US V Gomez

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2011 WL 3841071
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
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United States District Court,
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S.D. Florida.
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UNITED STATES of America,
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v.
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Alexei GOMEZ, et al., Defendants.
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Case No. 11\u8211\'3f20304\u8211\'3fCR.
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Aug. 31, 2011.
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Synopsis
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Background:
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Defendant, indicted for conspiring to import cocaine, moved to suppress evidenc
e arising out of the warrantless search of his cell phone.
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Holdings:
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The District Court,
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Ursula Ungaro
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, J., adopting the report and recommendation of
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Edwin G. Torres
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, United States Magistrate Judge, held that:
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agents\rquote warrantless observation of name which appeared on caller ID scre
en of defendant\rquote s cell phone when the phone rang after it was seized inci
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agents were justified in searching defendant\rquote s cell phone to review and
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exigent circumstances justified agents in answering defendant\rquote s cell pho
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agents were justified in conversing with by text messages with person who calle
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agents were justified in photographing the text messages exchanged.
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Motion denied.
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West Headnotes (22)
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Necessity of and Preference for Warrant, and Exceptions in General
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{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
t
}
}
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{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0

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d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
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rslt
Plain View from Lawful Vantage Point
\par
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
t
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
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0a1a0a0000000d494844520000001c0000001008020000008aad88b80000001974455874536f6674
776172650041646f626520496d616765526561647971c9653c000002e34944415478da9c545d4854
d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
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rslt
Nature of Items Seized; \u8201\'3fNexus
\par
}
}
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
While the plain view doctrine of the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of inc
riminating evidence, it does not authorize a warrantless search of the item for
concealed evidence.
}
.
\par
}
}
}
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2599362100520111110_1}
\par
}
}
ll \row }}
}
}
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}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\par
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\intbl
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{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
6
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}
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{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/KeyNumber/35/V
iew.html?docGuid=Idf052ecfd41711e0a06efc94fb34cdeb&originationContext=document&v
r=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
Arrest
}
}
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{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
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d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/KeyNumber/35k7
1.1(5)/View.html?docGuid=Idf052ecfd41711e0a06efc94fb34cdeb&originationContext=do
cument&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{
\fldrslt
Particular Places or Objects
\par
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
t
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
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776172650041646f626520496d616765526561647971c9653c000002e34944415478da9c545d4854
d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
rslt
Observation; \u8201\'3fItems in Plain View
\par
}
}
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Name which appeared on caller ID screen of defendant\rquote s cell phone when th
e phone rang after it was seized incident to his arrest was within plain view, s
uch that its warrantless observation by agents did not constitute a \u8220\'3fse
arch\u8221\'3f within meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
}
.
\par
}
}
}
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2599362100620111110_1}
\par
}
}
ll \row }}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj {

\intbl
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{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
7
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
Arrest
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
0a1a0a0000000d494844520000001c0000001008020000008aad88b80000001974455874536f6674
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d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
\fldrslt
Scope of Search
\par
}
}
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Exception to probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment for
searches incident to arrest permits the search and seizure of any evidence with
in an arrestee\rquote s immediate control, meaning the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence, incident to arrest;
once a person is lawfully seized and placed under arrest, he has a reduced expe
ctation or privacy in his person.
}
.
\par
}
}
}
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2599362100720111110_1}
\par
}
}
ll \row }}
}
}
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}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\par
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\intbl
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{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
8
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
Arrest
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
0a1a0a0000000d494844520000001c0000001008020000008aad88b80000001974455874536f6674
776172650041646f626520496d616765526561647971c9653c000002e34944415478da9c545d4854
d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1.1/View.html?docGuid=Idf052ecfd41711e0a06efc94fb34cdeb&originationContext=docum
drslt
Search
\par
}
}
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Under the Fourth Amendment, a showing of necessity, either for officer safety or
destruction of evidence, is not required to justify a search incident to arrest
.
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
2599362100820111110_1}
\par
}
}
ll \row }}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj {
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1

9
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
Arrest
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
0a1a0a0000000d494844520000001c0000001008020000008aad88b80000001974455874536f6674
776172650041646f626520496d616765526561647971c9653c000002e34944415478da9c545d4854
d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
\fldrslt
\par
}
}

\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Under the Fourth Amendment, because vehicles present a unique situation to arres
ting officers, they are deemed justified in conducting a search incident to a la
wful arrest of a vehicle\rquote s recent occupant when it is reasonable to belie
ve evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle, but o
nly if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evide
nce of the offense of arrest.
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
2599362100920111110_1}
\par
}
}
ll \row }}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj {
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1

10
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
Arrest
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
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776172650041646f626520496d616765526561647971c9653c000002e34944415478da9c545d4854
d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
\fldrslt
\par
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1

Arrest
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
0a1a0a0000000d494844520000001c0000001008020000008aad88b80000001974455874536f6674
776172650041646f626520496d616765526561647971c9653c000002e34944415478da9c545d4854
d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
\fldrslt
Persons and Personal Effects; Person Detained for Investigation
\par
}
}
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Under the Fourth Amendment, any objects found on an arrestee\rquote s person, on

his clothing, on any area within his immediate control, may be searched by law
enforcement, with or without any reason to suspect that the person is armed or c
arrying contraband.
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
2599362101020111110_1}
\par
}
}
ll \row }}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj {
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
11
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1

Arrest
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
0a1a0a0000000d494844520000001c0000001008020000008aad88b80000001974455874536f6674
776172650041646f626520496d616765526561647971c9653c000002e34944415478da9c545d4854
d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
\fldrslt
\par
}
}
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Under the Fourth Amendment, a cell phone found close to a defendant is subject t
o a search incident to arrest because it was seized in the arrestee\rquote s rea
ching area.
}

.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
2599362101120111110_1}
\par
}
}
ll \row }}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj {
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
12
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
Arrest
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0

{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
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776172650041646f626520496d616765526561647971c9653c000002e34944415478da9c545d4854
d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
\fldrslt
Scope of Search
\par
}
}
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Only material limitation in the breadth of the search incident to arrest excepti
on to the Fourth Amendment is its temporal and spatial limitation: compliance wi
th the warrant requirement is excused only when the search is substantially cont
emporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arr
est.
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
2599362101220111110_1}
\par
}
}
ll \row }}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj {
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
13
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
Arrest
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
0a1a0a0000000d494844520000001c0000001008020000008aad88b80000001974455874536f6674
776172650041646f626520496d616765526561647971c9653c000002e34944415478da9c545d4854
d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
\fldrslt
Scope of Search
\par
}
}
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
An extremely intrusive search incident to arrest may be limited by the reasonabl
eness component of the Fourth Amendment.
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
2599362101320111110_1}
\par
}
}
ll \row }}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj {
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
14
}
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
Arrest
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
0a1a0a0000000d494844520000001c0000001008020000008aad88b80000001974455874536f6674
776172650041646f626520496d616765526561647971c9653c000002e34944415478da9c545d4854
d14a09fb4b800100952bb3962ee31a410000000049454e44ae426082}}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
\fldrslt
\par
}
}
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
}
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Under the Fourth Amendment, agents were justified in searching defendant\rquote
s cell phone, incident to his drug-related arrest, to review and record its rece
nt call log history; phone was found within defendant\rquote s reaching distance
, and there was probable cause to suspect that it contained evidence relevant to
his arrest, since defendant was observed placing a package of cocaine in his ve
hicle and using his cell phone before the arrest.
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Search Not Incident to Arrest; Time and Distance Factors
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Under the Fourth Amendment, if officers do not contemporaneously search a cell p
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house, the subsequent search could not and should not be deemed incident to arr
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Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances; \u8201\'3fOpportunity to Obtain Warrant
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Pursuit
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Presence of Probable Cause
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Likely Escape or Loss of Evidence
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Appropriate inquiry in determining when such exigent circumstances exist as to j
ustify, under the Fourth Amendment, a search or seizure, is whether the facts in
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ieve that evidence might be destroyed before a warrant could be secured; other r
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ht or escape, danger of harm to police officers or the general public, risk of l
oss, destruction, removal or concealment of evidence, and hot pursuit of a fleei
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Presumptions and Burden of Proof
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Government bears burden of proving the exigent circumstances exception to the Fo
urth Amendment warrant requirement by establishing that both an exigency and pro
bable cause existed.
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Under the Fourth Amendment, and given the fleeting nature of phone calls, exigen
t circumstances justified agents\rquote act of answering defendant\rquote s cel
l phone when it rang after they arrested him, despite the absence of a search wa
rrant, where, since the phone received a number of calls from the same caller, t
here was probable cause to believe the caller was the intended recipient of the
package of cocaine which defendant had just picked up.
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Given that exigent circumstances, within meaning of the Fourth Amendment, justif
ied agents\rquote warrantless act of answering defendant\rquote s cell phone wh
en it rang several times after they arrested him, agents were similarly justifie
d in conversing with the caller by text messages; since the phone received a num
ber of calls from the same caller, there was probable cause to believe the calle
r was the intended recipient of the package of cocaine which defendant had just
picked up.
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{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Given that exigent circumstances, within meaning of the Fourth Amendment, justif
ied agents\rquote warrantless act of answering defendant\rquote s cell phone wh
en it rang several times after they arrested him, and in conversing with the cal
ler by text messages, agents were similarly justified in photographing the text
messages exchanged.
}
.
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2599362102020111110_1}
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Criminal Law
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}
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392.39(11)/View.html?docGuid=Idf052ecfd41711e0a06efc94fb34cdeb&originationContex
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Causal Nexus; \u8201\'3fIndependent Discovery or Basis or Source
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}
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Under the independent source doctrine, even where a Fourth Amendment violation h
as occurred, evidence obtained from a lawful source, independent of the illegal
conduct is admissible.
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.
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22
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Criminal Law
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Causal Nexus; \u8201\'3fIndependent Discovery or Basis or Source
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Rationale for the Fourth Amendment independent source doctrine is that the gover
nment should be put in the same, not a worse, position than it would have been i
n if no error or misconduct had occurred.
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.
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2599362102220111110_1}
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Attorneys and Law Firms
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{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Amanda Perwin, U.S. Attorney\rquote s Office, Miami, FL, for United States of Am
erica.
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}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Michael Dennis Walsh
}}}
, Attorney at Law, Miami, FL, for Defendants.
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{\*\bkmkstart co_opinion_1}{\*\bkmkend co_opinion_1}

