G.R. No. 114508. November 19, 1999.] PRIBHDAS J. MIRPURI, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and the BARBIZON CORPORATION, respondents. KEYWORD: BARBIZON BRASSIERS The Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property is a multi-lateral treaty which the Philippines bound itself to honor and enforce in this country. As to whether or not the treaty affords protection to a foreign corporation against a Philippine applicant for the registration of a similar trademark is the principal issue in this case. Modern authorities on trademark law view trademarks as performing three distinct functions: (1) they indicate origin or ownership of the articles to which they are attached; (2) they guarantee that those articles come up to a certain standard of quality; and (3) they advertise the articles they symbolize. Today, the trademark is not merely a symbol of origin and goodwill; it is often the most effective agent for the actual creation and protection of goodwill. It imprints upon the public mind an anonymous and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfaction. In other words, the mark actually sells the goods. The mark has become the "silent salesman," the conduit through which direct contact between the trademark owner and the consumer is assured. In the last half century, the unparalleled growth of industry and the rapid development of communications technology have enabled trademarks, tradenames and other distinctive signs of a product to penetrate regions where the owner does not actually manufacture or sell the product itself. Goodwill is no longer confined to the territory of actual market penetration; it extends to zones where the marked article has been fixed in the public mind through advertising. Whether in the print, broadcast or electronic communications medium, particularly on the Internet, advertising has paved the way for growth and expansion of the product by creating and earning a reputation that crosses over borders, virtually turning the whole world into one vast marketplace. The Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, otherwise known as the Paris Convention, is a multilateral treaty that seeks to protect industrial property consisting of patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names and indications of source or appellations of origin, and at the same time aims to repress unfair competition. In the case at bar, private respondent anchors its cause of action on the first paragraph of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention which reads as follows: "Article 6 (1) The countries of the Union undertake, either administratively if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well-known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such wellknown mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith

The essential requirement under Article 6 is that the trademark to be protected must be "well-known" in the country where protection is sought. The power to determine whether a trademark is well-known lies in the "competent authority of the country of registration or use." This competent authority would be either the registering authority if it has the power to decide this, or the courts of the country in question if the issue comes before a court. The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines declares that "an effective intellectual and industrial property system is vital to the development of domestic and creative activity, facilitates transfer of technology, it attracts foreign investments, and ensures market access for our products." The Intellectual Property Code took effect on January 1, 1998 and by its express provision, repealed the Trademark Law, the Patent Law, Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code, the Decree on Intellectual Property, and the Decree on Compulsory Reprinting of Foreign Textbooks. The Code was enacted to strengthen the intellectual and industrial property system in the Philippines as mandated by the country's accession to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). G.R. No. 120900. July 20, 2000.] CANON KABUSHIKI KAISHA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NSR RUBBER CORPORATION, respondents. KEYWORD: CANON for sandals Ordinarily, the ownership of a trademark or tradename is a property right that the owner is entitled to protect [Converse Rubber Corporation vs. Universal Rubber Products, Inc. 147 SCRA 154, (1987),p. 160.] as mandated by the Trademark Law.5 [RA 166, 20. Certificate of registration prima facie evidence of validity.