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INTRODUCTION Due Process Griswold v Connecticut Facts: Appellants Griswold, Executive Director of the planned Parenthood League of Connecticut

and its medical director, were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and medical advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wifes use. They said it violated the 14 th Amendment, which speaks of no person shall be deprived of life, liberty without due process of law. Issue: (1) Whether appellants have standing to assert constitutional rights of married people; (2) Whether the Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy (emanates from the right of liberty which cannot be deprived without due process) Held: 1. USSC sustained that petitioners have legal standing. Looking at the aspect of substantive due process, they held that the law operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physicians role in it. 2. Marriage is an association, and the courts protect this freedom to associate, as well as the privacy in association, far from governmental intrusion. Principle: Governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Hence the statute is unconstitutional since it violates the right of marital privacy which is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Equal Protection Eisenstadt v Baird Facts: Baird, herein appellee, was convicted for violating Massachusetts law for giving a woman a contraceptive foam at the close of his lecture to students on contraception. That law makes it a felony to give away a drug , medicine instrument, or article for the prevention of contraception except in a case of physicians and pharmacists who do it for married couples. Issue: Whether the statute violated the equal protection clause of the 14 th Amendment. Held: Yes, it violated the 14th Amendment by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated. (Note: State interests here are to deter premarital sex and disease) The Court said that: 1. The deterrence of fornication cannot reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the statute since it is riddled with exceptions making contraceptives freely available for use in premarital sexual relations and its scope and penalty structure is inconsistent with that purpose, 2. The protection of public health cannot also be reasonably regarded as the putose of the statute since if this were the case, it would be discriminatory and overbroad. (Thus, there is no fit between statute and goal)

Facts: Nita Villanueva had 3 abortions done by the same doctor, Antonio Geluz. Husband Oscar Lazo sued Geluz on the 3rd abortion seeking damages. CA sustained claim of Lazo for P3,000. Issue: Whether or not the husband can claim damages forn an unborn fetus from the abortionist. Held: No, he cannot. Award for death of a person does not cover unborn fetus because it is still not vested with legal personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the apellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment. Concept and Classes of Persons\Civil personality extinguished by death (Art. 42 CC) People v Tirol Facts: Kosain Manibpol and his family were sleeping when he heard the dog bark. When he went to investigate, 2 persons have already come up to their house, asking if they can borrow his land. After he gave his consent, Kulas arrived, flashed the light in his face and punched him. When he fell, the assailants companions (more than 10 armed men) came in hacked him and his wife and 7 children. His wife died, 6 kids. Of the 14 suspects, only 2 were apprehended, Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol. After they were found guilty of the crime of murder of the 7 persons, they filed an appeal, during which Baldesco died. Issue: Whether or not Baldesco by his death will still be liable for civil damages Held: The courts dismissed the case insofar as the criminal liability of Baldesco is concerned. However following the doctrine in People vs. Sendaydiego, the appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of determining his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate is liable. Art. 42 of the CC states that Civil personality is extinguished b death. The effect of death upon rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. One of the effects on rights as is that upon death of a person the subject of legal relations disappears. Hence, criminal liability is extinguished in death. However, Baldescos civil liability is not extinguished but remains to be determined which can be recovered from his estate. Concept and Classes of Persons\Doubt re succession, Art. 43 CC Joaquin v Navarro Facts: This was a summary proceeding to resolve the order of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro Jr (JN) and his mother Angela Joaquin de Navarro (AJ). While the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the whole family sought refuge at the German

