Persons and Family Relations Prof.

Evalyn Ursua 2011

Article 2 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres, GR No. 101279, 6 August 1992 PHILSA v. Secretary, GR No. 103144, 4 April 2001 Republic v. Express Telecommunication, GR No. 147096, 15 January 2002 Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, GR No. 173918, 8 April 2008 Executive Order 200, 18 June 1987 Executive Order 292, Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book 7 (The Administrative Code of 1987) Section 27, Rep. Act No. 8792 (E-Commerce Act) June 14, 2000 Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, 23 December 2008 ART 2: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette. EO 292: Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987) RA 8792 Section 27:

EO 200:

Government Use of Electronic Data Messages, Electronic Documents and Electronic Signature. Not with standing any law to the contrary, within two (2) years from the date of the effectivity of this Act, all departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the government, as well as all government-owned and controlled corporations, that pursuant to law require or accept the filling of documents, require that documents be created, or retained and/or submitted, issue permits,

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licences or certificates of registration or approval, or provide for the method and manner of payment or settlement of fees and other obligations to the government, shall (a) accept the creation, filing or retention of such documents in the form of electronic data messages or electronic documents; (b) issue permits, licences, or approval in the form of electronic data messages or electronic documents; (c) require and/or accept payments, and issue receipt acknowledging such payments, through systems using electronic data messages or electronic documents; or (d) transact the government business and/or perform governmental functions using electronic data messages or electronic documents, and for the purpose, are authorized to adopt and promulgate, after appropriate public hearing and with due publications in newspapers of general circulation, the appropriate rules, regulations, or guidelines, to, among others, specify 1) the manner and format in which such electronic data messages or electronic documents shall be filed, created, retained or issued; 2) where and when such electronic data messages or electronic documents have to signed, the use of an electronic signature, the type of electronic signature required; 3) the format of an electronic data message or electronic document and the manner the electronic signature shall be affixed to the electronic data messages or electronic documents; 4) the control processes and procedures appropriate to ensure adequate integrity, security and confidentiality of electronic data messages or electronic documents or records of payments; 5) other attributes required to electronic data messages or electronic documents; and 6) the full or limited use of the documents and papers for compliance with the government requirements: provided, That this Act shall be itself mandate any department of the government, organ of state or statutory corporation to accept or issue any document in the form of electronic data messages or electronic documents upon the adoption, promulgation and publication of the appropriate rules, regulations or guidelines.

GR No. 101279 6 August 1992 Petitioner: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. De Guzman, Meneses and Associates Hon. Ruben Torres, as Sec. of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Jose Sarmiento, as Administrator of Philippine Overseas Employment Authority (POEA) Grino-Aquino, J. En Banc This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department

Respondents:

Ponente: SC: Action:

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Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers. Facts: PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers. June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons: o that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars o that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive o that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with Issues: WON: 1. the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars - NO 2. the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive - NO 3. the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with Not complied with Ratio Decidendi: 1. There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition: a. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. b. Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title

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On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging - To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . ." (Art. 15, Labor Code, Emphasis supplied) d. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive e. It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons" f. The Solicitor General - Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. g. The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. h. The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government. They are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 c.

2.

Ratio Disponendi: WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land.

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GR No. 103144 4 April 2001 Petioner: Respondents: PhilSA International Placement and Services Corporation Hon. Sec. of DOLE Vivencio de Mesa Rodrigo Milkin Cedric Leyson Gonzaga-Reyes, J. Third Division

Ponente: SC:

Action: This is a petition for certiorari from the Order dated November 25, 1991 issued by public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment. The November 25, 1991 Order affirmed in toto the August 29, 1988 Order of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (hereinafter the "POEA") which found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers in POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370. Facts: Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Philsa") is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson. Private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner. Private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract on February 4, 1985 which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. On April 1, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. Respondents filed a case before POEA [Case No. (L) 85-05 0370]: o Illegal dismissal o Payment of salary differentials o Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries; o Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and o Contract substitution On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated August 31, 1988, ordering awards be given to respondents by PhilSA and dismissing all other claims of complainants as well as the counterclaims of respondent for lack of merit. Petitioner and private respondents filed separate appeals from the August 31, 1988 POEA Decision to the NLRC. In a decision dated July 26, 1989 12 , the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials.