-A certificate of registration of a mark or trade-name shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, the registrant's ownership of the mark or tradename, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the same in connection with the goods, business or services specified in the certificate, subject to any conditions and limitations stated therein.] However, when a trademark is used by a party for a product in which the other party does not deal, the use of the same trademark on the latter's product cannot be validly objected to. A review of the records shows that with the order of the BPTTT declaring private respondent in default for failure to file its answer, petitioner had every opportunity to present ex-parte all of its evidence to prove that its certificates of registration for the trademark CANON cover footwear. The certificates of registration for the trademark CANON in other countries and in the Philippines as presented by petitioner, clearly showed that said certificates of registration cover goods belonging to class 2 (paints, chemical products, toner, dyestuff). On this basis, the BPTTT correctly ruled that since the certificate of registration of petitioner for the trademark CANON covers class 2 (paints, chemical products, toner, dyestuff), private respondent can use the trademark CANON for its goods classified as class 25 (sandals). Clearly, there is a world of difference between the paints, chemical products, toner, and dyestuff of petitioner and the sandals of private respondent. Petitioner counters that notwithstanding the dissimilarity of the products of the parties, the trademark owner is entitled to protection when the use of by the junior user "forestalls the normal expansion of his business".7 [Rollo, p. 18, citing Sta. Ana

vs. Maliwat, 24 SCRA 1018 (1968), p. 1025.] Petitioner's opposition to the registration of its trademark CANON by private respondent rests upon petitioner's insistence that it would be precluded from using the mark CANON for various kinds of footwear, when in fact it has earlier used said mark for said goods. Stretching this argument, petitioner claims that it is possible that the public could presume that petitioner would also produce a wide variety of footwear considering the diversity of its products marketed worldwide. We do not agree. Even in this instant petition, except for its bare assertions, petitioner failed to attach evidence that would convince this Court that petitioner has also embarked in the production of footwear products. We quote with approval the observation of the Court of Appeals that: "The herein petitioner has not made known that it intends to venture into the business of producing sandals. This is clearly shown in its Trademark Principal Register (Exhibit "U") where the products of the said petitioner had been clearly and specifically described as "Chemical products, dyestuffs, pigments, toner developing preparation, shoe polisher, polishing agent". It would be taxing one's credibility to aver at this point that the production of sandals could be considered as a possible "natural or normal expansion" of its business operation".8 [Ibid., p. 38.] In Faberge, Incorporated vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,9 [Faberge, Incorporated vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 215 SCRA 326 (1992)] the Director of patents allowed the junior user to use the trademark of the senior user on the ground that the briefs manufactured by the junior user, the product for which the trademark BRUTE was sought to be registered, was unrelated and non-competing with the products of the senior user consisting of after shave lotion, shaving cream, deodorant, talcum powder, and toilet soap. The senior user vehemently objected and claimed that it was expanding its trademark to briefs and argued that permitting the junior user to register the same trademark would allow the latter to invade the senior user's exclusive domain. In sustaining the Director of Patents, this Court said that since "(the senior user) has not ventured in the production of briefs, an item which is not listed in its certificate of registration, (the senior user), cannot and should not be allowed to feign that (the junior user) had invaded (the senior user's) exclusive domain."10 [Ibid., p. 325.] We reiterated the principle that the certificate of registration confers upon the trademark owner the exclusive right to use its own symbol only to those goods specified in the certificate, subject to the conditions and limitations stated therein.11 [Ibid., p. 326.] Thus, the exclusive right of petitioner in this case to use the trademark CANON is limited to the products covered by its certificate of registration. Petitioner further argues that the alleged diversity of its products all over the world makes it plausible that the public might be misled into thinking that there is some supposed connection between private respondent's goods and petitioner. Petitioner is apprehensive that there could be confusion as to the origin of the goods, as well as confusion of business, if private respondent is allowed to register the mark CANON. In such a case, petitioner would allegedly be immensely prejudiced if private respondent would be permitted to take "a free ride on, and reap the advantages of, the goodwill and reputation of petitioner Canon".12 [Rollo, p. 23.] In support of the foregoing arguments, petitioner invokes the rulings in Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat13 [Supra.], Ang vs. Teodoro14 [74 Phil 50 (1942)] and Converse Rubber Corporation vs. Universal Rubber Products, Inc.15 [Supra..].

