Politicization of the Bangladesh Military: A Response to Perceived Shortcomings of Civilian Government Author(s): Zillur R.

Khan Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 5 (May, 1981), pp. 551-564 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643833 . Accessed: 26/11/2011 06:01
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POLITICIZATION THE BANGLADESH OF MILITARY: RESPONSE TO A PERCEIVEDSHORTCOMINGS OF CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT Zillur R. Khan

THE ARMED FORCES during the British Raj were expected to be politically neutral, but the politics of colonialism itself was against such bureaucratic neutrality. In the post-independence era of the former colonies, the gap between what was expected of the military bureaucracy and what was happening in reality continued to widen. In the subcontinent, Pakistan during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s and Bangladesh in the 1970s have epitomized this trend. The process of politicization of the armed forces was associated with three main factors. First, the "aid to civil" phenomenon occurred at regular intervals after 1949 in Pakistan whenever the civil administration failed to tackle a crisis, no matter what the source. Whether the crisis was caused by communal riots as in 1950, 1952, 1954, 1963, and 1970, by a devastating flood, by periodic epidemics, or by food shortages and near-famines, the army had always been called into action to provide the necessary administrative and logistic aid to the civil administration.1 As in any culture of poverty dominated by the politics of

1 Stephen Cohen argues that the tradition of the British Indian Army has been to limit the non-military activities of the Indian and Pakistani military. He further states that the military (in India and Pakistan) plays no civic-action roles, and only limited "aid to the civil" roles. He attributes the diminishing "aid to civil" roles of the subcontinental military to the creation of paramilitary security forces; see Sephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 194. Cohen's analysis holds true with the Indian Army in the post-independence period, but not for the Pakistan Army during the same period, so his appraisal is misleading. "Aid to civil" phenomena have occurred with considerable regularity in Pakistan. This trend was repeated in Bangladesh. Linkages between the military and society have been critically analyzed in, among others, the following works: S. Andzekewski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Kegan

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scarcity, political and economic corruption became a part of daily administrative life. Exposed to such a state of affairs during their "aid to civil" operations, the highly nationalistic, indoctrinated armed personnel, particularly the junior officers and the rank and file, became disillusioned with politics and resentful of politicians. Over time, these experiences contributed to the growth of groups within the armed forces which did not trust any politicians. Ambitious officerswith considerable daring and a little idealism have used these groups for usurping governmental power. Second, differences on national policies and their modes of execution have been used as justification by the armed forces for drastic political actions resulting in coups d'etat. But after each military takeover, serious conflicts have often developed between different sections of army officers over sectionalism, regionalism, and ethnocentrism. These conflicts have remained unresolved owing to the failure of military leadership to utilize an ideology as a common politico-economic ground on which consensus and unity could develop. In fact, the Bangladeshi military has been plagued by ideological conflicts since the beginning of the country's independence struggle. After independence, the sudden overthrow of the charismatic leadership followed by a quick succession of coups has made the ideological division within the military even more intense. Third, the deterioration of economic conditions in the postindependence period in Pakistan and Bangladesh has increased the politicization of their armies. Usually a section within the bureaucratic elite succeeds in putting the blame for such a state of affairs on the political leadership, pointing to its inability to make and implement hard decisions. Particularly in Bangladesh, the political leadership has been faulted for its lack of basic understanding of the politics of budgeting, especially in respect to the military. A group within the army that had fought valiantly in the war of independence contended that Bangladesh could not afford to maintain a large standing army and argued that a people's liberation army (PLA) following the Chinese model would be more appropriate for the country. The vast majority of the military elite, however, feel that a PLA would not work. Such a Chinese-type PLA force would require social regimentation. Without the total regimentation of a society along the lines of China, the raising of a PLA would lead to warlordism and internecine conflicts within the country and would adversely affect all developmental and institution-building activities that less-developed countries undertake. For example, many peasants, students, and worker groups who took up arms and received guerrilla training to fight the Pakistani army
Paul, 1954); S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960); Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: Univexsity of Chicago Press, 1942); Hans Speier, Social Order and the Risks of War (New York: Stewart, 1952).

