LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents.
ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalI and on behalI oI all taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
TUASON, J.: Three oI these cases were consolidated Ior argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all oI them present the same Iundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed oI jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or suIIiciency oI interest oI the petitioners in case G. R. No. L-3054 and case G. R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and L- 2756. No practical beneIit can be gained Irom a discussion oI the procedural matters since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners' cause oI action or the propriety oI the procedure Iollowed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public oI these cases demands that they be settled promptly and deIinitely, brushing aside, iI we must, technicalities oI procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G. R. No. L-2821.) The petitions challenge the validity oI executive orders oI the President avowedly issued in virtue oI Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals Ior houses and lots Ior residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court oI First Instance oI Manila Ior violation oI the provisions oI this Executive Order, and prays Ior the issuance oI the writ oI prohibition to the judge and the city Iiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports Irom the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ oI mandamus to compel the Administrator oI the Sugar Quota OIIice and the Commissioner oI Customs to permit the exportation oI shoes by the petitioner. Both oIIicial reIuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation oI shoes Irom the Philippines is Iorbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates Iunds Ior the operation oI the Government oI the Republic oI the Philippines during the period Irom July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and Ior other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president oI the Nacionalista Party, applies Ior a writ oI prohibition to restrain the Treasurer oI the Philippines Irom disbursing this Executive Order. AIIected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to deIray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug oI the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the respondents Irom disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing oI that amount or any part oI it."
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionally oI Act No. 671, the petitioners do not press the point in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case chieIly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any Iorce and eIIect. This is the basic question we have reIerred to, and it is to this question that we will presently address ourselves and devote greater attention. For the purpose oI this decision, only, the constitutionality oI Act No. 671 will be taken Ior granted, and any dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary to that hypothesis should be understood as having been made merely in Iurtherance oI the main thesis.
Act No. 671 in Iull is as Iollows:
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly oI the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence oI war between the United States and other countries oI Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions oI Article VI, section 26, oI the Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the existence oI the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereoI. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transIer the seat oI the Government or any oI its subdivisions, branches, departments, oIIices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government oI the Commonwealth including the determination oI the order oI precedence oI the heads oI the Executive Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, agencies or instrumentalities oI government and to abolish any oI those already existing; (d) to continue in Iorce laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modiIy or suspend the operation or application oI those oI an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (I) to raise Iunds through the issuance oI bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure oI the proceeds thereoI; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdraIts Ior purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension oI the collection oI credits or the payment oI debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem to enable the Government to IulIill its responsibities and to maintain and enIorce the authority.
SEC. 3. The President oI the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening oI the Congress oI the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take eIIect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in Iorce and eIIect until the Congress oI the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
Section 26 oI Article VI oI the Constitution provides:
In time oI war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, Ior a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term Iix the duration oI its eIIectiveness. The intention oI the Act has to be sought Ior in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences oI the various constructions oIIered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.
Article VI oI the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereoI should be "Ior a limited period." "Limited" has been deIined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; conIined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justiIy the delegation oI emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank oI Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938.).
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have Iull knowledge oI the constitutional scope oI its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. II a new and diIIerent law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period Ior the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indeIinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. |2d|, 912); Ior Congress might not enact the repeal, and even iI it would, the repeal might not meet the approval oI the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier Ior Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President: OIIice and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:
It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers signiIies at the very least that the legislature may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view oI the scope that legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent oI the delegate; . . . .
Section 4 goes Iar to settle the legislative intention oI this phase oI Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in Iull Iorce and eIIect until the Congress oI the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence oI the law regarding the repeal oI the authority itselI, in the Iace oI the express provision Ior the repeal oI the rules and regulations issued in pursuance oI it, a clear maniIestation oI the belieI held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide Ior the Iormer. It would be strange iI having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be eIIective the National Assemble Iailed to make a provision Ior this termination in the same way that it did Ior the termination oI the eIIects and incidents oI the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law iI the law itselI was to remain in Iorce, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature.
More anomalous than the exercise oI legislative Iunction by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise oI its authority is the Iact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the same Iield, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nulliIying each other's actions. Even iI the emergency powers oI the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived aIter each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions oI Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a Iantastic apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good Iaith, and inspired only by the best interests oI the country as they saw them, a Iormer President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals aIter he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present ChieI Executive issued an executive order on export control aIter Congress had reIused to approve the measure.
Quiet apart Irom these anomalies, there is good basis in the language oI Act No. 671 Ior the inIerence that the National Assembly restricted the liIe oI the emergency powers oI the President to the time the Legislature was prevented Irom holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:
The President oI the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening oI the Congress oI the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
The clear tenor oI this provision is that there was to be only one meeting oI Congress at which the President was to give an account oI his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have said iI that had been the intention. II the National Assembly did not think that the report in section 3 was to be the Iirst and last Congress Act No. 671 would lapsed, what reason could there be Ior its Iailure to provide in appropriate and clear terms Ior the Iiling oI subsequent reports? Such reports, iI the President was expected to continue making laws in the Iorms oI rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, oI as unimportant, as the initial one.
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration oI Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out oI the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment oI the Emergency Powers Act, iI indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "Ior a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction oI the law upon the conclusion oI a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law aIter the expiration oI that period. They signiIy that the same law, not a diIIerent one, had to be repassed iI the grant should be prolonged.
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph oI his autobiography Iurnished part oI the answer. He said he issued the call Ior a special session oI the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conIerring oI enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with speciIic view to the inability oI the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other Iactor than this inability could have motivated the delegation oI powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly oI its authority. The enactment and continuation oI a law so destructive oI the Ioundations oI democratic institutions could not have been conceived under any circumstance short oI a complete disruption and dislocation oI the normal processes oI government. Anyway, iI we are to uphold the constitutionality oI the act on the basis oI its duration, we must start with the premise that it Iixed a deIinite, limited period. As we have indicated, the period that best comports with constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context oI the law and with what we believe to be the main iI not the sole raison d'etre Ior its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability oI Congress to Iunction, a period ending with the conventing oI that body.
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority oI law. In setting the session oI Congress instead oI the Iirst special session preceded it as the point oI expiration oI the Act, we think giving eIIect to the purpose and intention oI the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article VI oI the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved oI the necessity oI deciding the question as to which department oI government is authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is predicated still exists. The right oI one or another department to declare the emergency terminated is not in issue. As a matter oI Iact, we have endeavored to Iind the will oI the National Assemblycall that will, an exercise oI the police power or the war power and, once ascertained, to apply it. OI course, the Iunction oI interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty. In so Iar as it is insinuated that the ChieI Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the strength oI his opinion and Iindings in contravention oI the law as the courts have construed it, no legal principle can be Iound to support the proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. we take it that the respondents, in sustaining the validity oI these executive orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 oI the Iormer Commonwealth and on no other source. To put it diIIerently, the President's authority in this connection is purely statutory, in no sense political or directly derived Irom the Constitution.
Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening oI the regular session oI Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger iI not conclusive indication that they were selI-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance oI Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates oI adjournment oI the Iollowing sessions oI the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn Irom this provision is that in the mind oI the lawmakers the idea was Iixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to provide Ior the automatic repeal oI those rules and regulations necessarily was predicated on the consciousness oI a prior or at best simultaneous repeal oI their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily Ioreseen, oI the Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations oI the President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into Iorce and to issue new ones independently oI the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretoIore adduced against the asserted indeIinite continuance oI the operation oI Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620.
The other corollary oI the opinion we have reached is that the question whether war, in law or in Iact, continues, is irrelevant. II we were to that actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the elusion would not be altered. AIter the convening oI Congress new legislation had to be approved iI the continuation oI the emergency powers, or some oI them, was desired. In the light oI the conditions surrounding the approval oI the Emergency Power Act, we are oI the opinion that the "state oI total emergency as a result oI war" envisaged in the preamble reIerred to the impending invasion and occupation oI the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization oI the Government, principally the impossibility Ior the National Assembly to act. The state oI aIIairs was one which called Ior immediate action and with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The war itselI and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position to operate.
AIter all the criticism that have been made against the eIIiciency oI the system oI the separation oI powers, the Iact remains that the Constitution has set up this Iorm oI government, with all its deIects and shortcomings, in preIerence to the commingling oI powers in one man or group oI men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the Iaith oI other democracy-loving people in this system, with all its Iaults, as the ideal. The point is, under this Iramework oI government, legislation is preserved Ior Congress all the time, not expecting periods oI crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history oI the United States, the basic Ieatures oI whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the speciIic Iunctions oI the legislative branch oI enacting laws been surrendered to another department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out oI a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was Iighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a liIe-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept oI constitutional government, in times oI extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
These observations, though beyond the issue as Iormulated in this decision, may, we trust, also serve to answer the vehement plea that Ior the good oI the Nation, the President should retain his extraordinary powers as long asturmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass the Philippines.
Upon the Ioregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In order to avoid any possible disruption and interruption in the normal operation oI the Government, we have deemed it best to depart in these cases Irom the ordinary rule to the period Ior the eIIectivity oI decisions, and to decree, as it is hereby decreed, that this decision take eIIect IiIteen days Irom the date oI the entry oI Iinal judgment provided in section 8 oI Rule 53 oI the Rules oI Court in relation to section 2 oI Rule 35. No costs will be charged.
Ozaeta, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MORAN, C. J., concurring:
I agree with the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Tuason, except on the points hereunder discussed.
I believe, on the one hand, that the emergency power oI the President had ceased not in May 1946, when Congress held its regular sessions, as Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria maintain, but on June 9, 1945, when Congress convened in a special session to consider general legislation. The emergency contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, is "total emergency" which means the state oI actual war involving the Philippines, with the impending invasion and occupation oI our country by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization and paralyzation oI the Government, principally, the impossibility Ior the National Assembly to act. This was the only reason and justiIication Ior the total relinquishment oI legislative power by Congress in Iavor oI the ChieI Executive under Commonwealth Act No. 671. Such relinquishment was total because the emergency was also total. Clearly, thereIore, the inability oI Congress to act was the soul oI the law, and the moment such inability ceased, the total emergency also ceased and the law likewise ceased to validly exist. On June 9, 1945, the Congress oI the Philippines convened in a special session "to adopt such measures as may be necessary to meet the existing emergency" and "Ior the purpose oI considering general legislation." I hold that Irom that date, June 9, 1945, Congress was able and ready to act on all matters, and the emergency powers delegated to the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671, naturally ceased to exist.
Upon the other hand, while I believe that the emergency powers had ceased in June 1945, I am not prepared to hold that all executive orders issued thereaIter under Commonwealth Act No. 671, are per se null and void. It must be borne in mind that these executive orders had been issued in good Iaith and with the best oI intentions oI three successive Presidents, and some oI them may have already produced extensive eIIects in the liIe oI the nation. We have, Ior instance, Executive Order No. 73, issued on November 12, 1945, appropriating the sum oI P6,750,000 Ior public works; Executive Order No. 86, issued on January 7, 1946, amending a previous order regarding the organization oI the Supreme Court; Executive Order No. 89, issued on January 1, 1946, reorganizing the Courts oI First Instance; Executive Order No. 184, issued on November 19, 1948, controlling rice and palay to combat hunger; and other executive orders appropriating Iunds Ior other purposes. The consequences oI a blanket nulliIication oI these executive orders will be unquestionably serious and harmIul. And I hold that beIore nulliIying them, other important circumstances should be inquired into, as Ior instance, whether or not they have been ratiIied by the Congress expressly or impliedly, whether their purposes have already been accomplished entirely or partially, and in last instance, to what extent; acquiescence oI litigants; de Iacto oIIicers; acts and contrast oI parties acting in good Iaith; etc. It is my opinion that each executive order must be viewed in the lights oI its peculiar circumstances, and, iI necessary and possible, beIore nulliIying it, precautionary measures should be taken to avoid harm to public interest and innocent parties.
To illustrate the Ioregoing proposition oI individual consideration oI speciIic cases, shall go into a brieI discussion oI the executive orders involved in the cases now beIore this Court. With regard to Executive No. 225 on general appropriation, I hold that the court should not declare it null and void till Congress may have an opportunity to provide a substitute measure Ior the sustenance oI government. This view is predicated upon the principle oI absolute necessity. Till Congress may pass a valid appropriation act our government cannot survive without the executive order in question. It would be absurd Ior this court to declare the cessation oI an emergency, and by that same declaration permit, iI not abet, the Iormation oI another emergency which would be inevitable iI, by reason oI lack oI appropriation, government shall cease to Iunction. In such cases, when apparently the provisions oI our laws and Constitution seem inadequate, the courts must go deeper even than the very Magna Carta itselI and Iind solution in the basic principles oI preservation oI government and oI national survival, which in the last analysis, are the very reasons Ior the existence oI a Constitution. In such extreme cases, as can come Irom the present situation, it would be the height oI judicial imprecision to preserve the Iorm oI the constitution, and at the same time permit the disruption and cessation oI the government which that same constitution so intricately designed and Iirmly established. Thus, in the remedy oI an evil, we shall cause a Iar greater one.
It may be argued that the course oI action I am taking is Iounded upon Iear, Iear that Congress will again Iail to act on the matter oI appropriation, and it may be asserted that the members oI the Congress are presumed to be as patriotic as the members oI this Court, iI not more, and that, thereIore, we may rest assured that they will not Iail to IulIill their duty. I admit this to be true, and accordingly, I ask what is then the hurry and necessity Ior nulliIying the executive order on appropriation which we are sure will soon be substituted by a valid appropriation act? Why not deIer judgment and wait until the special session oI Congress so that it may IulIill its duty as it clearly sees it? I can Iind no reason against this suggestion except, perhaps, a desire to assert judicial supremacy in a case where judicial statemanship is more necessary.
It is also true that the possibility that Congress will again Iail to provide Iunds Ior the operation oI the government is a remote possibility. But there is no harm in providing Ior all the possibilities, both near and remote. II that remote possibility never comes, well and good, nothing is lost and the situation is saved. However, iI the remote possibility does come, and it is not impossible, and we had already nulliIied the executive order on appropriation, how will the government Iunction and survive? On the other hand, iI we deIer judgment upon the nullity oI such executive order, and that remote possibility does come, we still have the saving liIeline oI that executive order which may, perhaps, be tolerated to save the country Irom chaos, until a more proper and adequate remedy can be secured.
With regard to the executive order appropriating Iunds Ior the conduct oI the coming elections, I uphold the same view as in the Ioregoing, namely, not in abdicating the power oI this court to pass upon the validity oI an executive order, but to deIer judgment upon such an order until the legislature may provide a substitute measure. The reason Ior this is, likewise, absolute necessity. Without such Executive Order we may have not elections in November. Elections are the very essence oI popular government Ior the establishment and preservation oI which, our Constitution has been consecrated. To permit the unwarranted abolition or even suspension oI elections, will surely result either in the denial oI popular representation or in the perpetuation in power oI those already in oIIice. Either result is revolting to our system oI government. BrieIly stated, I hold that this court should neither ratiIy nor nulliIy this executive order, but should deIer judgment in the same manner and Ior the same reasons stated above in connection with the executive order on appropriations. The Court, in these cases, is conIronted not only with bare issues oI law, but with actual anomalous situations pregnant with possible dangers to the nation, and it is the duty oI the Court, as a dispenser oI justice, to Iind a solution that is both legal and realistic.
With reIerence to Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals Ior houses, and Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports Irom the Philippines, I agree that they must be held null and void upon the reason stated by Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria and also upon those stated by Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Alex Reyes.
My vote, thereIore, is that the petitions must be granted in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, G. R. No. L-2044; Araneta vs. Angeles, G. R. No. L-2756 and Guerrero vs. Commissioner oI Customs, G. R. No. L-3055, and that judgment must be deIerred in Rodriguez vs. El Tesorero de Filipinas, G. R. No. L-3054 and Barredo vs. The Commission on Election, G. R. No. L-3056.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur in the opinion oI Mr. Justice Tuason. I wish to add, however the Iollowing observations: Even assuming, Ior the sake oI argument, that the legislative intent is to make Commonwealth Act No. 671, eIIective during the existence oI the emergency contemplated therein and that it is within the exclusive province oI the political departments to determine whether said emergency continues or has ceased to exist, I am oI the conviction that, in view oI the Iormal and unmistakable declarations oI both the Congress and the President, said Act No. 671, should be held as having lost its Iorce and eIIect.
It is important to remember that the kind oI emergency expressly spoken oI in the Act is a total emergency resulting Irom war and that the Act was passed at a time (December 16, 1941) when there was Iactually a state oI war involving the Philippines.
In section 1 oI Republic Act No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948, it was categorically declared by the Congress that "since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, but not so with regard to those who have suIIered the ravages oI war and who have not received any relieI Ior the loss and destruction resulting thereIrom," and that "the emergency created by the last war as regards these was suIIerers being still existent, it is the declared policy oI the state that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in Iorce in a modiIied Iorm." The President, in turn, in his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic) Iaces today are incidental passing pains artiIicially created by seasonal partisanship, very common among democracies but will disappear with the rains that Iollow the thunderclaps not later than November 8 oI this year."
We thus have a Iormal declaration on the part oI the Congress that the emergency created by the last war exists as regards only those debtors whose war damage claims have not been settled by the United States Philippine War Damage Commission (section 2, Republic Act No. 342), patently meaning that said emergency is, at most, a partial emergency. It is needless to point out that only a small portion oI the Philippine population are debtors and not all oI those who are debtors are war damage claimants.
We also have the solemn declaration on the part oI the President that the emergencies Iaced by the Republic are incidental emergencies artiIicially created by seasonal partisanship, clearly meaning that such emergencies not only are not total but are not the result oI war.
II the emergency is, as admitted by the Congress, not total and, as admitted by the President, not the result oI the war, Commonwealth Act No. 671 has lost its basis and cannot legally give rise to the executive orders herein involved. Indeed, it is not pretended that said orders are intended to meet any emergency growing out oI the last war. Lack oI a budget, an appropriation Ior the elections, or an import control law, has been brought about by the inaction oI the Congress unaIIected by the last war, and such emergency, iI it may be called so, is not oI the kind contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671.
The government has Ior Iour years since liberation been normally Iunctioning; election had been regularly held; a national census had been taken; Congress had held regular and special session; "people travel Ireely most everywhere and more quickly, by land, sea and air, to an extent that was not hitherto enjoyed," and "business is more brisk than ever, goods are plentiIul, our people even in the remotest communities and barrios oI the country are better dressed, their diet has been immensely improved, and they look more healthy than they ever did" (President's IiIth monthly radio chat, March 15, 1949); and the sporadic depredations oI the outlaws in isolated areas oI the country are but the last paroxysms oI a dying movement (President's State-oI-the-Nation Message, January 24, 1949), all these certainly negative the existence oI any real (much less total) emergency.
That the Congress had heretoIore recognized the cessation oI the emergency is conclusively established by the Iact that it had assumed the task oI directly enacting, during its past sessions, measures dealing with all the matters covered by the speciIic legislative powers conceded to the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671. This is in line with the Iundamental reason Ior the approval oI said Act, as may be gathered Irom the Iollowing statement oI President Quezon: "When it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving a resolution which reaIIirmed the abiding Iaith oI the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The assembly also enacted a law granting the President oI the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in time oI war." (The Good Fight, pp. 204-205.) When President Quezon said "in time oI war", he undoubtedly meant Iactual war, a situation that existed at the time oI the passage oI Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Indeed, the dissenters admit that any delegated power directly exercised by the principal is considered withdrawn Irom the agent. A cursory examination oI Commonwealth Act No. 671 will show that the legislative Iunction therein speciIied had been discharged by the Congress. The Iollowing illustrates the powers delegated in the Act and the measures enacted by the Congress itselI covering each:
Section 2 oI Commonwealth Act No. 671
(a) to transIer the seat oI the Government or any oI its subdivisions, branches, departments, oIIices, agencies or instrumentalities:
Republic Act No. 333
An Act to establish the Capital oI the Philippines and the permanent seat oI the National Government, to create a capital city planning commission, to appropriate Iunds Ior the acquisition oI private estates within the boundary limits oI said city, and to authorize the issuance oI bonds oI the National Government Ior the acquisition oI private estates, Ior the subdivision thereoI, and Ior the construction oI streets, bridges, waterworks, sewerage and other municipal improvements in the capital City. (Approved, July 17, 1948.)
(b) to reorganize the Government oI the Commonwealth including the determination oI the order oI precedence oI the heads oI the Executive Departments:
Republic Act No. 51
Act authorizing the President oI the Philippines to reorganize within one year the diIIerent Executive departments, bureaus, oIIices, agencies and their instrumentalities oI the government, including the corporations owned or controlled by it. (Approved, October 4, 1946.)
(c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, oIIices, agencies or instrumentalities oI government and to abolish any oI those already existing:
Commonwealth Act No. 732
An Act to create the Department oI Foreign AIIairs and to authorize the President oI the Philippines to organize said department as well as the Ioreign service oI the Republic oI the Philippines. (Approved, July 3, 1946.)
(d) to continue in Iorce laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modiIy or suspend the operation or application oI those oI an administrative character:
Commonwealth Act No. 709
An Act appropriating the sum oI Iive million pesos to enable the national housing commission to resume its Iunctions" (Approved, November 1, 1945.)
Commonwealth Act No. 710
An Act to appropriate Iunds to continue the payment oI Retirement gratuities or pensions under existing laws. (Approved, November 1, 1945.)
(e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence:
Republic Act No. 215
An Act to amend Section One oI the Republic Act numbered eighty- one providing a new time limit Ior the waiver oI, and/or extension oI the period, within which to perIorm, accomplish or comply with, any term, condition, or stipulation required oI locators, holders, lessees, operators oI mining claims or concessions, and oI water rights and timber concessions with the mining industry and the condonation oI mining, speciIic and real estate taxes, under certain terms and conditions. (Approved, June 1, 1948.)
Ley No. 321 de la Republica
Ley que eleva los derechos de transIerencia de ganado mayor, enmendado al eIecto el articulo quinientos veintiochos del Codigo Administrativo Revisado. (Apobada, Junio 9, 1948.)
(I) to raise Iunds through the issuance oI bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure oI proceeds thereoI:
Republic Act No. 265
An Act establishing the Central Bank oI the Philippines . . . . (Section 87 |e| No. 7.) Approved, June 15, 1948.)
Republic Act No. 266
An Act appropriating such sums as may Irom time to time be released by the Central Bank representing excess monetary reserves, and authorizing the President oI the Philippines to issue bonds, certiIicates or other evidences oI indebtedness covering such amounts. (Approved, June 15, 1948.)
Republic Act No. 85
An Act creating the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. (Section 2 |I|.) (Approved, Oct. 29, 1946.)
(g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal government to incur in overdraIts Ior the purposes that he may approve:
Various Appropriation Acts.
(h) to declare the suspension oI the collection oI credits or the payments oI debts:
Republic Act No. 342, approved, July 26, 1948.
(i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to IulIill its responsibilities and to maintain and enIorce its authority.
The powers included in this subdivision (i) are oI course covered by hundreds oI other acts approved by the Congress which, it cannot be denied, all tend to "enable the Government to IulIill its responsibilities and to maintain and enIorce its authority." Moreover, the withdrawal oI the greater and more important powers may be presumed to have carried the accessory and less important powers.
There is no merit in the contention that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted by virtue oI the war powers oI the Congress. As the Act itselI expressly states, its basis is section 26 oI Article VI oI the Constitution which merely authorizes delegation oI legislative powers to the President in times oI war or other national emergency. The phrase "in times oI war or other national emergency" is solely indicative or descriptive oI the occasions during which the delegation may be extended and does not classiIy the act oI delegating legislative Iunctions as a war power. It must be borne in mind that said section 26 is peculiar to our Constitution, with the result that the decisions oI the Supreme Court oI the United States cited on behalI oI the respondents, expounding the theory that the exercise by the President oI his war powers granted by the Congress cannot be interIered with by the courts, are not controlling. Particularly, the case oI Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883, in which the opinion oI the United States Supreme Court was written by Mr. Justice FrankIurter, cannot apply, Ior the Iurther reason that it merely involved the power oI deportation which, even in our jurisdiction, is recognized, it being the rule here that the courts cannot control the right oI the ChieI Executive to determine the existence or suIIiciency oI the Iacts justiIying an order oI deportation. Upon the other hand, the war power oI the President is separately covered by section 10, paragraph (2), oI Article VII, and that oI the Congress by section 25.
Article VI, oI the Constitution, which are not invoked Ior the passage oI Commonwealth Act No. 671.
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:.
The majority opinion holds that Executive Order No. 62 dated June 21, 1947; Executive Order No. 192 dated December 24, 1948; and Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 both dated June 15, 1949 were issued without authority oI law and thereIore illegal and oI no legal Iorce and eIIect. I concur only in the result. Ordinarily, such concurrence without comment or explanation would be suIIicient and satisIactory. However, in view oI the radical diIIerence between the reasons had and given by the majority in arriving at the result and those entertained by me, and considering the transcendental importance oI these cases, not only because oI the vast amounts oI public Iunds and the rights oI citizens aIIected but also oI the principles oI law involved, and the Iact that not only the Iorce and the eIIect oI a law (Commonwealth Act No. 671) but also the legality and the Iorce and eIIect oI numerous executive orders issued by several Presidents during a period oI about three years, aIIecting as they do not only citizens, their interest and their properties but also the diIIerent departments and oIIices oI the Government, I deem it my duty to set Iorth my views and the reasons in support oI the same.
There is a claim made about lack oI personality oI some oI the parties- petitioners particularly, the petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056. Much could be said Ior and against that claim, but I am willing to brush aside all deIenses and technicalities on this point in order to be able to consider and decide the more important question oI the legality oI the executive orders involved and whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in Iorce.
The aIorementioned executive orders were issued on the straight oI and by virtue oI Commonwealth Act No. 671. The majority holds that Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to have any Iorce and eIIect on May 25, 1946 when Congress Iirst convened in regular session aIter liberation. In This, I disagree Ior I believe and hold that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in Iorce and in eIIect. But despite this view, I am not oI the opinion that the executive orders under consideration were issued without authority.
Starting with Executive Order No. 62, we Iind that it deals with and regulates houses and lot rentals. II the legislature had not already acted and legislated on this matter since the promulgation oI Commonwealth Act No. 671, this would be a proper Iield Ior Presidential action. However, the legislature had already promulgated Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, regulating house rentals and, as late as the month oI May, 1947, Congress passed House Bill No. 978 Iurther amending Commonwealth Act No. 689. In other words, in thus acting, the Legislature had already shown its readiness and ability to legislate on this matter, and had withdrawn it Irom the realm oI presidential legislation or regulation under the powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671. Not only this, but in issuing rules and regulations in the Iorm oI executive orders under his delegated powers, the ChieI Executive merely acts as an agent oI the legislature, his principal which made the delegation. As such agent, he cannot go against the policy and expressed desire oI his principal.
There are radical diIIerences between Commonwealth Act No. 689, Republic Act No. 66, and House Bill No. 978 on one side and Executive Order No. 62 on the other. That was the reason why President Roxas vetoed House Bill No. 978, believing in good Iaith that it would not solve and remedy the problem oI house rentals as explained by him in his communication to the House oI Representatives oI June 21, 1947, setting Iorth his views on the bill. The President may not and could not substitute his opinion however excellent or superior Ior that oI the legislature on matters oI legislation when Congress has already acted and expressed its opinion and desire on the matter.
With respect to Executive Order No. 192, it will be remembered that Congress passed Commonwealth Act No. 728, approved on July 2, 1946, authorizing the President to regulate, curtail, control, and prohibit the exportation oI certain products, merchandise and materials. Under said authority the President issued Executive Order No. 3 dated July 10, 1946, later amending section 2 oI said Executive Order by issuing Executive Order No. 23 dated November 1, 1946, regulating the exportation oI certain products, materials and merchandise. The important thing to consider is that section 4 oI Commonwealth Act No. 728 provided that the authority it granted to the President shall terminate on December 31, 1948, that is to say, that aIter said date the Executive could no longer validly regulate exports under said law. The President, however, overlooked or ignored said injunction and invoking his emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, promulgated Executive Order No. 192 regulating exports, to take eIIect on January 1, 1949. What was said with regard to Executive Order No. 62 is applicable to the lack oI authority oI the Executive to promulgate Executive Order No. 192, namely, that on this matter oI export control, the legislature had already withdrawn it Irom the jurisdiction oI the Executive under his emergency powers aIter the enactment oI Commonwealth Act No. 728. Any Presidential power or authority on the subject oI export control was derived Irom said Act. Not only this, but when in section 4 oI Commonwealth Act No. 728 the legislature terminated the authority given the President to regulate and control exports on December 31, 1948 and Iailed or reIused to renew said authority, the inIerence or conclusion and that aIter said date Congress deemed any presidential regulation on exports unnecessary and inadvisable. ThereIore, in promulgating Executive Order No. 192 the ChieI Executive acted not only without legislative authority but also against the wishes and policy oI Congress. This he may not validly do.
With respect to Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the considerations made with regard to Executive Orders Nos. 62 and 192 are equally applicable. By previously enacting necessary legislation on the yearly Government appropriation and on the appropriation oI Iunds Ior the expenses incurred in national elections, Congress has shown its readiness and ability to cope with the Iinancial problems oI the Government on this point. Republic Act No. 80, approved October 22, 1946, appropriating Iunds Ior the operation oI National Government Irom July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947; Republic Act No. 156 appropriating Iunds Ior the Iiscal year 1947-48 and Republic Act No. 320, the appropriation law Ior the Iiscal year 1948-49 show that Congress was in a position and able to provide Ior the yearly expenditures oI the Government. And Republic Act No. 73 appropriating P1,000,000 to deIray election expenses on March 11, 1947; Republic Act No. 147 appropriating P1,000,000 to deIray expenses Ior the election oI provincial city and municipal oIIicials and eight senators held on November 11, 1947, and Republic Act No. 235 appropriating P100,000 Ior the special elections held on March 23, 1948, to Iill vacancies in Representative District No. 4 oI Iloilo and No. 1 oI Leyte, demonstrated the ability oI the Congress to appropriate money Ior election purposes. By so doing Congress had tacitly and impliedly withdrawn this portion oI the Iield where the President may under his emergency power legislate or promulgate rules and regulations.
In this connection, it may be stated that in my opinion, the theory underlying the delegation oI emergency powers to the under Commonwealth Act No. 671 and the similar laws is that the legislature because oI the emergency resulting Irom the war, would be unable to meet in order to legislate or although able to meet, because oI the emergency, the ordinary process oI legislation would be too slow and inadequate and could not cope with the emergency. So, as a remedy, the power and authority oI legislation are vested temporarily in the hands oI one man, the ChieI Executive. But as regards Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the legislature has demonstrated that not only it could meet but also it could legislate on this point oI appropriations by approving general appropriation laws Ior the diIIerent Iiscal years since liberation as well as appropriations Ior the necessary Iunds Ior the diIIerent national and provincial elections. Consequently, there no longer was any necessity Ior Presidential legislation in this regard. Moreover, and this is not unimportant, the Iailure oI the Legislature to pass an appropriation law Ior the Iiscal year 1949-50 and a law appropriating Iunds Ior the elections in November, 1949 was not due to any emergency resulting Irom the war, contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671, but rather and possibly due to lack oI time and because oI the rather abrupt and adjourning oI the last session oI the Legislature last May.
As already stated, the majority holds that Act No. 671 ceased to have Iorce and eIIect on May 25, 1946. The other view is that it is still in Iorce. To me this is the main and the more important issue involved in these cases. In Iact the argument oI the parties centered on this point. The importance oI this issue may readily be appreciated when it is realized that on its determination is based, not only the validity or nullity (according to the theory oI the majority opinion), oI the Iour Executive Orders now under consideration, but also oI all the Executive Orders promulgated under authority oI Commonwealth Act No. 671 aIter May 25, 1946, up to the present time. Its determination will also decide whether or not the President may still exercise his emergency powers in the Iuture on matters and subjects not heretoIore withdrawn by the Legislature. Because oI my disagreement with the majority on this point, I deem it necessary to explain and elaborate on my reasons Ior my disagreement.
For purposes oI reIerence and to Iacilitate the same, I am reproducing Commonwealth Act No. 671 in Iull as well as section 26, Article VI oI the Constitution on which said Act is based:
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly oI the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence oI war between the United States and other countries oI Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions oI Article VI, section 26, oI the Constitution, the President is hereby authorize, during the existence oI the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereoI. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transIer the seat oI the Government or any oI its subdivisions, branches, departments, oIIices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government oI the Commonwealth including the determination oI the order oI precedence oI the heads oI the heads oI Executive Departments; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, oIIices, agencies or instrumentalities oI government and to abolish any oI those already existing; (d) to continue in Iorce laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modiIy or suspend the operation or application oI those oI an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (I) to raise Iunds through the issuance oI bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure oI the proceeds thereoI; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdraIts Ior purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension oI the collection oI credits or the payments oI debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to IulIill its responsibilities and to maintain and enIorce the authority.
SEC. 3. The President oI the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening oI the Congress oI the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take eIIect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in Iorce and eIIect until the Congress oI the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
In time oI war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, Ior a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry our a declared national policy. (Section 26, Article VI, Constitution.)
I Iully agree with the majority when in its opinion it says:
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term Iix the duration oI its eIIectiveness. The intention oI the Act has to be sought Ior in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be sub-served, and its relation to the Constitution. (Page 5, majority opinion.)
The main thesis oI the majority is that the only reason Ior the delegation oI legislative powers to the ChieI Executive under the Constitution, such as was done under Commonwealth Act No. 671 was because due to the emergency resulting Irom the war, the Legislature could not meet to enact legislation; that the moment oI Legislature could convene there would no longer be any reason Ior the exercise by the President oI emergency powers delegated to him; that iI, when the Legislature could meet and actually is in session, the President is allowed to exercise his delegated legislative powers, there would be the serious anomaly oI two legislative bodies acting at the same time, namely, the Legislature and the Executive, "mutually nulliIying each other's action" ; that the limited period Iixed in Commonwealth Act No. 671 Ior its liIe and eIIectiveness as required by the Constitution is the interval Irom the passage oI said Act and the moment that Congress could convene, not in special session where its power oI legislation is limited by the ChieI Executive in his call Ior special session, but in regular session where it could be Iree to enact general legislation; and that unless this automatic ending or cessation oI Act No. 671 is so held, there would be need oI another Act or legislation by the Congress to repeal Act No. 671 in which case, the ChieI Executive may by his veto power eIIectively block any eIIort in this direction.
I beg to diIIer with the Ioregoing thesis. I believe that, as I already had occasion to state though incidentally, the real reason Ior the delegation oI legislative powers to the ChieI Executive is not only because the Legislature is unable to meet due to a national emergency but also because although it could and does actually meet, whether in regular or special session, it is not in a position and able to cope with the problems brought about by and arising Irom the emergency, problems which require urgent and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more quickly and expeditiously than about one hundred members oI the Legislature, especially when they are divided into legislative chambers. That is why in times oI emergency, much as we in democratic countries dislike the system or idea oI dictatorship, we hear oI Iood dictator, Iuel dictator, transportation dictator, civilian evacuation dictator, etc., where the Iunctions which ordinarily belong to a council or board or to a legislative body, are entrusted under certain limitations to one single oIIicial or individual.
Supposing that during a national emergency and while the Legislature is in session, the legislators woke up one morning to Iind that there was extreme scarcity oI imported Iood, Iuel, building materials, equipment required in agriculture and industry, etc., because oI a monopoly, hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulation, private controls and proIiteering, or that there were wide-spread lockouts and strikes paralyzing transportation, commerce and industry, or rampant espionage or sabotage endangering the very liIe and security oI the nation. How much time would it take the legislature to enact the necessary legislation in order to cope with the situation and pass the necessary emergency measures?
We are Iamiliar with the practice and routine oI enacting laws. A bill is introduced in the Legislature; it is reIerred to the corresponding committee, it is studied by said committee, which in some cases holds public hearings; the committee discusses the bill and sometimes introduces amendments; iI the bill is not killed in the committee or shelved, it is submitted to the chamber Ior study, discussion and possible amendment by all the members; it is Iinally voted and iI approved, it is sent to the other house where it undergoes the same process; and iI it is Iinally approved by both houses oI Congress, it is submitted to the ChieI Executive Ior his study and approval or veto. All these may consume weeks or months as a result oI which, ordinarily, many bills Iinally approved by the Congress could be sent to the President Ior approval or veto only aIter adjournment oI the legislative session. And we should not overlook the Iact that in some cases Ior lack oI time oI due to disagreement among the legislators or between the two houses oI Congress, important pieces oI legislations like the annual appropriation law Ior the Iiscal year 1949-50, appropriation oI Iunds Ior the election to be held in November, 1949, contained in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, involved in the present cases, and the proposed amendment to the Election Code etc. have not been passed by Congress in its last session ending last May, 1949, which session lasted one hundred days. II we were to rely on the ordinary process oI legislation to meet a national emergency, by the time the necessary and needed law is passed, the situation sought to be remedied, or the problem sought to be solved may have become disastrous or ended in calamity or gone beyond legislation or any remedy. It would be too late. It would be like locking the stable door aIter the horse had been stolen.
Now, Ior some retrospect. The Philippine National Assembly delegated its legislative powers because oI the existence oI a state oI national emergency as early as the year 1939. During its second special session oI that year, it promulgated the Iollowing laws:
(a) Commonwealth Act No. 494, authorizing the President oI the Philippines to suspend until the time oI the adjournment oI the next regular session oI the National Assembly, either wholly or partially and under such conditions as he may deem proper, the operation oI Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known as the Eight Hour Labor Law;
(b) Commonwealth Act No. 496, authorizing the President to take over, Ior use or operation by the Government, any public service or enterprise and to pay just compensation in the manner to be determined by him and to prescribe and promulgate regulations he may deem essential to carry out the purposes oI the Act;
(c) Commonwealth Act No. 498 declaring a state oI national emergency due to a state oI war among several nations and as a measure to prevent scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious speculations, proIiteering, etc. aIIecting the supply, distribution movement oI Ioods, clothing, Iuel, building materials, agricultural equiptments etc. authorized the President to purchase any oI the articles or commodities available Ior storage, Ior re-sale or distribution, to Iix the maximum selling price oI said articles or commodities and to promulgated such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary; and
(d) Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President in view oI the existence oI a state oI national emergency to reduce the expenditures oI the executive departments oI the Government by the suspension or abandonment oI service, activities, or operations oI no immediate importance.
At the time, September, 1939 the second world war was only in Europe, quite Iar Irom the Philippines and had just begun. There was then no likelihood oI the Philippines being involved in the war until more than two years later, in December, 1941. The National Assembly was then Iree to meet either in regular or special session to enact legislation to meet the emergency. In Iact, it met in regular session in January, 1941 lasting 100 days and in January, 1941 Ior another regular session oI 100 days, excluding the several special session held during those two years. And yet the Assembly delegated legislative powers to the President under section 26, Article II oI the Constitution. This is clear prooI that, contrary to the theory oI the majority opinion, the Legislature delegated legislative powers to the President even when it could meet and it actually met several times.
AIter passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to the President, the Assembly in its Iourthly special session on August 19, 1940 repeated and reiterated this practice and policy by passing Commonwealth Act No. 600 delegating additional and more extensive powers to the President in spite oI the Iact that the war was still Iar away in Europe and there was no danger or prospect oI involving the Philippines, and the Legislature was still Iree to meet as in Iact it met again in regular session in January, 1941. During its regular session begun that month and year, instead oI stopping or ending the legislative powers delegated to the President, because according to the theory oI the majority opinion, the Legislature was able to meet, the Assembly allowed them to continue by passing Commonwealth Act No. 620 which merely amended section 1 oI Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that all this, Iar Irom supporting the view oI the majority that the Legislature delegated legislative powers to the President only because it could not meet, Iairly and squarely reIutes said view.
Now, let us consider the theory oI the majority that it would be a great anomaly to have two legislative bodies, the Legislature and the President to be acting at the same time, each nulliIying the acts oI the other. I Iail to see the suggested anomaly. In Iact, under the view and interpretation given by the majority oI the delegation oI contemplated the simultaneous Iunctioning oI the Legislature and the President, both exercising legislative powers. And it is a Iact that there were several instances oI the legislature and the President both validly and simultaneously exercising legislative powers.
Under section 2 oI Commonwealth Act No. 496 already reIerred to, approved on September 30, 1939, the power delegated to the President to prescribe rules and regulations he may deem essential to carry out the purposes oI the Act, namely, the taking over oI and operation by the Government oI any public service or enterprise and to pay Ior the same, was to last until the date oI the adjournment oI the next regular session oI the National Assembly. This means that, during the regular session oI the Assembly which begun in January, 1940 and lasted 100 days, the President could exercise the emergency powers delegated to him. Again, under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 the President could and indeed he exercised his emergency powers during the regular session oI the Assembly which began in January, 1941, when President Quezon issued at least nine Executive Orders numbered 321, 333, 335, 337, 339, 340, 342, 344 and 345.
The same thing obtains under Commonwealth Act 671. Since under the view oI the majority the emergency power oI the President granted him in Commonwealth Act No. 671 ended only on May 25, 1946, then the extensive legislative powers delegated to the President under that Act could be exercised and in Iact they were exercised during the Iive special session oI Congress in the year 1945, which lasted a total oI 84 days. During those special session oI 1945, President Osmea issued several Executive Orders in the exercise oI his emergency powers.
Is there Iurther prooI needed to show that the suggested and Ieared anomaly and impropriety oI the Legislature and the Executive both exercising legislative Iunctions simultaneously, is more Iancied than real? The situation was contemplated and expressly intended by the Legislature itselI, evidently believing that said condition or state oI aIIairs was neither anomalous nor improper. There is to my mind really no incompatibility. At such a time and during the period oI their simultaneous Iunctioning, the Legislature may perIorm its ordinary legislative duties taking its time to study, consider, amend and pass bills, reserving to the President matters requiring and demanding immediate action.
AIter all, it is Ior the Legislature to say whether it wants the President to exercise his emergency powers at the same time that it is in session. It may validly and properly stipulate in its grant oI emergency powers that they be exercised when the Legislature is not in session. In Iact, in one instance, in Commonwealth Act No. 500, section 2, the Notional Assembly expressly provided "that the authority herein given shall be exercised only when the National Assembly is not in session." When in its other acts oI delegation, like Commonwealth Act 671, the Legislature not only Iails to stipulate this condition, but on the contrary, contemplates Presidential exercise oI legislative powers simultaneously with the Legislature, it is to be presumed that the Legislature intended it and saw nothing improper or anomalous in it, and it is not Ior the Court to pass upon the supposed impropriety or anomaly.
As to the possibility oI the ChieI Executive validly and successIully nulliIying the acts oI the Legislature, to me that is quite remote, iI not impossible. As already stated at the beginning oI this opinion, the ChieI Executive acting as an agent oI the Legislative under his emergency powers, may not go against the wishes and policies oI his principal. He can only carry out its wishes and policies, and where his acts and orders run counter to those oI the Legislature, or operate on a Iield already withdrawn because the Legislature had already acted therein, his acts or Executive Orders must give way and will be declared void and oI no eIIect, by the Courts, as we are doing with the Executive Orders involved in these cases.
With respect to the claim oI the majority opinion that unless the emergency powers were made to end at the time the President made his report to Congress when it convened, it would be necessary to enact new legislation to repeal the act oI delegation, in which case the period Ior the delegation would be unlimited, indeIinite, and uncertain, contrary to the constitutional provision, I may say that the President was authorized by Act 671 to exercise emergency powers "during the existence oI the emergency," and not a day longer. To me that is a limited period in contemplation oI the Constitution. There would be no need Ior a new law to repeal the Act oI delegation, Ior said Act is selI-liquidating. The moment the emergency ceases, the law itselI automatically ceases to have Iorce and eIIect, and the Presidential emergency powers also end with it.