The likelihood of confusion of goods or business is a relative concept, to be determined only according to the particular, and sometimes peculiar, circumstances of each case. [Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 336 (1982), p, 341.] Indeed, in trademark law cases, even more than in other litigation, precedent must be studied in the light of the facts of the particular case. [Ibid.] Contrary to petitioner's supposition, the facts of this case will show that the cases of Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat,, Ang vs. Teodoro and Converse Rubber Corporation vs. Universal Rubber Products, Inc. are hardly in point. The just cited cases involved goods that were confusingly similar, if not identical, as in the case of Converse Rubber Corporation vs. Universal Rubber Products, Inc. Here, the products involved are so unrelated that the public will not be misled that there is the slightest nexus between petitioner and the goods of private respondent. In cases of confusion of business or origin, the question that usually arises is whether the respective goods or services of the senior user and the junior user are so related as to likely cause confusion of business or origin, and thereby render the trademark or tradenames confusingly similar. [RUBEN E. AGPALO, TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE PHILIPPINES, (1990), p. 54.] Goods are related when they belong to the same class or have the same descriptive properties; when they possess the same physical attributes or essential characteristics with reference to their form, composition, texture or quality. [Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p, 342.] They may also be related because they serve the same purpose or are sold in grocery stores. In its bid to bar the registration of private respondent of the mark CANON, petitioner invokes the protective mantle of the Paris Convention. Petitioner asserts that it has the exclusive right to the mark CANON because it forms part of its corporate name or tradename, protected by Article 8 of the Paris Convention, to wit: "A tradename shall be protected in all the countries of the Union without the obligation of filing or registration, whether or not it forms part of a trademark." The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property does not automatically exclude all countries of the world which have signed it from using a tradename which happens to be used in one country. To illustrate - if a taxicab or bus company in a town in the United Kingdom or India happens to use the tradename "Rapid Transportation", it does not necessarily follow that "Rapid" can no longer be registered in Uganda, Fiji, or the Philippines. This office is not unmindful that in the Treaty of Paris for the Protection of Intellectual Property regarding well-known marks and possible application thereof in this case. Petitioner, as this office sees it, is trying to seek refuge under its protective mantle, claiming that the subject mark is well known in this country at the time the then application of NSR Rubber was filed. However, the then Minister of Trade and Industry, the Hon. Roberto V. Ongpin, issued a memorandum dated 25 October 1983 to the Director of Patents, a set of guidelines in the implementation of Article 6bis (sic) of the Treaty of Paris. These conditions are:

a) the mark must be internationally known; b) the subject of the right must be a trademark, not a patent or copyright or anything else; c ) the mark must be for use in the same or similar kinds of goods; and d) the person claiming must be the owner of the mark (The Parties Convention Commentary on the Paris Convention. Article by Dr. Bogsch, Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, 1985)' From the set of facts found in the records, it is ruled that the Petitioner failed to comply with the third requirement of the said memorandum that is the mark must be for use in the same or similar kinds of goods. The Petitioner is using the mark "CANON" for products belonging to class 2 (paints, chemical products) while the Respondent is using the same mark for sandals (class 25). Hence, Petitioner's contention that its mark is well-known at the time the Respondent filed its application for the same mark should fail. "32 [Records, pp. 21-22.] Petitioner assails the application of the case of Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court to this case. Petitioner points out that in the case of Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, petitioner therein was found to have never at all conducted its business in the Philippines unlike herein petitioner who has extensively conducted its business here and also had its trademark registered in this country. Hence, petitioner submits that this factual difference renders inapplicable our ruling in the case of Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court that Article 8 of the Paris Convention does not automatically extend protection to a tradename that is in danger of being infringed in a country that is also a signatory to said treaty. This contention deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to say that the just quoted pronouncement in the case of Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, was made independent of the factual finding that petitioner in said case had not conducted its business in this country. G.R. No. L-28499. September 30, 1977.] VICTORIA MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. ONG SU AND THE HONORABLE TIBURCIO S. EVALLE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, respondents. KEYWORD: DIAMOND design for sugar From the evidence and pleadings, it appears that petitioner is relying heavily on its diamond design, the color scheme, and the printing sequence or arrangement of such legends as weight, contents and manufacturer or packer. I am of the firm belief that the diamond portion of petitioner's trademark has not bolstered its cause. Common geometric shapes such as circles, ovals, squares, triangles, diamonds, and the like, when used as vehicles for display of word marks, ordinarily are not regarded as indicia of origin for goods to which the marks are applied, unless of course they have acquired secondary meaning. I have scoured the records completely to ascertain if the petitioner has submitted satisfactory evidence in this regard, but I find absolutely nothing to base a ruling that the triangle (sic) design has acquired a secondary meaning with respect to its sugar business. It is the common practice for trademark owners to register designs forming outline of their distinguishing mark, but when the registrant of such design relies upon

registration in proceeding based upon likelihood of confusion of purchasers, he assumes the burden of showing that the design portion of the mark has been so used that purchasers recognize the design, standing alone, as indicating goods emanating from the registrant.-Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., v. Overseas Finance & Trading Co., Inc. (ComrPats) 112 USPQ 6. Considering herein that the petitioner failed to establish that diamond design component of its mark has acquired a secondary meaning and that the literal portion of the marks have no similarity, there is no reasonable, likelihood of purchaser confusion resulting from registrant's use of VALENTINE within a diamond and petitioner's use of VICTORIAS within a diamond. The contention of petitioner that the diamond design in its trademark is an index of origin has no merit. The petitioner has not shown that the design portion of the mark has been so used that purchasers recognize the design, standing alone, as indicating goods coming from the registrant. As correctly stated by the Director of Patents, common geometric shapes such as diamonds ordinarily are not regarded as indicia of origin for goods to which the marks arc applied unless they have acquired a secondary meaning. And there is no evidence that the diamond design in the trademark of the petitioner has acquired a secondary meaning with respect to its sugar business. The word "Victorias" is what identifies the sugar contained in the bag as the product of the petitioner. Indeed, the petitioner has advertised its sugar in bags marked "Victorias" with oval, hexagon and other designs.