CIVIL PERSONALITY Concept and Classes of Persons\Unborn fetus Geluz v. CA

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Club. While staying there, the the building was packed with refugees, it was set on fire and the Japanese were shooting at the fleeing refugees. In trying to escape the 3 daughters were shot dead. Angela refused to leave the place while Joaquin Navarro Jr, wife, (Francisco Lopez) FL & Joaquin Navarro Sr fled. Joaquin Navarro Jr was shot while coming out. Moments later, the German Club collapsed. CA said that the mother died before the son on the basis that she could have died immediately after for a variety of causes. The importance of the question whether AJ died before JN or vice versa lies in the fact that it radically affects the right of succession of petitioner Ramon Joaquin an acknowledged child of AJ and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and respondent Antonio Navarro son of JN Jr by first marriage. Issue: Whether the mother died before Joaquin Navarro Jr. Held: In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died before his mother. The presumption that AJ died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art. 43 of the CC speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship. Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon Presumption of Capacity Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas Facts: Vicente Villanueva signed a bond as surety for defendant Codina Arenas in favor of plaintiff on December 15, 1908. on April 5, 1909, the plaintiff sued on the bond; Villanueva did not appear, and was declared in default. When judgment against him was about to be executed, his wife appeared and asked that he be relieved from the bond and the judgment because he was insane. It appears that he was declared insane by July 24, 1909 and his wife was appointed as his guardian. The case was reopened and tried and the evidence showed that Villanueva executed the bond with full understanding of the nature and consequences of the act performed by him although he was suffering from a monomania of great wealth. He was, therefore, held liable on the bond. Hence appealed to the SC. Issue: Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does not have capacity to act and whether or not the Villanueva was actually incapable of entering into contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15, 1908. Held: The SC affirmed the judgment of the CA. It would have been necessary to show that 1. such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the patient; 2. that the bond executed was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that is, that there was not, or could there have been any other cause for the contract than the ostentation of wealth and this was purely an effect of such monomania of wealth; 3. that the monomania existed on the date the bond in question was executed. Monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply that the person is incapable of executing a bond such as that in question. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to

continue for so long as the contrary is not proved, that is, at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind; which, in the opinion of the court, has not been proved in this case. Effects of Minority on Contracts\manifestation of legal age, estoppel Mercado vs Espiritu Facts: The annulment of a deed of sale was sought on the ground that two (Domingo Mercado and Josefa Mercado) of the four parties thereto were minors (under the Civil Code), 18 and 19 years old respectively, on the date the instrument was executed. In the deed of sale however, the minors stated that they were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it; and they made the same manifestation before the notary public when the document was prepared. Issues: 1. Whether it is true that plaintiffs were then minors and therefore incapable of selling their property, and 2. Whether a person who are really and truly minors, and notwithstanding, manifesting that they are of legal age, can after the execution of the deed of sale, ask for the annulment of its execution. Held: The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, effected by minors who have already passed the age pf puberty and adolescence and are near the adult age, when they pretend to have already reached their majority, while in fact, they have not, is valid, and they cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. This doctrine is entirely in accord with the provisions of our law on estoppel. Effects of Minority on Contracts\NO manifestation of legal age Bambalan v Maramba Facts: Isidro Bambalan, herein plaintiff, who was a minor, executed a deed of sale of a piece of land to the defendant, Genoveva Muerong. Bambalan made no representation as to his age, which was well known to the defendant, inasmuch as the latter was the one who purchased the plaintffs cedula to be used in the acknowledgement of the document bfore a notary public. Plaintiff now seeks to annul the sale. Issue: Was the sale of the piece of land in question void or valid? Held: The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor as to its execution. The doctrine laid down in Mercado v Espiritu is not applicable in this case, because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him to be a minor. Effects of Minority on Contracts\parental consent as binding Shields v Gross Facts: In 1975, when she was 10 years old, appellant Brooke Shields did photographs for a Playboy Press to pose nude in a bathtub. Before session, Shields mother and legal guardian executed 2 consents in favor of Gross, photographer and herein appellee, giving the latter the copyrights. In 1980, the 1975 photos came out in a French magazine. In 1981, Shields sought compensatory and punitive damages from Gross and an injunction to permanently enjoining Gross from further use of her photographs. Issue: Whether or not an infant model may disaffirm a prior consent made on her behalf by her parent.