Opinion
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{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_I855161cc0c2211e18b05fdf15589d}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_I85
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ORDER ON MAGISTRATE JUDGE\rquote S REPORT
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URSULA UNGARO
}}}
, District Judge.
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THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Defendant\rquote s First Particularized
Motion to Suppress Evidence and Brief in Support. (D.E. 37.)
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}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
THE COURT has considered the Motion and the pertinent portions of the record and
is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres, who, on July 22, 2
011, held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion. On August 12, 2011, the Magistra
te Judge issued a Report setting forth his findings of fact and conclusions of l
aw and recommending that the Motion be denied. (D.E. 46.)
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
The parties were afforded the opportunity to file objections to the Magistrate J
udge\rquote s Report; however, no objections were filed. After conducting a
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
de novo
}
}
review of the record, it is hereby
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Magistrate Judge\rquote s Report (D.E. 46) is RATI
FIED, ADOPTED, AND AFFIRMED: Defendant\rquote s First Particularized Motion to S
uppress Evidence (D.E. 37) is DENIED.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_I855161cd0c2211e18b05fdf15589d}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_I85
5161cd0c2211e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT\rquote S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
EDWIN G. TORRES
}}}
, United States Magistrate Judge.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_I855161d00c2211e18b05fdf15589d}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_I85
5161d00c2211e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Alexei Gomez (\u8220\'3fDefendant\u
8221\'3f)\rquote s First Particularized Motion to Suppress Evidence and Brief in
Support (\u8220\'3fMotion\u8221\'3f). [D.E. 37]. The Court has reviewed the Mot
ion, the Government\rquote s response in opposition [D.E. 41], and held an evide
ntiary hearing regarding this Motion on July 22, 2011. Initially, the Court limi
ted briefing to only the Government\rquote s response [D.E. 40]; however, during
the hearing, the Court gave Defendant the option to file a reply with respect t
o certain issues raised during the hearing. Instead, Defendant chose to rest on
his Motion and argument presented. The Court\rquote s decision rests on the foll
owing facts gleaned from the papers filed by the Parties and those presented dur
ing the July 22, 2011 evidentiary hearing. For the following reasons, Defendant\
rquote s Motion should be
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
DENIED.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
5161d10c2211e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
\par
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
On April 5, 2011, law enforcement agents (\u8220\'3fagents\u8221\'3f) seized app
roximately two (2) kilograms of cocaine at the DHL hub located in Miami, Florida
. The agents investigated a package that contained unusually high densities when
scanned by X\u8211\'3fRAY; a subsequent canine unit alerted agents that this pa
ckage contained narcotics. With their suspicions sufficiently piqued, agents ope
ned the package to investigate its contents. The package contained a horse saddl
e that, when drilled, revealed a white substance. This substance field tested po
sitive for cocaine. The shipment originated in San Jose, Costa Rica sent from a
shipper/exporter Servicio Internacionals De Carga and was addressed to the Defen
dant at a business address located in Miami, Florida.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
With this information, agents searched the Florida Driver and Vehicle Informatio
n Database to reveal Defendant\rquote s home address and driver license picture.
The agents also investigated the recipient address and uncovered it was a real
estate business, Choice One Realty (\u8220\'3fChoice One\u8221\'3f), that employ
ed the Defendant. The agents then decided to reseal the package and attempt a co
ntrolled delivery to the Defendant later that afternoon. Prior to attempting the
delivery, however, the agents did not secure an anticipatory search and seizure
or arrest warrant.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*2
}
}
At approximately 4:30 p.m., an agent delivered the package to Choice One while
the remaining agents staged around this location waiting for somebody to pickup
the package. Eventually, agents asked Choice One\rquote s manager to call the De
fendant and inform him that a package had arrived for him; the manager left Defe
ndant a voicemail message. At about 7:30 p.m., an individual matching the descri
ption of, and operating a vehicle registered to, the Defendant appeared at Choic
e One. He picked up the package, placed it in his vehicle and drove away.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj

The agents followed close behind the Defendant. Likely a result of the predomina
nce of single lane roads in their vicinity, all parties involved soon became awa
re of each other\rquote s presence. The Defendant\rquote s driving behavior show
ed signs of distress and turned erratic with frequent \u8220\'3fheat runs\u8221\
'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_B00112025993621_ID0}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_B00112025993621_ID0}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnote_B00112025993621_1" }{\fldrslt
1
}}}
}
and unnecessary doubling back u-turns. An unintended consequence of this behavi
or was, however, that agents were able to observe Defendant operating his cell p
hone as the line of vehicles passed by one another after each u-turn. This errat
ic driving, coupled with the fact that Defendant was driving away from his resid
ence, motivated the agents to effect a stop. The agents immediately handcuffed t
he Defendant, secured him in an agent\rquote s vehicle and informed him he was a
rrested because of the package.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
After securing Defendant\rquote s vehicle, the agents conducted a search of the
vehicle and recovered, among other benign objects, an operational Metro PCS cell
ular phone (\u8220\'3fcell phone\u8221\'3f). This cell phone is capable of makin
g calls, receiving voice mail, sending text messages and taking photographs, but
it is not a \u8220\'3fsmartphone.\u8221\'3f As such, Defendant\rquote s cell ph
one is not, for instance, an iPhone that can utilize computerized functions like
accessing the internet or maintaining sophisticated computer-like data storage
capabilities. The agents testified that the cell phone was not internet capable.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Upon seizing the cell phone, Agent Randy McPhee (\u8220\'3fAgent Mcphee\u8221\'3
f) reviewed its call log history and made a written record of each name and numb
er for incoming and outgoing calls made during the preceding 24\u8211\'3f48 hour
period. Afterwards, the cell phone was left powered \u8220\'3fon\u8221\'3f and
placed on the trunk of a vehicle at the scene of the arrest.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B00222025993621_ID0}
2
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
At about this time, Defendant\rquote s cell phone, which rang audibly, began to
receive several phone calls from a \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f whose name ap
peared on the cell phone\rquote s caller ID in the agents\rquote plain view. Af
ter the fourth or fifth unanswered attempt, Agent Marcos Olaniel (\u8220\'3fAgen
t Olaniel\u8221\'3f) answered Defendant\rquote s ringing cell phone and engaged
\u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f in conversation. \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f
asked, \u8220\'3fdo you have the package.\u8221\'3f After Agent Olaniel, posing
as Defendant, responded \u8220\'3fyes,\u8221\'3f \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3
f quickly grew suspicious of his unfamiliar voice and terminated the call. \u822
0\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f called back several additional times to resume commun
ication with Defendant but, each time, the call was terminated by either Agent O
laniel (to avoid detection) or \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f (due to his suspi
cion). Because of these problems, Agent Olaniel changed mediums of communication
and continued the conversation by text message.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*3
}
}
\u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f proved receptive to text messages and asked the
\u8220\'3fDefendant\u8221\'3f to deliver the package to his residence. Because
Agent Olaniel was at an informational disadvantage, he devised a ruse explaining
that, due to engine problems, \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f would have to pic
k up the package directly from their location.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Approximately thirty minutes later, \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f arrived in a
Toyota Corrola along with two additional individuals. \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u82
21\'3f exited this vehicle, walked towards Defendant\rquote s vehicle, surveyed
the surrounding area, and then attempted to walk back to the Corrola. The agents
then appeared and detained all three individuals. \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'
3f was identified as co-defendant Javier Almeida. Co\u8211\'3fDefendant Almeida
gave agents his consent to examine his cell phone and discovered that, among oth
er things, his cell phone matched the number of \u8220\'3fJavier Blue.\u8221\'3f
Based on this information, the agents arrested Javier Almeida.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B00332025993621_ID0}