G.R. No. L-23954. April 29, 1977.] AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and TIU CHIAN, respondents. G.R. No. L-23035. July 31, 1975.] PHILIPPINE NUT INDUSTRY, INC., petitioner, vs. STANDARD BRANDS INCORPORATED and TIBURCIO S. EVALLE, as Director of Patents, respondents. G.R. No. 10738. January 14, 1916.] RUEDA HERMANOS & CO., plaintiff-appellant, vs. FELIX PAGLINAWAN & CO., defendant-appellant. G.R. No. 14269. October 16, 1919.] FORBES, MUNN & CO. (LTD.), plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANG SAN To, defendantappellee. [G.R. No. 45502. May 2, 1939.] SAPOLIN CO., INC., cross-plaintiff-appellant, vs. CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, and GERMANN & CO., LTD., crossdefendants. GERMANN & CO., LTD., appellee. G.R. No. 48226. December 14, 1942.] ANA L. ANG, petitioner, vs. TORIBIO TEODORO, respondent. G.R. No. L-4531. January 10, 1953.] ANG SI HENG and SALUSTIANA DEE, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. WELLINGTON DEPARTMENT STORE INC., BENJAMIN CHUA, S. R. MENDINUETO, and FILEMON COSIO, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-3952. December 29, 1953.] MASSO HERMANOS, S. A., petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, respondent. G.R. No. L-8072. October 31, 1956.] LIM HOA, petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, respondent. G.R. No. L-14761. January 28, 1961.] ARCE SONS AND COMPANY, petitioner, vs. SELECTA BISCUIT COMPANY, INC, ET AL., respondents. G.R. No. L-17501. April 27, 1963.] MEAD JOHNSON & COMPANY, petitioner, vs. N. V. J. VAN DORP, LTD., ET AL., respondents. G.R. No. L-18289. March 31, 1964.] ANDRES ROMERO, petitioner, vs. MAIDEN FORM BRASSIERE CO., INC. and THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, respondents. G.R. No. L-18337. January 30, 1965.] CHUA CHE, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE PATENT OFFICE and SY TUO, respondents. G.R. No. L-20635. March 31, 1966.] ETEPHA, A.G., petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and WESTMONT PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., respondents. [G.R. No. 112012. April 4, 2001.] SOCIETE DES PRODUITS NESTLE, S.A. and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CFC CORPORATION, respondents. [G.R. No. 111580. June 21, 2001.] SHANGRI-LA INTERNATIONAL HOTEL MANAGEMENT LTD., SHANGRI-LA PROPERTIES, INC., MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. and KUOK PHILIPPINE PROPERTIES, INC., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FELIX M. DE GUZMAN, as Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 99 and DEVELOPERS GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC., respondents. [G.R. No. 114802. June 21, 2001.] DEVELOPERS GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. IGNACIO S. SAPALO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, and SHANGRI-LA INTERNATIONAL HOTEL MANAGEMENT, LTD., respondents. G.R. No. 139300. March 14, 2001.] AMIGO MANUFACTURING, Inc., petitioner, vs. CLUETT PEABODY CO., INC., respondent. G.R. No. 118192. October 23, 1997.] PRO LINE SPORTS CENTER, INC., and QUESTOR CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, UNIVERSAL ATHLETICS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, INC., and MONICO SEHWANI, respondents. G.R. No. 123248. October 16, 1997.]

