TOPIC

ORALITY, PHILOSOPHY AND AFRICAN IDENTITY

By Fredrick O. Juma

A paper presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, on 21 March, 2007

Egerton University, Njoro.

ORALITY, PHILOSOPHY AND AFRICAN IDENTITY Abstract This paper is concerned about the epistemic status of orality in culture. As part of the rationale for this engagement, I look at a close connection between technologies of communication and the epistemological and ontological status of African cultural development. The background to my argument is that the historical reason for the European contempt for Africa and the denial of its civilization is the lack of writing and written records in most parts of the African continent at the time of the European incursion. The way in which anthropological, philosophical and historical discourses have shaped Western conception of African identity confirms to this claim. communication scholars. But the main argument of my paper is a critique of the discourse or oral tradition in African philosophy. I categorize the issue of African philosophy as a debate, and whether it exists or not is not my concern. I argue that this identity crisis in African philosophy is traceable to only one cause; doubt regarding the status of African oral tradition. In this way, some African It is adequately supported by African historians, philosophers and

philosophers manifest the same Western conception of what constitutes truth and knowledge about the African identity something that these scholars (ideological askaris) with a slave mentality have obviously learnt from their masters. This argument is intended to show that the dependence by African philosophers on the Western construction of a knowledge system such as philosophical discourse raises the question of the status of indigenous knowledge systems. I conclude that once more we see an intimate

relationship between the complex knowledge power, and the construction of racial identity.

ORALITY, PHILOSOPHY AND AFRICAN IDENTITY I shall begin by quoting statements of two pre-eminent European philosophers, Kant and Hume, on the subject of African identity. Kant in one of his writings, Section IV of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, he writes: The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling, which rises above the trifling. Mr. Hume challenges everybody, to produce a single example where a Negro has shown talents.So essential is the difference between these two races of men, (black and white) and it appears to be equally great with regard to the mental capacities, as with regard to the colour. The Fetiche-religion, so widely diffused among them is a species of idolatry, which perhaps sinks as deep into the trifling, as it seems possible for human nature to admit ofThe blacks are remarkably vain, but in a negro manner, and so loquacious, that they must absolutely be separated by the cogent and conclusive argument of caning. (73f) Blacks, according to the German philosopher, can also be educated only by way of training. Training for Kant, consists in physical coercion. This training should be done using a split bamboo cane instead of a whip, so that the negro will suffer a great deal of pains, since the Negros thick skin would not be racked with sufficient agonies through a whip, and because the blood needs to find a way out of thick pigment to avoid festering (Eze 1997). The idea of education proper, as distinct from mere training, is linked to Kant, and in many other Western philosophers. To be educable is to be capable of progress in the arts and sciences, and to possess the talents and motivation that make such progress possible. The African is excluded from this possibility by virtue of being African. To quote Kants well known comment on a certain statement attributed to an African person this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid (Eze, 1997). David Hume claimed to present proof of the inferiority of the African in this way: I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the white. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, or even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturers among them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites such as the ancient

GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies there are NEGROE slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In JAMAICA, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly (Eze 1997). Hume makes two points here: (1) the black race has no individual genius in any realm of life; (2) nor a cultural tradition of inventiveness, creativity or accomplishments however conceived. We shall see much later on how the idea of individuality interacts with the concept of community or collectivity in the analysis of identity, in its relation to the communicative technologies of orality and writing. Hume was a philosopher renowned for his skeptical and one may raise this

question: how much did the Western world know about the Dark Continent prior to colonization of Africa? It is, I believe, a relatively easy refutation of Hume, given our present state of knowledge of Africa, to cite available evidence of African writing even in European languages long before and during Humes time. I would like to suggest that the basis of Humes judgment, typical for the Europe of his time and even in our time, is simply the putative lack of written evidence (at least on a substantial or common scale) of those things that he implies confer cultural accomplishments on a nation, race or people. At any rate, to be on the safe side, perhaps we should quickly make a logical distinction between actual lack of African writing in any language, and European (ac)knowledge(ment) of this writing. For example, a man such as David Hume whose furthest journey from his native Edinburgh was France, or a scholar like Kant who was town-bound, literally speaking, in Konigsberg, and both of whom had no personal knowledge of Africa, could

have known nothing of any black writing for the simple reason that, with the state of communication at the time, none was available to them. However, precisely on this excusable ground of ignorance, the least you would expect from a man described as the greatest British philosopher, is to suspend judgment or at least temper his conclusion by adverting to the contemporary condition of knowledge. I believe this is not a harsh judgment, as my conclusion of this paper will show. It is a fair guess that the general attitude of the western world towards on non-European subjects, portrayed narrowness of vision. Late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century European writing of the most important kind could not but focus almost exclusively on Europe, particularly as the very concept of Europe had begun then to be formalized in the wake of the French revolution and the eventual rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. It is therefore not at all surprising that European attention to non-European subjects was minimal. The shift from an exclusive European focus in European writing came about in the nineteenth century. This shift can be safely attributed to the development of a new science, a science whose primary concern was in fact the non-European subject or culture, and this science is anthropology. The institutionalization of anthropology within the European academy, and even more importantly, in the European episteme, is significant, not because it marked any major change in the European conception of the other, but principally because it demonstrated that the study of other races and cultures could no longer be accommodated under the fanciful travel tales of explorers, adventures and missionaries, tales which appeared designed to fix the native European imaginations understanding the other by the Europeans became politically important and the academy had to provide space for this effort.

Anthropology rapidly moved beyond speculations about monogenesis or polygenesis of the human specie or the origins of ritual or myth (Harris 80 107; Bell 1992; Okpewho 1982). Special methods, involving the study of language and cultural behavior, emphasized the scientificity of the new field. Reporting and documentation became increasingly rigorous. Some of the highlights of this new situation include: (a) the idea that the societies in question merit scientific investigation, whatever the political and ideological uses to which the findings could be put; (b) the fact that many anthropologists had no obvious commitment to a political or partisan principle or program and appeared to be driven by nothing more sinister than individual ambition; (c) the global scale of this enterprise. On the other hand, it was no accident, as hinted at above, that anthropology as an academic discipline and a section of the Western episteme, rose in tandem with colonialism. The relationship between power and the knowledge system in the European project, as expressed in imperialism, has received some critical attention in our time (Mudimbe 1988). Political power made possible and paved the way for anthropology. In some instances, for example in the British Imperial Services, there were existing bureaucratic positions for anthropologists in the colonies. This government tink-tank was responsible for some of the earliest ethnographic studies carried out in Africa. Anthropology was therefore a sign that Europe was serious in its political and ideological intention, namely, to conquer and dominate exteriorly and interiorly. In this sense, anthropology was thus a positive science. If in the long run the conclusions that it frequently arrived at compromised its scientific status somewhat and made it inseparable from the political and ideological motivation, in retrospect this was inevitable. Morgans theory of evolutionism became the standard reference point for subsequent cultural explanations and critiques, commanding high praise and reliance for their own theories among

such diverse Western thinkers as Karl Marx and Sigmud Freud but it has been noted that there were various as he suggests that civilizations defining characteristic is phonetic writing. The idea that writing is the hallmark of civilization and, more specifically, that phonetic writing defines Western civilization, has usually been traced to Plato especially to the discourse on writing in the Phaedrus (cf. Havelock, preface to Plato, Socrates narrates the Egyptian myth of the origin of writing, about how the god Theuth revealed the art of writing to the King, Thamus. After the revelation, the god says to the King: Here, O King, is a branch of learning that will make the people of Egypt wiser and improve their memories; my discovery provides a recipe for memory and wisdom. But Thamus answered; O man full of arts, to one it is given to create the things of art, and to another to judge what measure of harm and of profit they have for those that shall employ them. And so it is that you, by reason of your tender regard for the writing that is your offspring, have declared the very opposite of its true effect. If men learn this, it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to exercise memory because they will rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks. What you have discovered is a recipe not for memory but for reminder. And it is no true wisdom that you offer your disciples, but only its semblance, for by telling them of many things without teaching them, you will make them seem to know much, while for the most part they know nothing, and as men filled, not with wisdom, but with the conceit of wisdom, they will be a burden to their fellows. (Plato, collected dialogues, 520). The moral of this myth, according to Derrida (1976), who examines this against the background of Platos metaphysics, is that speech takes precedence over writing as a vehicle or mirror of the truth. In this perspective, writing comes second speech because truth can be communicated through speech and not necessarily through writing as it were. The notion of logo centrism thus goes beyond the matter of the relation of speech to writing as communicative media, and this is elicited in Platos metaphysical theory of forms and of his epistemology of knowledge as an act of memory of the (absolute) world of forms.

But skepticism about the ability or power of language to convey or apprehend reality, is an argument that, in going beyond, actually obscures and devalues or deflects the critical question of the forms of language and their axiological relationship to power, that is, to the ways forms of language are institutionalized hierarchically as instruments of domination. In other words, the central issue here is that western world understand writing as an icon and forms of their civilization. From the African point of view, it is important to recover the main thread of arguments on the relations of orality to writing. Havelock (1991) says that Western civilization is attributable to (phonetic) writing, and that without this technological invention, we would not have science, philosophy, written law or literature, nor the automobile or the airplane. This thesis has since been subjected to very rigorous criticism by several scholars (cf. Stree,1988; Finnegan, `988; Biakolo, 1999) on different grounds, including the validity of cultural process in passing on knowledge. Writing, in particular, phonetic writing has not merely made Western civilization possible but it is at the heart of the distinction between Europe and the rest of us. Cultural hierarchies put in place since the genesis of European modernity are built according to the degree of their approximation to European alphabetic civilization, that is whether or not they possess writing and of what kind. This brought about anthropological classes such as tradition versus modernity, logical versus illogical mentalities, primitive versus civilized societies (Biakolo, 1999 and 2002). Needless to add, Africa is invariably at the bottom of the hierarchy. A distinction is made between on one hand, black, sub-Saharan African, and Arab Africa where writing is found; and on the other hand, between pre-writing such as hieroglyphics in Egypt and true writing such as is found among the Greeks.