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Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated October 25; 1989. Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petition was dismissed outright for "insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questioned resolution dated August 23, 1989." POEA issued a separate Order dated August 29, 1988 14 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents' complaint. In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction

Issues: WON: 1. Public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in holding the petioner guilty of illegal extractions 2. Public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in penalizing the petitioner with contract substitution 3. Public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner liable for illegal deductions Ratio Decidendi: 1. On issue 1 Petitioner would want us to overturn the findings of the POEA, subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, that it is guilty of illegal exaction committed by collecting placement fees in excess of the amounts allowed by law. This issue, however, is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. a. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not include correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality." b. As stated above, the settled rule is that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the POEA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. c. We have carefully examined the records of the case and it is clear that the ruling of public respondent POEA that petitioner is guilty of illegal exaction is supported by substantial evidence. d. Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication. Art 2, Tanada v. Tuvera, EO 200 and EO 292 e. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register. f. POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00.

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Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. On issue 2 - petitioner would want us to review the findings of fact of the POEA regarding the two counts of alleged contract substitution. Again, this is a question of fact which may not be disturbed if the same is supported by substantial evidence a. August 29, 1988 Order of the POEA shows that, indeed, the ruling that petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts of prohibited contract substitution is supported by substantial evidence. Issue 3 - petitioner argues that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries considering that the Supreme Court itself has already absolved petitioner from this charge. a. Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents arising from employeremployee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that petitioner is absolved. b. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate Order." c. The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying private respondent de Mesa's claim for salary deduction based its ruling on a finding that the said money claim was not raised in the complaint. d. But the fact that the claim for salary deduction was not raised by private respondents in their complaint will not bar the POEA from holding petitioner liable for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the suspension or cancellation of petitioner's license. e. Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of the license of any private placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned therein. 34 As such, even without a written complaint from an aggrieved party, the POEA can initiate proceedings against an erring private placement agency and, if the result of its investigation so warrants, impose the corresponding administrative f. It is thus clear that even if recruitment violations were not included in a complaint for money claims initiated by a private complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may still take cognizance of the same and impose administrative sanctions if the evidence so warrants. g. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of salary. g.

2.

3.

Ratio Disponendi: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 13, 1991 and November 25, 1991 Orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby MODIFIED. As modified, the license of private respondent Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is hereby suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it is hereby ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as fine. Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa. All other monetary awards are deleted.

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GR No. 147096 15 January 2002 Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines National Telecommunications Commission Express Telecommunication Co. Inc. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. Ynares-Santiago, J. First Division

Respondents:

Ponente: SC: Action:

Facts: On December 29, 1992, International Communications Corporation (now Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA). The application was docketed as NTC Case No. 92-486. January 22, 1993, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 4-1-93 directing all interested applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective applications before the Commission on or before February 15, 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any application filed after said date until further orders. May 6, 1993, and prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantel's original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. May 17, 1993, the notice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended application was published in the Manila Chronicle. NTC issued an Order dated December 19, 1993 ARCHIVING the application of Bayantel June 18, 1998, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 5-6-98 re-allocating five (5) megahertz (MHz) of the radio frequency spectrum for the expansion of CMTS networks. March 23, 1999, Memorandum Circular No. 3-3-99 was issued by the NTC re-allocating an additional five (5) MHz frequencies for CMTS service May 17, 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case,7 citing the availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators, as provided for under Memorandum Circular No. 3-3-99. February 1, 2000, the NTC granted BayanTel's motion to revive the latter's application and set the case for hearings on February 9, 10, 15, 17 and 22, 2000. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case No. 92-486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's application. o Bayantel's motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost eight (8) years ago. Thus, the documentary evidence and the allegations of respondent Bayantel in this application are all outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the necessity for the proposed CMTS service. o There was no public need for the service applied for by Bayantel as the present five CMTS operators --- Extelcom, Globe Telecom, Inc., Smart Communication, Inc., Pilipino Telephone Corporation, and Isla Communication Corporation, Inc. --- more than adequately addressed the market demand

