A.

Deterrence fails-empirically proven

Kober 10
research Iellow in Ioreign policy studies at the Cato Institute (6/13, Stanley, 'The Deterrence Illusion,
http://www.cato.org/pubdisplay.php?pubid11898)
The Iirst world war was the product oI a mode oI rational thinking that went badly oII course. The peace oI Europe was
based on security assurances. Germany was the protector oI Austria-Hungary, and Russia was the protector oI Serbia. The prospect oI
escalation was supposed to prevent war, and it did until, Iinally, it didn't. The Russians, who should have been
deterred they had suIIered a terrible deIeat at the hands oI Japan just a Iew years beIore decided they had to come to the
support oI their Iellow Slavs. As countries honoured their commitments, a system that was designed to prevent war instead
widened it. We have also been living in an age oI globalisation, especially since the end oI the cold war, but it too is
increasingly being challenged. And just like the situation at the beginning oI the last century, deterrence is not
working. Much is made, Ior example, oI the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) invoking Article V the Iamous "three musketeers"
pledge that an attack on one member is to be considered as an attack on all Iollowing the terrorist attacks oI September 11. But the United
States is the most powerIul member oI NATO by Iar. Indeed, in 2001, it was widely considered to be a hegemon, a
hyperpower. Other countries wanted to be in NATO because they Ielt an American guarantee would provide
security. And yet it was the US that was attacked. This Iailure oI deterrence has not received the attention it
deserves. It is, aIter all, not unique. The North Vietnamese were not deterred by the American guarantee to South
Vietnam. Similarly, Hezbollah was not deterred in Lebanon in the 1980s, and American Iorces were assaulted in
Somalia. What has been going wrong? The successIul deterrence oI the superpowers during the cold war led to the belieI
that iI such powerIul countries could be deterred, then lesser powers should Iall into line when conIronted with an
overwhelmingly powerIul adversary. It is plausible, but it may be too rational. For all their ideological diIIerences, the US and
the Soviet Union observed red lines during the cold war. There were crises Berlin, Cuba, to name a couple but these did not touch on
emotional issues or vital interests, so that compromise and retreat were possible. Indeed, what we may have missed in the west is the importance
oI retreat in Soviet ideology. "Victory is impossible unless |the revolutionary parties| have learned both how to attack and how to retreat
properly," Lenin wrote in LeIt-Wing Communism: An InIantile Disorder. When the Soviets retreated, the US took the credit. Deterrence worked.
But what iI retreat was part oI the plan all along? What iI, in other words, the Soviet Union was the exception rather than the rule? That question
is more urgent because, in the post-cold war world, the US has expanded its security guarantees, even as its enemies show they are not impressed.
The Iraqi insurgents were not intimidated by President Bush's challenge to "bring 'em on". The Taliban have made
an extraordinary comeback Irom oblivion and show no respect Ior American power. North Korea is demonstrating
increasing belligerence. And yet the US keeps emphasising security through alliances.


1. Heg collapse doesn`t cause global nuclear war - conflicts would be small and
managable
Haas 08
Richard Haas (president oI the Council on Foreign Relations, Iormer director oI policy planning Ior the Department oI State, Iormer
vice president and director oI Ioreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting proIessor oI
international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment Ior International Peace, a lecturer in public
policy at Harvard University`s John F. Kennedy School oI Government, and a research associate at the International Institute Ior
Strategic Studies) April 2008 'Ask the Expert: What Comes AIter Unipolarity?
http://www.cIr.org/publication/16063/asktheexpert.html
Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances oI another world war? Will nuclear deterrence
continue to prevent a large scale conIlict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance oI a
world war, i.e., one involving the major powers oI the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This
reIlects more than anything else the absence oI disputes or goals that could lead to such a conIlict. Nuclear
deterrence might be a contributing Iactor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers
would justiIy any use oI nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the Iundamental reason great power relations
are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and
Iinancial Ilows and avoids large-scale conIlict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conIlict as we
Ieared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conIlicts involving terrorist groups, militias,
rogue states, etc.
. Heg destroys Russian relations and causes global war
Press TV 9
('Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony, Sept 15
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id106209&sectionid351020602)
Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies oI a state whose
actions aIIect the world. Speaking at the opening oI a global security conIerence in the central Russian city oI Yaroslavl on Monday, Dmitry Medvedev said those
problems oI one country, have the potential to lead to international conIlict. "This happens immediately and incompetence and
reluctance to solve one's own problems inIlict damage not only to your country but to a huge number oI other countries," he added. The Russian president also
lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies oI a country that led to the global Iinancial melt
down. Medvedev did not reIer to the United States by name but the target oI his comments was clear. His remarks came shortly beIore the US President Barack Obama
delivered a key speech in New York, where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective Iailure". Earlier in March the Kremlin had
suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications. Medvedev's comments
Iurther developed those ideas, attacking eIIorts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects oI
global supremacy . 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'". There can be no "high-Ilown justiIication Ior military adventures, suppression oI rights and
Ireedoms -- oI any illegal activities," he stressed.

3. &$ heg breeds resentment and terrorism
Walt 5
(Stephen, ProIessor oI at Harvard, 9/5/5, 'Taming American Power, anglais.u-
paris10.Ir/IMG/doc/TamingAmericanPowerStephenM.doc)
Proponents oI a muscular U.S. Ioreign policy tend to portray anti Americanism as hostility toward
American values or simple resentment oI U.S. dominance. President Bush has said that "America was
targeted Ior attack because we're the brightest beacon oI Ireedom ... in the world." He later explained, "The
terrorists who attacked our country on September 11, 2001, were not protesting our policies. They were
protesting our existence." And the Pentagon's new National DeIense Strategy, issued in March, stated, "Our
leading position in the world will continue to breed unease, a degree oI resentment, and resistance."