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Held: No, she may not because a written consent was obtained from the person. Because Shields was a minor, consent was obtained from her parent and legal guardian. The parents consent is binding on the minor. Construing Sec. 50 & 41 of the Civil Rights Law strictly, the parents consent is binding on the infant and no words prohibiting disaffirmance are necessary to effectuate the legislative intent. Neither is a prior court approval of the employment contract for child models is necessary to validate the contract, since the statute requiring such applies only to child performers. (Note: by denying the appeal, the court upheld the stability of commercial transactions.) Effect of Minority on Marriage Moe v Dinkins Facts: Plaintiffs seek judgment declaring unconstitutional, and enjoining the enforcement of a statue requiring parental consent of both parents prior to marriage of unemancipated minors. (Males, 16-18; Females, 14-18). They raised the issue of the statute impeding the exercise of their liberty, and they do not want to have their child stigmatized as illegitimate. Plaintiff Maria got pregnant at 15, and her mother refused to give consent because she wished to continue receiving welfare benefits for Maria. Interveners Cristina Coe and Pedro Doe also raised the same issues. Issue: Whether or not the statute is unconstitutional on the basis of substantive issues. (Whether there exists a rational relation between the measure chosen b the NY legislature and the legitimate state objective) Held: The statute is upheld. 1. It is the states interest to protect the minors from immature decision-making and preventing unstable marriages. 2. The requirement of parental consent ensures that at least 1 mature person will participate in the decision of a minor to marry. Though petitioners suggest that the courts are in a better position to judge whether a minor is prepared to marry, the law presumes that the parents possess what the child lacks in maturity, and that parents are more capable to act in their best interests. 3. There is no denial of right to marry. The Statue merely delays plaintiffs access to the institution of marriage until they comply with the necessary requirements of parental consent, or emancipation. The illegitimacy of the child would only be a temporary situation. Subsequent marriage of the parents legitimizes the child. Effect of Insanity on Contracts Carillo v Jaojaco Facts: Adriana Carillo executed a sale of land 33 hectares to Marcos Jaojaoco for the sum of P4,000. Nine (9) days later, she was declared mentally incapacitated by the court and later on died. Her sister, Miguela Carillo herein petitioner, as administratrix of her estate, brought an action for the annulment of the sale of land on the basis of Adrianas mental incapacity. Issue: Whether or not Adriana was incapacitated to effect a valid sale of land. Held: There is no record of evidence to show that Adriana has been incapacitated before the execution of the deed of sale. Though she was confined in a hospital for cerebral hemorrhage on Nov. 13, 1819, there was no proof of any mental abnormality, as testified by the notary public who attended to her on Dec. 8,1819. The burden of proof in establishing mental incapacity is upon any person who alleges it. Hence, the mental capacity of Adriana must be presumed.

Effect of Insanity on Crimes US v Vaquilar Facts: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and his daughter, as well as injuring other persons with a bolo. Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant appeared to be insane prior to the commission of the crimes. They also testified that the appellant was complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. The witnesses evidence for insanity include: 1. Appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetrating at the time he was killing his wife. 2. He looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he wouldnt have killed his family 3. At the moment of cutting those people, he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut anybody at random 4. Sister said, then he pursued mehe must have been crazy because he cut me. In prison, he had a morbid mental condition. Issue: Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare the accused as insane, therefore incapacitated and hence exempt from criminal liability. Held: The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The appellants conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with an unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of crazy is not synonymous with the legal terms insane. The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word in the cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after the commission of the crime. The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity which results not from any disease of the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal state of mind. (Notes: 3-way test of Insanity: 1. Is it habitual? Does it cause mental perturbation? 2. Is it the cause of the act in question? 3. Did it exist it the time of the act?) Effect of Insanity on Contracts Dumaguin v Reynolds Facts: Appellant Paulino Dumaguin was placedunder the guardianship of his wife after September 1930. Sometime in 1931, he began to work for the gold propectors Reynolds and Harrison, appellees. In that year Paulino and his brother Fructuoso located 10 mining claims which Paulino transferred to Reynolds and Harrison. Dumaguin initiated this case by filing a complaint alleging that the transfers were void claiming mental incapacity as reason. Issue: Whether or not the deeds of transfer were null and void because of Paulinos mental incapacity to contract. Held: No, the transfers were valid. The presumption of mental incapacity in a person under guardianship for mental derangement may be rebutted by evidence. That person may enter a valid contract provided it is proven: 1. that he was not insane at the time he executed the contract, 2. that his mental defect did not affect the capacity to appreciate the meaning and significance of the transaction. Even the insane can have lucid moments. Even if Paulino was incapacitated when he executed the contracts, he could still be compelled through his guardian to execute the