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during the 1971 liberation struggle became marauders and ravaged the countryside after independence. The charismatic appeal of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) and the resoluteness of the people were necessary to contain these armed groups. Bangladesh's geopolitics calls for an army largely geared to maintaining internal security and to preventing sporadic armed incursions, if any, from the outside. A regular war with India is impossible for Bangladesh, and even a guerrilla war might not be feasible given the fact that Bangladesh is almost totally surrounded by India. However, in the unlikely event that Bangladesh is overrun by the Indian army, and if the Bengalis should opt for underground resistance to Indian domination, the Zia regime has developed a blueprint for military reorganization to deal with such an exigency. But before going into the details of the reorganization plan, it would be appropriate to highlight the political forces which led to certain significant developments within the Bangladeshi military. In the early stage of the civil war, mutinous units of the Pakistani army and most Bengali soldiers and their few officers in the East Pakistan Rifles (a paramilitary force raised to maintain security along the border), and many Bengali insurgents who joined up with them, received a rude shock when they confronted the Pakistani regular army in open battles in the tradition of conventional warfare. In spite of the numerical advantage of many Bengali armed units, they were defeated by the Pakistanis in battle after battle because of the latter's training, experience, discipline, and superior firepower. Only in May when the strategy was changed from regular to guerrilla warfare did the Bengali freedom fighters succeed in undermining the morale of the Pakistanis by chipping away at their defenses. Young Bengali sector commanders such as Ziaur Rahman, presently the President of Bangladesh; Abu Taher, a hero of the liberation war who was later hanged for the political crime of sowing seeds of class struggle within the Bangladesh army after independence; Ziauddin, who is now a leader of an underground revolutionary party called the Sharbohara party; Khaled Mosharraf, who briefly took control of the Bangladesh government through a coup in November 1975, and was killed when his coup failed, went for an all-out guerrilla war with the provision that the core of the guerrilla army would consist of professional army personnel with battle experience and special training in commando operations and guerrilla warfare. Despite occasional disagreements and misunderstandings with the Indian government and army commanders, the Bengalis used this new strategy to their great advantage. This also made it easier for New Delhi to win the third Indo-Pakistani war decisively and within two weeks against 7 or 8 well-fortified divisions of the Pakistani regular army and a large number of their paramilitary supporters in East Pakistan. After independence, another incident occurred which contributed to the Bangladesh army planners post-Mujib strategy. Unsure of the

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ideological commitments of different sections of the Bangladesh Liberation Forces, Mujib sought to raise a division of security forces which would have unquestioned loyalty to the new regime. Called the Jatio Rakkhi Bahini (National Security Army), this new contingent was designed as a countervailing force to the Bangladesh regular army. But this only aggravated the differences and generated serious conflict between the command structures of the two parallel armies which in turn resulted in the deterioration in general morale of Bangladesh army personnel. The deterioration of military efficiency as a result of the conflict led to a crisis of internal security for the new republic. Only through a major political change could this type of military contradiction be resolved. Such an opportunity was presented by the successful majors' coup of August 15, 1975, in which Mujib was assassinated. Once again, the two parallel armed forces were merged into a single Bangladesh army. The August coup also gave rise to another incident which showed the vulnerability of the Bangladesh armed forces. A handful of junior army officers staged the coup and brought about a drastic political change, but they did not have the support of the senior officers or the rank and file of the armed forces. As a result, another contradiction soon surfaced pitting the young officers against their senior colleagues and at the same time dividing the whole Bangladesh administration into two parallel power camps. This, too, undermined the capability of the Bangladesh armed forces to preserve the internal security of the young republic. Two more coups in November 1975 created another incident which demonstrated once again the need for a well-planned, well-coordinated, and disciplined army for Bangladesh. The second coup on November 3 was staged by ambitious senior officerswho wanted to salvage Mujibism, but who did not realize that the majority of the Bengali elite was still haunted by bitter memories of the Mujib regime. The situation was greatly aggravated by the emergence of pro-Mujib politicians and retired or discharged soldiers and non- or junior commissioned officers of Mujib's parallel army, the Jatio Rakkhi Bahini. Sensing the anticoup and anti-Mujib revival sentiments of the general public, a radical group within the army belonging to the Jatio Samjtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party), which had been formed by a number of dissidents and Marxists within the Awami League Party in 1972, struck, killing a few officersand terrorizing others within the Bangladesh armed forces, and claimed that the revolutionaries had already established control at different levels of the army hierarchy. A de facto government was established immediately after the November 7, 1975 soldiers' uprising. In order to create an impression among his fellow officers that he was different from his predecessor Khaled Mosharaff in the sense that he was not power hungry, Major General Ziaur Rahman stepped down from the post of Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), thus allowing the new president to be

