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CHINA
China is going to attack us - they want to counterbalance against us and take Taiwan this causes accidental launch fastest timeframe, immediate triggers econ collapse, that causes all violence to escalate Taiwan war leads to superpower nuclear exchange extinction is inevitable in a world we fail to deter China

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China Will Attack/ A2: China Not Threat


Chinese attack and space race is inevitable this takes out their offense 3 reasons 1) Percpetion of vulnerability- thats Tellis 08- China sees our space assets as fragile and will take them down to gain dominance 2) Chinese doctrine- thats Wortzel 08- Chinese military journals prove they develop jamming satellites and know that space control enables Earth control, and theyre much more aggressive with territorial claims 3) PLA insulated from pressure- thats MacDonald 11- they would initiate war and traditional barriers dont check 4) China weaponizing now- thats Peoples 08- Chinese techno-nationalism means they develop dual-use tech to undermine US China has conducted multiple ASAT tests they will continue Lele, 11 - a former Air Force Wing Commander, with a post graduate degree in Physics and Defence and Strategic Studies [Date used: June 24, 2011 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/military-&-space/Militarization-ofSpace-.html Militarization of Space] On the other hand, this Chinese

act of destroying a satellite should not be considered as an one-off event. On 11 January 2007, they successfully carried out an anti-satellite (ASAT) test, but this was preceded by three earlier unsuccessful attempts. Their interests in the weaponisation of space has been known for some time. However, China had continuously talked about establishing an international structure for stopping the weaponisation of space over the last few years while assiduously working towards developing space weapons. According to a 2001 report, China had also ground tested an advanced anti-satellite weapon called Parasitic Satellite. It could be deployed on an experimental basis and enter the phase of space tests in the near future. This ASAT system can be used against many types of satellites in different orbits like communication satellites, navigational satellites, reconnaissance satellites and early warning satellites. According to a Space Daily report this nanometer-sized parasitic satellite is designed to be deployed
and attached to the enemys satellite. There are three components to the ASAT parasitic satellites system: a carrier (mother) satellite and launcher, and a ground control system. During conflict, commands are sent to this satellite to interfere or destroy the host satellite. The cost of building these satellites is 0.1 percent to 1 percent of any typical satellite. The January 2001, Donald Rumsfeld led Space Commission, had recommended that the military should ensure that the President will have the option to deploy weapons in space. It was reported by the media that in September 2006 Beijing had secretly used lasers to paint US spy satellites with the aim of blinding their sensitive surveillance devices to prevent spy photography as they pass over China. The Chinese aim was not to destroy the US satellites but to make them useless over Chinese territory. It has also been reported that the US military was so alarmed by this Chinese activity that it has begun to carry out test attacks against its own satellites to determine the dimensions of this threat.

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PGS
Missiles follow a different flight path to avoid Russia or China Amy E Woolf 9, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Service, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range
Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress, January 26, 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33067.pdf The Air Force has also indicated that it could alter the trajectory of ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads so that they would not resemble the trajectories that would be followed by nuclear-armed ballistic missiles on course for targets in Russia or China.66 As was noted above, CAV is have the capability to travel 3,000 miles downrange and 3,000 miles cross-range, after release from its ballistic missile delivery system. Hence, according to the Air Force, the missile could travel on a shaped trajectory or, if launched from the East Coast towards the Middle East, a southern trajectory, so that it would not fly over Russia or China, and make up for the added distance by using the flight range of the CAV. The missile could also launch with a depressed trajectory, then use the aerodynamic lift of the CAV to achieve the range it would need to
reach around the globe without flying over Russia.

All risks associated with CGPS are overstated and false its successful in combating terrorism, proliferation, sustaining deterrence and preventing nuclear war in general Friedman 8-19 (Jonah, Research Intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues, CSIS, 8-19-11, The Case for Conventional Prompt Global Strike, http://csis.org/blog/case-conventional-prompt-global-strike)DR
Last week, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency carried out its second test of the Falcon Hypersonic Technology Vehicle, meant to be used in an eventual convention prompt global strike (CPGS) capability. Unfortunately, the test seems to have been a failure, with the vehicle being lost after about nine minutes due to an anomaly. The failure of this test has the potential to derail any further pursuit of this technology. Some might argue that this is just as well, since the capabilities which conventional

prompt global strike offers are not only unnecessary, but could also be destabilizing. Yet opponents exaggerate the dangers of CPGS while underemphasizing the benefits that it could bring to U.S. deterrence, counterterrorism, and non-proliferation policies by providing the United States with a greater range of military options. The objective of the CPGS program is to provide the United States with the ability to strike any target on the globe in under an hour with a conventional warhead, without the need to use forward-deployed assets. The CPGS program would signal a departure from current U.S. capabilities. Although the United States possesses ICBMs which can hit any spot on earth in approximately an hour, these are normally tipped with nuclear warheads. Likewise, although the United States maintains a variety of conventional strike assets, these may not be capable of responding within such a short period of time, even if forward-deployed. Amy Woolf, in a recent Congressional Research Service report outlined several possible scenarios in which CPGS might be used, including: A terrorist organizations leadership was known to have gathered in a given location in a neutral state. Weapons of mass destruction were known to be located temporarily in a rural part of a neutral state. (This scenario envisions the WMD are in a rural part of the country, presumably so that civilian casualties would be minimized.) A cargo of nuclear materials had been shipped to a neutral state by a terrorist organization. A rogue regime with nuclear weapons had intention to use them against an ally of the United States. These cases illustrate examples of when the promptness of CPGS, its global reach, or its non-nuclear aspects might be highly valuable. Yet, Woolf is skeptical about the plausibility of such scenarios. She points out that the mission requirements for CPGS are based on
a number of potentially unlikely assumptions, namely that: a future conflict would take place far from existing U.S. bases overseas, and possibly far from ocean areas where the United States has deployed most of its sea-based forcesthat a future conflict could develop quickly, allowing too little time for the United States to move its forces into the region, either by acquiring basing rights on land or by moving sea-based forces closer to the theater of conflictthat targets could appear with little notice and remain vulnerable for a short period of time, factors that place a premium on the ability to launch quickly and arrive on target quicklythat U.S. forces are likely to face an anti-access threat, or air defense capabilities that would impede operations by U.S. aircraft. She concludes that it is highly unlikely that many of these characteristics would exist in a future conflict, and that such a conflict would constitute a worstcase scenario that may occur rarely, or not at all, in its entirety, and that other weapons systems can respond to many of these requirements in most circumstances. It is certainly true that the circumstances in which CPGS could be most useful would be rare, but that does not mean that the United States should not have the capability to respond to such circumstances. As Woolf herself notes in her report, many of these characteristics were present in Afghanistan in 2001, but in her assessment, the fact that they are unlikely to occur again in the future suggests that CPGS may not be necessary. Yet, CPGS is meant to be a niche capability, to be used in only a narrow range of contingencies (current plans call for procuring as few as three missiles) which may occur rarely, if ever. That they

might be used only exceedingly seldom should not discourage pursuit of a capability which could be sorely needed to counter uniquely dangerous or time-sensitive threats. A number of possible scenarios in which CPGS would be useful are given by Bruce Sugden in his 2009 International Security article, Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles. According to Sugden, CPGS could be used to deal with emerging, time-sensitive, soft targets, such as exposed WMD launchers, terrorist leaders, and sites of state transfers of WMD to terrorists or other states within roughly one hour of a decision to attack, particularly when U.S. forces are unavailable in the vicinity or are otherwise committed. He provides two specific examples: the 1998 attack against an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan (using cruise missiles), and the start of Operation Iraqi