Under my view, had the invasion oI the Philippines by the Japanese Iorces, which we Ieared and expected in December, 1941 Iailed to materialize either because the invasion was repelled or because the Japanese high command at the last moment decided to by-pass the Philippines and divert his Iorces Iurther south to invade, say Australia, or iI the PaciIic war had ended as we all or most oI us then expected it to end sooner within weeks or months aIter its commencement and that the emergency resulting thereIrom had also ceased soon thereaIter, Commonwealth Act No. 671 would have automatically ceased to have Iorce and eIIect right in the year 1942 without any aIIirmative act or law oI the Legislature. There would be no point or reason Ior the President to continue exercising emergency powers when there no longer was any emergency. But under the view oI the majority, emergency or no emergency even iI Congress could meet in special session to enact general legislation, the country must continue to be ruled by the Presidential decree until the next regular session oI Congress which may not come till may months later. In my opinion this is not logical. To me the real and only reason and test Ior the continuance oI the exercise oI emergency powers is the continued existence oI the emergency, not the inability oI the Congress to meet in regular session.
The majority, and the parties who initiated these proceedings in court Iear that the President may promulgate rules and regulations contrary in purpose and eIIect to legislation enacted by the Legislature; that he may reenact his rules and regulations aIter being repealed by the legislature, and that he may even veto a bill passed by Congress repealing the Act oI delegation and ending his emergency powers. It is a Iear not well Iounded. It runs counter to the presumption that the ChieI Executive like any other public oIIicial would perIorm his Iunctions and conduct himselI in every respect Ior the good and welIare oI the people and in accordance with the Constitution. It is Iear based on the presumption that the Legislature and the ChieI Executive are at loggerheads, working at cross purposes and that the President though acting as a mere agent oI his principal, the legislature, would brazenly repudiate his principal and even challenge its authority, and that the ChieI Executive is so much in love with his emergency powers that he would perpetuate them by going as Iar as vetoing an act oI Congress ending said emergency powers. Let it be said to the credit oI and in justice to the diIIerent ChieI Executives who have wielded these emergency powers, President Quezon, Osmea, Roxas and the present incumbent President Quirino, that no accusing Iinger has ever been pointed at them, accusing or even insinuating that they have abused their emergency powers or exercised them Ior any purpose other than the welIare oI the country, or that they had maliciously acted contrary to the wishes oI the Legislatures. Even aIter liberation there has been no claim not even Irom the Legislatures itselI, to the knowledge oI this Court, at least to that oI the undersigned, that any ChieI Executive exercised his delegated powers, knowing that they had ended or had abused the same.
There is no charge or insinuation that any oI the Executive Orders which we are now holding to be invalid were issued Irom the ulterior motives or to Iurther and Iavor the political interest oI the President issuing them. It is admitted in the majority opinion that Executive Order No. 62, seeking to regulate house and lot rentals was issued in good Iaith by President Roxas. Executive Order No. 192 was issued to regulate exports, President Quirino presumably believing that exports at this time still needed regulation and control as was Iormerly provided by Congress in its Act No. 728, and that the matter was still within the Iield oI his emergency powers as was also mistakenly believed by President Roxas in issuing Executive Order No. 52. As to Executive Order No. 226, it merely appropriated Iunds to deIray the expenses in connection with the holding oI the national elections in November, 1949, without which, said election could not be held. With respect to Executive Order No. 225, it merely continues in Iorce Republic Act 320 which appropriated Iunds Ior the last Iiscal year inasmuch as Congress had Iailed to pass a General Appropriation Act Ior the operation oI the National Government Ior the period beginning July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950. There is no insinuation that any political motives or purposes are involved in these Executive Orders.
I agree with the majority that since the Constitution provides that the delegation oI legislative powers by the Legislature should be done Ior a limited period, it is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. I even agree to its deIinition oI the word "limited." But I submit that Commonwealth Act No. 671 itselI, limited its operation and eIIectiveness to and make it coextensive with the duration oI the emergency resulting Irom the war and that Iurthermore, that duration is a limited period within the meaning and contemplation oI the Constitution. Surely the emergency resulting Irom the war contemplated by the National Assembly when it acted Act No. 671 is not permanent or indeIinite. It is oI limited duration. It may be long or it may be short; but it cannot be Ior always. It has an end. Presumably the members oI the National Assembly thought that the emergency would not last as long as it did. The belieI entertained at the time by not a Iew, in Iact by a great portion oI the people here not excluding the legislators, was that the war with Japan would be oI short duration, a question oI months at the longest; that American reinIorcements would come at the beginning oI the year 1942 and drive away the invading Japanese armies iI they ever were able to occupy the Philippines and that, consequently, the war as Iar as these islands were concerned and the resulting emergency would soon pass away. The wisdom or lack oI wisdom oI the National Assembly in limiting or rather making the liIe and eIIectiveness oI Commonwealth Act No. 671 coextensive with the resulting emergency, viewed in the light oI what had actually happened, cannot be passed upon this Court. So, as I see it, so long as the emergency resulting Irom the War continues, Commonwealth Act No. 671 subsists and so long the ChieI Executive retains his emergency powers.
The majority believes that as already stated, Act No. 671 was in Iorce only until Congress could meet resume its legislatives Iunctions. Naturally, this view is based on the theory that legislative Iunctions in times oI emergency are delegated only because oI the inability oI the Legislative Department to meet and exercise its Iunctions. I believe I have successIully demonstrated the Ilaw in this theory, not only by showing that the real reason underlying the delegation oI legislative powers is not inability oI Legislature to meet but rather it inability to consider and pass legislation in time to meet an emergency which requires as it does urgent and immediate action and can be solved only by the exercise oI legislative Iunctions by one single responsible individual, unhamppered by study and prolonged discussion by many members oI the legislative body, but also by the Iact that although since 1939 when the second world war broke out in Europe and Ior a period oI more than two years thereaIter, when the National Assembly could still meet and in Iact convened on several occasions and Ior hundreds oI days in regular and special session, nevertheless, it had been delegating legislative powers to the President.
The majority view Iinds no support in the law. Section 26, Article VI oI the Constitution does not impose this condition or requirement. The only important conditions imposed by the Constitution are that there be a national emergency and delegation be Ior a limited period. The same thing is true with Act No. 671 which makes the delegation. The only condition imposed by section 2 oI said Act is that the delegated powers be exercised during the emergency. Neither in the Constitution nor in Commonwealth Act No. 671 is there any hint or insinuation, much less express mention about the inability oI the Legislature to meet. When every consideration Ior clearness and Ior Executive and Judicial guidance loudly called Ior and demanded an unequivocal and clear expression oI Constitutional and legislative intent, both laws, the source and basis oI the emergency powers are conspicuously silent on this point. The only conclusion is that neither the Iramers oI the Constitution nor the members oI the National Assembly had thought oI much less intended to impose this condition. To sustain the majority view would require reading into the law what is not there. In Iurther support oI its view that emergency powers may be exercised by the President only until the Legislature could meet, the majority Iinds comIort in and cites section 3 oI Act 671 which reads as Iollows:
SEC. 3. The President oI the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening oI the Congress oI the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
I Iail to see anything in said section that warrants a holding that upon Iiling his report with Congress, about the rules and regulation promulgated by him under his emergency powers under Commonwealth Act 671, his emergency powers automatically ceased. I could well imagine that under an act oI delegation oI legislative powers where the President is authorized to perIorm one single act such as the suspension oI the eight-hour labor law under Commonwealth Act No. 494, or the reduction oI the expenditures oI the executive departments oI the National Government by the suspension or abandonment oI services, activities or operations oI no immediate necessity under Commonwealth Act No. 500, when the President has exercised his delegated authority and made his report to the Assembly as required by said laws, the latter, as well as his delegated authority thereunder automatically ceased, Ior the simple reason that nothing remains to be perIormed or done. However, treating oI the grant oI extensive emergency powers as was done under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671 where said laws contemplated many diIIerent acts, rules and regulations oI varied categories and objectives and to be perIormed not at one at time or instance but at diIIerent times during the existence oI the emergency, as the need or occasion arose, there is no reason Ior the belieI or the holding that upon submitting a partial report, the whole law making the delegation including his powers under it automatically ended. The legislature during the emergency might be able to convene and naturally, the President will immediately make his report to it oI the rules and regulations promulgated by him up to that time; but iI the emergency continued or even became more serious, would it be reasonable to hold that his emergency powers ended right then and there? Would it not be more logical and reasonable to believe that inasmuch as the grant and the exercise oI his emergency powers were motivated by and based upon the existence oI the emergency and since the emergency continued his work and responsibility were not ended and that his partial report could not possibly aIIect the continuance oI his emergency powers?
Section 3 oI Commonwealth Act No. 671 provides Ior the Iiling oI a report with Congress by the President as soon as that body convened. According to the majority opinion on that date the whole Act No. 671 ceased to have Iorce and eIIect. Under that theory, as soon as the Congress convened in June, 1945, and it is to be presumed that President Osmea, complying with his duty, must have made his report oI all the numerous Executive Orders he had issued so Iar, perhaps including those issued by his predecessor President Quezon who because oI his premature death was unable to report his acts to Congress, the President automatically lost his emergency powers. But the majority opinion qualiIies this convening oI the Congress, Ior it says that it must be a regular session and not a special session, thereby extending the liIe oI Commonwealth act No. 671 one year longer, to May, 1946 when Congress held its Iirst regular session aIter liberation. I do not quite see the necessity or the reason Ior the distinction made between the special and regular session, Ior at both sessions Congress could well receive the report oI the President. The reason given is that "in a special session Congress may consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." But as a matter oI Iact, the Iirst two special sessions called by President Osmea in 1945, aIter liberation, each Ior a period oI thirty days were both to consider general legislation. So, actually there is no reason Ior the distinction.
Furthermore, iI it were the intention oI the Legislature to Iix the time at which Commonwealth Act No. 671 would cease in its operation as oI the date when the President could Iile his report beIore Congress when it Iirst convened not in special session but in regular session, it would have expressly and unequivocally said so. In its other acts oI delegation oI powers when the legislature wanted to have the report oI the President at its regular session, it expressly and explicitly said so. In section 3 oI Commonwealth Act 494, in section 5 oI Commonwealth Act 496, in section 6 oI Commonwealth Act 498, in section 3 oI Commonwealth Act 500 and in section 4 oI Commonwealth Act 600, the National Assembly provided that the President shall report to the National Assembly within ten days aIter the opening oI the next regular session oI the said Assembly oI whatever acts have been taken by him under the authority oI those Acts. The Assembly leIt nothing Ior interpretation or speculation. In section 3 oI Commonwealth Act 671, however, the same Assembly has not speciIied the kind oI session beIore which the President should make his report. It merely said that upon the convening oI the Congress the President shall report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him. We should make no distinction where the law makes or calls Ior none. Here again, to support the majority opinion would require reading into the law, section 3 oI Act 671, something that is not there.
In case like the present where there is room Ior doubt as to whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 671 has ceased to operate, one view (oI the majority) being that it automatically ceased to have any Iorce and eIIect on May 25, 1946, the other view being that the law operated as long as the emergency resulting Irom the war existed, the opinion oI and the obvious interpretation given by the legislature which enacted the law and made the delegation oI powers and the President to whom the delegation was made and who exercised said powers, should have much iI not decisive weight. We must bear in mind that we are not passing upon the validity or constitutionality oI a law enacted by the Legislature, in which case, the Court may Iind the act invalid and unconstitutional iI it is in violation oI the basic law, regardless oI the opinion or interpretation given by the Legislature that passed it or oI the Executive Department which may be trying to enIorce it. We assume that Act No. 671 is valid and constitutional. Here, we are merely trying to ascertain the intention oI the National Assembly as to the liIe and period oI eIIectiveness oI Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Do the study and analysis oI other acts oI the Legislature similar to Commonwealth Act 671, Iavor the view oI the majority? The answer in my opinion is clearly and decidedly in the negative. The majority cites the Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 to support the theory that Commonwealth Act 671 automatically ceased to operate Congress met at its next regular session. But the logical inIerence or conclusion to be drawn Irom these two acts is, in my opinion, just the reverse. It is even Iatal to the view oI the majority as I shall attempt to show. Let us consider Commonwealth Act 600 delegating extensive legislative powers to the President, approved on August 19, 1940, which like Act 671 is silent as to any express provision regarding its liIe or period oI eIIectiveness, and as to how long the emergency powers granted the President by it will last. Section 4 oI said Commonwealth Act No. 600 like section 3 oI Act 671 provides that "the President shall within the Iirst ten days Irom the date oI the opening oI the Assembly's next regular session report to said Assembly whatever action he had taken under the authority therein granted." Said section 4 oI Act 600 is clearly and more speciIic than section 3 oI Act 671 in that it clearly speciIies the next regular session whereas the latter reIers merely to the convening oI Congress. But let us assume arguendo as contended by the majority that "the convening oI the Congress" mentioned in section 3 oI Commonwealth Act 671, reIerred to regular session. According to the majority opinion, under section 4 oI the Commonwealth Act No. 600, as soon as the President made the report oI the National Assembly at its "next regular session" which was to be and was actually held in January, 1941, Commonwealth Act 600 automatically ceased to operate and the President automatically lost his delegated legislative powers. But this contrary to the very view oI the National Assembly which passed said Act 600. Commonwealth Act No. 620 oI the National Assembly passed during that "next regular session" and approved on June 6, 1941 merely amended section 1 oI Commonwealth Act 600, which enumerated the powers delegated to the ChieI Executive. It leIt the rest oI the provisions and sections oI Commonwealth Act 600 intact. So that, under section 4 (which was leIt intact) oI Act 600, the President was still required to report to National Assembly within the Iirst 10 days Irom the date oI the opening oI its next regular session which should have begun in January, 1942, despite the Iact that he had already made a report to the Legislature in January, 1941. Incidentally, this answer and reIutes the contention oI the majority that the law oI delegation oI powers contemplated only one meeting oI the Congress at which the President was to report his acts oI emergency, and that said report was to be the Iirst and the last.
Now, what inIerence may be drawn Irom this amending oI section 1 only oI Commonwealth Act No. 600 by Commonwealth Act No. 620? The logical conclusion is that in promulgating Commonwealth Act 620 on June 6, 1941, the National Assembly all along regarded Commonwealth Act No. 600 which delegated legislative powers to the President as still in Iorce and eIIect despite the report Iiled with the Assembly by the President at the beginning oI its regular session in January, 1941. When the Legislature merely amends a section oI a law, leaving the rest oI said law intact and unchanged, the logical inIerence and conclusion is that the amended law was still in Iorce because you cannot amend a law which is no longer in Iorce. The only thing that could be done with a law that has ceased to operate is to reenact it. But in passing Commonwealth Act 620 in July, 1941, the Assembly did not reenacted Commonwealth Act No. 600. By merely amending one oI its sections, the Assembly, as late as June 1941, considered said Act 600 as still eIIective and in operation and consequently, the emergency powers oI the President continued and subsisted despite his previously having made a report oI his actions in January 1941. This squarely reIutes the theory that as soon as the President Iiled his report on the exercise oI his emergency powers with the Legislature, the Act making the delegation ceased to operate and the President lost his emergency powers.
As I have already stated in the course oI this opinion, in connection with another phrase oI this case Irom January to June, 1941, President Quezon had issued at least eight Executive Orders in the exercise oI his emergency powers, by authority oI Commonwealth Act 600. From this it is evident that he did not share the majority view, because despite his having made his report to the Assembly in January, 1941, and even beIore the enactment oI Commonwealth Act No. 620, he believed and considered Commonwealth Act No. 600 as still in Iorce aIter that date and that he still retained his emergency powers.
Then, let us see what was the attitude and conduct oI the ChieI Executive and oI Congress aIter May 25, 1946, when according to the majority opinion Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to operate. AIter May 25, 1946, two Presidents, Roxas and Quirino had issued numerous Executive Orders based upon and invoking Commonwealth Act No. 671. Like President Quezon, they also evidently were oI the opinion that despite the meeting oI the Legislature in regular session the act delegating legislative powers to them (in the case oI Roxas and QuirinoCommonwealth Act No. 671) was still in Iorce, that they still retained their emergency powers and so proceeded to exercise them in good Iaith.
Congress also, evidently, believed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in Iorce and eIIect aIter said date, May 25, 1946. In spite oI the several legislative sessions, regular and special since then and up to and including the year 1949, Congress has not by law or resolution said anything questioning or doubting the validity oI said Executive Order on the score oI having been promulgated aIter Commonwealth Act No. 671 had supposedly ceased to operate. Not only this, but at least in one instance, Congress had by a law promulgated by it, considered one oI those supposed illegal Executive Orders promulgated aIter May 25, 1946, to be valid. I reIer to Republic Act No. 224 approved on June 5, 1948, creating the National Airport Corporation which considered and treated as valid Executive Order No. 100, dated October 21, 1947, by providing in section 7 oI said Republic Act No. 224 Ior the abolishment oI the OIIice oI the Administrator oI the Manila International Airport established under the provisions oI said Executive Order No. 100 and the transIer oI the personnel and Iunds created under the same Executive Order to the National Airport Corporation. This Executive Order No. 100 which appropriated public Iunds and thereIore, was oI a legislative nature must have been issued under Commonwealth Act No. 671. It cannot possibly be regarded as having been promulgated by authority oI Republic Act No. 51, Ior said Act approved on October 4, 1946, gave the President only one year within which to reorganize the diIIerent executive departments, oIIices, agencies, etc. and Executive Order No. 100 was promulgated on October 23, 1947, aIter the expiration oI the one year period. Furthermore, it is a matter oI common knowledge that during the last session oI Congress which ended in May, 1949, there was talk iI not a movement in the Congress to end the emergency powers oI the President. Nothing concrete in the Iorm oI legislation or resolution was done, Ior iI we are to accept newspaper reports and comment, the members oI Congress or at least a majority oI them were willing and satisIied to have the ChieI Executive continue in the exercise oI his emergency powers until the end oI 1949. All this leads to no other conclusion but that Congress believed all along that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in Iorce and eIIect.
II Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in Iorce and eIIect the question arises: how long and Ior what period will said Act continue to operate? As I have already stated, I believe that the delegation oI emergency powers was made coextensive with the emergency resulting Irom the war, as long as that emergency continues and unless the Legislature provides otherwise, Act 671 will continue to operate and the President may continue exercising his emergency powers.
The last and logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the emergency resulting Irom the war passed or does it still exist? This is a Iair and decisive question inasmuch as the existence oI the emergency is, my opinion, the test and the only basis oI the operation or cessation oI Act 671. The existence or non-existence oI the emergency resulting Irom the war is a question oI Iact. It is based on conditions obtaining among the people and in the country and perhaps even near and around it. It is highly controversial question on which people may honestly diIIer. There are those who in all good Iaith believe and claim that conditions have returned to normal; that the people have now enough to eat, sometimes even more than they had beIore the war; that people nowadays especially in the cities are better nourished and clothed and transported and better compensated Ior their labor, and that the President himselI in his speeches, chats and messages had assured the public that normal times have returned, that the problem oI peace and order had been solved, that the Iinances oI the Government and the national economy are sound, and that there is an adequate Iood supply. It is thereIore, claimed that there is no longer any emergency resulting Irom the war.
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite camp that conditions are still Iar Irom normal; that the picture painted by the President in cheerIul and reassuring colors is based on over optimism and, as to be expected, calculated to show in bold relieI the achievements oI the administration, and so should be considered with some allowance; that we are now importing more rice than beIore the war Ior the reason that many rice Iarms are idle because oI the Iarmer's Iear oI or interIerence by dissidents; that the problem oI peace and order is Iar Irom solved as shown by the Irequent hold-ups, kidnapping, loothing and killings and organized banditry not only in Luzon but also in the Visayas and Mindanao; that whereas beIore the war, the Constabulary Iorce consisting oI only about 6,000 oIIicers and men could provide complete protection to liIe and property and was adequate in all respects to enIorce peace and order, now this Constabulary enlarged to about 20,000 men, provided with modern weapons and equipment and with the aid oI thousands oI civilians guards and oI the Philippine Army and Air Force cannot solve the peace and order problem; that the dissidents who are well organized, armed and disciplined even attack and sack towns and sometimes openly deIy and engage the armed Government Iorces; that as long as more than 100,000 Iirearms are loose and in the hands oI irresponsible parties, not excluding the seemingly regular mysterious supply to them oI additional Iirearms and ammunitions, there can be no peace and order; and as to the barrio Iolks in central Luzon and now, even in provinces bordering central Luzon whose parents and relatives had been killed by dissidents, whose women Iolk had been outraged by the same elements, whose homes had been looted and burned and whose very lives had been subjected to constant terror and peril, compelling them to leave their homes and their Iarms and evacuate to and be concentrated in the poblaciones to live there in utter discomIort and privation, it is said that it would be diIIicult to convince these unIortunate people that normalcy has returned and that there is no longer any emergency resulting Irom the war. To Iurther support the claim oI the existence oI an emergency, the menace oI communism not only at home, particularly in central Luzon but Irom abroad, especially China, is invoked. And it is asserted that all this is a result oI the war.
I repeat that this question oI the existence oI an emergency is a controversial one, the decision on which must be based on the ascertainment oI Iacts, circumstances and conditions and the situation obtaining in the country. This Court is not in a position to decide that controversy. It does not have the Iacilities to obtain and acquire the necessary Iacts and data on which to base a valid and just decision. Neither did it have the opportunity to receive the necessary evidence as in a hearing or trial at which evidence, oral or documentary, is introduced. We cannot invoked and resort to judicial notice because this reIers to things oI public knowledge, and not controverted, whereas things, Iacts and conditions necessary Ior the determination oI whether or not there is still an emergency, are oIten not oI public knowledge but require investigation, accurate reporting and close contact with the people to be able to ascertain their living conditions, their needs, their Iears, etc.
To me, the department oI the Government equipped and in a position to decide this question oI emergency are the ChieI Executive and the Legislature. The Iirst has at his command and beck and call all the executive oIIicials and departments. He has the Army, the Constabulary, Naval Patrol, the Police oI the cities and towns and the barrio lieutenants to inIorm him oI the state oI peace and order and the security oI the states. He has the Secretary oI Education and all the subordinates oIIicers and the school oIIicials under him to inIorm him as to whether or not there is a school crisis or emergency as a result oI the war. He has the Secretary oI Agriculture and Natural Resources and his men to advise him as to the agricultural needs and the Iood supply oI the country. He has the Secretary oI Finance and all the oIIicials under him to inIorm him oI the Iinances oI the Government and the economy oI the country as well as the oIIicials to advise him oI the land shipping transportation situation. In other words, the President is in a position to determine whether or not there is still an emergency as a result oI the war.
As to Congress, it is equally in a position and in Iact it is the Iirst to called upon to decide as to the existence or non-existence oI an emergency. According to the Constitution, section 24, Article VI, either House oI Congress may call upon the head oI any department oI the Government on any matter pertaining to his departure. The members oI Congress come Irom all parts and the Iar corners oI the country. They are supposed to be in close contact with their constituents and know at Iirst hand their needs, the way they live, etc. Congress thereIore should know. Moreover, it is the legislature that must Iirst determine as to whether or not there is a national emergency as a condition precedent to the delegation oI its legislative powers. Naturally, it is the one that is called upon to say when that emergency ceases.
Now, one will ask, what does Congress think about the emergency? Does it believe that it still exists? To me the answer is YES. What has been said about the acts, conduct and attitude oI the legislature as to its belieI that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in Iorce, are all applicable and may be repeated to show that the Congress believes that the emergency resulting Irom the war still exist. Under the theory that I maintain, Congress must be oI the opinion that the emergency still exists Ior the reason that as I have shown Congress believes that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in Iorce and the liIe and the operation oI said Act depends upon and is coextensive with the existence oI the emergency. To this may be added the attitude and the belieI oI the President as to the continued existence oI the emergency. It must be borne in mind that Commonwealth Act No. 671 authorizes the President to exercise his emergency powers only during the existence oI the emergency. The inIerence is that beIore exercising his emergency powers by promulgating an Executive Order he must Iirst determine and decide that the state oI emergency still exists, Ior that is the condition precedent to the exercise oI his delegated powers. In other words, the two departments oI the Government, the Legislative and the Executive Departments, best qualiIied and called upon to determine whether or not the emergency resulting Irom the war still exists have made maniIest in their acts and attitude that they believe that such emergency still exists. I may here state that on this question oI emergency, I entertain no personal opinion either way lacking as I do the means oI deciding Iairly and justly. Neither has the Court. II the decision oI the courts on question oI Iact involved in a controversy are given due respect and weight and are binding, it is because such decisions are based on evidence adduced and received aIter a hearing. No such hearing was held Ior the purpose and no evidence been received. In other words, we have nothing in which to decide a question oI Iact which is the existence or non-existence oI emergency.
In view oI the conclusion we have arrived at, Iinding these Executive Orders to be void and oI no eIIect, particularly Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 with the evident result that no Iunds are appropriated Ior the operation oI the Government Ior the Iiscal year beginning July oI this year and Ior the expenses in the coming national election next November, one may inquire as to what will happen or what is to be done. The answer or answers to this question lie with the ChieI Executive. Congress will not meet in regular session until next year. It is not Ior the court, not even the undersigned to suggest the calling oI a special legislative session to cope with the perilous situation thus created, altho one may regard that as a logical remedy. But, should the President call a special session and Congress Ior one reason or another Iails to meet or though it meets, Ior one reason or another it Iails to pass an appropriation law, then a real crisis will have ensued. I am conIident that the ChieI Executive, conscious oI his responsibility as the ChieI oI the nation would not just stand supine and idle and see the Government oI the Republic oI the Philippines disintegrate and die. He would know what to do and he would do something according to his sound discretion and in accordance with the law, statutory or otherwise and in the discharge oI his high executive powers, express or implied.
TORRES, J., concurring:
I concur in the Ioregoing opinion oI Mr. Justice Montemayor on the existence oI the emergency powers. I reserve my opinion on the validity oI Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226.
REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:
The main issue in these cases is whether the emergency which on December 16, 1941 prompted the approval oI Commonwealth Act No. 671, delegating extraordinary powers to the President, still existed at the time the ChieI Executive exercised those powers by promulgating the executive orders whose validity is now challenged.
On issue similar to the one just Iormulated there is a diversity oI opinions. While some courts would rather leave the determination oI such issues to the political department oI the Government, others are Ior making the determination subject to judicial review. But the latest ruling oI the United States Supreme Court on the point accords with Iirst view and declares that "these are matters oI political judgment Ior which judges have neither technical competence nor oIIicial responsibility." (Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883.)
In any event the existence or non-existence oI an emergency is a question oI Iacts which may not always be determine without the evidence by mere reIerence to Iacts within the judicial notice. In the present cases, there has been no trial Ior the reception oI prooI, and I am not aware that enough Iacts have been shown to justiIy the conclusion that the emergency in question has already ceased. On the other hand, since the exercise oI the emergency powers by the President presupposes a determination oI the existence oI the emergency, the President must be presumed to have satisIied himselI in some appropriate manner that the emergency existed when he issued his executive orders. Under the theory oI separation oI powers and in accord with the latest ruling oI the United States Supreme Court, it is not Ior the judiciary to review the Iinding oI the Executive in this regard. Judicial review would in such case amount to control oI executive discretion and place the judicial branch above a co-equal department oI the Government. Only in case oI a maniIest abuse oI the exercise oI powers by a political branch oI the Government is judicial interIerence allowable in order to maintain the supremacy oI the Constitution. But with the cold war still going on though the shooting war has already ended; with the world still in turmoil so much so that the American Secretary oI the State has declared that "the world has never beIore in peace time been as troubled or hazardous as it is right now;" with most oI the industries oI the country still unrihabilitated, so that a large proportion oI our Iood and other necessaries have to be imported; with a great portion oI the population still living in temporary quarters; with most oI the war damage claims still unpaid; and with peace and other conditions in the country Iar Irom normal, it would be presumptuous Ior this Court, without prooI oI the actual condition obtaining in all parts oI the Archipelago, to declare that the President clearly abused his discretion when he considered the emergency not ended at the time he promulgated the executive orders now questioned.
The majority opinion has skirted the issue oI whether or not the question oI the existence or continuance oI the emergency is one Ior the political department oI the Government to determine by restricting "the liIe oI the emergency powers oI the President to the time the Legislature was prevented Irom holding session due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war." I cannot subscribe to this narrow interpretation oI Commonwealth Act No. 671, Ior in my opinion it is contrary to both the plain language and maniIest purpose oI that enactment. The law invests the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the emergency resulting Irom the war and it expressly says that the President is to exercise those powers "during the existence oI the emergency." The Act does not say that the President may exercise the powers only when the Legislature is not session. Much less does it say that the emergency powers shall cease as soon as the Legislature has convened in regular session. An emergency resulting Irom a global war cannot end with the mere meeting oI the Legislature. Neither may be legislated out oI existence. The Legislature, once it was convened, may, iI it so desire, revoked the emergency powers oI the President, but it cannot by any Iorm oI legislative action put an immediate end to the emergency itselI. Well known is a Iact that a deliverative body, such as the Legislature, because oI the time consumed in the study and discussion oI a measure, may not always act with the promptness which the situation requires so that in an emergency there is really need Ior the concentration oI power in one man. This may well be the reason why Act No. 671 in express terms authorizes the President to exercise the emergency powers "during the existence oI the emergency" and not merely during the time that the Legislature could be in session. For one thing to make the liIe oI the emergency powers depend upon the inability oI the Legislature to meet is the same as to declare those emergency powers automatically ended the moment they were conIerred, Ior at that very moment oI the Legislature that conIerred them was in session.
The argument that, unless the emergency powers oI the President were made to cease the moment Congress convened in regular session, we should be having two legislatures which could mutually annul each other, will not stand analysis. In supposing that the President, in the exercise oI the emergency powers could "repeal or modiIy a bill passed by the Legislature," the argument overlooks the Iact that the emergency powers delegated to the President under Article VI, section 26 oI the Constitution could only authorize him "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Only the Legislature (with the concurrence oI the President oI course) may declare the President may not, under the Constitution, depart Irom it. Moreover, unless the Presidential veto could be overriden, no bill approved by Congress could become a law iI the President did not want it. And iI the President approves a bill and allows it to become a law, surely he can have no reason Ior repealing it; while, on the other hand, there is no point in his repealing that bill, because iI there are enough votes to override his veto there must also be enough votes to repeal his emergency powers.
The majority opinion has I think placed a rather Iorced construction upon section 3 oI Commonwealth Act No. 671, which provides that
The President oI the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening oI the Congress oI the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
As may be seen, the above provision does not say that the President has to report only once, that is, the Iirst time Congress is convened, and never again. But the majority opinion wants to read that thought into the law in order to bolster up the theory that the emergency powers oI the President would end as soon as Congress could convene in a regular session.
Invoking the rule oI contemporary construction, the majority opinion makes reIerence to a passage in President Quezon's book. "The Good Fight," to the eIIect that, according to the author, Act No. 671, was only "Ior a certain period" and "would become valid unless re-enacted." But I see nothing in the quoted phrases any suggestion that the emergency powers oI the President were to end the moment Congress was convened in regular session regardless oI the continuance oI the emergency which gave birth to those powers. A more valid application oI the rule oI contemporary construction may, I think, be made by citing the executive orders promulgated by President Roxas by Commonwealth Act No. 671. Many oI those executive orders were issued aIter May 25, 1946 when Congress convened in regular session, an event which, according to the majority opinion, automatically put an end to the emergency powers.
While we have adopted the republican Iorm oI government with its three co-equal departments, each acting within its separate sphere, it would be well to remember that we have not accepted the American theory oI separation oI powers to its Iull extent. For, proIiting Irom the experience oI America when her Supreme Court, by the application many a New Deal measure which her Congress had approved to meet a national crisis, our Constitutional Convention in 1935, despite the warning oI those who Ieared a dictatorship in his country, decided to depart Irom the strict theory oI separation oI powers by embodying a provision in our Constitution, authorizing the delegation oI legislative powers to the President "in times oI war or other national emergency." It is my surmise that this provision was intended to guard not only against the inability to meet but also against its usual tardiness and inaction. We have prooI oI this last in the last regular session oI Congress, when this body Iailed to pass measures oI pressing necessity, especially the annual appropriation law and the appropriation Ior the expenses oI the coming elections.
It is said that the need Ior an appropriation law Ior the Iiscal year 1949-1950 as well Ior the coming elections is not an emergency resulting Irom the war. But I say that iI the emergency resulting Irom the war as contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671 still exists, as the President believes it exists or he would not have issued the executive orders in question (and it is not Ior the Court to change that belieI in the absence oI prooI that the President was clearly wrong) would it not be a dereliction oI duty on his part to Iall to provide, during the emergency, Ior the continuance oI the Iunctions oI government, which is only possible with an appropriation law? What would be gained by issuing rules and regulations to meet the emergency iI there is no Government to enIorce and carry them out? The mere calling oI a special is no guaranty that an appropriation law will be passed or that one will be passed beIore the thousands oI oIIicials and employees who work Ior the Government have starved. It is, probably, because oI these considerations that the National Assembly, in approving Commonwealth Act No. 671, speciIically empowered the President, during the existence oI the emergency, "to continue in Iorce laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative." And that Act has authorized the President during the existence oI the same emergency "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the government to IulIill its responsibilities and to maintain in Iorce this authority." Under this speciIic provision, the appropriation Ior the expenses oI the coming elections would, naturally, come, Ior, without doubt, it is a measure to enable the Government "to IulIill its responsibilities."
Consistently with the views above express, I am oI the opinion that Executive Order No. 225, appropriating Iunds Ior the operation oI the Government oI the Republic Ior the Iiscal year 1949-50, and Executive Order No. 226, appropriating Iunds Ior the expenses oI the coming national elections in November, 1949, are valid so that the petition in G.R. No. L-3054, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Treasurer oI the Philippines, and the petition in G.R. No. L- 3056, Antonio Barredo, etc., vs. Commissioner on Election, et al., in which the said two executive orders are respectively challenged, should be denied.
But Executive Order No. 62 (regulating rents) and Executive Order No. 192 (controlling exports) stand on a diIIerent Iooting. The validity oI Executive Order No. 62 can no longer be maintained because oI the approval by the Legislature oI Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, which regulate the same subject matter and which, as an expression oI the national policy, can not be deviated Irom by the President in the exercise oI the emergency powers delegated to him by Commonwealth Act No. 671. The same is true with respect to Executive Order No. 192 (controlling exports) in view oI the passage oI Commonwealth Act No. 728, regulating the same subject matter, especially because section 4 oI said Act terminates the power oI the President thereunder on December 31, 1948, iI not sooner. Consequently, since the validity oI these executive orders (Nos. 62 and 192) can no longer be upheld, the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-2044, L-2756 and L-3055, which seek to prohibit their enIorcement, should be granted.
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join in this opinion oI Mr. Justice Reyes. I wish to add that I agree with Mr. Justice Bengzon that petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 have no personality to institute the proceedings.
BENGZON, J., dissenting:
The majority Ieels that it has to decide the question whether the President still has emergency powers; but unable to determine in which oI the above cases the issue may properly be decided, it grouped them together. When the eye or the hand is unsure, it is best to shoot at Iive birds in a group: Iiring at one aIter another may mean as many misses.
It does not matter that the Iirst two cases had been submitted and voted beIore the submission oI the last three. Neither does it matter that, oI these last, two should be thrown out in accordance with our previous rulings. The target must be large.
These cases could be, and should be decided separately. II they are, they may be disposed oI without ruling on the general question whether the President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 7671. How? This way, which is my vote.
1. L-2044, Araneta vs. Dinglasan; L-2756, Araneta vs. Angeles. The President has presently no power to regulate rents, because his power to do so is granted by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 which have lapsed. Under Commonwealth Act No. 671 he has no power to regulate rents.
2. L-3056, Barredo vs. Commission, etc. Dismissed because petitioner has no personality to sue. According to Custodio vs. President oI the Senate et al., 42 OII. Gaz., 1243, a citizen and taxpayer, as such, has no legal standing to institute proceedings Ior the annulment oI a statute.
3. L-3054, Rodriguez vs. Treasurer. Dismissed, like the Barredo case. The private rights oI petitioner and oI his partymen are aIIected only as taxpayers.
4. L-3055, Guerrero vs. Commissioner oI Customs. Supposing that the President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, and that they include regulation oI exportation, inasmuch as the Congress has chosen to legislate on exports (Commonwealth Act No. 728), it has thereby pro tanto withdrawn the power delegated to the President along that Iield.
It is a sound rule, I believe, Ior the Court to determine only those questions which are necessary to decide a case.
Although I am Iavorably impressed by the considerations set Iorth by Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes on the existence oI emergency powers, I preIer to vote as herein indicated.
I reserve the right subsequently to elaborate on the above propositions.
For lack oI the required number oI votes, judgment was not obtained. However, aIter rehearing, the required number oI votes was had, by resolution oI September 16, 1949, which Iollows.
RESOLUTION
September 16, 1949
MORAN, C. J.:
Petitioners Iiled motions asking (1) that Mr. Justice Padilla be qualiIied to act in these cases; (2) that the vote cast by the late Mr. Justice Perpecto beIore his death be counted in their Iavor; and (3) that the opinion oI the ChieI Justice be counted as a vote Ior the nullity oI Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226.
I
As regards the motion to disqualiIy Mr. Justice Padilla, the Court is oI the opinion that it must not be considered, it having been presented aIter Mr. Justice Padilla had given his opinion on the merits oI these cases. As we have once said "a litigant . . . cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action oI the court and raise an objection oI this sort aIter decision has been rendered." (Government oI the Philippine Islands vs. Heirs oI Abella, 49 Phil., 374.)
Furthermore, the Iact that Justice Padilla, while Secretary oI Justice, had advised the President on the question oI emergency powers, does not disqualiIy him to act in these cases, Ior he cannot be considered as having acted previously in these actions as counsel oI any oI the parties. The President is not here a party.
All the members oI this Court concur in the denial oI the motion to disqualiIy Mr. Justice Padilla, with the exception oI Mr. Justice Ozaeta and Mr. Justice Feria who reserve their vote.
II
With respect to the motion to include the vote and opinion oI the late Mr. Justice PerIecto in the decision oI these cases, it appears that Mr. Justice PerIecto died and ceased to be a member oI this Court on August 17, 1949, and our decision in these cases was released Ior publication on August 26, 1949. Rule 53, section 1, in connection with Rule 58, section 1, oI the Rules oI Court, is as Iollows:
SECTION 1. Judges: who may take part. All matters submitted to the court Ior its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted Ior consideration and adjudication by any and all oI the justices who are members oI the court at the time when such matters are taken up Ior consideration and adjudication, whether such justices were or not members oI the court and whether they were or were not present at the date oI submission; . . . .
Under this provision, one who is not a member oI the court at the time an adjudication is made cannot take part in the adjudication. The word "adjudication" means decision. A case can be adjudicated only by means oI a decision. And a decision oI this Court, to be oI value and binding Iorce, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated (Article VIII, sections 11 and 12, oI the Constitution; Republic Act No. 296, section 21; Rule 53, section 7, oI the Rules oI Court). Promulgated means the delivery oI the decision to the Clerk oI Court Ior Iiling and publication.
Accordingly, one who is no longer a member oI this Court at the time a decision is signed and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision. As above indicated, the true decision oI the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. BeIore that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision oI the Court to speak oI. The vote cast by a member oI the Court aIter deliberation is always understood to be subject to conIirmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. That vote is oI no value iI it is not thus conIirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose oI this practice is apparent. Members oI this Court, even aIter they have cast their vote, wish to preserve their Ireedom oI action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they may take Iull advantage oI what they may believe to be the best Iruit oI their most mature reIlection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice, beIore a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and aIter the deliberation oI the Court, remain in the breast oI the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. OI course, they may serve Ior determining what the opinion oI the majority provisionally is and Ior designating a member to prepare the decision binding unless and until duly signed and promulgated.
And this is practically what we have said in the contempt case against Abelardo Subido,1 promulgated on September 28, 1948:
que un asunto o causa pendiente en esta Corte Suprema solo se considera decidido una vez registrada, promulgada y publicada la sentencia en la escribania, y que hasta entonces el resultado de la votacion se estima como una materia absolutamente reservada y conIidencial, perteneciente exclusivamente a las camaras interiores de la Corte.
In an earlier case we had occasion to state that the decisive point is the date oI promulgation oI judgment. In that case a judge rendered his decision on January 14; qualiIied himselI as Secretary oI Finance on January 16; and his decision was promulgated on January 17. We held that the decision was void because at the time oI its promulgation the judge who prepared it was no longer a judge. (Lino Luna vs. Rodriquez, 37 Phil., 186.)
Another reason why the vote and opinion oI the Mr. Justice PerIecto can not be considered in these cases is that his successor, Mr. Justice Torres, has been allowed by this Court to take part in the decision on the question oI emergency powers because oI lack oI majority on that question. And Mr. Justice Torres is not bound to Iollow any opinion previously held by Mr. Justice PerIecto on that matter. There is no law or rule providing that a successor is a mere executor oI his predecessor's will. On the contrary, the successor must act according to his own opinion Ior the simple reason that the responsibility Ior his action is his and oI no one else. OI course, where a valid and recorded act has been executed by the predecessor and only a ministerial duty remains to be perIormed Ior its completion, the act must be completed accordingly. For instance, where the predecessor had rendered a valid judgment duly Iiled and promulgated, the entry oI that judgment which is a ministerial duty, may be ordered by the successor as a matter oI course. But even in that case, iI the successor is moved to reconsider the decision, and he still may do so within the period provided by the rules, he is not bound to Iollow the opinion oI his predecessor, which he may set aside according to what he may believe to be Ior the best interests oI justice.
We are oI the opinion, thereIore, that the motion to include the vote and opinion oI the late Justice PerIecto in the decision oI these cases must be denied.
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla, Mr. Justice Montemayor, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes, and Mr. Justice Torres concur in this denial. Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Tuason dissent.
III
In connection with the motion to consider the opinion oI the ChieI Justice as a vote in Iavor oI petitioners, the writer has the Iollowing to say:
In my previous concurring opinion, I expressed the view that the emergency powers vested in Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased in June 1945, but I voted Ior a deIerment oI judgment in these two cases because oI two circumstances then present, namely, (1) the need oI sustaining the two executive orders on appropriations as the liIe-line oI government and (2) the Iact that a special session oI Congress was to be held in a Iew days. I then asked, "Why not deIer judgment and wait until the special session oI Congress so that it may IulIill its duty as it clearly sees it?"
It seemed then to me unwise and inexpedient to Iorce the Government into imminent disruption by allowing the nullity oI the executive orders to Iollow its reglementary consequences when Congress was soon to be convened Ior the very purpose oI passing, among other urgent measures, a valid appropriations act. Considering the Iacility with which Congress could remedy the existing anomaly, I deemed it a slavish submission to a constitutional Iormula Ior this Court to seize upon its power under the Iundamental law to nulliIy the executive orders in question. A deIerment oI judgment struck me then as wise. I reasoned that judicial statesmanship, not judicial supremacy, was needed.
However, now that the holding oI a special session oI Congress Ior the purpose oI remedying the nullity oI the executive orders in question appears remote and uncertain, I am compelled to, and do hereby, give my unqualiIied concurrence in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Tuason declaring that these two executive orders were issued without authority oI law.
While in voting Ior a temporary deIerment oI the judgment I was moved by the belieI that the positive compliance with the Constitution by the other branches oI the Government, which is our prime concern in all these cases, would be eIIected, and indeIinite deIerment will produce the opposite result because it would legitimize a prolonged or permanent evasion oI our organic law. Executive orders which are, in our opinion, repugnant to the Constitution, would be given permanent liIe, opening the way to practices which may undermine our constitutional structure.