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the CMLA. Zia retained his previous position as Chief of Staff of the army and became one of the three Deputy Martial Law Administrators (DMLC), apparently sharing power with Commodore M. H. Khan and Air Vice-Marshall M. G. Tawab, the other two service chiefs who were also DMLC's. In reality, however, Zia became the power behind the military regime. But Colonel Abu Taher, a hero of the liberation war who became the commander of the Commilla brigade after independence, sought to radicalize the Bangladesh army by emphasizing a 12-point program under which the non-commissioned officers, junior commissioned officers, and the mass of soldiers would receive a number of benefits including higher salaries and better working conditions. However, whether willfully or inadvertently, Taher and his political associates of the JSD created an impression among the soldiers that a class war within the armed forces was a prelude to a socialist revolution. Some overzealous soldiers began to challenge their officers' authority to command, killing a few in the process. Discipline within the army became a serious problem and panic followed, again seriously undermining the capability of the army to maintain internal security. For the time, the situation was saved by the timely decision of Zia-who had earlier supported Taher's stand-to restore order and discipline within the army by arresting Taher and other JSD leaders. As exemplary punishment, Taher was executed and a few other JSD leaders were imprisoned for terms ranging from five to twenty years. Following the political trial and the first political execution in Bengal since that of Khudiram,2 knowledgeable quarters within Bangladesh felt that the disastrous results of Taher's attempted coup, which had pitted soldiers against officers, and its ultimate failure would discourage similar adventurism within the country's defense forces. This was not to be. During 1977 sporadic and seemingly unconnected and uncoordinated mutinies occurred among troops in different parts of Bangladesh, the more serious ones taking place in Chittagong within the naval base, and in Rajshahi, Rangpur, and Bogra. However, these uprisings followed a common pattern, inevitably involving common soldiers who challenged the existing military hierarchy. No officer openly played any leadership role and the mutineers were brought under control by a few officers and their loyal soldiers. There was hardly any bloodshed except when certain soldiers of the armored regiment in Bogra revolted on September 28, 1977, killing two officers. Considering what happened in the first week of October, these mutinies by common soldiers were hardly isolated incidents. One could see in these uprisings the hand of an ideological group the same as or at least similar to Taher's that was testing the strength and will of the officer class and Zia's loyal followers
2 Khudiram was a Bengali nationalist who was hanged by the British at the turn of the century for anti-British terrorism.