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Freedom in 2003, where U.S. aircraft were not able to strike Saddam Hussein during the initial bombardment. CPGS would also allow the United States to intervene in a situation without having to resort to the use of a nuclear-tipped ICBM, which could in turn enhance U.S. deterrence posture. As M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo argue in their Institute for
National Security Studies article Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability? A long-range conventional strike capability might enhance deterrence and assurance by providing an effective and usable (and thus more credible) strike option. They bring an example from Brad Roberts, current Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, who pointed out in 2010 that in a case where a nuclear missile launch from North Korea appeared imminent, it would be useful to have other means with which to respond other than a nuclear attack. However, CPGS also presents potential dangers chief among them is the problem of ambiguity. Opponents of CPGS point out that there always exists the danger that other nuclear states such as China or Russia will misinterpret the launch of a CPGS weapon as the start of a nuclear attack on themselves, since missiles intended for potential targets (such as Iran or North Korea) would likely fly near or over China or Russia. Moreover, as Amy Woolf notes: The potential for misunderstanding is compounded by the short time of flight of these missiles, giving these nations little time to evaluate the event, assess the threat, and respond with their own forces. Under such circumstances, critics claim that these nations may conclude they have no other option than to respond with their own nuclear weapons. Proponents of CPGS argue, however, that this risk can be mitigated by the differing trajectories of ICBMs

and proposed CPGS weapons. Whereas traditional ICBMs (which are most associated with delivering nuclear payloads) follow an exoatmospheric trajectory, CPGS missiles would follow an endoatmospheric trajectory (as well as exhibiting other defining characteristics as a result of its boost-glide flight). Moreover, the greater maneuverability of CPGS weapons would also allow them to limit the extent to which they must overfly states such as Russia or China on their way to other targets, thereby reducing concern in those states. (Opponents, however, might counter that the ability of CPGS weapons to change their trajectories
unlike an ICBM would make it harder for states to predict CPGS targets and as a result, would increase their apprehension of any CPGS strike.) Yet

neither China nor Russia need to fear that CPGS could pose a threat to their nuclear deterrents, since a report by the National Academies (cited by Bunn and Manzo) notes that the United States would require thousands of CPGS missiles in order to do so. Current U.S. plans calling for only a handful of weapons should thus help to allay Chinese and Russian fears. The other side of the ambiguity issue is the inability of other states to be certain whether a CPGS missile is armed
with a conventional or nuclear warhead. While the United States can claim that this technology will be used exclusively to deliver conventional payloads, in the event of a launch, other states cannot be so sure. A variety of solutions to this problem have been proposed. Amy Woolf cites one which would see

CPGS missiles deployed only at bases without any nuclear weapons or association with them. Another, proposed by Bunn and Manzo, would entail a series of confidence-building measures which would enable states such as Russia or China to obtain enough metrics about a CPGS launch that they would be able to differentiate it from an ICBM launch. Moreover, it should be noted, that while both of these ambiguities (the location of the target and the character of the warhead) pose risks, the threat of a Russian or Chinese nuclear attack in response to a CPGS launch is extremely unlikely. As Bunn and Manzo point out: if Russia detects the launch of a few U.S. CPGS missiles but is unsure of their location and payload (conventional or nuclear), Russian leaders would be unlikely to conclude that the United States was starting a nuclear war with Russia in a bolt-from-the-blue attack with so few missiles. At the very least, Russian leaders would have strong incentives to wait until they had more information about the targets of such a small strike before employing their nuclear forces against the United States. Some might further argue that CPGS could be destabilizing in that their nonnuclear nature means that the bar to their use is correspondingly lower. It is certainly true that one of the goals of CPGS is to allow the United States to respond more easily than if it had to choose between the hard options of a nuclear attack or no response at all. Yet this is one of the chief strengths of CPGS. In a situation where the choice is between not responding at all to a major threat and breaching the nuclear threshold, CPGS would offer a more flexible option that could help reestablish deterrence in a crisis situation that had grown out of control, without guaranteeing nuclear escalation. Moreover, the use of CPGS in a
crisis would still be subject to the weighing of pros and cons, as with any other weapon. Bunn and Manzo give the example of a situation in which tensions between China and the United States are raised over Taiwan. In such a scenario, these tensions would necessarily impact deliberations about whether the launch of CPGS weapons (say against a North Korean missile launch site) is prudent, given the prospects for misinterpretation, but that would be true for almost any military action undertaken under these circumstances. Joshua Pollack, writing in a 2009 article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists entitled Evaluating Conventional Prompt Global Strike, argues that another flaw in the CPGS plan is that it does not rule out the possibility that the capability could at some point be used against targets in Russia or China (at least according to the National Academies report mentioned above). He finds the reports argument that CPGS offers a lower probability of nuclear retaliation unappealing, since: In other words, conventional prompt global strike attacks on nuclear-armed powers are acceptable because they are less dangerous than preemptive nuclear attackan argument that could justify almost any act imaginable. Yet Pollack misses the point here. Many actions taken by the United States against Russia or China in an

emergency would be provocative. The report is not suggesting that the lower probability of triggering nuclear war means that CPGS should be used against Russia, but only that if an extreme contingency called for an attack on Russia or China, a conventional strike would be less provocative than a nuclear one. The idea of CPGS is not to make it easier to go to war with a peer or near-peer competitor such as Russia or China, since as Bunn and Manzo note, this decision is constantly darkened by the nuclear shadow. As argued above, the use of CPGS in any situation would have to be weighed against the risks involved. In that sense, it differs little from using any other conventional weapon. While CPGS does pose some risks to strategic stability, those risks appear to be minimal and manageable, given the multitude of mitigating factors.
Bunn and Manzo point out that, where nuclear cruise missiles were once thought necessary to defeat air defenses, that task can (and is) now accomplished with conventional versions. The destabilizing influence of this shift appears to have been relatively minimal, and given that

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CPGS weapons will possesses features which help to distinguish them from ICBMS, the instability they engender should be equally manageable. CPGS will give the United States a capability to counter highly dangerous and time-sensitive threats involving unique circumstances. Both the likelihood that such a capability will be used, and the probability that it will undermine strategic stability appear to be low. It makes more sense to be prepared to face admittedly unlikely but plausible scenarios than to remain unprepared due to exaggerated concerns over strategic stability.

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AEROSPACE
They concede that the Aerospace industry is key to the world economy, extend ODonnell that economic collapse causes nuclear war, this o/w any of their DAs on magnitude and timeframe.

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HEG

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Framing
Few conceded 1ac framing arguments a. neo-realism dictates the international sphere countries operate based on whats best for their national security interest when the US is vulnerable it is in their best interest to go to space b. recent indications that China will weaponize their white papers are lies, their system isnt transparent, they are building weapons dont be dissuaded thats Peoples c. the PLA is insulated from policymaking diplomatic backtrackings are largely irrelevant the pla acts for the militarys best interest thats Macdonald d. current US vulnerabilities guarantee a Chinese attack on our systems they see us as too dependent thats Tellis

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Overview
Heg is good, but it`s on the brink of collapsing now our assets are vulnerable and countries are challenging us plan key to solve all conflict escalation and superpower wars. Heg outweighs all their impacts as allows US to be guarantor of stability and ensure global order- 60 stable years prove- thats Zhan and Shi 07.

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Development
1. We meet we change the strategic landscape of space to include US military defenses 2. CI
The development of outer space includes remote sensing, telecommunications, mineral mining and military use Goh 07 Ph. D., Legal Advisor and Project Manager at the Business and Legal Support Department of the German Aerospace Center, Lecturer at the
Institute of Air and Space Law, University of Cologne, (Grardine Meishan, Dispute settlement in international space law: a multi-door courthouse for outer space Pg. 24) The rapid advancement of scientific discoveries and technological progress was another motive for the lack of enthusiasm to incur additional obligation with respect to compulsory dispute settlement procedures. Political and economic interests steadily increased as to the development of the use of

outer space. Remote sensing, direct broadcasting, telecommunications, the mineral exploitation of the Moon and other celestial bodies, as well as the extraordinary tactical advantages of the military use of outer space added to the
mounting conflicting interests between States, both space-faring and non-space-faring. States consciousness that their varied interests could in the future mature into severe conflicts was undeniably a substantial persuasion for being opposed to all compulsory procedures, and for choosing the uninhibited maneuvering characteristic of negotiation and traditional diplomatic intercourse.