If writing is at the heart of the European imaginary, and if it forms the foundation of European cultural discourse, is it not obvious that it should also occupy a similar position in Africanist discourse, specifically the discourse of cultural identity. Why is the question of African identity tied up with the identity of African philosophy? The answer to this question is to be found in the relations that have been established between ontology and epistemology, or to put it quite simply, between questions of identity and forms and modes of knowledge. Inevitably, so many issues are entangled here but we shall try to separate them as much as possible. Accordingly, we must understand what a Nigerian author, Walter Ong, writes about. He talks of the identity of what he calls primary oral cultures, that is, cultures that are predominantly oral in their mode of communication. Ongs argument is that since primary oral cultures have no fixed (i.e. written) texts, they organize and transmit knowledge in ways designed to facilitate the labour of human memory. As a result of this mnemonic necessity, whatever is conceptualized tends to be formalized or institutionalized in existential terms: skills and information are acquired by personal contact and personal instruction or examples. Thus oral cultures and their discourses are traditionalist, conservative (they conserve what they have) and communal (knowledge and life skills have to be shared to survive). This is different from the literate cultures. Since they have no fear of losing what has been created or conceived, writing being in itself a sure storage system, literate cultures are innovative, inventive, and individualistic. Reflecting on the Africanist discourse of African philosophy, D. A. Masolo (2000 and 2003) discusses the concern of this writing with oral tradition. Oral tradition, in his analyses, is invested with cognate or alternative terms and concepts like indigenous knowledge and ethnophilosophy. According to Masolo, an important part of this concern is the need to

distinguish philosophy from ethnophilosophy. Following Hountondji (1977), Masolo distinguishes between first order discourse, that is, ethnophilosophy, which is characterized as collective, passive and anonymous. Philosophy proper, the second order discourse, on the other hand, is a true academic discipline born out of a deliberate reflective practice guided by specific rules of the game. But it is in the work of the Ghanaian philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu, that the African philosophers attitude to ethnophilosophy is most graphically represented. I make reference to attitudinal representation, because woven intricately with the argument that Wiredu makes on the issue, is a tone and manner towards African oral knowledge that is nothing short of contempt. I shall not be dealing with this attitude, but shall concentrate on the substance of the argument. According to Wiredu, it was a pervasive trait of this indigenous (African) culture that enabled sparse groups of Europeans to subjugate much larger numbers of Africans and keep them in colonial subjection for many years, and which even now makes them a prey to neocolonialism. I refer to the traditional and non-literate character of the culture with its associated under development (Masolo 2000). Wiredu adds, for good measure, that a culture cannot be both scientific and non-literate, for the scientific method can flourish only where there can be recordings of precise measurement, calculations and generally of observational data. (Masolo 2000). Wiredu then goes on to distinguish between folk philosophy, written traditional philosophy and modern philosophy. The first is called philosophy only in a loose, broad sense, since without argument and clarification, philosophy in the strict sense does not exist. Folk thought, a far preferable term for Wiredu than philosophy, is hampered by non-discursiveness. In Africa, so called African philosophy (as distinguished from academic philosophy in Africa) is nothing but traditional folk thought. Thus, for Wiredu, the African philosopher has no choice but to

conduct his philosophical inquiries in relation to the philosophical writings of other peoples, for his own ancestors left him no heritage of philosophical writings (Masolo 2000). Putting together this and similar discussions in the literature, we can present the arguments against oral traditions that purport to be philosophy, that is, ethnophilosophy, including Africas, in the following way (cf. the three negative claims of H. Odera Oruka). According to the argument, ethnophilosophy is not philosophy because: a) Unlike philosophy which is the product of an individual mind, ethnophilosophy is basically the work of the collectivity. In this sense, we can speak of traditional African philosophy in the same way we can speak of traditional Indian philosophy and traditional European or English philosophy, with this significant difference of course, that there is a second order Indian philosopher might rely on as a foundation for a (third order) discourse. The English example is even more complicated by Wiredus suggestion that in truth traditional English philosophy might in fact refer to the philosophy of Hume and the English empirical tradition. In spite of all these foreign complications, the situation regarding Africa as far as Wiredu is concerned if fairly straight forward: individuals do philosophy in the true sense, the community or tribe does not; as since in Africa the traditional philosophy is the work of the collective, it does not quality as philosophy. Let us for the sake of simplicity call this the Individualist or Subjectivist argument.
b) Another reason why ethnophilosophy is not philosophy is that the former is not

analytical, or expository or discursive, these three terms being used rather synonymously. A collection of proverbs, saying and other wisdom literature do not constitute philosophy. To clarify the point: Wiredu states clearly that philosophy occurs where there is a thesis

or argument, and there is a discussion or clarification. But as I shall be arguing below, this statement is rather ambiguous. Is it the form (prose) that constitutes the defining criterion here, or is it the structure (thesis counter thesis conclusion or first premise second premise or premises conclusion), that is, the syllogistic structure? Is each of these criteria, that is form or structure, sufficient; is any necessary? We shall call this the formal argument or argument from form. c) The third argument may be called the Disciplinary or Epistemic argument or thesis. According to this argument, ethnophilosophy is not philosophy because it does not follow, in the words of Masolo, the rules of the game, that is the rules of philosophic discourse. Some questions immediately arise here: (i) what are these rules of philosophic discourse; (ii) who makes them; (iii) are they the same as the formal or structural requirements of (b); (iv) are these rules universal such that anyone from any culture or language can recognize given an adequate translation, or are these rules culture specific but binding on all others in as much as they come to the game of philosophy. To come to the bald point without further equivocation: is philosophy a specifically Western discourse or discipline as indeed Hegel and Heidegger had claimed? This is for me the critical question, the very heart of the debate. But let us proceed in a more systematic manner and take each of these arguments in the order above. The view that philosophy is not a group or collective activity but a practice of individual investigators inquiring into an aspect of truth or reality is a subjective thesis. It is subjective in the ordinary sense that philosophy is not out there, an anonymous intellectual event or process. It is the expression of the thoughts and ratiocination of a specific human subject. And because it is the subject who initiates and carries out this activity, the content of the process is the

expression of the subjectivity of the inquirer. Philosophy, in this view, expresses the identity of the inquiring subject. What we call philosophy is the discourse of a particular subject who in and through this discourse expresses his or her subjective identity. The arguments and clarifications, the thesis, even when they have nothing to do with the actual workaday life of the subject as such, are nevertheless the work, the inner work of a subject, and these cannot be expropriated from him or her. The subjects identity is embedded in the very act of thesis formulation. This way of putting the matter naturally raises other questions. For example, does this mean that the only truth or reality that a subject can express is his or her subjectivity, or is there room for an objective or transcendent truth or reality and how does it relate to the immanence of personal subjectivity? This forum is perhaps not the most appropriate for examining these questions closely. Nevertheless, the question of subjectivity by its very nature raises the cognate issue of how this subjectivity is constituted in itself. Does a human subject have the capacity to constitute itself? Or is it the case that the collectivity is invariably implicated or involved in the constitution of the subject? That is to say, is it possible for a philosophical statement or thesis to be posited without reference to a social or communal context? Can a subjects identity be constructed outside the context of a collectivity of any description? Is it not a fairer, more accurate explanation of reality to adopt the contrary view, namely, that no personal subjectivity can be constituted outside some kind of social context; that no matter how original the philosophical thesis of the subjective inquirer might be, it derives its meaning and purpose or even its origin from the community. This origin, meaning and purpose is articulated with and has various dimensions and remifications in the life of the community, including the language, a social product and process which makes philosophical communication possible; including the

teleology of the thesis, namely; to increase the human knowledge of the community or make receivers of the communication better citizens or human beings and so on. Now at the basis of the subjective thesis is the implicit sub-thesis, namely; that every community or society possesses a set of principles, laws, mores and lore, which together constitute an ordinary ethos or view of life and which the philosophic subject interrogates, challenges, and often discards in favour of his or her own inner lights. It is through this interrogation, rejection and reconstitution of truth that the subjective identity as a philosopher is expressed. That is, the subjective identity of the philosopher consists in bringing this world view to critical examination. The philosopher lives the examined life, or he / she is no philosopher. But this sub-thesis actually commits one to the view that the origin of the content of the philosophers thesis is the community or society. It may well be that at the end of the examination, the communal world view is replaced by a subjective view. Yet it cannot be claimed that this new view bears no relation to the communal world view. Or that any philosophers thoughts originate from the blank slate of personal subjectivity. Furthermore, even from the point of view of the ends of the activity, no matter how misanthropic a philosopher may be, the fact that a world view has been rigorously re-examined and thus considerably clarified for the human intellect, is itself, is itself a purposive improvement of the community and therefore teleologically the subjective philosophers thesis is oriented to the common good. We might also examine the communicative tools with which the philosopher carries out the function of critiquing the communal world view. The basic tool, we remarked earlier, is language. Even if one contests an instrumental or referential theory of language, that is, if language is rejected as a direct way of naming and appropriating the world, seeing it instead as a

self-reflexive, self-signifying system, we are still bound to admit that every meaningful philosophy to date has had recourse to the communal resources of natural language and is thus indebted to society. No matter how clever or creative the philosophers use of language, no matter how much he/she extends the boundaries of the language, this debt cannot be fully repaid. Therefore, in the same breath by which very serious philosophy contributes to the enrichment of the language resources of the community, by that same token, a debt is being paid and the relation of philosopher to community becomes symbiotic. We are thus forced to conclude that the subjective thesis draws a wrong emphasis concerning the philosophers relationship to the community. It seems to me a false conclusion that a philosopher is a philosopher because of the subjective relations that he/she bears to the community, or that philosophy is principally characterized by the unique subjective relationship that its practitioner, the philosopher, has with the community and its world view. This just does not work as a defining criterion. We shall now proceed to the second argument, the so called Analytical thesis. The way this thesis is framed, analyticity is sometimes mistaken for a material value rather than a descriptive term for the formal properties of an argument. A category mistake is somewhere. The analytical does not refer to concepts or judgments, as in the Kantian sense. In that sense, they have the character of substantives. But in the ordinary sense, the analytical refers to the way a thesis or argument is presented or structured. Taking the simple example of a syllogism, the analytical refers to the manner in which the premises are posited from which a certain conclusion is derived. That is, it indicates the relationship between premises and conclusion. All analysis is analogically of this type. There is really no new term or element produced or that it discovers or that can be discovered in it. All analysis does is to uncover what is hidden or embedded in

concepts or terms. This is the ordinary sense of analysis, to which we must suppose our African philosophers subscribe, especially as they have not shown that they attach a special sense to the term. So then, are we to understand that philosophy is not philosophy unless it adopts this particular way of presenting an argument? To address this question, we must go back to the example of Kwasi Wiredu and what he says in connection with analyticity. Wiredu argues that philosophical analysis of any rigorous kind is not possible without writing. Now this is a rather curious point. Are we to understand that Socrates was not in fact doing philosophy, since his arguments were orally delivered and that it was not until Plato committed these arguments to writing that a philosophical activity place? Does this make sense? What this position commits one is to the view that writing is a necessary means for doing philosophy, for analysis. That is, no argument can be constituted analytically without the material aid of writing. Yet this very point permits a distinction to be drawn between the term (and I hope the properties of) analysis and the means (writing). By adumbrating form (formal properties) and content, proponents of this argument make what appears to be an iron-clad case against ethnophilosophy. But in truth the merely confuse two different features of a process. Ironically this confusion actually clears up for us a few grey areas of the debate. I refer to the relationship among the nature of analysis, prose as a form of language, and philosophy as a human activity. There is a common view, associated with Havelock and Ong on one hand, and scholars such as Ian Watt and Jack Goody (1963) on the other, that writing and prose are genetically connected. The suggestion is that without writing, prose would not have been possible. But this is just a dispute about language and terms. If prose is equated with prose

writing, then of course the association is understandable. However, this also empties the distinction of any value. What really ought to be done is to identify prose with prosaic language, that is, ordinary, every day language, and thus separate it from the specialized language usage such as poetry, ritual discourse and so on. The history of writing attests to a much earlier ancestry or precedence of this specialized language in writing. It may well be that the association of priestly, scribal or clerical orders with writing in its earlier stages, explains the precedence of poetic and specialized writing. The growth of secular writing and of such forms as scientific, philosophic and historical discourse, with the power they command over the development of knowledge and the academy, may have been the main factor in shaping this association of prose and writing. The point therefore is that the postulation of some kind of genetic relationship between writing and prose is false. Prose writing is a much later development, and philosophical prose, as in Plato, even later than literary or historical prose writing. The view that philosophy is not possible without writing, or more specifically, prose writing, is a good example of how not to read the history of writing or philosophy for that matter. It is simply a piece of professionalisms among academic philosophers. Philosophy and philosophers are most certainly not going to make themselves relevant to Africa or any where else, by this sort of uniquely Western discipline or activity. This view, as is widely recognized, has been explicitly formulated by Hegel and his followers. It is connected with the project of modernity or the concept of Europe. What it espouses is the cultural and ideological position that philosophy, as a critical science, not only arose or was developed in the West, but uniquely speaks to Western concerns and culture; it expresses the mind of the West. As such, it is a thesis at one with the claim that writing, the sign of the Logos, is the spirit of the West.