The harmIul consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring opinion, would come to pass should the said executive orders be immediately declared null and void, are still real. They have not disappeared by reason oI the Iact that a special session oI the Congress is not now Iorthcoming. However, the remedy now lies in the hands oI the ChieI Executive and oI Congress, Ior the Constitution vests in the Iormer the power to call a special session should the need Ior one arise, and in the latter, the power to pass a valid appropriation act.
That Congress may again Iall to pass a valid appropriations act is a remote possibility, Ior under the circumstances it Iully realizes its great responsibility oI saving the nation Irom breaking down; and Iurthermore, the President in the exercise oI his constitutional powers may, iI he so desires, compel Congress to remain in special session till it approves the legislative measures most needed by the country.
Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge victorious as a permanent way oI liIe in this country, iI each oI the great branches oI the Government, within its own allocated spear, complies with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless oI diIIiculties.
Our Republic is still young, and the vital principle underlying its organic structure should be maintained Iirm and strong, hard as the best oI steel, so as to insure its growth and development along solid lines oI a stable and vigorous democracy.
With my declaration that Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 are null and void, and with the vote to the eIIect oI Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Montemayor, there is a suIIicient majority to pronounce a valid judgment on that matter.
It is maintained by the Solicitor General and the amicus curiae that eight Justices are necessary to pronounce a judgment on the nullity oI the executive orders in question, under section 9 oI Republic Act No. 296 and Article VIII, section 10 oI the Constitution. This theory is made to rest on the ground that said executive orders must be considered as laws, they having been issued by the ChieI Executive in the exercise oI the legislative powers delegated to him.
It is the opinion oI the Court that the executive orders in question, even iI issued within the powers validly vested in the ChieI Executive, are not laws, although they may have the Iorce oI law, in exactly the same manner as the judgments oI this Court, municipal ordinances and ordinary executive orders cannot be considered as laws, even iI they have the Iorce oI law.
Under Article VI, section 26, oI the Constitution, the only power which, in times oI war or other national emergency, may be vested by Congress in the President, is the power "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Consequently, the executive orders issued by the President in pursuance oI the power delegated to him under that provision oI the Constitution, may be considered only as rules and regulations. There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the vote oI eight Justices to nulliIy a rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the President. It is very signiIicant that in the previous draIts oI section 10, Article VII oI the Constitution, "executive order" and "regulation" were included among those that required Ior their nulliIication the vote oI two thirds oI all oI the members oI the Court. But "executive order" and "regulations" were later deleted Irom the Iinal draIt (Aruego, The Framing oI the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a mere majority oI six members oI this Court is enough to nulliIy them.
All the members oI the Court concur in this view.
For all the Ioregoing, the Court denies the motion to disqualiIy Mr. Justice Padilla, and the motion to include the vote oI the late Mr. Justice PerIecto in the decision oI these cases. And it is the judgment oI this Court to declare Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, null and void, with the dissent oI Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Reyes, upon the grounds already stated in their respective opinions, and with Mr. Justice Torres abstaining.
But in order to avoid a possible disruption or interruption in a normal operation oI the Government, it is decreed, by the majority, oI course, that this judgment take eIIect upon the expiration oI IiIteen days Irom the date oI its entry. No costs to be charged.
The respondent in the cases G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 contend that the petitioners in said cases can not institute an action to invalidate the Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 promulgated by the President, because they have no interest in preventing the illegal expenditures oI moneys raised by taxation, and can not thereIore question the validity oI said executive orders requiring expenditures oI public money.
Although the Supreme Court, in the case oI Custodio vs. President oI the Senate, G. R. No. L-117 (42 OII. Gaz., 1243) held in a minute resolution "That the constitutionality oI a legislative act is open to attack only by person whose rights are aIIected thereby, that one who invokes the power oI the court to declare an Act oI Congress to be unconstitutional must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger oI sustaining some direct injury as the result oI its enIorcement," that ruling was laid down without a careIul consideration and is contrary to the ruling laid down in the majority oI jurisdictions in the United States that "In the determination oI the degree oI interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality oI a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually aIIected, but also have taxpayers, have suIIicient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures oI money raised by taxation and may thereIore question the constitutionality oI statutes requiring expenditures oI public moneys." (Am. Jur., Vol. 11, p. 761) All the members oI this Court, except two, in taking cognizance oI those cases, rejected the respondents' contention, reversed the ruling in said case and adopted the general rule above mentioned; and we believe the latter is better than the one adopted in said case oI Custodio, which was based on a doctrine adhered to only in Iew jurisdiction in the United States; because iI a taxpayer can not attack the validity oI the executive orders in question or a law requiring the expenditure oI public moneys, one under our laws could question the validity oI such laws or executive orders.
AIter laying down the Iundamental principles involved in the case at bar, we shall discuss and show that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was no longer in Iorce at the time the Executive Orders under consideration were promulgated, because even the respondents in the cases G. R. Nos. L-2044 and L-2756, in sustaining the validity oI the Executive Order No. 62 rely not only on Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, but on Commonwealth Act No. 671; and aIterwards we shall reIute the arguments in support oI the contrary proposition that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in Iorce and, thereIore, the President may exercise now the legislative powers therein delegated to him.
PRELIMINARY
The Constitution oI the Philippines, draIted by the duly elected representatives oI the Filipino people, provides in its section 1, Article II, that "The Philippines is a republican states, sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates Irom them." The people have delegated the government authority to three diIIerent and separate Departments: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. In section 1, Article VI, the legislative power to make laws is conIerred upon Congress; the executive power to IaithIully executed the laws is vested by sections 1 and 10 oI Article VII, in the President; and the judicial power is vested by section 1, Article VII, in one Supreme Court and in such inIerior courts as may be established by law, the Supreme Court having the supremacy to pass upon "the constitutionality or validity oI any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulations."
The distribution by the Constitution oI the powers oI government to the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments operates, by implication, as an inhibition against the exercise by one department oI the powers which belong to another, and imposes upon each oI the three departments the duty oI exercising its own peculiar powers by itselI, and prohibits the delegation oI any oI those powers except in cases expressly permitted by the Constitution. The principle oI the separation oI the powers oI government is Iundamental to the very existence oI a constitutional government as established in the Philippines patterned aIter that oI the United States oI America. The division oI governmental powers into legislative, executive, and judicial represents the most important principle oI government that guarantees the liberties oI the people, Ior it prevents a concentration oI powers in the hands oI one person or class oI persons.
Under the doctrine oI separation oI the powers oI government, the law- making Iunctions is assigned exclusively to the legislative, and the legislative branch cannot delegate the power to make laws to any other authority. But it must be borne in mind that what cannot be delegated is that which is purely legislative in nature, not administrative. There are powers so Iar legislative that may properly be exercised by the legislature, but which may nevertheless be delegated because they may be advantageously exercised in proper cases by persons belonging to the other departments oI the government, such as the authority to make rules and regulations oI administrative character to carry out an legislative purposes or to eIIect the operation and enIorcement oI a law. As illustrations oI the proper exercise oI the power oI Congress to delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations with the necessary details to carry into eIIect a law, are Act No. 3155 empowering the Governor General then, now the President, to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition oI the importation oI Ioreign cattle (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Act No. 3106 authorizing the Commissioner oI the Public Service Commission to regulate those engaged in various occupations or business aIIected with a public interest, and to prescribe what the charges shall be Ior services rendered in the conduct oI such business (Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446); and the National Industrial Recovery Act enacted by the Congress oI the United States authorizing the President to promulgate administrative rules and regulations to carry out the emergency measure enacted by Congress, though a part thereoI was declared unconstitutional Ior producing a delegation oI legislative authority which is unconIined, "and not canalized within banks to keep it Irom ever Ilowing."
Athough, in principle, the power oI the Legislature to make laws or perIorm acts purely legislative in nature may only be delegated by Congress to another authority or oIIicers oI either the executive or judicial department when expressly permitted by the Constitution, no such delegation is authorized by the State constitution or Federal Constitution oI the Untied States. It is a Iact admitted by the attorneys and amici curiae Ior the petitioners and respondents in these case that section 26, Article VI, our Constitution is unique and has no counterpart in said constitutions, and Ior that reason not a single case involving a question similar to the one herein involved has never been submitted to and passed upon by the courts oI last resort in the United States. The provision oI our Constitution reads as Iollows:
SEC. 26. In times oI war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, Ior a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
It is important to observe that what the above-quoted constitutional provision empowers Congress to delegate to the President, is not the power to promulgate rules and regulations oI administrative nature, Ior this may also be delegated at any time without necessity oI an express authority by the Constitution, but the power to promulgate rules and regulations purely legislative in nature, leaving to the discretion oI the President the determination oI what rules or regulations shall be or what acts are necessary to eIIectuate the so-called declared national policy, Ior otherwise it would not have been necessary Ior the Constitution to authorize Congress to make such delegation.
DEMONSTRATION
The Constitution permits Congress to authorize the President oI the Philippines to promulgate rules and regulations oI legislative nature only (1) in times oI war or (2) other national emergency, such as rebellion, Ilood, earthquake, pestilence, economic depression, Iamine or any other emergency diIIerent Irom war itselI aIIecting the nation.
It is obvious that it is Congress and not a particular emergency and to authorize the President to promulgate rules and regulations to cope with it. ThereIore, iI Congress declares that there exist a war as a national emergency and empowers the President to promulgate rules and regulations to tide over the emergency, the latter could not, because he believes that there is an economic emergency or depression or any emergency other than war itselI, exercise the legislative power delegated to meet such economic or other emergency.
The Constitution requires also that the delegation be Ior a limited period or other authority so delegated shall cease ipso Iacto at the expiration oI the period, because to require an express legislation to repel or terminate the delegated legislative authority oI the President might be subversive to the constitutional separation oI powers in out democratic Iorm oI government, Ior the President my prevent indeIinitely the repeal oI his delegated authority by the exercise oI his veto power, since the veto could be overridden only by two-thirds vote and it would be extremely diIIicult to repeal it in subservient Congress dominated by the ChieI Executive. Besides, to provide that the delegated legislative powers shall continue to exist until repealed by the Congress, would be delegation not Ior limited, but Ior an unlimited period or rather without any limitation at all, because all acts enacted are always subjects to repeal by the Congress, without necessity to providing so.
No question is raised as to the constitutionality oI Commonwealth Act No. 671 under which Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were promulgated by the President oI the Philippines according to the contention oI the respondents. The question involved is the validity (not constitutionality) oI said executive orders, that is, whether or not the President had authority to promulgate them under Commonwealth Act No. 671; and thereIore the concurrence oI two- thirds oI all the members oI this Court required by section 10, Article VIII oI the Constitution to declare a treaty or law unconstitutional is not required Ior adjudging the executive orders in question invalid or not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 671, which read as Iollows:
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly oI the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence oI war between the United States and other countries oI Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions oI Article VI, section 16, oI the Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the existence oI the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereoI. Accordingly he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transIer the seat oI the Government or any oI its subdivisions, branches, departments, oIIices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the government oI the Commonwealth including the determination oI the order oI procedure oI the heads oI the Executive Departments; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, oIIices, agencies or instrumentalities oI Government and to abolish any oI those already existing; (d) to continue in Iorce laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modiIy or suspend the operation or application oI those oI an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence; (I) to raise Iunds through the issuance oI bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure oI the proceeds thereoI (g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdraIts Ior purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension oI the collection oI credits or the payment oI debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to IulIill its responsibilities and to maintain and enIorce its authority.
SEC. 3. The President oI the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening oI the Congress oI the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take upon its approval, and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in Iorce and eIIect until the Congress oI the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
Approved, December 16, 1941.
Taking into consideration the presumption that Congress was Iamiliar with the well-known limits oI its powers under section 26, Article VI, oI the Constitution and did not intend to exceed said powers in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 671, the express provisions oI Commonwealth Acts. Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 as amended by 620 and 671, and those oI Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by Republic Act No. 66 and Republic Acts Nos. 51 and 728, we are oI the opinion, and thereIore so hold, that the actual war in the Philippine territory and not any other national emergency is contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, and that the period oI time during which the President was empowered by said Commonwealth Act No. 671 to promulgate rules and regulations was limited to the existence oI such war or invasion oI the Philippines by the enemy, which prevented the Congress to meet in a regular session. Such emergency having ceased to exist upon the complete liberation oI the Philippines Irom the enemy's occupation, Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased to be in Iorce and eIIect at the date oI the adjournment oI the next regular session oI the Congress in 1946, beIore the promulgation oI said executive orders, and hence they are null and void.
In view oI the existence oI a state oI national emergency caused by the last world war among several nations oI the world, the second National Assembly during its second special session passed the Iollowing acts: (a) Commonwealth Act No. 494 authorizing the President until the adjournment oI the next regular session oI the National Assembly, to suspend the operation oI Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known as the "Eight-Hour Labor-Law," when in his judgment the public interest so required, in order to prevent a dislocation oI the productive Iorces oI the country; (b) Commonwealth Act No. 496 delegating to the President the power expressly granted by section 6, Article XIII, oI the Constitution to the State "until the date oI adjournment oI the next regular session oI the National Assembly, to take over solely Ior use or operation by the Government during the existence oI the emergency any public service or enterprise and to operate the same," upon payment oI just compensation; (c) Commonwealth Act No. 498, authorizing the President, among others, to Iix the maximum selling prices oI Ioods, clothing, Iuel, Iertilizers, chemicals, building materials, implements, machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and industry, and other articles or commodities oI prime necessity, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary in the public interest, which rules and regulations shall have the Iorce and eIIect oI law until the date oI the adjournment oI the next regular session oI the National Assembly; (d) Commonwealth Act No. 499 providing that until the date oI the adjournment oI the next regular session oI the National Assembly, any sale, mortgage, lease, charter, delivery, transIer oI vessels owned in whole or in part by a citizen oI the Philippines or by a corporation organizes under the laws oI the Philippines, to any person not a citizen oI the United States or oI the Philippines, shall be null and void, without the approval oI the President oI the Philippines; and Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President to reduce the expenditure oI the Executive Department oI the National Government by the suspension or abandonment oI services, activities or operations oI no immediate necessity, which authority shall be exercised only when the National Assembly is not in session. All these Commonwealth Acts took eIIect upon their approval on September 30, 1939, a short time aIter the invasion oI Poland by Germany.
During the Iourth special session oI the second National Assembly, Commonwealth Act No. 600, which superseded the above-mentioned emergency power acts, was passed and took eIIect on its approval on August 19, 1940. This Act No. 600 expressly declared that the existence oI war in many parts oI the world had created a national emergency which made it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to saIeguard the integrity oI the Philippines and to insure the tranquility oI its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all supervise activities, by preventing or relieving unemployment, by insuring to the people adequate shelter and clothing and suIIicient Iood supply, etc. To carry out this policy the President was "authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the Iorce and eIIect oI law until the date oI adjournment oI the next regular session oI the National Assembly," which rules and regulations may embrace the objects therein enumerated. And the National Assembly in its regular session commencing in January, 1941, in view oI the Iact that the delegated authority granted to the President by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 500, and 600 was to terminate at the date oI the adjournment oI that regular session oI the National Assembly, passed Act No. 620 which took eIIect upon its approval on June 6, 1941, amending section 1 oI Commonwealth Act No. 600 by extending the delegated legislative authority oI the President until the date oI the adjournment oI the next regular session oI the Congress oI the Philippines, instead oI the National Assembly, the Constitution having been amended by substituting the Congress oI the Philippines Ior the National Assembly..
Although Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, provides that "the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the Iorce and eIIect oI law until the date oI adjournment oI the next regular session oI the Congress oI the Philippines," it is evident that this limitation was intended to apply, not only to the eIIectivity oI the rules and regulations already promulgated, but specially to the authority granted to the President to promulgated them, Ior the Iollowing reasons: First, because Commonwealth Act Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, and 500 had expressly limited the authority oI the President to exercise the delegated power while the Assembly was not in session until the date oI the adjournment oI the next regular session oI then National Assembly, and there was absolutely no reason whatsoever why the National Assembly, in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended, which superseded said Act, would not impose the same limitation on the authority delegated in Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended in compliance with the requirement oI the Constitution; secondly, because it would have been useless to give the rules and regulations the eIIect and Iorce oI law only until the date oI the adjournment oI the next regular session oI the Congress, iI the President might, aIter said adjournment, continue exercising his delegated legislative powers to promulgate again the same and other rules and regulations; and lastly, because to construe Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Act No. 620, otherwise would be to make the delegation not Ior a limited but Ior an indeIinite period oI time, in violation oI the express provision oI section 26, Article VI oI the Constitution.
All the above-mentioned Acts Nos. 494, 496, 499, 500, and 600 beIore its amendment show that it was the intention or policy oI the National Assembly, in delegating legislative Iunctions to the President, to limit the exercise oI the latter's authority to the interregnum while the National Assembly or Congress oI the Philippines was not in session until the date oI the adjournment oI the next regular session thereoI, which interregnum might have extended over a long period oI time had the war in Europe involved and made the Philippines a battle ground beIore the next regular session oI the Congress had convened. And the authority granted to the President oI Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended, had to be extended over a long period oI time during the occupation because, beIore the meeting oI the next regular session oI the Congress, the Philippines was involved in the war oI the United States and invaded and occupied by the Japanese Iorces. And the President was authorized to exercise his delegated powers until the date oI the adjournment oI the next regular session oI the Congress, Ior the reason that although during the next regular session a bill may be passed, by the Congress, it would not become a law until it was approved, expressly or impliedly, by the President during the period oI twenty days aIter it shall have been presented to him.
The reason oI the limitation is that iI Congress were in position to act it would not be necessary Ior it to make such legislative delegation to the President, Ior Congress may in all cases act, declare its will and, aIter Iixing a primary standard or yardstick, authorize the President to Iill up the details by prescribing administrative rules and regulations to cope with the actual conditions oI any emergency; and it is inconceivable that there may arise an emergency oI such a nature that would require immediate action and can not wait, without irreparable or great injury to the public interest, and action oI the legislative in regular or special session called by the ChieI Executive Ior the purpose oI meeting it. II in the United States they could withstand and have withstood all kinds oI emergency without resorting to the delegation by the legislative body oI legislative power to the Executive except those oI administrative nature, because no such delegation is permitted by the States and Federal constitution, as above stated, there is no reason why the same can not be done in the Philippines. The Irames oI our Constitution and the national Assembly that enacted Commonwealth Act No. 671 are presumed to be aware oI the inconvenience and chaotical consequences oI having two legislative bodies acting at one and the same time.
It is true that Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not expressly say that the President is authorized to promulgates rules and regulations until the date oI the adjournment oI the next regular session oI the National Assembly or Congress as the above-quoted Commonwealth Acts; but it is also true that it clearly provides that "pursuant to the provisions oI Article VI, section 26, oI the Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the existence oI the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared"; and that the deIinite and speciIic emergency therein reIerred to is no other that the "state oI total emergency as a result oI war involving the Philippines", declared in the title oI said Act No. 671, that was the reason Ior which the President was "authorize to promulgate rules and regulations to meet resulting emergency." It is obvious that what Act No. 671 calls "total emergency" was the invasion and occupation oI the Philippines by the enemy or Japanese Iorces which, at the time oI the passage and approval oI said Act, had already landed in Philippine soil and was expected to paralyze the Iunctioning oI the Congress during the invasion and enemy occupation oI the Philippines.
The mere existence oI the last world war in many parts oI the world which had created a national emergency made it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers was not called total emergency by Commonwealth Act Nos. 600 and 620, because it had not yet actually involved and engulIed the Philippines in the maelstrom oI war. It does not stand to reason that the authority given to the President to promulgate rules and regulations oI legislative nature by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 and 620 was to terminate at the date oI the adjournment oI the next regular session oI the Congress oI the Philippines in 1946, but those granted to the President by Commonwealth Act No. 671 under the same war emergency should continue to exist indeIinitely even aIter the Congress oI the Philippines had regularly convened, acted, and adjourned in the year 1946 and subsequent years. Besides to give such construction to Act No. 671 would make it violative oI the express provision oI section 26, Article VIII, oI the Constitution, under which said Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted, as expressly stated in said Act, and which permits the Congress to authorize the President, only Ior a limited period during a war emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry into eIIect a declared national policy.
By the special session oI the Iirst Congress oI the Philippines commencing on the 9th day oI June, 1945, called by the President Ior the purpose oI considering general legislation, Commonwealth Act No. 671 did not cease to operate. As we have already said, the emergency which prompted the second National Assembly to enact Commonwealth Act No. 671 delegating legislative powers to the President, was the inability oI Congress to convene in regular session in January oI every during the invasion oI the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Iorces. The National Assembly could not have in mind any special session which might have been called by the President immediately aIter liberation, because the calling oI a special session as well as the matters which may be submitted by the President to Congress Ior consideration is a contingent event which depend upon the possibility oI convening it and the discretion oI the President to call it, and the matters he will submit to it Ior consideration; because it is to be presumed, in order to comply with the provision oI section 26, Article VI oI the Constitution, that it was the intention oI the National Assembly to Iix a limited period, independent oI the President's will, during which he is authorized to exercise his delegated legislative power.
The object oI section 3 oI Act No. 671 in requiring the President to report "as soon as practicable upon the convening oI the Congress oI the Philippines all rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers therein granted" is to inIorm the Congress oI the contents oI said rules and regulations so that the latter may modiIy or repeal them iI it sees Iit to do so, inasmuch as, according to section 4 oI the same Act, "the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in Iorce and eIIect until the Congress shall otherwise provide." And although said section 3 does not speciIy whether in regular or special session, it is evident that it reIers to the next regular and not to the special session oI the Congress, because as a rule a special session is called to consider only speciIic matters submitted by the President to Congress Ior consideration, and it would be useless to submit such report to the Congress in special session iI the latter can not either modiIy or repeal such rules and regulations; and besides, it is to be presumed that it was the intention oI the National Assembly in enacting section 3 oI Commonwealth Act No. 671 to require the submission oI a report to the next regular session oI the Assembly or Congress, as provided in section 4 Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, which required a similar report, Ior there was absolutely no plausible reason to provide otherwise.
Our conclusion is corroborated by the Iact that section 3 oI Act No. 671 only requires the President to submit the report, "as soon as practicable upon the convening oI the Congress" and not to submit a report to the Congress every time it convenes, in order to inIorm the Congress thereoI so that the latter may modiIy or repeal any or all oI them, Ior under section 4 oI the same Act "such rules and regulations shall continue in Iorce and eIIect until the Congress shall otherwise provide." It is obvious that the convening oI the Congress reIerred to in said section 3 is the next regular session oI the Congress aIter the passage oI Act No. 671, and not any other subsequent session; because, otherwise, it would not have required that it shall be submitted to the Congress as soon as practicable and the purpose oI the law already stated in requiring the submission oI the report would be deIeated; and iI it were the intention oI said Commonwealth Act No. 671 to authorize the President to continue promulgating rules and regulations aIter the next regular session oI the Congress, it would have required the President to submit to the Congress each and every time it convenes a report oI the rules and regulations promulgated aIter his previous reports had been submitted.
Furthermore, our conclusion is conIirmed by the legislative interpretation give to Commonwealth Act No. 671 by the same Congress in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 728 which took eIIect on July 2, 1946, authorizing the President to regulate, control, curtail, and prohibit the exploration oI agricultural or industrial products, merchandise, articles, materials and supplies without the permit oI the President until December 31, 1948 as expressly provided in section 4 thereoI, because it would not have been necessary Ior the Congress to promulgate said Act No. 728 iI the President had authority to promulgate Executive Order No. 62 in question on January 1, 1949, under Commonwealth Act No. 671 as contended by the respondents; and Republic Act No. 51, approved on October 4, 1946, authorizing within one year the diIIerent executive departments, business, oIIices, agencies and other instrumentalities oI the government, including corporations controlled by it, would not have been passed by the Congress iI Commonwealth Act No. 671 under consideration was then still in Iorce, Ior section 2 (b) and (c) oI said Act No. 671 authorizes the President to reorganize the Government and to create new subdivisions, branches, department oIIices, agencies or instrumentalities oI government, and to abolish any oI those already existing.
REPUTATION
There is no Iorce in the argument that the executive orders in question are not valid, not because the promulgation oI the acts above mentioned and oI Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by the Republic Act No. 66 on rentals, the appropriation acts or Republic Act Nos. 1, 156, and 320 Ior the years 1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49, and oI the Republic Acts Nos. 73, 147, and 235 appropriating public Iinds to deIray the expenses Ior the elections held in 1947 and 1948, shows that the emergency powers granted by Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to exist, but because Congress "has shown by their enactment its readiness and ability to legislate on those matters, and had withdrawn it Irom the realm oI presidential legislation or regulations under the powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671." II the Congress was ready and able to legislate on those matters since 1946 and Ior that reason the executive orders herein involved are null and void, there is no valid reason Ior not concluding that the emergency powers oI the President has ceased to exist it did not, legislate on all matters on which the President was granted and delegated power to legislate by the Commonwealth Act No. 671. And iI Commonwealth Act No. 671 continues to be in Iorce and eIIect in so Iar as it grants delegated legislative powers to the President and declares the national policy to be carried out by the rules and regulations the President is authorize to promulgate, the mere promulgation oI the acts above described can not be considered as an implied repeal or withdrawal oI the authority oI the President to promulgates rules and regulations only on those matters, and the adoption oI a contrary policy by the Congress, because implied repeal is not Iavored in statutory construction, and the national policy reIerred to in section 26, Article VIII oI the Constitution is to be declared by the Congress in delegating the legislative powers to the President, in order to establish the standard to be carried out by him in exercising his delegated Iunctions, and not in repealing said powers.
As we have already said, section 26, Article VI oI the Constitution expressly empowers Congress, in times oI war and other national emergency, to authorize the President to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy, and thereIore it is Ior the National Assembly to determine the existence oI a particular emergency declare the national policy, and authorize the President to promulgate rules and regulations oI legislative nature to carry out that policy. As the Commonwealth Act No. 671 that the existence oI war between the United States and other countries oI Europe and Asia which involves the Philippines is the emergency which made it necessary Ior the National Assembly to invest the President with extraordinary powers to promulgate rules and regulations to meet the resulting emergency Irom the actual existence oI that war which involved the Philippines, the President cannot, under said Act No. 671, determine the existence oI any other emergency, such as the state oI cold war, the continued military occupation oI the enemy country, and the economic and political instability throughout the world, cited by the respondents, and promulgate rules and regulations to meet the emergency; because obviously it is not Ior the delegate but Ior the delegation to say when and under what circumstances the Iormer may act in behalI oI the latter, and not vice-versa.
The theory oI those who are oI the opinion that the President may determine "whether the emergency which on December 16, 1941, prompted the approval oI Commonwealth Act No. 671 delegating extraordinary powers to the President, still existed at the time the ChieI Executive exercised those powers," is predicated upon the erroneous assumption that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 contemplated any other emergency not expressly mentioned in said Commonwealth Act. This assumption or premise is obviously wrong. Section 1 oI said Act No. 671 expressly states that "the existence oI the war between the United States and other countries oI Europe and Asia which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary power in order to meet the resulting emergency." That is the war emergency. Ant it is evident, and thereIore no evidence is requires to prove, that the existence oI the war which involved the Philippines had already ceased beIore the promulgation oI the executive orders in question, or at least, iI the last war has not yet technically terminated in so Iar as the United States is concerned, it did no longer involve the Republic oI the Philippines since the inauguration oI our Republic or independence Irom the sovereignty oI the United States.
It is untenable to contend that the words "resulting emergency Irom the existence oI the war" as used in section 1 oI Commonwealth Act No. 671 should be construed to mean any emergency resulting Irom or that is the eIIect oI the last war, and not the war emergency itselI, and that thereIore it is Ior the President to determine whether at the time oI the promulgation oI the executive orders under consideration such emergency still existed, because such contention would make Act No. 671 unconstitutional or violative oI the provisions oI section 26, Article VI oI the Constitution. This constitutional precept distinguishes war emergency Irom any other national emergency, such as an economic depression and others which may be the eIIect oI a war, and empowers the Congress in times oI war and other national emergency, to be determined by Congress itselI as we have already said and shown, to authorize the President, Ior a limited period that may short or oI the same duration but not longer than that oI the emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the policy declared by the Congress in order to meet the emergency. To construe Commonwealth Act No. 671 as contended would be to leave the determination oI the existence oI the emergency to the discretion oI the President, because the eIIects oI the war such as those enumerated by the respondents are not determined or stated in said Act and could not have been Ioreseen by the Assembly in enacting said Act; and because it would make the delegation oI powers Ior an in deIinite period, since such an emergency may or may not become depression, eIIect oI the Iirst world war, took place in the year 1929, or about ten years aIter the cessation oI hostilities in the year 1919; and by no stretch oI imagination or intellectual gymnastics may the Iailure oI the Congress to appropriate Iunds Ior the operation oI the Government during the period Irom July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and to deIray the expenses in connection with the holding oI the national election on the second Tuesday oI November, 1949, be considered as an emergency resulting Irom the last war.
In the enactment oI emergency police measures, the questions as to whether an emergency exists is primarily Ior the legislature to determine. Such determination, although entitled to great respect, is not conclusive because the courts, in such cases, posses the Iinal authority to determine whether an emergency in Iact exists. (American Jurisprudence, Vol. XI, page 980.).
No case decided by the courts oI last resort in the United States may be cited in support oI the proposition that it is Ior the President to determine whether there exist an emergency in order to exercise his emergency powers, and "it is not Ior the judiciary to review the Iinding oI the Executive in this regard." There is none and there cannot be any. Because, as we have already stated at the beginning oI this opinion, and we are supported by the above quotation Irom American Jurisprudence, the power to pass emergency police legislation in the United States may be exercised only by the legislature in the exercise oI the police power oI the State, and it can not be delegated to the Executive because there is no provision in the State and Federal constitutions authorizing such delegation as we have in section 26, Article VI, oI our Constitution. As we have already said beIore, the only legislative power which may be delegated to the Executive and other administrative bodies or oIIicers in the United States is the power to promulgate rules and regulations oI administrative nature, which does not include the exercise oI the police power oI the State.
The ruling laid down by the United States Supreme Court in the case oI Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 Law ed., 1883, quoted by the respondents and dissenters in support oI the proposition that "only in case oI a maniIest abuse oI the exercise oI powers by a political branch oI the government is judicial interIerence allowable in order to maintain the supremacy oI the Constitution," has no application to the present case; because the question involved in the present case is not a political but a justiciable question, while the question in issue in said Ludecke case was the power oI the court to review "the determination oI the President in the postwar period that an alien enemy should be deported, even though active hostilities have ceased," and it was held that it was a political question and, thereIore, was not subject to judicial review.
CONCLUSION
In view oI all the Ioregoing, we have to conclude and declare that the executive orders promulgated by the President under Commonwealth Act 671 beIore the date oI the adjournment oI the regular session oI the Congress on the Philippines in 1946 are valid, because said Commonwealth Act was then still in Iorce; but the executive orders promulgated aIter the said date are null and void, because Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to be in Iorce in so Iar as the delegation oI powers was concerned. ThereIore, are null and void the Executive Order No. 192 promulgated on December 24, 1948, on the control oI exports Irom the Philippines; the Executive Order No. 225 dated June 15, 1949, appropriating Iunds Ior the operation oI the Government oI the Republic oI the Philippines during the period Irom July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950; and the Executive Order No. 226 promulgated on June 15, 1949, appropriating the sum oI six million pesos to deIray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the holding oI the national election to be held on the second Tuesday oI November, 1949.
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II oI the City Court oI Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners, vs. MANUEL ALBA, Minister oI Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister oI Justice, Respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility oI passing upon the validity oI any executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue oI the constitutionality oI Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds ThereIor and Ior Other Purposes." The task oI judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative power, that oI judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle oI the independence oI the judiciary 2 as protected and saIeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members oI the Supreme Court and judges oI inIerior courts shall hold oIIice during good behavior until they reach the age oI seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties oI their oIIice. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges oI inIerior courts and, by a vote oI at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges oI inIerior courts Irom the Court oI Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants oI the Sandiganbayan and the Court oI Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inIerior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated Irom the judiciary. It is the termination oI their incumbency that Ior petitioners justiIies a suit oI this character, it being alleged that thereby the security oI tenure provision oI the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded,
That is the Iundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition Ior Declaratory RelieI and/or Ior Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action Ior prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister oI the Budget, respondent Chairman oI the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister oI Justice Irom taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack oI good Iaith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation oI legislative power to the President his authority to Iix the compensation and allowances oI the Justices and judges thereaIter appointed and the determination oI the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer oI Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justiIication Ior the attack on the constitutionality oI this statute, it being a legitimate exercise oI the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations oI absence oI good Iaith as well as the attack on the independence oI the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid oI any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise Iiled on October 8, 1981, Iollowed by a Reply oI petitioners on October 13. AIter the hearing in the morning and aIternoon oI October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and thereaIter submission oI the minutes oI the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted Ior decision.
The importance oI the crucial question raised called Ior intensive and rigorous study oI all the legal aspects oI the case. AIter such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange oI views being supplemented by memoranda Irom the members oI the Court, it is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack oI standing oI petitioners is easily resolved. As Iar as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly Ialls within the principle set Iorth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity oI a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result oI its enIorcement." 9 The other petitioners as members oI the bar and oIIicers oI the court cannot be considered as devoid oI "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt Irom a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on the standing oI petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter oI the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public oIIicials staying on the path oI constitutionalism. As was so well put by JaIIe: 'The protection oI private rights is an essential constituent oI public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no enIorcement oI private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects oI the totality oI the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat Irom the liberal approach Iollowed in Pascual v. Secretary oI Public Works, Ioreshadowed by the very decision oI People v. Vera where the doctrine was Iirst Iully discussed, iI we act diIIerently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to aIIord any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the language oI a bygone era even in the United States. For as ChieI Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case oI Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up iI not breached has deIinitely been lowered." 11
2. The imputation oI arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment oI Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack oI good Iaith does maniIest violence to the Iacts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in inIorming themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid themselves open to the accusation oI reckless disregard Ior the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 oI that year. It clearly speciIied the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall Iormulate plans on the reorganization oI the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days Irom August 7, 1980 to provide the President suIIicient options Ior the reorganization oI the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court oI Appeals, the Courts oI First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the Iollowing Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation Ior the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means Ior what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring oI the judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call Ior remedial measures. The Ielt necessities oI the time, to borrow a phrase Irom Holmes, admit oI no delay, Ior iI no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's Iaith in the administration oI justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater eIIiciency in the disposition oI cases and that litigants, especially those oI modest means much more so, the poorest and the humblest can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the Iairness in the way the courts operate must be maniIest to all members oI the community and particularly to those whose interests are aIIected by the exercise oI their Iunctions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itselI and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point Ior an institutional reIorm in the Philippine judiciary. The experience oI the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inIerior courts, Irom the Court oI Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as training oI judges Ior more eIIicient administration does not suIIice. I hence, to repeat, there is need Ior a major reIorm in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the Iirst oI its kind since the Judiciary Act became eIIective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit oI doubt that the last two decades oI this century are likely to be attended with problems oI even greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing Ior recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged, have Iound legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more Iormidable. For so much grist is added to the mills oI justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need Ior an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search Ior solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and satisIactory. Only thus may there be continued national progress." 15 AIter which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly stressed and rightly so. All eIIorts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in terms oI sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes Iurther than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization oI social and economic opportunities, the substantiation oI the true meaning oI social justice." 17 This process oI modernization and change compels the government to extend its Iield oI activity and its scope oI operations. The eIIorts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call Ior more regulatory legislation. That way the social justice and protection to labor mandates oI the Constitution could be eIIectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely aIIected would be challenged in court on grounds oI validity. Even iI the question does not go that Iar, suits may be Iiled concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas Ior injunction or restraining orders. Lack oI success oI such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt Iinal disposition. Thus delay in the execution oI the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally oI vital concern is the problem oI clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one oI the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined eIIorts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership oI both retired ChieI Justice Querube Makalintal and the late ChieI Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, Irom the time supervision oI the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the growth oI population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar Iactors, the judiciary is called upon much oItener to resolve controversies. Thus conIronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls Ior a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, beIore the ailment became even worse. Time was oI the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindIul, as it ought to be, oI the extent oI its coverage beIore enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, thereIore, the need Ior "institutional reIorms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization oI such scope, iI it were to take place, would be the most thorough aIter Iour generations. 22 The reIerence was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June oI 1901, 23 amended in a signiIicant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, oI course, the creation oI the Court oI Appeals in 1935, originally composed "oI a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President oI the Philippines, with the consent oI the Commission on Appointments oI the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one oI six and another oI Iive Judges, to transact business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years aIter the establishment oI independence oI the Republic oI the Philippines, the Judiciary Act oI 1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing system oI regular inIerior courts, namely, the Court oI Appeals, Courts oI First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice oI the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership oI the Court oI Appeals has been continuously increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be Iorty-Iive members, a Presiding Justice and Iorty-Iour Associate Justices, with IiIteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The Iirst was the Court oI Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court oI Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court oI the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Ior Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently Iollowed by the creation oI two other such courts Ior Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same qualiIications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges oI Courts oI First Instance. 34
4. AIter the submission oI such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis oI Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. AIter setting Iorth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been draIted in accordance with the guidelines oI that report with particular attention to certain objectives oI the reorganization, to wit, the attainment oI more eIIiciency in disposal oI cases, a reallocation oI jurisdiction, and a revision oI procedures which do not tend to the proper meeting out oI justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus oI, the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was Ielt that some options set Iorth in the Report be not availed oI. Instead oI the proposal to conIine the jurisdiction oI the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preIerence has been opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to eIIectively assist the Supreme Court. This preIerence has been translated into one oI the innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman oI the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was reIerred. ThereaIter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech oI Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reIerence to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines Ior Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was draIted substantially in accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options set Iorth in the aIoresaid report were not availed oI upon consultation with and upon consensus oI the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was reIerred, Iollowing the public hearings on the bill held in December oI 1980. The hearings consisted oI dialogues with the distinguished members oI the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation oI the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment oI such Cabinet Bill would, Iirstly, result in the attainment oI more eIIiciency in the disposal oI cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality oI justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence oI the easing oI the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation oI jurisdiction and the revision oI the rules oI procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies oI the present day Philippine society, and hopeIully, oI the Ioreseeable Iuture." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the minutes oI the proceedings oI the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and eIIort as well as exhaustive study beIore the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it becomes quite maniIest how lacking in Iactual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice oI arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good Iaith that characterized its enactment Irom its inception to the aIIixing oI the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition oI an oIIice within the competence oI a legitimate body iI done in good Iaith suIIers Irom no inIirmity. The ponencia oI Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine: "We Iind this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation oI petitioners Irom the service is here involved, but the validity oI the abolition oI their oIIices. This is a legal issue that is Ior the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition oI oIIices is neither removal nor separation oI the incumbents. ... And, oI course, iI the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold oIIice. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits oI the case. As well- settled as the rule that the abolition oI an oIIice does not amount to an illegal removal oI its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good Iaith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the oIIices in the other branches oI the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good Iaith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment oI Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack oI merit oI this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring opinion oI Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding Iiled by petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled to he oIIice oI judge oI the FiIth Branch oI the Court oI First Instance oI Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year aIter the inauguration oI the Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts oI original jurisdiction known as the Courts oI First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent oI such branch. ThereaIter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation. UnIortunately Ior him, the Commission on Appointments oI then National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity oI the Act insoIar as it resulted in his being Iorced to vacate his position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground oI estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence oI Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaIIirms in no uncertain terms the standard oI good Iaith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition oI an inIerior court, with due recognition oI the security oI tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am oI the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so Iar as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces oI Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion Ilows Irom the Iundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inIerior to the Supreme Court and thereIore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII oI the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to deIine, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction oI the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case oI the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 oI the same article oI the Constitution provides Ior the security oI tenure oI all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections oI the same article oI the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation oI a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies oI every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to deIeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security oI tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view oI Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion oI Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application oI a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily Iactual and circumstantial and that Iixity oI principle is the rigidity oI the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation oI the constitutional provision regarding security oI tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power oI reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case oI that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer Iall and heavily. But not until then. I am satisIied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the IulIillment oI what was considered a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to aIIect adversely the tenure oI judges or oI any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am Ior sustaining the power oI the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity Ior reorganization consequent upon the establishment oI the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the deIunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case oI these two Acts there was an express provision providing Ior the vacation by the judges oI their oIIices whereas in the case oI Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be resolved in Iavor oI the valid exercise oI the legislative power." 45
6. A Iew more words on the question oI abolition. In the above-cited opinion oI Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reIerence was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization oI the Courts oI First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization oI all branches oI the government, including the courts oI Iirst instance. In both oI them, the then Courts oI First Instance were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the Iact oI abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system oI the courts oI Iirst instance was provided Ior expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation oI an entirely new district oI the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion Ilowing "Irom the Iundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inIerior to the Supreme Court and thereIore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts oI the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less reason then to doubt the Iact that existing inIerior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment oI such new inIerior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed Ior solution. Certainly, there could be diIIerences oI opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was Ior the Batasan to make, not Ior this Court, which deals only with the question oI power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Eage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si eIectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 aos de edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su Iacultad de abolir, Iusionar o reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter oI Tacloban City creating a city court in place oI the Iormer justice oI the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de Iorma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged statute was not within the bounds oI legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation oI Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions aIIecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope oI the assailed legislation as Iar as all inIerior courts Irom the Courts oI Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely oI the Sandiganbayan and the Court oI Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its eIIect on such cherished Ideal. The Iirst paragraph oI the section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions oI this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court oI Appeals, the Courts oI First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts oI Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to Iunction as presently constituted and organized, until the completion oI the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereoI shall cease to hold the oIIice." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to inquire Iurther into the allegation by petitioners that the security oI tenure provision, an assurance oI a judiciary Iree Irom extraneous inIluences, is thereby reduced to a barren Iorm oI words. The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition oI a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work oI Iormer Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto oI the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept, categorically spoke oI providing "an executive power which, subject to the Iiscalization oI the Assembly, and oI public opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a Iirm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interIerences by other departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be aIIirmed that once again the principle oI separation oI powers, to quote Irom the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but by actual division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head oI state and chieI executive oI the Republic oI the Philippines." 65 Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise." 66 Article VII oI the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a President oI the Philippines." 67 As originally Iramed, the 1973 Constitution created the position oI President as the "symbolic head oI state." 68 In addition, there was a provision Ior a Prime Minister as the head oI government exercising the executive power with the assistance oI the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modiIied parliamentary system was established. In the light oI the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister oI Labor 70 could state: "The adoption oI certain aspects oI a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character." 71 The retention, however, oI the position oI the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority oI the members oI which shall come Irom the regional representatives oI the Batasang Pambansa and the creation oI an Executive Committee composed oI the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than Iourteen other members at least halI oI whom shall be members oI the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature oI the system oI government that is now operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its Iull authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually Iormulated in a caucus oI the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transIerring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence oI the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a Iusion between the executive and the legislative branches." 74
8. To be more speciIic, petitioners contend that the abolition oI the existing inIerior courts collides with the security oI tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 oI the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as Iar as conIerring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inIerior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges oI inIerior courts and, by a vote oI at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, oI course, to be distinguished Irom termination by virtue oI the abolition oI the oIIice. There can be no tenure to a non-existent oIIice. AIter the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case oI removal, there is an oIIice with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that Irom the standpoint oI strict law, the question oI any impairment oI security oI tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, Ior the incumbents oI inIerior courts abolished, the eIIect is one oI separation. As to its eIIect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition oI the oIIice. Realistically, it is devoid oI signiIicance. He ceases to be a member oI the judiciary. In the implementation oI the assailed legislation, thereIore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles oI constitutional construction that as Iar as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the Iullest consideration. No Iear need be entertained that there is a Iailure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question oI law is involved. II such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either oI the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way oI deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands oI the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure thereIore Irom the tried and tested ways oI judicial power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise oI the conceded power oI reorganizing tulle inIerior courts, the power oI removal oI the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be Iree Irom any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice oI alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the Iormer is to be preIerred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and Iorms part oI every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuez v. Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections oI the Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As oI now, however, no ruling is called Ior. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion oI Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree Irom the direct Iate oI invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itselI Ior approval." 80 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, speciIically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions oI this Decree through implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that inIorms it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test oI constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be speciIic, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inIerior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination oI oIIice oI their occupants, as a necessary consequence oI such abolition, is hardly distinguishable Irom the practical standpoint Irom removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is oI the essence oI constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded Irom acting within the boundaries oI its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task oI reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deIt strokes and in bold lines, allotment oI power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments oI the government, the overlapping and interlacing oI Iunctions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves oII and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic utterance Irom the same jurist, even more emphatic in its aIIirmation oI such a view, moreover buttressed by one oI those insights Ior which Holmes was so Iamous "The classical separation oI government powers, whether viewed in the light oI the political philosophy oI Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or oI the postulations oI Mabini, Madison, or JeIIerson, is a relative theory oI government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation oI powers, Ior as observed by Justice Holmes in a case oI Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water- tight compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances oI the Constitution do not establish and divide Iields oI black and white but also because 'even the more speciIic oI them are Iound to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually Irom one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too Irom Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with Iorce and clarity why the need Ior reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the Iundamental principle oI separation oI powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings oI governmental Iunctions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities oI governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation oI right versus right, there are instances, and this is one oI them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case oI power against power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no diIIiculty. Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation oI legislative power to the President the grant oI authority to Iix the compensation and the allowances oI the Justices and judges thereaIter appointed. A more careIul reading oI the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language oI the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as Iollows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set Iorth in Letter oI Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence oI a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine oI non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness oI the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint oI unlawIul delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itselI determines matters oI principle and lays down Iundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge oI complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus deIines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and speciIies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be eIIected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. ThereaIter, the executive or administrative oIIice designated may in pursuance oI the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. II the Iormer, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out speciIically. It could be implied Irom the policy and purpose oI the act considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments under the amended Constitution assure that the Iraming oI policies as well as their implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and eIIiciency. There is accuracy, thereIore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption oI such means as may be necessary to eIIectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, ProIessor JaIIe, as early as 1947, could speak oI delegation as the 'dynamo oI modern government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent Iactor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this point Irom the same opinion" "The spectre oI the non-delegation concept need not haunt, thereIore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another objection based on the absence in the statue oI what petitioners reIer to as a "deIinite time Irame limitation" is equally bereIt oI merit. They ignore the categorical language oI this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days Irom the date oI the eIIectivity oI this act, a staIIing pattern Ior all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis oI the implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding section." 93 The Iirst sentence oI the next section is even more categorical: "The provisions oI this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be IaithIully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing inIerior courts aIIected continue Iunctioning as beIore, "until the completion oI the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereoI shall cease to hold oIIice." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents oI the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold oIIice." No Iear need be entertained by incumbents whose length oI service, quality oI perIormance, and clean record justiIy their being named anew, 97 in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity oI their service. 98 It is equally reasonable to assume that Irom the ranks oI lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law proIessors will come the new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal oI whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not Irom their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaIIirmation oI the good Iaith that will characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation oI Justice Holmes that even acceptance oI the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualiIied as earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional Ilaw
11. On the morning oI the hearing oI this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer oI this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and AmeurIina Melencio-Herrera disqualiIied because the Iirst-named was the chairman and the other two, members oI the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one oI the three members oI the Court had any hand in the Iraming or in the discussion oI Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testiIy. The challenged legislation is entirely the product oI the eIIorts oI the legislative body. 100 Their work was limited, as set Iorth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan Ior reorganization. That is more in the nature oI scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inIorm itselI as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection oI the writer oI this opinion that either the then Chairman or members oI the Committee on Justice oI the then Senate oI the Philippines 101 consulted members oI the Court in draIting proposed legislation aIIecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt Irom an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the ChieI Justice oI the United States has played a leading part in judicial reIorm. A variety oI conditions have been responsible Ior the development oI this role, and Ioremost among them has been the creation oI explicit institutional structures designed to Iacilitate reIorm." 102 Also: "Thus the ChieI Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reIorm at the Iederal level and, to the extent issues oI judicial Iederalism arise, at the state level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article oI Iaith oI our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public oIIicials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not Ior their own beneIit but Ior the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language oI ambiguity: "A public oIIice is a public trust." 104 That is more than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public oIIicial certain rights. It does so to enable them to perIorm his Iunctions and IulIill his responsibilities more eIIiciently. It is Irom that standpoint that the security oI tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any Iear oI reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge oI the law and the dictates oI their conscience, Iree Irom the corrupting inIluence oI base or unworthy motives. The independence oI which they are assured is impressed with a signiIicance transcending that oI a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely Ior their welIare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack oI due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion oI that Ideal so Iirmly embedded in the national consciousness There is this Iarther thought to consider. independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by Iormer ChieI Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary oI Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee oI judicial independence than the God-given character and Iitness oI those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a Iixed tenure oI oIIice during good behavior, but iI they are oI such stuII as allows them to be subservient to one administration aIter another, or to cater to the wishes oI one litigant aIter another, the independence oI the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are conIident, can be oI the type oI Lord Coke, regardless or in spite oI the power oI Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised to reorganize inIerior courts." 106 That is to recall one oI the greatest Common Law jurists, who at the cost oI his oIIice made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes |him| as a judge." So it was pointed out in the Iirst leading case stressing the independence oI the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia oI Justice Malcolm IdentiIied good judges with "men who have a mastery oI the principles oI law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perIorm the duties oI the oIIice undeterred by outside inIluence, and who are independent and selI-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments oI government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the Iailure oI this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration oI justice. It does not Iollow that the abolition in good Iaith oI the existing inIerior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court oI Tax Appeals and the creation oI new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any Iear that less than good Iaith will attend the exercise be oI the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and eIIicient judiciary is something to the credit oI any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the Iundamental principle oI separation oI powers assumes, and justiIiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to IulIilling the hopes oI the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement oI Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost halI a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian oI constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly conIine its own sphere oI inIluence to the powers expressly or by implication conIerred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality oI Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I join the majority oI my brethren in voting that the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is not unconstitutional as a whole nor in any oI its parts.