3. Their interp is bad for debate


a. overlimits- there are no good col affs, lunar mining is singlehandedly the worst aff put out at a camp, and cooperation is extratopical thanks for destroying the topic b. holistic education military is good education it allows us to better investigate global affairs and they lmti it out c. they dont lose ground the 1nc was prty specific Potential Abuse is not a voter impossible to quantify and judge intervention competing interps causes a limits race to the bottom artificially excluding the aff default to reasonability

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Multilat
1. Non-unique constellation cancellation
Newton 11 PhD from UA-Huntsville, Leader at the Center for System Studies (Elizabeth, United States space policy

and international partnership, Space Policy, Vol. 27, Science Direct)


President Obamas 2010 policy is notable for the shift over the 2006 version, which most agree to be more a stylistic change of tone, rather than one of substance. The messages conveying the need for multilateral action are likely to be welcome to external audiences ears and suggest a more consultative approach. That said, the cancellation of the Constellation program was done without prior notice or consultation

with international partners, and much of the debate on the subject has centered on the domestic repercussions of the decision, not the impact on the partners. There is evidently a mismatch between intent and such unilateralist actions.

2. The US wont pursue a code of conduct, and even if we did, China, India, and Pakistan would all violate it
Hitchens 10 Director of UN Institute for Disarmament Research, former director of the Center for Defense Information and led its Space Security Project (Summer 2010, Theresa, Multilateralism in Space: Opportunities and Challenges for Achieving Space Security, Space and Defense, Vol. 4, No. 2, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_4_No_2_ files/ Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf) MGM
Still, it

is by no means clear that discussions within the CD would result in the near-term or medium-term establishment of negotiations on PAROS or the PPWT. First of all, while the Obama campaign signaled support for an eventual space weapons treaty, the administrations stance has shifted considerably over the last year toward a more cautious approach and, according to American insiders, there is a serious debate within the administration on what, if any, multilateral agreements for space security should be pursued. Led by the Department of Defense (DOD), a review of U.S. national security space posture was begun in May 2009.58 In July 2009, the National Security Council began a review of U.S. National Space Policy, last revised by the Bush administration in 2006.59 The space posture review originally was slated to be finished by 1 February 2010, but in January stalled and will now not likely be completed until year end or even the beginning of 2011. While Pentagon officials cited the need to wait for the new National Space Policy before formally deciding on a national space posture which would outline what space systems would be pursued by DOD, the Air Force, and the intelligence community U.S. officials familiar with the internal discussions also noted that fierce infighting between the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and DOD on responsibility and budgeting for satellite assets had contributed to the delay.60 The National Space Policy review was originally given a deadline of 1 October 2009,61 and then was delayed until December 2009, and as of today remains unfinished. While the review is expected to call for a renewed emphasis on multilateral cooperation in space, there is little evidence that U.S. agreement to PAROS negotiations on a space weapons ban will be forthcoming, due to ongoing concerns about the verifiability of such a treaty. At the October 2009 session of the General Assembly First Committee, Garold Larson, then acting head of the United
States mission to the CD, said: In consultation with allies, the Obama administration is currently in the process of assessing U.S. space policy, programs, and options for international cooperation in space as a part of a comprehensive review of space policy. This review of space cooperation options includes a blank slate analysis of the feasibility and desirability of options for effectively verifiable arms control measures that enhance the national security interests of the United States and its allies.62 Second of all, despite Chinas strong diplomacy surrounding the need for a PPWT, it remains

unclear whether the Chinese government would be willing to trade-off ASAT development capabilities in exchange for a space-based weapons ban. However, Chinese diplomats over the last few months have shifted their rhetoric to insist that an ASAT ban could be considered in future negotiations on the PPWT. The Pentagons 2009 annual report to Congress on Chinese military power, released in late March 2009, stated that: China is developing the ability to attack an adversarys space assets. Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) documents emphasize destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemys reconnaissance/ observation and communication satellites, suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among initial targets of attack to blind and deafen the enemy. The same PLA analysis of U.S. and Coalition military operations also states that destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors will deprive the opponents of initiatives on the battlefield and [make it difficult] for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play.63 Concomitantly, willingness by China to include terrestrial-based ASATs in any discussions or negotiations

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would in essence be a signal about Chinas good faith on efforts to prevent space weaponization in that while it is not certain that the United States would under any circumstances agree to negotiations of a space-based weapons ban, it is certain that the United States would not enter such negotiations without the inclusion of terrestrial-based ASATs. In addition, India with an eye to rival China has been sending signals that it too is working to develop ASAT capabilities. At a January 2010 meeting of Indian scientists, the director general of Indias Defense Research and Development Organization
(DRDO) said that India is working to ensure space security and to protect our satellites. At the same time, we are also working on how to deny the enemy access to its space assets.64 Many Indian experts now believe that India would not be willing to negotiate any space weapons

treaty until it has successfully demonstrated ASAT technologies. Indias political and military elites, these experts say, never reconciled themselves with the fact that Indias failure to conduct a nuclear test prior to the 1968 NPT accord demoted India to a have not status, and are determined not to make the same mistake again. If and when globally negotiated restraints are placed on such strategic defensive systems or technologies perhaps restraints of some sort of ASAT testing, hit-to-kill technologies India will already have crossed the technical threshold in that regard, and acknowledgement of such status [will be] grand-fathered into any such future agreement.65 Indeed, according to Indian diplomats, the thinking
in India is that efforts toward PAROS have been superseded by events, and that any international accords will need to focus instead on managing the already on-going ASAT arms race and the time for a treaty negotiation is nowhere near mature. Needless to say, development by

India of ASATs would, in turn, almost assure similar efforts by Pakistan and thus mitigate any support of a weapons ban treaty. And certainly, if India resists near-term moves to launch the PAROS talks, Pakistan will also.

3. Consensus-building is impossible, which structurally makes multilateralism impossible


Hitchens 10 Director of UN Institute for Disarmament Research, former director of the Center for Defense Information and led its Space Security Project (Summer 2010, Theresa, Multilateralism in Space: Opportunities and Challenges for Achieving Space Security, Space and Defense, Vol. 4, No. 2, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_4_No_2_ files/ Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf) MGM Efforts at multilateral approaches toward developing new regulations and legal measures to ensure the sustained, safe, and secure use of space remain difficult. The critical obstacle for all three of the major institutional frameworks COPUOS, ITU, and CD on space governance is the desire to obtain consensus. The CD is particularly unable to reach agreements by the fact that consensus is required, even for procedural matters a fact that is aggravated by the linkages in the longstanding agenda between nuclear disarmament, space security, and conventional disarmament issues, each having a different priority for different states. From the struggles in all three fora, it is clear that there is a widespread reluctance among states to enact new legal restraints on space activities in any domain. Indeed, some states seem intent on avoiding the legal responsibilities that they arguably already have accepted. Thus, the development of any new treaty in the near-term is unlikely whether it is designed to establish safety measures or arms control for space.