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within the Bangladesh armed forces. The limited but scattered mutinies could have been used by a central group as a prelude to a full-scale coup d'etat by the non-commissioned officers, junior commissioned officers, and jawans (privates) of the armed forces to establish essentially a military rule by the non-officer class using a section of senior officersas figureheads or fronts. Although Bengali army officers in general contend that common soldiers are incapable of establishing a government even if they succeed in staging a coup, the case of Liberia has disproved this contention. Indeed, just before the non-commissioned officers and men of the air force tried to seize power on October 2, the class conflict in the army heightened when the slain officers from Bogra were brought to Dacca Cantonment for burial. The father of one of the dead charged in his eulogy that the army had fallen so low that it failed to protect its own officers against undisciplined and murderous soldiers. Brigadier M. A. Manzoor, who was then the chief of the General Staff of the army, responded that the whole Bangladesh army could not be held responsible for the misdeeds of a few soldiers, and that soldiers needed their officers for leadership. This rejoinder apparently satisfied both the parents of the dead officers and the soldiers. But for the swift rejoinder, there might have been an uprising of soldiers then and there. Manzoor's actions only delayed another attempt by the soldiers to take over the reins of government. Probably suspecting another coup attempt by the non-commissioned officers and jawans and because of his deep loyalty to President Ziaur Rahman, Manzoor ordered the 46th Brigade, known as the Dacca Brigade and commanded by Lt. Colonel Ameen, to report directly to the president and bypass the 9th Division commanded by Major General Shawkat in case of any unrest among the rank and file. This move by Manzoor, and the inability of the mutineers to generate widespread support from soldiers and airmen, saved Zia in October when some noncommissioned air force personnel led a soldiers' coup against the Zia regime. On October 1 negotiations were underway to persuade the hijackers of a Japan Airlines plane, who had forced the crew to land the aircraft in Dacca four days before, to release the passenger-hostages in return for a ransom of US$6,000,000 to be delivered in six phases and for the release of six Japanese political prisoners. (The hijackers demanded the release of nine prisoners, but three refused to join them.) At midnight, a number of non-commissioned air force officers and airmen attempted a coup and involved a group of non-commisioned officers, junior commissioned officers, and soldiers from the army. Despite early warnings, the 9th Division failed to act in time; only the 46th Brigade maintained its alert and came to Zia's rescue when the rebels tried to overpower the presidential guards and completely overrun the defense perimeters of the president's house. The brigade's timely action, especially the courageous stand by Lt. Col. M. Ameen and his fellow officers and

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loyal soldiers, averted what could have been the end of Zia as well as his government. Had the final thrust by the airmen and soldiers against the president's house succeeded, fence sitters within the army and air force would probably have joined the rebels. But when the rebels were defeated in the final encounter near the president's house, the attempted coup d'etat failed and what could have been a general uprising of the mass of soldiers turned into a localized mutiny of the disappointed, frustrated, and revengeful non-officer class of the air force and army. In the ensuing event, the soldiers took over the radio station very briefly and declared that their coup was a success. Subsequently, another rebel group moved to the airport where negotiations were still continuing between the senior officers of the government, including chief negotiator Air Vice Marshall A. G. Mahmud, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, then Aviation Minister of the Bangladesh government and one of the country's three DMLC's, and the Japanese hijackers. The mutineers captured a number of air force officers and executed eleven of them by firing squad. A. G. Mahmud and a number of high officials escaped unhurt. By early morning of October 2, the 9th Division moved in support of the 46th Brigade and put an end to the rebellion by the airmen and soldiers. The delayed action by the 9th Division was probably due to the fact that the 9th (less the 46th Brigade) was in Savar and not on alert, whereas the 46th Brigade was right in Dacca and on alert. There are basically two interpretations of the October 2 attempted coup and the massacre of air force officers by disgruntled air force personnel when the initial coup collapsed. One view, subscribed to by a few senior Bangladesh army officers, suggests that the attempted coup by the air force NCOs and JCOs was carefully synchronized with the hijacking of the Japan Airlines plane. In collaboration with the Japanese Red Army radicals, and possibly supported by the Soviet Union, the Bangladesh air force sought to change the government in favor of a pro-Soviet regime. In support of this point of view, these senior officers3 have pointed out that the negotiations were intentionally made unusually long, and despite the availability of commandos who could have overpowered the hijackers, the negotiators opted for a slow process of delivering the $6,000,000 ransom to the hijackers, the sixth phase of delivery taking an abnormally long time. The whole hijacking episode, in short, according to these officers,was designed as a diversion to allow the coup leaders sufficient time to successfully bring about the fall of the Zia government in an emergency situation. Another view held by a few junior officers and a very important senior officer maintains that the hijacking incident actually saved Zia and his regime. According to this view, the JSD cells, after testing the
3 Among others, Brigadier Sabehuddin, formerly Deputy Director of the Jatio Rakkhi Bahini and currently chairman of the government's Rural Electrification Board (based on an interview with him on June 20, 1979).