The issue oI unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44 oI the Act which reads as Iollows:
SEC. 44. Transitory provisions. The provisions oI this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court oI Appeals, the Courts oI First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts oI Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to Iunction as presently constituted and organized, until the completion oI the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereoI shall cease to hold oIIice. The cases pending in the old Courts shall e transIerred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent Iunctions, records, equipment,. property and the necessary personnel.
The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transIerred to the appropriate courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary Irom the Iunds Ior organizational changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said Iunding shall thereaIter be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which mandates that "upon the declaration upon the President that the reorganization contemplated in the Act has been completed), the said courts (meaning the Court oI Appeals and all other lower courts, except the Sandiganbayan and the Court oI Tax Appeals) shall be deemed abolished and the incumbents thereoI shall cease to hold oIIice" trenches on all the constitutional saIeguards and guarantees oI the independence oI the judiciary, such as the security oI tenure oI its members (Section 7, Article X oI the Philippine Constitution oI 1973), the prerogatives oI the Supreme Court to administratively supervise all courts and the personnel thereoI (Section 6, Id.) and principally, the power oI the Supreme Court "to discipline judges oI inIerior courts and, by a vote oI at least eight Members, order their dismissal. " (Section 7, Id.)
On the other hand, respondents maintain that thru the above-quoted Section 44. the Batasan did nothing more than to exercise the authority conIerred upon it be Section I oI the same Article oI the Constitution which provides that The Judicial power shall be rested in one Supreme Court and in such inIerior courts as may be established by law." In other words, since all inIerior courts are, constitutionally speaking, mere creatures oI the law (oI the legislature it Iollows that it is within the legislature's power to abolish or reorganize them even iI in so doing, it might result in the cessation Irom oIIice oI the incumbents thereoI beIore the expiration oI their respective constitutionally Iixed tenures. Respondents emphasize that the legislative power in this respect is broad and indeed plenary.
Viewing the problem beIore Us Irom the above perspectives, it would appear that our task is either (1) to reconcile, on the one hand, the parliament's power oI abolition and reorganization with, on the other, the security oI tenure oI members oI the judiciary and the Supreme Court's authority to discipline and remove judges or (2) to declare that either the power oI the Supreme Court or oI the Batasan is more paramount than that oI the other. I believe. however, that such a manner oI looking at the issue that conIronts Us only conIuses and compounds the task We are called upon to perIorm. For how can there be a satisIactory and rational reconciliation oI the pretended right oI a judge to continue as such, when the position occupied by him no longer exists? To suggest, as some do, that the solution is Ior the court he is sitting in not to be deemed abolished or that he should in some way be allowed to continue to Iunction as judge until his constitutional tenure expires is obviously impractical, iI only because we would then have the absurd spectacle oI a judiciary with old and new courts Iunctioning under distinct set-ups, such as a district court continuing as such in a region where the other judges are regional judges or oI judges exercising powers not purely judicial which is oIIensive to the Constitution. The other suggestion that the incumbent oI the abolished court should be deemed appointed to the corresponding new court is even worse, since it would deprive the appointing authority, the president, oI the power to make his own choices and would, Iurthermore, amount to an appointment by legislation which is a Constitutional anachronism. more on this point later .
Inasmuch as pursuant to the analysis oI the majority oI the Members oI this Court, in Iact and in law, the structure oI judicial system created by Batas Pambansa 129 is substantially diIIerent Irom that under the Judiciary Act oI 1948, as amended, hence the courts now existing are actually being abolished, why do We have to indulge in any reconciliation or Ieel bound to determine whose power, that oI the Batasang Pambansa or that oI this Court, should be considered more imperious? It being conceded that the power to create or establish carries with it the power to abolish, and it is a legal axiom, or at least a pragmatic reality that the tenure oI the holder oI an oIIice must oI necessity end when his oIIice no longer exists, as I see it, be have no alternative than to hold that petitioners' invocation oI the independence oI the judiciary principle oI the Constitution is unavailing ill the cases at bar. It is as simple as that. I might hasten to add, in this connection, that to insist that what Batas Pambansa 129 is doing is just a renaming and not a substantial and actual modiIication or alteration oI the present judicial structure or system assuming a close scrutiny might somehow support such a conclusion, is pure wishIul thinking, it being explicitly and unequivocally provided in the section in question that said courts are deemed abolished" and Iurther, as iI to make it most unmistakably emphatic, that "the incumbents thereat shall cease to hold oIIice." Dura les, sed les. As a matter oI Iact, I cannot conceive oI a more emphatic way oI maniIesting and conveying the determined legislative intent about it.
Now, why am I yielding to the above reasoning and conclusion? Why don't I insist on championing the cause oI the independence oI the judiciary by maintaining that the constitutional saIeguards thereoI I have already enumerated earlier must be respected in any reorganization ordained by the parliament My answer is simple. Practically all the Members oI the Court concede that what is contemplated is not only general reorganization but abolition in other words, not only a rearrangement or remodelling oI the old structure but a total demolition thereoI to be Iollowed by the building oI a new and diIIerent one. I am practically alone in contemplating a diIIerent view. True, even iI I should appear as shouting in the wilderness, I would still make myselI a hero in the eyes oI man justices and judges, members oI the bar and concerned discerning citizens, all lovers oI the judicial independence, but understandably, I should not be, as I am not, disposed to play such a role virtually at the expense not only oI my distinguished colleagues but oI the Batasang Pambansa that Iramed the law and, most oI all, the President who signed and, thereIore, sanctioned the Act as it is, unless I am absolutely sure that my position is Iormidable, unassailable and beyond all possible contrary ratiocination, which I am not certain oI, as I shall demonstrate anon.
To start with, the jurisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the question now beIore Us cannot be said to be clear and consistent, much less unshakeable and indubitably deIinite either way. None oI the local cases 1 relied upon and discussed by the parties and by the Members oI the Court during the deliberations, such as Borromeo, 2 Ocampo, 3 Zandueta, 4 Brillo, 5 etc. can, to my mind, really serve as reliable pole stars that could lead me to certainty oI correctness.
OI course, my instinct and passion Ior an independent judiciary are uncompromising and beyond diminution. Indeed, my initial reactions, publicly known, about Batas Pambansa 129 explaining academically its apparent tendency to invade the areas oI authority oI the Supreme Court, not to speak oI its dangerously impairing the independence oI the judiciary, must have, I imagine, created the impression that I would vote to declare the law unconstitutional. But, during the deliberations oI the Court, the combined wisdom oI my learned colleagues was something I could not discount or just brush aside. Pondering and thinking deeper about all relevant Iactors, I have come to the conviction that at least on this day and hour there are justiIiable grounds to uphold the Act, iI only to try how it will operate so that thereby the people may see that We are one with the President and the Batasan in taking what appear to be immediate steps needed to relieve the people Irom a Iast spreading cancer in the judiciary oI our country.
Besides, the Philippines has somehow not yet returned to complete normalcy The improved national discipline so evident during the earlier days oI martial law, has declined at a quite discernible degree. DiIIerent sectors oI society are demanding urgent reIorms in their respective Iield And about the most vehement and persistent, loud and clear, among their gripes, which as a matter oI Iact is common to all oI them is that about the deterioration in the quality oI perIormance oI the judges manning our courts and the slow and dragging pace oI pending judicial proceedings. Strictly speaking, this is, to be sure, something that may not necessarily be related to lack oI independence oI the judiciary. It has more to do with the ineptness and/or corruption among and corruptibility oI the men sitting in the courts in some parts oI the country And what is worse, while in the communities concerned the malady is known to Iactually exist and is actually graver and widespread, very Iew, iI any individuals or even associations and organized groups, truly incensed and anxious to be oI help, have the courage and possess the requisite legal evidence to come out and Iile the corresponding charges with the Supreme Court, And I am not vet reIerring to similar situations that are not quite openly known but nevertheless just as deleterious. On the other hand, iI all these intolerable instances should actually be Iormally brought to the Supreme Court, it would be humanly impossible Ior the Court to dispose oI them with desirable dispatch, what with the thousands oI other cases it has to attend to and the rather cumbersome strict requirements oI procedural due process it has to observe in each and every such administrative case all oI which are time consulting. Verily, under the Ioregoing circumstances, it may be said that there is justiIication Ior the patience oI the people about the possibility oI early eradication oI this disease or evil in our judiciary pictured above to be nearing the breaking point.
Withal, we must bear in mind that judicial reorganization becomes urgent and inevitable not alone because oI structural inadequacies oI the system or oI the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in Iorce, but also when it becomes evident that a good number oI those occupying positions in the judiciary, make a mockery oI justice and take advantage oI their oIIice Ior selIish personal ends and yet, as already explained, those in authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation under existing laws and rules. It is my personal assessment oI the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be oI necessity two-pronged, as I have just indicated, Ior the most Ideal judicial system with the most perIect procedural rules cannot satisIy the people and the interests oI justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character, competence and sense oI loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to an temptations oI graIt and corruption, including the usual importunings and the Iearsome albeit improper pressures oI the powers that be. I am certain that the Filipino people Ieel happy that Batas Pambansa 129 encompasses both oI these objectives, which indeed are aligned with the Ioundation oI the principle oI independence oI the judiciary.
The above premises considered, I have decided to tackle our problem Irom the viewpoint oI the unusual situation in which our judiciary is presently perilously situated. Needless to say, to all oI us, the Members oI the Court, the constitutional guarantees oI security oI tenure and removal only by the Supreme Court, among others, against impairment oI the independence oI the judiciary, which is one oI the bedrock's and, thereIore, oI the essence in any "democracy under a regime oI justice, peace, liberty and equality (Preamble oI the 1973 Constitution), are priceless and should be deIended, most oI all by the Supreme Court, with all the wisdom and courage God has individually endowed to each oI Us. Withal, we are all conscious oI the Iact that those saIeguards have never been intended to place the person oI the judge in a singular position oI privilege and untouchability, but rather, that they are essentially part and parcel oI what is required oI an independent judiciary where judges can decide cases and do justice to everyone beIore them ruat caelum. However, We Iind Ourselves Iace to Iace with a situation, in our judiciary which is oI emergency proportions and to insist on rationalizing how those guarantees should be enIorced under such a circumstance seem to be diIIicult, aside Irom being controversial. And so, in a real sense, We have to make a choice between adhering to the strictly legalistic reasoning pursued by petitioners, on the one hand, and the broader and more practical approach, which as I have said is within the spirit at least oI the Constitution.
My concept oI the Constitution is that it is not just a cluster oI high sounding verbiages spelling purely Idealism and nobility in the recognition oI human dignity, protection oI individual liberties and providing security and promotion oI the general welIare under a government oI laws. With all emphasis and vehemence, I say that the Iundamental law oI the land is a living instrument which translates and adapts itselI to the demands oI obtaining circumstances. It is written Ior all seasons, except Ior very unusual instances that human ratiocination cannot justiIy to be contemplated by its language even iI read in its broadest sense and in the most liberal way. Verily, it is paramount and supreme in peace and in war, but even in peace grave critical situations arise demanding recourse to extraordinary solutions. Paraphrasing the Spanish adage, "Grandes males, grandes remedios ", such in ordinary problems justiIy exceptional remedies. And so, history records that in the Iace oI grave crises and emergencies, the most constitutionally Idealistic countries have, at one time or another, under the pressure oI pragmatic considerations, adopted corresponding realistic measures, which perilously tether along the periphery oI their Charters, to the extent oI creating impressions, oI course erroneous, that the same had been transgressed, although in truth their integrity and imperiousness remained undiminished and unimpaired.
The Philippines has but recently had its own experience oI such constitutional approach. When martial law was proclaimed here in 1972, there were those who vociIerously shouted not only that the President had acted arbitrarily and without the - required Iactual bases contemplated in the Commander-in-ChieI clause oI the 1935 Constitution, but more, that he had gone beyond the traditional and universally recognized intent oI said clause by utilizing his martial law powers not only to maintain peace and tranquility and preserve and deIend the integrity and security oI the state but to establish a New Society The critics contended that martial law is only Ior national security, not Ior the imposition oI national discipline under a New Society.
Due to its relevancy to Our present discussion, it is well Ior everyone to bear in mind that in this jurisdiction, this concept oI martial law has already been upheld several times by this Court. 1, Ior one, accepted such a construction because I Iirmly believe that to impose martial law Ior the sole end oI suppressing an insurrection or rebellion without coincidentally taking corresponding measures to eradicate the root causes oI the uprising is utter Iolly, Ior the country would still continue to lay open to its recurrence.
I have made the Ioregoing discourse, Ior it is Iundamentally in the Iight oI this Court's doctrines about the imposition oI martial law as I have stated that I preIer to base this concurrence. To put it diIIerently, iI indeed there could be some doubt as to the correctness oI this Court's judgment that Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional, particularly its Section 44, I am convinced that the critical situation oI our judiciary today calls Ior solutions that may not in the eyes oI some conIorm strictly with the letter oI the Constitution but indubitably justiIied by its spirit and intent. As 1 have earlier indicated, the Charter is not just a construction oI words to whose literal iron-clad meanings we must Ieel hidebound without regard to every Constitution's desirable inherent nature oI adjustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and Iundamental intent and objectives oI the Iramers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one such adaptation that comes handy Ior the attainment oI the transcendental objectives it seeks to pursue While, to be sure, it has the eIIect oI Iactually easing out some justices and judges beIore the end oI their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual administrative investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru means that, in the light oI the prevailing conditions, is constitutionally permissible.
BeIore closing, it may not be amiss Ior me to point out that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, aside Irom what has been discussed about its eIIect on the guarantees oI judicial independence, also preempts, in some oI its provisions, the primary rule-making power oI the Supreme Court in respect to procedure, practice and evidence. With the pardon oI my colleagues, I would just like to say that the Court should not decry this development too much. AIter all, the legislature is expressly empowered by the Charter to do so, (Section 5(5), Article X oI the Constitution oI 1973) so much so, that I doubt iI the Court has any authority to alter or modiIy any rule the Batasang Pambansa enunciates. Truth to tell, as Chairman oI the Committee on the Revision oI the Rules oI Court, Ior one reason or another, principally the lack oI a clear consensus as to what some oI my colleagues consider very radical proposals voiced by me or my committee, We have regrettably procrastinated long enough in making our procedural rules more practical and more conducive to speedier disposal and termination oI controversies by dealing more with substantial justice.
So also have We, it must be conIessed, Iailed to come up to expectations oI the Iramers oI the Constitution in our ways oI disposing oI administrative complaints against erring and misconducting judges. OI course, We can excuse Ourselves with the explanation that not only are We overloaded with work beyond human capability oI its being perIormed expeditiously, but that the strict requisites oI due process which are time consuming have precluded Us Irom being more expeditious and speedy.
I Ieel I must say all oI these, because iI the above-discussed circumstances have not combined to create a very critical situation in our judiciary that is making the people lose its Iaith and conIidence in the administration oI justice by the existing courts, perhaps the Court could look with more sympathy at the stand oI petitioners. I want all the sundry to know, however, that notwithstanding this decision, the independence oI the judiciary in the Philippines is Iar Irom being insubstantial, much less meaningless and dead. Batas Pambansa 129 has precisely opened our eyes to how, despite doubts and misgivings, the Constitution can be so construed as to make it possible Ior those in authority to answer the clamor oI the people Ior an upright judiciary and overcome constitutional roadblocks more apparent than real.
To those justices, judges, members oI the bar and concerned citizens whose eyes may be dimming with tears oI disappointment and disenchantment because oI the stand I have chosen to adopt in these cases, may I try to assuage them by joining their Iervent prayers that some other day, hopeIully in the near Iuture, Divine Providence may dictate to another constitutional convention to write the guarantees oI judicial independence with ink oI deeper hue and words that are deIinite, clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, in drawing the line oI demarcation between the Parliament and the Judiciary in the manner that in His InIinite wisdom would most promote genuine and impartial justice Ior our people, Iree, not only Irom graIt, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even Irom the tentacles oI interIerence and insiduous inIluence oI the political powers that be. Presently, I am constrained Irom going along with any other view than that the Constitution allows abolition oI existing courts even iI the eIIect has to be the elimination oI any incumbent judge and the consequent cutting oI his constitutional tenure oI oIIice.
I cannot close this concurrence without reIerring to the apprehensions in some quarters about the choice that will ultimately be made oI those who will be eased out oI the judiciary in the course oI the implementation oI Batas Pambansa 129. By this decision, the Court has in Iactual eIIect albeit not in constitutional conception yielded generally to the Batasang Pambansa, and more speciIically to the President, its own constitutionally conIerred power oI removal oI judges. Section 44 oI the Batasan's Act declares that all oI them shall be deemed to have ceased to hold oIIice, leaving it to the President to appoint those whom he may see Iit to occupy the new courts. Thus, those who will not be appointed can be considered as "ceasing to hold their respective oIIices", or, as others would say they would be in Iact removed. How the President will make his choices is beyond Our power to control. But even iI some may be eased out even without being duly inIormed oI the reason thereIor, much less being given the opportunity to be heard the past actuations oI the President on all matters oI deep public interest shouted serve as suIIicient assurance that when lie ultimately acts, he will IaithIully adhere to his solemn oath "to do justice to every man hence, lie will equip himselI Iirst with the Iullest reliable inIormation beIore acts. This is not only my individual Iaith Iounded on my personal acquaintance with the character and sterling qualities oI President Ferdinand E. Marcos. I dare say this is the Iaith oI the nation in a man who has led it successIully through crises and emergencies, with justice to all, with malice towards none. I am certain, the President will deal with each and every individual to be aIIected by this reorganization with the best light that God will give him every moment he acts in each individual case as it comes Ior his decision
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The petitioners Iiled this petition Ior declaratory relieI and prohibition "to declare the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) unconstitutional".
The petition should have been dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relieI and prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the constitutionality oI the law. the petition is premature. No jurisdictional question is involved.
There is no justiciable controversy wherein the constitutionality oI the said law is in issue. It is presumed to be constitutional. The lawmaking body beIore enacting it looked into the constitutional angle.
Seven oI the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail the constitutionality oI the said law even as taxpayers.
The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge (who in 1977 Iiled a petition Ior declaratory relieI assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229, which called Ior a reIerendum. De la Llana his Comelec, 80 SCRA 525), has no cause oI action Ior prohibition. He is not being removed Irom his position.
The Judiciary Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good Iaith and not "to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose As ably expounded by the ChieI Justice, in enacting the said law, the lawmaking body acted within the scope oI its constitutional powers and prerogatives.
GUERRERO, J., concurring:
I concur with my distinguished and learned colleagues in upholding the constitutionality oI the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980. For the record, however, I would like to state my personal convictions and observations on this case, a veritable landmark case, Ior whatever they may be worth.
The legal basis oI the Court's opinion rendered by our esteemed ChieI Justice having been exhaustively discussed and decisively justiIied by him, a highly-respected expert and authority on constitutional law, it would be an exercise in duplication to reiterate the same cases and precedents. I am then constrained to approach the problem quite diIIerently, not through the classic methods oI philosophy, history and tradition, but Iollowing what the well-known jurist, Dean Pound, said that "the most signiIicant advance in the modern science oI law is the change Irom the analytical to the Iunctional attitude." 1 And in pursuing this direct
ion, I must also reckon with and rely on the ruling that "another guide to the meaning oI a statute is Iound in the evil which it is designed to remedy, and Ior this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention oI the legislative body." 2
I have no doubt in my mind that the institutional reIorms and changes envisioned by the law are clearly conducive to the promotion oI national interests. The objectives oI the legislation namely: (a) An institutional restructuring by the creation oI an Intermediate Appellate Court, thirteen (I 3) Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts: (b) A reappointment oI jurisdiction geared towards greater eIIiciency: (c) A simpliIication oI procedures and (d) The abolition oI the inIerior courts created by the Judiciary Act oI 1948 and other statutes, as approved by the Congress oI the Philippines 3 are undoubtedly intended to improve the regime oI justice and thereby enhance public good and order. Indeed, the purpose oI the Act as Iurther stated in the Explanatory Note, which is "to embody reIorms in the structure, organization and composition oI the Judiciary, with the aim oI improving the administration oI justice, oI decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with the more complex problems on the present and Iorseeable Iuture cannot but "promote the welIare oI society, since that is the Iinal cause oI law. 4
Hence, Irom the standpoint oI The general utility and Iunctional value oI the Judiciary Reorganization Act, there should be no diIIiculty, doubt or disbelieI in its legality and constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the judicial system is undeniable. The notorious and scandalous congestion oI court dockets as too well-known to be ignored as are the causes which create and produce such anomaly. Evident is the need to look Ior devices and measures that are more practical, workable and economical. 5
From the Iigures alone (301,497 pending cases in 1976; 351, 943 in 1977; 404, 686 in 1978; 426, 911 in 1979; 441, 332 in 1980; and 450, 063 as oI February 3, 1982) 6 the congested character oI court dockets rising year aIter year is staggering and enormous, looming like a legal monster.
But greater than the need to dispense justice speedily and promptly is the necessity to have Justices and Judges who are Iair and impartial, honest and incorruptible, competent and eIIicient. The general clamor that the prestige oI the Judiciary today has deteriorated and degenerated to the lowest ebb in public estimation is not without Iactual basis. Records in the Supreme Court attest to the unIitness and incompetence, corruption and immorality oI many dispensers oI justice. According to the compiled data, the total number oI Justices and Judges against whom administrative charges have been Iiled Ior various oIIenses, misconduct, venalities and other irregularities reaches 322. OI this total, 8 are Justices oI the Court oI Appeals, 119 CFI Judges, 2 Criminal Circuit Judges, 8 CAR Judges, 1 Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court Judge, 38 City Judges, and 146 Municipal Judges.
The Supreme Court has Iound 102 oI them guilty and punished them with either suspension, admonition, reprimand or Iine. The number includes 1 CA Justice, 35 CFI Judges, 1 CCC Judge, 3 CAR Judges, 1 JDRC Judge, 9 City Judges and 53 Municipal Judges.
Seventeen (17) Judges have been ordered dismissed and separated Irom the service. And these are 3 CFI, 1 CAR, 1 City Judge and 12 Municipal Judges.
Going over these administrative proceedings, it took an average oI two-year period Irom the Iiling oI the charge to the dismissal oI the respondent. In one case, the proceedings were terminated aIter seven years. How long the pending administrative cases will be disposed oI, only time will tell as an increasing number oI administrative cases are being Iiled by victims oI judicial misconduct, abuse and arbitrariness.
Excepting those who have been punished and dismissed Irom the service, there are many who have been castigated and censured in Iinal judgments oI the Supreme Court upon appeal or review oI the decisions, orders and other acts oI the respondent courts, Justices and Judges. To cite a Iew cases, Our decisions have categorically pronounced respondents' actuations, thus: "deplorable, giving no credit to the Judiciary" 7; applicable rules. The whole proceedings looked no more than a pre-arranged compromise between the accused and the Judge to Ilaunt the law and every norm oI propriety and procedure" 8; "there was a deliberate Iailure oI respondent Judge to respect what is so clearly provided in the Rules oI Court" 9; "It is unIortunate that respondent Judge Iailed to acquaint himselI with, 01' misinterpreted, those controlling provisions and doctrines" 10; "The Iailure oI the respondent Municipal Judge to yield obedience to authoritative decisions oI the Supreme Court and oI respondent Court oI First Instance Judge and his deplorable insistence on procedural technicalities was called down in L-49828, July 25, 1981. For peremptorily dismissing the third party complaint on the ground that the motion to dismiss was 'well-taken' and respondent Judge did not elaborate, the Court remarked: "May his tribe vanish." 11 In one case, We noted "There is here so something unusual, but Iar Irom palliating the gravity oI the error incurred, it merely exacerbated it. ... it did render the due process requirement nugatory, Ior instead oI a Iair and impartial trial, there was an Idle Iorm, a useless ceremony." 12
It is dishonorable enough to be publicly and oIIicially rebuked but to allow these Judges and their ilk to remain and continue to preside in their courtrooms is a disgrace to the Judiciary. It is to be deplored that the Supreme Court has not Iound time to exercise its power and authority in the premises, Ior no charges or proceedings have been instituted against them. We have a list oI these crooked Judges whose actuations have been Iound to be patiently wrong and maniIestly in-deIeasible. There ought to be no objection or compunction in weeding them out Irom the service. II they are not booted out now, it will take Irom here to eternity to clean this Augean stable.
Candidly, one reason Ior writing this concurring opinion is to call attention to these evils, abuses and wrongs which are surreptitiously but surely destroying the trust and Iaith oI the people in the integrity oI the entire Judiciary. Some members oI the Court Ielt that these revelations would be like washing dirty linen in public. But these Iacts are oI public and oIIicial record nay court cases, and sooner or later, Truth will come out.
In the light oI these known evils and inIirmities oI the judiciary system, it would be absurd and unreasonable to claim that the legislators did not act upon them in good Iaith and honesty oI purpose and with legitimate ends. It is presumed that oIIicial duty has been regularly perIormed. 13 The presumption oI regularity is not conIined to the acts oI the individual oIIicers but also applies to the acts oI boards, such as administrative board or bodies, and to acts oI legislative bodies. 14 Good Iaith is always to be presumed in the absence oI prooI to the contrary, oI which there is none in the case at bar. It could not be otherwise iI We are to accord as We must, Iull Iaith and credit to the lawmakers' deep sense oI public service and the judicious exercise oI their high oIIice as the duly-elected representatives oI the people.
It is conceded that the abolition oI an oIIice is legal iI attendant with good Iaith. 15 The question oI good Iaith then is the crux oI the conIlict at bar. Good Iaith in the enactment oI the law does not reIer to the wisdom oI the measure, the propriety oI the Act, or to its expediency. The questions raised by petitioners and amicus curiae Ior their cause, viz: Why abolish all the courts Why legislate out the judges Why not amend the Rules oI Court only Is abolition oI all courts the proper remedy to weed out corrupt and misIits in our Judiciary? may not be inquired into by Us. "It is not the province oI the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds oI propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." 16 The Courts "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and ... never inquire into the wisdom oI the law." 17 ChieI Justice Fernando who penned the MorIe decision, writes that while "(i)t is thus settled, to paraphrase ChieI Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom oI the action taken, may be the basis Ior declaring a statute invalid," 18 he adds that it is "useIul to recall what was so clearly stated by Laurel that 'the Judiciary in the determination oI actual cases and controversies must reIlect the wisdom and justice oI the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments oI the government.'" 19 In any case, petitioners have not shown an iota oI prooI oI bad Iaith. There is no Iactual Ioundation oI bad Iaith on record. And I do not consider the statement in the sponsorship speech Ior Cabinet Bill No. 42 oI Minister oI Justice Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be a more eIIicient vehicle oI "eliminating incompetent and unIit Judges as indicative oI impermissible legislative motive. 20
It may be true that while the remedy or solution Iormulated by the legislation will eradicate hopeIully or at least minimize the evils and ills that inIect and pester the judicial body, it will result in the actual removal oI the Justices oI the Court oI Appeals and Judges oI the lower courts. It is also true that whether it is termed abolition oI oIIice or removal Irom oIIice, the end-result is the same termination oI the services oI these incumbents. Indeed, the law may be harsh, but that is the law. Dura lex sed lex.
The Justices and Judges directly aIIected by the law, being lawyers, should know or are expected to know the nature and concept oI a public oIIice. It is created Ior the purpose oI eIIecting the ends Ior which government has been instituted, which are Ior the common good, and not the proIit, honor or private interest oI any one man, Iamily or class oI men. In our Iorm oI government, it is Iundamental that public oIIices are public trust, and that the person to be appointed should be selected solely with a view to the public welIare. 21 In the last analysis, a public oIIice is a privilege in the giIt oI the State. 22
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an oIIice, or even an absolute right to hold oIIice. Excepting constitutional oIIices which provide Ior special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an oIIice or its salary. When an oIIice is created by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished by the legislature, but when created by the State under the authority oI the Constitution, it may be abolished by statute and the incumbent deprived oI his oIIice. 23 Acceptance oI a judicial appointment must be deemed as adherence to the rule that "when the court is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge oI such a court takes oIIice with that encumbrance and knowledge." 24 "The Judge's right to his Iull term and his Iull salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the contingency that the legislature may Ior the public good, in ordaining and establishing the courts, Irom time to time consider his oIIice unnecessary and abolish it." 25
The removal Irom oIIice oI the incumbent then is merely incidental to the valid act oI abolition oI the oIIice as demanded by the superior and paramount interest oI the people. The bad and the crooked Judges must be removed. The good and the straight, sober Judges should be reappointed but that is the sole power and prerogative oI the President who, I am certain, will act according to the best interest oI the nation and in accordance with his solemn oath oI oIIice "to preserve and deIend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to everyone ... " There and then the proper balance between the desire to preserve private interest and the desideratum oI promoting the public good shall have been struck. 26
The Supreme Court has been called the conscience oI the Constitution. It may be the last bulwark oI constitutional government. 27 It Must, however, be remembered "that legislatures are ultimate guardians oI the liberties and welIare oI the people in quite as great a degree as courts." 28 The responsibility oI upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislatures as well. It adheres, thereIore, to the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in Iavor oI the constitutionality oI a statute" Ior which reason it will not set aside a law as violative oI the Constitution "except in a clear case." 29
Finally, I view the controversy presented to Us as a conIlict oI opinions on judicial independence, whether impaired or strengthened by the law; on reorganization oI the courts, whether abolition oI oIIice or removal thereIrom, and on delegation oI legislative power, whether authorized or unauthorized. Without detracting Irom the merits, the Iorce and brilliance oI their advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, I choose to stand on the social justiIication and the Iunctional utility oI the law to uphold its constitutionality. In the light oI contemporaneous events Irom which the New Republic emerged and evolved new Ideals oI national growth and development, particularly in law and government, a kind or Iorm oI judicial activism, perhaps similar to it, is necessary to justiIy as the ratio decidendi oI Our judgment.
This is the time and the moment to perIorm a constitutional duty to aIIix my imprimatur and aIIirmance to the law, hopeIully an act oI proper judicial statesmanship.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I agree with the learned ChieI Justice oI the Philippines that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional. Unlike Oscar Wilde, I choose not to yield to temptation by embellishing my concurrence lest I be accrued oI bringing coal to Newcastle. Accordingly, I will simply vote to dismiss the petition
However, I cannot agree with the ChieI Justice when he says:
... In the implementation oI the assailed legislation, thereIore it should be in accordance with accepted principles oI constitutional construction that as Iar as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the Iullest consideration. There would be no plausibility then to the allegation that there is an unconstitutional taint to the challenged Act. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice oI alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the Iormer is to be preIerred.
It has already been ruled that the statute does not suIIer Irom any constitutional inIirmity because the abolition oI certain judicial oIIices was done in good Iaith. This being the case, I believe that the Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power to Iill the newly created judicial positions without any obligation to consult with this Court and to accord its views the Iullest consideration. To require consultation will constitute an invasion oI executive territory which can be resented and even repelled. The implicit suggestion that there could be an unconstitutional implementation oI the questioned legislation is not congruent with the basic conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.
DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
I concur in the declaration that the law is not unconstitutional.
May I, however, submit this separate opinion more to avoid being misunderstood by my brethren in the judiciary as not Ieeling Ior them as much concern as I should Ior their security oI tenure which is raised as the main argument against the constitutionality oI the law, than by way oI giving added Iorce or support to the main opinion so well-written by Our learned ChieI Justice in his usual scholarly Iashion. I, thereIore, limit myselI to a discussion that the assailed statue is not unconstitutional without having to suggest how it may be implemented in order that it could stand the most rigid test oI constitutionality, Ior in that area, what is involved is purely an executive act oI the President in whose wisdom, patriotism and sense oI justice We should trust in how he would IulIill his sworn duties to see that the laws are IaithIully executed and to do justice to every man.
Moreover, while I also concur in the dismissal oI the petition, I do so on the additional ground that petitioners have not IulIilled all the requisites Ior the exercise by this Court oI its power oI judicial inquiry the power to declare a law unconstitutional.
I
The creation and organization oI courts inIerior to the Supreme Court is a constitutional prerogative oI the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the power to reorganize said courts, and in the process, abolish them to give way to new or substantially diIIerent ones. To contend otherwise would be to Iorget a basic doctrine oI constitutional law that no irrepealable laws shall be passed. 1
The power to create courts and organize them is necessarily the primary authority Irom which would thereaIter arise the security oI tenure oI those appointed to perIorm the Iunctions oI said courts. in the natural order oI things, thereIore, since the occasion to speak oI security oI tenure oI judges arises only aIter the courts have Iirst been brought into being, the right to security oI tenure takes a secondary position to the basic and primary power oI creating the courts to provide Ior a Iair and strong judicial system. II the legislature, in the exercise oI its authority, deems it wise and urgent to provide Ior a new set oI courts, and in doing so, it Ieels the abolition oI the old courts would conduce more to its objective oI improving the judiciary and raising its standard, the matter involved is one oI policy and wisdom into which the courts, not even the Supreme Court, cannot inquire, much less interIere with. By this secondary position it has to the primary power oI the legislature to create courts, the security oI tenure given to the incumbents should not be a legal impediment to the exercise oI that basic power oI creating the statutory courts which, by necessary implication, includes the power to abolish them in order to create new ones. This primary legislative power is a continuing one, and the resultant right oI security oI tenure oI those appointed to said courts could not bring about the exhaustion oI that power. Unquestionably, the legislature can repeal its own laws, and that power can never be exhausted without, as a consequence, violating a Iundamental precept oI constitutional and representative government that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.
II the creation oI courts is a legislative prerogative their abolition is, thereIore, a matter oI legislative intent. it involves the exercise oI legislative power, an act oI legislation which generally concerns policy in the Iormation oI which the courts have no say Initially, when the legislature creates the courts, it suIIers Irom no limitation arising Irom the necessity or respecting the security oI tenure oI judges who are not yea there. This inherent character oI Iullness and plenitude oI the power to create and abolish courts does not change when that same power is once more exercised thereaIter, as the need thereIor is Ielt. Which only goes to show that when done in good Iaith and motivated solely by the good and the well-being oI the people, the exercise oI the power is not meant to be restricted, curtailed, much less exhausted by the so-called judicial security oI tenure.
The passage oI the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980 is no more than the exercise oI the power vested by the Constitution on the legislative body oI the Republic as described above. That power carries with it the duty and responsibility oI providing the people with the most eIIective and eIIicient system oI administration oI justice. This is by Iar oI more imperative and transcedental importance than the security oI tenure oI judges which, admittedly, is one oI the Iactors that would conduce to independence oI the judiciary but Iirst oI all, a good, eIIicient and eIIective judiciary. A judiciary wanting in these basic qualities does not deserve the independence that is meant only Ior a judiciary that can serve best the interest and welIare oI the people which is the most primordial and paramount consideration, not a judiciary in which the people's Iaith has been eroded, a condition which the security oI tenure, in some instances, may even be contributory.
In enacting the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980, the legislature is presumed to have been motivated by no other objective than to provide the people the kind oI judicial machinery that would best serve their interest and welIare, in its belieI that the present machinery is Ialling short oI that measure oI public service. It should, likewise, be presumed that it has been led to this low estimate oI the utility and eIIectiveness oI the present set-up oI the judiciary aIter inIorming itselI, with the Iacilities at its command, such as the power oI legislative investigation, oI the actual condition oI the courts, particularly as to whether they continue to enjoy the trust, Iaith and conIidence oI the public, and what the cause or causes are oI their erosion, iI not loss, as is the keenly perceptible Ieeling oI the people in general. Responsibility Ior this more or less extensive slowdown oI the delivery oI judicial service can be laid on no other than either oI the two components oI a court the procedural laws or rules that govern the workings oI the courts, or the persons executing or applying them or both.
When two interests conIlict as what had given rise to the present controversy the duty oI the legislature to provide society with a Iair, eIIicient and eIIective judicial system, on one hand, and the right oI judges to security oI tenure, on the other, the latter must oI necessity yield to the Iormer. One involves public welIare and interest more directly and on a greater magnitude than the right oI security oI tenure oI the judges which is, as is easily discernible, more oI a personal beneIit to just a Iew, as indeed only the judge aIIected could seek judicial redress oI what he conceives to be its violation.
Herein lies the propriety oI the exercise oI "police power" oI the State, iI this concept which underlies even the Constitution, has to be invoked as a constitutional justiIication oI the passage oI the Act in question. That is, iI a conIlict between the primary power oI the legislature to create courts, and mere consequential beneIit accorded to judges and justices aIter the creation oI the courts is indeed perceivable, which the writer Iails to see, or, at least, would disappear upon a reconciliation oI the two apparently conIlicting interests which, Irom the above disquisition is not hard to Iind. It is, without doubt, in the essence oI the exercise oI police power that a right assertable by individuals may be inIringed in the greater interest oI the public good and general welIare. This is demonstrated in how the rights and Ireedoms enumerated in the Bill oI Rights enjoyable by The entire people, not just by a handIul in comparison, are made subject to the lawIul exercise oI the police power oI the State.
Viewed, thereIore, Irom the above-mentioned perspective, the general revamp oI the judiciary involving both its components the court as an oIIice or institution, and the judges and justices that man them should not Iind any legal obstacle in the security oI tenure oI judges. This security, aIter all, is no more than as provided Ior all other oIIicials and employees in the civil service oI the government in Section 3, Article XII-B oI the Constitution which provides:
No oIIicer or employees in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed except Ior cause as provided by law.