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There were no available radio frequencies that could accommodate a new CMTS operator as the frequency bands allocated in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 3-3-99 were intended for and had in fact been applied for by the existing CMTS operators. o Extelcom pointed out that Bayantel is its substantial stockholder to the extent of about 46% of its outstanding capital stock, and Bayantel's application undermines the very operations of Extelcom. March 13, 2000, Bayantel filed a Consolidated Reply/Comment,10 stating that the opposition was actually a motion seeking a reconsideration of the NTC Order reviving the instant application NTC issued on March 9, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 9-3-2000, re-allocating the following radio frequency bands for assignment to existing CMTS operators and to public telecommunication entities which shall be authorized to install, operate and maintain CMTS networks May 3, 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service. Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition,15 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58893, seeking the annulment of the Order reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS, and Memorandum Circular No. 9-3-2000 allocating frequency bands to new public telecommunication entities which are authorized to install, operate and maintain CMTS. September 13, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision - Orders of public respondent dated February 1, 2000 and May 3, 2000 in NTC Case No. 92-486 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Amended Application of respondent Bayantel is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application. Bayantel filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision.18 The NTC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), also filed its own motion for reconsideration.19 On the other hand, Extelcom filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum Circular No. 9-3-2000 be also declared null and void. February 9, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution denying all of the motions for reconsideration of the parties for lack of merit. Hence, the NTC filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 147096, raising the following issues for resolution of this Court: o Whether or not the Order dated February 1, 2000 of the petitioner which revived the application of respondent Bayantel in NTC Case No. 92-486 violated respondent Extelcom's right to procedural due process of law; o Whether or not the Order dated May 3, 2000 of the petitioner granting respondent Bayantel a provisional authority to operate a CMTS is in substantial compliance with NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure and Memorandum Circular No. 9-14-90 dated September 4, 1990 NTC was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 546, promulgated on July 23, 1979. o NTC has the sole authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) o Has authority to determine the areas of operations of applicants for telecommunications services. o o

Issues: 1. Whether or not the Order dated February 1, 2000 of the petitioner which revived the application of respondent Bayantel in NTC Case No. 92-486 violated respondent Extelcom's right to procedural due process of law - NO

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2. Whether or not the Order dated May 3, 2000 of the petitioner granting respondent Bayantel a provisional authority to operate a CMTS is in substantial compliance with NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure and Memorandum Circular No. 9-14-90 dated September 4, 1990 NO, rule in effect is 1978

Ratio Decidendi: 1. On issue 1 a. The Court of Appeals ruled that there was a violation of the fundamental right of Extelcom to due process when it was not afforded the opportunity to question the motion for the revival of the application. However, it must be noted that said Order referred to a simple revival of the archived application of Bayantel in NTC Case No. 92-426. At this stage, it cannot be said that Extelcom's right to procedural due process was prejudiced. It will still have the opportunity to be heard during the full-blown adversarial hearings that will follow. b. In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), we held that the right to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court. A party may also be heard through his pleadings. where opportunity to be heard is accorded either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. c. 2. On issue 2 a. In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a CMTS, the NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. b. Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993. c. NTC, through the Secretary of the Commission, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules. d. The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. e. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Ratio Disponendi: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated September 13, 2000 and Resolution dated February 9, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction issued by the Court of Appeals is LIFTED. The Orders of the NTC dated February 1, 2000 and May 3, 2000 are REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

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GR No. 173918 8 April 2008 Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines Department of Energy Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation Chico-Nazario, J. Third Division

Respondents: Ponente: SC:

Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated 4 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183.1 The appellate court reversed the Decision2 dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President in OP NO. Case 96-H-6574 and declared that Ministry of Finance (MOF) Circular No. 1-85 dated 15 April 1985, as amended, is ineffective for failure to comply with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987,3 which requires the publication and filing in the Office of the National Administration Register (ONAR) of administrative issuances. Thus, surcharges provided under the aforementioned circular cannot be imposed upon respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Facts: Respondent is a corporation duly organized existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is engaged in the business of refining oil, marketing petroleum, and other related activities. Department of Energy (DOE) is a government agency under the direct control and supervision of the Office of the President. The Department is mandated by Republic Act No. 7638 to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the Government relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation. 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No. 1956 for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October 1984 was issued directing the utilization of the OPSF to reimburse oil companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum products Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20 November 1984, mandated the Board of Energy (now, the Energy Regulatory Board) to review and reset prices of domestic oil products every two months to reflect the prevailing prices of crude oil and petroleum. 27 February 1987, Executive Order No. 137 was enacted to amend P. D. No. 1956. It expanded the sources and utilization of the OPSF in order to maintain stability in the domestic prices of oil products at reasonable levels. 4 December 1991, the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), now the DOE, informed the respondent that respondents contributions to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge for the period December 1989 to March 1991 were insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was imposed upon respondent. 9 December 1991, the OEA wrote another letter11 to respondent advising the latter of its additional underpayment to the OPSF of the foreign exchange risk fee in the amount of P10,139,526.56 for the period April 1991 to October 1991. In addition, surcharges in the amount of P2,806,656.65 were imposed thereon.