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determination and will of the officers and loyal soldiers through sporadic revolts of soldiers in different parts of Bangladesh, came up with a master plan for the takeover of the government by killing the high officials of the army and the government at the Air Force Day reception on October 9. Their plan was totally upset by the hijacking, which caused the cancellation of the grand reception. The ringleaders could not take a chance on postponing the coup, so they struck a few days sooner, thinking that they might succeed in the melee. Whatever the reason behind the timing of the October 2, 1977 soldiers' coup, two things were quite apparent. First, viewed against the sporadic uprisings by groups of soldiers in different cantonments of Bangladesh, the October 2 uprising in the capital city was probably a planned effort on the part of a group of soldiers to change the country's government. Second, it was not an isolated incident, but rather the climax of all the efforts, starting with the seemingly isolated soldiers' revolts in different military bases of Bangladesh, to establish a classless armed force with corresponding implications for the entire Bengali society. On this issue, Taher and Ziauddin had come to a parting of ways. Whereas Taher believed that the radicalization of the society does not have to precede the radicalization of the military, Ziauddin felt that any effort to radicalize the army without first radicalizing society would create ideological and administrative problems that could The class conflict within the Bengali armed forces did not come jeopardize the security of the fledgling republic.4 about suddenly. It was the product of a long history of colonialism with its attending deficiencies in social justice, in the institutionalization of power, and, most importantly, in legitimacy. The conflict began with the colonial era when ordinary soldiers were patronized, continued through the early part of the post-colonial time when the mass of soldiers was alienated by extreme inequalities between them and the officer class and the absence of upward mobility, and extended to the 1970s when Bengali soldiers found themselves in a position to revolt not only against their West Pakistani officers but also later against the legitimate political authority of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Interestingly, a closer relationship had existed during the colonial period between the soldiers and their British officers. As Philip Mason narrates: Thus Britons of the Imperial class had built up a strangepartnership; they had turned schoolmasters, their pupils being young men of certain hardypeasantstocksand of certainfiercetribes,of whom they had made a highly efficient professional army. It was based on the concept of honour-the honour of the regimentand of the "class" and the personal honour of a man who must respect himself and stand in honour before his comradesin the village and the army. But it stood or fell by the
4 This position was also taken by M. Toaha of East Bengal Communist Party. See Lawrence Lifschultz, "Abu Taher's Last Testament," Economic and Political Weekly, Special Number, August 1977, p. 1339.

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relationship of officersand men who were linked together by enthusiasms that sometimes seem strangely boyish.5

As in the pre-modern age with its uncertainty in authority structure and confusing relationships between different classes, Bangladesh's post-liberation period was marked by confusing loyalties, as seen by Bengali confusion over who to give their loyalty to-leader (Mujib) or institution (military) or the nation; a distorted sense of justice as explified by certain government actions to promote dishonest officers and to penalize the honest ones; and a questionable political legitimacy as a result of rigged elections, which affected the military more than any other institution. Mujib's fall at the hands of a small clique of soldiers and a few officers had already cast the issue of political legitimacy in questionable light. Now Zia's effort to legitimize his rule through one local government election and one referendum seemed uncertain against the attempted coup of October 2. The coup revealed the weakness of both legitimizing efforts. The local government election of March 1977 demonstrated that the Awami League political organization, especially at the grass roots level, was still formidable. In order to avert a possible defeat for his candidates, Zia hurriedly called off the election to district offices. The need for a stronger grass roots organization led him to enunciate a 19-point program in April 1977 emphasizing the theme that political and administrative accountability of the government to the people must be achieved through public participation across the whole spectrum of the governmental policy-making process, particularly at the local level of government. Another try at legitimizing Zia's power in May was partially successful. On May 30, 1977, Zia sought to win a vote of confidence through a referendum. Although he received an overwhelming 98.89% of the popular vote, his victory was tarnished by the extensive use of government machinery to induce the people to vote for him. Voter turnout was low and those who opposed Zia had nothing to vote for and no knowledge of what would happen if Zia lost. Moreover, such phrasing of the referendum question as "Do you have confidence in President Major General Ziaur Rahman and in his policies and programs enunciated by him" gave the people little or no choice. Linking personality to policies served to control the voting behavior of those who wanted the policies but were leery about any military ruler. Though unsuccessful, the coup attempt of October 2, 1977 was bloody and ideologically explosive enough to force Zia to ensure his legitimacy by holding a presidential election in June 1978. There were probably equally important reasons for Zia to hold the elections, such as keeping his electoral commitment to the people and maintaining his
5 Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), p. 386.