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transfers. He acted as a trustee for his employers, and the law will not let him invoke insanity to violate his trust. Restrictions to Capacity to Act\State of Being Deaf-mute People v Sasota Facts: Defendant Fidel Sasota was charged with the crime of rape of a deaf and dumb girl. He was found guilty of the crime because of the victims testimony. Defendant now posits that the testimony of the deaf and dumb should not have been accepted by the court at its full value. Issue: Whether or not a deaf and dumb person is considered a competent witness by the court. Held: There is no merit in the contention of the defendant that deaf and dumb persons are to be considered incompetent witnesses. Though formerly, deaf and dumb persons were considered incompetent, experience and observation have shown conclusively that the mere fact that a person is deaf and dumb is not sufficient to justify the finding that he is incompetent as a witness. When such a witness is produced, the court may ascertain whether he has the requisite intelligence, and the judge will allow the witness to adopt such mode of communicating his ideas, whether by signs or writing as he deems most satisfactory. Restrictions to Capacity to Act\State of Being Deaf-mute Director of Lands v Abelardo Facts: The case revolves around proving the ownership of 2 parcels of lands, which were properties subject in a successional litigation. Siblings Fulgencia and Jose Dino, herein appellants, are contesting the ownership of subject properties in the possession of Manuel Libunao, herein claimant and appellee. Appellants further claim that as deaf-mutes, they should not be barred by prescription in filing the case. Issue: Whether or not the prescription period in filing the case should be relaxed due to their being deaf-mutes. Held: No, they should not. The SC ruled that the subject lands are still and should still be owned by Manuel Libuano and family due to the following reasons (1) the preponderance of evidence as to the ownership of the lands are in favor of Libunao, (2) the action for filing a claim regarding the partition of the estate has already prescribed. Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without the concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized by law, considered included among the exceptions which in matters of prescription, are granted to incapacitated persons, in connection with the running of the prescriptive period Restrictions to Capacity to Act\Prodigality Martinez v Martinez Facts: Pedro Martinez Ilustre brought an action against his father Francisco for a declaration of prodigality against him. Pedro alleges that his father has been dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations to his 2nd wife, as well as the administration of his estate. The father denied such allegations, instead he posted that his son was actually mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate. Issue: What constitutes prodigality? Held: Since prodigality is not defined in our law, it may be inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of bind and a disposition to spend, waste, and

lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate. The testimony of the plaintiff was insufficient to support his allegations against his father. There was no evidence to show his father has been transferring by sale or mortgage any property, which will reflect in the city record of public deeds. The court found the defendant is far from being prodigal, and is still in the full exercise of his faculties and still possess the industry, thrift and ability in managing the estate. MARRIAGE Breach of Promise to Marry Wassmer v Velez Facts: On August 23, 1954, plaintiff Beatriz Wassmer and defendant Francisco Velez applied for a license to contract marriage which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set Sept. 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed. Party dresses and wedding dresses were prepared. A matrimonial bed with accessories was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, 2 days before the wedding, defendant simply left a note for plaintiff stating will have to postpone wedding- my mother opposes it. He enplaned to his home City of Cagayan de Oro, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: Nothing changed rest assured returning soon. But he never returned and was never heard from again. Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable. Held: Surely this is not the case of mere breach of promise to marry. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparations publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This is contrary to good customs for which the defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 NCC. Defendant is liable for actual damages, as well as to moral and exemplary damages. Judgment affirmed with modifications (on amount of damages). Breach of Promise to Marry different from Seduction Tanjanco v CA Facts: The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that from December 1957 to December 1959, plaintiff Arceli Santos and defendant Apolinario Tanjanco were sweethearts; that in consideration of defendants promise marriage, plaintiff consented to have sexual intercourse with defendant; that these sexual intercourses became regular until plaintiff became pregnant; that defendant refused to marry plaintiff. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child to give her support plus moral and exemplary damages of P100,000. The CFI dismissed the complaint for no cause of action. The CA set aside the CFI decision. Issue: Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute seduction as contemplated in Art. 21. Held: No. In Art. 21 The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than sexual intercourse or breach of promise to marry, but connoting essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. The facts stand out that for one whole year, the plaintiff, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with defendant, with