Empirically denied X37B marked the beginning of an arms race and winning that race is good
Edwards 10 (Tim, Managing editor of The First Post and former managing editor of Yahoo News UK, 4-26-10, Top Secret Space Plane has Americas Enemies Scared, http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/62593,newscomment,news-politics,top-secret-space-bomber-has-america-enemies-scared-china-shenlong-x-37b)DR A top secret robotic space plane has blasted off from Cape Canaveral, and the involvement of a US military agency in the project has Iran - and maybe China - worried about the possibilities of what could be a prototype 'space bomber'. Officially, the X-37B (above) is on a test flight to evaluate the vehicle's Performance. But the space plane's pedigree as an offshoot of the shuttle programme has led some to suggest it could eventually conduct espionage missions in orbit - and is another step on the road to the "weaponisation of space". The X-37 project was begun in 1999 by Nasa and built by Boeing's evocatively
titled Phantom Works division. It was envisaged as a 'lifeboat' for the International Space Station. But in 2004 Nasa ditched it and development was taken over by the secretive Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which has the stated aim of "maintaining technological superiority of the US military and preventing technological surprise". Now in the hands of the US Air Force, the X-37B finally piggybacked into orbit aboard an Atlas V

rocket yesterday, two years late. Gary Payton, the US Air Force's deputy under-secretary for space programmes said the mission's top priorities were
"getting into orbit, getting the payload bay doors open, the solar array deployed, learning about on-orbit attitude control and bringing it all back". The length of the mission is unknown, but the X-37B, which looks like a cross between a space shuttle and a cruise missile, can stay in

orbit for up to 270 days. When it returns, it will autonomously navigate its way back to land at the Vandenberg Air Force base in

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first robotic re-entry in the history of the US space programme. America's enemies are watching closely. Iran's government mouthpiece, Press TV, has dubbed the X-37B a "secret space warplane" and a "first generation of US 'space Predator drones'" in a reference to the automated fighter planes the US military uses in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The truth is, according to Rick Fisher, senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, the US already
has a 'space bomber': it's called the space shuttle and it's about to be retired. "For the US it is very fortunate that this long overdue programme reaches its testing point the year the space shuttle retires," says Fisher. "The X-37B, like the space shuttle before it, provides a much-needed

commodity in the dangerous uncertainty of space: deterrence." Fisher explains that in the 1970s Moscow viewed the US shuttle as a 'space bomber' aimed at them. As a result, the Russians proceeded to launch a series of space combat programmes that would have given them military space dominance in the 1990s had the Soviet Union not fallen.
Documents declassified by Moscow show that the now-defunct MIR space station was intended as a base for up to four Soviet wingless space shuttle bombers. It has been suggested that the space shuttle's large, heat-shielded wings were proof that the vehicle had dual-use military capabilities. As for the

X-37B, its ability to manoeuvre whilst in orbit, and carry or pick up a payload, has led to the conjuring up of exotic James Bond scenarios. For example, it could take off into the kind of 'stealth orbit' between the North and South Poles favoured by spy satellites, 'kidnap' a foreign spy satellite and bring it home. The owner of the spy satellite would suspect what had happened, because it is impossible to hide a Cape Canaveral launch, but they would be able to prove nothing. Fisher confirms the X-37B can perform a range of non-military or military missions as the US leadership pleases - an ambiguity of
purpose that serves America well in a world where China seems keen to pursue its own weaponisation of space. "Did the US Air Force have secret space combat payloads for the shuttle?" asks Fisher. "I don't know, but I am very grateful that the Soviets and others had to consider that possibility. I am also assured that China and others now have to consider the military potential of the X-37B." China may already be

developing its own space shuttle, Fisher says. The Shenlong or 'divine dragon' test vehicle (pictured above in 2007) could be Beijing's response to the X-37B. "For sure, China will soon have its own similar weapon; if you hadn't noticed, we are in an arms race in space. But who do you want to win this race? The Americans who have provided your GPS since 1996, or the Chinese who would turn off your GPS if some elementary school put a Taiwanese flag in its play?"

4. The US is developing a host of space weapons now


Fakiolas and Fakiolas 9 *PhD in War Studies, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Peloponnese,and Strategy and Southeast European Affairs Analyst AND **Special Advisor on Russian and East European Affairs (June 2009, Efstathios and Tassos, Space control and global hegemony, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 2, http://kida.re.kr/data/kjda/RKJD_A_387383_P.pdf) MGM
At the same time, the

United States is spending billions of dollars in developing and testing offensive space weapons. The Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), which guides conventional weapons into space; the hypervelocity tungsten metal rods designed to strike targets anywhere on the earth; and the energy weapons, which using high-power radio-frequency transmitters can destroy a military command and control system. In one respect, Washington is nearing the ability to destroy space weapons utilizing only the proven technology developed to date.56 Besides this feat, a future global missile defense system is likely to be dominated by U.S. technology.57
latter include, among others, the

5. Deterrence by denial undermines the intent for weaponization by other countries even if its perceived as offensive enemies no longer have an incentive to weaponize.
Harrison et al 9 (Roger G. Director, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, United States Air Force Academy, Collins G. Shackelford, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, Deron R. Jackson, assistant professor deputy director, center for space and defense studies, Summer 2009, Space And Defense Volume Three Number One, http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Space_Deterrence_files /Space_and_Defense_3_1%20Space%20Deterrence.pdf)DR (we do not endorse any gendered language in this article)DR Deterrence by denial is a policy which convinces an adversary undeterred by norms, economic costs, or the threat of retaliation that in the end he cannot achieve the purposes intended by launching an attack. During the Cold War, the advent of long-range nuclear missiles and Soviet conventional superiority in Europe combined to make denial problematic as a centerpiece of doctrine. A host of Cold War doctrines flexible response, defense in depth, rapid reinforcement, assured secondstrike capability were developed to make deterrence by denial more credible. The advent of the triad of submarine launched ballistic

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missiles, hardened land-based ICBMs and strategic bombers on airborne alert could also be portrayed as elements of a denial strategy. President

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Reagans SDI initiative in 1983 brought deterrence by denial to the forefront in the nuclear standoff, at the same time moving the emphasis away from the balance of terror. The nub of the political debate in the United States in these years was whether these were steps to enhance deterrence or preparations for war fighting. In fact, they were both by necessity. No policy of deterrence by denial could be credible without the perception that the U.S. could absorb an initial attack (whether conventional or nuclear) and still fight and win the resulting war, delivering unacceptable damage to the enemy. Accordingly, no strategy of space deterrence by denial can be credible unless a potential adversary perceives that the U.S. military capability within the atmosphere will not be crippled by attacks in space, i.e. that the U.S. will retain superior war fighting capability even after an initial attack. If to this perception is added the conviction that his own space or other capability will also be degraded or destroyed in the process, deterrence is that much stronger.

6. Non-unique Chinese counterspace capabilities shouldve caused an arms race


Larrimore 7 (Scott C., Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force, April 2007, operationally responsive space: a new paradigm or another false start?, https://docs.google.com/viewer? a=v&q=cache:7aSLBGzamIwJ:https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_5ea32116-b119-43ab-8fcb-9565110bb741/display.aspx?rs %3Denginespage+%22operationally+responsive+space %22+relations&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgLlMBw5oYUEFTGdMwyRB2J8JeZTaR2IDAn1GxST_sSC TQFEvOpsYyuxUGuVR2zEkQuTCSYBxmR72XWu2PeNYLhaOLo1R3WBSBR622R_JtwW0dOUsIP9ARsaOVyi8C yZtI3HlY&sig=AHIEtbTGnpwqUBlSnD4u4PWRXLEnNerC8A&pli=1)DR
On January 11, 2007, China

revealed another facet of its emerging military prowess by successfully testing a new direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon against one of its own orbiting satellites. In doing so, it joined the United States and former Soviet Union as the only countries with a manifest potential to attack space platforms. This was the second space weapon tested by the Chinese. In 2006, they illuminated a United States reconnaissance satellite with a laser ASAT weapon, but did not damage the American spacecraft.1 Chinas actions threaten to undermine an implicit multi-decade old space sanctuary policythat is, a space realm unthreatened by space weapons. Chinas feat may be a catalyst to space weapon proliferation around the world.2

7. Defensive options like space surveillance arent controversial


Whitelaw 7 (Kevin, US News and World Report, national security, intelligence, and international affairs, 1204-07, China Aims High Beijing's blast sets off a debate about how to protect U.S. satellites, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2007/12/04/china-aims-high?PageNr=1)DR
There are, however, some defensive

options that are not at all controversial. The Air Force is already working to rebuild its space surveillance network, which atrophied after the end of the Cold War. Using a set of 28 radar sensors at 18 ground stations around the world, along with one sensor in space, officials currently track more than 17,300 objects in space, including satellites and debris. Built with a focus on the Soviet Union, the network today has some gaps in the Eastern and Southern hemispheres.