Now if philosophy is a uniquely Western discourse, then all that African philosophers are trying to do is to recreate in their own environment a Western product, something analogical to creating an African Ford or African Toyota car. No serious theoretical questions of identity can be raised in a situation like that. Rather, it is simple matter of indigenization of a foreign construct. To introduce an African car in the conception of the body and engine parts will not obscure the fact that we have an American or Japanese product. There can be no great shame in that. After all, as Martin Bernal (1991) showed years ago, the cultural appropriation of whatever is valuable is also a Western habit. But pursuing that automobile analogy further, if any African manufacturer, adopting the general principles of automobile manufacturing were to create a car by the name of Uno and he /she called it an African car, this would perhaps be more in the nature of an authentic African invention. Any deeper level question such as the origin of the principles of automobile making would then take us all far back into perhaps the preliterate past that at the end we might all be content to allow that to each their cultural claims. That really would be a more satisfactory state of affairs. Unfortunately we do not have luxury just yet and therefore we must return to the question facing us: is philosophy a European discourse? At first sight, this appears to be a valid question; it is simply the interrogative form of the thesis: philosophy is a European discourse. However, we find that the logical obstacles to answering it are insurmountable. I refer to logic, because history itself provides no adequate proof of the case, for the reason that history itself is complicit in the case. That history, which is part of the Western control and power over the global system of information, communication and education, cannot sit as impartial judge; neutral, objective history is a fiction. In this regard, if you were to contest the claim that philosophy is a European enterprise, you would be asked to provide written

evidence that any other cultural group has the sort of philosophy that the Europeans possess. The onus is thus placed on the other cultures to prove that their counter-claims are also valid, with the provision that they must follow the European criteria of validity. The query goes something like this: can you provide evidence of philosophy in your culture that is written, analytical and argumentative? In this way, it becomes quite clear that there is no rational way to engage the argument. Its circularity makes it impossible to do so. For, once philosophy is defined in this culturally exclusive way, it becomes the special preserve of the one who does the defining. This is precisely the trap that African philosophy, the lack of progress it exhibits. It is entangled in the non-issue of whether it exists and in what form and by whose doing. Instead of this futile merry-go-round, African philosophy should borrow a leaf from the excellent example of other genres of humanistic studies such as literary and historical writing. The enormous strides made since the end of formal European colonialism in African literature and history, the creative and critical output in these two genres of writing, are such that even the chauvinistic West is forced to acknowledge their vitality and originality. These two disciplines were able to discover, indeed recover, their energies from a rampant colonialist obliteration of African knowledge claims because they refused to be bogged down by self-defeating arguments whether oral literature is an authentic form of literature, or whether oral history is historiographically permissible or genuine, according to some other peoples cultural lights. Cultural producers in those disciplines simply went a head and did their thing, never bothering to look perpetually over their shoulders for approving glances from some European Master. I shall wind up this discussion by quoting once more from that famous passage in the Phaedrus. After Socrates concludes the narrative of the origins of writing, his interlocutor, Phaedrus, then rebukes the philosopher for invoking a foreign origin for the art of writing. To this, in a crushing

sarcasm, Socrates retorts in words that his European philosophical and cultural progenies and their camp followers appear to have never heard: Oh, but the authorities of the temple of Zeus at Dodoma, my friend, said that the first prophetic utterances came from an oak tree. In fact the people of those days, lacking the wisdom of the young people, were content in their simplicity to listen to trees or rocks, provided these told the truth. For you apparently it makes a difference who the speaker is, and what country he comes from; you dont merely ask whether what he says is true or false. (Plato, 520) Work cited Bell, Catherine. Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Bernal, Martin. Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. (1987) New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1991. Biakolo, Emevwo. On the Theoretical Foundations of Orality and Literacy. Research in African Literatures Vol. 30, No. 2 (Summer 1999), 42 65. -------------Categories of Cross-cultural cognition and the African Condition. In philosophy from Africa: A Text with readings. 2nd Edition. Eds. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 2002. 9 19. Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri G. Spivak. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976. Eze, Emmanuel, C. The Colour of Reason: The Idea of Race in Kants Anthropology. In Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Ed. Emmanuel C. Eze. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1997. 103 104. Finnegan, Ruth. Literacy and Orality: Studies in the Technology of Communication. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. Goody, Jack and Watt, Ian. The Consequences of Literacy. In Literacy in Traditional Societies. Ed. Jack Goody. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963. 27 68. Harris, Marvin. The Rise of Anthropological Theory. London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969. Havelock, Eric, Preface to Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.

------------The Oral-Literate Equation: a Formula for the Modern Mind. In Literacy and Orality. Eds. David Olson and Nancy Torrance. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1991. 11 - 27. Hountondji, Paulin J. African Philosophy : Myth and Reality. Trans Henri Evans with the collaboration of Jonathan Ree. London: Hutchinson, 1983. Hume, David. Of National Characters. In David Hume: Political Essays Ed. Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 78 92. Kant, Immanuel. Essays and Treaties. Vo. 11, Trans. Anon. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1993 (rpt 1799 ed.) Masolo, D. A. From Myth to Reality: African Philosophy at Century End. Research in African Literatures Vol. 31 / 1 (Spring 2000): 149 172. -------------------Philosophy and Indigenous Knowledge : An African Perspective Africa Today Vol. 50 / 2 (Fall / Winter 2003): 21 38. Morgan, Henry, Lewis. Systems of Consaguinity and Affinity of the Human Family (1870). Washington: Smithsonian Institute. Oruka, Odera H. Ed. Sage Philosophy : Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy. Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1990. Okpewho, Isidore. Myth in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Ong. Walter. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. London: Methuen, 1982. Plato. The Collected Dialogues. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1961. Street, Brian, A Critical look at Walter Ong and the Great Divid Aspects 1/1 (1988). Rpt Literacy Research Centre 4.1 (1988): 1 5. Wiredu, Kwasi. Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1980.

THE AFRICAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONFLICTS AND DEVELOPMENT

By Fredrick O. Juma

A paper presented to Egerton University Model United Nations (EUMUN), Njoro, on 30 th March 2007 EGERTON UNIVERSITY

Abstract The split of African philosophical thinking between the schools of ethnophilosophy and professional philosophy shows the involvement of philosophical conflicts in the African development process. Indeed, the philosophical debate does no more than revive the entrenched views of development theories, namely the conflict between tradition and modernity. While ethnophilosophy thinks that the rehabilitation of African traditions, drives to successful modernization, especially after the disparaging discourse of colonialism, professional philosophy is of the opinion that success depends on the exchange of the traditional culture for modern ideas and institutions. The article exposes and evaluates the major arguments developed by the two conflicting schools of thought in support of their position. The outcome is that both are right about their affirmations. Accordingly, the paper suggests that the conception of development as validation is alone able to reconcile the positive contribution of each school, since validation is how a traditional personality is judged according to modern norms, and thus achieves worldly success. Introduction

The involvement of African philosophy in development issues is not a known practice. It can even cause uneasiness in view of the speculative nature of philosophy. Apparently, philosophy either transcends questions of development or is little competent to deal with a topic requiring the attention of positive sciences, such as economics and sociology. failure of African development. A more malicious interpretation would detect in African philosophy a negative reflection stemming from the very In the absence of concrete measures and advancement, powerlessness, it would seem, can find a substitute in a speculative diversion, in a retreat from the practical world. When a deadlock is reached, concrete problems put on a metaphysical turn so that the interference of African philosophy in issues of development would be nothing by the expression of conflicts. Excessive preoccupations with speculative and literary matters manifests a profound discrepancy between the African mind and the exigencies of modernity, the mark of its alienation from the modern world. This is a sufficient reason for trying to understand why in Africa the failure of development turns into a philosophical conflict. In order to clarify the role of African philosophy in issues of conflicts and development, this paper assumes the following tasks. First, it shows why and how the issue of African development expounds philosophical conflicts. Second, it demonstrates how African philosophical schools owe their divergence to the infiltration of development issues by definite philosophical stands. Third, it elaborates the philosophical framework liable to promote a positive process of culture change. The Philosophical Background of Africas Development Problems Without even reaching the point of considering the African urge to development, theories accounting for the underdevelopment of Africa have been riddled with philosophical questions. Whether the Africa underdevelopment is attributed to colonialism and neocolonialism or to properly African inadequacies or to both. Some scholars state that colonialism kept Africa away from modernity. In addition to the economic pillage of Africa and the establishment of inadequate social institutions, this means that he ideology of colonialism has deeply disturbed and negatively affected the perception that Africans have of themselves. This is dehumanizing practice of colonialism whose outcome, it is said, Africa into a deep and lasting crisis of identity. Summarizing the positions of representative Africa philosophers, D. A. Masolo writes that the Africa philosophical debate