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In a letter dated 20 January 1992 addressed to the OEA, respondent justified that its calculations for the transactions in question were based on a valid interpretation of MOF Order NO. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985 and MOE Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May 1985. 24 March 1992, respondent paid the OEA in full the principal amount of its underpayment, totaling P24,554,387.31, but not the surcharges. 15 March 1996, OEA notified the respondent that the latter is required to pay the OPSF a total amount of P18,535,531.40 for surcharges on the late payment of foreign exchange risk charges for the period December 1989 to October 1991. 11 July 1996, the DOE reiterated its demand for respondent to settle the surcharges due. 19 July 1996, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of the President affirmed the conclusion of the DOE, contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President, which was denied on 28 November 2003. Respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals wherein it presented Certifications dated 9 February 200418 and 11 February 200419 issued by ONAR stating that DOF Circular No. 2-94 and MOF Circular No. 1-85 respectively, have not been filed before said office. Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the Office of the President in O.P. CASE No. 96-H-6574 and ruled that MOF Circular 1-85, as amended, was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR. 25 September 2006, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein the following issues were raised: o The surcharge imposed by ministry of finance (mof) circular no. 1-85 has been affirmed by e.o. No. 137 having received vitality from a legislative enactment, mof circular no. 1-85 cannot be rendered invalid by the subsequent enactment of a law requiring registration of the mof circular with the office of the national register o Assuming that the registration of mof no. 1-85 is required, respondent waived its objection on the basis of non-registration when it paid the amount required by petitioner.

Issues: WON: 1. The surcharge imposed by ministry of finance (mof) circular no. 1-85 has been affirmed by e.o. No. 137 having received vitality from a legislative enactment, mof circular no. 1-85 cannot be rendered invalid by the subsequent enactment of a law requiring registration of the mof circular with the office of the national register 2. Assuming that the registration of mof no. 1-85 is required, respondent waived its objection on the basis of non-registration when it paid the amount required by petitioner. Ratio Decidendi: 1. This petition is without merit. a. As early as 1986, this Court in Taada v. Tuvera23 enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect b. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

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Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted, with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII [] Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. d. Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera,24 the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. On issue 2 a. Petitioners argument that respondent waived the requisite registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, when it paid in full the principal amount of underpayment totaling P24,544,387.31, is specious. b. Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no longer necessary since the respondent knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. This argument is seriously flawed and contrary to jurisprudence. c.

2.

Ratio Disponendi: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 4 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183 is AFFIRMED.

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GR No. 170338 December 23, 2008 Petitioner: Respondents: Virgilio Garcillano The House Of Representatives - Committees On: Public Information, Public Order And Safety, National Defense And Security, Information And Communications Technology, And Suffrage And Electoral Reforms Nachura, J. En Banc

Ponente: SC:

Action: Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. Facts: More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons. Petitioner prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings. On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties. Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter.

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August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials. September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 (An Act To Prohibit And Penalize Wire Tapping And Other Related Violations Of The Privacy Of Communication, And For Other Purposes) and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution [(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. . As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007. Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007. October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275 November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 [preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports] and 179275 [to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation] Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.

Issues: WON: 1. The parties have legal standing a. Garcillano in GR No. 170338 YES b. Ranada and Agcaoili in GR No.179275 YES 2. GR No. 170338 is justiciable NO 3. The requirement of publication is satisfied for the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation - NO Ratio Decidendi: 1. On Issue 1 - Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition a. In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act b. A party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the

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injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. c. Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them d. In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees actions and charges of electoral fraud. e. In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation. f. Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings. g. Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process, they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic. The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. a. The exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversy b. By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities c. Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced d. In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the

2.

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Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. On Issue 3 a. The petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. b. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." c. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code d. The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for onehalf of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm. e. Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators. f. It is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. g. Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page. h. The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate. i. Justice Carpio - The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.

3.

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j. The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Ratio Disponendi: WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.

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