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Ptx
The plan is massively popular Kyl loves it
Larrimore 7 (Scott C., Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force, April 2007, operationally responsive space: a new paradigm or another false start?, https://docs.google.com/viewer? a=v&q=cache:7aSLBGzamIwJ:https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_5ea32116-b119-43ab-8fcb-9565110bb741/display.aspx?rs %3Denginespage+%22operationally+responsive+space %22+relations&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgLlMBw5oYUEFTGdMwyRB2J8JeZTaR2IDAn1GxST_sSC TQFEvOpsYyuxUGuVR2zEkQuTCSYBxmR72XWu2PeNYLhaOLo1R3WBSBR622R_JtwW0dOUsIP9ARsaOVyi8C yZtI3HlY&sig=AHIEtbTGnpwqUBlSnD4u4PWRXLEnNerC8A&pli=1)DR
Criticism has been much louder from several members of Congress. Senator Jon Kyl

argued, Key policy makers seem oblivious to the nature and the urgency of the threat.8 In speeches following the Chinese ASAT test, Senator Kyl, as well as the former Ranking Member on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Representative Jane Harman and current Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Representative Terry Everett,9 called on the nation to create new Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) capabilities as a means to mitigate the Chinese ASAT threat.10 The members of Congress look to ORS as a means to reconstitute critical assets lost in space combat. In a world where our space assets are likely to be threatened, operationally responsive space capabilities will allow us to quickly and affordably replace assets lost to anti-satellite attacks, Senator Kyl advocated. While a key motivator, ORS is more than just a satellite replenishment strategy. In a broader sense, Congress seeks ORS to launch and activate quickly militarily useful satellites11 in order to supplement a battlefield commanders capabilities.12

Kyls key
McConnell 10 (Mitch, Senate Minority Leader, Jon Kyl, Time 100,
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1984685_1984864_1984901,00.html, EMM)

In the Senate, Arizona's Jon Kyl has built a reputation for his encyclopedic knowledge of domestic and foreign policy, and his hard work and leadership. Few people have his command of policy, his knowledge of its nuances or his grip on how they fit together. This is why so many of his Senate colleagues look to him for policy advice. Kyl, 68, is a principled conservative who knows what is attainable. He believes in the wisdom contained in a sign on President Reagan's desk that said, "There's no limit to what a man can do or where he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." Jon Kyl is a great persuader. As minority whip, the No. 2 position in the Senate Republican leadership, he is responsible for rallying his Republican colleagues for key legislative votes. What is unique is his single-minded focus on convincing them that a particular vote is in the best interests of their state and the nation. Jon demonstrates continually that the essence of Senate power is the power to persuade.

3. Satellite vulnerability means Congress loves the plan


Larrimore 7 (Scott C., Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force, April 2007, operationally responsive space: a new paradigm or another false start?, https://docs.google.com/viewer? a=v&q=cache:7aSLBGzamIwJ:https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_5ea32116-b119-43ab-8fcb-9565110bb741/display.aspx?rs %3Denginespage+%22operationally+responsive+space %22+relations&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgLlMBw5oYUEFTGdMwyRB2J8JeZTaR2IDAn1GxST_sSC TQFEvOpsYyuxUGuVR2zEkQuTCSYBxmR72XWu2PeNYLhaOLo1R3WBSBR622R_JtwW0dOUsIP9ARsaOVyi8C yZtI3HlY&sig=AHIEtbTGnpwqUBlSnD4u4PWRXLEnNerC8A&pli=1)DR

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Regional conflicts, particularly the Middle East, will likely embroil the United States for years to come. Concern is increasing, however, that some regional actors such as Iran or North Korea might develop ASAT weapons to ride atop their proven intermediate ballistic missiles. Concern over United States satellite vulnerability is one reason Congress decided to fund robustly the ORS initiative in 2006 and 2007.

4. Winners win plan specific


Swilley 11 Major (1/28/2011, Scott, Space Power: A Theory for Sustaining US Security Through the Information Age, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA545154&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) MGM Space power contains substantial demonstrated potential for political influence, influence which affects both the domestic population and international actors. The political influence of space power lies within the perception of possibilities. Status as the global space leader provides a critical political overmatch in crafting the perceived possibilities within space commercialization, space militarization, and space exploration into real political influence. The Reykjavik Summit held between President Ronald Reagan and Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev in early October of 1986 is an example of the political influence associated with the possibilities within US space power. The US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or star wars program, proved to be the most valuable bargaining chip for the US in negotiating an arms
reduction of nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. Despite the significant technological challenges and limited progress of the SDI Program at the time of the Reykjavik Summit, the perceived possibilities of the program supplied enormous political power to President

Reagan. Negotiating for the significant reduction in SDI research, Secretary-General Gorbachev proposed the extreme measure of complete mutual
dismantlement of nuclear arms. However, recognizing the political influence of even the possibility of the SDI program, President Reagan countered the offer with limiting the SDI Program to laboratory research while retaining a mutually acceptable level of nuclear arms reduction. The negotiations concluded without reaching an agreement on the continuation of nuclear arms reduction. However, the possibilities of space power overmatch clearly influenced political outcomes. The political influences of space power are equally mobilizing on domestic populations. Public

statements by political leaders stating awe-inspiring goals associated with space exploration create considerable political capital. Political capital is generated through reinforced national pride and confidence in the government to achieve seemingly unfathomable results. Examples include the Saturn Project, the Space Shuttle Program, and the recent global access to position, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities. As the global leader in space, US political influence is only limited by imagination and the audacity to set goals at the edge of the possible.

5. Its compartmentalized
A. No internal link external policies like the plan or Obamas polcap are irrelevant to passage Dickinson, 9 professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at Harvard University where he worked under the
supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt (5/26/09, Matthew, Presidential Power: A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics, Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/, JMP) As for Sotomayor, from here the path toward almost certain confirmation goes as follows: the Senate Judiciary Committee is slated to hold hearings sometime this summer (this involves both written depositions and of course open hearings), which should lead to formal Senate approval before Congress adjourns for its summer recess in early August. So Sotomayor will likely take her seat in time for the start of the new Court session on October 5. (I talk briefly about the likely politics of the nomination process below). What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball

writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a presidents influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative box scores designed to measure how many times a presidents preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the presidents preferences? How often is a presidents policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative endgame to gauge presidential influence will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors a member of Congress ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether shes up for reelection or not we can

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usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a presidents veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes dont depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence.
Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obamas lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obamas power, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess and it is only a guess is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the presidents ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial activism (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts make policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

6. And a rational policy maker could both pass the plan and the DA 7. Winners-win increase public support after controversial legislation
Singer, 3/3 Juris Doctorate candidate at Berkeley Law (Jonathon, By Expending Capital, Obama Grows His Capital, 3/3/2009, http://www.mydd.com/story/2009/3/3/191825/0428)
Despite the country's struggling economy and vocal opposition to some of his policies, President Obama's

favorability rating is at an all-time high. Two-thirds feel hopeful about his leadership and six in 10 approve of the job he's doing in the White House. "What is amazing here is how much political capital Obama has spent in the first six weeks," said Democratic pollster Peter D. Hart, who conducted this survey with Republican pollster Bill McInturff. "And against that, he stands at the end of this six weeks with as much or more capital in the bank." Peter Hart gets at a key point. Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated -- and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite near-unanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the American public as a result.
Take a look at the numbers. President Obama now has a 68 percent favorable rating in the NBC-WSJ poll, his highest ever showing in the survey. Nearly half of those surveyed (47 percent) view him very positively. Obama's Democratic Party earns a respectable 49 percent favorable rating. The Republican Party, however, is in the toilet, with its worst ever showing in the history of the NBC-WSJ poll, 26 percent favorable. On the question of blame for the partisanship in Washington, 56 percent place the onus on the Bush administration and another 41 percent place it on Congressional Republicans. Yet just 24 percent blame Congressional Democrats, and a mere 11 percent blame the Obama administration. So at this point, with President Obama seemingly benefiting from his ambitious actions and the Republicans sinking further and further as a result of their knee-jerked opposition to that agenda, there universal healthcare to energy

appears to be no reason not to push forward on anything from

reform to ending the war in Iraq.