expresses the epistemological roots of: the deep social, political and cultural crisis of muntu, the African person (Eboussi Boulaga); Africans continued servitude to Western domination (Towa); Africas dependence on Western tutelage (Hebga); the invention of Africa at the margins of Western knowledge(Mudimbe). Indeed, according to the racist ideology of colonialism, Africans are so alien to modern and rational life that they cannot be expected to make any progress without a close and corrective European tutelage. The category of primitiveness diverts African thinking of any inner impulse to liberate itself from irrationality, myths and obsolete habits. Only under the supervision and guidance of the West can it be dragged into some kind of rationality. This model of development, otherwise known as Westernization, had a particularly corrosive impact on Africa because, unlike other colonized peoples, Africans could not counter the disparaging discourse with the mitigating effect of a glorious past. Africa being the land of those who invented neither gunpower nor compass, to quote Aime Cesaire, nor gave birth to universalist religion, still less to expanding empires, the colonial discourse was bound to be devastating. No other race in the world was so reminded of its alleged inferiority, and no other race was so disarmed to combat the allegation. Quite naturally, the accusation of prerationality and primitiveness imparted a philosophical texture to the whole idea of African modernization. In particular, the question of knowing whether or not Africans are rational by nature triggered philosophical investigations into African cultures. On the presumption that the ability to think philosophically reveals a rationalistic disposition, the presence or lack of philosophy in Africa became the yardstick of the rationality of Africans. This merging of rational thinking with philosophy invested from the start African philosophy with the task of disproving the charge of prerationality against Africa. scientific and technological abilities on which development depends. Among African philosophers, many became convinced that the best way to counter the imputation of prerationality was to support the concept of pluralism. The need for extended humanity, the very one able to offer a place for those who did not invent anything, became all the more pressing the more the records of African failure to catch up with the West were accumulating. The confrontation between the African legacy and the requirements of the modern world acquired the spiritual dimension of alterity, otherness. This, in turn, placed the This refutation had a direct bearing on development, given that rationality is a prerequisite for

issue of difference, the connection between race and the human nature, at the centre of African philosophical reflections. The need to define humanness in a world dominated by Eurocentric models imparted to African Philosophy an acute sense of subjectivity in search of a new definition. According to Descartes say that he is not his body, that his subjectivity is thought, transcendence, aloofness from bodily determinations. He is the captain in his ship. This is not the case to Africans who see to what extent their body sticks to them, how its being held in closeness to their thinking and prevent them from identifying themselves with a non-corporeal subjectivity. As emphasized by Lucius Outlaw, the deep issue of African philosophy is a struggle over the meaning of man and civilized human, and all that goes with this in the context of the political economy of the capitalized and Europeanized Western world. In the light of the European incursion of Africa, the emergence of African philosophy poses deconstructive (and reconstructive) challenges. Whether Africans accepts the inability to join the modern world due to the inappropriateness of their legacy or to the ruin of their original identity, in both cases they are compelled to take the West as an unavoidable challenge inducing them to reexamine their legacy and culture. As stated by Serequeberhan, the indisputable historical and violent diremption effected by colonialism and the continued misunderstanding of our situation perpetuated by neocolonialism calls forth and provokes thought in post-colonial Africa. The addition of the dereliction of post colonial Africa to the disparaging discourse of colonialism deepens even more the crisis of identity and obliges philosophical thinking to be nothing more than a haunting quest for identity. Should Africans feel that a major reason for inadequacy is the loss of identity, we see them engaged in the task of restoring precolonial links. Should they decide that the precolonial heritage obstructs advancement, they feel compelled to adopt a critical attitude with the view of strengthening universalist leanings to the detriment of particularism. In either case, they are at variance with themselves so that, as Alassan Ndaw suggests, African philosophy draws its breath from the experience of internal tear. The issue of modernity versus tradition is a serious conflict and it emerges as the basic concern of African Philosophy. It should be noted that the conflict between tradition and modernity is the core question that demarcates the various schools of development. Thus, while the school known as modernization theory explains underdevelopment by the persistence of traditional thinking and institutions, the trend known as dependency school rejects the vulnerability of

tradition, arguing that the satellization of African societies by the powerful Western is the real cause of underdevelopment. Another school, called the mode of production approach, attempts a synthesis by suggesting that underdevelopment occurs when traditional methods and structures complete with the advanced systems to perpetuate themselves. In all these positions, the friction between tradition and modernity remains the core problem. Nothing could better illustrate the overlap between development issues and philosophical questions than the fact that the conflict between tradition and modernity generates similar divisions in African philosophy. Speaking of the displeasure of professional philosophers with ethnophilosophy, Oyeka Owomoyela remarks that development is the powerful end that orients all their arguments. For those who argue that the present powerlessness of Africa is due to its straying from its legacy, some kind of revival of the past is seen as a remedy. Termed as ethnophilosophers, their position has instigated a vigorous critique of the modernists or professional philosophers. The latter equate this infatuation with the past with a reactionary attitude designed to maintain Africa in its backward beliefs and practices. Pointing out the real issue at stake, Kwasi Wiredu writes: This process of modernization entails changes not only in the physical environment but also in the mental outlook of our peoples, manifested both in their explicit beliefs and in their customs and their ordinary daily habits and pursuits. Since the fundamental rationale behind any changes in a world outlook is principally a philosophical matter, it is plain that the philosophical evaluation of our traditional thought is of very considerable relevance to the process of modernization in our continent. Clearly, the conflict between tradition and modernity highlights the philosophical texture of the terms of African development. Besides, this should not come as a surprise. The encounter of African philosophy with the problems of development is not particular to Africa. Whatever the purpose, theories of development are sooner or later confronted with the basic problem of philosophy, namely the question of the primacy of mind or matter. So when theories explain development wither by economic or environmental causes or by spiritualist and cultural considerations, they inevitably come under materialism or spiritualism. For instance, as Marxism ascribes social evolution to economic determinism, it represents the most accomplished materialist theory of development. In return, when Max Weber typifies a spiritualist approach, as for him religious anxiety explains, in the last instance, European capitalism.

Thus, the attribution of underdevelopment to economic dependency is consistent with a materialist approach, while the appeal to cultural reasons tend to conform to a spiritualist assumption. It is this philosophy of development, most of the time implicit in the mind of social scientists, which erupts in the debate dividing African philosophers. The question of knowing whether the lasting effect of colonialism and neocolonialism in African is to be found in socioeconomic or spiritual disabilities is, as we shall soon see in detail, an important aspect of the African philosophical debate. No Modernity without Heritage It is usual to distinguish four schools of thought in African philosophy. They are: (1)

ethnophilosophy, whose thinkers are Placide Temples, Alexis Kagame, John Mbiti etc; (2) philosophic sagacity, defended by Odera Oruka and his followers; (3) national and ideological philosophy, to which Cabral, Nyerere etc., are said to belong; (4) professional philosophy, which claims such scholars as Hountondji, Wiredu, Bodunrin, etc. ethnophilosophy refers to the works of those philosophers who present the collective worldviews of traditional Africa as philosophy. Professional philosophy rejects this identification of philosophy with collective thinking, arguing that only works based on rational and critical argumentation deserve to be called philosophical. Accepting the challenge, philosophic sagacity attempts to identify individuals who crown their traditional background with critical assessments of traditional beliefs. For its part, national and ideological philosophy prefers to emphasize the African primacy of collective destiny and its main corollary, namely the need for a theory rooted in traditional African socialism and family hood to achieve the authentic and effective liberation of Africa. These classifications pose many conflicts. The classified schools overlap in major issues and, in some cases, distinct trends of thought are not recognized, as for instance the existence of the hermeneutical school. etc., schools. Moreover, the classification is not based on proper philosophical consideration matching the Western categorization of rationalist, empiricist, materialist, idealist, However, our purpose, being demonstration of the relevance of African philosophical debate to issues of development, does not need an elaborate type of classification. The broad distinction of ethnophilosophy on one hand and professional philosophy on the other is enough to articulate our problem. The two schools do reproduce in philosophical terms the splits caused by the conflict between tradition and modernity in development theories.

Viewed from the angle of development, ethnophilosophy handles two positions namely; the criticism of the Western conceptions of Africa and the rehabilitation of Africa cultures. The task is regarded as the major condition of African renaissance and hence modernization. The premises of this thinking were started by Placide Tempels, though he came round to the idea of African philosophy through the purpose of evangelizing Africans, but his problem still meets the issues of African modernization in general. He registers the failure of missionary work in Africa by remarking that the work has only succeeded in creating the evolue. The evolue is a failure or conflict lacking stability and firmness. The reason for this superficial Christianization is that the evolue, according to Tempels, has never effected reconciliation between his new way of life and his former native philosophy, which remains intact just below the surface. Because he/she has not reached a synthesis, Christianity and the native philosophy conflict and a deep and firm conversion is blocked. Tempels sees the deep reason for this failure in the colonial discourse describing African beliefs as childish and savage customs. This characterization, he boldly states, imputes to the colonizer the responsibility for having killed the main in the Bantu. Evidently, Temples view extends to the general problem of the modernization of Africa. It inaugurates a mode of thought which discards the method of Westernization as well as the depreciation of African traditional cultures, arguing that modernity cannot take root if it dehumanizes the African. It even suggests that underdevelopment is just the product of the dehumanization of Africa. The superficial adoption of Western culture and the subsequent conflict with the native personality can hardly support a successful process of change. To reverse this trend, there is no other way than to refute the colonial insult by exposing the philosophical dimension of the traditional thinking. Accordingly, the question of the existence of African philosophy must be answered by a loud and clear yes. Anything less than the demonstration of the prior existence of African philosophy to the colonial incursion, ethnophilosophy warns, would fall short of being a pertinent defense of the humanity of Africans. This clears the way for an African road to development, which rejects Westernization and conceives of modernization as an assertion of African personality. The whole idea turns modernization into a restoration of the pre-colonial norms of Africa.

The restoration of Africas precolonial philosophical thinking and cultural references will allow Africans to interpret and organize the modern world from their own standpoint. Far from being an assault on tradition, modernization requires its reinstatement, which is then an act of empowerment. The distinct message of ethnophilosophy is thus clear that modernization does not implicate a flight from ones cultural legacy and the alleged conflict between tradition and modernity is but a fake assumption. What explains underdevelopment is not that tradition persists, but that it has been discarded. This thinking puts ethnophilosophy and the West on a collision course. Already, as is obvious with Nyerere and Nkrumah, there is an attempt to throw back the insult. Africa is labeled as primitive, yet the alleged superiority of the West is but a sham: it cannot hide how squarely its superior civilization is built on the exploitation of man by man. There is nothing noble about it, and Africa will prefer its poverty to a mode of life that portrays as virtue and unspeakable crime. If Africa is backward, the West is barbaric, and so even less civilized since real civilization is unthinkable without humanism. As Nyerere says, the creation of wealth is a good thing and something which we shall have to increase. But it will cease to be good the moment wealth ceases to serve man and begins to be served by man. There is, therefore, a deliberate attempt to rehabilitate Africa by emphasizing its humanistic values as opposed to the exploitative relationships of Western capitalism. The revelation of African humanism counters the colonial affront, but more yet, it falsifies it in the very terms of the civilizing mission. This polemical course is inherent in the position defending the existence of African philosophy, and its purpose is to create what Mazrui called cultural nationalism. No Modernity without Denial In light of the West identifying itself with reason, the slightest successful move towards modernity becomes conditional on Africans being endowed with the same human potential. The more ethnophilosophy insists on the peculiarity of Africans, the higher becomes their separation from the development process. Paradoxically, by making Africans into a strange people, ethnophilosophy, contradicting its own principles, justifies and calls for the civilizing mission. Obviously, being alien to rationality by nature, Africans cannot be put on the track of

development without the imposition of an external model.