TWIN ACE HOLDINGS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. Nos. L-27425 & L-30505. April 28, 1980.] CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION and EDWARDSON MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JACINTO RUBBER & PLASTICS CO., INC., and ACE RUBBER & PLASTICS CORPORATION, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-26676. July 30, 1982.] PHILIPPINE REFINING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. NG SAM and THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, respondents. G.R. No. L-29971. August 31, 1982.] ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and UNITED CIGARETTE CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. Nos. 63796-97. May 21, 1984.] LA CHEMISE LACOSTE, S. A., petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XLIX, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila and GOBINDRAM HEMANDAS, respondents. G.R. No. L-32747. November 29, 1984.] FRUIT OF THE LOOM, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GENERAL GARMENTS CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. L-27906. January 8, 1987.] CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. UNIVERSAL RUBBER PRODUCTS, INC. and TIBURCIO S. EVALLE, DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, G.R. No. 75067. February 26, 1988.] PUMA SPORTSCHUHFABRIKEN RUDOLF DASSLER, K.G., petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MIL-ORO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 78298. January 30, 1989.] WOLVERINE WORLDWIDE, INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITO P. CRUZ, respondents. G.R. No. 78325. January 25, 1990.] DEL MONTE CORPORATION and PHILIPPINE PACKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SUNSHINE SAUCE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, respondents. G.R. No. 75420. November 15, 1991.] KABUSHI KAISHA ISETAN, also known and trading as ISETAN CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, INC. respondents. G.R. No. 71189. November 4, 1992.] FABERGE, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and CO BENG KAY, respondents. G.R. No. 103543. July 5, 1993.]

ASIA BREWERY, INC. petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 91332. July 16, 1993.] PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., AND FABRIQUES OF TABAC REUNIES, S.A., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 91385. January 4, 1994.] HEIRS OF CRISANTA Y. GABRIEL-ALMORADIE, herein represented by the special administrator LORENZO B. ALMORADIE of the Intestate Estate of the Late Crisanta Y. Gabriel-Almoradie and LORENZO B. ALMORADIE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIA M. SUMERA, herein sued in her capacity as special administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late DR. JOSE R. PEREZ, respondents. G.R. No. 115115. July 18, 1995.] CONRAD AND COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FITRITE INC., and VICTORIA BISCUITS CO., INC., respondents. G.R. No. 100098. December 29, 1995.] EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER and H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC., respondents. [G.R. No. L-24075. January 31, 1974.] CRISANTA Y. GABRIEL, petitioner, vs. DR. JOSE R. PEREZ and HONORABLE TIBURCIO EVALLE as Director of Patents, respondents. G.R. No. L-14377. December 29, 1960.] THE EAST PACIFIC MERCHANDISING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and LUIS P. PELLICER, respondents. G.R. No. L-19297. December 22, 1966.] MARVEX COMMERCIAL CO. INC., petitioner, vs. PETRA HAWPIA & CO., and THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, respondents. G.R. No. L-23023. August 31, 1968.] JOSE P. STA. ANA, petitioner, vs. FLORENTINO MALIWAT and TIBURCIO S. EVALLE, in his capacity as Director of Patents, respondents. G.R. No. L-26557. February 18, 1970.] AMERICAN WIRE & CABLE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and CENTRAL BANAHAW INDUSTRIES, respondents. G.R. No. L-29155. May 13, 1970.] UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MAGDALO V. FRANCISCO, SR., and VICTORIANO V. FRANCISCO, respondents. G.R. No. L-28744. April 29, 1971.] ACOJE MINING CO., INC., petitioner-applicant, vs. THE DlRECTOR OF PATENTS, respondent.