3
}}}
}
Thereafter, the agents photographed Defendant\rquote s cell phone to memorializ
e their text message exchange with Javier Almeida.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
On April 6, 2011, Defendant was charged by criminal complaint for one count of k
nowingly and intentionally conspiring to import 500 grams or more of cocaine int
o the Unites States in violation of
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=21USCAS952&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cbl
t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4" }{
\fldrslt
21 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 952(a)
}}}
and
}
t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_424e0000ad683" }{
\fldrslt
\u167\'3f 960(b)(2)(B)
}}}
. [D.E. 3]. Seven days later, Magistrate Judge Patrick White issued an after-the
-fact search and seizure warrant for Defendant\rquote s cell phone. The scope of
this warrant was broad and included the phone itself, as well as all phone numb
ers, any records relating to outgoing/incoming calls, voicemail messages, any co
ntacts stored on the cell phone, all instant/text messages, and any picture/vide
os stored on the cell phone.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
On July 11, 2011, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized by agents, along w
ith fruits thereof, pursuant to a purportedly unlawful warrantless search of Def
endant\rquote s cell phone in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, D
efendant seeks to suppress the following evidence: 1) the cell phone\rquote s ca
ll log history; 2) the name \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f that appeared on the
caller ID in plain view; 3) Agent Olaniel\rquote s voice and text conversation
with \u8220\'3fJavier Blue;\u8221\'3f and, 4) the photographic evidence of the A
gent Olaniel/Javier Almeida text message conversation. In short, Defendant seeks
to suppress all cell phone evidence obtained on April 5, 2011. Defendant mainta
ins that the agents\rquote warrantless search of his cell phone did not fall un
der a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment. In response, the Government

asserts that the agents conducted a valid warrantless search pursuant to the \u8
220\'3fsearch incident to arrest\u8221\'3f and \u8220\'3fexigent circumstances\u
8221\'3f exceptions. And, to the extent either exception is found unjustified, t
he Government contends the \u8220\'3findependent source doctrine\u8221\'3f remed
ies any purported constitutional misstep.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
5161d20c2211e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
II. ANALYSIS
\par
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
1
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B12025993621_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B12025993621_1}
}
}
2
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizur
es.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
}
U.S. Const. Amend. IV
}}}
. \u8220\'3fSearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior appro
val by judge or magistrate, are
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
per se
}
}
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment\u8212\'3fsubject only to a few specific
ally established and well-delineated exceptions.\u8221\'3f
}
dType=Y&serNum=1967129584&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1
.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Katz v. United States,
}
}
389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)
}}}
;
}
.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_506_1082" }{\fld
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Holmes v. Kucynda,
}
}
321 F.3d 1069, 1082 (11th Cir.2003)
}}}
;
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Groh v. Ramirez,
}
}
540 U.S. 551, 572\u8211\'3f73, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004)
}}}
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (\u8220\'3f[O]ur cases stand for the illuminating prop
osition that warrantless searches are

}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
per se
}
}
unreasonable, except, of course, when they are not.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*4
}
}
Because several legal principles are in play with respect to the warrantless se
arch of Defendant\rquote s cell phone, we portion our discussion into five discr
ete parts: 1) standing; 2) the cell phone\rquote s caller ID in plain view\u8212
\'3f\u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f calls; 3) whether the warrantless search was
reasonable under the search incident to arrest exception; 4) whether the warran
tless search was reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception; and, 5) a
ssuming the search was unjustified, whether the independent source doctrine cure
s any constitutional transgression.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
5161d30c2211e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
A. Standing: Do Fourth Amendment Protections Attach to Defendant\rquote s Cell P
hone?
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
In a word, yes. And, the Government effectively concedes as much in its response
.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
[D.E. 41 at p. 6\u8211\'3f8]. As noted by the Government, courts have held that
an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the call history of a
cell phone.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_506_259" }{\fldr
slt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Finley,
}
}
477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir.2007)
}}}
(finding legitimate expectation of privacy in call history of cell phone);
}
dType=Y&serNum=1999093591&pubNum=4637&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_4637_372" }{\fl
drslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
U.S. v. De La Paz,
}
}
43 F.Supp.2d 370, 372 (S.D.N.Y.1999)
}}}
(finding legitimate privacy expectation in the fact that calls were received an
d in the identity of the callers).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Courts have also recognized that an individual has a reasonable
}
expectation
}
}
}
of
}
privacy
}
}
}
in a cell phone\rquote s text messages.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
City of Ontario v. Quon,
}
}
\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3fU.S. \u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f, \u
8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2626, 177 L.Ed.2d 216 (2
010)
}}}
(finding
}
expectation
}
}
}
of
}
privacy
}
}
}
in text messages on
}
cell
}
}
}
}
phone
}
}
}
);
}
slt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Finley,
}
}
477 F.3d at 259
}}}
(reasonable
}
expectation
}
}
}
of
}
privacy
}
}
}
in text message on
}
cell
}
}
}
}

phone
}
}
}
);
}
dType=Y&serNum=2017749429&pubNum=0000999&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=c
blt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Wall,
}
}
08\u8211\'3f60016\u8211\'3fCR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3 (S.D.Fla. Dec. 22, 2008)
}}}
(noting that government did not contest that viewing of text messages on defend
ant\rquote s
}
cell
}
}
}
}
phone
}
}
}
constituted a
}
search
}
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
As the weight of authority agrees that accessing a

}
cell
}
}
}
}
phone\rquote s
}
}
}
call log or text message folder is considered a \u8220\'3f
}
search
}
}
}
\u8221\'3f for Fourth Amendment purposes, it would logically follow that an indi
vidual also has a reasonable
}
expectation
}
}
}
of
}
privacy
}
}
}
with respect to operational functions, such as making calls or exchanging text
messages. The Government, though tenuously, seems to argue that the contrary res
ult is more appropriate. The argument relies on a line of cases that dealt with
land line phones when the arrestee was not a party to the phone call.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Vadino,
}
}
680 F.2d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir.1982)
}}}
(no
}
privacy
}
}
}
}
expectation
}
}
}
implicated when agents answer another\rquote s land-line telephone while lawful
ly on the premises).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
In
}
dType=Y&serNum=1999093591&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transiti
onType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
De La Paz,
}
}}}
however, this rationale was squarely rejected with respect to cell phones and t
he court concluded that a cell phone itself warrants Fourth Amendment protection
s due to the nature of the privacy expectation bestowed on it by its owner and t
he public generally.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Id.
}
}
at 372.
}}}
We agree with
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
De La Paz
}
}}}
that the traditional land-line telephone cases are inapposite to the unique cha
racter of a cell phone call and that Fourth Amendment protections apply.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*5
}
}
}
3
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
By synthesizing these various cases, this Court reaches the conclusion that the
Defendant had a reasonable
}
expectation
}
}
}
of
}
privacy
}
}
}
in his cell phone as a whole. Because this Court affirmatively concludes that a
}
{\i0
{\i0
cell
}
}
{\i0
}
{\i0
\fs20 \cf19 \f2 \chcbpat22 \b1

\fs20 \sa0 \ul0 \cf19 \strike0 \f2 \b1 \sb0
\fs20 \cf1 \f2 \chcbpat2 \b0

\fs20 \sa0 \ul0 \cf1 \strike0 \f2 \b0 \sb0
}
{\i0 \fs20
{\i0 \fs20
phone
}
}
{\i0 \fs20
}
{\i0 \fs20
\cf19 \f2 \chcbpat22 \b1

\sa0 \ul0 \cf19 \strike0 \f2 \b1 \sb0
\cf1 \f2 \chcbpat2 \b0

\sa0 \ul0 \cf1 \strike0 \f2 \b0 \sb0
}
search
}
}
}
will trigger Fourth Amendment protections, we turn to whether the warrantless
}
search
}
}
}
of Defendant\rquote s
}
cell
}
}
}

}
phone
}
}
}
fell into one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
5161d40c2211e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
B. The Cell Phone\rquote s Caller ID in Plain View\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fJavier Blu
e\u8221\'3f calls
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
The agents arrested Defendant, searched him and his vehicle incident to arrest,
discovered an operational cell phone close to Defendant, and seized it. That typ
e of search and seizure is clearly permissible under the Fourth Amendment, and D
efendant acknowledged as much during the hearing.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chimel v. California,
}
}
395 U.S. 752, 762\u8211\'3f63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)
}}}
;
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Arizona v. Gant,
}
}
556 U.S. 332, \u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1719, 1
73 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009)
}}}
(the \u8220\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chimel
}
}}}
rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant\r
quote s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.\u8221\'3f);
}
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_6538_98" }{\fld
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Fuentes,
}
}
368 Fed.Appx. 95, 98 (11th Cir.2010)
}}}
(interpreting
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant
}
}}}
to permit the search of a vehicle and seize of items, including cell phones, in
cident to drug-related arrest). With respect to the Caller ID screen, Defendant
contends that its warrantless search post-seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.
The Government responds, however, that the cell phone rang independent of any a
ction taken by the agents and that because the Caller ID displayed the caller\rq
uote s name\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f\u8212\'3fin plain view, the
re was no \u8220\'3fsearch\u8221\'3f for Fourth Amendment purposes.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj

The agents testified that they placed Defendant\rquote s properly seized cell ph
one on the truck of a vehicle during the course of Defendant\rquote s arrest. Th
e cell phone rang four to five times in close succession and, in each instance,
the Caller ID displayed the name \u8220\'3fJavier Blue.\u8221\'3f The agents lea
rned this name solely by accident when it appeared on the display screen in plai
n view. Put differently, the agents did not manipulate the cell phone in any way
to cause \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\rquote s\u8221\'3f name to appear. Moreover, Def
endant proffers no contrary testimony. Because we find the agents\rquote testim
ony credible on this point, the question turns on whether a name appearing on De
fendant\rquote s caller ID display, through no fault or effort of the agents, is
considered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
4
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
}
5
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
We find the answer by applying the \u8220\'3fplain view\u8221\'3f doctrine, whi
ch provides that agents may seize items if (1) the officers are lawfully in a po
sition from which they view an object, (2) the incriminating character of the ob
ject is immediately apparent, and (3) the officers have a lawful right of access
to the object.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Minnesota v. Dickerson,
}
}
508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)
}}}
. But, while this doctrine permits the seizure of incriminating evidence, it doe
s not authorize a warrantless search of the item for concealed evidence.
}
slt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Miller,
}
}
769 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir.1985)
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*6
}
}
}
6
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
The Supreme Court recently discussed this plain view exception and, relying on
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Horton v. California,
}
}}}
noted that \u8220\'3flaw enforcement officers may seize evidence in plain view,
provided that they have not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the sp
ot from which the observation of the evidence is made.\u8221\'3f
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Kentucky v. King,
}
}