Consequently, the critique of

ethnophilosophy by professional philosophers revolves around three points: (1) ethnophilosophy is an endorsement of the anthropological discourse on Africa; (2) it is based on a misconception of the nature of philosophy; (3) its implications are most detrimental to progress. The endorsement of the anthropological theory is indeed the apex of self-contradiction. The affirmation of African difference does no more than reproduce the anthropological view of irrational and mythical Africa. It supports the colonial reasoning according to which Africans are unable to acquire the rudiments of modern life without the permanent tutelage of the West. By subscribing to the idea of Africans otherness, ethnophilosophy defines reasons as the prerogative of the white man. Hence Hountondjis indictment that it is nothing but a revamped version of Levy-Bruhls primitive mentality. Far from retrieving Africas pride and rehabilitating its culture, as it claims, ethnophilosophy is an accomplice upholding the disparagement of Africa and its subordination to the West. What is demanded from African philosophy is, according to professional philosophy, the radical rejection of Africas alleged otherness. The restoration of the pride and creativity of Africans depend on the recognition, not of their strangeness, but of their universal virtues, which they share equally with the rest of human kind. Since the colonial and neocolonial discourse contests the membership of Africans in the normal human order, African philosophy must denounce this invention of difference for the sole purpose of marginalizing Africa. The staunch critique of anthropology, not its sanction, should be the main focus of African philosophy. How does professional philosophy repudiate the colonial discourse on the prelogical nature of Africans and reinstate their pride and humanity? Since the claim of difference and the relativization of Western pretensions to universality result in a backfiring strategy, the best way is to demonstrate that the science on which the perception of Africa is based in a fake, apseudoscience, as Hountondji says. That is why professional philosophers lead the battle on the epistemological ground rather than on metaphysical and ethical grounds, as ethnophilosophy does. The idea is to pinpoint invention, construction where the colonial mind professes an objectivist reading. This method of discrediting the colonial descriptions of Africa makes the school dependent on the philosophical premises of the Frankfurt school and French structuralism.

Does this mean that professional philosophy disputes the existence of African philosophy? If we are to believe Hountondji, the answer is no. ethnophilosophy is the proof that African philosophy exists by the same right and in the same mode as all the philosophies of the world: in the form of a literature. Simply, in the case of ethnophilosophy, the individual views are hidden under a collective veil and identified with an ethnic group. It is a philosophy which, instead of presenting its own rational justification, shelters lazily behind the authority of a tradition and projects its own theses and beliefs on to that tradition. So what is being offered as a collective philosophy is the view of an individual African philosopher. In the light of these serious drawbacks of ethnophilosophy, the progressive thinking is the one that admits that African philosophy is before us, not behind us, and must be created today by decisive action. It must be critical not only of the West, but of African cultures and customs as well, thys avoiding any snugness about African vices and shortcomings in the name of identity. As Mudimbe proposes, this philosophy should be critical of the other discourses.and, at the same time by vocation, one which should be autocritical. Above all, it must discard the idea of African otherness so as to inaugurate philosophical systems defined as African only by the geographical origin of the authors rather than an alleged specificity of content. For professional philosophers, this amount to saying that development can neither be positively theorized nor practically engaged if the conflict between tradition and modernity is not accepted as an essential ingredient of the problem. The undermining of folk thinking and past beliefs and practices is the first step towards modernization. Development lies in transition from particularism to a universal, scientific culture. Many scholars have come to reprove the Western model because it has so far failed. Failure exposes the bare fact that Westernization is merely a continuation of the colonial model. The fact that in postcolonial Africa the model has become the goal of native ruling elite which does not change its nature. So long as Africa is not after its own self, armed with its own beliefs and myths, development is still a civilizing mission. To conclude, the dismissal of the conflict between tradition and modernity and the conception of the latter as wordly corroboration of the former advise the replacement of the suppression of traditions. In this way, culture change is promoted through the commitment to tradition rather

than its denial.

Neither Westernization nor careful borrowings really change an inherited

personality; they simply burden it with dualism. Also, the attempt to wipe out the legacy is futile and humanly suicidal. In return, what is viable is the alteration of the past, the manner the legacy is received. This amounts to renovating identity, and not solving any conflicts. Quoted References D. A. Masolo, African Philosophy in Search of Identity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 147. Aime Cesaire, Return to My Native Land (Harmonsdworth: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 72. Lucius Outlaw, African Philosophy: Deconstructive and Reconstructive Challenges, Sage Philosophy, ed. H. Odera Oruka (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), p. 224. Tsenay Serequeberhan, The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy (New York : Routledge, 1994), p. 16. Alassane Ndaw, La Pensee Africaine (Dakar : Less Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1983), P. 36. The translation is mine. See Messay Kebede, Underdevelopment and the Problem of Causation, Journal of Social Philosophy (San Antonio : Trinity University), 22 = 1 (spring 1990). Oyeka Owomoyela, Africa and the Imperative of Philosophy: A Skeptical Consideration, African Philosophy: The Essenstial Readings, ed. Tsenay Serequeberhan (New York: Paragon House, 1991), p. 162. Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and an African culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.x.

RELIGION AND HIV / AIDS; A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

BY FREDRICK O. JUMA

A Paper presented to the International Students Conference on AIDS-ISCA, EGERTON UNIVERSITY

ADDRESS P.O. Box 536 NJORO Mobile No.: 0733 836951

FEBRUARY 25, 2005

ABSTRACT God has created man in the best form, and laid down for him, within the precepts of the heavenly codes of life, principles and rules that would ensure for him a happy, normal life. He has drawn mans attention to the importance of health, and warned him against exposing himself to danger or destruction. Religious teachings have given as much attention to the health and well being of society as they have to that of the individual person. The progressive development of life on this planet has brought about a number of deep and rapid consequences, the changes in human behavior caused by increased population, mass immigration and other social and economic developments are manifest to us all. Despite the undoubtedly positive aspects of these changes, their negative impact on the balance of mans personality, the family structure and the cohesion of society, is now clear to all. These crucial changes have been accompanied by a weakening of religious restrains and moral modes of behavior, which has led to the spread of alien and including all types of sexually transmitted diseases, not least of which is the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). In the circumstances, avoiding the risk factors proves to be the only weapon available in combating this disease and this can be achieved by adopting responsible, sensible and rational behaivour, i.e. a return to the proper moral framework taught by religion.

INTRODUCTION The aim of this paper is to discuss the role of religion and ethics in the prevention and control of HIV / AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases, and to convey a strong and direct message about risks and side effects of misbehavior. It also urges society to observe religious teachings and cherish moral and ethical values that prevent individuals from getting involved in risky relationships. It aims to encourage individuals to develop the necessary self-control to prevent them from such dangerous practices. Until very recently, some people used to believe that the Arab-Muslim parts of the world and the Mediterranean Region were safe from the spread of AIDS and from the devastating effects of other sexually transmitted diseases. However,

research, studies and the available statistical data have shown that this belief is totally false. With regard to AIDS, there are at present specific indications of the fast spread of the disease locally and in all parts of the world, especially among certain groups such as drug addicts, prostitutes and the homosexuals. As for other sexually transmitted diseases, indications confirm that infection and spread rates continue to rise. The factors causing this perhaps include the increase in population movement for natural or industrial reasons, urbanization and increased tourism, all of which have their impact on peoples morals and behavior patterns. These diseases are seen to be more serious when we remember that the highest rates of incidence occur among those who are between 20 and 24 years of age, followed by the 15 19 year age group and then the 25 and above age group. The practical message for this paper is exceptionally important as it emphasizes religious and ethical values and encourages healthy behavior as a preventive measure or method to be used against the rampant scourage of AIDS and all other sexually transmitted diseases. No country in the world is immune from these diseases, which, once allowed to spread, can gather

greater momentum with far reaching destructive effects on man. After all, it is man who builds human civilization and he is the prime beneficiary of all moral and material progress. Finally, since AIDS mainly spreads through both heterosexual and homosexual activity and among drug addicts, especially intravenous drug users or those who use contaminated needles, the exposition of religious teachings relating to such types of behavior is essential in building protective and preventive barriers against infection and disease. RELIGION AND SENSUAL PLEASURERS Religion has a well-known, universally agreed stand on the sensual pleasure, which does not approve either total indulgence or total prohibition. All religions allow certain kinds of such enjoyment that are known in religious language as permissible, and censor others that are designated as forbidden. No divine scripture received by the prophets and messengers absolutely prohibits sensual pleasures or permits their unrestrained indulgence. Total prohibition is

contrary to basic human nature. This basic human nature comprises of desires and urges that have to be satisfied in various sensual ways. Total permissiveness, however changes man from a rational and highly honoured being to a dumb creature that sinks to the level lower than that of animals, who after satisfying their instinctive desires, simply do what pleases them and avoid what does them harm. Since the modes of transmission of HIV /AIDS infection and other sexually transmitted diseases mostly revolve around human pleasures, it is important to analyse the effect of religious observance and the adherence to the behavoural values instituted by religion and moral values it recommends on mans attitude to sensual pleasures and how they are to be gratified. It requires first all the identification of which sensual pleasures are permissible and which are not, in order

to ensure that by following religious teachings, people would effectively steer away from behavior patterns through which this individually and collectively devastating epidemic can spread. The gist of religious teachings in this regard is that religion encourages and advocates marriage and prohibits all other alternatives for sexual enjoyment. Religious also prescribe the

preservation of the human rational faculties and prohibit the use of all kinds of substances, such as drugs and narcotics, that may impair them, regardless of the manner in which these substances are taken or administered. Religion urges public cleanliness and promote public health to a degree that protects human beings from risks of infection by destructive diseases, the most dangerous of which in this day and age, are sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS in particular. CHASTITY AS AN OBLIGATION The two main religions, Christianity and Muslim attach great importance to marriage and marital relationships. In Quran for example, Islam pays particular attention to marriage, showering it with such distinctive veneration that makes it unique among all human contracts. Islamic statements point out that among the purposes of marriage, is the protection of men and women against immoral behavior resulting from sexual permissiveness. It is for this reason that Islam urges those who can afford, not to delay it. In general terms, Quran restricts sex to marriage and considers any sexual activity outside marriage as a forbidden transgression. Similarly, Christianity encourages marriage and this is documented in both Old and New Testament of the Holy Bible. We read from the Old Testament that God made the institution of marriage

appropriate for human beings (Genesis; 2:18). Christian scriptures also consider marriage as sacrosanct, and urge both husband and wife to be faithful to each other. By preserving their