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image as a trustworthy third world leader before the leadership of western democracies. Despite the fact that the election was based on universal adult franchise and was considered more or less fair, nine rival candidates, including General (Rtd.) M. A. G. Osmani (Zia's commanding officer during the Bengali independence struggle) bitterly complained about the time limitations (they were allowed to start campaigning only 20 days before the election) and Zia's unlimited use of governmental machinery for campaigning. Securing 76% of the total votes cast in the election, Zia was elected president for five years, proving his legitimate authority to rule. Subsequently, through the formation of his own political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and using the 19-point program as its ideological platform, Zia increased his control over the political process and, at the same time, seemed to relinquish some control by establishing a parliament. In the parliamentary election held in February 1979, Zia's party won 206 of the 300 seats in the legislature. All through his rise to power, Zia tried to optimize his political and military strategies. Sensing that as long as social injustice prevails in the larger society with spill-over effects on the country's armed forces, which would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the concept of political legitimacy to take firm social roots, Zia sought to reduce class friction within the armed forces. He attempted to ensure military stability by following a scheme not very dissimilar to the one used by Nehru's defense minister, Krishna Menon, in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Zia tried to diffuse the power of the armed forces by raising new divisions and spreading the existing brigades, regiments, and battalions in such a way that both officers' and soldiers' loyalty to the regime would be ensured by careful distribution of forces among different regions and having them work in close cooperation with local paramilitary forces such as the Ansars, the Bangladesh Rifles, and the reorganized paramilitary Combat Police Force and the voluntary village-based Village Defense Parties.6 Following the model of checks and balances within the armed forces, Zia's blueprint for the republic's military reorganization was comprised of the following decisions. Five new divisions were raised between 1977 and 1978 with a view to diffusing the power of the battalions that had fought in the liberation war and had begun to expect drastic socioeconomic reforms after independence. Clandestine revolutionary cells planted by the JSD during and immediately after liberation, which were indirectly responsible for the soldiers' successful coup on November 7, 1975 and the unsuccessful one on October 2, 1977, were expected
6 According to a memo from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, issued on August 23, 1979, 60,294 Village Defense Parties have been formed throughout the country consisting of approximately 904,410 members. 12,000 VDP members were scheduled to undergo training in small arms in the 19791980 financial year, with the training program spreading over the years and in phases. "Village Defense Parties," M.A. Aziz, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, August 23, 1979.