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1. no solvency a. heg a Chinese attack on our space weapons would collapse hegemony - thats marshall and tellis b. china only strategy that solves is deterrence by denial thats sejba, putman, and tellis also they obviously dont solve US first strike vulnerability that only the plan can resolve causes us to first strike them out of fear c. aerospace duh they dont develop anything Perm do both China and Russia would agree to the counterplan but would backstab the US this sol Brown 9 MSc from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, author interested in political, economic, and military strategy for the medium of space (Spring 2009, Trevor, Soft power and space weaponization, Air & Space Power Journal 23.1, accessed on Academic Onefile) MGM
Some people speak as if they believe that a country can choose whether to pursue national security through arms or through arms control. (11) But

Code of Conduct

Russia's interest in banning space weapons is motivated by a desire to stunt the growth of US military space programs in order to buy time for covertly advancing its own space-weapons program and achieving technological parity." Russia bases its opposition to space weaponization not on a scrupulous set of principles but on strategic objectives. Two scholars contend that "to understand whether Russia could indeed change its position on the weaponization of space, we need to go beyond official statements and discussion among Russian military experts. The course of the military space program in Russia will be determined primarily by the availability of the resources required to support the program and by the ability of the industry and the military to manage development projects for the military use of space." (12) Despite China's repeated calls for a ban on all space weapons, historical evidence suggests that little separates Chinese and Russian motivations for such bans. "Because a broad interpretation of space weapons would rule out almost all U.S. missile defense systems, Chinese officials who want to limit U.S. missile defense deployments would advocate a ban that used this interpretation." (13) Interestingly, after the Clinton administration scrapped the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1993,
China redoubled its efforts in military space and gained ground on the United States. (14) By 1999 "China's test of a spacecraft intended for manned flight demonstrated a low-thrust rocket propulsion system that could be used to make warheads maneuver to defeat a BMD [ballistic missile defense] system." (15) Perhaps there remains a belief in the US strategic community that "the deployment of U.S. space weapons is likely to make space assets--including commercial communications and broadcast satellites--even more vulnerable, since no other country is pursuing, let alone deploying, space attack weapons." (16) Such notions were shattered when China conducted its first successful ASAT test in January 2007, suggesting that it had spent many years developing ASAT capabilities. The United States--as well as the rest of the world, for that matter--should not allow itself to be duped. The record

shows that although officials in the Chinese Communist Party rail against military space as a threat to peace and stability, the People's Liberation Army busies itself with the acquisition of space weapons. The notion that the United States can keep space from becoming a "shooting gallery" by agreeing to a comprehensive ban on space weapons is naive. (17) The hard truth is that as long as US economic and military power depends on massive, complex, and expensive sets of vulnerable space assets, the incentive for any potential foe to develop ways of attacking them remains too great to be overcome by any international agreement. (18) If, however, such an agreement can constrain the United States from developing and deploying effective countermeasures, foes would have every reason to pressure Washington into limiting its own actions. (19) As space technology spreads, the incentives for small and medium states to seek space-warfare capabilities increase, and the destruction of a major US satellite would represent both a substantive and symbolic victory over the United States. (20) There is, therefore, no question of whether to proceed with space weapons-only a question of how to do so with the requisite political skill in order to retain soft power while expanding hard power.

Neo-realism shapes international relations China will try to get space as long as the US is vulnerable CONDO BAD

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Code of Conduct fails our understanding of China is objective Tellis 7 Senior Associate at Carnegie (Autumn 2007, Ashley, Survival, Chinas Military Space Strategy, ingenta) MGM

20

The emergence of potent Chinese counterspace capabilities makes US military operations in Asia more risky than ever. The threat has not arisen due to a lack of a space arms-control regime, or because of the Bush administrations disinclination to negotiate an accord that bans the weaponisation of space. Rather, it is rooted entirely in Chinas requirement that it be able to defeat the United States in a regional conflict despite its conventional inferiority. This strategic challenge has compelled Beijing to exploit every anti-access and battlespace-denial technology potentially available. The threat posed by this Chinese effort cannot be neutralised by arms-control agreements, even though all countries stand to profit from the absence of threats to their assets in space. There is a temptation, especially in the United States, to view Chinas counterspace programmes in moralistic terms. This approach is undesirable and best avoided: Beijings desire to defeat the stronger by asymmetric means is not a reflection of its deviousness, nor provoked by mendacity on the part of the United States or the Bush administration. It is grounded in the objective conditions that define the relationship between the two countries: competing political goals, likely to persist whether or not the Taiwan conflict is resolved. In such circumstances, the United States should seek, as the Bush administrations own National Space Policy declares, to protect
the use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. But if this fundamental goal is threatened by Chinese counterspace activities aimed at American space assets, the United States has no choice but to run an offencedefence arms race,

and win. Full SSA capabilities are necessary to solve debris current efforts arent enough Sadeh 11 [Eligar, American political scientist and academic Assistant Professor, Department of Space Studies University of North Dakota, Ch. 13 Space Power and the Environment, Toward a Theory of Spacepower, June 13, 2011,http://www.opensourcesinfo.org/journal/2011/6/13/toward-a-theory-of-spacepower-selected-essays.html, MStef]
The millions of debris particles smaller than 1 mm are beyond detection capabilities from satellite or ground-based radar observing systems. Despite

the fact that technical capabilities exist to systematically track debris at about 50 mm in size, the U.S. Air Force Space Command nominally tracks and catalogues debris of about 100 mm or greater in size.30 This discrepancy between what is possible and what is accomplished is one of the key political issues facing SSA and the need for additional budgetary allocations to upgrade capabilities. Space Command's SSA mission also aims at information transparency and "deconfliction."31 To these ends, Space Command shares debris data with space users worldwide in the civil, commercial, and military sectors and provides space users with modeling and predictions for debris avoidance. Information transparency is a tool to deconflict any potential national security issues or threats that the debris issue may posit. Deconfliction implies diplomatic and cooperative paths to address problems. SSA is necessary to prevent collisions Shelton 5-11 (William, air force commander, Air Force Space Command Congressional Documents and Publicatoins, 5-11-11, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Hearing; Military space programs in review of the Defense Authorization Request for FY2012 and the Future Years Defense Program, LexisNexis accessed 8/20/11)DR
As the National Security Space Strategy states, "space these challenges to the space domain, we

is becoming increasingly contested, congested and competitive." In light of must maintain adequate resiliency of space capabilities to ensure space-based information delivery and access for Joint forces and allies. Foundational to our ability to "operate through" the growing threats is SSA, which is enabled by the fusion of Space Surveillance Network (SSN) sensor information at the Joint Space Operations Center
(JSpOC). Behind the scenes providing this capability daily are Space Event Duty Technicians, like Staff Sergeant Adrian Cervantes, ensuring the accuracy of the SSA data by working closely with fellow space, cyber and intelligence operators. In 2010, the JSpOC routinely tracked over 22,000 space objects, an approximately 10% increase in objects from the previous year. Each week JSpOC conducts over 7,000 space object conjunction (collision potential) screenings which are critically important to the 23 commercial and agency partners in the SSA Sharing Program. Last year, there were 126

collision avoidance maneuvers, a 180% increase over 2009, the year of the very unfortunate Cosmos and Iridium satellite collision. Our ability to maintain leadership in SSA depends on SSN modernization and adding increased SSA capability to track smaller objects, increase timeliness of revisit rates and mitigate coverage gaps. Replacing the Air Force Space Surveillance System, which employs a 1960's era Very High Frequency (VHF) radar, is