chastity within marriage, Muslims and Christians protect themselves against the most risky source of infection with the AIDS virus and other diseases. This objective can only be achieved through chaste and clean marriage. According to religious law, marriage is the only permissible way that God has prescribed for men and women to enjoy the physical aspects of the sexual relationship. All other forms of sexual contact that take place outside a proper marriage are sinful and unlawful. Perhaps it is interesting to reflect here that the phenomenon of the espousal and the existence of the male and the female are not exclusive to man. Duality is a fundamental and constant feature of all Gods creation. Therefore marriage is a major solution to some of these problems, as it tremendously difficult to achieve this because it is not sufficient to simply advise young people to abstain from sexual activities while all around them is inviting and full to temptation. Society must therefore facilitate marriage and remove all financial, social and traditional obstacles that prevent it. In order to protect young people from sexual misdemeanor therefore, early marriages should be encouraged by solving the social and economic problems that are currently causing the average age at which people get married to be high. Early marriage must also be accompanied by a call for proper family planning. PROHIBITION OF SEXUAL RELATIONS OUTSIDE MARRIAGE The religions provide a second ring of protection for individuals and society against the adverse effects of unrestrained sexual freedom. This can be seen in their prohibition of all kinds of extramarital relations. Divine religions indeed, outlaw adultery and block all the roads leading to it. Adultery inflicts considerable damage upon family geneology, honour and future generations and causes numerous family break-ups as well as the disintegration of the ties that bind family

groups together. It brings about an oppressive spread of licentiousness leading to a total moral breakdown. General approach in forbidding any action is not limited to its verbal condemnation but always entails closing the doors that may lead to committing it. Islam for example forbids men and women meeting alone privately or in seclusion. It also forbids lecherous gazing at the opposite sex, looking at those parts or other peoples bodies which require to remain covered in public. This is also found in both Old and New Testament of the Bible, as it is stated in (Mathew 5:28), You shall not commit adultery, and in the Old Testament (Proverbs 32), He who commits adultery has no sense. Adultery has strictly been forbidden in all religions and has been branded by all prophets as unclean, indecent, profane, capricious and a vile lust. St. Paul goes even further by prohibiting mixing with adulterers and says that they should be isolated (1st Corinthians 5:5-9). Observance of religious teachings prohibiting adultery is one of the most effective methods of avoiding the risk of infection with HIV / AIDS, and other sexual diseases. This becomes even more significant when we understand that infection comes about chiefly as a result of sexual conduct, whether between heterosexuals or homosexuals. According to (Leviticus 20:13),

Christianity prohibits all kinds of unnatural sexual relationships including homosexuality of men and women, and if that happened, they both ought to be put to death. PROHIBITION OF DRUGS AND ALL INTOXICATING SUBSTANCES All divine religions outlaw taking substances that cause damage to the brain, or induce unconsciousness or impairment of the mind. Christians, Muslims and all creeds agree that the overall objective of the religious law is the preservation of the five basic essential elements of human life namely; belief, body, mind, offspring and property. Narcotic drugs are not condoned

by all religions because intoxicating drinks are felt to be at the root of all grave and serious offences. Alcohol is at the same time the main substance that has a negative effect on the mind. Drinking intoxicants, trading in them, and indeed the mere handling of any of them, are considered in religious law offences that incur punishment. The prohibition of such substances are in consequence of the malice and harm they cause, and this has raised consensus among religious scholars that all types of drugs that influence the human mind are not permissible to take. Christianity and other religions outlaw the usage of such substances and those addicted should be isolated from the society. From this we can conclude that all religions affirm elimination of all, or most means and routes that lead to the infection with and spread of AIDS. All religions are not content with simple declaration or warnings with respect to unlawful or harmful activity and behavior, rather they are concerned with practical terms of removing all means that lead to what is unlawful. This is meant to cleanse the social atmosphere of all provocative agents of temptation and sensuality. Religious teachings are normally geared to alleviate hardship and facilitate a clean and chaste life. The society should not strife to justify the unlawful behavior, which should instead be punished accordingly. All ethical teachings and instructions of religion are aimed at invigorating and supporting the intrinsic quality of human nature, and making it stronger with knowledge, understanding and feeling. The purpose is to make it part of the moral fabric of mans personality and to protect and guard mans moral well-being. Christianity and Islam advocate moral ideals, thus we see that their teachings do not stop at mere advocacy but go further to condemn any contemplation of sin. Adherence to religious moral injunctions in avoiding immoral and sinful practices is not portrayed simply as a way leading to happiness in the hereafter, but it has a role to play in the

enhancement of the physical and moral purification of the human personality in this world as well. Your dignity has to be safeguarded both at individual and community level. Religious approach as we have seen, relies heavily on the need to protect human beings against all gross indecency. It lays down a verdict of prohibition on all indecent and sinful practices, projects them as unpleasant and discourages believers from pursuing them. Religions also advocate preventive measures that would curb the spread of such practices. People however are not of the same caliber and ability when it comes to religious observance and piety. There are those who posses sufficient willpower and strength of character that can not be broken by temptation and seduction. However, there are others who can neither resist temptation nor effectively restrain their desires. Such people fall into the traps of sin and vile behavior. For these people, religions have prescribed some hash penalities that aim to dissuade sinners and deter others who might be tempted to follow their example. These penalties are found both in the Bible and the Quran. THE CONCEPTS OF FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS It is clear that religious teachings and rules advocate certain forms of restrictive and penal measures with respect to certain types of human behavior. This may seem to invalidate or contradict the concept of personal freedom as some modern philosophers have claimed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the intellectual, philosophical, legal or social aspects relating to the concept of personal freedom or what influence it may have on the legal system or the social make-up of behavioural values. For the purpose of this paper, what is understood by personal freedom is ones right to enjoy any God-given talents and aptitudes as well as the facilities available in this world, in any manner that one desires. These basic guidance with

respect to freedom to enjoy the God-given life on this earth, bring into focus the fact that all divine religions do not define personal freedom in the same way as it has come to be known or understood in the modern world. According to this modern concept, everyone has the right to have as many, so called free sexual relationships as she or he may desire. Society thus shades its prudent image which helps protect individuals against corruption and moral misconduct. Society demands that individuals do things that are considered proper or prudent. Religious and International views on human rights do not in fact differ much, except that in religious context, these rights are exercised within the framework outlined by religion with regard to human behavior. Whereas one of the policy guidelines of the World Health Organization (WHO), relating to the fight against the AIDS epidemic, is to support the current efforts being made in the area of human rights. It is difficult to imagine these efforts bearing fruit, unless the concept of human rights is understood in the light of the religious beliefs which should prevail in many countries, including Kenya, and to be more focused, Egerton University. One of the human rights recognized by International law is the right of privacy which gives everyone the privilege to choose his or her private relationships and practices as they please. However, in a society observing religious teachings, this right, as well as the right of personal security is exercised within the values relating to personal and collective morals. Accordingly, Article 17 of the UNESCO Declaration of Human Rights states that; everyone has the right to live in an environment that is free from moral corruption and disease, which enables him or her to develop his or her personality morally, the society and the state being bound by law to guarantee that right. The major aim of promoting and supporting human rights is currently focused on eliminating discrimination against individuals, whose infection with HIV has been confirmed. This aim is also guaranteed in both Christianity and Islam. Human rights are guaranteed by all

religions, and the call for personal freedom should not be used as a pretext to allow modes of behavior that threaten the freedom and safety of others or that of society as a whole, including exposing them in infection. RECOMMENDATION
1.

The battle against the AIDS epidemic calls for efforts and resources beyond those of the health authorities alone. All other sectors concerned and the religious sector in particular, are called upon to stand side-by-side in facing up to this challenge. Spiritual work must, all times, be related to health and other efforts and should not be confined to certain issues or times.

2.

Mosques and churches have a fundamental role to play in educating society. They must, in addition to highlighting religious teachings, tackle those tackle those aspects relating to the prevention and control of diseases, including AIDS and all sexually transmitted diseases, taking into account the sound principles of freedom, human rights, social welfare and cohesion, personal relationships and family life. Health authorities must provide religious leaders with basic information relating to the incidence of these diseases in society, in order to incorporate such information, into their religious instruction.

3.

Since the highest rates of infection with the AIDS virus and all sexually transmitted diseases are found among young people and the working population, these sections of society must be targeted and given particular attention. In order to boost the effects of the media, education and communication efforts directed at these sectors and other groups at risk, scientific information must be combined with spiritual guidance in a well-organized

educational effort. As well as involving religious leaders and institutions, this effort must enlist the energies of all those concerned with areas of health, education and social work. 4. Religious instruction must be introduced into school curricula at all levels of education, so as to support and complement other subjects, with the aim of building the personality of the individual in a way that is in harmony with the interests of others and those of society as a whole. 5. Sex education is essential within the appropriate considerations of age and educational standards. It must be complementary to health education and religious instruction.
6.

The media and non-governmental organizations are important partners in the international effort against disease. In order to guarantee public support and participation, information on the scientific aspects of the problem and the relevant religious, behavioural and moral regulations must be made available to the media and non-governmental bodies.

7.

Sex is a biological part of the human constitution. It has its own natural needs and demands which must be regulated and controlled according to the accepted social norms. To safeguard young people against sexual misbehavior, early marriages must be encouraged by solving the current social and economic problems which cause marriage to be delayed. The call for early marriage must be accompanied by a complementary call for family planning.

8.

Human rights are guaranteed by all religions. The call for personal freedom must not be used as a pretext for any behavior which infringes on the freedom and safety of others, or those of society as a whole, including exposing them to infection.

9.

Every patient has the right to adequate treatment, and patients must be made aware of how to prevent both the deterioration of their health and the infection of others. Religions do not allow the exposure of patients to discrimination, disgrace or neglect, for whatever reason, and no matter how their infection has occurred.

10.

Protection and support must be extended to the families of affected people, so that they are able to provide the necessary care for their relatives who have caught the disease and overcome the gravity of their loss. Exposing such families to any kind of discrimination or hardship is contrary to ethical principles.

11.

There are no objections to the use of condoms, whenever necessary, for the protection of spouses of infected persons. But the promotion of the use of condoms for purposes of protection against sexually transmitted diseases outside the framework of marriage is not acceptable. Chastity, fidelity and virtue must be upheld and encouraged. These noble qualities alone are sufficient to guarantee peoples total safety and provide them with an effective safeguard against the scourage of disease and infection.

CONCLUSION It has become very clear that the factors and conditions leading to infection by AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases can be avoided if people adopt proper and decent patterns of behaviour, and if they adhere to the fundamental teachings of religion and the moral ethos based on them, which have become the central component of the unique culture of the people of this region, and their inherited traditions. Human nature is basically good and if it is properly nurtured, it will yield the best results. Many parts of the world today, however, are in the grip of a credibility crisis between the teachers and

leaders on the one hand, and the general public on the other. This crisis can only be overcome by societys leaders themselves becoming worthy examples, endearing religion and religious behavior to people in general and providing for religion to have its full effect in the field of health, and its two main areas of prevention and treatment. REFERENCES
1. Hashim, A.O. (2003). The Complementary of Religious Activities Social Science and

Medicine 38 (14) 1642 1692.