\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f U.S. \u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f, \
u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1858, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (
2011)
}}}
(citing
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Horton v. California,
}
}
496 U.S. 128, 136\u8211\'3f140, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)
}}}
). As noted in
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Horton,
}
}}}
\u8220\'3f[i]t is ... an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure o
f incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment i
n arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed.\u8221\'
3f
}
496 U.S. at 136, 110 S.Ct. 2301.
}}}
Clearly, the agents lawfully stopped, detained Defendant and then seized his ce
ll phone incident to his arrest. The fact that the agents observed Javier Blue\r
quote s name on Defendant\rquote s cell phone clearly falls under the rubric of
\u8220\'3fplain view\u8221\'3f and is thus there is no \u8220\'3fsearch\u8221\'3
f of the cell phone\rquote s Caller ID for Fourth Amendment purposes.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
Cf.
}
}
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_4637_1172" }{\f
ldrslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Davis,

}
}
787 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1172\u8211\'3f73 (D.Or.2011)
}}}
(plain view exception did not justify cell phone search where officers searched
contents of phone rather than merely observing the number appear in plain view)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
5161d50c2211e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
C. Search Incident to Arrest Justified Call Log History Search
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Defendant contends that the recent Supreme Court decision in
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Arizona v. Gant
}
}}}
supports his position that the agents improperly searched his cell phone\rquote
s call log history incident to arrest because, once the agents seized his cell
phone, any risk of injury to the agents or potential loss of evidence disappeare
d. In response, the Government maintains that, in effect, the present state of F
ourth Amendment law permits a law enforcement agent to conduct an abbreviated pe
rusal of relevant, arrest-related evidence on an arrestee\rquote s cell phone in
cident to an arrest. As applied here, the Government asserts that the agents wer
e justified to search Defendant\rquote s recent call log history incident to his
drug-related arrest because such a search was likely to provide evidence releva
nt to the Defendant\rquote s offense or arrest. Thus, the question presented her
e turns on the applicability of the search incident to arrest doctrine with resp
ect to the Defendant\rquote s cell phone call log history when seized by agents
incident to a drug-related arrest.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj

{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
7
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
The search incident to arrest exception is a long standing exception to the war
rant requirement.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Weeks v. United States,
}
}
232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914)
}}}
. This exception permits the search and seizure of any evidence within an arrest
ee\rquote s \u8220\'3f \u8216\'3fimmediate control,\u8217\'3f \u8221\'3f meaning
\u8220\'3fthe area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or de
structible evidence,\u8221\'3f incident to arrest.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chimel,
}
}
395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034.
}}}
This is a well-recognized exception to both the probable cause and warrant requ
irements of the Fourth Amendment because, once a person is lawfully seized and p
laced under arrest, he has a reduced expectation of privacy in his person.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Robinson,
}
}
414 U.S. 218, 233\u8211\'3f24, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)
}}}
(upholding search of closed cigarette package on arrestee\rquote s person);
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Edwards,
}
}
415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974)
}}}
(valid search of an arrestee\rquote s clothes);
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
New York v. Belton,
}
}
453 U.S. 454, 462\u8211\'3f63, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981)
}}}
(valid search incident to arrest of defendant\rquote s jacket found inside pass
enger compartment, notwithstanding that officer unzipped pockets and discovered
cocaine). This reduced expectation of privacy also applies to vehicles, though t
o a lesser degree.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant,
}
}

129 S.Ct. at 1719
}}}
(holding the \u8220\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chimel
}
}}}
rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant\r
quote s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*7
}
}
}
8
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
}
9
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
The rule, as expressed in
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chimel,
}
}}}
was deemed necessary because an arresting officer had an immediate need to remo
ve any weapon the arrestee may have to resist arrest or escape, and the need to
prevent concealment or destruction of evidence.
}
395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034.
}}}
Since
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chimel,
}
}}}
however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that a showing of necessit
y, either for officer safety or destruction of evidence, is not required to just
ify an officer\rquote s search incident to arrest.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Robinson,
}
}
414 U.S. at 235, 94 S.Ct. 467
}}}
(rejecting suggestion that \u8220\'3fthere must be litigated in each case the i
ssue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the autho
rity\u8221\'3f to conduct a search incident to arrest). Moreover, because vehicl
es present a unique situation to arresting officers, they are deemed justified t
o conduct a \u8220\'3fsearch incident to a lawful arrest when it is \u8216\'3fre
asonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in t
he vehicle.\u8217\'3f \u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}

rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant,
}
}
129 S.Ct. at 1719
}}}
(quoting
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Thornton v. United States,
}
}
541 U.S. 615, 632, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004)
}}}
). But, by narrowing
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Belton,
}
}}}
the
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant
}
}}}
opinion clarified the scope of a vehicle search by stating, \u8220\'3f[agents]
may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant\rquote s arrest only if the a
rrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the o
ffense or arrest.\u8221\'3f
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0

Gant,
}
}
129 S.Ct. at 1723
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
The exception for warrantless searches incident to arrest is thus quite broad, e
ven after
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant.
}
}}}
Its justification is best explained by the belief that:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li200 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li200 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li200 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li200 \b0 \qj
There is nothing irrational about broader police authority to search for evidenc
e when and where the perpetrator of a crime is lawfully arrested.... Moreover, i
t is not illogical to assume that evidence of a crime is most likely to be found
where the suspect is apprehended.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Thornton,
}
}
541 U.S. at 630, 124 S.Ct. 2127
}}}
(Scalia, J. concurring).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
10
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
}
11
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
}
12
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
While
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant
}
}}}
signaled a retraction from the ever-expanding line of
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Belton
}
}}}
cases in the vehicle context, it is still well established that any objects fou
nd on an arrestee\rquote s person, on his clothing, on any area within his immed
iate control, may be searched by law enforcement,
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
with or without
}
}
any reason to suspect that the person is armed or carrying contraband.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
slt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Jackson,
}
}
377 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir.2004)
}}}
(citations omitted). Post}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant,
}
}}}
of course, a vehicle search incident to arrest is limited to the arrestee\rquot
e s \u8220\'3freaching area\u8221\'3f unless there is reason to believe evidence
of the arrest exists.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B00442025993621_ID0}
4
}}}
}
Historically, and most analogous to the search at issue here, the broad grant o
f authority to search includes highly private articles on a person like a wallet
or purse,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B00552025993621_ID0}
5
}}}
}
a briefcase,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B00662025993621_ID0}
6
}}}
}
a backpack or personal bag,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B00772025993621_ID0}
7
}}}
}
an address book or organizer,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B00882025993621_ID0}
8
}}}
}
highly private places like a person\rquote s home closet
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B00992025993621_ID0}
9
}}}
}
or his groin area,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_B010102025993621_ID}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_B010102025993621_ID}
10
}}}
}
or even highly unusual things like a person\rquote s bicycle handlebar.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B011112025993621_ID}
11
}}}
}
Not unlike these highly private items searched in similarly private areas, it i
s undisputed that, even post}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant,
}
}}}
a cell phone found \u8220\'3fclose to [the] Defendant\u8221\'3f is also subject
to a search incident to arrest because it was seized in the arrestee\rquote s \
u8220\'3freaching area.\u8221\'3f
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant,
}
}
129 S.Ct. at 1719.
}}}
The only material limitation in the breadth of this so-called \u8220\'3flimited
exception\u8221\'3f is its \u8220\'3ftemporal and spatial limitation on searche
s incident to arrest, excusing compliance with the warrant requirement only when
the search \u8216\'3fis substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is co
nfined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.\u8217\'3f \u8221\'3f
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Kucynda,
}
}
321 F.3d at 1082
}}}
(Eleventh Circuit quoting
}

{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Belton,
}
}
453 U.S. at 465, 101 S.Ct. 2860,
}}}
and holding that search of bedroom invalid as incident to arrest where not cont
emporaneous with or conducted in the vicinity of the arrest);
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
see, e.g.,
}
}
slt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Wells,
}
}
347 F.3d 280, 287 (8th Cir.2003)
}}}
(search of automobile invalid as incident to arrest when vehicle first driven t
o station after driver arrested before search conducted). This means that when t
he temporal and spatial requirements of the search incident to arrest exception
are not present, then a search without probable cause and without a warrant are
invalid under the Fourth Amendment\rquote s
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
per se
}
}
rule.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Chadwick,
}
}

433 U.S. 1, 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977)
}}}
(warrantless search of a locked footlocker that was lawfully seized as incident
to defendant\rquote s arrest could not be justified under this exception becaus
e it was too \u8220\'3fremote in time or place from the arrest,\u8221\'3f and no
other exigency existed).
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B012122025993621_ID}
12
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*8
}
}
}
13
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
Also, an extremely intrusive search incident to arrest may also be limited by t
he reasonableness component of the Fourth Amendment.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_506_6" }{\fldrsl
t
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Swain v. Spinney,
}
}
117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997)
}}}
;
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
e.g.,
}
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago,
}
}
723 F.2d 1263, 1269\u8211\'3f71 (7th Cir.1983)
}}}
(strip searches incident to arrest not reasonable);
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
cf.
}
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Evans v. Stephens,
}
}
407 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir.2005)
}}}
(en banc) (holding post-arrest strip searches violated Fourth Amendment).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
14
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
Applying these current principles here, the Government is correct that, even un
der the post}