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to be neutralized by the decision to reorganize and strengthen a 12,500strong Combat Police Force. The need for such a police force was first felt when Zia tried to contain the soldiers led by Lt. Col. Taher, who demanded an end to hierarchy and class distinction between themselves and their officers through a 12-point program. Using the Napoleonic strategy, he went along with the rebel soldiers and later turned their guns against them. In this, since Zia could not trust the regular army units, he used the special police force to round up the leaders of the November 7 coup, thereby restoring order and discipline within the armed forces.7 So far as the power wielded by rival senior officers was concerned, after the October 2 coup Zia posthaste sent competing senior officers such as Major General Mir Shawkat Ali, Major General Mohammad Abul Manzoor, and Brigadier M. Nuruddin, respectively, to three sectors located near Bangladesh's western, southeastern, and eastern borders. A relatively junior officer was sent to the northern sector. Major General Hafez Mohammad Ershad, the most trusted senior officer, was retained at the center in Dacca. The blueprint for military reorganization was designed in part to contain the rising expectations of soldiers. The military scheme was not only to dissipate the rival leadership within the army but also to reconstruct the armed forces. The whole country was delineated militarily into five regions and the army, cooperating and yet maintaining separateness, could play the dual role of carrying out detailed strategies in order to preserve internal security and of providing prolonged resistance to a possible Indian domination. Each division would coordinate its operation with the paramilitary groups within its area of command, and would also mobilize mass support behind the government and help raise and rain guerrilla units in the event of an occupation by New Delhi. Another of Zia's strategies has been to make the elected assembly completely dependent upon the armed forces so that major government policies would require the open, or at least tacit, approval of the country's military institution. In this regard, the Zia government went a step further than the Ayub regime with its basic democracy scheme. Zia's efforts to militarize the government were much more subtle and sophisticated than Ayub's. An instance in point is the composition of the elected National Assembly in which, allegedly, about 30% of the elected representatives are informers of the military regime.8 The net result is that whereas in the Mujib regime an effort was made to separate the political elements from the military, the Zia regime succeeded in welding the two inseparably. Quantitatively, five divisions, with shortages in their armored corps,
7 L. Lifschultz, "Abu Taher's Last Testament," p. 1352.
8 This belief is widely held by the Opposition elite. However, upon checking the background of some of the suspect representatives, the author found that the allegations are not baseless.

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total 60,000 fighting men. Taking together the Ansars and the BDR, each sector would have a fighting strength of 30,000 men.9 Concerning internal security, these 150,000 fighting men would have basic loyalty to the Zia regime, and, it is hoped, contain any clandestine revolutionary cells within the regular army started by the JSD and the Taher
group.

However, despite the efforts of the government to maintain the loyalty of the mass of soldiery, widespread corruption and injustice in the government could very well turn the otherwise loyal contingents into rebel units. The "aid to civil actions" coupled with the intense patriotism of the Bengali armed forces could make it extremely difficult for the Zia regime to prevent gradual dissatisfaction and the resulting frustration among ordinary soldiers. When presented with the choice in 1975, the soldiers rose against a section of the elite. It is quite possible that given the opportunity the armed forces would rise again against the officer class as a way of registering their protest against the elite's mishandling of the politico-economic situation. But the future of class relations within the armed forces does not seem as grim as it once did. The younger officers, taking their lessons from the past, have established a rapport between themselves and the ordinary soldiers. Starting with the post-liberation recruits to the officers' class, from second lieutenants to newly promoted majors, an understanding seems to have developed between the officers and the rank and file. Ordinarily, the new trend of increasing rapport between soldiers and their young officerswould assure the Zia regime of stability within the armed forces. But the nature of the relationship between officers recruited in the post-liberation period and the soldiers in the paramilitary forces is yet to be assessed. If the sectoral plan of insuring internal security of the country is to succeed, meticulous efforts must be made to coordinate personnel policies of the regular army with that of the paramilitary groups, with the hope that there will be a comparable growth of informal organization in both military and paramilitary forces. Cohort groupings with their ethos and value system are aspects of informal organization which could make the decision implementing process of a formal organization more effective. Indeed, formal organization within the armed forces could expose only the tip of the iceberg, making it almost impossible
9 In 1976 the total armed forces of Bangladesh were estimated at 63,000, with 3,000 Air Force and 1,000 Navy personnel. Additionally, there were 20,000 personnel of Bangladesh Rifles chiefly used to patrol the borders. Military hardware included 30 tanks, 7 patrol boats, 9 MiG 21's, and 11 helicopters. Defense expenditures in dollars were 52 million in 1975-1976, compared to $65 million in 1973-1974. Military Balance, 1976-77, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1976. As for arms imports, Bangladesh imported $10 million (constant 1976) worth of arms in 1975 and the same amount in 1976, compared to $51 million (constant 1976) in 1973 and $19 million (constant 1976) in 1977. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-1977, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Publication 100, 1979.

