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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE TO USE THE FIRM NAME OZAETA, ROMULO, ETC.

FACTS: Two petitions. One petitioner prays for the continued use of the name of Alexander Sycip a deceased partner of the law firm. The other petition prays for the continued use of the name of Herminio Ozaeta, likewise a deceased partner of another law firm. ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT SURVIVING PARTNERS MAY CONTINUE USING THE DECEASED PARTNERS IN THEIR LAW FIRMS. RULING: Petition denied. The names of deceased partners may not be used because in 1958, the Supreme Court ruled: After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name PERKINS from their firm name. The Courts finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings it laid down. Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of one or more of the partners. Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability of a partner. The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title. MENDIOLA VS. CA The petitioner and private respondents are the surviving heirs of the late Carlos Mendiola who died on December 28, 1984. Florentina Mendiola is the surviving spouse while the petitioner and all the private respondents are the children of the. A petition for probate of a will was filed by the petitioner on March 30, 1987 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila entitled 'Probate of the Will and Testament of Deceased Carlos Mendiola' Sp. Proc. No. 10027 which was set for hearing on August 18, 1987. On October 9, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 166 presided by Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision allowing the will and issuing letters testamentary in favor of the petitioner who was declared executor of the estate of the deceased in the will. After the petitioner took his oath on October 14, 1987 letters testamentary was issued in favor of the petitioner on October 20, 1987. On April 28, 1989, the private respondents filed a motion for the removal of the executor and another motion on May 2, 1989 for the appointment of Redentor Mendiola of (sic) executor. On May 22, 1989, the respondent-Judge granted the motion and ordered the removal of the petitioner as executor and revoked the letters testamentary. On May 23, 1989, the trial court ordered the appointment of Redentor Mendiola as executor. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner which was opposed by the private respondents and the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review. Issue: Whether the petitioner must be removed as an executor of the estate . Held: The removal of the petitioner is in accordance with the provisions of Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court that: If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign ... . The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. (Abad vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 18 SCRA 371.) The removal of an administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. (Id.) WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision dated February 12, 1990 and the order dated April 25, 1990 of the respondent Court of Appeals, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.

PEOPLE VS. GALACGAC Facts: Enrique Galacgac was a naturalized US citizen. He arrived in the Philippines to visit his wife and in his possession is a gun, which is gift to the said spouse. Upon reaching his in-laws home, he and his wife had a fight, which caused his brother in law to beat him on the head. In retaliation, he fired indiscriminately wounding his wifes brothers and sisters. He was accused of attempted parricide but retorted that the Philippines has no jurisdiction over him since he is an American Citizen. Issue: Whether or not Galagcac enjoys extra-territoriality rights Decision: No. No foreigner enjoys in this country extra-territorial right to be exempted from its laws and jurisdiction, with exception of heads of states and diplomatic representatives who, by virtue of customary law of nations, are not subject to the Philippine territorial jurisdiction. Co vs. CA 227 SCRA 444,448-449 (1993) Facts: Sometime on October 9, 1984, plaintiff entered into a verbal contract with defendant for her purchase of the latters house and lot located at 316 Beata St., New Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, for and in consideration of the sum of $100,000.00. One week thereafter, and shortly before she left for the United States, plaintiff paid to the defendants the amounts of $1,000.00 and P40,000.00 as earnest money, in order that the same may be reserved for her purchase, said earnest money to be deducted from the total purchase price. The purchase price of $100,000.00 is payable in two payments $40,000.00 on December 4, 1984 and the balance of $60,000.00 on January 5, 1985. On January 25, 1985, although the period of payment had already expired, plaintiff paid to the defendant Melody Co in the United States, the sum of $30,000.00, as partial payment of the purchase price. Defendants counsel, Atty. Leopoldo Cotaco, wrote a letter to the plaintiff dated March 15, 1985, demanding that she pay the balance of $70,000.00 and not receiving any response thereto, said lawyer wrote another letter to plaintiff dated August 8, 1986, informing her that she has lost her option to purchase the property subject of this case and offered to sell her another property. Under date of September 5 (1986), Atty. Estrella O. Laysa, counsel for plaintiff, wrote a letter to Atty. Leopoldo Cotaco informing him that plaintiff is now ready to pay the remaining balance to complete the sum of $100,000.00, the agreed amount as selling price and on October 24, 1986, plaintiff filed the instant complaint. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of private respondent Adoracion Custodio (CUSTODIO) and ordered the petitioner spouses Henry and Elizabeth Co (COS) to refund the amount of $30,000.00 in CUSTODIOs favor. Not satisfied with the decision, the COS appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether a rescission creates an obligation to return things which are subject of a contract. Held: Under Article 1385 of the Civil Code, rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract but such rescission can only be carried out when the one who demands rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. This principle has been applied to rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals therefore did not err in ordering the COS to return the amount of $30,000.00 to CUSTODIO after ordering the rescission of the contract of sale over the Beata property. In the case at bar, the property involved has not been delivered to the appellee. She has therefore nothing to return to the appellants. The price received by the appellants has to be returned to the appellee as aptly ruled by the lower court, for such is a consequence of rescission, which is to restore the parties in their former situations. No error was committed by the lower court when it did not award attorneys fees to the appellants for as has been shown, the appellees complaint is not unfounded. We cannot uphold the forfeiture clause contained in the petitioners August 8, 1986 letter. It appears that such condition was unilaterally imposed by the COS and was not agreed to by CUSTODIO. It cannot therefore be considered as part of the contract of sale as it lacks the consent of CUSTODIO. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.