The provision oI Article XVII, Section 10 oI the Constitution gives to judicial oIIicials no more than a guarantee that their retirement age as Iixed in the Constitution shall not be alterable at mere legislative pleasure. The equivalent provision in the 1935 Constitution was inserted Ior the Iirst time because the retirement age beIore then was provided merely by statute not by the Constitution. II it comes to their removal or suspension, what gives them constitutional protection is the aIorequoted provision which does not contemplate abolition oI oIIice when done in good Iaith, Ior removal implies the existence oI the oIIice, not when it is abolished. Admittedly, as has been held, abolition oI oIIice Ior no reason related to public welIare or Ior the good oI the service, let alone when done in bad Iaith, amounts to an unlawIul removal. 2 The abolition oI the courts as declared in the Act as a result oI a reorganization oI the judiciary, as the Title oI the law curtly but announces, can by no means, Irom any viewpoint, be so branded. And whether by said reorganization, the present would be deemed abolished, as the law expresses such an unmistakable intent, the matter is one Ior the sole and exclusive determination oI the legislature. It rests entirely on its discretion whether by the nature and extent oI the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider them abolished. To give the Supreme Court the power to determine the extent or nature oI the changes as to their structure, distribution and jurisdiction, beIore the clear intent to abolish them, or to declare them so abolished, is given eIIect, would be to allow undue interIerence in the Iunction oI legislation. This would be contrary to the primary duty oI courts precisely to give eIIect to the legislative intent as expressed in the law or as my be discovered thereIrom.
From the above observation, it would be Iutile to insist that the present courts would not eIIectively be abolished by the Act in question. it might be to arrogate power Ior Us to say that the changes the law brings to the present judicial system, do not suIIice Ior this Court to give eIIect to the clear intent oI the legislative body. Where would the agrarian courts, the circuit criminal courts, the JDRC's be in the judicial structure as envisioned by the law? Are they not abolished by merger with the regional trial courts, which by such merger, and by the other changes introduced by the law, would make said courts diIIerent Irom the present Courts oI First Instance which, as a consequence, may then be considered abolished Integrated as the present courts are supposed to be, changes somewhere in the judicial machinery would necessarily aIIect the entire system.
The Iact that the Supreme Court may specially assign courts to Iunction as the special courts just mentioned, does not mean that the changes wrought are only superIicial or "cosmetic" as this term has been used so oIten in the oral argument. Without the new law, these courts will remain Iixed and permanent where they are at present. Yet in the course oI time, the need Ior their independent existence may disappear, or that by changed conditions, where they are needed at present at a certain place, the need Ior them may be somewhere else in later years, iI maximum beneIit at the least expense is to be achieved, as always should be a most desirable goal and objective oI government.
Demonstrably then, the abolition oI the courts is a matter oI legislative intent into which no judicial inquiry is proper, except perhaps iI they intent is so palpably tainted with constitutional repugnancy, which is not so in the instant case. We have, thereIore, no occasion, as earlier intimated, to speak oI removal oI judges when the reorganization oI the judiciary would result in the abolition oI the courts other than the Supreme Court and the Court oI Tax Appeals. Hence, the provision oI the Constitution giving to the Supreme Court power to dismiss a judge by a vote oI eight justices does not come into the vortex oI the instant controversy. Its possible violation by the assailed statute cannot happen, and may, thereIore, not constitute an argument against the constitutionality oI the law.
Former Justice Barrera, in a speech beIore the Philippine Bar Association, 3 impliedly indorsed the judicial revamp when he enumerated the qualities oI a good judge that the appointing power should consider in making new appointments to the judiciary upon its reorganization pursuant to the questioned Act. The words oI the eminent jurist may well reIlect the Iavorable reaction oI the public in general to what the Act aim to achieve in the name oI good and clean government. The present judicial incumbents, who have not in any way, by their acts and behavior while in oIIice, tarnished the good image that the judiciary should have, thereIore, have no cause Ior apprehension that what they are entitled to under the Constitution by way oI security oI tenure wig be denied them, considering the publicly known aim and purpose oI the massive judicial revamp, specially as cherished with deep concern by the President who initiated the move when he created the Judiciary Reorganization Committee to recommend needed and appropriate judicial reIorms.
II the only obstacle to a verdict in Iavor oI constitutionality oI the law is its possible eIIect oI impairing the security oI tenure oI the incumbents, We may have the Iollowing Iacts to consider:
1. Under the 1973 Constitution all incumbent judges and justices may continue in oIIice until replaced or reappointed by the President. As to those judicial oIIicials, no security oI tenure, in the traditional concept, attaches to their incumbency which is, in a real sense, only a holdover tenure. How the President has exercised this immense power with admirable restraint should serve as the strongest guarantee oI how justice and Iairness will be his sole guide in implementing the law.
2. As to the rest oI the incumbents, they are all appointees oI Our present President, and he should Ieel concerned more than anyone else to protect whatever rights they may rightIully claim to maintain their oIIicial standing and integrity. They need have no Iear oI being ignored Ior no reason at all, much less Ior mere spirit oI vindictiveness or lack oI nobility oI heart.
From the Ioregoing, it would become apparent that only in the implementation oI the law may there possibly be a taint oI constitutional repugnancy as when a judge oI acknowledged honesty, industry and competence is separated, because an act oI arbitrariness would thereby be committed, but the abolition oI the courts as decreed by the law is not by itselI or per se unconstitutional.
Consequently, the law, the result oI serious and concerned study by a highly competent committee, deserves to be given a chance to prove its worth in the way oI improving the judiciary. II in its implementation, any one, iI at all, Ieels aggrieved, he can always seek judicial redress, iI he can make out a case oI violation oI his right oI security oI tenure with uncontrovertible clarity, as when the separation is very arbitrary in the peculiar circumstances oI his case, Ior an act oI arbitrariness, under any constitution, is unpardonable.
This petition should also be dismissed Ior being premature, as is the stand oI Justice Aquino. The petition asks this Court to exercise its power oI judicial inquiry, the power to declare a law unconstitutional when it conIlicts with the Iundamental law (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This power has well-deIined limits, Ior it can be exercised only when the Iollowing requisites are present, to wit: (1) There must be an actual case or controversy; (2) The question oI constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) He should do so at the earliest opportunity, and (4) The determination oI the constitutionality oI the statute must be necessary to a Iinal determination oI the case.
I am oI the opinion that the petition does not present an actual controversy nor was it Iiled by the proper parties.
The main ground Ior which the constitutionality oI the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980 is assailed is that it is violative oI the security oI tenure oI justices and judges. The only persons who could raise the question oI constitutionality oI the law are, thereIore, the actual incumbents oI the courts who would be separated Irom the service upon the abolition oI the courts aIIected by the law, on the theory as advanced by petitioners that their judicial security oI tenure would be violated. Olongapo City Judge de la Llana, the only judge among the petitioners, has not been separated Irom the service. Nor is his separation already a certainty, Ior he may be appointed to the court equivalent to his present court, or even promoted to a higher court. Only when it has become certain that his tenure has been terminated will an actual controversy arise on his allegation oI a Iact that has become actual, not merely probable or hypothetical.
The present petition may neither be allowed as a taxpayer suit. A taxpayer may bring an action to raise the question oI constitutionality oI a statute only when no one else can more appropriately bring the suit to deIend a right exclusively belonging to him, and. thereIore, would localize the actual injury to his person, and to no other. For a "proper party" to invoke the power oI judicial inquiry, as one oI the requisites in the exercise oI such power, does not mean one having no better right, one more personalized, than what he has as a member oI the public in general. With the incumbent judges undoubtedly being the ones under petitioners' theory, who would suIIer direct and actual injury, they should exclude mere taxpayers who cannot be said to suIIer as "direct" and "actual" an injury as the judges and justices by the enIorcement oI the assailed statute, Irom the right to bring the suit.
The validity oI the Ioregoing observation becomes more evident when We consider that only aIter the Iate oI the present incumbents is known, whether they have been actually separated or not, would the present courts be declared abolished. For the law clearly continues their existence until all the new courts have been Iilled up with new appointments, or at least such number as would be equal to the number oI actual incumbents, and they are the very courts to which they may lay claim to the right to continue therein, so that the status oI each and everyone oI them has thereby been made certain. Only then, upon the actual abolition oI the courts, may there possibly be a violation oI the security oI tenure, as contented, that would give rise to an "actual controversy" in which the 6 improper party" can be no other than the judges who Ieel aggrieved by their non- appointment to the new courts.
It would, thereIore, not be proper to declare the law void at this stage, beIore it has even been given a chance to prove its worth, as the legislature itselI and an those who helped by their exhaustive and scholarly study, Ielt it to be an urgent necessity, and beIore any oI the proper parties who could assail its constitutionality would know Ior a Iact, certain and actual, not merely probable or hypothetical, that they have a right violated by what they could possibly contend to be an unconstitutional enIorcement oI the law, not by a law that is unconstitutional unto itselI.
I am, thereIore, Ior giving the law a chance to be put into application so as not to douse great popular expectations Ior the courts to regain their highest level oI eIIiciency had reputation Ior probity. Inevitably, this is to be so since only when the law is Iully implemented will all the courts aIIected be declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an interregnum when the country is without any court, except the Supreme Court, the Court oI Tax Appeals and the Sandigan. Only then will it be known whether an actual controversy would arise because any oI the incumbents have been leIt out in the restructured judiciary.
There would then be also a proper party to assail the constitutionality oI the law, conIormably to the conditions requisite Ior the exercise oI the power oI judicial inquiry which by their stringent character, together with the constitutional prescription oI a comparatively higher vote to declare a law unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle oI government that a law should, by all reasonable intendment and Ieasible means, be saved Irom the doom oI unconstitutionality, the rule corollary thereto being that iI a law is susceptible to two interpretations, one oI which would make it constitutional, that interpretation should be adopted that will not kill the law.
It is to adhere to the above principles that the submission is made herein, that while in the implementation oI the law, constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, a categorical ruling hereon not being necessary or desirable at the moment, the law itselI is deIinitely not unconstitutional. 4 Any oI the incumbent judges who Ieel injured aIter the law shall have been implemented has adequate remedy in law, with Iull relieI as would be proper. But surely, the beneIits envisioned by the law in the discharge oI one oI the basic duties oI government to the people the administration oI justice should not be sacriIiced, as it would be, iI the law is, as sought in the present petition, declared void right now, on the claim oI a Iew oI being allegedly denied a right, at best oI doubtIul character, Ior the claim would seem to rest on an unsupportable theory that they have a vested right to a public oIIice.
Just one more point. The law in question is not selI-executing in the sense that upon its eIIectivity, certain judges and justices cease to be so by direct action oI the law. This is what distinguishes the Act in question Irom R.A. No. 1186 involved in the Ocampo case, 5 which by its direct action, no act oI implementation being necessary, all the judges whose positions were abolished, automatically ceased as such. The Act in question, thereIore, is not as exposed to the same vulnerability to constitutional attack as R.A. No. 1186 was. Yet by the operation oI the Constitution with its wise provision on how a law may be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No. 1186 stood the test Ior it to be enIorced to the Iullness oI its intent, which was, as in the law under consideration, IdentiIied with public interest and general welIare, through a more eIIicient and eIIective judicial system as the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980 seeks to establish.
Hence, the constitutionality oI the law should not be assailed, and the law itselI, striken down, on the ground that some judges or justices may be removed or separated in violation oI their security oI tenure. The law does not directly operate with Chat eIIect. It is in how the law would be implemented that this Ieared eventuality may or may not occur. We would then be killing the law on a mere speculation iI We do so at this stage. This would be an injudicious act done in reckless disregard oI the saIeguards built around a law to deIend it when its constitutionality is attacked; Iirst the presumption that a law is constitutional; second when a law is susceptible to two interpretations one that would make it constitutional, the other, unconstitutional, the Iormer should be adopted; and third, the Constitution itselI which ordains that a law may not be declared unconstitutional except on the vote oI at least ten (10) members oI the Supreme Court, more than what is required Ior an ordinary decision oI the Court en banc. This is not to mention the stringent requisites Ior the exercise oI the power oI judicial inquiry as already adverted to, all designed to save the law Irom the dire Iate oI unconstitutionality.
To the writer, the question beIore this Court is a simple matter oI choosing between protecting some judges Irom possible separation, as the implementation oI the law to achieve its primary purpose oI improving the judiciary may have to result in, or serving the interest oI the entire society through an honest, eIIicient and eIIective judiciary. For, it is unthinkable that what is Ior the good oI the people as a whole could have been meant by the Constitution to be sacriIiced Ior the sake oI only the Iew. The greatest good Ior the greatest number is an unwritten rule, more Iirm and enduring than any oI the postulates spread in our written Constitution. This, I might say, is the main theme oI this separate opinion, otherwise expressed in the well-known and time-honored maxim "Salus populi establish suprema lex."
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
There is unqualiIied adherence on my part to the dismissal oI the Petition Iiled in this case. II I am writing this separate concurrence, it is merely to state certain views I entertain in regards to the constitutionality oI Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The controversy in this case involves two constitutional provisions. Article X, Section 1, oI the Organic law provides that the legislative has the power to establish inIerior Courts by law. Section 7 oI the same Article reads:
SEC, 7. The Members oI the Supreme Court and judges oI inIerior courts shall hold oIIice during good behavior until they reach the age oI seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties oI their oIIice. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges oI inIerior courts and, by a vote oI at least eight Members order their dismissal.
There should be no conIlict Between the two provisions. Both should be harmonized.
1. a) It is a Iundamental proposition that the legislative power to create Courts ordinarily includes the power to organize and to reorganize them, and that the power to abolish Courts is generally coextensive with the power to create them. The power to abolish was not intended to be qualiIied by the permanence oI tenure (Opinion oI ChieI Justice Ricardo Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary oI Justice, 51 O.G. 147 |1955|, citing McCulley vs. State, 53 SW 134; Halsey vs. Gaines 2 Lea 316). The right oI Judges to hold oIIice during good behavior until they reach the age oI 70 years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties oI their oIIice, does not deprive Congress oI its power to abolish, organize or reorganize inIerior Courts (Brillo vs. Enage, 94 Phil. 732, 735, citing Zandueta vs. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615; 42 Am. Jur., Pub. OIIicer, 904-5). Judges oI those Courts take oIIice with that encumbrance and knowledge.
The legislative power to create a court carries with it the power to abolish it. When the court is abolished any unexpired term is abolished also. The judge oI such court takes oIIice with that encumbrance and knowledge. Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala 103, 6 Am. Rep. 698; State, ex rel. Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165, 54 So 283, et al."
The importance and the imperative oI maintaining the independence oI the Judiciary is undisputed. At the same time, the power oI Congress under the Constitution cannot be abridged. For, in the last analysis, it is not the security oI tenure per se that is the only saIeguard to the independence oI the Judiciary. It is the character and the mettle oI the Judges who sit on the Bench. Has not the impression been created in the public and that there are those who have abused the prerogatives oI their judicial position knowing that they are untouchables by virtue oI the permanence oI their tenure
b) A distinction should be made between tenure oI Judges and tenure oI Courts. Section 1 heretoIore mentioned reIers to the "Judiciary" as a Iundamental department oI Government. Section 7 quoted above reIers to the tenure oI oIIice oI "individual" Judges (inclusive oI Justices oI inIerior Courts that is to say, tenure oI oIIice is a matter concerning the individual Judge. This "individuality" character oI Section 7 is supported by the clause that the Supreme Court has the power to discipline individual judges oI inIerior Courts.
A legislature is not bound to give security oI tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. In Iact, the entire judicial system can be changed. II that system can no longer admit oI change, woe to the wheels oI progress and the imperatives oI growth in the development oI the Judiciary. To hold that tenure oI Judges is superior to the legislative power to reorganize is to render impotent the exercise oI that power.
It may even be stated that, under Section 7, supra, Judges are entailed to their Courts, Irom which they cannot be separated beIore retirement age except as a disciplinary action Ior bad behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to their Judges, because the power oI the legislative to establish inIerior Courts presupposes the power to abolish those Courts. II an inIerior Court is abolished, the Judge presiding that Court will necessarily have to lose his position because the abolished Court is not entailed to him.
c) The constitutional guarantee oI tenure oI Judges applies only as their Courts exist. As long as those Courts exist, the Judges cannot be ousted without just cause; that is the extent oI the constitutional provision relative to security oI tenure oI Judges. Upon declaration oI the completion oI the reorganization as provided Ior in the Reorganization Act, the aIIected Courts "shall be deemed automatically abolished There being no Courts, there are no oIIices Ior which tenure oI Judges may be claimed. By the abolition oI those oIIices, the rights to them are necessarily extinguished (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 |1954|).
2. I am satisIied that the challenged law was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in response to an urgent and pressing public need and not Ior the purpose oI aIIecting adversely the security oI tenure oI all Judges or legislating them out to the detriment oI judicial independence. It should riot be said oI the Batasang Pambansa that its power oI abolition oI Courts has been used to disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose to deIeat the security oI tenure oI Judges. The Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1981 suIIiciently complies with the bona Iide rule in the abolition oI public oIIice, as clearly explained in the main opinion. Besides, every presumption oI good Iaith in its actuations must be accorded a coordinate and coequal branch oI government, supreme within the limits oI its own sphere, until that presumption is clearly overcome. There is no showing that the Reorganization Act was motivated Ior personal or political reasons as to justiIy the interIerence by the Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 199 Mass, 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127 A.S.R. 468; State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont. 287; 106 Pac. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs. Dimaporo, 16 SCRA 599 |1966|). Public interest and public good, as the legislative body views it, must be balanced with tenure oI Judges, which is an individual right. Reverting to Section 1 and Section 7, supra, the Iormer is the weightier, because the "Judiciary" is oI more importance to the welIare oI the country than the tenure oI oIIice oI an individual Judge. II a Judge is removed without cause there can be damage to the public welIare to some extent, but maintenance oI a Court that does not meet the requirements oI progressive Government, can cause incalculable prejudice to the people.
3. Nor does a conIlict exist with the power oI discipline vested in the Supreme Court by the present Constitution reading: the Supreme Court shall have the power "to discipline Judges oI inIerior Courts, and, by a vote oI at least 8 members, order their dismissal Absent the Court, it would be Iutile to speak oI the Supreme Court's power to discipline. Thus, where the legislature has willed that the Courts be abolished, the power to discipline cannot pose an obstacle to the abolition. The power to discipline can come into play only when there is removal Irom an existing judicial oIIice but not when that it oIIice is abolished. The reorganization oI the judicial system with the abolition oI certain Courts is not an exercise oI the power to discipline the Judges oI the abolished Courts.
It is oI signiIicance to note that the power to dismissal vested in the Supreme Court by the 1973 Constitution is delimited by its power to discipline. Absent any need Ior discipline and the power to dismiss does not exist. Being circumscribed in scope, it may well be asked: does the grant oI the power oI discipline and dismissal in the Supreme Court deprive the executive oI the power oI removal? Is it not more in keeping with the allocation oI powers in our government to state that the Supreme Court shares its power to dismiss with the executive power oI removal? For is not the power oI removal basically executive in nature, as an incident to the power oI appointment, which is the prerogative oI the ChieI Executive alone As in the case oI appointments, Section 5 (6), Article X oI the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall appoint its oIIicials and employees. However, is not this power shared with the power oI appointment oI the executive who appoints some oI the Court oIIicials These questions could lend themselves to an in-depth study in the proper case.
4. The abolition would be no deprivation either oI due process oI law. A public oIIice cannot be regarded as the "property " oI the incumbent. A public oIIice is not a contract (Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 |1925|). A public oIIice is a public trust (Section 1, Article XIII. 1973 Constitution). It is a privilege in the giIt oI the State (Brown vs. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA, 253 cited also in Taada & Carreon, Political Law oI the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 537). The oIIicers are the servants oI the people and not their rulers (22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin, Administrative Law, Law on Public OIIicers and Election Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing that there is no removal Irom oIIice but abolition oI the oIIice itselI.
5. The questioned statute is in keeping with major reIorms in other departments oI government. "The thrust is on development." It is "the Iirst major reorganization aIter Iour generations." It does not provide Ior a piecemeal change, which could be ineIIective. It goes to the roots and does not just scratch the surIace oI our judicial system. Its main objectives are an improved administration oI justice, the "attainment oI more eIIiciency in the disposal oI cases, a reallocation oI jurisdiction, and a revision oI procedures which do not tend to the proper meting out oI justice." These aims are policy matters oI necessity in the pursuit oI developmental goals within the Judiciary.
6. The Reorganization Act reorganizing the entire judicial system excluding the Supreme Court, which is the only constitutional Court, and the Sandiganbayan. It envisages institutional reIorms in the Philippine judiciary. It does not simply change the names oI the Courts. The Iacts herein are dissimilar Irom those in Brillo vs. Enage (94 Phil. 732 |1954|) where the position oI Justice oI the Peace, although ostensibly abolished, was merely changed to Municipal Judge aIter the municipality oI Tacloban was converted into a city with its own charter.
SigniIicant among the institutional changes and procedural reIorms are:
The Intermediate Appellate Court
This Court is now constituted into ten (10) divisions instead oI IiIteen (15), Iive members composing each division, and a majority vote oI three members being needed Ior a decision. This obviates the cumbersome procedure, in case oI dissent, oI assigning two other members to compose a "division oI Iive". It also allows Ilexibility in that any three members oI a division, arriving at unanimity, can promulgate a decision. Now provided Ior is specialization into Iour (4) Civil Cases Divisions, two (2) Criminal Cases Divisions and Iour (4) Special Cases Divisions. The specialization is expected to contribute to the expeditious disposal oI cases. The Court has been given original jurisdiction to issue Writs oI mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, quo warranto and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not in aid oI its appellate jurisdiction. This would undoubtedly ease the burden oI the Supreme Court where numerous such cases are Iiled daily.
It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all Iinal judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards oI quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those Ialling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction oI the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution.
The Intermediate Appellate Court would now have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perIorm any and all acts necessary to resolve Iactual issues raised in cases Ialling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or Iurther proceedings (Sec. 9). This does away with the delays attendant to the remand oI cases to the lower trial Courts.
Regional Trial Courts
There are now thirteen (13) Judicial Regions, the same as the present administrative and Batasang Pambansa Regions, instead oI sixteen (16) Judicial Districts.
A Judge is appointed to a region, which is his oIIicial station. This ensures mobility since a Judge may be assigned anywhere within the Region without applying the constitutional limitation oI six months. Additionally, -it can remedy temporary inequalities oI caseloads in trial Courts.
Specialized Courts are integrated into the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, Regional Trial Courts would try all cases within its jurisdiction unless special cases are assigned to them, in which case, they remain as Branches oI Regional Trial Courts. Special procedures and technical rules governing special Courts will continue to remain applicable in Branches assigned those special cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts
There is one Metropolitan Trial Court with several Branches Ior large urban areas. The appointment oI Judges would be to a Metropolitan Trial Court although a Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any Branch oI the Metropolitan Trial Court as demanded by the exigencies oI the service.
The Supreme Court may designate certain Branches oI said Courts to exercise special jurisdiction over certain cases, unlike the present set-up where special jurisdiction applies only to cases oI traIIic violations.
Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
Municipal Trial Courts may now be designated by the Supreme Court to exercise special jurisdiction over certain cases, thereby resulting in overall Ilexibility. They can also be circuitized with those in cities not Iorming part oI metropolitan areas.
One notable change between the old and the new set up is that Judges oI these Courts will now be Presidential appointees unlike presently where the incumbent Judges are merely designated by the Supreme Court in an Administrative Order to sit in existing Municipal Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts.
7. There are innovative Ieatures in the Act that commend themselves:
a) The conIusing and illogical areas oI concurrent jurisdiction between trial Courts have been entirely eliminated.
b) Under Section 39, there is a uniIorm period Ior appeal oI IiIteen (15) days counted Irom the notice oI the Iinal order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed Irom.
A record on appeal is no longer required to take an appeal. The entire original record is now to be transmitted.
c) Under Section 40, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reIerence oI Iindings oI Iact and conclusions oI law as set Iorth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed Irom, is also provided Ior. This will expedite the rendition oI decisions in appealed cases.
d) Section 42 provides Ior "a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5 oI the monthly basic pay Ior Justices and
Judges oI the courts herein created Ior each Iive years oI continuous, eIIicient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary, Provided that, in no case shall the total salary oI each Justice or Judge concerned, aIter this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary oI the Justice or Judge next in rank." Thus, Justices and Judges who may not reach the top, where unIortunately there is not enough room Ior all, may have the satisIaction oI at least approximating the salary scale oI those above him depending on his length oI service,
8. But while the law itselI as written is constitutional, the manner in which it will be administered should not be tainted with unconstitutionality (Myles Salt Co. vs. Board oI Commrs., 239 US 478, 60 L. Ed. 392, 36 Sct 204). To obviate the possibility oI an unconstitutional exercise oI power the Iollowing saIeguards are recommended and/or expected to be undertaken:
a) The President can be expected to indicate a reasonable time Irame Ior the completion oI the reorganization provided Ior in the Act and the issuance oI the corresponding implementing Order.
b) Appointments and their eIIectivity should be simultaneous with, or as close as possible, to the declaration by the President oI the completion oI the reorganization under Section 44 to avoid any detriment to the smooth and continuous Iunctioning oI the judicial machinery.
c) The services oI those not separated should be deemed uninterrupted, as recommended by the Committee on Judicial Reorganization (Article XI oI its Report).
9. For the speedy implementation oI the law, the Supreme Court can be expected to submit to the President within thirty (30) days Irom the date oI Iinality oI its Decision the staIIing pattern Ior all Courts required by Section 43.
I am constrained to disagree with the suggestion oI one oI the amici curiae that the staIIing pattern be made to include the names oI Judges. The staIIing pattern Ior Judges is already clearly and explicitly provided in the law itselI which enumerates the various Judges and Justices in their hierarchical order. Furthermore, to include the superior positions oI Judges would depart Irom the traditional concept oI a staIIing pattern, which reIers more to personnel organization and corresponding salaries oI inIerior employees. It is also constitutionally objectionable in that it would interIere with the prerogative oI appointment intrinsically executive in nature (Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 |1966|; Government oI the Philippines vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 |1927|). The President may not be deprived oI, nor be limited in, the Iull use oI his discretion in the appointment oI persons to any public oIIice. Nothing should so trench upon executive choice as to be, in eIIect, judicial designation.
10. A word oI explanation. II I had resolved not to inhibit myselI in this case upon motion Iiled by petitioners, it was because the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, oI which I was privileged to be a member, conIined its work to the recommendation oI options and guidelines in the task oI reorganization. The Committee had no part whatsoever in the draIting oI the bill nor in the public hearings conducted. In Iact, some oI its recommendations like the circuitization or regionalization oI the Intermediate Appellate Court, the appellation oI members oI the Judiciary, the conIinement oI the jurisdiction oI the Intermediate Appellate Court merely to appellate jurisdiction, the adoption oI the system Iound in the United Kingdom and in Commonwealth countries oI having a Court oI general jurisdiction with trial and appellate divisions, were not availed oI in the Iinal Act.
11. Lastly, but by no means the least, I entertain no doubt that reliance can be placed on the good Iaith oI the President that all the deserving, upon considerations oI "eIIiciency, integrity, length oI service and other relevant Iactors shall be appointed to a strengthened and revitalized judicial system in the interest oI public service; that appointments will not be unduly delayed; and that appointees will be evaluated thoroughly to ensure quality and impartiality in the men and women who will keep vigil over our judicial ramparts.
ERICTA, J., concurring:
I concur in the view that the Judiciary reorganization law is not unconstitutional. It does not violate the principle oI security oI tenure oI judges.
The Constitution grants to the Batasang Pambansa the power to create courts inIerior to the Supreme Court (Article X, Section 1). All existing inIerior courts were created by law. No law is irrepealable. The power to create an oIIice includes the power to abolish the same. (Urgelio vs. Osmea 9 SCRA 317; Maza vs. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142)
Security oI tenure cannot be invoked when there is no removal oI a public oIIicer or employee but an abolition oI his oIIice. (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903; Cruz vs. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998; Baldoz vs. OIIice oI the President, 78 SCRA 354, 362) A distinction should be made between removal Irom oIIice and abolition oI an oIIice. Removal implies that the oIIice subsists aIter ouster, while, in abolition, the oIIice no longer exists thereby terminating the right oI the incumbent to exercise the rights and duties oI the oIIice. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)
The power oI the legislative branch oI the government to abolish courts inIerior to the Supreme Court has long been established. (Ocampo vs. Secretary oI Justice, 51 O.G. 147). What is only needed is that the abolition passes the test oI good Iaith. it need only be shown that said abolition oI the courts is merely incidental to a bona Iide reorganization. (Urgelio vs. Osmea supra.)
It is unthinkable to impute bad Iaith to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization composed oI Iour (4) distinguished members oI the Supreme Court, the Minister oI Justice and the Deputy Minister oI Justice, and to the members oI the Batasang Pambansa whose combined eIIorts aIter a careIul study and deliberation resulted to the enactment oI a bill now signed into law as Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129. In his sponsorship speech, Justice Ricardo C. Puno declared the objectives oI the Judiciary Reorganization Law to be the Iollowing: (1) the attainment oI more eIIiciency in the disposal oI cases; (2) the improvement in the quality oI decisions by the courts that will result Irom the easing oI court dockets; and (3) structural changes to meet the exigencies oI present day Philippine Society and oI the Ioreseeable Iuture.
Admittedly, in the implementation oI the law, some Judges and Justices may be adversely aIIected. But in a conIlict between public interest and the individual interest oI some Judges and Justices, the public weal must prevail. The welIare oI the people is the supreme law.
The implementation oI the law will entail appointments to the new courts. The power oI appointment is the exclusive prerogative oI the President. The implementation oI the law should be leIt exclusively to the wisdom, patriotism and statesmanship oI the President.
PLANA, J., concurring:
As the lawmaking body has the power to create inIerior courts and deIine, prescribe and apportion their jurisdiction, so it has the power to abolish or replace them with other courts as long as the act is done in good Iaith and not Ior the purpose oI attaining an unconstitutional end. Good Iaith has thus become the crucial issue in the case at bar.
Upon an examination oI the legislative history oI Batas Pambansa 129, as has been done in the main opinion, it is maniIest that actual, not merely presumed good Iaith attended its enactment. On this basis, I concur in the opinion penned by the learned ChieI Justice, qualiIied only by the Iollowing observations:
1. Executive consultation with the Supreme Court. I believe the President is under no obligation to consult with the Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the President. Indeed, as the Supreme Court itselI has said, it cannot give advisory opinions (Bacolod Murcia Planters' Asso., Inc. vs. Bacolod Murcia milling Co., 30 SCRA 67; NWSA vs. Court oI Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 629) even to the President.
In the draIting oI the present Constitution, there was an attempt to vest the Supreme Court with the Iunction oI giving advisory opinions. The Iramers oI the Constitution, however, did not see Iit to adopt the proposal.
II the President should consult the Supreme Court on the implementation oI Batas Pambansa 129 and the Supreme Court should give its advice (leaving aside the question oI procedure), I believe the President would be Iree to Iollow or disregard the advice; but, in either case, there would be no guarantee that the implementing action would be upheld in one case or stricken down in the other.
2. Undue delegation oI legislative powers.
The petitioners have also assailed the constitutionality oI Batas Pambansa 129 on the ground that a provision thereoI (regarding Iixing oI compensation and allowances Ior members oI the Judiciary) constitutes an undue delegation unto the President oI legislative power.
As pointed out in the main opinion, the legislature has provided ample standards or guidelines Ior the implementation oI the delegated power, which makes the delegation inoIIensive. I would like to add however some observations on the doctrine oI undue delegation oI legislative power.
Under the old Constitution, when the abiding rule was separation oI legislative and executive powers, there was good reason to maintain the doctrine oI non-delegation oI legislative power. Otherwise, the principle oI separation oI governmental powers could be negated via unbridled delegation oI legislative power. The 1973 Constitution has however radically changed the constitutional set-up. There is now a commingling or Iusion oI executive and legislative powers in the hands oI the same group oI oIIicials. Cabinet members play a leading role in the legislative process, and members oI the Batasan actively discharge executive Iunctions. The Prime Minister indeed must come Irom its ranks. Under the circumstances, there is really not much sense in rigidly upholding the principle oI non-delegation oI legislative power, at least vis-a-vis the Executive Department. In a very real sense, the present Constitution has signiIicantly eroded the hoary doctrine oI non-delegation oI legislative power, although it has retained some provisions oI the old Constitution which were predicated on the principle oI non-delegation, this time perhaps not so much to authorize shiIting oI power and thereby correspondingly reduce the incidence oI "undue" delegation oI legislative power, as to avert the abdication thereoI.
In times oI war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President Ior a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution oI the Batasang Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment. (Art. VIII, Sec. 15.)
The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President to Iix within speciIied this and subject to such stations and restrictions as it may impose, tariII rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharIage dues, and other duties or imposts. |Ibid, Sec. 17(2).|
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Undoubtedly, no more crucial and transcendental issue oI such magnitude has conIronted the Philippine judiciary than in the present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by its title would reorganize all existing courts (except the nine-member Sandiganbayan 1 and the three- member Court oI Tax Appeals) and upon declaration by the President oI the completion oI the reorganization would unprecedentedly deem all the said courts "automatically abolished en masse and "the incumbents thereoI shall cease to hold oIIice." 2 The total abolition involves a total oI 1,663 judicial positions with 1,180 incumbent judges and 483 vacancies) as oI January 26, 1982 and the Act would eIIect an increase oI 230 judicial positions raising the total oI judicial positions to be Iilled by new appointments to 1,893. Notwithstanding the great deIerence due to enactments oI the Batasan, I regretably Iind myselI unable to join the ranks oI my esteemed colleagues in the majority who uphold the constitutionality oI the Act and have voted to dismiss the petition, Ior the Iollowing main considerations and reasons:
1. I go by the ruling oI the numerical majority oI seven Justices (namely, Pablo, Cesar Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista, Roberto Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, JJ.) in the leading 1955 case oI Ocampo 3 who Iell short by one vote to reach the constitutionally required 2/3 majority (at the time 8 out oI an 11-member Supreme Court) to declare unconstitutional and invalid section 3 oI Republic Act 1186 abolishing the positions oI 18 judges-at-large and 15 cadastral judges and removing or legislating out the incumbent judges Irom oIIice as against the contrary vote oI a minority oI 4 Justices (namely, then ChieI Justice Paras and Padilla, Alex Reyes and Labrador, JJ.) with the paradoxical situation that the last three named Justices voted Ior the validity oI the Act as a remedial measure that abolished said positions without permanent station which subjected them to a rigodon de jueces without the consent oI the Supreme Court, which they considered as "repulsive to an independent judiciary" and violative oI an express prohibitory provision oI the 1935 Constitution while Justice Alex Reyes conceded that otherwise he would go with the majority that "Congress may not, as a general rule, abolish a judicial post without allowing the incumbent to Iinish his term oI oIIice."
2. As then Associate, later ChieI Justice Cesar Bengzon remarked in his separate opinion "(T)he |adverse| outcome oI this litigation |sanctioning the ouster Irom oIIice oI the ten petitioners who were presiding diIIerent Courts oI First Instance, some as judges-at-large, others as cadastral judges, upon the enactment on June 19, 1954 oI R.A. 1186 abolishing the positions oI judges-at large and cadastral judges| is apt to revive the speculation whether wittingly or unwittingly the Constitution has Iurther weakened the usually weak judicial department because oI its 'innovative' requirement oI a 2/3 majority vote oI the Supreme Court to declare a statute unconstitutional, and 'never in our history has such a number oI judges oI Iirst instance |totalling 33 positions| been ousted through judicial reorganization.
His rationale that the express constitutional guaranty oI security oI tenure oI judges "during good behavior until they reach the age oI seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties oI their oIIice" 4 must prevail over the implied constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust the judges despite their constitutionally-secured tenure bears repeating thus:
A careIul analysis will perceive that whereas petitioners invoke an express guaranty or positive deIinition oI their term oI oIIice, the respondents rely on implied authority to abolish courts and the positions oI the respective judges. Accurately stated, respondents' deIense rests on a second inIerence deduced Irom such implied power, because they reason out thusly: Congress has express power to establish courts; thereIore it has implicit power to abolish courts and the positions oI judges oI such abolished courts (Iirst inIerence); and thereIore (second inIerence) Congress likewise has power to eject the judges holding such positions.
Resulting juridical situation. The implied authority invoked by respondents collides with the express guaranty oI tenure protecting the petitioners. Which shall prevail Obviously the express guaranty must override the implied authority. "Implications can never be permitted to contradict the expressed intent or to deIeat its purpose."
xxx xxx xxx
But the collision may he should be avoided, and both sections given validity, iI one be considered a proviso or exception to the other. In other words, under the Constitution the Congress may abolish existing courts, provided it does not thereby remove the incumbent judges; such abolition to take eIIect upon termination oI their incumbent The Iundamental provisions on the matter are thereby coordinated and harmonized' as Justice Laurel suggested in his concurring opinion in Zandueta v. De la Costa. To bring about reconciliations is the great work oI jurists. (Cardozo, Paradoxes oI Legal Science, p. 6) 5
3. This reasoning that the express guaranty oI tenure protecting incumbent judges during good behavior unless removed Irom oIIice aIter hearing and due process or upon reaching the compulsory retirement age oI seventy years must override the implied authority oI removing by legislation the judges has been Iurther strengthened and placed beyond doubt by the new provisions oI the 1973 Constitution that transIerred the administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel Irom the ChieI Executive through the then Secretary oI Justice to the Supreme Court 6 and vested in the Supreme Court exclusively "the power to discipline judges oI inIerior courts and, by a vote oI at least eight members, order their dismissal," 7 Which power was Iormerly lodged by the Judiciary Act in the ChieI Executive.
As Iormer ChieI Justice Bengzon stressed in his opinion in Ocampo, the 1934 Constitutional Convention "Irowned on removal oI judges oI Iirst instance through abolition oI their oIIices or reorganization," citing ProIessor Jose Aruego's observation that the security oI judges' tenure provision was intended to "help secure the independence oI the judiciary" in that "during good behavior, they may not be legislated out oI oIIice by the law-making body nor removed by the ChieI Executive Ior any reason and under the guise oI any pretense whatsoever; they may stay in oIIice until they reach the age oI seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties oI their oIIice. (Aruego, The Framing oI the Philippine Constitution, Vol. 11, pp. 718-719)" He Iurther cited Aruego's report that a proposed amendment to the eIIect that the prohibition against transIers oI judges to another district without the approval oI the Supreme Court 8 "should not be applicable to a reorganization oI tribunals oI justice or oI districts, but the amendment was deIeated easily without debate" 9 and logically concluded that "(N)ow, there . beIore, having vetoed the transIer oI judges thru a re-organization, the Convention evidently could not have permitted the removal oI judges thru re-organization.
Now, iI the Iramers oI the 1973 Constitution wished to dispel the strong doubts, to say the least in the light oI the 7 to 4 vote in the Ocampo case against removal oI incumbent judges through legislative action by abolition oI their courts, then they would have so clearly provided Ior such Iorm oI removal in the 1973 Constitution, but on the contrary as already stated they ruled out such removal or ouster oI judges by legislative action by vesting exclusively in the Supreme Court the power oI discipline and removal oI judges oI all inIerior courts.
4. This being so, the Iundamental point emphasized by Iormer ChieI Justice Bengzon that abolition oI the 33 judicial positions in the Ocampo case was "merely an indirect manner oI removing the petitioners-judges" while the "positions |that| were eliminated . . . were in Iact substituted or replaced by other positions oI judges" applies with greater Iorce in the case at bar which involves an unprecedented total "abolition," thus: "(C)all it reorganization, or legislation or removal or abolition, this law disregards the constitutional assurance that these judges, once appointed, shall hold oIIice during good behavior ... |unless incapacitated and until retirement|.
The abolition oI their oIIices was merely an indirect manner oI removing these petitioners. Remember that on June 19, 1954, there were 107 judges oI Iirst instance, district judges, judges at-large and cadastral judges (Rep. Act 296). AIter the passage oI Republic Act No. 1186 there were 114 positions oI judges oI Iirst instance. There was no reduction there was increase in the number oI judges, nor in the number oI courts. The positions oI Judges-at-Large and Cadastral Judges were eliminated; but they were in Iact substituted or replaced by other positions oI judges; or iI you please, there was a mere change oI designation Irom 'Cadastral Judge or Judge at large to district judge Hence it should be ruled that as their positions had not been 'abolished' de Iacto, but actually retained with another name, these petitioners are entitled to remain in the service. (Brillo v. Enage, G.R. No. L-7115, March 30, 1954.) For it is not permissible to eIIect the removal oI one judge thru the expediency oI abolishing his oIIice even as the oIIice with same power is created with another name. (Brillo v. Enage, Malone v. Williams, 118 tenn. 391, Gibbe's Case 4 A.L.R. p. 211). In this view oI the picture, we believe, Congress could have, and should haveas suggested by Secretary Tuazon during the hearings in Congress directed in said Republic Act No. 1186 that 'the present judges-at-large and cadastral judges shall become district judges presiding such districts as may be Iixed by the President with the consent oI the Commission on Appointments or by the Secretary oI Justice, as originally proposed by Senator Laurel in connection with the same bill. Something similar was done beIore, and it would not be objectionable as an encroachment on the President's prerogative oI appointment, because such judges had already been appointed to the judiciary beIore the passage oI the act, and the provision may be construed in the light oI mere change oI oIIicial designation plus increase in salary."
5. Concededly, the questioned Act eIIects certain changes and procedural reIorms with more speciIic delineation oI jurisdiction as mentioned particularly in the majority opinion, but they do not change the basic structure oI the existing courts. The present Municipal Courts, Municipal Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts in the challenged Act. The Courts oI First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile & Domestic Relations Courts and Courts oI Agrarian Relations are all restructured and redesignated to be known by the common name oI Regional Trial Courts with provision Ior certain branches thereoI "to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reIorm cases . . . . and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest oI a speedy and eIIicient administration oI justice" 10 and the Court oI Appeals is restructured and redesignated as the Intermediate Appellate Court with an increase in the number oI Appellate Justices Irom the present 45 to 50 but with a reduction oI the number oI divisions Irom 15 (composed oI 3 Justices each) to 10 (composed oI 5 members each) such that it is Ieared that there is created a bottleneck at the appellate level in the important task discharged by such appellate courts as reviewers oI Iacts.
In my view, the "candid admission" by the ChieI Justice in his opinion Ior the Court "that he entertained doubts as to whether the intermediate court oI appeals provided Ior is a new tribunal" 10a is equally applicable to all the other above mentioned courts provided Ior in the challenged Act as "new courts". And the best prooI oI this is the plain and simple transitory provision in section 44 thereoI that upon the President's declaration oI completion oI the reorganization (whereby the "old courts" shall "be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereoI shall cease to hold oIIice "(T)he cases pending in the old Courts shall be transIerred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent Iunctions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel together with the "applicable appropriations." This could not have been possible without a speciIication and enumeration oI what speciIic cases oI the "old courts" would be transIerred to the particular "new courts," had these "new courts" not been maniIestly and substantially the "old courts" with a change oI name or as described by Justice Barredo to have been his Iirst view, now discarded, in his separate opinion: "just a renaming, and not a substantial and actual modiIication or alteration oI the present judicial structure or system" or "a rearrangement or remodeling oI the old structure." 11
6. I do not subscribe to the test oI good Iaith or bad Iaith in the abolition oI the courts and consequent ouster oI the incumbent judges Irom oIIice as expounded by the late eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel in his separate concurring opinion in the pre-war case oI Zandueta 12 wherein the Court dismissed the petition Ior quo warranto on the ground oI petitioner Zandueta's estoppel and abandonment oI oIIice. 13 Realistically viewed Irom the basis oI the established legal presumptions oI validity and constitutionality oI statutes (unless set aside by a 2/3 majority oI 10 members oI the Supreme Court) and oI good Iaith in their enactment, one is hard put to conjure a case where the Court could speculate on the good or bad motives behind the enactment oI the Act without appearing to be imprudent and improper and declare that "the legislative power oI reorganization (is) sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose." The good Iaith in the enactment oI the challenged Act must needs be granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative power to abolish courts as implied Irom the power to establish them with the express constitutional guaranty oI tenure oI the judges which is essential Ior a Iree and independent judiciary. Adherents oI the Rule oI Law are agreed that indispensable Ior the maintenance oI the Rule oI Law is a Iree and independent judiciary, sworn to protect and enIorce. it without Iear or Iavor "Iree, not only Irom graIt, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even Irom the tentacles oI interIerence and insiduous inIluence oI the political powers that be to quote again Irom Justice Barredo's separate concurring opinion. 14 Hence, my adherence to the 7-member majority opinion oI Iormer ChieI Justice Bengzon in the Ocampo case, supra, as restated by the Philippine Association oI Law ProIessors headed by Iormer ChieI Justice Roberto Concepcion that "any reorganization should at least snow the incumbents oI the existing courts to remain in oIIice |the appropriate counterpart 'new courts'| unless they are removed Ior cause."