{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant
}
}}}
scope of a search incident to arrest, Agent McPhee\rquote s post-seizure decisi
on to review and record Defendant\rquote s call log history was permissible. Pla
inly, the agents arrested the Defendant and, incident to that arrest, they seize
d a cell phone that was found close to the Defendant (i.e. within his \u8220\'3f
reaching distance\u8221\'3f). While this alone is enough, the agents also had pr
obable cause to suspect Defendant\rquote s cell phone contained evidence relevan
t to his arrest. Indeed, the salient facts make this clear: the agents intercept
ed a package carrying cocaine; Defendant placed this package in his vehicle; and
, before agents effected a vehicle stop they observed Defendant on his cell phon
e.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Altogether, the agents had \u8220\'3freason[ ] to believe the vehicle contain[ed
] evidence of the offense or arrest\u8221\'3f and the Defendant was \u8220\'3fwi
thin reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.\u
8221\'3f On these facts, the agents were clearly permitted to seize the cell pho
ne (indeed, Defendant concedes as much) and, like a wallet, purse, bag, or cigar
ette case, look through the item at the scene to see if any evidence or other co
ntraband could be found. Moreover, because Agent Mcphee promptly reviewed the ca
ll log history at the scene, the search was temporally and spatially connected w
ith the arrest. It was, in short, a classic search incident to arrest.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Defendant\rquote s primary argument against applying the exception here is that
there was no necessity for the search to be conducted at that point. In other wo
rds, the search was not necessary to preserve officer safety by looking for weap
ons; the cell phone\rquote s contents obviously posed no threat of harm to the a
gents or threat of escape to Defendant once the cell phone was seized. Also, dur
ing the hearing, Defendant argued that the search was not necessary to prevent d
estruction of evidence because the agents already seized the cell phone. Indeed,
it is true that Defendant was already in handcuffs, under arrest and placed in
an agents\rquote vehicle when the search took place. He was not a serious threa
t to destroy the potential evidence, say by grabbing the cell phone and smashing
it to the ground, or by remotely accessing the cell phone and deleting its cont
ents.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B013132025993621_ID}
13
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
The problem for Defendant is that these attempts to distinguish this case from o
ther search incident to arrest cases are absolutely foreclosed by the Supreme Co
urt\rquote s post}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chimel
}
}}}
line of incident to arrest cases, including most recently
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Arizona v. Gant,
}
}}}
because \u8220\'3fcircumstances unique to the automobile context justify a sear
ch incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offe
nse of arrest might be found in the vehicle.\u8221\'3f
}
rslt
129 S.Ct. at 1714
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*9
}
}

Thus, even though the search of Defendant\rquote s cell phone may not have been
justified by the agents\rquote safety or Defendant\rquote s possible destructi
on of the call log history, that necessity or exigency analysis is beside the po
int. Even though we may disagree with the application of that post}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chimel
}
}}}
line of cases to the ever-advancing technology of cell phones, or more specific
ally to the application of the
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Belton
}
}}}
\u8220\'3fany container\u8221\'3f rule for searches incident to arrest (as limi
ted by
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant
}
}
),
}}}
we are constrained to apply the law as the Supreme Court currently pronounces i
t.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Agostini v. Felton,
}
}
521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997)
}}}
(\u8220\'3fIf a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet a
ppears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court t
he prerogative of overruling its own decisions.\u8221\'3f).
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B014142025993621_ID}
14
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Our conclusion that the search incident to arrest exception must apply to the gi
ven facts is certainly in line with other pure \u8220\'3fcellphone\u8221\'3f cas
es that reached similar results.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
slt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Finley,
}
}
477 F.3d at 260
}}}
(\u8220\'3fPolice officers are not constrained to search only for weapons or in
struments of escape on the arrestee\rquote s person; they may also, without any
additional justification, look for evidence of the arrestee\rquote s crime on hi
s person in order to preserve it for use at trial.\u8221\'3f). Searches of highl
y personal items like wallets or purses, which we consider analogous to an elect
ronic storage device like a cell phone (especially its call log history), are pe
rmissible if searched incident to arrest regardless of need or exigency.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0

Richardson,
}
}
764 F.2d at 1527
}}}
(\u8220\'3fThe wallet and papers belonging to the defendants here were actually
found on their persons during a valid search incident to an arrest. Such search
es may properly extend to personal property such as a wallet found on the person
of the arrestee.\u8221\'3f);
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
see also
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Cote,
}
}
No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343, *6 (N.D.Ill. May 26, 2005)
}}}
(upholding search incident to arrest of cellular phone\rquote s call log, phone
book, and wireless web inbox). Thus, the agents, while at the scene of the arre
st, had no need to obtain either Defendant\rquote s consent, or a warrant, befor
e searching the cell phone\rquote s call log history.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the limitations (or lack thereof) accompa
nying the
}
search
}
}
}
incident to arrest of a
}
cell
}
}

}
}
phone
}
}
}
.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_6538_27" }{\fld
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Allen,
}
}
416 Fed.Appx. 21, 27 (11th Cir.2011)
}}}
(\u8220\'3fWhether the warrantless
}
search
}
}
}
of a
}
cell
}
}
}
}
phone
}
}

}
incident to arrest violates a person\rquote s Fourth Amendment
}
expectation
}
}
}
of
}
privacy
}
}
}
is an unanswered question in this Circuit.\u8221\'3f). However, the Fifth Circu
it, in the leading case on this issue, addressed the
}
search
}
}
}
of a
}
cell
}
}
}
}
phone
}
}
}
incident to arrest in
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0

Finley,
}
}}}
where officers arrested a defendant and a passenger in the defendant\rquote s c
ar after effecting a traffic stop. Officers seized the defendant\rquote s cellul
ar phone at the time of the arrest, and then transported the defendant to the pa
ssenger\rquote s residence; while at the residence, officers searched the call r
ecords and text messages on the defendant\rquote s cellular phone, and questione
d him about those records and messages.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Finley
}
}}}
held that \u8220\'3fno warrant was required since the search was conducted purs
uant to a valid custodial arrest.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Id.
}
}
at 260.
}}}
Granted, since
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant,
}
}}}
the
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Finley
}
}}}
opinion permitting a broad vehicle search incident to a traffic arrest may no l
onger be valid. However, because Defendant was stopped for a drug-related arrest
the
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Finley
}
}}}
reasoning remains good law as applied here. Thus, under that same reasoning in
this case, even more so due to the presence of probable cause, Agent Mcphee was
entitled to
}
search
}
}
}
Defendant\rquote s
}
cell
}
}
}
}
phone
}
}
}
call log history at the scene of the arrest and within a reasonable time therea
fter.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*10
}
}
Aspects of the
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Finley
}
}}}
decision also focused on the exigencies involved in a situation where phone-rel
ated information stored on a cell phone or pager could potentially dissipate bef
ore law enforcement could obtain a warrant to search and retrieve that informati
on. That was also true in a more recent case from the Fourth Circuit,
}
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Young,
}
}
278 Fed.Appx. 242 (4th Cir.2008)
}}}
. That case involved a cell phone search incident to drug-related arrest, where
officers immediately searched through the text messages of cell phones seized fr
om the personal possessions of two drug suspects. The officers searched through
the messages to obtain any incriminating information. On a motion to suppress, t
he trial court denied the motion relying on the incident to arrest exception, an
d the Fourth Circuit affirmed, over the defendants\rquote objections that a war
rant was necessary before the officers reviewed the cell phones\rquote contents
. \u8220\'3fPrivacy rights in the phone are tempered by an arresting officer\rqu
ote s need to preserve evidence. This need is an important law enforcement compo
nent of the rationale for permitting a search of a suspect incident to a valid a
rrest.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Id.
}
}
at 245
}}}
(citing
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Robinson,
}
}
414 U.S. at 226, 94 S.Ct. 467
}}}
and
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Hunter,
}
}
166 F.3d 1211 (4th Cir.1998)
}}}
(finding that officers had authority to retrieve telephone numbers seized from
a pager incident to arrest)).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Indeed, other district court cases have relied in greater part on exigent circum
stances as justification for law enforcement\rquote s immediate search of a cell
phone or pager for call history information.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Ortiz,
}
}
84 F.3d 977 (7th Cir.1996)
}}}
(warrantless search of pager to preserve electronic evidence);
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Zamora,
}
}

2006 WL 418390, *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8196, *31\u8211\'3f32 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 2
1, 2006)
}}}
(\u8220\'3fIn this case the phones were reasonably believed by the investigatin
g agents to be dynamic, subject to change without warning by a call simply being
made to the instrument. With each call is the risk that a number stored would b
e deleted....\u8221\'3f);
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Mercado\u8211\'3fNava,
}
}
486 F.Supp.2d 1271 (D.Kan.2007)
}}}
(interest in preventing destruction of evidence justified warrantless search in
cident to arrest of cell phone information);
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Parada,
}
}
289 F.Supp.2d 1291 (D.Kan.2003)
}}}
(because stored telephone number data on cell phone was easily lost warrantless
search of cell phone incident to arrest valid).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Others have also focused on the diminished expectation of privacy involved in th
at type of information to authorize immediate searches.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
ldrslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
U.S. v. Fierros\u8211\'3fAlavarez,
}
}
547 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1211 (D.Kan.2008)
}}}
(\u8220\'3f[D]efendant has not carried his burden of proving a reasonable expec
tation of privacy in the addressing information retrieved from the recent calls
directory and in the names and numbers taken from the phonebook directory\u8221\
'3f).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
These cases also concern the search of a cell phone, but they are of marginal va
lue when addressing strictly the proper scope of a search of incident to arrest.
Under that exception, the existence of probable cause to search the device, the
potential loss of information, or the diminished expectation in call history da
ta are inconsequential. What is consequential is the location that the device wa
s found incident to arrest and the time that the search was conducted.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*11
}
}
That is not to say, of course, that the exigency concerns expressed in these ca
ses are not warranted. They are. But exigent circumstances, to the extent that t
hey are relied upon to the conduct an immediate search, also require an objectiv
e belief that probable cause exists to search the cell phone.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
slt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Santa,
}
}
236 F.3d 662, 668 (11th Cir.2000)
}}}
(citing
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Tobin,
}
}
923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir.1991)
}}}
(en banc));
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
see also
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
infra
}
}
at 26\u8211\'3f32. These earlier cell phone cases most likely could have made\u
8212\'3fand indeed often did make\u8212\'3fa probable cause finding. Here, for n
ow, we are focused on a search incident to arrest exception that, under the curr
ent state of the law,
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
does not
}
}
require a finding of probable cause.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B015152025993621_ID}
15
}}}
}
We will not, and need not, blur the lines between these separate doctrines by m
ixing the two. The search of Defendant\rquote s call log history was permissible
first and foremost on the search incident to arrest doctrine.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj

Defendant next focuses on
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Wall,
}
}
2008 WL 5381412,
}}}
for the bright-line proposition that \u8220\'3f[t]he search of [a] cell phone c
annot be justified as a search incident to lawful arrest.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Id.
}
}
at *3.
}}}
Defendant predicates this \u8220\'3fholding\u8221\'3f on the now commonplace sc
enario of \u8220\'3fagents searched two cell phones found on the defendant\rquot
e s person after his arrest.\u8221\'3f From those facts, Defendant maintains tha
t
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
Wall
}
}
held the search incident to arrest was unlawful. It would seem, however, that s
uch a holding would conflict with the present weight of authority on this issue
(and our foregoing analysis).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Unsurprisingly, there is more to the
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
Wall
}
}
story than Defendant initial leads us to believe. A

}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
critically
}
}
important fact, at least by this Court\rquote s reading, is that the agent sear
ched the defendant\rquote s cell phone at the station house and thus the search
took place subsequent to,
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
rather than incident to,
}
}
defendant\rquote s arrest.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Id.
}
}
at *3.
}}}
Our reading is bolstered by
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
Wall\rquote s
}
}
conclusion that \u8220\'3f[t]he DEA policy on rummaging through cell phones dur
ing the booking process cannot immunize an
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
otherwise unconstitutional search.
}
}
\u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Id.
}
}
at *4
}}}
(emphasis added). Moreover,
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
Wall\rquote s
}
}
adherence to the \u8220\'3ftwin
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chimel
}
}}}
rationales\u8212\'3fofficer safety and evidence preservation,\u8221\'3f must be
viewed through the post}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant
}
}}}
lens because in the vehicle context, such as here, \u8220\'3fa search incident
to arrest [is justified] when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the o
ffense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.\u8221\'3f
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant,
}
}
129 S.Ct. at 1714.
}}}
Obviously, had the agents here waited to search Defendant\rquote s cell phone u
ntil they were back at the station house, their search would have run afoul with
the spatial and temporal safeguards that ultimately controlled the result in
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
Wall:
}
}

\u8220\'3f[t]he search of the cell phone cannot be justified as a search incide
nt to lawful arrest [because] ... Agent Mitchell accessed the text messages when
Wall was being booked at the station house.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Wall,
}
}
2008 WL 5381412 at *3.
}}}
Because the agents here searched Defendant\rquote s cell phone contemporaneous
with his arrest,
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
Wall
}
}
is distinguishable and unpersuasive.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*12
}
}
In this particular case, the immediate search at the scene of the cell phone\rq
uote s call log history, limited to phone calls from the preceding 24\u8211\'3f4
8 hours, in our view, was reasonable and appropriate under Supreme Court and Ele
venth Circuit precedent. Thus, Agent Mcphee conducted a valid search of Defendan
t\rquote s cell phone incident to arrest, and Defendant\rquote s Motion to Suppr
ess the cell phone\rquote s call log history should be denied.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
Wall
}
}
does not suggest otherwise.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj

{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
To be clear, we do not suggest that the search incident to arrest exception give
s agents carte blanche to search indefinitely each and every facet of an arreste
e\rquote s cell phone. After all, a search incident to arrest must always fall w
ithin the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment and, more narrowly,
relate to the evidence of the underlying offense or arrest. Courts applying thi
s exception must also do so in a manner that faithfully enforces the temporal an
d spatial requirements of the doctrine. By doing so, the scope of a search will
be limited as a practical matter. In the case of a cell or smartphone, for insta
nce, a search contemporaneous with an arrest would not possibly allow a law enfo
rcement officer at the scene of an arrest from downloading the entire content of
the phone\rquote s memory. It would not allow much more than what occurred here
\u8212\'3fa short, limited perusal of only recent calls to quickly determine if
any incriminating evidence relevant to this drug crime can be identified.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
15
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
It should also be noted that, when a search incident to arrest goes beyond the
strict temporal and spatial requirements of the doctrine, a different rule must
govern. If officers do not contemporaneously search a cell phone, and instead se
ize it for later review at the station house the subsequent search could not and
should not be deemed incident to arrest.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
E.g.,
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Wall,
}
}
2008 WL 5381412 at *3, *5.
}}}
It should instead fall under the
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Place

}
}}}
line of cases, that hold that \u8220\'3f[w]here law enforcement authorities hav
e probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence of a c
rime, but have not secured a warrant, the Court has interpreted the [Fourth] Ame
ndment to permit seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to exami
ne its contents, if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other
recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Place,
}
}
462 U.S. 696, 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)
}}}
. A warrant must then be obtained. Because the search here was in fact contempor
aneous with the arrest,
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Place
}
}}}
has no bearing on the outcome.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
We recognize that our conclusion contributes to the present uneasiness with resp
ect to the specific scope of a search incident to arrest. Indeed, there is no qu
estion that \u8220\'3fa short, limited perusal of recent calls to quickly determ
ine if any incriminating evidence relevant to Defendant\rquote s drug crime can
be identified\u8221\'3f provides a less than ideal \u8220\'3fbright-line\u8221\'
3f rule to guide law enforcement or the public alike. However, simply put, craft
ing such a specific rule for a cell phone is very difficult. This problem, of co
urse, is exacerbated by the continually advancing technology and computing capab
ilities of hardware, such as \u8220\'3fsmart\u8221\'3f phones, a concept more co
lloquially referred to as \u8220\'3fMoore\rquote s law.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B016162025993621_ID}
16
}}}
}
Perhaps the better alternative is to find a technological answer to this techno
logical problem. We don\rquote t have the answer, but a good place to start is b
y a user password protecting the electronic device. Short of that practical step
, the solution does not lie with a revamped analysis of the search incident to a
rrest doctrine.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
5161d60c2211e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
D. Exigent Circumstances Justified Answering the Cell Phone
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*13
}
}
}
16
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
As briefly discussed above, a recognized exigent circumstance is a situation in
which there is \u8220\'3fa realistic expectation that any delay would result in
destruction of evidence.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Santana,
}
}

427 U.S. 38, 43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976)
}}}
. As couched by the Eleventh Circuit, the appropriate inquiry under this excepti
on is whether the facts involved would lead a reasonable, experienced agent to f
ind probable cause and believe that evidence might be destroyed before a warrant
could be secured.
}
slt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Santa,
}
}
236 F.3d at 669
}}}
(quotations and citations omitted);
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
e.g.,
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Minnesota v. Olson,
}
}
495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990)
}}}
(\u8220\'3fthere must be probable cause to believe that one or more of the othe
r [exigent circumstances] factors justifying the entry were present and that in
assessing the risk of danger, the gravity of the crime and likelihood that the s
uspect is armed should be considered.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
17
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
Other recognized situations in which exigent circumstances exist include: \u822
0\'3fdanger of flight or escape; danger of harm to police officers or the genera

l public; risk of loss, destruction, removal or concealment of evidence; and \u8
220\'3fhot pursuit\u8221\'3f of a fleeing suspect.\u8221\'3f
}
slt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Santa,
}
}
236 F.3d at 669
}}}
(quoting
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Blasco,
}
}
702 F.2d 1315, 1325 (11th Cir.1983)
}}}
). Ultimately, the Government bears the burden of proving the \u8220\'3fexigent
circumstances\u8221\'3f exception by establishing both an exigency and probable
cause existed.
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Davis,
}
}
313 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir.2002)
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Defendant argues that no exigency existed to justify searching Defendant\rquote
s cell phone because \u8220\'3f[Defendant] was secured in the back of a police c
ar [and thus] there was no risk of flight or injury. Moreover, he was unable to
destroy any evidence that may have been contained on his cell phone.\u8221\'3f A
s clarified during the hearing, Defendant maintains that no exigent circumstance
existed to either review the call log history or communicate with \u8220\'3fJav
ier Blue.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
The Government contends, however, that the combination of relevant facts support
a finding of exigent circumstances to justify their \u8220\'3fsearch\u8221\'3f
of Defendant\rquote s cell phone with respect to both answering \u8220\'3fJavier
Blue\u8221\'3f \lquote s phone call and thereafter communicating with him by te
xt message.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_B017172025993621_ID}
17
}}}
}
We agree.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
As discussed previously, the agents had probable cause to arrest Defendant and s
uspect that Defendant\rquote s ringing cell phone contained evidence relating to
a drug trafficking conspiracy. Thus, the Government satisfied its burden with r
espect to probable cause.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
As for the exigency, the relevant facts here compel an obvious answer. To quickl
y recap: 1) Defendant was a suspected drug courier who was observed driving erra
tically away from his residence; 2) agents observed him using his cell phone whi
le following him; and, 3) after his arrest, a single caller\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fJ
avier Blue\u8221\'3f\u8212\'3fmade repeated attempts over a short period of time
to reach the Defendant.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Considering the context of his arrest, Agent Olaniel reasonably believed that th
ese post-arrest phone calls would contain evidence of defendant\rquote s drug-re
lated activity. \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f confirmed this belief when he im