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repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion. If she had been deceived, she would not have again yield to his embraces, much less for one year. Hence no case is made under Art. 21. Decision reversed. Breach of Promise to Marry\can claim damages? De Jesus v Syquia Facts: Cesar Syquia (CS) courted Antonia de Jesus who was 20 years old. Amorous relations resulted in de Jesus giving birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. They lived together for one year until CS married another woman. This action is for damages for breach of promise and recognition of the child. Issue: Whether de Jesus can claim damages for breach of promise to marry Held: The trial court was right in refusing to give damages to de Jesus for supposed breach of contract. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing for civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such action. Marriage Models\Traditional Marriage Graham v Graham Facts: James Sebastian Graham herein plaintiff is suing his former wife, Margrethe, herein defendant to recover on a written agreement whereby defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a certain some of money. The couple had once agreed that Margrethe would pay James $300 each month until the parties no longer desire the agreement. The reason why such agreement exists is that his wife asked him to quit his job so that he can accompany her to his travels, to which he agreed. Issue: Whether the contract or written agreement was valid. Held: No, the contract is not valid. As a result of the marriage contract, the husband has the duty or obligation to support and live with his wife, and the wife must contribute her services and society to the husband and follow him in his choice of domicile. Furthermore, a private agreement between persons married or about to be married whereby they attempt to change the essential obligations of the marriage contract, as defined by law, is contrary to public policy. Challenges to Traditional Model\Changing Status of Women Dunn v Palermo Facts: Rose Palermo is a Nashville lawyer. On September 29, 1973 she married Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She has continued to use and enjoy her maiden name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for all purposes. Tennessee had a state-wide compulsory Registration Law. Subsequent to her marriage, she lodged with the Registrar a change of address form listing her name as Palermo. She was advised that she was required to register anew under the surname of her husband, or have her name purged from the registration list. Upon her refusal to so register, her name was purged from the registration list. Hence this action. Issue: Is it mandatory that a married woman assume her husbands name? Held: No. Woman upon marriage, may elect to retain her own surname or she may adopt the surname of her husband and the choice is hers. So long as a persons name remains constant and consistent, and unless until changed in prescribed

manner, and in absence of any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, state has no legitimate concern as to name used. Challenges to Traditional Model\By Private Contract: When Void? In Re Santiago Facts: Respondent lawyer prepared for a married couple (who had bee separated for 9 years) a document wherein it was stipulated, inter alia, that they authorize each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing whatever right of action one might have against the other. When the husband inquired if there could be no trouble, respondent lawyer pointed to his diploma which was hanging on the wall and said, I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid. The husband remarried. Issue: Whether Santiago should be disbarred from the practice of law Held: The respondent was suspended from practice of law for one year for having been ignorant of the law or being careless for giving legal advice by trying to beak the marriage through a private contract. The document is contrary to law, good morals and public order. Marriage is an inviolable social institution that cannot be made inoperative by the stipulations of the parties. Challenges to Traditional Model\By Private Contract: When Void? Selanova v Mendoza Facts: Respondent Judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of Saturnino Selanova and his wife. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and they waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit against the other. This document was also acknowledged before him as City Judge and Notary Public Ex Officio. Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law. Issue: Whether or not the document is valid Held: The agreement is void because it contravenes the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of Art. 221 of NCC. Even before the enactment of the NCC, this court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage without judicial approval secured beforehand was void. While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they shall remain crimes, and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law and consequently not judicially recognizable. Respondent is severely censured. Essential Requisites of Marriage\Legal Capacity male and female Jones v Hallahan Facts: Marjorie Jones and her female partner, herein appellants, were not issued a license to marry each other in the state of Kentucky. They contend that the failure of the clerk to issue the marriage license deprived them of three (3) basic constitutional rights, namely, the right to marry; the right of association; and the right to free exercise of religion. Appellants also contend that the refusal subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment. Issue: Whether or not 2 women can marry each other Held: No, they cannot. Marriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman. It appears that appellants are prevented from marrying not by the