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for political and military planners to evaluate the loyalty and effectiveness of the fighting men. But in order for decision-makers and planners to come to grips with the internal problems, personnel being the most important one, they must involve representatives of both officers and soldiers in the planning process. The "Catch 22" is that such involvement of officers,particularly the junior ones, and the ranks is impossible to achieve unless the planners are serious about involving those who are going to be affected by their plans. Image and credibility of the planners are equally important factors and could make a difference between lukewarm involvement and real involvement of operational people with the planners in their reorganizational efforts. Evidence indicates that the sectoral plan of the Bangladesh army lacks proper inputs from junior officers and soldiers. The ideological conflicts which once gave rise to clandestine grouping and factionalism within the Bengali armed forces are still important for the military planners. To insure the state's interal security they must define their goals for reorganization, keeping in view the significance of ideological commitments in this context. An understanding and a proper appraisal of the condition which led to the soldiers' revolts in 1975 and during 1977 would aid the military planners in adopting the most desirable ideology for mobilizing rank and file support for their sectoral plan of national security and defense. But it is questionable whether or to what extent, if at all, the military decision-makers would be able to utilize the appropriate ideology for defining their long-term goals and short-term objectives within an environment of gross socioeconomic inequity. Unless the contradictions in the post-liberation period in Bangladesh are resolved one way or the other, lasting military reorganization having a minimum of stability and administrative equilibrium will remain as elusive as ever. So far, the government's strategy to neutralize radical opposition, particularly within the armed forces, has been pragmatic. President Ziaur Rahman has met with partial success in his effort to lure away JSD-leaning radical officers and men within the armed forces.10He has not only given blanket pardons to these radicals but has also offered them trusted positions within the army. This strategy of cooption has its limits. First, it can encourage opportunism within the group whose ideal is patriotism and service to the nation. Secondly, this non-ideological cooption could be used by radical elements within the army to bolster their own support and to expand their following. Finally, Ziaur Rahman's efforts at non-ideological cooption may be viewed by these radical elements as a sign of weakness on the part of the governments which would make the government's efforts counterproductive. Whatever may be the outcome of the government's efforts to neutralize radical opposition, the ideological aspects must not be brushed aside in favor of short-range benefits. Dealing with the problems of the armed forces
10 Interview with President Ziaur Rahman on August 24, 1979 in Dacca.

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in one of the most unstable political entities, the leadership in Bangladesh must not lose sight of what could happen if their non-ideological action should result in the break-up of the only organized, cohesive, and nationalistic group within the Bangladesh polity. Devoid of an ideological framework for military reorganization, personal relations between the officers and the non-officer class are likely to remain as uncertain as before despite the new trend of closeness between junior officers and soldiers. The rapport between the two groups in the absence of an ideological frame of reference will be personalized rather than institutionalized. In that event, the possibility of coups d'etat and military uprisings would increase, eroding governmental legitimacy, if any, and undermining internal security and defense capability of the fledgling nation. Repetitions of the majors' successful coup against the "father of the nation" could then occur at regular intervals. The "aid to civil" phenomenon would, under the circumstances, act as a doctrinal force lacking any ideological basis, which could turn the younger officers against their older colleagues, unleashing a centrifugal force hard to contain. After a series of lieutenants' coups the scenario might again change, pitting the soldiers against their officers once again. In order to get out of such a vicious cycle, the Bangladeshi military organization needs to be institutionalized with a modicum of equity and justice ensured in the hierarchic relationships. Pressed with the need to utilize human and material resources more effectively, the political decision-makers might change their old ways of imposing decisions and plans, particularly in regard to the military organization, from the top without giving the middle and lower echelons and the public a chance to provide feedback about the usefulness of such decisions and plans.

ZILLUR R. KHAN is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science,

University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh.