing the and political patronage amongthem. Additionally continuing the personal popularity Sheikh of Mujib worked a deterrent as againstfactional revolt. Factionalleadersdid notbreakaway from party the sincetheywereuncertain theirpolitical of survival Mujib's opponents.24 as WhenMizanurRahmanChoudhury, one ofthecabinetministers a top AwamiLeaguer,was askedto resignby and SheikhMujib, he did so without public protestand did not join any opposition party. Factionalism beleagueredthe administration too. In 1972 there was bitterinfighting betweenthe "Mujibnagar" and "non-Mujibnagar" ad2"See my"Bangladesh in 1972," op. cit.,fora discussionof some of these schisms. 22Tle Awami League Constitution stipulatesthat the posts of partypresidentand the leader of the Parliamentary Party should not be held by the same person. However,as no acceptable candidate was foundin 1972 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had to continuein both posts. 28Before and after the March election, Sheikh Moni and Mannan repeatedly announcedthat upon Sheikh Mujib's ordertheywould soon starta purification campaign to cleanse the administration, partyand the country unpatriotic of and corrupt elements. SheikhMujib's directives, however,did not come through, when Mannan's supporters kidnappedAhmed Fazlur Rahman, a businessmanand Awami League supporter, and brought him for questioningMujib had to personallyinterveneto get Fazlur Rahman released. 24TajuddinAhmed reportedly did not break away fromthe party for fear that his politicalcareerwould be destroyed Sheikh Mujib if Tajuddin joined the opposition. by

schisms21 and the addition of new ones in the party and the administra-

of Management FactionalPolitics:The yearsaw thecontinuation old of

130

BANGLADESH

;25 ministrators in 1973 a third category of schism was added-the returnees from Pakistan.26 The jockeying for position by the three groups the coherence and efficiency the services. The morale of the of undermined services was already low because of their j ob insecurity.After liberation the erstwhile civil service of Pakistan was abolished and in the absence of a new structurethe top bureaucrats felt insecure. Additionally the civil se-vices, used to freedomfrompolitical control during the Pakistani days, to found it difficult adjust to the changed set-up in a parliamentarysystem wheretheywere placed under the control of the political leadership. Apart fromtheir own factional division, members of the civil bureaucracy were caught in the factional schisms of the Awami League. The armed forces also could not escape factional tension. Conflictbetween the forces repatriated from Pakistan and those who fought in the liberationwar was particularlyacute. A large number of the army repatriated fromPakistan were left out of the Bangladesh army and many of the were posted in insignificantposts after their resenior military officers patriation.27Conflictand jealousy also prevailed between the militaryand the more political para-militia, the Rakkhi Bahini. The multiplication of or Bahinis,28most of which belonged to the government the party in power, added to the problemsof coordinatingthe law and order enforcingagencies. output to The regime did make some attempts reorganize its faction-torn sector. A number of commissions were set up to recommend ways and such reorganizations.The report of the Administrative means of effecting and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC), submittedto the government in April, recommended, among other things, the separation of the civil bureaucracy into two separate branches-general and development The report -ofthe ASRC is under scrutinyby the governadministration. ment and its fate is still undecided. The Pay Committee submitted its reportin May and recommendedten national pay scales, and taka 2000/ as the maximum and taka 130/ as the minimumpay. A part of the report of the Pay Committeewas implementedby the regime from July 1973. However,the reportof the Education Commission,submittedto the governmentin June,is yetto be published.

between 25Seemy"Bangladesh in 1972," op. cit.,p. 200 fora discussionof the conflict the "patriots"and the "collaborators" after liberation. 26Alarge numberof bureaucratswere repatriatedfromPakistan afterAugust 1973. postswere alreadyfilledby the "Mujibnagar" and "nonAs manyof the top government fromPakistan foundit difficult land topthe to Mujibnagar"administrators, returnees rankingjobs. 27Thusafterhis returnfromPakistan, Lt. General Wasiduddin, who is the senior on He was mostarmyofficer, made an officer special dutyin the foreignministry. was the not offered post of Chief of the Bangladesh Army. armed organizations. has Apart fromthe three 28Thegovernment nearlyhalf-a-dozen thereare the Bangladesh Rifles, Rakkhi Bahini, Police, Ansar servicesof the military, and village defenseforce.The Awami League has its ChesyasevakBahini (volunteer labor front-SramikLeague-has its lal bahini. Clashes amongst corps) and the party's these Bahinis are quite frequent.

ROUNAQ

JAHAN

131

was The taskof reorganizing partyand the administration seriously the that intoall echelons theregime. of impeded thevisiblecorruption crept by that EvenSheikhMujiburRahmanstatedrepeatedly he could not get the country movingto rebuild"sonar Bangla" (golden Bengal) because of of aroundhim.Public and privaterumors corrupwidespread corruption SheikhMujiburRahman'sfamily tionoftopAwamiLeaguersabounded.29 The allegation corof also cameunderfireforallegedmisuseof power.30 the workers affected moraleof party and ruption thetop leveladversely at suffered, did so the civil/military services.The administrative efficiency of became theregime's efficacy. Criticism and opposition againsttheregime voluble. The PoliticalOpposition:The yearstarted a tensepoliticalnote.On on 1 Students Union (NAPJanuary twostudents belonging theBangladesh to on M's student protesting front)werekilledin a police firing a procession who werelooking theVietnam war.The incident electrified opposition the All foran issue to mobilizemass sentiment againsttheregime. opposition the strike was obpolitical partiesprotested police actionand a complete the served nextday. But whentheytriedto draw an analogybetween the 1952 languagemovement 1973 VietnamProtest and Day, the opposition, theirhand. especially NAP(M), CPB and Students the Union,overplayed the Personalcriticism SheikhMujib turned tide of popularsympathy of criticism against when they capitulated toneddowntheir and them;and then theNAP(M), CPB and theStudents Unionlostface and support.3' In the election the of campaign opposition partiesfocusedon a number The issuescritical theregime. NAP (M) and CPB emphasized of corruption, and with political repression thelaw and order problem. Theydid notdiffer theAwamiLeague on any fundamental policyissue and earnedthe nicknameofbeingthe"B team"oftheAwamiLeague.The NAP(B) and Jatiya the Leaguefocused Indo-Bangladesh on relations triedto exploit rising and in The theme was scientianti-India sentiment thecountry. JSD's campaign ficsocialism. All theopposition WhiletheAwami partiesfaredbadly in the election. Leaguepolled73% of votescast,theNAP(M) got8%, NAP(B) 5% and
29There were allegations of corruption against the top leadership of the party.Only a fewAwami Leaguers were knownto be noncorrupt. 80Thepolitical involvement and influenceof Sheikh Moni (Sheikh Mujib's nephew) and SheikhKamal (Sheikh Mujib's son) generatedwidespreadcriticism. See Ganakantha,(Dacca), September 1973. 4, 81TheNAP(M), CPB and Students Union launched a bitterattack against Sheikh Mujib after January The StudentsUnion leaders demandedthatSheikh Mujib should 1. of ask theforgiveness students.But even on January2, when Dacca was shut down by a strike, Sheikh Mujib wentto Barisal and addressed a mammoth public meetingwhich was an index of his tremendouspopularity.The Awami League and its student and labor fronts and launched a counter-movement demanded that the NAP and Students Unionleaders should apologize to Sheikh Mujib. NAP and StudentsUnion finallygave in. This capitulationcost themloss of credibility with theirsupporters.

132

BA N G LA D ES H

the JSD 6%.32 The electionresultdemoralizedthe oppositionparties. backto their policyofseeking alliance old an soonwent NAP(M) and CPB3 33 front the NAP(M) took the withthe AwamiLeague. The student's of in an the front (the initiative striking alliancewith AwamiLeague's student in Students League), and putup a jointpanel ofcandidates theDacca UniCentral in FollowStudents Union (DUCSU) election September.34 versity an ing thestudent's NAP(M) and CPB formed alliancewiththe initiative, The AwamiLeague knownas theGono OikyaJote.35 Joteleaderspledged jointactionagainstthe"anti-socials."36 the feuds.After The yearsaw theNAP(B) tornby factional liberation, becauseofBhashani's anti-India NAP(B) picked somerightwing up support statements. Left-right tensionin the partybecame quite visible.Bhashani againstthe regime but made severalattempts launcha mass movement to without a muchsuccess.In May he started fastuntodeathwhicharoused failedto mobilizea mass campopularsympathy support his party and but paign.As theyeardrewto an endBhashanicalledforan "armedstruggle," buttheother leadersoftheparty wereat painsto pointoutthatNAP would continue be a constitutional to party. Of all theopposition up partiestheJSD showedsome successin picking League (R-S faction) -won a popularsupport. student Its front-Students number collegeunionelections. theDUCSU election, whichis often of In politics, provedto be a strong it regarded thebarometer thecountry's as of of Partyalso force.37 variousMarxist-Leninist The factions theCommunist worriedthe regime.The regimecrackeddown hard on such factions in wereimPabna,Rajshahiand Kushtia;theleadersofsomeoftheseparties it that prisoned went or underground. November wasreported theMarxistIn to opposition the to Leninist groupsformed common a front givean united regime.
32Source: Bangladesh Election Commission. 33Duringthe national liberation movementand after liberation the NAP(M) and CPB repeatedlycalled for an alliance of the "patriotic" parties. The Awami League, however, spurned such requests for an alliance. 34During and afterthe Vietnam Day Protest,therewere bitterexchanges of charges and counter-charges betweenthe StudentsUnion and the StudentsLeague. The Union called the League a fascistorganization and the latter called the former mistressof "a the Awami League not deservingequal status with the wife," the League presumably beingthewife.When Union made commoncause withthe League even aftersuch public insults,its image suffered. 3"TheGono Oikya Jote and the Union-League alliance were formedat the initiative of CPB who followedthe Soviet line in Bangladesh. See Badruddin Umar, "The United Front of 'Patriotic' Parties," Holiday, September 9, 1973 and Sirajul Hossain Khan, "The CarnivalCongress,"Holiday, December 9, 1973, foran elaborate discussionof the Soviet role in the formation the alliance. of "6TheBangladesh Observer,(Dacca), September4, 1973. "7Though DUCSU electionresultcould not be publishedbecause of the lootingof the ballot boxes, it was reportedthat the contest between the joint panel of Union and League and the StudentsLeague (R.S.) was a close one.

ROUNAQ

JAHAN

133

tacks as the work of "ultra leftists"and "Naxalites," but later called them the work of "miscreants."39

Fromthemiddleof 1973 theregime'sauthority thecountryside in was seriously threatened the risingincidenceof armedattackon local law by andorder enforcing agencies. Between June November, and there werearmed attacks 52 thanasand policestations.38 on Whilesuchattacks werereported from overthecountry, districts Dacca, Barisal,Kushtiaand Rajall the of shahiweretheworst affected. a retaliatory As measure government the commenced combing operations a number districts-i.e., in of Hill Chittagong at brandedtheseatTracts, Rajshahi,Barisal and Khulna.The regime first

the In responseto rising criticismof the government, regimetook a number of steps to strengthen hand. In Septemberthe second amendmentto its the constitutionwas passed by the parliament which provided for the inclusion of emergencyprovisions in 'theconstitution.Under the amendment thepresidentis empoweredto declare a state of emergencyif he is satisfied that "a grave emergencyexists in which the security or economic life of . Bangfladesh . . is threatenedby war or external aggression or internaldis"40 turbance. The regimealso triedto controlthepress. Several attempts we're made to close down the newspapersand weekliesbelonging to the opposition -Ganakantha, Holiday, Wave and Desh Bangla. Individual journalists and editors were also harassed. Afterthe Vietnam Protest Day two journalists working in a government-managed newspaper lost their jobs for writing pieces critical of the regime.The editor and newsmen of Desh Bangla were imprisoned.The editor of Holiday was harassed afterthe DUCSU election and the weeklywas closed down temporarily. But side by side with these restrictivemeasures the regime also came forward with reconciliatorygestures towards the opposition, such as the formationof the Jote. The regime's announcementof the release 'of nearly 33,000 "detained collaborators was another example of its reconciliatory mood.4' Clearly the regime's policy was to divide the opposition and isolate thefar leftgroups and crush them.By a judicious mixtureof repressionand reconciliationthe regime achieved considerable success in winning over or neutralizingthe moderate opposition. As the year drew to an end, Sheikh Mujib's major political problems lay not with the opposition but with the factionsin his own party.

"'The Ittefaq, (Dacca), November30, 1973. ""The term"miscreant," firstpopularized by the Pakistani occupation armyto refer to the Bengali freedom fighters, later became part of the Bangladesh government's official vocabularywith referenceto militantleft groups. "0See Badruddin Umar, "The Political Significanceof the EmergencyProvisions," Holiday, September23, 1973. "1OnNovember29, Sheikh Mujib announced a general amnesty all the prisoners for held underthe collaborators act. Exceptionswere made only in cases where therewere specific criminalcharges.See The Bangladesh Observer,(Dacca), November30, 1973.

134
FOREIGN RELATIONS

BA N G LA D ES H

Theyear1973saw a breakthrough thestalemated in Indo-Pak-Bangladesh conflict aroseafter breakup of Pakistanin 1971. Throughout that 1972 the the outstanding issues betweenthe threecountries-i.e., the fate of the recognition Prisoners War (POWs) in India and Bengalisin Pakistan, of of the Bangladesh Pakistan by and thedivision assetsand liabilities of between of attitude successor states-couldnotbe solvedbecauseoftheirreconcilable thethree parties. Pakistaninsisted an unconditional on releaseof all POWs including thoseBangladeshwantedto tryforwar crimes. Bangladeshanand refused nounced non-negotiable its commitment holdwarcrimetrials to in to be present a meeting withPakistan The prioritorecognition. deadlock was broken whenPakistanand India signeda tripartite agreement regardingrepatriation. Underthe agreement India and Bangladeshagreedto the releaseof all but 195 of PakistaniPOWs, and Pakistanagreedto let all Bengalis leavePakistan to accept and backa substantial number Pakistani of civilians and Biharislivingin Bangladesh. The 1973 agreement therewas sultofcompromise thepartof all parties. on India and Bangladesh gave up their earlier recognition demand. first Theyagreedto the releaseof POWs evenbefore Pakistan recognized Bangladesh. Bangladesh also toneddowniits earlier standon warcrime trials. Insteadof 1500,Bangladesh agreedto try only POWs. Pakistan 195 also agreed therepatriation Bengalis to of and nonand implicitly recognized as Bengalis, Bangladesh, clause V of the agreement statesthatBangladeshwouldparticipate a meeting in withPakistan onlyon thebasis of sovereign equality." The Augustagreement createda climate further of accommodation between Pakistanand Bangladesh. Howthe itself was a diplomatic victory Pakistansinceunder for ever, agreement theagreement Bangladesh mademanymorecompromises thanPakistan. was itsrecognition In 1973,themajordiplomatic gainforBangladesh by in theArab bloc countries. Bangladeshalso participated the nonaligned held in To conference in Algiers September. gain Arab recognition, Banglaimageand during Arab-Israeli in Octothe deshplayed its"muslim" war up teamto helptheArab side.ThoughBanglasenta doctor's ber,Bangladesh deshwas recognized more than one hundred Pakistanand by countries, to recognition Bangladesh, their and conChinarefused givediplomatic to tinued Nations. opposition Bangladesh oftheUnited kept out taking interest internain Theyear1973 saw thePrimeMinister personal on to Rahman went state visits Yugoslaviaand Sheikh tional affairs. Mujibur in Conference Ottawaand thenonthe Japanand attended Commonwealth its continued non-aligned in aligned conference Algiers. Bangladesh foreign aid the substantial from U.S., U.K. WestGerreceived Bangladesh policy. suchas theWorldBank.At the and multilateral many, Japan other agencies with aid and obtained from pledgedfriendship India, Bangladesh sametime Anti-Indian and theSovietUnionand the otherEast Europeancountries. becamequitevisibleas thesetwocountries anti-Soviet however, sentiment,

ROUNAQ

JAHAN

135

wereblamed forhaving undue influence and controlover the administration. In sum: 1973 saw the Awami League regimecontinuingin its old policies in economic,political and internationalaffairs.The early predictions of a blood bath and famine did not materialize in Bangladesh. The regime achieved commendable success in its task of economic/politicalreconstruction of the country.However, there was a growingfrustration especially in theurban areas. The high prices squeezed the urban salaried groups and they were particularlysensitiveto the issue of corruption.The rural landless was the othergroup adversely!affected the economic conditions prevailing in by the country.The regime's major success in 1973 was that it was able to keep the various frustrated groups fragmented thattherewas no massive so movementagainst the regime.

Dacca University, Department, Bangladesh.

Professor Chairman the PoliticalScience of and ROUNAQJAHANis an Associate