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important to this overall objective. The Space Fence and its S-band radar capability will significantly aid the detection of smaller objects and provide uncued tracking of space objects. Last September, the first operational launch of a
Minotaur IV delivered the Space Based Surveillance System (SBSS) to orbit, the first dedicated on-orbit SSA satellite, which provides us the capability to track an object, day or night, without weather interference. The satellite's first image was taken in October by a team of SMC, 1 SOPS and 7 SOPS (Reserve Associate Unit) personnel as part of planned calibration and characterization activities, and the initial data is superb. Another new potential SSN contributor is DARPA's Space Surveillance Telescope (SST), based in New Mexico, which is currently undergoing extensive testing. SST has the potential to provide AFSPC with new capability to detect and track faint space objects at geosynchronous distance. Foundational to all the space surveillance

architecture improvements is ensuring that we have the processing and data fusion capabilities to conduct SSA. The JSpOC Mission System (JMS), with a FY12 budget request of $122.1 million (OandM, RDTandE and Procurement) will replace legacy technology with improved data processing, integration, visualization and exploitation capabilities. Without the capability to receive, process, fuse, and exploit the data we receive from SSA sources, we will not meet the challenges of an increasingly congested and contested space environment.

Collisions cause nuclear war with Russia misread the event and cause panic Lewis, 04 postdoctoral fellow in the Advanced Metods of Cooperative Study Program; worked in the office of
the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy [Jeffrey, Center for Defense Information, What if Space were Weaponized? July 2004, http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf]
This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for Americas opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This section focuses on the risk that a single accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted in an earlier section, the United States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply destabiliz- ing. For all the talk about a new relationship between the United States and Russia, both sides retain thousands of nuclear forces on alert and configured to fight a nuclear war. When briefed about the size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked What do we need all these weapons for?43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies, including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Rus- sian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the countrys declining military might. In the mid-1990s, Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from the rst use of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion. In October 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov reiter- ated that Moscow might use nuclear weapons preemptively in any number of contingencies, including a NATO attack.44 So, it remains business as usual with U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional false alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years. In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet earlywarning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile elds in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as to fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satel- lite might malfunction, the ofcer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early-warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He reportedly explained his caution by saying: When people start a war, they dont start it with only ve missiles. You can do little damage with just ve missiles.45

In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a sounding rocket on a trajectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile might take if it were launched to blind Russian radars with a high altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was apparently serious enough that, the next day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that he had activated his nuclear football a device that allows the
Russian president to communicate with his military advisors and review his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early-warning satellites could clearly see that no attack was under way and the crisis passed without incident.46 In both cases, Russian observers were con-dent that what appeared to be a small attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one. In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket, spacebased sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack. The Russian command sys-tem, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating attack cor-ridors through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines.47 Further, Russias constellation of early-warn-ing satellites has been allowed to decline only one or two of the six satellites remain operational, leaving Russia with early warning for only six hours a day. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But Russia will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning of an American attack.48 As the previous section explained, the Penta- gon is contemplating military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited ef- fort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct early deterrence strikes to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation.49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes to disable Russias nuclear deterrent before the Rus- sian leadership understood what was going on. What would happen if a piece of space debris were to disable a Russian early-warning satel-lite under these conditions? Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the rst phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian earlywarning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difcult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warn-ing of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state of Russias warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned50 could make both the more difcult orbital plane and any warning systems moot. The unpleasant truth is that the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call. No state has the ability to denitively deter-mine the cause of the satellites failure. Even the United States does not maintain (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distin- guish between a satellite

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malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. Even the risk assessments for col-lision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning
satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how condent could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike oc-curred shortly after a false alarm showing a mis-sile launch? False alarms are appallingly common according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 moderately seri-ous false alarms between 1977 and 1983 an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable.51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of co- incidences is difcult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously early- warning data is taken by Russian leaders. More- over, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits.52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. The loss of an early-

warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian

leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expan- sion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreas- ing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian govern- ment.53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave.54 If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a t of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be extremely suspi-cious. It is any militarys nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case light. For ex- ample, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising.55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentied aircraft penetrat- ing its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG15s were ying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian eet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the conuence of events might trigger off the NATO operations plan that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The jets over Turkey were a ock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Mos- cow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difculties; and the Soviet eet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not coincidences but rather different manifestations of a common failure human er- ror resulting from extreme tension of an interna- tional crisis. As one author noted, The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the rst major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own. Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major war scare during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortied by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American ofcials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American rst strike during this period.56 All of these incidents have a common theme that confidence is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady ow of reli-

able information. When that information flow is disrupted whether by a deliberate attack or an accident confidence collapses and the re- sult is panic and escalation. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more

dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the condence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely.

That causes extinction

Helfand and Pastore, 09 (*Ira, M.D., and **John O., M.D., Past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility.
U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat, 3-31, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT_pastoreline_03-3109_EODSCAO_v15.bbdf23.html.
Since the end of the Cold War, many

have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the and Russian arsenals remain on readyalert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the
world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In

the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth

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age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including

perhaps our own, would become extinct.It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today. The nuclear danger will not pass until the U.S. and Russia lead the other nuclear states to a Nuclear Weapons Convention that seeks to abolish these weapons forever. As a critical first step the U.S. and Russia must take their weapons off ready-alert status. Presidents Obama and Medvedev can do this on their own by executive order.

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Security
1. Cycles of hostility have already begun even if they are constructed. Their K ignores real threats that are entrenched by past representations Pan 2004 (Chengxin, Australian National University, Discourses of China in International
Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, Doctoral Thesis, p. 240-241)
Thus understood, these Chinese

reactions, hostile as they might be, can no longer be oversimplified or totalised as entrenched, highly predicated on the ways in which China is treated by the West. In spite of this, however, they need to be taken seriously. This is because the accumulation of these reactive, nationalist, and essentialist sentiments could easily turn into a narcissistic, megalomanic affirmation of China and fascistic arrogance and selfaggrandizement.142 Taking on a life of their own, this highly appealing vision of China could then negatively impact on its relations with the West in the long term. Among other things, this new appreciation of a sense of national humiliation has given rise to the questioning of the fundamental direction of Chinese foreign policy as pursued by the neoliberal ruling elites. For example, one influential commentator argues that the problem in Sino-Western
xenophobic anti-Americanism per se.141 Rather, it seems that they are relations is not that we Chinese are unwilling to learn from outside, but that the West-led outside world does not welcome us to do so.143 Indeed, for many Chinese intellectuals, this now widely held perception reverberates strongly with the longstanding agony that Western teachers never really welcomed their Chinese students to learn their real secrets. Out of this doubt over Western sincerity have now grown both a strong criticism of Chinas neoliberal views of the outside world as one-sided wishful thinking, and a heightened

fascination with realism and power politics in Chinas strategic thinking and IR studies, to which my analysis will now turn.