7. The "judges' broader and stronger guarantees oI tenure than ordinary civil servants" as stressed by Iormer ChieI Justice Bengzon in Ms majority opinion in Ocampo is based on the judiciary's status as a coequal and coordinate branch oI government, whereas the long line oI Philippine cases upholding the legislative power to abolish oIIices reIers to oIIicers or employees in the executive branch oI government and "the underlying consideration must be borne in mind that Manalang |the aggrieved petitioner| belonged to the Executive Department and because the President approved the law no question or encroachment by one branch on the other could be apprehended or alleged. 15 This is not a matter oI personal privilege Ior the incumbent judges but as aptly stated by Iormer U.P. Law Dean Irene Cortez in her memorandum as amicus curiae, "Ior the judiciary whose independence is not only eroded but is in grave danger oI being completely destroyed." Dean Cortez aptly stressed that "judicial independence is not a guarantee intended Ior the Supreme Court alone, it extends to the entire court system and is even more vital to the courts at the lowest levels because there are more oI them and they operate closest to the people," and "(P)articularly under the present Iorm oI modiIied parliamentary government with legislative and executive Iunctions overlapping and in certain areas merging, the judiciary is leIt to perIorm the checking Iunction in the perIormance oI which its independence assumes an even more vital importance. "
The extensive memoranda Iiled by Dean Cortez and other amici curiae such as Iormer Senator Jose W. Diokno who strongly urges the Court to strike down the Act "to prevent Iurther destruction oI judicial independence," Iormer Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, president oI the Philippine Constitution Association who advocates Ior the Court's adoption oI the B Bengzon majority opinion in the Ocampo case so as to abide by "the elementary rule in the interpretation oI constitutions that eIIect should be given to all parts oI the Constitution" and that the judges' security oI tenure guaranty should not be rendered meaningless and inoperative" Iormer Solicitor General Arturo A. AlaIriz, president oI the Philippine Lawyers' Association who submits that the total abolition oI all courts below the Supreme Court (except the Sandiganbayan and the Court oI Tax Appeals) and the removal oI the incumbent Justices and Judges "violates the independence oI the judiciary, their security oI tenure and right to due process guaranteed them by the Constitution" and Atty. Raul M. Gonzales, president oI the National Bar Association oI the Philippines who invokes the Declaration oI Delhi at the ICJ ConIerence in 1959, that "The principles oI unremovability oI the Judiciary and their Security oI Tenure until death or until a retiring age Iixed by statute is reached, is an important saIeguard oI the Rule oI Law" have greatly helped in IortiIying my views.
8. I had submitted in my memo oI September 4, 1980 to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization that "(W)hatever reorganization plans the committee may recommend to meet the worldwide problem oI congested court dockets, and to improve judicial services in the public interest, it should be borne in mind that the members oI the judiciary as the weakest branch oI government, yet called upon to saIeguard the people's rights and protect them oppression, oIIicial and otherwise, are entitled to security oI tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even though the lower courts may be reshuIIled or abolished in the process, the mandate and spirit oI the Constitution guaranteeing their security oI tenure and maintaining the independence oI the judiciary should be respected, and they should be retained in the new courts."
In the same vein, Dean Cortez warned oI the dire consequences oI giving the questioned provisions oI the Act the "absolutist sense which they appear to have at Iirst blush" thus: "(T)o accept legislative power to abolish courts asserted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which sweeps through practically the entire judiciary would be to open the door to Iuture court abolitions in the guise oI reorganization. At this stage oI our political development, the process oI embarking upon a modiIied parliamentary system may well usher in a situation where despite guarantees oI judicial tenure, each ruling party in the legislature or any alliance that can command a majority vote may periodically undertake complete reorganization and remove judges, thus making oI the judiciary a veritable straw in the political wind and "(F)urthermore, what can result in the modiIied parliamentary system Irom the close working relationship between executive and legislature is made maniIest in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. II the sweeping revamp provided were to be carried out the President would appoint all oI the justices and judges oI the courts aIIected and the whole membership in the judiciary Irom the highest to the lowest courts would be his appointees. It is relevant to point out that it is precisely a situation like this that the Constitution seeks to avoid when it provides staggered terms Ior the chairman and members oI the constitutional commissions which like the judiciary are guaranteed independence."
9. The judges' security oI tenure was rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions oI the 1973 Constitution which granted the incumbent President the unlimited power to remove and replace all judges and oIIicials 16 (as against the limited one-year period Ior the exercise oI such power granted President Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon establishment oI the Philippine Commonwealth Upon the declaration oI martial law in September, 1972, justices and judges oI all courts, except the Supreme Court, had been required to hand in their resignations. There is listed a total oI 53 judges who were replaced or whose resignations were accepted by the President during the period Irom September, 1972 to April, 1976. The power to replace even the judges appointed aIter the eIIectivity on January 17, 1973 oI the 1973 Constitution is yet invoked on behalI oI the President in the pending case oI Tapucar vs. Famador 17 notwithstanding the generally held view that such post-1973 Constitution appointed judges are not subject to the Replacement Clause oI the cited Transitory Provision. (In this case, petitioner judge appointed on January 30, 1976 as judge oI the Court oI First Instance oI Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 1, invoked his constitutional security oI tenure and questioned the appointment extended on February 26, 1980 to respondent to replace him, although he had not been removed or otherwise dismissed Irom his position nor had be resigned thereIrom. The Court per its March 27, 1980 resolution ordered both to reIrain Irom discharging the Iunctions oI the questioned oIIice And now comes this total abolition oI 1,663 judicial positions (and thousands oI personnel positions) unprecedented in its sweep and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen the judiciary with the restoration oI the security oI tenure oI judges, which is essential Ior a Iree and independent judiciary as mandated by the Constitution, not to make more enIeebled an already Ieeble judiciary, possessed neither oI the power oI the sword nor the purse, as decried by Iormer ChieI Justice Bengzon in his Ocampo majority opinion:
Shall we have judges oI the type oI Lord Coke Or judges, who, in his place, would have answered 'I'll do what his majesty pleases,' judges who, aIraid oI ouster thru a judiciary reshuIIle, would rather serve the interests oI the party in power or oI the political boss, than the interests oI justice?
As it is, the Judicial Department is Ieeble enough. Shall we render it Ieebler with judges precariously occupying their oIIicial seats Judges perIorming their duties under the sword oI Damocles oI Iuture judicial reorganizations
10. The ChieI Justice, in his opinion Ior the Court, equally stressed that "what is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its Iull authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually Iormulated in a caucus oI the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun vs. Labang 18 it as stressed that with the provision transIerring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need 'to preserve unimpaired the independence oI the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intends and purposes, there is a Iusion between the executive and the legislative branches,'" 19 with the Iurther observation that "many are the ways by which such independence could be eroded." In the cited case oI Judge Fortun (likewise penned by the ChieI Justice Ior the Court), the Court issued a writ oI prohibition and certiorari ordering the dismissal oI the criminal complaint Iiled with respondent Iiscal Labang by "disgruntled members oI the bar with a record oI losing cases" in the judge's court and imposed the penalty oI censure on each and everyone oI the private respondents-lawyers Ior the "unseemly haste" with which they Iiled the criminal complaint, abetted by "the appearance oI sheer vindictiveness or oppressive exercise oI state authority." The Court marked the "violation oI the cardinal principles oI Iairness and due process that underlie the Rule oI Law. Petitioner- Judge was not heard; he was denied the opportunity to deIend himselI against the accusation. There was, on the part oI private respondents then, a Iailure to abide by a Resolution oI the Integrated Bar stressing that precisely integration could shield 'the judiciary which traditionally cannot deIend itselI except within its own Iorum, Irom the assaults that politics and selI-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence,' " and that such subjection oI a judge to public "harassment and humiliation . . . can diminish public conIidence in the courts."
11. This brings us to the allegedly underlying need Ior B.P. Blg. 129 discussed in the course oI committee hearings oI Cabinet Bill No. 42 and the deliberation on second reading in the Batasang Pambansa to rid the judiciary oI incompetent and corrupt judges and to restore conIidence in the integrity oI the courts. The purge has been the constant subject oI headlines and editorials, with the Ministry oI Justice's Integrity Council reportedly screening and conducting "integrity tests as to new applicants and the incumbent judges 20 and seeking "conIidential inIormation on corrupt and incompetent judges to help the government purge the judiciary." 21 Prime Minister Cesar Virata was quoted as saying that "there will be a purge oI the corrupt and the misIits' when the Judiciary Reorganization Act is signed into law by President Marcos and implemented in coordination with the Supreme Court." 22 The public respondents' answer sidesteps the issue oI such purge contravening the rudiments oI a Iair hearing and due process and submits that "no term oI oIIice is sacrosanct when demanded beIore the altar oI the public good." The metropolitan papers reported the "anxiety gripping the judiciary as the Ministry oI Justice has reportedly been asked to collate inIormation 'on the perIormance oI the judges and on the qualiIications oI those slated to take over the positions oI the incompetent, the ineIIicient or those involved in irregularities. As stated in an editorial, 'Somehow, the uncertainty that now hovers over the judiciary has unduly subjected the judges to mental torture since they do not know when or whether the axe will Iall on them. Worse, the sword oI Damocles hanging over their heads could provoke them into seeking the help oI people claiming to have inIluence with the powers that be." 23
But Dean Cortez in her memorandum states that "However, nowhere on public record is there hard evidence on this. The only Iigures given in the course oI the committee hearings were to the eIIect that out oI some 1,700 members oI the judiciary, between 10 to 15 were oI the undesirable category, i.e. misIit, incompetent or corrupts. (Barredo, J., beIore the Committee on Justice, human Rights and Good Government, December 4, 1980)," and that "(I)I this be the case, the unprecedented, sweeping and wholesale abolition oI judicial oIIices becomes an arbitrary act, the eIIect oI which is to assert the power to remove all the incumbents guilty or innocent without due process oI law." Now would it be oI any avail to beg the question and assert that due process is not available in mass abolitions oI courts.
Justice Barredo, however, without citing any hard evidence, reIers in his separate concurrence to twin objectives oI getting rid oI " structural inadequacies oI the system or oI the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in Iorce and oI "a good number oI those occupying positions in the judiciary (who') make a mockery oI justice and take advantage oI their oIIice Ior personal ends He adds that "it is my personal assessment oI the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be oI necessity two- pronged, as I have just indicated, Ior the most Ideal judicial system with the most perIect procedural rules cannot satisIy the people and the interests oI justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character, competence and sense oI loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations oI graIt and corruption, including the usual importunings and the Iearsome albeit improper pressures oI the powers that be," 24 and invokes the adage oI "grandes males, grandes remedios" to now uphold the validity oI the Act.
Former Senator Diokno in his memorandum anticipates the argument that "great ills demand drastic cures" thus: "Drastic, yes but not unIair nor unconstitutional. One does not improve courts by abolishing them, any more than a doctor cures a patient by killing him. The ills the judiciary suIIers Irom were caused by impairing its independence; they will not be cured by totally destroying that independence. To adopt such a course would only breed more perversity in the administration oI justice, just as the abuses oI martial rule have bred more subversion."
12. Finally, as stated by the 19-i 5 integrated Bar oI the Philippines 2nd House oI Delegates, "It would, indeed, be most ironical iI Judges who are called upon to give due process cannot count it on themselves. Observance oI procedural due process in the separation oI misIits Irom (he Judiciary is the right way to attain a laudable objective. '
As stressed by the ChieI Justice in the Fortun case, judges are entitled to the cardinal principles oI Iairness and due process and the opportunity to be heard and deIend themselves against the accusations made against their and not to be subjected to harassment and humiliation, and the Court will repudiate the "oppressive exercise oI legal authority." More so, are judges entitled to such due process when what is at stake is their constitutionally guaranteed security oI tenure and non-impairment oI the independence oI the judiciary and the proper exercise oI the constitutional power exclusively vested in the Supreme Court to discipline and remove judges aIter Iair hearing.
In sum, I see no reason to change the stand submitted by me to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization that
Judges oI inIerior courts should not be summarily removed and branded Ior liIe in such reorganization on the basis oI conIidential adverse reports as to their perIormance, competence or integrity, save those who may voluntarily resign Irom oIIice upon being conIronted with such reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte reports, without due process or hearing, has been proven Irom our past experience where a number oI honest and competent judges were summarily removed while others who were generally believed to be basket cases have remained in the service; and
The power oI discipline and dismissal oI judges oI all inIerior courts, Irom the Court oI Appeals down, has been vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and iI the judiciary is to be strengthened, it should be leIt to clean its own house upon complaint and with the cooperation oI the as grieved parties and aIter due process and hearing.
The constitutional conIrontation and conIlict may wen be avoided by holding that since the changes and provisions oI the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and Iunctions oI the "new courts" therein provided as compared to the "abolished old courts" but provide Ior procedural changes, Iixed delineation oI jurisdiction and increases in the number oI courts Ior a more eIIective and eIIicient disposition oI court cases, -the incumbent judges guaranteed security oI tenure require that they be retained in the corresponding "new courts."
Fernandez, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I join the majority oI my brethren in voting that the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is not unconstitutional as a whole nor in any oI its parts.
The issue oI unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44 oI the Act which reads as Iollows:
SEC. 44. Transitory provisions. The provisions oI this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court oI Appeals, the Courts oI First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts oI Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to Iunction as presently constituted and organized, until the completion oI the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereoI shall cease to hold oIIice. The cases pending in the old Courts shall e transIerred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent Iunctions, records, equipment,. property and the necessary personnel.
The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transIerred to the appropriate courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary Irom the Iunds Ior organizational changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said Iunding shall thereaIter be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which mandates that "upon the declaration upon the President that the reorganization contemplated in the Act has been completed), the said courts (meaning the Court oI Appeals and all other lower courts, except the Sandiganbayan and the Court oI Tax Appeals) shall be deemed abolished and the incumbents thereoI shall cease to hold oIIice" trenches on all the constitutional saIeguards and guarantees oI the independence oI the judiciary, such as the security oI tenure oI its members (Section 7, Article X oI the Philippine Constitution oI 1973), the prerogatives oI the Supreme Court to administratively supervise all courts and the personnel thereoI (Section 6, Id.) and principally, the power oI the Supreme Court "to discipline judges oI inIerior courts and, by a vote oI at least eight Members, order their dismissal. " (Section 7, Id.)
On the other hand, respondents maintain that thru the above-quoted Section 44. the Batasan did nothing more than to exercise the authority conIerred upon it be Section I oI the same Article oI the Constitution which provides that The Judicial power shall be rested in one Supreme Court and in such inIerior courts as may be established by law." In other words, since all inIerior courts are, constitutionally speaking, mere creatures oI the law (oI the legislature it Iollows that it is within the legislature's power to abolish or reorganize them even iI in so doing, it might result in the cessation Irom oIIice oI the incumbents thereoI beIore the expiration oI their respective constitutionally Iixed tenures. Respondents emphasize that the legislative power in this respect is broad and indeed plenary.
Viewing the problem beIore Us Irom the above perspectives, it would appear that our task is either (1) to reconcile, on the one hand, the parliament's power oI abolition and reorganization with, on the other, the security oI tenure oI members oI the judiciary and the Supreme Court's authority to discipline and remove judges or (2) to declare that either the power oI the Supreme Court or oI the Batasan is more paramount than that oI the other. I believe. however, that such a manner oI looking at the issue that conIronts Us only conIuses and compounds the task We are called upon to perIorm. For how can there be a satisIactory and rational reconciliation oI the pretended right oI a judge to continue as such, when the position occupied by him no longer exists? To suggest, as some do, that the solution is Ior the court he is sitting in not to be deemed abolished or that he should in some way be allowed to continue to Iunction as judge until his constitutional tenure expires is obviously impractical, iI only because we would then have the absurd spectacle oI a judiciary with old and new courts Iunctioning under distinct set-ups, such as a district court continuing as such in a region where the other judges are regional judges or oI judges exercising powers not purely judicial which is oIIensive to the Constitution. The other suggestion that the incumbent oI the abolished court should be deemed appointed to the corresponding new court is even worse, since it would deprive the appointing authority, the president, oI the power to make his own choices and would, Iurthermore, amount to an appointment by legislation which is a Constitutional anachronism. more on this point later .
Inasmuch as pursuant to the analysis oI the majority oI the Members oI this Court, in Iact and in law, the structure oI judicial system created by Batas Pambansa 129 is substantially diIIerent Irom that under the Judiciary Act oI 1948, as amended, hence the courts now existing are actually being abolished, why do We have to indulge in any reconciliation or Ieel bound to determine whose power, that oI the Batasang Pambansa or that oI this Court, should be considered more imperious? It being conceded that the power to create or establish carries with it the power to abolish, and it is a legal axiom, or at least a pragmatic reality that the tenure oI the holder oI an oIIice must oI necessity end when his oIIice no longer exists, as I see it, be have no alternative than to hold that petitioners' invocation oI the independence oI the judiciary principle oI the Constitution is unavailing ill the cases at bar. It is as simple as that. I might hasten to add, in this connection, that to insist that what Batas Pambansa 129 is doing is just a renaming and not a substantial and actual modiIication or alteration oI the present judicial structure or system assuming a close scrutiny might somehow support such a conclusion, is pure wishIul thinking, it being explicitly and unequivocally provided in the section in question that said courts are deemed abolished" and Iurther, as iI to make it most unmistakably emphatic, that "the incumbents thereat shall cease to hold oIIice." Dura les, sed les. As a matter oI Iact, I cannot conceive oI a more emphatic way oI maniIesting and conveying the determined legislative intent about it.
Now, why am I yielding to the above reasoning and conclusion? Why don't I insist on championing the cause oI the independence oI the judiciary by maintaining that the constitutional saIeguards thereoI I have already enumerated earlier must be respected in any reorganization ordained by the parliament My answer is simple. Practically all the Members oI the Court concede that what is contemplated is not only general reorganization but abolition in other words, not only a rearrangement or remodelling oI the old structure but a total demolition thereoI to be Iollowed by the building oI a new and diIIerent one. I am practically alone in contemplating a diIIerent view. True, even iI I should appear as shouting in the wilderness, I would still make myselI a hero in the eyes oI man justices and judges, members oI the bar and concerned discerning citizens, all lovers oI the judicial independence, but understandably, I should not be, as I am not, disposed to play such a role virtually at the expense not only oI my distinguished colleagues but oI the Batasang Pambansa that Iramed the law and, most oI all, the President who signed and, thereIore, sanctioned the Act as it is, unless I am absolutely sure that my position is Iormidable, unassailable and beyond all possible contrary ratiocination, which I am not certain oI, as I shall demonstrate anon.
To start with, the jurisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the question now beIore Us cannot be said to be clear and consistent, much less unshakeable and indubitably deIinite either way. None oI the local cases 1 relied upon and discussed by the parties and by the Members oI the Court during the deliberations, such as Borromeo, 2 Ocampo, 3 Zandueta, 4 Brillo, 5 etc. can, to my mind, really serve as reliable pole stars that could lead me to certainty oI correctness.
OI course, my instinct and passion Ior an independent judiciary are uncompromising and beyond diminution. Indeed, my initial reactions, publicly known, about Batas Pambansa 129 explaining academically its apparent tendency to invade the areas oI authority oI the Supreme Court, not to speak oI its dangerously impairing the independence oI the judiciary, must have, I imagine, created the impression that I would vote to declare the law unconstitutional. But, during the deliberations oI the Court, the combined wisdom oI my learned colleagues was something I could not discount or just brush aside. Pondering and thinking deeper about all relevant Iactors, I have come to the conviction that at least on this day and hour there are justiIiable grounds to uphold the Act, iI only to try how it will operate so that thereby the people may see that We are one with the President and the Batasan in taking what appear to be immediate steps needed to relieve the people Irom a Iast spreading cancer in the judiciary oI our country.
Besides, the Philippines has somehow not yet returned to complete normalcy The improved national discipline so evident during the earlier days oI martial law, has declined at a quite discernible degree. DiIIerent sectors oI society are demanding urgent reIorms in their respective Iield And about the most vehement and persistent, loud and clear, among their gripes, which as a matter oI Iact is common to all oI them is that about the deterioration in the quality oI perIormance oI the judges manning our courts and the slow and dragging pace oI pending judicial proceedings. Strictly speaking, this is, to be sure, something that may not necessarily be related to lack oI independence oI the judiciary. It has more to do with the ineptness and/or corruption among and corruptibility oI the men sitting in the courts in some parts oI the country And what is worse, while in the communities concerned the malady is known to Iactually exist and is actually graver and widespread, very Iew, iI any individuals or even associations and organized groups, truly incensed and anxious to be oI help, have the courage and possess the requisite legal evidence to come out and Iile the corresponding charges with the Supreme Court, And I am not vet reIerring to similar situations that are not quite openly known but nevertheless just as deleterious. On the other hand, iI all these intolerable instances should actually be Iormally brought to the Supreme Court, it would be humanly impossible Ior the Court to dispose oI them with desirable dispatch, what with the thousands oI other cases it has to attend to and the rather cumbersome strict requirements oI procedural due process it has to observe in each and every such administrative case all oI which are time consulting. Verily, under the Ioregoing circumstances, it may be said that there is justiIication Ior the patience oI the people about the possibility oI early eradication oI this disease or evil in our judiciary pictured above to be nearing the breaking point.
Withal, we must bear in mind that judicial reorganization becomes urgent and inevitable not alone because oI structural inadequacies oI the system or oI the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in Iorce, but also when it becomes evident that a good number oI those occupying positions in the judiciary, make a mockery oI justice and take advantage oI their oIIice Ior selIish personal ends and yet, as already explained, those in authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation under existing laws and rules. It is my personal assessment oI the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be oI necessity two-pronged, as I have just indicated, Ior the most Ideal judicial system with the most perIect procedural rules cannot satisIy the people and the interests oI justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character, competence and sense oI loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to an temptations oI graIt and corruption, including the usual importunings and the Iearsome albeit improper pressures oI the powers that be. I am certain that the Filipino people Ieel happy that Batas Pambansa 129 encompasses both oI these objectives, which indeed are aligned with the Ioundation oI the principle oI independence oI the judiciary.
The above premises considered, I have decided to tackle our problem Irom the viewpoint oI the unusual situation in which our judiciary is presently perilously situated. Needless to say, to all oI us, the Members oI the Court, the constitutional guarantees oI security oI tenure and removal only by the Supreme Court, among others, against impairment oI the independence oI the judiciary, which is one oI the bedrock's and, thereIore, oI the essence in any "democracy under a regime oI justice, peace, liberty and equality (Preamble oI the 1973 Constitution), are priceless and should be deIended, most oI all by the Supreme Court, with all the wisdom and courage God has individually endowed to each oI Us. Withal, we are all conscious oI the Iact that those saIeguards have never been intended to place the person oI the judge in a singular position oI privilege and untouchability, but rather, that they are essentially part and parcel oI what is required oI an independent judiciary where judges can decide cases and do justice to everyone beIore them ruat caelum. However, We Iind Ourselves Iace to Iace with a situation, in our judiciary which is oI emergency proportions and to insist on rationalizing how those guarantees should be enIorced under such a circumstance seem to be diIIicult, aside Irom being controversial. And so, in a real sense, We have to make a choice between adhering to the strictly legalistic reasoning pursued by petitioners, on the one hand, and the broader and more practical approach, which as I have said is within the spirit at least oI the Constitution.
My concept oI the Constitution is that it is not just a cluster oI high sounding verbiages spelling purely Idealism and nobility in the recognition oI human dignity, protection oI individual liberties and providing security and promotion oI the general welIare under a government oI laws. With all emphasis and vehemence, I say that the Iundamental law oI the land is a living instrument which translates and adapts itselI to the demands oI obtaining circumstances. It is written Ior all seasons, except Ior very unusual instances that human ratiocination cannot justiIy to be contemplated by its language even iI read in its broadest sense and in the most liberal way. Verily, it is paramount and supreme in peace and in war, but even in peace grave critical situations arise demanding recourse to extraordinary solutions. Paraphrasing the Spanish adage, "Grandes males, grandes remedios ", such in ordinary problems justiIy exceptional remedies. And so, history records that in the Iace oI grave crises and emergencies, the most constitutionally Idealistic countries have, at one time or another, under the pressure oI pragmatic considerations, adopted corresponding realistic measures, which perilously tether along the periphery oI their Charters, to the extent oI creating impressions, oI course erroneous, that the same had been transgressed, although in truth their integrity and imperiousness remained undiminished and unimpaired.
The Philippines has but recently had its own experience oI such constitutional approach. When martial law was proclaimed here in 1972, there were those who vociIerously shouted not only that the President had acted arbitrarily and without the - required Iactual bases contemplated in the Commander-in-ChieI clause oI the 1935 Constitution, but more, that he had gone beyond the traditional and universally recognized intent oI said clause by utilizing his martial law powers not only to maintain peace and tranquility and preserve and deIend the integrity and security oI the state but to establish a New Society The critics contended that martial law is only Ior national security, not Ior the imposition oI national discipline under a New Society.
Due to its relevancy to Our present discussion, it is well Ior everyone to bear in mind that in this jurisdiction, this concept oI martial law has already been upheld several times by this Court. 1, Ior one, accepted such a construction because I Iirmly believe that to impose martial law Ior the sole end oI suppressing an insurrection or rebellion without coincidentally taking corresponding measures to eradicate the root causes oI the uprising is utter Iolly, Ior the country would still continue to lay open to its recurrence.
I have made the Ioregoing discourse, Ior it is Iundamentally in the Iight oI this Court's doctrines about the imposition oI martial law as I have stated that I preIer to base this concurrence. To put it diIIerently, iI indeed there could be some doubt as to the correctness oI this Court's judgment that Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional, particularly its Section 44, I am convinced that the critical situation oI our judiciary today calls Ior solutions that may not in the eyes oI some conIorm strictly with the letter oI the Constitution but indubitably justiIied by its spirit and intent. As 1 have earlier indicated, the Charter is not just a construction oI words to whose literal iron-clad meanings we must Ieel hidebound without regard to every Constitution's desirable inherent nature oI adjustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and Iundamental intent and objectives oI the Iramers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one such adaptation that comes handy Ior the attainment oI the transcendental objectives it seeks to pursue While, to be sure, it has the eIIect oI Iactually easing out some justices and judges beIore the end oI their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual administrative investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru means that, in the light oI the prevailing conditions, is constitutionally permissible.
BeIore closing, it may not be amiss Ior me to point out that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, aside Irom what has been discussed about its eIIect on the guarantees oI judicial independence, also preempts, in some oI its provisions, the primary rule-making power oI the Supreme Court in respect to procedure, practice and evidence. With the pardon oI my colleagues, I would just like to say that the Court should not decry this development too much. AIter all, the legislature is expressly empowered by the Charter to do so, (Section 5(5), Article X oI the Constitution oI 1973) so much so, that I doubt iI the Court has any authority to alter or modiIy any rule the Batasang Pambansa enunciates. Truth to tell, as Chairman oI the Committee on the Revision oI the Rules oI Court, Ior one reason or another, principally the lack oI a clear consensus as to what some oI my colleagues consider very radical proposals voiced by me or my committee, We have regrettably procrastinated long enough in making our procedural rules more practical and more conducive to speedier disposal and termination oI controversies by dealing more with substantial justice.
So also have We, it must be conIessed, Iailed to come up to expectations oI the Iramers oI the Constitution in our ways oI disposing oI administrative complaints against erring and misconducting judges. OI course, We can excuse Ourselves with the explanation that not only are We overloaded with work beyond human capability oI its being perIormed expeditiously, but that the strict requisites oI due process which are time consuming have precluded Us Irom being more expeditious and speedy.
I Ieel I must say all oI these, because iI the above-discussed circumstances have not combined to create a very critical situation in our judiciary that is making the people lose its Iaith and conIidence in the administration oI justice by the existing courts, perhaps the Court could look with more sympathy at the stand oI petitioners. I want all the sundry to know, however, that notwithstanding this decision, the independence oI the judiciary in the Philippines is Iar Irom being insubstantial, much less meaningless and dead. Batas Pambansa 129 has precisely opened our eyes to how, despite doubts and misgivings, the Constitution can be so construed as to make it possible Ior those in authority to answer the clamor oI the people Ior an upright judiciary and overcome constitutional roadblocks more apparent than real.
To those justices, judges, members oI the bar and concerned citizens whose eyes may be dimming with tears oI disappointment and disenchantment because oI the stand I have chosen to adopt in these cases, may I try to assuage them by joining their Iervent prayers that some other day, hopeIully in the near Iuture, Divine Providence may dictate to another constitutional convention to write the guarantees oI judicial independence with ink oI deeper hue and words that are deIinite, clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, in drawing the line oI demarcation between the Parliament and the Judiciary in the manner that in His InIinite wisdom would most promote genuine and impartial justice Ior our people, Iree, not only Irom graIt, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even Irom the tentacles oI interIerence and insiduous inIluence oI the political powers that be. Presently, I am constrained Irom going along with any other view than that the Constitution allows abolition oI existing courts even iI the eIIect has to be the elimination oI any incumbent judge and the consequent cutting oI his constitutional tenure oI oIIice.
I cannot close this concurrence without reIerring to the apprehensions in some quarters about the choice that will ultimately be made oI those who will be eased out oI the judiciary in the course oI the implementation oI Batas Pambansa 129. By this decision, the Court has in Iactual eIIect albeit not in constitutional conception yielded generally to the Batasang Pambansa, and more speciIically to the President, its own constitutionally conIerred power oI removal oI judges. Section 44 oI the Batasan's Act declares that all oI them shall be deemed to have ceased to hold oIIice, leaving it to the President to appoint those whom he may see Iit to occupy the new courts. Thus, those who will not be appointed can be considered as "ceasing to hold their respective oIIices", or, as others would say they would be in Iact removed. How the President will make his choices is beyond Our power to control. But even iI some may be eased out even without being duly inIormed oI the reason thereIor, much less being given the opportunity to be heard the past actuations oI the President on all matters oI deep public interest shouted serve as suIIicient assurance that when lie ultimately acts, he will IaithIully adhere to his solemn oath "to do justice to every man hence, lie will equip himselI Iirst with the Iullest reliable inIormation beIore acts. This is not only my individual Iaith Iounded on my personal acquaintance with the character and sterling qualities oI President Ferdinand E. Marcos. I dare say this is the Iaith oI the nation in a man who has led it successIully through crises and emergencies, with justice to all, with malice towards none. I am certain, the President will deal with each and every individual to be aIIected by this reorganization with the best light that God will give him every moment he acts in each individual case as it comes Ior his decision
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The petitioners Iiled this petition Ior declaratory relieI and prohibition "to declare the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) unconstitutional".
The petition should have been dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relieI and prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the constitutionality oI the law. the petition is premature. No jurisdictional question is involved.
There is no justiciable controversy wherein the constitutionality oI the said law is in issue. It is presumed to be constitutional. The lawmaking body beIore enacting it looked into the constitutional angle.
Seven oI the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail the constitutionality oI the said law even as taxpayers.
The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge (who in 1977 Iiled a petition Ior declaratory relieI assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229, which called Ior a reIerendum. De la Llana his Comelec, 80 SCRA 525), has no cause oI action Ior prohibition. He is not being removed Irom his position.
The Judiciary Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good Iaith and not "to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose As ably expounded by the ChieI Justice, in enacting the said law, the lawmaking body acted within the scope oI its constitutional powers and prerogatives.
GUERRERO, J., concurring:
I concur with my distinguished and learned colleagues in upholding the constitutionality oI the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980. For the record, however, I would like to state my personal convictions and observations on this case, a veritable landmark case, Ior whatever they may be worth.
The legal basis oI the Court's opinion rendered by our esteemed ChieI Justice having been exhaustively discussed and decisively justiIied by him, a highly-respected expert and authority on constitutional law, it would be an exercise in duplication to reiterate the same cases and precedents. I am then constrained to approach the problem quite diIIerently, not through the classic methods oI philosophy, history and tradition, but Iollowing what the well-known jurist, Dean Pound, said that "the most signiIicant advance in the modern science oI law is the change Irom the analytical to the Iunctional attitude." 1 And in pursuing this direct
ion, I must also reckon with and rely on the ruling that "another guide to the meaning oI a statute is Iound in the evil which it is designed to remedy, and Ior this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention oI the legislative body." 2
I have no doubt in my mind that the institutional reIorms and changes envisioned by the law are clearly conducive to the promotion oI national interests. The objectives oI the legislation namely: (a) An institutional restructuring by the creation oI an Intermediate Appellate Court, thirteen (I 3) Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts: (b) A reappointment oI jurisdiction geared towards greater eIIiciency: (c) A simpliIication oI procedures and (d) The abolition oI the inIerior courts created by the Judiciary Act oI 1948 and other statutes, as approved by the Congress oI the Philippines 3 are undoubtedly intended to improve the regime oI justice and thereby enhance public good and order. Indeed, the purpose oI the Act as Iurther stated in the Explanatory Note, which is "to embody reIorms in the structure, organization and composition oI the Judiciary, with the aim oI improving the administration oI justice, oI decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with the more complex problems on the present and Iorseeable Iuture cannot but "promote the welIare oI society, since that is the Iinal cause oI law. 4
Hence, Irom the standpoint oI The general utility and Iunctional value oI the Judiciary Reorganization Act, there should be no diIIiculty, doubt or disbelieI in its legality and constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the judicial system is undeniable. The notorious and scandalous congestion oI court dockets as too well-known to be ignored as are the causes which create and produce such anomaly. Evident is the need to look Ior devices and measures that are more practical, workable and economical. 5
From the Iigures alone (301,497 pending cases in 1976; 351, 943 in 1977; 404, 686 in 1978; 426, 911 in 1979; 441, 332 in 1980; and 450, 063 as oI February 3, 1982) 6 the congested character oI court dockets rising year aIter year is staggering and enormous, looming like a legal monster.
But greater than the need to dispense justice speedily and promptly is the necessity to have Justices and Judges who are Iair and impartial, honest and incorruptible, competent and eIIicient. The general clamor that the prestige oI the Judiciary today has deteriorated and degenerated to the lowest ebb in public estimation is not without Iactual basis. Records in the Supreme Court attest to the unIitness and incompetence, corruption and immorality oI many dispensers oI justice. According to the compiled data, the total number oI Justices and Judges against whom administrative charges have been Iiled Ior various oIIenses, misconduct, venalities and other irregularities reaches 322. OI this total, 8 are Justices oI the Court oI Appeals, 119 CFI Judges, 2 Criminal Circuit Judges, 8 CAR Judges, 1 Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court Judge, 38 City Judges, and 146 Municipal Judges.
The Supreme Court has Iound 102 oI them guilty and punished them with either suspension, admonition, reprimand or Iine. The number includes 1 CA Justice, 35 CFI Judges, 1 CCC Judge, 3 CAR Judges, 1 JDRC Judge, 9 City Judges and 53 Municipal Judges.
Seventeen (17) Judges have been ordered dismissed and separated Irom the service. And these are 3 CFI, 1 CAR, 1 City Judge and 12 Municipal Judges.
Going over these administrative proceedings, it took an average oI two-year period Irom the Iiling oI the charge to the dismissal oI the respondent. In one case, the proceedings were terminated aIter seven years. How long the pending administrative cases will be disposed oI, only time will tell as an increasing number oI administrative cases are being Iiled by victims oI judicial misconduct, abuse and arbitrariness.
Excepting those who have been punished and dismissed Irom the service, there are many who have been castigated and censured in Iinal judgments oI the Supreme Court upon appeal or review oI the decisions, orders and other acts oI the respondent courts, Justices and Judges. To cite a Iew cases, Our decisions have categorically pronounced respondents' actuations, thus: "deplorable, giving no credit to the Judiciary" 7; applicable rules. The whole proceedings looked no more than a pre-arranged compromise between the accused and the Judge to Ilaunt the law and every norm oI propriety and procedure" 8; "there was a deliberate Iailure oI respondent Judge to respect what is so clearly provided in the Rules oI Court" 9; "It is unIortunate that respondent Judge Iailed to acquaint himselI with, 01' misinterpreted, those controlling provisions and doctrines" 10; "The Iailure oI the respondent Municipal Judge to yield obedience to authoritative decisions oI the Supreme Court and oI respondent Court oI First Instance Judge and his deplorable insistence on procedural technicalities was called down in L-49828, July 25, 1981. For peremptorily dismissing the third party complaint on the ground that the motion to dismiss was 'well-taken' and respondent Judge did not elaborate, the Court remarked: "May his tribe vanish." 11 In one case, We noted "There is here so something unusual, but Iar Irom palliating the gravity oI the error incurred, it merely exacerbated it. ... it did render the due process requirement nugatory, Ior instead oI a Iair and impartial trial, there was an Idle Iorm, a useless ceremony." 12
It is dishonorable enough to be publicly and oIIicially rebuked but to allow these Judges and their ilk to remain and continue to preside in their courtrooms is a disgrace to the Judiciary. It is to be deplored that the Supreme Court has not Iound time to exercise its power and authority in the premises, Ior no charges or proceedings have been instituted against them. We have a list oI these crooked Judges whose actuations have been Iound to be patiently wrong and maniIestly in-deIeasible. There ought to be no objection or compunction in weeding them out Irom the service. II they are not booted out now, it will take Irom here to eternity to clean this Augean stable.
Candidly, one reason Ior writing this concurring opinion is to call attention to these evils, abuses and wrongs which are surreptitiously but surely destroying the trust and Iaith oI the people in the integrity oI the entire Judiciary. Some members oI the Court Ielt that these revelations would be like washing dirty linen in public. But these Iacts are oI public and oIIicial record nay court cases, and sooner or later, Truth will come out.
In the light oI these known evils and inIirmities oI the judiciary system, it would be absurd and unreasonable to claim that the legislators did not act upon them in good Iaith and honesty oI purpose and with legitimate ends. It is presumed that oIIicial duty has been regularly perIormed. 13 The presumption oI regularity is not conIined to the acts oI the individual oIIicers but also applies to the acts oI boards, such as administrative board or bodies, and to acts oI legislative bodies. 14 Good Iaith is always to be presumed in the absence oI prooI to the contrary, oI which there is none in the case at bar. It could not be otherwise iI We are to accord as We must, Iull Iaith and credit to the lawmakers' deep sense oI public service and the judicious exercise oI their high oIIice as the duly-elected representatives oI the people.
It is conceded that the abolition oI an oIIice is legal iI attendant with good Iaith. 15 The question oI good Iaith then is the crux oI the conIlict at bar. Good Iaith in the enactment oI the law does not reIer to the wisdom oI the measure, the propriety oI the Act, or to its expediency. The questions raised by petitioners and amicus curiae Ior their cause, viz: Why abolish all the courts Why legislate out the judges Why not amend the Rules oI Court only Is abolition oI all courts the proper remedy to weed out corrupt and misIits in our Judiciary? may not be inquired into by Us. "It is not the province oI the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds oI propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." 16 The Courts "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and ... never inquire into the wisdom oI the law." 17 ChieI Justice Fernando who penned the MorIe decision, writes that while "(i)t is thus settled, to paraphrase ChieI Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom oI the action taken, may be the basis Ior declaring a statute invalid," 18 he adds that it is "useIul to recall what was so clearly stated by Laurel that 'the Judiciary in the determination oI actual cases and controversies must reIlect the wisdom and justice oI the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments oI the government.'" 19 In any case, petitioners have not shown an iota oI prooI oI bad Iaith. There is no Iactual Ioundation oI bad Iaith on record. And I do not consider the statement in the sponsorship speech Ior Cabinet Bill No. 42 oI Minister oI Justice Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be a more eIIicient vehicle oI "eliminating incompetent and unIit Judges as indicative oI impermissible legislative motive. 20
It may be true that while the remedy or solution Iormulated by the legislation will eradicate hopeIully or at least minimize the evils and ills that inIect and pester the judicial body, it will result in the actual removal oI the Justices oI the Court oI Appeals and Judges oI the lower courts. It is also true that whether it is termed abolition oI oIIice or removal Irom oIIice, the end-result is the same termination oI the services oI these incumbents. Indeed, the law may be harsh, but that is the law. Dura lex sed lex.
The Justices and Judges directly aIIected by the law, being lawyers, should know or are expected to know the nature and concept oI a public oIIice. It is created Ior the purpose oI eIIecting the ends Ior which government has been instituted, which are Ior the common good, and not the proIit, honor or private interest oI any one man, Iamily or class oI men. In our Iorm oI government, it is Iundamental that public oIIices are public trust, and that the person to be appointed should be selected solely with a view to the public welIare. 21 In the last analysis, a public oIIice is a privilege in the giIt oI the State. 22
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an oIIice, or even an absolute right to hold oIIice. Excepting constitutional oIIices which provide Ior special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an oIIice or its salary. When an oIIice is created by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished by the legislature, but when created by the State under the authority oI the Constitution, it may be abolished by statute and the incumbent deprived oI his oIIice. 23 Acceptance oI a judicial appointment must be deemed as adherence to the rule that "when the court is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge oI such a court takes oIIice with that encumbrance and knowledge." 24 "The Judge's right to his Iull term and his Iull salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the contingency that the legislature may Ior the public good, in ordaining and establishing the courts, Irom time to time consider his oIIice unnecessary and abolish it." 25
The removal Irom oIIice oI the incumbent then is merely incidental to the valid act oI abolition oI the oIIice as demanded by the superior and paramount interest oI the people. The bad and the crooked Judges must be removed. The good and the straight, sober Judges should be reappointed but that is the sole power and prerogative oI the President who, I am certain, will act according to the best interest oI the nation and in accordance with his solemn oath oI oIIice "to preserve and deIend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to everyone ... " There and then the proper balance between the desire to preserve private interest and the desideratum oI promoting the public good shall have been struck. 26
The Supreme Court has been called the conscience oI the Constitution. It may be the last bulwark oI constitutional government. 27 It Must, however, be remembered "that legislatures are ultimate guardians oI the liberties and welIare oI the people in quite as great a degree as courts." 28 The responsibility oI upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislatures as well. It adheres, thereIore, to the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in Iavor oI the constitutionality oI a statute" Ior which reason it will not set aside a law as violative oI the Constitution "except in a clear case." 29
Finally, I view the controversy presented to Us as a conIlict oI opinions on judicial independence, whether impaired or strengthened by the law; on reorganization oI the courts, whether abolition oI oIIice or removal thereIrom, and on delegation oI legislative power, whether authorized or unauthorized. Without detracting Irom the merits, the Iorce and brilliance oI their advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, I choose to stand on the social justiIication and the Iunctional utility oI the law to uphold its constitutionality. In the light oI contemporaneous events Irom which the New Republic emerged and evolved new Ideals oI national growth and development, particularly in law and government, a kind or Iorm oI judicial activism, perhaps similar to it, is necessary to justiIy as the ratio decidendi oI Our judgment.