2. Guirguis, W. Q. (2004). Obligations of Religious Leaders in Enhancing Public

Awareness of AIDS Journal of the American Medical Association. 263, 269 300.
3. Sheikh, S. M. (1991). The Role of Islam in the Prevention of AIDS. Egypt, Alexandria

Foundation.
4. Hezairy, H. (1990). We Shall Not Lose Hope World Health. Yale University Press P.

140. 5. WHO, (1989). Publications on AIDS, and in particular, the Report of the International Consultation on AIDS and Human Rights, Geneva.
6. Kelly, G. (1951). The Duty to Preserve Life, in Theological Studies. 14. P. 256. 7. UNAIDS, HIV / AIDS. Curriculum for Theological Institutions and Bible Colleges in

Africa. (2002).
8. World Health Organization (WHO) (1999): Profile of HIV / AIDS Epidemic, Cameroon.

Weekly Epidemiological Record 68 (11) : 74 88.

9. Carballo, M. (1998). Behavioural Issues and AIDS in Africa. New York. Raven Press. 10. Manuhya, J. (2004). AIDS and the Religions. New York. St. Martins Press.

THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN GLOBAL PEACE

By Fredrick O. Juma

A Paper presented to the Third UNESCO Philosophy Day Conference at the Catholic University of Eastern Africa on November 17th 18th, 2004.

EGERTON UNIVERSITY, NJORO P.O. BOX 536

EGERTON

ABSTRACT Global peace is the Summum Bonum, so we must as philosophers know its negative as well as positive meaning. Simultaneously peace must be understood in all its interrelated but

theoretically differentiated dimensions as person, social, national, international and global. Today, mankind is suffering from multi-dimensional crisis such as terrorism, exploitation, HIV/AIDS, denial of human rights, population, economic inequality, racial discrimination, ideological extremism, religious intolerance, social injustice, ecological imbalance, oppression of the weak etc. These peace related issues compel us as philosophers to lay down fundamental principles of a radical global ethics that expects us to realize our roles and duties regarding global peace. It includes the roles and ideals of other professionals like the scientists,

educationists, other thinkers and of course the philosophers. All these should inculcate human values such as forgiveness, non violence, love, negotiations etc we should engage in philosophical war. Instead of bullets and bayonets, we should fight with words and ideas and irrationally should be our common enemy. Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.

THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN GLOBAL PEACE The idea of world peace is, in itself a relatively recent idea. Not so long ago, all over the world, and in Europe in particular, every generation had its war. War was almost considered as inevitable and peace was only a vague utopian dream. The 20th Century peace movements were necessitated by two wars, which also gave rise to the League of Nations. Initially this failed due to technicalities as stated by Rapport, (1992). The rise in the Nationalist movements of the 19 th and 20th Centuries which provoked the two world war played, according to some, a major role in the idea of creating the conditions for world peace. World War I took the lives of more than 9 million people, killing between 20% to 25% of the male population of France and Germany. As for the World War II, 55 million people died, including 6 million Jews in the Nazi concentration camps, Adams (1994). Faced with the largest catastrophes in human history, men and women around the planet began to dream of a better, peaceful world. World peace became the Supreme Ideal or the Summum Bonum for the many who lived. All of us share this desire of living peacefully, but still peace has not been attained globally since the two world wars. We are still at crossroads, when peaceful living and healthy future of civilization in the world today depend upon the ecological balance. In order to comprehend the exact meaning and real nature of peace, it is necessary to comprehend different ways of attaining it. Empty rhetoric will not grant us global peace, but

rather sacrifices and commitment to the course is mandatory, and to these, Rev. Sun Myung (1994) states; The order of existence in the universe is rooted in acting for the sake of others. The world of true peace, true love and the true ideal is both the ideal of Gods creation and the desire of human kind. Therefore, the origin of happiness and peace lies in living for the sake of others. As philosophers, we should also resist the tendency of defining peace just as the absence of bilateral war or absence of something else, because this encourages negativity approach to the struggle of attaining world peace. Being contemporary scholars therefore, we should be asking ourselves, under what context do we achieve and understand the concept of peace? We must cooperate to achieve peace democratically, and according to Gandhi (1982); There is no human institution without its danger. The greater the institution the greater the chances of abuses. Democracy is a great institution and therefore it is liable to be greatly abused. The remedy, therefore is not avoidance of democracy but reduction of possibility of abuse to minimum. Rai (1998) and Indian moral philosopher argues that peace can only be achieved if all such violence is removed, such as wars, environmental destruction, violation of human rights, cruelty against women and children, oppression and exploitation of the weak, discrimination of the poor and the illiterates, application of the law impartially, i.e. favouring some groups of people within the same environment etc. But Gandhi(1982) states, it should be noted that peace is not only a state of non-violence or absence of wars. It is no non-violence if we merely love those that love us. It is non-violence only when we love those who hate us. I know how difficult it is to follow this grand law of love. But are not all

great and good things difficult to do? Love of the hater is the most difficult of all. But by the grace of God, even this most difficult thing becomes easy to accomplish if we want to do it for the sake of peace. Being a regulative goal of person and mankind, it has a positive aspect, which should not be overlooked. In other words, peace must be understood in all its dimensions, that is to say that personal mental peace leads to internal calm and tranquility, which in turn leads to social peace, social justice and development. The world virtually needs peace for its multidimensional

developments at all levels. International peace is a necessity for peaceful relations among all nations, hence global peace should mean peaceful co-existence of all existent. Mental peace reveals a state of unshakable quiet and composure, which is achieved through inculcation of such creative virtues as friendliness, compassion, mercy, modesty, forgiveness, love, non-violence, humility, understanding etc. Most of these virtues signify that peace carries with it a surpassing of personality. It means that even the personal peace anticipates peaceful interpersonal relational relations. Today, personal peace is highly lacking due to our restless fast life, continuously affected by frequent changes in socio-political and economic situations. The social peace can hardly be achieved due to the current problems of terrorism, unemployment, insecurity, communal and ethnic clashes, party-politics and other internal wrangling. Gandhi (1982) writes; I do believe that all Gods creatures have the right to live as much as we have. Instead of prescribing the killing of the so called injurious fellow creatures of ours as duty, if men of knowledge had devoted their gift of discovering ways of dealing with them otherwise than by killing them, we would be living in a world befitting our status as men endowed with reason and

the power of choosing between good and evil, right and wrong, violence and non-violence, truth and untruth. After contemplating on such disturbing issues, no rational person can deny the inseparability of different dimensions of peace and that the main problem of the contemporary thinkers is to strive and achieve global peace, not through coercion, but through negotiations and good will. Today mankind all over the world is facing various crisis originating from terrorism, populationexplosion, denial of human rights, economic inequality, racial discrimination, vanity of cultural superiority, ideological extremism, religious intolerance, nationalism, social injustice, poverty, starvation, exploitation of nature, oppression of weaker section by the powerful and rich, ecological imbalance, natural calamities, HIV / AIDS, sexism, racism, classism, capitalism etc. These paints a gloomy picture on the world situation, elucidating that lack of peace has contributed enormously to underdevelopment and under nourishment. To give one concrete example is what is happening in Darfur, Sudan. The United States and humanitarian groups accuse elements of Sudans government and the allied Arab militia of committing genocide against Africans who live in Darfur. An estimated 70,000 people have died since the conflict broke out in early 2003. According to UN figures, nearly 1.5 million people have fled their homes into refugee camps, including tens of thousands crossing into neighbouring Chad. Gandhi (1982) on this issue of peace states; If the mad race for armaments continues it is bound to result in a slaughter such as has never occurred in history. If there is a victor left the very victory will be a living death for the nation that emerges victorious.

This means that the survival of mankind and other related issues of peace compel us, as scholars to lay down the fundamental principles of an emerging comprehensive global ethics that expects all to realize their freedom to choose between life and death, and demands our active participation in decision making and policy making and other commitment to human values and world peace. As issues concerning global peace are mutually, dependent, the principles of global ethics must be adhered to by all interested parties like politicians, moralists, social-scientists as well as ordinary citizens of the world. We live in an age stained by cruelty, torture, conflict and violence, which are not natural conditions, but scourges to be eradicated. Hence global ethics expounds that peace can be achieved when exploitation and discrimination is replaced by equality domination by autonomy, participation in policy making and diplomacy by transparency. All of us are yearning to live peacefully, but we have reached crossroads when peaceful living and healthy future of civilization depend upon the ecological balance or preservation of environment, we must learn a lesson from the Gulf War and most recently, the invasion of Iraq by USA. There wars were fought for the resources of the earth, and as Thomas Merton (1915 1968) says, peace demands the most heroic labour and the most difficult sacrifice. It demands greater heroism than war. PHILOSOPHERS AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS ON GLOBAL PEACE The philosophers would argue that the only way to achieve global peace is to deny the nature that makes us human. There are countless facets of human nature that make war inevitable. There are also many aspects that encourage peace, however peace does not exist without war. Sadly, war is often the victor of the two. For example, what makes America great is that

everyone is so different, but it is these differences that also drive up apart from one another. One way global peace can be achieved is if we also achieve global uniformity, which is the last thing anybody wants. There will always be someone or some group that somebody hates, and

therefore war becomes a statistical eventuality. Is it possible to think of life as a mountain, with peace as an uphill road filled with many obstacles to overcome, and war on the other hand as downhill run, free from obstacles and much faster? So if everyone in the world is working towards peace, and one person decides to take the easy path to war, it can destroy everything everyone else has worked to achieve. Hate often spreads like plague and infects everyone. War is not just a physical act, such as one country against another, it is also a mental act. Just because someone does not do harm to others, does not mean he/she is not at war with them. For example if there is a person with whom you disagree, it does not mean that you want him harmed, but it can still mean you are at war with him mentally and these feelings easily escalate. Historians will lecture us on many occasions when some countries have transgressed against others and these are not often forgotten, making lasting peace a difficult goal, like in the case of Iraq and Kuwait at one point. Peace cannot be accomplished unwillingly, or is it just an act of cease-fire. A forced peace is but a temporary solution to a problem, whose real solution was never even approached. Most countries are simultaneously trying to prevent while also preparing for war with each other. This is no way to bring about global peace. This distrust sows more distrust, which eventually leads to war. As a philosopher, personally, I do not believe global peace is possible, but this in n o way means that I do not think it is important to work towards it. There is no great goal than peace, and perhaps someday, global peace will be within our grasp. Hope springs eternal.