2. Were not using a positivist epistemology its not our claim that we can objectively know China in an absolute sense, just that we should combine the best evidence we have available to make an educated guess about the consequences of different political choices. Objectivity is the ultimate straw figurethey can entirely win that our perspective is dependent, partially inaccurate, and subjective without proving that our claims are necessarily wrong. 3. Their K cannot wish away specific harm and solvency claims Pan 2004 (Chengxin, Australian National University, Discourses of China in International
Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, Doctoral Thesis, p. 12-13)
Perhaps for this reason, I

will occasionally be guilty of broad brush generalisation (e.g., by employing the terms do violence to some individual China scholars. This is not my intention. And while I have misgivings about the general field of China studies, this is by no means to suggest that mainstream Chinese foreign policy scholarship has no valuable insight to offer. Nor, indeed, is my position to imply that all Western students of Chinese foreign relations are invariably or equally guilty, for I am perfectly aware that this whole has never been entirely homogeneous. Rather, my point is that the problem I will deal with here is a general mode of thinking which cannot be simply reduced to the individual level but which nonetheless has to be illustrated in relation to specific works.
mainstream Western scholars) and I might

4. Framework compare the hypothetical enactment of the plan to a competitive policy option their framework is bad A.) Moots the 1AC renders eight minutes of Aff speech time irrelevant, collapsing competitive equity

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25 2011 File Title B.) Plan focus is necessary to preserve Aff ground and topic education, otherwise the debate centers on trivial issues that the Aff cant generate offense against 5. Anti PTX Privileging Reps encourages anti-politics Boggs 97 (CARL BOGGS Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741780)
Postmodernism and its offshoots (poststructuralism, semiotics, dier- ence feminism, etc.) have indeed reshaped much of academia, including such disciplines as sociology, history, literature, lm, and communica- tions. More than that, the theory (if that is the correct label for some- thing so diffuse) amounts to a kind of anti-paradigm paradigm, which often refocuses debates around defining motifs of the post-Fordist order: commodification of culture, the media spectacle, proliferation of images and symbols, fragmentation of identities, the dispersion of local movements, and loss of faith in conventional political ideologies and organizations. So far as all this is concerned, post-modernism can be viewed as marking a rather healthy break with the past.50 The problem is that the main thrust of postmodernism so devalues the common realm of power, governance, and economy that the dynamics of social and institutional life vanish from sight. Where the reality of corporate, state, and military power wind up vanishing within a post- modern amorphousness, the very effort to analyze social forces and locate agencies or strategies of change becomes impossible. In its reac- tion against the comprehensive historical scope of Marxism, the micro approach dismisses in toto macropolitics and with it any conceivable modern project of radical transformation. An extreme ``micro'' focus is most visible in such theorists as Baudrillard who, as Steven Best and Douglas Kellner put it, in effect ``announce the end of the political project in the end of history and society''51 ^ a stance that replicates the logic of a profoundly depoliticized culture.

They embrace anti-politics this dooms their project, creates atrocity, and cedes politics to the Right. Boggs 97 (CARL BOGGS Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741780)
The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved -- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological

crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context diseases, technological displacement of workers) of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites -- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a
Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of

politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75

6. Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative in every other instance. Double bind either the alt can overcome the plan, or it cant and wont solve the squo either. 7. Reps
a.) Dont come first Tuathail 96 (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

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While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decisionmakers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problemsolving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger th at academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of
foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalbys fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay.

The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by

itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalbys reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalbys fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalbys book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and poststructuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalbys interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachevs reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly selfinterested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern materialist and the

cultural, the political and the significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies poststructuralism nor convenient
reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become

b.) destroy policy and social change Taft-Kaufman, 95 (Jill, professor, Department of Speech Communication And Dramatic Arts, at Central Michigan University, Southern
Communication Journal, Spring, proquest)
The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of

despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new
the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet,

subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the

I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror
coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the

discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counterhegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told

Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political
they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences.

agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

8. Realism means space militarization and competition is inevitable state seek power that maximizes security the only impact to overreaction is increased defense budgets if we dont react it results in nuclear holocaust thats Cooper 9. Perm do both

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Zizek 89, Senior Researcher in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, Codirector of the Center for Humanities at Birkbeck College,
University of London, and Distinguished Fashion Expert for Abercrombie and Fitch Quarterly, 89 (Slavoj, Autumn, Looking Awry October, Vol 50 p 30-55, JSTOR) By means of a metaphor of the way anamorphosis functions in painting, Bushy tries to convince the queen that her sorrow has no foundation, that its reasons are null, but the crucial point is the way his metaphor splits, redoubles itself, i.e., the way he entangles himself in contradiction. First ("sorrow's eye, glazed with blinding tears, / Divides one thing entire to many objects"), he refers to the simple, commonsense opposition between a thing as it is "in itself," in reality, and its "shadows," reflections in our eyes, subjective impressions multiplied because of our anxieties and sorrows. When we are worried, a small difficulty assumes giant proportions; we see the thing as far worse than it really is. The metaphor at work here is that of a glass surface sharpened, cut in such a way that it reflects a multitude of images; instead of the tiny substance, we see its "twenty shadows." In the following verses, however, things become complicated. At first sight it seems that Shakespeare only illustrates the fact that "sorrow's eye . . . divides one thing entire to many objects" with a metaphor from the domain of painting ("Like perspectives, which rightly gaz'd upon/Show nothing but confusion; ey'd awry/Distinguish form"), but what he really accomplishes is a radical change of terrain. From the metaphor of a sharpened glass surface he passes to the metaphor of anamorphosis, the logic of which is quite different. A detail of a picture that "rightly gaz'd," i.e., from a

straightforward, frontal view, appears a blurred spot, assumes clear, distinct shapes once we look at it "awry," from aside
. The verses which apply this metaphor back to the queen's anxiety and sorrow are thus profoundly ambivalent: "so your sweet majesty, / Looking awry upon your lord's departure, / Finds shapes of grief more than himself to wail; / Which, look'd on as it is, is nought but shadows / Of what is not." That is to say, if we take the comparison between the queen's look and the anamorphic look literally, we would be obliged to state that precisely by "looking awry," i.e., from aside, she sees the thing in its clear and distinct form, in opposition to the "straightforward," frontal view which sees only an indistinct confusion (and, incidentally, the further development of the drama fully justifies the queen's most sinister presentiments), But, of course, Bushy did not "want to say" this. His intention was to say quite the opposite: by means of an imperceptible subreption, he returned to the first metaphor (that of a sharpened glass) and "wanted to say" that, because her view is distorted by sorrow and anxiety, the queen sees causes for alarm where a closer, matter-of-fact look attests that there is next to nothing in it. What we have here are thus two realities, two "substances." On the level of the first metaphor, we have the commonsense reality as "substance with twenty shadows," as a thing split into twenty reflections by our subjective view; in short, as a substantial "reality" distorted by our subjective perspective (inflated by our anxiety, etc.). If we look at a thing straight on, from a matter-of-fact perspective, we see it "as it really is," while the look puzzled by our desires and anxieties ("looking awry") gives us a distorted, blurred image of the thing. On the level of the second metaphor (anamorphosis), however, the relation is exactly the opposite: if we look at a thing straight on, i.e., from a matter-of-fact, disinterested, "objective" perspective, we see nothing but a formless spot. The object assumes clear and distinctive features only if we look at it "from aside," i.e., with an "interested" look, with a look supported, permeated, and "distorted" by a desire. This is precisely the Lacanian objet petit a, the object-cause of desire, an object which is, in a way, posited by the desire itself. The paradox of desire is that it posits retroactively its own cause, i.e., an object that can be perceived only by the look "distorted" by desire, an object that does not exist for an "objective" look. In other words, the objet petit a is always, by definition, perceived in a distorted way, because, outside this distortion, "in itself," it does not exist, i.e., because it is nothing but the embodiment, the materialization of this distortion, of this surplus of confusion and perturbation introduced by desire into so-called "objective reality." Objet petit a is "objectively" nothing, it is nothing at all, nothing of the desire itself which, viewed from a certain perspective, assumes the shape of "something." It is, as is formulated in an extremely precise manner by the queen in her response to Bushy, her "something grief" begot by "nothing" ("For nothing hath begot my something grief "). Desire "takes off" when "something" (its object-cause) embodies, gives positive existence to its "nothing," to its void. This "something" is the anamorphic object, a pure semblance that we can perceive clearly only by "looking awry." It is precisely (and only) the logic of desire that belies the notorious wisdom that "nothing comes from nothing." In the movement of desire, "something comes from nothing." It is true that the object-cause of desire is a pure semblance, but this does not prevent it from triggering off a whole chain of consequences which regulate our "material," "effective" life and deeds.