This is the time and the moment to perIorm a constitutional duty to aIIix my imprimatur and aIIirmance to the law, hopeIully an act oI proper judicial statesmanship.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I agree with the learned ChieI Justice oI the Philippines that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional. Unlike Oscar Wilde, I choose not to yield to temptation by embellishing my concurrence lest I be accrued oI bringing coal to Newcastle. Accordingly, I will simply vote to dismiss the petition
However, I cannot agree with the ChieI Justice when he says:
... In the implementation oI the assailed legislation, thereIore it should be in accordance with accepted principles oI constitutional construction that as Iar as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the Iullest consideration. There would be no plausibility then to the allegation that there is an unconstitutional taint to the challenged Act. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice oI alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the Iormer is to be preIerred.
It has already been ruled that the statute does not suIIer Irom any constitutional inIirmity because the abolition oI certain judicial oIIices was done in good Iaith. This being the case, I believe that the Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power to Iill the newly created judicial positions without any obligation to consult with this Court and to accord its views the Iullest consideration. To require consultation will constitute an invasion oI executive territory which can be resented and even repelled. The implicit suggestion that there could be an unconstitutional implementation oI the questioned legislation is not congruent with the basic conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.
DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
I concur in the declaration that the law is not unconstitutional.
May I, however, submit this separate opinion more to avoid being misunderstood by my brethren in the judiciary as not Ieeling Ior them as much concern as I should Ior their security oI tenure which is raised as the main argument against the constitutionality oI the law, than by way oI giving added Iorce or support to the main opinion so well-written by Our learned ChieI Justice in his usual scholarly Iashion. I, thereIore, limit myselI to a discussion that the assailed statue is not unconstitutional without having to suggest how it may be implemented in order that it could stand the most rigid test oI constitutionality, Ior in that area, what is involved is purely an executive act oI the President in whose wisdom, patriotism and sense oI justice We should trust in how he would IulIill his sworn duties to see that the laws are IaithIully executed and to do justice to every man.
Moreover, while I also concur in the dismissal oI the petition, I do so on the additional ground that petitioners have not IulIilled all the requisites Ior the exercise by this Court oI its power oI judicial inquiry the power to declare a law unconstitutional.
I
The creation and organization oI courts inIerior to the Supreme Court is a constitutional prerogative oI the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the power to reorganize said courts, and in the process, abolish them to give way to new or substantially diIIerent ones. To contend otherwise would be to Iorget a basic doctrine oI constitutional law that no irrepealable laws shall be passed. 1
The power to create courts and organize them is necessarily the primary authority Irom which would thereaIter arise the security oI tenure oI those appointed to perIorm the Iunctions oI said courts. in the natural order oI things, thereIore, since the occasion to speak oI security oI tenure oI judges arises only aIter the courts have Iirst been brought into being, the right to security oI tenure takes a secondary position to the basic and primary power oI creating the courts to provide Ior a Iair and strong judicial system. II the legislature, in the exercise oI its authority, deems it wise and urgent to provide Ior a new set oI courts, and in doing so, it Ieels the abolition oI the old courts would conduce more to its objective oI improving the judiciary and raising its standard, the matter involved is one oI policy and wisdom into which the courts, not even the Supreme Court, cannot inquire, much less interIere with. By this secondary position it has to the primary power oI the legislature to create courts, the security oI tenure given to the incumbents should not be a legal impediment to the exercise oI that basic power oI creating the statutory courts which, by necessary implication, includes the power to abolish them in order to create new ones. This primary legislative power is a continuing one, and the resultant right oI security oI tenure oI those appointed to said courts could not bring about the exhaustion oI that power. Unquestionably, the legislature can repeal its own laws, and that power can never be exhausted without, as a consequence, violating a Iundamental precept oI constitutional and representative government that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.
II the creation oI courts is a legislative prerogative their abolition is, thereIore, a matter oI legislative intent. it involves the exercise oI legislative power, an act oI legislation which generally concerns policy in the Iormation oI which the courts have no say Initially, when the legislature creates the courts, it suIIers Irom no limitation arising Irom the necessity or respecting the security oI tenure oI judges who are not yea there. This inherent character oI Iullness and plenitude oI the power to create and abolish courts does not change when that same power is once more exercised thereaIter, as the need thereIor is Ielt. Which only goes to show that when done in good Iaith and motivated solely by the good and the well-being oI the people, the exercise oI the power is not meant to be restricted, curtailed, much less exhausted by the so-called judicial security oI tenure.
The passage oI the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980 is no more than the exercise oI the power vested by the Constitution on the legislative body oI the Republic as described above. That power carries with it the duty and responsibility oI providing the people with the most eIIective and eIIicient system oI administration oI justice. This is by Iar oI more imperative and transcedental importance than the security oI tenure oI judges which, admittedly, is one oI the Iactors that would conduce to independence oI the judiciary but Iirst oI all, a good, eIIicient and eIIective judiciary. A judiciary wanting in these basic qualities does not deserve the independence that is meant only Ior a judiciary that can serve best the interest and welIare oI the people which is the most primordial and paramount consideration, not a judiciary in which the people's Iaith has been eroded, a condition which the security oI tenure, in some instances, may even be contributory.
In enacting the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980, the legislature is presumed to have been motivated by no other objective than to provide the people the kind oI judicial machinery that would best serve their interest and welIare, in its belieI that the present machinery is Ialling short oI that measure oI public service. It should, likewise, be presumed that it has been led to this low estimate oI the utility and eIIectiveness oI the present set-up oI the judiciary aIter inIorming itselI, with the Iacilities at its command, such as the power oI legislative investigation, oI the actual condition oI the courts, particularly as to whether they continue to enjoy the trust, Iaith and conIidence oI the public, and what the cause or causes are oI their erosion, iI not loss, as is the keenly perceptible Ieeling oI the people in general. Responsibility Ior this more or less extensive slowdown oI the delivery oI judicial service can be laid on no other than either oI the two components oI a court the procedural laws or rules that govern the workings oI the courts, or the persons executing or applying them or both.
When two interests conIlict as what had given rise to the present controversy the duty oI the legislature to provide society with a Iair, eIIicient and eIIective judicial system, on one hand, and the right oI judges to security oI tenure, on the other, the latter must oI necessity yield to the Iormer. One involves public welIare and interest more directly and on a greater magnitude than the right oI security oI tenure oI the judges which is, as is easily discernible, more oI a personal beneIit to just a Iew, as indeed only the judge aIIected could seek judicial redress oI what he conceives to be its violation.
Herein lies the propriety oI the exercise oI "police power" oI the State, iI this concept which underlies even the Constitution, has to be invoked as a constitutional justiIication oI the passage oI the Act in question. That is, iI a conIlict between the primary power oI the legislature to create courts, and mere consequential beneIit accorded to judges and justices aIter the creation oI the courts is indeed perceivable, which the writer Iails to see, or, at least, would disappear upon a reconciliation oI the two apparently conIlicting interests which, Irom the above disquisition is not hard to Iind. It is, without doubt, in the essence oI the exercise oI police power that a right assertable by individuals may be inIringed in the greater interest oI the public good and general welIare. This is demonstrated in how the rights and Ireedoms enumerated in the Bill oI Rights enjoyable by The entire people, not just by a handIul in comparison, are made subject to the lawIul exercise oI the police power oI the State.
Viewed, thereIore, Irom the above-mentioned perspective, the general revamp oI the judiciary involving both its components the court as an oIIice or institution, and the judges and justices that man them should not Iind any legal obstacle in the security oI tenure oI judges. This security, aIter all, is no more than as provided Ior all other oIIicials and employees in the civil service oI the government in Section 3, Article XII-B oI the Constitution which provides:
No oIIicer or employees in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed except Ior cause as provided by law.
The provision oI Article XVII, Section 10 oI the Constitution gives to judicial oIIicials no more than a guarantee that their retirement age as Iixed in the Constitution shall not be alterable at mere legislative pleasure. The equivalent provision in the 1935 Constitution was inserted Ior the Iirst time because the retirement age beIore then was provided merely by statute not by the Constitution. II it comes to their removal or suspension, what gives them constitutional protection is the aIorequoted provision which does not contemplate abolition oI oIIice when done in good Iaith, Ior removal implies the existence oI the oIIice, not when it is abolished. Admittedly, as has been held, abolition oI oIIice Ior no reason related to public welIare or Ior the good oI the service, let alone when done in bad Iaith, amounts to an unlawIul removal. 2 The abolition oI the courts as declared in the Act as a result oI a reorganization oI the judiciary, as the Title oI the law curtly but announces, can by no means, Irom any viewpoint, be so branded. And whether by said reorganization, the present would be deemed abolished, as the law expresses such an unmistakable intent, the matter is one Ior the sole and exclusive determination oI the legislature. It rests entirely on its discretion whether by the nature and extent oI the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider them abolished. To give the Supreme Court the power to determine the extent or nature oI the changes as to their structure, distribution and jurisdiction, beIore the clear intent to abolish them, or to declare them so abolished, is given eIIect, would be to allow undue interIerence in the Iunction oI legislation. This would be contrary to the primary duty oI courts precisely to give eIIect to the legislative intent as expressed in the law or as my be discovered thereIrom.
From the above observation, it would be Iutile to insist that the present courts would not eIIectively be abolished by the Act in question. it might be to arrogate power Ior Us to say that the changes the law brings to the present judicial system, do not suIIice Ior this Court to give eIIect to the clear intent oI the legislative body. Where would the agrarian courts, the circuit criminal courts, the JDRC's be in the judicial structure as envisioned by the law? Are they not abolished by merger with the regional trial courts, which by such merger, and by the other changes introduced by the law, would make said courts diIIerent Irom the present Courts oI First Instance which, as a consequence, may then be considered abolished Integrated as the present courts are supposed to be, changes somewhere in the judicial machinery would necessarily aIIect the entire system.
The Iact that the Supreme Court may specially assign courts to Iunction as the special courts just mentioned, does not mean that the changes wrought are only superIicial or "cosmetic" as this term has been used so oIten in the oral argument. Without the new law, these courts will remain Iixed and permanent where they are at present. Yet in the course oI time, the need Ior their independent existence may disappear, or that by changed conditions, where they are needed at present at a certain place, the need Ior them may be somewhere else in later years, iI maximum beneIit at the least expense is to be achieved, as always should be a most desirable goal and objective oI government.
Demonstrably then, the abolition oI the courts is a matter oI legislative intent into which no judicial inquiry is proper, except perhaps iI they intent is so palpably tainted with constitutional repugnancy, which is not so in the instant case. We have, thereIore, no occasion, as earlier intimated, to speak oI removal oI judges when the reorganization oI the judiciary would result in the abolition oI the courts other than the Supreme Court and the Court oI Tax Appeals. Hence, the provision oI the Constitution giving to the Supreme Court power to dismiss a judge by a vote oI eight justices does not come into the vortex oI the instant controversy. Its possible violation by the assailed statute cannot happen, and may, thereIore, not constitute an argument against the constitutionality oI the law.
Former Justice Barrera, in a speech beIore the Philippine Bar Association, 3 impliedly indorsed the judicial revamp when he enumerated the qualities oI a good judge that the appointing power should consider in making new appointments to the judiciary upon its reorganization pursuant to the questioned Act. The words oI the eminent jurist may well reIlect the Iavorable reaction oI the public in general to what the Act aim to achieve in the name oI good and clean government. The present judicial incumbents, who have not in any way, by their acts and behavior while in oIIice, tarnished the good image that the judiciary should have, thereIore, have no cause Ior apprehension that what they are entitled to under the Constitution by way oI security oI tenure wig be denied them, considering the publicly known aim and purpose oI the massive judicial revamp, specially as cherished with deep concern by the President who initiated the move when he created the Judiciary Reorganization Committee to recommend needed and appropriate judicial reIorms.
II the only obstacle to a verdict in Iavor oI constitutionality oI the law is its possible eIIect oI impairing the security oI tenure oI the incumbents, We may have the Iollowing Iacts to consider:
1. Under the 1973 Constitution all incumbent judges and justices may continue in oIIice until replaced or reappointed by the President. As to those judicial oIIicials, no security oI tenure, in the traditional concept, attaches to their incumbency which is, in a real sense, only a holdover tenure. How the President has exercised this immense power with admirable restraint should serve as the strongest guarantee oI how justice and Iairness will be his sole guide in implementing the law.
2. As to the rest oI the incumbents, they are all appointees oI Our present President, and he should Ieel concerned more than anyone else to protect whatever rights they may rightIully claim to maintain their oIIicial standing and integrity. They need have no Iear oI being ignored Ior no reason at all, much less Ior mere spirit oI vindictiveness or lack oI nobility oI heart.
From the Ioregoing, it would become apparent that only in the implementation oI the law may there possibly be a taint oI constitutional repugnancy as when a judge oI acknowledged honesty, industry and competence is separated, because an act oI arbitrariness would thereby be committed, but the abolition oI the courts as decreed by the law is not by itselI or per se unconstitutional.
Consequently, the law, the result oI serious and concerned study by a highly competent committee, deserves to be given a chance to prove its worth in the way oI improving the judiciary. II in its implementation, any one, iI at all, Ieels aggrieved, he can always seek judicial redress, iI he can make out a case oI violation oI his right oI security oI tenure with uncontrovertible clarity, as when the separation is very arbitrary in the peculiar circumstances oI his case, Ior an act oI arbitrariness, under any constitution, is unpardonable.
This petition should also be dismissed Ior being premature, as is the stand oI Justice Aquino. The petition asks this Court to exercise its power oI judicial inquiry, the power to declare a law unconstitutional when it conIlicts with the Iundamental law (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This power has well-deIined limits, Ior it can be exercised only when the Iollowing requisites are present, to wit: (1) There must be an actual case or controversy; (2) The question oI constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) He should do so at the earliest opportunity, and (4) The determination oI the constitutionality oI the statute must be necessary to a Iinal determination oI the case.
I am oI the opinion that the petition does not present an actual controversy nor was it Iiled by the proper parties.
The main ground Ior which the constitutionality oI the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980 is assailed is that it is violative oI the security oI tenure oI justices and judges. The only persons who could raise the question oI constitutionality oI the law are, thereIore, the actual incumbents oI the courts who would be separated Irom the service upon the abolition oI the courts aIIected by the law, on the theory as advanced by petitioners that their judicial security oI tenure would be violated. Olongapo City Judge de la Llana, the only judge among the petitioners, has not been separated Irom the service. Nor is his separation already a certainty, Ior he may be appointed to the court equivalent to his present court, or even promoted to a higher court. Only when it has become certain that his tenure has been terminated will an actual controversy arise on his allegation oI a Iact that has become actual, not merely probable or hypothetical.
The present petition may neither be allowed as a taxpayer suit. A taxpayer may bring an action to raise the question oI constitutionality oI a statute only when no one else can more appropriately bring the suit to deIend a right exclusively belonging to him, and. thereIore, would localize the actual injury to his person, and to no other. For a "proper party" to invoke the power oI judicial inquiry, as one oI the requisites in the exercise oI such power, does not mean one having no better right, one more personalized, than what he has as a member oI the public in general. With the incumbent judges undoubtedly being the ones under petitioners' theory, who would suIIer direct and actual injury, they should exclude mere taxpayers who cannot be said to suIIer as "direct" and "actual" an injury as the judges and justices by the enIorcement oI the assailed statute, Irom the right to bring the suit.
The validity oI the Ioregoing observation becomes more evident when We consider that only aIter the Iate oI the present incumbents is known, whether they have been actually separated or not, would the present courts be declared abolished. For the law clearly continues their existence until all the new courts have been Iilled up with new appointments, or at least such number as would be equal to the number oI actual incumbents, and they are the very courts to which they may lay claim to the right to continue therein, so that the status oI each and everyone oI them has thereby been made certain. Only then, upon the actual abolition oI the courts, may there possibly be a violation oI the security oI tenure, as contented, that would give rise to an "actual controversy" in which the 6 improper party" can be no other than the judges who Ieel aggrieved by their non- appointment to the new courts.
It would, thereIore, not be proper to declare the law void at this stage, beIore it has even been given a chance to prove its worth, as the legislature itselI and an those who helped by their exhaustive and scholarly study, Ielt it to be an urgent necessity, and beIore any oI the proper parties who could assail its constitutionality would know Ior a Iact, certain and actual, not merely probable or hypothetical, that they have a right violated by what they could possibly contend to be an unconstitutional enIorcement oI the law, not by a law that is unconstitutional unto itselI.
I am, thereIore, Ior giving the law a chance to be put into application so as not to douse great popular expectations Ior the courts to regain their highest level oI eIIiciency had reputation Ior probity. Inevitably, this is to be so since only when the law is Iully implemented will all the courts aIIected be declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an interregnum when the country is without any court, except the Supreme Court, the Court oI Tax Appeals and the Sandigan. Only then will it be known whether an actual controversy would arise because any oI the incumbents have been leIt out in the restructured judiciary.
There would then be also a proper party to assail the constitutionality oI the law, conIormably to the conditions requisite Ior the exercise oI the power oI judicial inquiry which by their stringent character, together with the constitutional prescription oI a comparatively higher vote to declare a law unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle oI government that a law should, by all reasonable intendment and Ieasible means, be saved Irom the doom oI unconstitutionality, the rule corollary thereto being that iI a law is susceptible to two interpretations, one oI which would make it constitutional, that interpretation should be adopted that will not kill the law.
It is to adhere to the above principles that the submission is made herein, that while in the implementation oI the law, constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, a categorical ruling hereon not being necessary or desirable at the moment, the law itselI is deIinitely not unconstitutional. 4 Any oI the incumbent judges who Ieel injured aIter the law shall have been implemented has adequate remedy in law, with Iull relieI as would be proper. But surely, the beneIits envisioned by the law in the discharge oI one oI the basic duties oI government to the people the administration oI justice should not be sacriIiced, as it would be, iI the law is, as sought in the present petition, declared void right now, on the claim oI a Iew oI being allegedly denied a right, at best oI doubtIul character, Ior the claim would seem to rest on an unsupportable theory that they have a vested right to a public oIIice.
Just one more point. The law in question is not selI-executing in the sense that upon its eIIectivity, certain judges and justices cease to be so by direct action oI the law. This is what distinguishes the Act in question Irom R.A. No. 1186 involved in the Ocampo case, 5 which by its direct action, no act oI implementation being necessary, all the judges whose positions were abolished, automatically ceased as such. The Act in question, thereIore, is not as exposed to the same vulnerability to constitutional attack as R.A. No. 1186 was. Yet by the operation oI the Constitution with its wise provision on how a law may be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No. 1186 stood the test Ior it to be enIorced to the Iullness oI its intent, which was, as in the law under consideration, IdentiIied with public interest and general welIare, through a more eIIicient and eIIective judicial system as the Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1980 seeks to establish.
Hence, the constitutionality oI the law should not be assailed, and the law itselI, striken down, on the ground that some judges or justices may be removed or separated in violation oI their security oI tenure. The law does not directly operate with Chat eIIect. It is in how the law would be implemented that this Ieared eventuality may or may not occur. We would then be killing the law on a mere speculation iI We do so at this stage. This would be an injudicious act done in reckless disregard oI the saIeguards built around a law to deIend it when its constitutionality is attacked; Iirst the presumption that a law is constitutional; second when a law is susceptible to two interpretations one that would make it constitutional, the other, unconstitutional, the Iormer should be adopted; and third, the Constitution itselI which ordains that a law may not be declared unconstitutional except on the vote oI at least ten (10) members oI the Supreme Court, more than what is required Ior an ordinary decision oI the Court en banc. This is not to mention the stringent requisites Ior the exercise oI the power oI judicial inquiry as already adverted to, all designed to save the law Irom the dire Iate oI unconstitutionality.
To the writer, the question beIore this Court is a simple matter oI choosing between protecting some judges Irom possible separation, as the implementation oI the law to achieve its primary purpose oI improving the judiciary may have to result in, or serving the interest oI the entire society through an honest, eIIicient and eIIective judiciary. For, it is unthinkable that what is Ior the good oI the people as a whole could have been meant by the Constitution to be sacriIiced Ior the sake oI only the Iew. The greatest good Ior the greatest number is an unwritten rule, more Iirm and enduring than any oI the postulates spread in our written Constitution. This, I might say, is the main theme oI this separate opinion, otherwise expressed in the well-known and time-honored maxim "Salus populi establish suprema lex."
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
There is unqualiIied adherence on my part to the dismissal oI the Petition Iiled in this case. II I am writing this separate concurrence, it is merely to state certain views I entertain in regards to the constitutionality oI Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The controversy in this case involves two constitutional provisions. Article X, Section 1, oI the Organic law provides that the legislative has the power to establish inIerior Courts by law. Section 7 oI the same Article reads:
SEC, 7. The Members oI the Supreme Court and judges oI inIerior courts shall hold oIIice during good behavior until they reach the age oI seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties oI their oIIice. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges oI inIerior courts and, by a vote oI at least eight Members order their dismissal.
There should be no conIlict Between the two provisions. Both should be harmonized.
1. a) It is a Iundamental proposition that the legislative power to create Courts ordinarily includes the power to organize and to reorganize them, and that the power to abolish Courts is generally coextensive with the power to create them. The power to abolish was not intended to be qualiIied by the permanence oI tenure (Opinion oI ChieI Justice Ricardo Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary oI Justice, 51 O.G. 147 |1955|, citing McCulley vs. State, 53 SW 134; Halsey vs. Gaines 2 Lea 316). The right oI Judges to hold oIIice during good behavior until they reach the age oI 70 years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties oI their oIIice, does not deprive Congress oI its power to abolish, organize or reorganize inIerior Courts (Brillo vs. Enage, 94 Phil. 732, 735, citing Zandueta vs. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615; 42 Am. Jur., Pub. OIIicer, 904-5). Judges oI those Courts take oIIice with that encumbrance and knowledge.
The legislative power to create a court carries with it the power to abolish it. When the court is abolished any unexpired term is abolished also. The judge oI such court takes oIIice with that encumbrance and knowledge. Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala 103, 6 Am. Rep. 698; State, ex rel. Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165, 54 So 283, et al."
The importance and the imperative oI maintaining the independence oI the Judiciary is undisputed. At the same time, the power oI Congress under the Constitution cannot be abridged. For, in the last analysis, it is not the security oI tenure per se that is the only saIeguard to the independence oI the Judiciary. It is the character and the mettle oI the Judges who sit on the Bench. Has not the impression been created in the public and that there are those who have abused the prerogatives oI their judicial position knowing that they are untouchables by virtue oI the permanence oI their tenure
b) A distinction should be made between tenure oI Judges and tenure oI Courts. Section 1 heretoIore mentioned reIers to the "Judiciary" as a Iundamental department oI Government. Section 7 quoted above reIers to the tenure oI oIIice oI "individual" Judges (inclusive oI Justices oI inIerior Courts that is to say, tenure oI oIIice is a matter concerning the individual Judge. This "individuality" character oI Section 7 is supported by the clause that the Supreme Court has the power to discipline individual judges oI inIerior Courts.
A legislature is not bound to give security oI tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. In Iact, the entire judicial system can be changed. II that system can no longer admit oI change, woe to the wheels oI progress and the imperatives oI growth in the development oI the Judiciary. To hold that tenure oI Judges is superior to the legislative power to reorganize is to render impotent the exercise oI that power.
It may even be stated that, under Section 7, supra, Judges are entailed to their Courts, Irom which they cannot be separated beIore retirement age except as a disciplinary action Ior bad behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to their Judges, because the power oI the legislative to establish inIerior Courts presupposes the power to abolish those Courts. II an inIerior Court is abolished, the Judge presiding that Court will necessarily have to lose his position because the abolished Court is not entailed to him.
c) The constitutional guarantee oI tenure oI Judges applies only as their Courts exist. As long as those Courts exist, the Judges cannot be ousted without just cause; that is the extent oI the constitutional provision relative to security oI tenure oI Judges. Upon declaration oI the completion oI the reorganization as provided Ior in the Reorganization Act, the aIIected Courts "shall be deemed automatically abolished There being no Courts, there are no oIIices Ior which tenure oI Judges may be claimed. By the abolition oI those oIIices, the rights to them are necessarily extinguished (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 |1954|).
2. I am satisIied that the challenged law was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in response to an urgent and pressing public need and not Ior the purpose oI aIIecting adversely the security oI tenure oI all Judges or legislating them out to the detriment oI judicial independence. It should riot be said oI the Batasang Pambansa that its power oI abolition oI Courts has been used to disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose to deIeat the security oI tenure oI Judges. The Judiciary Reorganization Act oI 1981 suIIiciently complies with the bona Iide rule in the abolition oI public oIIice, as clearly explained in the main opinion. Besides, every presumption oI good Iaith in its actuations must be accorded a coordinate and coequal branch oI government, supreme within the limits oI its own sphere, until that presumption is clearly overcome. There is no showing that the Reorganization Act was motivated Ior personal or political reasons as to justiIy the interIerence by the Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 199 Mass, 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127 A.S.R. 468; State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont. 287; 106 Pac. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs. Dimaporo, 16 SCRA 599 |1966|). Public interest and public good, as the legislative body views it, must be balanced with tenure oI Judges, which is an individual right. Reverting to Section 1 and Section 7, supra, the Iormer is the weightier, because the "Judiciary" is oI more importance to the welIare oI the country than the tenure oI oIIice oI an individual Judge. II a Judge is removed without cause there can be damage to the public welIare to some extent, but maintenance oI a Court that does not meet the requirements oI progressive Government, can cause incalculable prejudice to the people.
3. Nor does a conIlict exist with the power oI discipline vested in the Supreme Court by the present Constitution reading: the Supreme Court shall have the power "to discipline Judges oI inIerior Courts, and, by a vote oI at least 8 members, order their dismissal Absent the Court, it would be Iutile to speak oI the Supreme Court's power to discipline. Thus, where the legislature has willed that the Courts be abolished, the power to discipline cannot pose an obstacle to the abolition. The power to discipline can come into play only when there is removal Irom an existing judicial oIIice but not when that it oIIice is abolished. The reorganization oI the judicial system with the abolition oI certain Courts is not an exercise oI the power to discipline the Judges oI the abolished Courts.
It is oI signiIicance to note that the power to dismissal vested in the Supreme Court by the 1973 Constitution is delimited by its power to discipline. Absent any need Ior discipline and the power to dismiss does not exist. Being circumscribed in scope, it may well be asked: does the grant oI the power oI discipline and dismissal in the Supreme Court deprive the executive oI the power oI removal? Is it not more in keeping with the allocation oI powers in our government to state that the Supreme Court shares its power to dismiss with the executive power oI removal? For is not the power oI removal basically executive in nature, as an incident to the power oI appointment, which is the prerogative oI the ChieI Executive alone As in the case oI appointments, Section 5 (6), Article X oI the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall appoint its oIIicials and employees. However, is not this power shared with the power oI appointment oI the executive who appoints some oI the Court oIIicials These questions could lend themselves to an in-depth study in the proper case.
4. The abolition would be no deprivation either oI due process oI law. A public oIIice cannot be regarded as the "property " oI the incumbent. A public oIIice is not a contract (Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 |1925|). A public oIIice is a public trust (Section 1, Article XIII. 1973 Constitution). It is a privilege in the giIt oI the State (Brown vs. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA, 253 cited also in Taada & Carreon, Political Law oI the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 537). The oIIicers are the servants oI the people and not their rulers (22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin, Administrative Law, Law on Public OIIicers and Election Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing that there is no removal Irom oIIice but abolition oI the oIIice itselI.
5. The questioned statute is in keeping with major reIorms in other departments oI government. "The thrust is on development." It is "the Iirst major reorganization aIter Iour generations." It does not provide Ior a piecemeal change, which could be ineIIective. It goes to the roots and does not just scratch the surIace oI our judicial system. Its main objectives are an improved administration oI justice, the "attainment oI more eIIiciency in the disposal oI cases, a reallocation oI jurisdiction, and a revision oI procedures which do not tend to the proper meting out oI justice." These aims are policy matters oI necessity in the pursuit oI developmental goals within the Judiciary.
6. The Reorganization Act reorganizing the entire judicial system excluding the Supreme Court, which is the only constitutional Court, and the Sandiganbayan. It envisages institutional reIorms in the Philippine judiciary. It does not simply change the names oI the Courts. The Iacts herein are dissimilar Irom those in Brillo vs. Enage (94 Phil. 732 |1954|) where the position oI Justice oI the Peace, although ostensibly abolished, was merely changed to Municipal Judge aIter the municipality oI Tacloban was converted into a city with its own charter.
SigniIicant among the institutional changes and procedural reIorms are:
The Intermediate Appellate Court
This Court is now constituted into ten (10) divisions instead oI IiIteen (15), Iive members composing each division, and a majority vote oI three members being needed Ior a decision. This obviates the cumbersome procedure, in case oI dissent, oI assigning two other members to compose a "division oI Iive". It also allows Ilexibility in that any three members oI a division, arriving at unanimity, can promulgate a decision. Now provided Ior is specialization into Iour (4) Civil Cases Divisions, two (2) Criminal Cases Divisions and Iour (4) Special Cases Divisions. The specialization is expected to contribute to the expeditious disposal oI cases. The Court has been given original jurisdiction to issue Writs oI mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, quo warranto and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not in aid oI its appellate jurisdiction. This would undoubtedly ease the burden oI the Supreme Court where numerous such cases are Iiled daily.
It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all Iinal judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards oI quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those Ialling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction oI the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution.
The Intermediate Appellate Court would now have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perIorm any and all acts necessary to resolve Iactual issues raised in cases Ialling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or Iurther proceedings (Sec. 9). This does away with the delays attendant to the remand oI cases to the lower trial Courts.
Regional Trial Courts
There are now thirteen (13) Judicial Regions, the same as the present administrative and Batasang Pambansa Regions, instead oI sixteen (16) Judicial Districts.
A Judge is appointed to a region, which is his oIIicial station. This ensures mobility since a Judge may be assigned anywhere within the Region without applying the constitutional limitation oI six months. Additionally, -it can remedy temporary inequalities oI caseloads in trial Courts.
Specialized Courts are integrated into the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, Regional Trial Courts would try all cases within its jurisdiction unless special cases are assigned to them, in which case, they remain as Branches oI Regional Trial Courts. Special procedures and technical rules governing special Courts will continue to remain applicable in Branches assigned those special cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts
There is one Metropolitan Trial Court with several Branches Ior large urban areas. The appointment oI Judges would be to a Metropolitan Trial Court although a Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any Branch oI the Metropolitan Trial Court as demanded by the exigencies oI the service.
The Supreme Court may designate certain Branches oI said Courts to exercise special jurisdiction over certain cases, unlike the present set-up where special jurisdiction applies only to cases oI traIIic violations.
Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
Municipal Trial Courts may now be designated by the Supreme Court to exercise special jurisdiction over certain cases, thereby resulting in overall Ilexibility. They can also be circuitized with those in cities not Iorming part oI metropolitan areas.
One notable change between the old and the new set up is that Judges oI these Courts will now be Presidential appointees unlike presently where the incumbent Judges are merely designated by the Supreme Court in an Administrative Order to sit in existing Municipal Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts.
7. There are innovative Ieatures in the Act that commend themselves:
a) The conIusing and illogical areas oI concurrent jurisdiction between trial Courts have been entirely eliminated.
b) Under Section 39, there is a uniIorm period Ior appeal oI IiIteen (15) days counted Irom the notice oI the Iinal order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed Irom.
A record on appeal is no longer required to take an appeal. The entire original record is now to be transmitted.
c) Under Section 40, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reIerence oI Iindings oI Iact and conclusions oI law as set Iorth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed Irom, is also provided Ior. This will expedite the rendition oI decisions in appealed cases.
d) Section 42 provides Ior "a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5 oI the monthly basic pay Ior Justices and
Judges oI the courts herein created Ior each Iive years oI continuous, eIIicient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary, Provided that, in no case shall the total salary oI each Justice or Judge concerned, aIter this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary oI the Justice or Judge next in rank." Thus, Justices and Judges who may not reach the top, where unIortunately there is not enough room Ior all, may have the satisIaction oI at least approximating the salary scale oI those above him depending on his length oI service,
8. But while the law itselI as written is constitutional, the manner in which it will be administered should not be tainted with unconstitutionality (Myles Salt Co. vs. Board oI Commrs., 239 US 478, 60 L. Ed. 392, 36 Sct 204). To obviate the possibility oI an unconstitutional exercise oI power the Iollowing saIeguards are recommended and/or expected to be undertaken:
a) The President can be expected to indicate a reasonable time Irame Ior the completion oI the reorganization provided Ior in the Act and the issuance oI the corresponding implementing Order.
b) Appointments and their eIIectivity should be simultaneous with, or as close as possible, to the declaration by the President oI the completion oI the reorganization under Section 44 to avoid any detriment to the smooth and continuous Iunctioning oI the judicial machinery.
c) The services oI those not separated should be deemed uninterrupted, as recommended by the Committee on Judicial Reorganization (Article XI oI its Report).
9. For the speedy implementation oI the law, the Supreme Court can be expected to submit to the President within thirty (30) days Irom the date oI Iinality oI its Decision the staIIing pattern Ior all Courts required by Section 43.
I am constrained to disagree with the suggestion oI one oI the amici curiae that the staIIing pattern be made to include the names oI Judges. The staIIing pattern Ior Judges is already clearly and explicitly provided in the law itselI which enumerates the various Judges and Justices in their hierarchical order. Furthermore, to include the superior positions oI Judges would depart Irom the traditional concept oI a staIIing pattern, which reIers more to personnel organization and corresponding salaries oI inIerior employees. It is also constitutionally objectionable in that it would interIere with the prerogative oI appointment intrinsically executive in nature (Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 |1966|; Government oI the Philippines vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 |1927|). The President may not be deprived oI, nor be limited in, the Iull use oI his discretion in the appointment oI persons to any public oIIice. Nothing should so trench upon executive choice as to be, in eIIect, judicial designation.
10. A word oI explanation. II I had resolved not to inhibit myselI in this case upon motion Iiled by petitioners, it was because the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, oI which I was privileged to be a member, conIined its work to the recommendation oI options and guidelines in the task oI reorganization. The Committee had no part whatsoever in the draIting oI the bill nor in the public hearings conducted. In Iact, some oI its recommendations like the circuitization or regionalization oI the Intermediate Appellate Court, the appellation oI members oI the Judiciary, the conIinement oI the jurisdiction oI the Intermediate Appellate Court merely to appellate jurisdiction, the adoption oI the system Iound in the United Kingdom and in Commonwealth countries oI having a Court oI general jurisdiction with trial and appellate divisions, were not availed oI in the Iinal Act.
11. Lastly, but by no means the least, I entertain no doubt that reliance can be placed on the good Iaith oI the President that all the deserving, upon considerations oI "eIIiciency, integrity, length oI service and other relevant Iactors shall be appointed to a strengthened and revitalized judicial system in the interest oI public service; that appointments will not be unduly delayed; and that appointees will be evaluated thoroughly to ensure quality and impartiality in the men and women who will keep vigil over our judicial ramparts.
ERICTA, J., concurring:
I concur in the view that the Judiciary reorganization law is not unconstitutional. It does not violate the principle oI security oI tenure oI judges.
The Constitution grants to the Batasang Pambansa the power to create courts inIerior to the Supreme Court (Article X, Section 1). All existing inIerior courts were created by law. No law is irrepealable. The power to create an oIIice includes the power to abolish the same. (Urgelio vs. Osmea 9 SCRA 317; Maza vs. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142)
Security oI tenure cannot be invoked when there is no removal oI a public oIIicer or employee but an abolition oI his oIIice. (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903; Cruz vs. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998; Baldoz vs. OIIice oI the President, 78 SCRA 354, 362) A distinction should be made between removal Irom oIIice and abolition oI an oIIice. Removal implies that the oIIice subsists aIter ouster, while, in abolition, the oIIice no longer exists thereby terminating the right oI the incumbent to exercise the rights and duties oI the oIIice. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)
The power oI the legislative branch oI the government to abolish courts inIerior to the Supreme Court has long been established. (Ocampo vs. Secretary oI Justice, 51 O.G. 147). What is only needed is that the abolition passes the test oI good Iaith. it need only be shown that said abolition oI the courts is merely incidental to a bona Iide reorganization. (Urgelio vs. Osmea supra.)
It is unthinkable to impute bad Iaith to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization composed oI Iour (4) distinguished members oI the Supreme Court, the Minister oI Justice and the Deputy Minister oI Justice, and to the members oI the Batasang Pambansa whose combined eIIorts aIter a careIul study and deliberation resulted to the enactment oI a bill now signed into law as Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129. In his sponsorship speech, Justice Ricardo C. Puno declared the objectives oI the Judiciary Reorganization Law to be the Iollowing: (1) the attainment oI more eIIiciency in the disposal oI cases; (2) the improvement in the quality oI decisions by the courts that will result Irom the easing oI court dockets; and (3) structural changes to meet the exigencies oI present day Philippine Society and oI the Ioreseeable Iuture.
Admittedly, in the implementation oI the law, some Judges and Justices may be adversely aIIected. But in a conIlict between public interest and the individual interest oI some Judges and Justices, the public weal must prevail. The welIare oI the people is the supreme law.
The implementation oI the law will entail appointments to the new courts. The power oI appointment is the exclusive prerogative oI the President. The implementation oI the law should be leIt exclusively to the wisdom, patriotism and statesmanship oI the President.
PLANA, J., concurring:
As the lawmaking body has the power to create inIerior courts and deIine, prescribe and apportion their jurisdiction, so it has the power to abolish or replace them with other courts as long as the act is done in good Iaith and not Ior the purpose oI attaining an unconstitutional end. Good Iaith has thus become the crucial issue in the case at bar.
Upon an examination oI the legislative history oI Batas Pambansa 129, as has been done in the main opinion, it is maniIest that actual, not merely presumed good Iaith attended its enactment. On this basis, I concur in the opinion penned by the learned ChieI Justice, qualiIied only by the Iollowing observations:
1. Executive consultation with the Supreme Court. I believe the President is under no obligation to consult with the Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the President. Indeed, as the Supreme Court itselI has said, it cannot give advisory opinions (Bacolod Murcia Planters' Asso., Inc. vs. Bacolod Murcia milling Co., 30 SCRA 67; NWSA vs. Court oI Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 629) even to the President.
In the draIting oI the present Constitution, there was an attempt to vest the Supreme Court with the Iunction oI giving advisory opinions. The Iramers oI the Constitution, however, did not see Iit to adopt the proposal.
II the President should consult the Supreme Court on the implementation oI Batas Pambansa 129 and the Supreme Court should give its advice (leaving aside the question oI procedure), I believe the President would be Iree to Iollow or disregard the advice; but, in either case, there would be no guarantee that the implementing action would be upheld in one case or stricken down in the other.
2. Undue delegation oI legislative powers.
The petitioners have also assailed the constitutionality oI Batas Pambansa 129 on the ground that a provision thereoI (regarding Iixing oI compensation and allowances Ior members oI the Judiciary) constitutes an undue delegation unto the President oI legislative power.
As pointed out in the main opinion, the legislature has provided ample standards or guidelines Ior the implementation oI the delegated power, which makes the delegation inoIIensive. I would like to add however some observations on the doctrine oI undue delegation oI legislative power.
Under the old Constitution, when the abiding rule was separation oI legislative and executive powers, there was good reason to maintain the doctrine oI non-delegation oI legislative power. Otherwise, the principle oI separation oI governmental powers could be negated via unbridled delegation oI legislative power. The 1973 Constitution has however radically changed the constitutional set-up. There is now a commingling or Iusion oI executive and legislative powers in the hands oI the same group oI oIIicials. Cabinet members play a leading role in the legislative process, and members oI the Batasan actively discharge executive Iunctions. The Prime Minister indeed must come Irom its ranks. Under the circumstances, there is really not much sense in rigidly upholding the principle oI non-delegation oI legislative power, at least vis-a-vis the Executive Department. In a very real sense, the present Constitution has signiIicantly eroded the hoary doctrine oI non-delegation oI legislative power, although it has retained some provisions oI the old Constitution which were predicated on the principle oI non-delegation, this time perhaps not so much to authorize shiIting oI power and thereby correspondingly reduce the incidence oI "undue" delegation oI legislative power, as to avert the abdication thereoI.
In times oI war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President Ior a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution oI the Batasang Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment. (Art. VIII, Sec. 15.)
The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President to Iix within speciIied this and subject to such stations and restrictions as it may impose, tariII rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharIage dues, and other duties or imposts. |Ibid, Sec. 17(2).|
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Undoubtedly, no more crucial and transcendental issue oI such magnitude has conIronted the Philippine judiciary than in the present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by its title would reorganize all existing courts (except the nine-member Sandiganbayan 1 and the three- member Court oI Tax Appeals) and upon declaration by the President oI the completion oI the reorganization would unprecedentedly deem all the said courts "automatically abolished en masse and "the incumbents thereoI shall cease to hold oIIice." 2 The total abolition involves a total oI 1,663 judicial positions with 1,180 incumbent judges and 483 vacancies) as oI January 26, 1982 and the Act would eIIect an increase oI 230 judicial positions raising the total oI judicial positions to be Iilled by new appointments to 1,893. Notwithstanding the great deIerence due to enactments oI the Batasan, I regretably Iind myselI unable to join the ranks oI my esteemed colleagues in the majority who uphold the constitutionality oI the Act and have voted to dismiss the petition, Ior the Iollowing main considerations and reasons:
1. I go by the ruling oI the numerical majority oI seven Justices (namely, Pablo, Cesar Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista, Roberto Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, JJ.) in the leading 1955 case oI Ocampo 3 who Iell short by one vote to reach the constitutionally required 2/3 majority (at the time 8 out oI an 11-member Supreme Court) to declare unconstitutional and invalid section 3 oI Republic Act 1186 abolishing the positions oI 18 judges-at-large and 15 cadastral judges and removing or legislating out the incumbent judges Irom oIIice as against the contrary vote oI a minority oI 4 Justices (namely, then ChieI Justice Paras and Padilla, Alex Reyes and Labrador, JJ.) with the paradoxical situation that the last three named Justices voted Ior the validity oI the Act as a remedial measure that abolished said positions without permanent station which subjected them to a rigodon de jueces without the consent oI the Supreme Court, which they considered as "repulsive to an independent judiciary" and violative oI an express prohibitory provision oI the 1935 Constitution while Justice Alex Reyes conceded that otherwise he would go with the majority that "Congress may not, as a general rule, abolish a judicial post without allowing the incumbent to Iinish his term oI oIIice."
2. As then Associate, later ChieI Justice Cesar Bengzon remarked in his separate opinion "(T)he |adverse| outcome oI this litigation |sanctioning the ouster Irom oIIice oI the ten petitioners who were presiding diIIerent Courts oI First Instance, some as judges-at-large, others as cadastral judges, upon the enactment on June 19, 1954 oI R.A. 1186 abolishing the positions oI judges-at large and cadastral judges| is apt to revive the speculation whether wittingly or unwittingly the Constitution has Iurther weakened the usually weak judicial department because oI its 'innovative' requirement oI a 2/3 majority vote oI the Supreme Court to declare a statute unconstitutional, and 'never in our history has such a number oI judges oI Iirst instance |totalling 33 positions| been ousted through judicial reorganization.
His rationale that the express constitutional guaranty oI security oI tenure oI judges "during good behavior until they reach the age oI seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties oI their oIIice" 4 must prevail over the implied constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust the judges despite their constitutionally-secured tenure bears repeating thus:
A careIul analysis will perceive that whereas petitioners invoke an express guaranty or positive deIinition oI their term oI oIIice, the respondents rely on implied authority to abolish courts and the positions oI the respective judges. Accurately stated, respondents' deIense rests on a second inIerence deduced Irom such implied power, because they reason out thusly: Congress has express power to establish courts; thereIore it has implicit power to abolish courts and the positions oI judges oI such abolished courts (Iirst inIerence); and thereIore (second inIerence) Congress likewise has power to eject the judges holding such positions.