mediately asked Agent Olaniel whether the package was received. Thereafter, Agen
t Olaniel continued his conversation with Javier Blue (posing as the Defendant)
to avoid detection and to lure Javier Blue to the agents. Agent Olaniel reasonab
ly believed that \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f called with respect to the drug
conspiracy and, had he not answered the ringing call, the evidence may have bee
n lost. Simply put, Agent Olaniel answered the cell phone in response to an exig
ent circumstance.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*14
}
}
At least two other courts have agreed with this conclusion, with less compellin
g facts. In
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
De La Paz,
}
}}}
a factually analogous case, the court found that answering a defendant\rquote s
cell phone following a drug-related arrest was justified by exigent circumstanc
es. The relevant facts from
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
De La Paz
}
}}}
are:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li200 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li200 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li200 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li200 \b0 \qj
Agents lawfully (but without a warrant) seized a cellular phone incident to an a
rrest of a the defendant for his participation in a narcotics conspiracy. While
the agents were processing the defendant, his cellular phone rang nine times. Ea
ch time, without a warrant or consent, the agents answered the cellular phone. A
nd, each time, the caller asked for the defendant by his known to police drug de
aler moniker. The defendant sought to suppress the inculpatory cellular phone co
nversations.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_4637_371" }{\fl
drslt
43 F.Supp.2d at 371.
}}}
The court denied the motion to suppress concluding that even though the agents
had no warrant to \u8220\'3fsearch\u8221\'3f the cell phone, it was reasonable f
or them to answer the ringing cell phone because \u8220\'3fthe agents had probab
le cause to believe that calls to [defendant\rquote s] cellular telephone, a com
mon tool of the drug trade, would provide evidence of his criminal activity ...
and it was not unreasonable for the agents to \u8216\'3fseize\u8217\'3f that evi
dence without a warrant before it disappeared.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Id.
}
}
at 376.
}}}
Put differently, while
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
De La Paz
}
}}}
recognized the privacy interest relative to cell phones and the prerequisite fo
r a warrant before searching same, on balance the court resolved this conflict b
y concluding \u8220\'3f[w]hen it is impracticable for government agents to get a
warrant ... the Fourth Amendment does not require those agents to ignore potent
ial evidence that might disappear [,]\u8221\'3f such as a ringing phone call.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0

Id.
}
}
at 375\u8211\'3f76;
}}}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
see also
}
}
.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_595_14" }{\fldrs
lt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
State v. Carroll,
}
}
322 Wis.2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1, 14 (2010)
}}}
(agents were permitted to answer a ringing cellular phone due to the exigent ci
rcumstances commensurate with the \u8220\'3ffleeting nature of a phone call.\u82
21\'3f)
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
18
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
Here, Agent Olaniel had an even more compelling reason to answer Defendant\rquo
te s cell phone because, unlike
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
De La Paz\rquote s
}
}}}
nine different calls, each call Defendant received was from the same caller\u82
12\'3f\u8220\'3fJavier Blue.\u8221\'3f Thus, Agent Olaniel was not merely answer
ing the phone of a potential, yet random, drug conspirator; Agent Olaniel had pr
obable cause to believe he was answering the call of the recipient of Defendant\
rquote s package. Accordingly, we conclude that Agent Olaniel lawfully answered
Defendant\rquote s cell phone due to the \u8220\'3ffleeting nature of a phone ca
ll\u8221\'3f and the exigencies commensurate with the Defendant\rquote s ringing
cell phone.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
19
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
Because we have already concluded that exigent circumstances justified Agent Ol
aniel\rquote s answering Defendant\rquote s cell phone, we can see no reason to
alter our conclusion with respect to continuing this conversation by text messag
es. Rather, the unique circumstances of this conversation\u8212\'3fspecifically
\u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f \lquote s rising suspicions and Agent Olaniel\rq
uote s risk of detection\u8212\'3fnaturally led Agent Olaniel to switch mediums
of communication. Regardless, we find that it would be nothing less than counter
intuitive to find that Agent Olaniel lacked justification to text message when h
e was justified to answer Defendant\rquote s ringing cell phone. Accordingly, we
conclude that Agent Olaniel\rquote s warrantless usage of Defendant\rquote s ce
ll phone, limited solely to communications with co-defendant Javier Almeida aka
\u8220\'3fJavier Blue,\u8221\'3f did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*15
}
}
}
20
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
Finally, Defendant contends that the photographs taken of the text message exch
ange between Agent Olaniel and \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f should also be su
ppressed. The agents testified that they only photographed the text messages exc
hanged between Agent Olaniel and \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\'3f to memorialize
their communication. Put differently, the record contains no evidence that the a
gents searched through other text messages or seized any other text message info
rmation other than those limited to communications between Agent Olaniel and \u8
220\'3fJavier Blue.\u8221\'3f We find the agents\rquote testimony credible on t
his issue. Moreover, the Defendant presents no evidence to the contrary. Accordi
ngly, because Agent Olaniel was permitted to send these text messages, we see no
basis to suppress the photographs of same.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
5161d70c2211e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
E. Independent Source Doctrine
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
21
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
}
22
}}}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
The Government argued, in the alternative, that had the Court determined that t
he agents\rquote cell phone search was unjustified, the independent source doct
rine would cure any purported unlawful conduct. Under the independent source doc
trine, even where a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, evidence \u8220\'3f
obtained from a lawful source, independent of the illegal conduct\u8221\'3f is a
dmissible.
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Davis,
}
}
313 F.3d at 1303;
}}}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
see also
}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Segura v. United States,
}
}
468 U.S. 796, 805, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984)
}}}
(explaining that the exclusionary rule is not implicated when the government le
arned of the challenged evidence from an independent source). The rationale for
the independent source doctrine is that the government should be put \u8220\'3fi
n the same, not a worse, position tha[n] [it] would have been in if no ... error
or misconduct had occurred.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Murray v. United States,
}
}
487 U.S. 533, 537, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)
}}}
(quoting
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Nix v. Williams,
}
}
467 U.S. 431, 443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)
}}}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
However, since we conclude that the agents were entitled to \u8220\'3fsearch\u82
21\'3f Defendant\rquote s cell phone under either the \u8220\'3fsearch incident
to arrest\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3fexigent circumstances\u8221\'3f exceptions, the
re is no reason to consider this issue, beyond acknowledging its likely applicat
ion.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
5161d80c2211e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
III. CONCLUSION
\par
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
As many courts have already opined, the scope of a cell phone search incident to
arrest is presently in flux and, with every increasing advance to cell phone te
chnology and memory capacity (not to mention the advent of new portable devices
such as iPads), the question on how to deal with them will become increasingly i
mportant. However, in light of the current case law, we are precedent-bound to c
onclude that all of the information uncovered from Defendant\rquote s cell phone
squared with the Fourth Amendment\rquote s present safeguards. Accordingly, Def
endant\rquote s Motion to Suppress should be
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
DENIED.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Pursuant to Local
}
dType=L&pubNum=1005297&cite=FLRMAGJR4&originatingDoc=Idf052ecfd41711e0a06efc94fb
34cdeb&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D

Magistrate Rule 4(b)
}}}
, the parties have until
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
August 22, 2011
}
}
to serve and file written objections, if any, with the Honorable Ursula Ungaro,
United States District Judge. The Court finds good cause to expedite the object
ion period in light of the imminent trial date. Failure to timely file objection
s shall bar the parties from a
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
de novo
}
}
determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the report and bar t
he parties from attacking on appeal the factual findings contained herein, if an
y.
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
R.T.C. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc.,
}
}
996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir.1993)
}}}
;
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0
LoConte v. Dugger,
}
}
847 F.2d 745 (11th Cir.1988)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\i1 \fs20 \cf5 \f2 \b0

Nettles v. Wainwright,
}
}
677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)
}}}
(en banc);
}
t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_3fed000053a85" }{
\fldrslt
28 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 636(b)(1)
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*16
}
}
}
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b1
DONE AND SUBMITTED
}
}
in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 12th day of August, 2011.
\par
}
}
}{
\clpadt20 \clpadft3 \clpadb100 \clpadfb3 \clpadl100 \clpadfl3 \clpadr20 \clpadfr
3 \clbrdrt \clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clvertalt \cellx600
\clpadt20 \clpadft3 \clpadb90 \clpadfb3 \clpadl90 \clpadfl3 \clpadr20 \clpadfr3
\clbrdrt \clbrdrb \clbrdrr \trql \cellx10080
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnote_B00112025993621_1}{\*\bkmkend co_footnote_B00112025993
621_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_B00112025993621_ID0" }{\fld
rslt

1
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
As defined by the Government, \u8220\'3fquick repeated turns in an effort to elu
de anyone following [the Defendant].\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
}\i0 \ri20 \fs18 \sa0 \ul0 \cf1 \strike0 \f2 \li20 \b0 \sb0 \qj \intbl \cell \ro
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
621_1}
rslt
2
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
The record is unclear as to whether the phone rested on an agent\rquote s vehicl
e or the Defendant\rquote s.
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
621_1}
rslt
3

}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
The other two occupants of the Corrola were interviewed and released.
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
621_1}
rslt
4
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Significantly,
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant
}
}\i1 \fs18 \sa0 \ul1 \cf5 \strike0 \f2 \b0 \sb0 }}
distinguishes a traffic-related arrest from, for instance, a drug-related vehic
le arrest because, in the traffic-arrest context, an officer\rquote s justificat
ion to conduct a broad search is limited. In effect,
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant
}
revised
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chimel
}
and
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Belton
}
to condition a vehicle search incident to arrest on an actual reason to search
because otherwise it gave \u8220\'3fpolice the power to conduct such a search wh
en an individual [was] caught committing a traffic offense, when there [was] no
basis for believing evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle, [and
created] a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals.
\u8221\'3f
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Gant,
}
}
129 S.Ct. at 1720
.
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
621_1}
rslt

5
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Richardson,
}
}
764 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.1985)
(search of wallet and papers found on defendants\rquote person validly seized
in search incident to arrest);
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Sonntag,
}
}
684 F.2d 781 (11th Cir.1982)
(search incident to arrest may properly extend to personal property such as a w
allet found on the person of the arrestee);
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Ziller,
}
}
623 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir.1980)
(\u8220\'3f[A] search of the person which produced the wallet being permissible
under
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chadwick,
}
a search of the contents of the wallet is likewise permissible as being an inci
dent to and a part of a personal search.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
621_1}
rslt
6
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Ivy,
}
}
973 F.2d 1184, 1187 (5th Cir.1992)
(search of briefcase valid as incident to arrest);
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0

United States v. Johnson,
}
}
846 F.2d 279, 282\u8211\'3f84 (5th Cir.1988)
(same);
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Herrera,
}
}
810 F.2d 989, 990\u8211\'3f91 (10th Cir.1987)
(same).
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
621_1}
rslt
7
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0

United States v. Rosenthal,
}
}
793 F.2d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir.1986)
(search of bag valid as incident to arrest because defendant moved toward it as
he was arrested);
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
}
121 F.3d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir.1997)
(search of shaving bag found in passenger compartment of vehicle valid as incid
ent to arrest);
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Maldonado\u8211\'3fEspinosa,
}
}
968 F.2d 101, 104 (1st Cir.1992)
(search of carry-on bag valid as incident to arrest because it was within reach
of arrestee).
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
621_1}
rslt
8
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
rslt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Weaver,
}
}
433 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.2006)
(search of personal organizer found behind driver\rquote s seat of vehicle vali
d as incident to arrest).
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
621_1}
rslt
9
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}

.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_506_51" }{\fldrs
lt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Nascimento,
}
}
491 F.3d 25, 51 (1st Cir.2007)
(search of closet incident to arrest valid because defendant had to acquire clo
thes from closet at the time of arrest);
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Lucas,
}
}
898 F.2d 606, 609\u8211\'3f10 (8th Cir.1990)
(search of closed kitchen cabinet valid as incident to arrest because arrestee
reached for it upon being arrested).
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
93621_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_B010102025993621_ID" }{\fld
rslt
10
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Jackson,
}
}
377 F.3d at 716\u8211\'3f17
(search conducted by officer reaching into arrestee\rquote s groin area valid a
s incident to arrest).
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
93621_1}
rslt
11
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Currence,
}
}
446 F.3d 554, 558\u8211\'3f59 (4th Cir.2006)

(search of bicycle handlebar for evidence valid as incident to arrest).
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
93621_1}
rslt
12
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chadwick
}
was abrogated on other grounds by
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
California v. Acevedo,
}
}
500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991)
(overruling
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chadwick
}

as to containers within a vehicle and holding police may search a container wit
hin a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that the
container holds contraband or evidence).
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Chadwick\rquote s
}
holding that a search incident to arrest must not be too remote in time or plac
e is still good law.
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
93621_1}
rslt
13
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
The agents testified that they searched through the cell phone because they were
concerned that the cell phone might be remotely \u8220\'3fwiped,\u8221\'3f thus
deleting the call log history. Objectively speaking, we find this concern uncon
vincing especially in light of the their admission that the cell phone lacked in
ternet capabilities (consider: how do you remotely access and thus delete a cell
phone that is incapable of making a remote connection?) Regardless, as we discu
ss herein, the point is really moot because necessity of exigent circumstances a
re not relevant to a search incident to arrest analysis under current Supreme Co
urt authority.
\par
}
}
}
w }}{

\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
93621_1}
rslt
14
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
While not specifically relevant here, we agree with the rationale pronounced in
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
State v. Smith
}
that a cell phone is not a \u8220\'3fcontainer\u8221\'3f as defined in
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Belton
}
because a cell phone is not \u8220\'3fany object capable of holding another obj
ect\u8221\'3f\u8212\'3fat least not in an tangible sense of the phrase \u8220\'3
fcapable of holding.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
State v. Smith,
}
}

920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009)
(\u8220\'3fEven the more basic models of modern cell phones are capable of stor
ing a wealth of digitized information wholly unlike any physical object found wi
thin a closed container. We thus hold that a cell phone is not a closed containe
r for purposes of a Fourth Amendment analysis.\u8221\'3f)
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
93621_1}
rslt
15
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
As noted above, however, probable cause existed to search Defendant\rquote s cel
l phone due to the nature of his arrest, the agents\rquote observation of Defen
dant using his phone immediately before his arrest and that cell phones are cons
idered a known drug tool.
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Nixon,
}
}
918 F.2d 895, 900 (11th Cir.1990)
. Nevertheless, as will be noted below, the agents did not have an objective bel
ief that information on the cell phone could have been lost absent an immediate
search.
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See
}
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Santa,
}
}
236 F.3d at 669;
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
see also
}
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
infra
}
}
at n. 16.
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
93621_1}
rslt
16
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj

An observation made by Intel co-founder Gordon Moore in 1965. He noticed that th
e number of transistors per square inch on integrated circuits had doubled every
year since their invention. Moore\rquote s law predicts that this trend will co
ntinue into the foreseeable future. Put differently, the computing power of toda
y\rquote s cell phone, tablet PC, laptop, etc., is likely to be, at least, twice
as powerful in two years.
\par
}
}
}
w }}{
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
93621_1}
rslt
17
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
The Government focuses its exigency argument on the \u8220\'3fJavier Blue\u8221\
'3f phone call/text message communication and thus relies on the \u8220\'3fsearc
h incident to arrest\u8221\'3f exception to justify the warrantless search of th
e call log history. Had the Government made an exigency argument for the call lo
g history, however, we would have disagreed because the agents never proffered e
vidence to support an objective belief that the cell phone\rquote s call log his
tory was ever at risk of being lost or destroyed. In fact, while agents testifie
d to their speculation that a cell phone could theoretically be \u8220\'3fwiped\
u8221\'3f remotely by an unknown third party, each agent testified that they had
no reason to believe that Defendant\rquote s specific cell phone was capable of
remote deletion.
\par
}
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li200 \b0 \qj
This Court is aware of other cell phone and pager cases concluding that call his
tories or even address book information is susceptible to being lost or destroye
d.
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}

ldrslt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
Mercado\u8211\'3fNava,
}
}
486 F.Supp.2d at 1278
(\u8220\'3fThe need to preserve evidence is underscored where evidence may be l
ost due to the dynamic nature of the information stored on and deleted from cell
phones or pagers\u8221\'3f);
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Ortiz,
}
}
84 F.3d at 984
(\u8220\'3fBecause of the finite nature of a pager\rquote s electronic memory,
incoming pages may destroy currently stored telephone numbers in a pager\rquote
s memory.\u8221\'3f). However, the Government fails to make a showing that would
provide this Court a record basis to make such an exigency finding. Moreover, t
his weight of authority (duly cited by the Government) is unpersuasive and mispl
aced with respect to the technological capabilities of cell phones. As the court
in the Eastern District of Missouri correctly explained in refusing to follow t
he reasoning from these earlier cases, the \u8220\'3fservice provider keeps reco
rds of the incoming and outgoing calls, ... and so the fact that they might not
be stored on the phone itself does not mean they will be lost forever.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. James,
}
}
No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 1925032 at *7 n. 3 (E.D.Mo. April 29, 2008)
(upholding search of cell phone history and address book based on consent to se
arch, but declining to do so under the exigent circumstances approach). We tend
to agree with this position and recognize the ever-weakening argument that a mod
ern cell phone, with its continually advancing technology, is at any risk of del
eting its call history or text messages folder to make space for incoming calls
or text messages\u8212\'3fthe memory capacity of a cell phone is far, far greate
r than that of an analogized two-decade older pager. Indeed, pagers pre-dated co

mmercial internet usage; modern cell phones however are fully internet capable.
The weakness of this analogy is glaringly obvious.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li200 \b0 \qj
In the end, the Government proffers no evidence of exigency with respect to the
call log history despite its burden to do so.
}
{\i1 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \b0
See, e.g.,
}
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
United States v. Morales,
}
}
171 F.3d 978, 982 (5th Cir.1999)
(\u8220\'3fThe government bears the burden of proving that an exigency existed.
\u8221\'3f);
}
slt
{\i1 \fs18 \cf5 \f2 \b0
}
}
208 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir.2000)
(\u8220\'3fpolice officer\rquote s subjective belief that exigent circumstances
exist is insufficient to make a warrantless search. Instead, as is normally the
case for Fourth Amendment inquires, the test is objective: the government must
establish the circumstances as they appeared at the moment of entry would lead a
reasonable, experienced law enforcement officer to believe that [an immediate s
earch was necessary].\u8221\'3f). Therefore, the exigent circumstance exception
cannot be used to justify Agent McPhee\rquote s search of Defendant\rquote s cal
l log history.
\par
}
}
}
}
}\i0 \ri20 \fs18 \sa0 \ul0 \cf1 \strike0 \f2 \li200 \b0 \sb0 \qj \intbl \cell \r
ow }}
}
}
}
}
}{
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clbrdrr \trql \cellx10080
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End of Document
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}
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ow }}
}
}\sect }

US V Gomez

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Under the Fourth Amendment, any objects found on an arrestee\rquote s person, on

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Searches and Seizures

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is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

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der a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment. In response, the Government

osition that warrantless searches are

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United States v. Davis,

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story than Defendant initial leads us to believe. A

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United States v. Place

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