As any other professional, I think that if everyone on the planet could cultivate a philosophy of equality for all and look for win/win relationships with others, that would mark the first step towards a long journey to global peace. With this simple philosophy, our world can be a more peaceful and just place to live in, it is about working together and sharing the joy of what the human experience is all about. If we actually and carefully consider what is required to bring about world peace, we unsurprisingly conclude that it starts with a decision in individuals, making a profound change in their focus. Starting with ourselves, we can move the current state of the world towards peace by simply practicing a simple philosophy of feeling loved and expressing compassion for all beings. In invite you to meditate on peace. Take your mind away from the focus of the world media and look for that internal peace that exists within yourself and when you have the capacity to feel at peace with yourself, then you can transcend other boundaries to teach and project this capability to others. We are now faced with some

fundamental realities, critical choices of collectively making choices of simply voting for both inner and outer peace. With the many political hotspots existing in the world today, anti-peace has placed all of humankind in peril. It is now clear to many, that politics and force alone cannot bring about world peace. We can no longer accept acts of violence from one human being against another as an appropriate instrument of policy in the modern world. This means that issues relating to peaceful co-existence are not solely the property of politicians, national leaders and social scientists, but everyone. Every citizen of this global village must be aware of his/her

responsibility by adopting an essentially new way of thinking, i.e. holistic thinking or thinking ethically by making men free from their deep-rooted superstitions, dogmas and also from illogical, irrational and out-dated way of thinking.

Finally, according to Rev. Sun Moon (2003), peace has been the most crucial issue of human existence from its inception. Beginning from the very first recorded murder of Abel by his brother Cain, the children of Adam and Eve, mentioned in the Book of Genesis, the history of war and bloodshed is nearly as old as the history of humankind. Right up to the present day, we continue to witness outbreaks of violence throughout our war-torn global village, like the September 11th terrorist assaults on USA, unending spiral of attacks between Israelis and Palestinians and the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The 20th Century, which is now behind us could rightly be called the Century of warfare. The two world wars, the Korean and Vietnam wars, as well as the Middle East Gulf wars alone expended incalculable resources causing untold damage and destruction of human life on an apocalyptic scale. Yet why should the discussion of peace be limited only to global conflict? Within a country, divisions at racial, regional and factional levels arise. Weakened by corruption and the decline of ethics and morals, society is split by conflict between those of different social backgrounds. The family which is the basic building block to society is facing disintegration through immorality and divorce. Even as individuals, we see our spirit and body warring with each other and are left wondering how we are to be delivered of such wretchedness. Politics, religion, ideology and science have all been drawn upon in mans attempts to end all wars, instead they have at times even aggravated the situation. Does this mean that a peaceful world is remove and beyond our reach?

REFERENCE Rapport, A. (1992): peace . An Idea Whose Time Has Come Ann Habour, The University of Michigan Press. Chapter 10. 139 168. Patomki, Heikki (2001): The Challenge of Critical Theories : Peace Research at the Start of the New Century, Journal of Peace Research, 38 (6) 723 737. Elias, R. and J. Turpin (eds.) (1994) : Rethinking Peace, Boulder (Colorado), Lynne Rienner Publisher. 1 12. Adams, D. (1994): The Seville Statement on Violence, in Elias, R. and J. Turpin (eds.) Rethinking Peace, Boulder (Colorado), Lynne Rienner Publisher 65 68. Sun Myung Moon (2003): Sun Myungs Philosophy of Peace. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers 401 415. Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation on Divided Societies, Washington DC., United States Institute of Peace 23 35. Mahtma Gandhi (1982). Words of Gandhi. New York, Market Press 50 100.

TOPIC CURRENT SECURITY THREATS IN EAST AFRICA

By Fredrick O. Juma

A Paper Presented to the Military Conference on African Security Environment. United States of America on June 5, 2005.

CURRENT SECURITY THREATS IN EAST AFRICA As the title of this paper implies, there is a distinction to be drawn between threats and problems. In almost any states strategic environment, there are always problems. These usually involve disputes with other countries, economic difficulties or political destabilization in neighbouring states, with consequent difficulties such as decline in trade, defaults on debts, refugee flows, evacuation of nationals from dangerous areas or situations, etc. military threats, however may indeed require military action by the defence force. Therefore strategic developments or trends which imply potential threats need not just timely identification but clear distinction from problems as just defined. In the strategic environment now emerging, there are without doubt several significant problems, but it is less easy to identify potential threats. Uncertainty, however being an inability to accurately predict the future developments is an ongoing issue. It neither supports nor degrades national security. Since achieving independence, many former colonies have found full sovereignty a demanding responsibility and this does not exclude East Africa. Troubled by political instability, separatism and economic weakness exacerbated by corruption, East Africa has various problems to be tackled, and these include economic, agriculture, environment, human capacity, population and health, democracy and governance etc. Sub-Saharan Africa, East Africa included is plagued by seemingly lethal combination of ills. These include low economic growth rates, limited trade and investment, poor agricultural productivity and mineral levels of education. Inadequate family planning programmes, high in fact mortality rates and an ineffective health delivery system are made worse by rapidly growing HIV/AIDS pandemic, and also natural disasters.

Despite all the above, Western security interests in East Africa have case in a new light during the past two years, with policy makers in both Britain and United States of America expressing increased concern over the regions potential to emerge as a new front for jihadist extremism after the September 11th era. The policy makers argue the sizeable Islamic communities transfuse the hinterlands and coasts of a broad band of states extending from Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, which in certain cases appear to exhibit greater loyalty to the concept of a global muslim umma than to the relatively young nation. States of which they are citizens. While part of this transnational identity undoubtedly stems from long-established historical, cultural, linguistic and trade ties to the Arab world, intelligence sources believe they also reflect the fundamentalist proselytizing outside theocratic demagogues who have actively sought to exploit popular dissatisfaction brought about by autocratic governance and rampant corruption, poverty and a general lack of economic development. Further accentuating Western misgivings are several environmental facets that are generally regarded as ideally suited to the tactical designs of groups such as al Qaeda. Not only is the region characterized by highly porous land and sea borders, it is also beset by largely dysfunctional structures of law and enforcement, endemic organized criminality, involving everything from drugs and people smuggling, to weapons trafficking and relative proximity to known Islamist logistical bubs such as Yemen and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E). The Republic of Tanzania for example is one state that is beginning to elicit growing attention for many concerns. In May 2003, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F.C.O) specifically warned that an international terrorist group could be planning an attack on the island of Zanzibar, while United States and Britain have repeatedly advised their nationals to avoid al non-essential travel to Kenya and Tanzania, as long as the current security situation

prevails. Both London and Washington appear to be particularly worried that an imported radical wahabist undertone has taken hold across the Tanzania and this is now acting as a major lighting rod for al Qaeda doctrination, recruitment and training. Certainly, one cannot dismiss the possibility of Tanzania being brought into frontline of anti-Western terrorism, something that was graphically underscored by the August 1998 USA Embassy bombing in Dar-es-Salaam and the consequent bombing USA Embassy in Nairobi. However, the notion that the country has begun to degenerate into a new territorial beachhead for transnational Islamic extremism is misplaced, reflection a poor understanding of the specific socio-political and religious make up that is characteristic of this part of East Africa. In spite of this seemingly positive religious context, Western governments have began to express fears of growing radicalism in East Africa, arguing that a fundamental wahabist interpretation is spreading across the region, and this is being used by al Qaeda to establish a firm territorial foothold in the Horn of Africa. In particular there seems to be a growing concern that extremist outside influences from Sudan and Saudi Arabia have been imported into the region and that these are serving to dangerously radicalize indigenous beliefs and moderation. Most attention has been focused on Zanzibar, both on account of its overwhelmingly Islamic population and the fact that the semi-autonomous province has not relatively speaking enjoyed the same rate of economic growth and social development as has been evident on the main land. In addition, at least two al Qaeda operatives have been identified as originating form the Island, Khalfan Khamis Muhammed, of those convicted in connection with the 1998 USA Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, and Qaed Sanyan al-Harithi, a suspected East Africa point man for bin Laden who was killed in Yemen in 2003 by a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drone.

SMALL ARMS AND WEAPONS IN EAST AFRICAN REGION East Africa region as mentioned above is faced with various security challenges that need the combination of security machineries from all the three states. The region is faced by a major problem of proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The trafficking of these arms is a major security threat. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons stems mainly from struggles against colonization, more recently, civil wars in Uganda and neighbouring countries have ushered in a boom in the illegal market and illicit use of SALW. These weapons are now being used in conflicts over natural resources and cattle rustling, and have contributed to sourcing violent crime rate sin cities within the region. Due to porous and expansive borders, weak governments and ineffectual national security systems, SALW are difficult to control or account for as they move within the region from one conflict to another. They filter far beyond armies and police forces to criminal organizations, private security forces, vigilante squads and individual citizens. For example, among cross-border pastoralist communities arms are acquired overtly for security purposes but become facilitating instruments in traditional practices of livestock raiding. The use of such modern weapons has turned such traditional practices into lethal warfare. Also, as pastoral areas get saturated with arms, pastoralists themselves become suppliers of arms to non-pastoral rural areas and urban centres. Inadequate policing makes it easy for these illegal arms to circulate without being detected by law enforcement authorities. As a consequence armed criminality in urban, rural and border areas is on the increase. Although the total number of SALW circulating around the globe is not know, estimates in the Small Arms Survey 2001 put the figure at close to 100 million in Africa alone. Given that the Greater Horn of Africa region is one of the most politically volatile in Africa, is may be safe to assume that the bulk of that number has found its way to Africa including East Africa. The

existing weapons, plus those that tare produced through local cottage industries could fuel conflicts in this region. All these factors complicate efforts to alleviate human suffering and bring in security to the people of this region. The Nairobi Declaration was signed, by consensus, in March 2000 by Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The Nairobi Declaration reflects a willingness on the part of the signatory nations to address the illicit proliferation of SALW in these two regions ridden by conflict. States pledged to join efforts to address the problem, recognizing the need for information sharing and co-operation in all matters relating to illicit small arms and light weapons including the promotion or research and data collection in the region and encouraging co-operation among governments and civil society. To this end, the following year signatory countries agreed to the Co-ordinated Agenda for Action and an Implementation Plan that seeks to turn the Agenda for Action into working reality. The Agenda for Action calls for the development of relevant national control mechanisms. First and foremost, it calls for signatory states to establish, within three months of signing, a National Focal Point (NFP) to oversee the implementation of the Agenda for Action at the national level. To date, over a year later, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Rwanda have established NFPs but only Tanzania has actually managed to staff their office and fund a national action plan. All signatory countries are struggling to actively implement the declaration with few resources and /or cumbersome national bureaucracies. The Nairobi Declaration represents a significant commitment by signatory States to deal collectively with the problem of the proliferation of SALW, which until recently they would

have considered a highly sensitive issue to be handled unilaterally. The document also highlights the importance of community and civil society involvement in framing, and seeking solutions to the problems raised by the proliferation of SALW. These documents offering a comprehensive outline for action on SALW in the sub-region, informed the OAUs Bamako Declaration of December 2000, and the UN Programme of Action. REFERENCES International Millenium Declaration Development Goals, Zanzibar Report, March, 2003. Terrorism Monitro Vo. 1, Issue 5 and 6 2003. Research and Policy Development in Africa, July 2003 June 2006. Journal of Security Sector Management 1 (3), December 2003.