Resulting juridical situation. The implied authority invoked by respondents collides with the express guaranty oI tenure protecting the petitioners. Which shall prevail Obviously the express guaranty must override the implied authority. "Implications can never be permitted to contradict the expressed intent or to deIeat its purpose."
xxx xxx xxx
But the collision may he should be avoided, and both sections given validity, iI one be considered a proviso or exception to the other. In other words, under the Constitution the Congress may abolish existing courts, provided it does not thereby remove the incumbent judges; such abolition to take eIIect upon termination oI their incumbent The Iundamental provisions on the matter are thereby coordinated and harmonized' as Justice Laurel suggested in his concurring opinion in Zandueta v. De la Costa. To bring about reconciliations is the great work oI jurists. (Cardozo, Paradoxes oI Legal Science, p. 6) 5
3. This reasoning that the express guaranty oI tenure protecting incumbent judges during good behavior unless removed Irom oIIice aIter hearing and due process or upon reaching the compulsory retirement age oI seventy years must override the implied authority oI removing by legislation the judges has been Iurther strengthened and placed beyond doubt by the new provisions oI the 1973 Constitution that transIerred the administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel Irom the ChieI Executive through the then Secretary oI Justice to the Supreme Court 6 and vested in the Supreme Court exclusively "the power to discipline judges oI inIerior courts and, by a vote oI at least eight members, order their dismissal," 7 Which power was Iormerly lodged by the Judiciary Act in the ChieI Executive.
As Iormer ChieI Justice Bengzon stressed in his opinion in Ocampo, the 1934 Constitutional Convention "Irowned on removal oI judges oI Iirst instance through abolition oI their oIIices or reorganization," citing ProIessor Jose Aruego's observation that the security oI judges' tenure provision was intended to "help secure the independence oI the judiciary" in that "during good behavior, they may not be legislated out oI oIIice by the law-making body nor removed by the ChieI Executive Ior any reason and under the guise oI any pretense whatsoever; they may stay in oIIice until they reach the age oI seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties oI their oIIice. (Aruego, The Framing oI the Philippine Constitution, Vol. 11, pp. 718-719)" He Iurther cited Aruego's report that a proposed amendment to the eIIect that the prohibition against transIers oI judges to another district without the approval oI the Supreme Court 8 "should not be applicable to a reorganization oI tribunals oI justice or oI districts, but the amendment was deIeated easily without debate" 9 and logically concluded that "(N)ow, there . beIore, having vetoed the transIer oI judges thru a re-organization, the Convention evidently could not have permitted the removal oI judges thru re-organization.
Now, iI the Iramers oI the 1973 Constitution wished to dispel the strong doubts, to say the least in the light oI the 7 to 4 vote in the Ocampo case against removal oI incumbent judges through legislative action by abolition oI their courts, then they would have so clearly provided Ior such Iorm oI removal in the 1973 Constitution, but on the contrary as already stated they ruled out such removal or ouster oI judges by legislative action by vesting exclusively in the Supreme Court the power oI discipline and removal oI judges oI all inIerior courts.
4. This being so, the Iundamental point emphasized by Iormer ChieI Justice Bengzon that abolition oI the 33 judicial positions in the Ocampo case was "merely an indirect manner oI removing the petitioners-judges" while the "positions |that| were eliminated . . . were in Iact substituted or replaced by other positions oI judges" applies with greater Iorce in the case at bar which involves an unprecedented total "abolition," thus: "(C)all it reorganization, or legislation or removal or abolition, this law disregards the constitutional assurance that these judges, once appointed, shall hold oIIice during good behavior ... |unless incapacitated and until retirement|.
The abolition oI their oIIices was merely an indirect manner oI removing these petitioners. Remember that on June 19, 1954, there were 107 judges oI Iirst instance, district judges, judges at-large and cadastral judges (Rep. Act 296). AIter the passage oI Republic Act No. 1186 there were 114 positions oI judges oI Iirst instance. There was no reduction there was increase in the number oI judges, nor in the number oI courts. The positions oI Judges-at-Large and Cadastral Judges were eliminated; but they were in Iact substituted or replaced by other positions oI judges; or iI you please, there was a mere change oI designation Irom 'Cadastral Judge or Judge at large to district judge Hence it should be ruled that as their positions had not been 'abolished' de Iacto, but actually retained with another name, these petitioners are entitled to remain in the service. (Brillo v. Enage, G.R. No. L-7115, March 30, 1954.) For it is not permissible to eIIect the removal oI one judge thru the expediency oI abolishing his oIIice even as the oIIice with same power is created with another name. (Brillo v. Enage, Malone v. Williams, 118 tenn. 391, Gibbe's Case 4 A.L.R. p. 211). In this view oI the picture, we believe, Congress could have, and should haveas suggested by Secretary Tuazon during the hearings in Congress directed in said Republic Act No. 1186 that 'the present judges-at-large and cadastral judges shall become district judges presiding such districts as may be Iixed by the President with the consent oI the Commission on Appointments or by the Secretary oI Justice, as originally proposed by Senator Laurel in connection with the same bill. Something similar was done beIore, and it would not be objectionable as an encroachment on the President's prerogative oI appointment, because such judges had already been appointed to the judiciary beIore the passage oI the act, and the provision may be construed in the light oI mere change oI oIIicial designation plus increase in salary."
5. Concededly, the questioned Act eIIects certain changes and procedural reIorms with more speciIic delineation oI jurisdiction as mentioned particularly in the majority opinion, but they do not change the basic structure oI the existing courts. The present Municipal Courts, Municipal Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts in the challenged Act. The Courts oI First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile & Domestic Relations Courts and Courts oI Agrarian Relations are all restructured and redesignated to be known by the common name oI Regional Trial Courts with provision Ior certain branches thereoI "to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reIorm cases . . . . and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest oI a speedy and eIIicient administration oI justice" 10 and the Court oI Appeals is restructured and redesignated as the Intermediate Appellate Court with an increase in the number oI Appellate Justices Irom the present 45 to 50 but with a reduction oI the number oI divisions Irom 15 (composed oI 3 Justices each) to 10 (composed oI 5 members each) such that it is Ieared that there is created a bottleneck at the appellate level in the important task discharged by such appellate courts as reviewers oI Iacts.
In my view, the "candid admission" by the ChieI Justice in his opinion Ior the Court "that he entertained doubts as to whether the intermediate court oI appeals provided Ior is a new tribunal" 10a is equally applicable to all the other above mentioned courts provided Ior in the challenged Act as "new courts". And the best prooI oI this is the plain and simple transitory provision in section 44 thereoI that upon the President's declaration oI completion oI the reorganization (whereby the "old courts" shall "be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereoI shall cease to hold oIIice "(T)he cases pending in the old Courts shall be transIerred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent Iunctions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel together with the "applicable appropriations." This could not have been possible without a speciIication and enumeration oI what speciIic cases oI the "old courts" would be transIerred to the particular "new courts," had these "new courts" not been maniIestly and substantially the "old courts" with a change oI name or as described by Justice Barredo to have been his Iirst view, now discarded, in his separate opinion: "just a renaming, and not a substantial and actual modiIication or alteration oI the present judicial structure or system" or "a rearrangement or remodeling oI the old structure." 11
6. I do not subscribe to the test oI good Iaith or bad Iaith in the abolition oI the courts and consequent ouster oI the incumbent judges Irom oIIice as expounded by the late eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel in his separate concurring opinion in the pre-war case oI Zandueta 12 wherein the Court dismissed the petition Ior quo warranto on the ground oI petitioner Zandueta's estoppel and abandonment oI oIIice. 13 Realistically viewed Irom the basis oI the established legal presumptions oI validity and constitutionality oI statutes (unless set aside by a 2/3 majority oI 10 members oI the Supreme Court) and oI good Iaith in their enactment, one is hard put to conjure a case where the Court could speculate on the good or bad motives behind the enactment oI the Act without appearing to be imprudent and improper and declare that "the legislative power oI reorganization (is) sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose." The good Iaith in the enactment oI the challenged Act must needs be granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative power to abolish courts as implied Irom the power to establish them with the express constitutional guaranty oI tenure oI the judges which is essential Ior a Iree and independent judiciary. Adherents oI the Rule oI Law are agreed that indispensable Ior the maintenance oI the Rule oI Law is a Iree and independent judiciary, sworn to protect and enIorce. it without Iear or Iavor "Iree, not only Irom graIt, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even Irom the tentacles oI interIerence and insiduous inIluence oI the political powers that be to quote again Irom Justice Barredo's separate concurring opinion. 14 Hence, my adherence to the 7-member majority opinion oI Iormer ChieI Justice Bengzon in the Ocampo case, supra, as restated by the Philippine Association oI Law ProIessors headed by Iormer ChieI Justice Roberto Concepcion that "any reorganization should at least snow the incumbents oI the existing courts to remain in oIIice |the appropriate counterpart 'new courts'| unless they are removed Ior cause."
7. The "judges' broader and stronger guarantees oI tenure than ordinary civil servants" as stressed by Iormer ChieI Justice Bengzon in Ms majority opinion in Ocampo is based on the judiciary's status as a coequal and coordinate branch oI government, whereas the long line oI Philippine cases upholding the legislative power to abolish oIIices reIers to oIIicers or employees in the executive branch oI government and "the underlying consideration must be borne in mind that Manalang |the aggrieved petitioner| belonged to the Executive Department and because the President approved the law no question or encroachment by one branch on the other could be apprehended or alleged. 15 This is not a matter oI personal privilege Ior the incumbent judges but as aptly stated by Iormer U.P. Law Dean Irene Cortez in her memorandum as amicus curiae, "Ior the judiciary whose independence is not only eroded but is in grave danger oI being completely destroyed." Dean Cortez aptly stressed that "judicial independence is not a guarantee intended Ior the Supreme Court alone, it extends to the entire court system and is even more vital to the courts at the lowest levels because there are more oI them and they operate closest to the people," and "(P)articularly under the present Iorm oI modiIied parliamentary government with legislative and executive Iunctions overlapping and in certain areas merging, the judiciary is leIt to perIorm the checking Iunction in the perIormance oI which its independence assumes an even more vital importance. "
The extensive memoranda Iiled by Dean Cortez and other amici curiae such as Iormer Senator Jose W. Diokno who strongly urges the Court to strike down the Act "to prevent Iurther destruction oI judicial independence," Iormer Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, president oI the Philippine Constitution Association who advocates Ior the Court's adoption oI the B Bengzon majority opinion in the Ocampo case so as to abide by "the elementary rule in the interpretation oI constitutions that eIIect should be given to all parts oI the Constitution" and that the judges' security oI tenure guaranty should not be rendered meaningless and inoperative" Iormer Solicitor General Arturo A. AlaIriz, president oI the Philippine Lawyers' Association who submits that the total abolition oI all courts below the Supreme Court (except the Sandiganbayan and the Court oI Tax Appeals) and the removal oI the incumbent Justices and Judges "violates the independence oI the judiciary, their security oI tenure and right to due process guaranteed them by the Constitution" and Atty. Raul M. Gonzales, president oI the National Bar Association oI the Philippines who invokes the Declaration oI Delhi at the ICJ ConIerence in 1959, that "The principles oI unremovability oI the Judiciary and their Security oI Tenure until death or until a retiring age Iixed by statute is reached, is an important saIeguard oI the Rule oI Law" have greatly helped in IortiIying my views.
8. I had submitted in my memo oI September 4, 1980 to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization that "(W)hatever reorganization plans the committee may recommend to meet the worldwide problem oI congested court dockets, and to improve judicial services in the public interest, it should be borne in mind that the members oI the judiciary as the weakest branch oI government, yet called upon to saIeguard the people's rights and protect them oppression, oIIicial and otherwise, are entitled to security oI tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even though the lower courts may be reshuIIled or abolished in the process, the mandate and spirit oI the Constitution guaranteeing their security oI tenure and maintaining the independence oI the judiciary should be respected, and they should be retained in the new courts."
In the same vein, Dean Cortez warned oI the dire consequences oI giving the questioned provisions oI the Act the "absolutist sense which they appear to have at Iirst blush" thus: "(T)o accept legislative power to abolish courts asserted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which sweeps through practically the entire judiciary would be to open the door to Iuture court abolitions in the guise oI reorganization. At this stage oI our political development, the process oI embarking upon a modiIied parliamentary system may well usher in a situation where despite guarantees oI judicial tenure, each ruling party in the legislature or any alliance that can command a majority vote may periodically undertake complete reorganization and remove judges, thus making oI the judiciary a veritable straw in the political wind and "(F)urthermore, what can result in the modiIied parliamentary system Irom the close working relationship between executive and legislature is made maniIest in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. II the sweeping revamp provided were to be carried out the President would appoint all oI the justices and judges oI the courts aIIected and the whole membership in the judiciary Irom the highest to the lowest courts would be his appointees. It is relevant to point out that it is precisely a situation like this that the Constitution seeks to avoid when it provides staggered terms Ior the chairman and members oI the constitutional commissions which like the judiciary are guaranteed independence."
9. The judges' security oI tenure was rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions oI the 1973 Constitution which granted the incumbent President the unlimited power to remove and replace all judges and oIIicials 16 (as against the limited one-year period Ior the exercise oI such power granted President Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon establishment oI the Philippine Commonwealth Upon the declaration oI martial law in September, 1972, justices and judges oI all courts, except the Supreme Court, had been required to hand in their resignations. There is listed a total oI 53 judges who were replaced or whose resignations were accepted by the President during the period Irom September, 1972 to April, 1976. The power to replace even the judges appointed aIter the eIIectivity on January 17, 1973 oI the 1973 Constitution is yet invoked on behalI oI the President in the pending case oI Tapucar vs. Famador 17 notwithstanding the generally held view that such post-1973 Constitution appointed judges are not subject to the Replacement Clause oI the cited Transitory Provision. (In this case, petitioner judge appointed on January 30, 1976 as judge oI the Court oI First Instance oI Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 1, invoked his constitutional security oI tenure and questioned the appointment extended on February 26, 1980 to respondent to replace him, although he had not been removed or otherwise dismissed Irom his position nor had be resigned thereIrom. The Court per its March 27, 1980 resolution ordered both to reIrain Irom discharging the Iunctions oI the questioned oIIice And now comes this total abolition oI 1,663 judicial positions (and thousands oI personnel positions) unprecedented in its sweep and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen the judiciary with the restoration oI the security oI tenure oI judges, which is essential Ior a Iree and independent judiciary as mandated by the Constitution, not to make more enIeebled an already Ieeble judiciary, possessed neither oI the power oI the sword nor the purse, as decried by Iormer ChieI Justice Bengzon in his Ocampo majority opinion:
Shall we have judges oI the type oI Lord Coke Or judges, who, in his place, would have answered 'I'll do what his majesty pleases,' judges who, aIraid oI ouster thru a judiciary reshuIIle, would rather serve the interests oI the party in power or oI the political boss, than the interests oI justice?
As it is, the Judicial Department is Ieeble enough. Shall we render it Ieebler with judges precariously occupying their oIIicial seats Judges perIorming their duties under the sword oI Damocles oI Iuture judicial reorganizations
10. The ChieI Justice, in his opinion Ior the Court, equally stressed that "what is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its Iull authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually Iormulated in a caucus oI the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun vs. Labang 18 it as stressed that with the provision transIerring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need 'to preserve unimpaired the independence oI the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intends and purposes, there is a Iusion between the executive and the legislative branches,'" 19 with the Iurther observation that "many are the ways by which such independence could be eroded." In the cited case oI Judge Fortun (likewise penned by the ChieI Justice Ior the Court), the Court issued a writ oI prohibition and certiorari ordering the dismissal oI the criminal complaint Iiled with respondent Iiscal Labang by "disgruntled members oI the bar with a record oI losing cases" in the judge's court and imposed the penalty oI censure on each and everyone oI the private respondents-lawyers Ior the "unseemly haste" with which they Iiled the criminal complaint, abetted by "the appearance oI sheer vindictiveness or oppressive exercise oI state authority." The Court marked the "violation oI the cardinal principles oI Iairness and due process that underlie the Rule oI Law. Petitioner- Judge was not heard; he was denied the opportunity to deIend himselI against the accusation. There was, on the part oI private respondents then, a Iailure to abide by a Resolution oI the Integrated Bar stressing that precisely integration could shield 'the judiciary which traditionally cannot deIend itselI except within its own Iorum, Irom the assaults that politics and selI-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence,' " and that such subjection oI a judge to public "harassment and humiliation . . . can diminish public conIidence in the courts."
11. This brings us to the allegedly underlying need Ior B.P. Blg. 129 discussed in the course oI committee hearings oI Cabinet Bill No. 42 and the deliberation on second reading in the Batasang Pambansa to rid the judiciary oI incompetent and corrupt judges and to restore conIidence in the integrity oI the courts. The purge has been the constant subject oI headlines and editorials, with the Ministry oI Justice's Integrity Council reportedly screening and conducting "integrity tests as to new applicants and the incumbent judges 20 and seeking "conIidential inIormation on corrupt and incompetent judges to help the government purge the judiciary." 21 Prime Minister Cesar Virata was quoted as saying that "there will be a purge oI the corrupt and the misIits' when the Judiciary Reorganization Act is signed into law by President Marcos and implemented in coordination with the Supreme Court." 22 The public respondents' answer sidesteps the issue oI such purge contravening the rudiments oI a Iair hearing and due process and submits that "no term oI oIIice is sacrosanct when demanded beIore the altar oI the public good." The metropolitan papers reported the "anxiety gripping the judiciary as the Ministry oI Justice has reportedly been asked to collate inIormation 'on the perIormance oI the judges and on the qualiIications oI those slated to take over the positions oI the incompetent, the ineIIicient or those involved in irregularities. As stated in an editorial, 'Somehow, the uncertainty that now hovers over the judiciary has unduly subjected the judges to mental torture since they do not know when or whether the axe will Iall on them. Worse, the sword oI Damocles hanging over their heads could provoke them into seeking the help oI people claiming to have inIluence with the powers that be." 23
But Dean Cortez in her memorandum states that "However, nowhere on public record is there hard evidence on this. The only Iigures given in the course oI the committee hearings were to the eIIect that out oI some 1,700 members oI the judiciary, between 10 to 15 were oI the undesirable category, i.e. misIit, incompetent or corrupts. (Barredo, J., beIore the Committee on Justice, human Rights and Good Government, December 4, 1980)," and that "(I)I this be the case, the unprecedented, sweeping and wholesale abolition oI judicial oIIices becomes an arbitrary act, the eIIect oI which is to assert the power to remove all the incumbents guilty or innocent without due process oI law." Now would it be oI any avail to beg the question and assert that due process is not available in mass abolitions oI courts.
Justice Barredo, however, without citing any hard evidence, reIers in his separate concurrence to twin objectives oI getting rid oI " structural inadequacies oI the system or oI the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in Iorce and oI "a good number oI those occupying positions in the judiciary (who') make a mockery oI justice and take advantage oI their oIIice Ior personal ends He adds that "it is my personal assessment oI the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be oI necessity two- pronged, as I have just indicated, Ior the most Ideal judicial system with the most perIect procedural rules cannot satisIy the people and the interests oI justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character, competence and sense oI loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations oI graIt and corruption, including the usual importunings and the Iearsome albeit improper pressures oI the powers that be," 24 and invokes the adage oI "grandes males, grandes remedios" to now uphold the validity oI the Act.
Former Senator Diokno in his memorandum anticipates the argument that "great ills demand drastic cures" thus: "Drastic, yes but not unIair nor unconstitutional. One does not improve courts by abolishing them, any more than a doctor cures a patient by killing him. The ills the judiciary suIIers Irom were caused by impairing its independence; they will not be cured by totally destroying that independence. To adopt such a course would only breed more perversity in the administration oI justice, just as the abuses oI martial rule have bred more subversion."
12. Finally, as stated by the 19-i 5 integrated Bar oI the Philippines 2nd House oI Delegates, "It would, indeed, be most ironical iI Judges who are called upon to give due process cannot count it on themselves. Observance oI procedural due process in the separation oI misIits Irom (he Judiciary is the right way to attain a laudable objective. '
As stressed by the ChieI Justice in the Fortun case, judges are entitled to the cardinal principles oI Iairness and due process and the opportunity to be heard and deIend themselves against the accusations made against their and not to be subjected to harassment and humiliation, and the Court will repudiate the "oppressive exercise oI legal authority." More so, are judges entitled to such due process when what is at stake is their constitutionally guaranteed security oI tenure and non-impairment oI the independence oI the judiciary and the proper exercise oI the constitutional power exclusively vested in the Supreme Court to discipline and remove judges aIter Iair hearing.
In sum, I see no reason to change the stand submitted by me to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization that
Judges oI inIerior courts should not be summarily removed and branded Ior liIe in such reorganization on the basis oI conIidential adverse reports as to their perIormance, competence or integrity, save those who may voluntarily resign Irom oIIice upon being conIronted with such reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte reports, without due process or hearing, has been proven Irom our past experience where a number oI honest and competent judges were summarily removed while others who were generally believed to be basket cases have remained in the service; and
The power oI discipline and dismissal oI judges oI all inIerior courts, Irom the Court oI Appeals down, has been vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and iI the judiciary is to be strengthened, it should be leIt to clean its own house upon complaint and with the cooperation oI the as grieved parties and aIter due process and hearing.
The constitutional conIrontation and conIlict may wen be avoided by holding that since the changes and provisions oI the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and Iunctions oI the "new courts" therein provided as compared to the "abolished old courts" but provide Ior procedural changes, Iixed delineation oI jurisdiction and increases in the number oI courts Ior a more eIIective and eIIicient disposition oI court cases, the incumbent judges guaranteed security oI tenure require that they be retained in the corresponding "new courts."
Fernandez, J., concur.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary oI the Department oI Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge oI the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law OIIice Ior petitioners.
The Solicitor General Ior respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right oI Filipinos to a balanced and healthIul ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts oI "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." SpeciIically, it touches on the issue oI whether the said petitioners have a cause oI action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" oI Philippine rainIorests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage oI the country's vital liIe support systems and continued rape oI Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was Iiled beIore Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) oI the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiIIs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiII is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-proIit corporation organized Ior the purpose oI, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared Ior the protection oI our environment and natural resources. The original deIendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary oI the Department oI Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiIIs "are all citizens oI the Republic oI the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the Iull beneIit, use and enjoyment oI the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical Iorests." The same was Iiled Ior themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation oI said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all beIore the Court." The minors Iurther asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed Ior that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering deIendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalI to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist Irom receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiIIs ". . . such other relieIs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts oII with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago oI 7,100 islands has a land area oI thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainIorests in which varied, rare and unique species oI Ilora and Iauna may be Iound; these rainIorests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat oI indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and Ilourished since time immemorial; scientiIic evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthIul ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis oI a ratio oI IiIty-Iour per cent (54) Ior Iorest cover and Iorty-six per cent (46) Ior agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance oI this balance as a consequence oI deIorestation have resulted in a host oI environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting Irom drying up oI the water table, otherwise known as the "aquiIer," as well as oI rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization oI the water table as a result oI the intrusion therein oI salt water, incontrovertible examples oI which may be Iound in the island oI Cebu and the Municipality oI Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss oI soil Iertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume oI soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size oI the entire island oI Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction oI the country's unique, rare and varied Ilora and Iauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation oI cultural communities, including the disappearance oI the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (I) the siltation oI rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction oI corals and other aquatic liIe leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells oI drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity oI typhoon winds which result Irom the absence oI windbreakers, (i) the Iloodings oI lowlands and agricultural plains arising Irom the absence oI the absorbent mechanism oI Iorests, (j) the siltation and shortening oI the liIespan oI multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated Ior the purpose oI supplying water Ior domestic uses, irrigation and the generation oI electric power, and (k) the reduction oI the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon oI global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse eIIect."
PlaintiIIs Iurther assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences oI continued and deIorestation are so capable oI unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter oI judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and Iilm evidence in the course oI the trial.
As their cause oI action, they speciIically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. PlaintiIIs replead by reIerence the Ioregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-Iive (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares oI rainIorests constituting roughly 53 oI the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares oI said rainIorests or Iour per cent (4.0) oI the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares oI virgin old-growth rainIorests are leIt, barely 2.8 oI the entire land mass oI the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares oI immature and uneconomical secondary growth Iorests.
11. Public records reveal that the deIendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area oI 3.89 million hectares Ior commercial logging purposes.
A copy oI the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate oI deIorestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereIt oI Iorest resources aIter the end oI this ensuing decade, iI not earlier.
13. The adverse eIIects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage oI this continued trend oI deIorestation to the plaintiII minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter oI Iact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereoI are already being Ielt, experienced and suIIered by the generation oI plaintiII adults.
14. The continued allowance by deIendant oI TLA holders to cut and deIorest the remaining Iorest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiIIs especially plaintiII minors and their successors who may never see, use, beneIit Irom and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act oI deIendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment oI the natural resource property he holds in trust Ior the beneIit oI plaintiII minors and succeeding generations.
15. PlaintiIIs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthIul ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. PlaintiII have exhausted all administrative remedies with the deIendant's oIIice. On March 2, 1990, plaintiIIs served upon deIendant a Iinal demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy oI the plaintiIIs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. DeIendant, however, Iails and reIuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice oI plaintiIIs.
18. The continued Iailure and reIusal by deIendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative oI the rights oI plaintiIIs, especially plaintiII minors who may be leIt with a country that is desertiIied (sic), bare, barren and devoid oI the wonderIul Ilora, Iauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. DeIendant's reIusal to cancel the aIorementioned TLA's is maniIestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy oI the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to IulIill the social, economic and other requirements oI present and Iuture generations oI Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment oI an environmental quality that is conductive to a liIe oI dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, deIendant's continued reIusal to cancel the aIorementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy oI the State to
a. eIIect "a more equitable distribution oI opportunities, income and wealth" and "make Iull and eIIicient use oI natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII oI the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right oI the people to a balanced and healthIul ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony oI nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, deIendant's act is contrary to the highest law oI humankind the natural law and violative oI plaintiIIs' right to selI- preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage oI the country's vital liIe support systems and continued rape oI Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original deIendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., Iiled a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiIIs have no cause oI action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiIIs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches oI Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause oI action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the deIendant's abuse oI discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aIorementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the deIendant's claim that the complaint states no cause oI action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge Iurther ruled that the granting oI the relieI prayed Ior would result in the impairment oI contracts which is prohibited by the Iundamental law oI the land.
PlaintiIIs thus Iiled the instant special civil action Ior certiorari under Rule 65 oI the Revised Rules oI Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents oI the plaintiIIs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda aIter the OIIice oI the Solicitor General (OSG) Iiled a Comment in behalI oI the respondents and the petitioners Iiled a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause oI action as it contains suIIicient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 oI the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 oI Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 oI Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II oI the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right oI the people to a balanced and healthIul ecology, the concept oI generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept oI man's inalienable right to selI-preservation and selI-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 oI E.O. No. 192, to saIeguard the people's right to a healthIul environment.
It is Iurther claimed that the issue oI the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse oI discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas Ior logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge oI the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even iI TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners Iailed to allege in their complaint a speciIic legal right violated by the respondent Secretary Ior which any relieI is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause oI action. They then reiterate the theory that the question oI whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches oI Government. They thereIore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to Iile an action to court, but to lobby beIore Congress Ior the passage oI a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter oI the cancellation oI the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process oI law. Once issued, a TLA remains eIIective Ior a certain period oI time usually Ior twenty-Iive (25) years. During its eIIectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been Iound, aIter due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms oI the agreement or other Iorestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative oI the requirements oI due process.
BeIore going any Iurther, We must Iirst Iocus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original deIendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter oI the complaint is oI common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens oI the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, iI not totally impossible, to bring all oI them beIore the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiIIs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the Iull protection oI all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites Ior the Iiling oI a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 oI the Revised Rules oI Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the Iormer.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We Iind no diIIiculty in ruling that they can, Ior themselves, Ior others oI their generation and Ior the succeeding generations, Iile a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalI oI the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept oI intergenerational responsibility insoIar as the right to a balanced and healthIul ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinaIter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony oI nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation oI the country's Iorest, mineral, land, waters, Iisheries, wildliIe, oII-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as Iuture generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony Ior the Iull enjoyment oI a balanced and healthIul ecology. Put a little diIIerently, the minors' assertion oI their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the perIormance oI their obligation to ensure the protection oI that right Ior the generations to come.
The locus standi oI the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits oI the petition.
AIter a careIul perusal oI the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation oI the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to Iind Ior the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order Ior having been issued with grave abuse oI discretion amounting to lack oI jurisdiction. The pertinent portions oI the said order reads as Iollows:
xxx xxx xxx
AIter a careIul and circumspect evaluation oI the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the deIendant. For although we believe that plaintiIIs have but the noblest oI all intentions, it (sic) Iell short oI alleging, with suIIicient deIiniteness, a speciIic legal right they are seeking to enIorce and protect, or a speciIic legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unveriIied data. In Iine, plaintiIIs Iail to state a cause oI action in its Complaint against the herein deIendant.
Furthermore, the Court Iirmly believes that the matter beIore it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter oI public policy, may not be taken cognizance oI by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle oI "Separation oI Powers" oI the three (3) co-equal branches oI the Government.
The Court is likewise oI the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the relieIs prayed Ior by the plaintiIIs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist Irom receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment oI contracts" abhored (sic) by the Iundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiIIs Iailed to allege with suIIicient deIiniteness a speciIic legal right involved or a speciIic legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unveriIied data. A reading oI the complaint itselI belies these conclusions.
The complaint Iocuses on one speciIic Iundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthIul ecology which, Ior the Iirst time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the Iundamental law. Section 16, Article II oI the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right oI the people to a balanced and healthIul ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony oI nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided Ior in the preceding section oI the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health oI the people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthIul ecology is to be Iound under the Declaration oI Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill oI Rights, it does not Iollow that it is less important than any oI the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a diIIerent category oI rights altogether Ior it concerns nothing less than selI-preservation and selI- perpetuation aptly and Iittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement oI which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter oI Iact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution Ior they are assumed to exist Irom the inception oI humankind. II they are now explicitly mentioned in the Iundamental charter, it is because oI the well-Iounded Iear oI its Iramers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthIul ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itselI, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the Iirst and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too Iar when all else would be lost not only Ior the present generation, but also Ior those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable oI sustaining liIe.
The right to a balanced and healthIul ecology carries with it the correlative duty to reIrain Irom impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one oI the plenary sessions oI the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Iollowing exchange transpired between Commissioner WilIrido Villacorta and Commissioner AdolIo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all Iorms oI pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthIul (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty oI not impairing the same and, thereIore, sanctions may be provided Ior impairment oI environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation oI the country's Iorests.
Without such Iorests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
ConIormably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthIul ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions oI the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization oI the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 oI which expressly mandates that the Department oI Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible Ior the conservation, management, development and proper use oI the country's environment and natural resources, speciIically Iorest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands oI the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation oI all natural resources as may be provided Ior by law in order to ensure equitable sharing oI the beneIits derived thereIrom Ior the welIare oI the present and Iuture generations oI Filipinos." Section 3 thereoI makes the Iollowing statement oI policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration oI Policy. It is hereby declared the policy oI the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation oI the country's Iorest, mineral, land, oII-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement oI the quality oI the environment, and equitable access oI the diIIerent segments oI the population to the development and the use oI the country's natural resources, not only Ior the present generation but Ior Iuture generations as well. It is also the policy oI the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation oI our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV oI the Administrative Code oI 1987, 15 speciIically in Section 1 thereoI which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration oI Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, Ior the beneIit oI the Filipino people, the Iull exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation oI the country's Iorest, mineral, land, waters, Iisheries, wildliIe, oII-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity oI maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality oI the environment and the objective oI making the exploration, development and utilization oI such natural resources equitably accessible to the diIIerent segments oI the present as well as Iuture generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation oI our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity oI maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality oI the environment." Section 2 oI the same Title, on the other hand, speciIically speaks oI the mandate oI the DENR; however, it makes particular reIerence to the Iact oI the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department oI Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible Ior the implementation oI the Ioregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge oI carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation oI the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code oI 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases Ior policy Iormulation, and have deIined the powers and Iunctions oI the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even beIore the ratiIication oI the 1987 Constitution, speciIic statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" oI the present and Iuture generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The Iormer "declared a continuing policy oI the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to IulIill the social, economic and other requirements oI present and Iuture generations oI Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment oI an environmental quality that is conducive to a liIe oI dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks oI the "responsibilities oI each generation as trustee and guardian oI the environment Ior succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave Ilesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right oI the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthIul ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue oI its powers and Iunctions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code oI 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation oI that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause oI action. Petitioners maintain that the granting oI the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse oI discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthIul ecology; hence, the Iull protection thereoI requires that no Iurther TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause oI action is deIined as:
. . . an act or omission oI one party in violation oI the legal right or rights oI the other; and its essential elements are legal right oI the plaintiII, correlative obligation oI the deIendant, and act or omission oI the deIendant in violation oI said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint Iails to state a cause oI action, 19 the question submitted to the court Ior resolution involves the suIIiciency oI the Iacts alleged in the complaint itselI. No other matter should be considered; Iurthermore, the truth oI Ialsity oI the said allegations is beside the point Ior the truth thereoI is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged Iacts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground oI the absence thereoI |cause oI action| lest, by its Iailure to maniIest a correct appreciation oI the Iacts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is eIIectively nulliIied. II that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itselI stands in disrepute."
AIter careIul examination oI the petitioners' complaint, We Iind the statements under the introductory aIIirmative allegations, as well as the speciIic averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima Iacie, the claimed violation oI their rights. On the basis thereoI, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the relieIs prayed Ior. It bears stressing, however, that insoIar as the cancellation oI the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party deIendants, the grantees thereoI Ior they are indispensable parties.
The Ioregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy Iormulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches oI Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enIorcement oI a right vis-a-vis policies already Iormulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise oI judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions Irom judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph oI section 1, Article VIII oI the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty oI the courts oI justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enIorceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse oI discretion amounting to lack or excess oI jurisdiction on the part oI any branch or instrumentality oI the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member oI this Court, says:
The Iirst part oI the authority represents the traditional concept oI judicial power, involving the settlement oI conIlicting rights as conIerred as law. The second part oI the authority represents a broadening oI judicial power to enable the courts oI justice to review what was beIore Iorbidden territory, to wit, the discretion oI the political departments oI the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom oI the decisions oI the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid Ior lack or excess oI jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse oI discretion. The catch, oI course, is the meaning oI "grave abuse oI discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition oI the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking Ior this Court, noted:
In the case now beIore us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even iI we were to assume that the issue presented beIore us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded Irom revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conIerred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, oI the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment oI contracts clause Iound in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise oI the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the relieIs prayed Ior by the plaintiIIs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist Irom receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment oI contracts" abhored (sic) by the Iundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, iI not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the Iirst place, the respondent Secretary did not, Ior obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. II he had done so, he would have acted with utmost inIidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted beneIits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have Iorever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless oI changes in policy and the demands oI public interest and welIare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 oI the Forestry ReIorm Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modiIy, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other Iorm oI privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause oI the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director oI Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition oI Iorest resources to the end that public welIare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview oI the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welIare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawIul, and is not a contract between the authority, Iederal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting oI license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition oI Iorest resources to the end that public welIare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualiIied entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the Iorest products therein. They may be validly amended, modiIied, replaced or rescinded by the ChieI Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview oI the due process oI law clause |See Sections 3(ee) and 20 oI Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director oI Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302|.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation oI contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even iI it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modiIication oI existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting Iurther that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modiIications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation oI the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise oI the police power oI the state Ior the purpose oI advancing the right oI the people to a balanced and healthIul ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welIare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The Ireedom oI contract, under our system oI government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion oI public health, moral, saIety and welIare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty oI non-impairment oI obligations oI contract is limited by the exercise oI the police power oI the State, in the interest oI public health, saIety, moral and general welIare.
The reason Ior this is emphatically set Iorth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American LiIe Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our Iorm oI government the use oI property and the making oI contracts are normally matters oI private and not oI public concern. The general rule is that both shall be Iree oI governmental interIerence. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; Ior government cannot exist iI the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment oI his Iellows, or exercise his Ireedom oI contract to work them harm. Equally Iundamental with the private right is that oI the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power oI the state. 31
Finally, it is diIIicult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non- impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary Irom receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses Ior, save in cases oI renewal, no contract would have as oI yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter oI right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order oI respondent Judge oI 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may thereIore amend their complaint to implead as deIendants the holders or grantees oI the questioned timber license agreements.
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one oI the most important cases decided by this Court in the last Iew years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to inIluence proIoundly the direction and course oI the protection and management oI the environment, which oI course embraces the utilization oI all the natural resources in the territorial base oI our polity. I have thereIore sought to clariIy, basically to myselI, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance oI this suit (Decision, pp. 11- 12). Locus standi is not a Iunction oI petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to reIer to the legal interest which a plaintiII must have in the subject matter oI the suit. Because oI the very broadness oI the concept oI "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the Iuture it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to beneIit Irom the course oI action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen thereIore to be recognizing a beneIiciaries' right oI action in the Iield oI environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the Iield or sector oI activity involved. Whether such beneIiciaries' right oI action may be Iound under any and all circumstances, or whether some Iailure to act, in the Iirst instance, on the part oI the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion oI administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is leIt Ior Iuture determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and Iocused upon "one speciIic Iundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthIul ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthIul ecology" is "Iundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is Iundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "speciIic," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in Iact very diIIicult to Iashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthIul ecology." The list oI particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control oI emission oI toxic Iumes and smoke Irom Iactories and motor vehicles; oI discharge oI oil, chemical eIIluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, Iactories, mines and whole communities; oI dumping oI organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughIares; Iailure to rehabilitate land aIter strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash- and-burn Iarming; destruction oI Iisheries, coral reeIs and other living sea resources through the use oI dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination oI ground water resources; loss oI certain species oI Iauna and Ilora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV oI the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be Iormulations oI policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements oI basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthIul ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection oI more "speciIic environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (Iourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range oI topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) Iisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild liIe;
(iii) Iorestry and soil conservation;
(iv) Ilood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization oI surIace and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identiIied the particular provision or provisions (iI any) oI the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a speciIic legal right which petitioners are seeking to enIorce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identiIies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the Iormulation and implementation oI guidelines and programs dealing with each oI the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part oI private persons who are beneIiciaries oI implementation oI that Code.
As a matter oI logic, by Iinding petitioners' cause oI action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in eIIect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) oI Article II oI the Constitution are selI-executing and judicially enIorceable even in their present Iorm. The implications oI this doctrine will have to be explored in Iuture cases; those implications are too large and Iar-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, beIore the trial court, show a more speciIic legal right a right cast in language oI a signiIicantly lower order oI generality than Article II (15) oI the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or Iailures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part oI the relieI prayed Ior. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more speciIic legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus oI law, considering the general policy principles Iound in the Constitution and the existence oI the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an eIIective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead oI aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component oI a cause oI action be a speciIic, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, Ior at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given speciIication in operational terms, deIendants may well be unable to deIend themselves intelligently and eIIectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a speciIic violation oI law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to Iall back on the expanded conception oI judicial power in the second paragraph oI Section 1 oI Article VIII oI the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty oI the courts oI justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enIorceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse oI discretion amounting to lack or excess oI jurisdiction on the part oI any branch or instrumentality oI the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse oI discretion amounting to lack or excess oI jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectIully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean oI social and economic policy making. At least in respect oI the vast area oI environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and proIessional qualiIication. Where no speciIic, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and eIIective opportunity to Iashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them beIore the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, iI petitioners' entitlement to the relieI demanded is not dependent upon prooI oI breach by the timber companies oI one or more oI the speciIic terms and conditions oI their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence oI the speciIic legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality oI the claimed Iactual nexus between petitioners' speciIic legal rights and the claimed wrongIul acts or Iailures to act oI public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness oI the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition Ior Certiorari because the protection oI the environment, including the Iorest cover oI our territory, is oI extreme importance Ior the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one oI the most important cases decided by this Court in the last Iew years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to inIluence proIoundly the direction and course oI the protection and management oI the environment, which oI course embraces the utilization oI all the natural resources in the territorial base oI our polity. I have thereIore sought to clariIy, basically to myselI, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance oI this suit (Decision, pp. 11- 12). Locus standi is not a Iunction oI petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to reIer to the legal interest which a plaintiII must have in the subject matter oI the suit. Because oI the very broadness oI the concept oI "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the Iuture it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to beneIit Irom the course oI action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen thereIore to be recognizing a beneIiciaries' right oI action in the Iield oI environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the Iield or sector oI activity involved. Whether such beneIiciaries' right oI action may be Iound under any and all circumstances, or whether some Iailure to act, in the Iirst instance, on the part oI the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion oI administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is leIt Ior Iuture determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and Iocused upon "one speciIic Iundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthIul ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthIul ecology" is "Iundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is Iundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "speciIic," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in Iact very diIIicult to Iashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthIul ecology." The list oI particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control oI emission oI toxic Iumes and smoke Irom Iactories and motor vehicles; oI discharge oI oil, chemical eIIluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, Iactories, mines and whole communities; oI dumping oI organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughIares; Iailure to rehabilitate land aIter strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash- and-burn Iarming; destruction oI Iisheries, coral reeIs and other living sea resources through the use oI dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination oI ground water resources; loss oI certain species oI Iauna and Ilora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV oI the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be Iormulations oI policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements oI basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthIul ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection oI more "speciIic environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (Iourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range oI topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) Iisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild liIe;
(iii) Iorestry and soil conservation;
(iv) Ilood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization oI surIace and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identiIied the particular provision or provisions (iI any) oI the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a speciIic legal right which petitioners are seeking to enIorce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identiIies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the Iormulation and implementation oI guidelines and programs dealing with each oI the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part oI private persons who are beneIiciaries oI implementation oI that Code.
As a matter oI logic, by Iinding petitioners' cause oI action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in eIIect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) oI Article II oI the Constitution are selI-executing and judicially enIorceable even in their present Iorm. The implications oI this doctrine will have to be explored in Iuture cases; those implications are too large and Iar-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, beIore the trial court, show a more speciIic legal right a right cast in language oI a signiIicantly lower order oI generality than Article II (15) oI the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or Iailures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part oI the relieI prayed Ior. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more speciIic legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus oI law, considering the general policy principles Iound in the Constitution and the existence oI the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an eIIective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead oI aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component oI a cause oI action be a speciIic, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, Ior at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given speciIication in operational terms, deIendants may well be unable to deIend themselves intelligently and eIIectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a speciIic violation oI law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to Iall back on the expanded conception oI judicial power in the second paragraph oI Section 1 oI Article VIII oI the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty oI the courts oI justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enIorceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse oI discretion amounting to lack or excess oI jurisdiction on the part oI any branch or instrumentality oI the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse oI discretion amounting to lack or excess oI jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectIully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean oI social and economic policy making. At least in respect oI the vast area oI environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and proIessional qualiIication. Where no speciIic, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and eIIective opportunity to Iashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them beIore the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, iI petitioners' entitlement to the relieI demanded is not dependent upon prooI oI breach by the timber companies oI one or more oI the speciIic terms and conditions oI their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence oI the speciIic legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality oI the claimed Iactual nexus between petitioners' speciIic legal rights and the claimed wrongIul acts or Iailures to act oI public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness oI the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition Ior Certiorari because the protection oI the environment, including the Iorest cover oI our territory, is oI extreme importance Ior the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.