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statute of Kentucky but rather by their own incapacity of entering into marriage as the term is defined. A license to enter into a status or a relationship which the parties are incapable of entering is a nullity. Definition of marriage says, union of a man and a woman. Thus, in the courts opinion, there is not constitutional issue involved, since there is no constitutional sanction which protects the right of marriage between persons of the same sex. Essential Requisites of Marriage\Legal Capacity\Same Sex marriage [Goodridge v Department of Public Health and Baker v State] Essential Requisites of Marriage\Consent Freely Given People v Santiago Facts: Felipe Santiago asked Felicita Masilang, an 18 year old girl who is a niece of his deceased wife, to accompany him across the river to do some errand. He raped her. After the accused had consummated the crime of rape, he procured a marriage ceremony to be celebrated on the same day between himself and the girl, officiated by a Protestant minister in the house of his uncle Agaton Santiago. After this was over, he gave the girl a few pesos and sent her home. He was charged and convicted with rape. Issue: Whether or not the marriage was void. Held: The offense of rape had been committed and the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse in which appellant hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of the act. The manner in which appellant dealt with the girl after marriage, as well as before, shows that he had no bona fide intention of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer. Judgment affirmed. Essential Requisites of Marriage\Consent obtained through Fraud? Buccat v Mangonon de Buccat Facts: Godofredo married Luida with the belief that she was a virgin. 89 days after the marriage celebration, Luida gave birth. Her husband Godofredo herein appellant filed for annulment on the ground that she concealed her non-virginity. Issue: Whether or not marriage was valid. Held: Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud, that is, when the husband at the time of the marriage knew that the wife was pregnant, the marriage cannot be annulled. Here, the child was born less than 3 months after the celebration of marriage. We refuse to annul the marriage for the reason that the woman was at an advanced age of pregnancy at the time of the marriage and such condition must have been patent to the husband. Essential Requisites\Effect of failure to get Parental Consent Eigenmann v Guerra Facts: Eduardo Eigenmann married Maryden Guerra on November 5, 1957. On August 29, 1959 Eigenmann herein plaintiff appellant filed an action to annul his marriage with Guerra on the ground that he was between ages 16-20 at that time and his mother did not give her consent to the marriage. Issue: Whether or not there was parental consent, the absent of which could render the marriage void.

Held: Consent may be given in any form be it written, oral or even by implication. Eigenmanns mother was present at the time of the celebration of marriage and did not object thereto, such that consent can be gleaned from such act. (Effect of Minority on Marriage) Eigenmann is also estopped from asserting that he was a minor at the time of the marriage celebration, having represented himself to be over 25 years of age. (Some Notes: The requirement of written and acknowledged consent has been held to be applicable only to the issuance of the license, and simply directory to the clerk who issues the license, and the lack of such written and acknowledged consent does not affect the validity of marriage.) Formal Requisites\Authority of Solemnizing Officer (Jurisdiction) Navarro v Domagtoy Facts: Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. He has jurisdiction in MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos, but the marriage was solemnized in Dapa which does not fall under his jurisdictional area. Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed this administrative complaint. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is held liable, and whether this will render the marriage void. Held: Marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction Solemnization outside the judges territorial jurisdiction will not invalidate the marriage. What results is an irregularity in the formal requisites of a valid marriage. Respondent judge, by citing Art 8 of the FC as defense for the exercise of his misplaced authority, acted in gross ignorance of the law and was therefore held administratively liable suspension of 6 months. Formal Requisites\Authority of Solemnizing Officer\Art 7 and 8, FC Araes v Occiano Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Araes charged respondent judge Salvador Occiano for gross ignorance of the law. Occiano solemnized the marriage between herein petitioner and the late Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. Couple lived together as husband and wife until the death of Orobia. But then since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast property left by Orobia was not recognized. Respondent explained that he solemnized the marriage out of human compassion and because the parties promised to present their license the afternoon after the wedding. Issue: Is the respondent judge administratively liable. Held: Yes. He was faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license and for exceeding his territorial jurisdiction. He was fined P5000 and was given a stern warning by the SC, that repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt more severely. The absence of a marriage license made the marriage void. Formal Requisites\Marriage License Republic v CA Facts: On June 24, 1970 Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo Malvar. Marriage was celebrated without knowledge of Castros parents. Defendant Cardenas was personally responsible for the processing of the documents, including the procurement of marriage license.

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Couple did not immediately live together, but only until Castro became pregnant. They parted ways after 4 months, thereafter she gave birth. Baby was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas, and is now in US. In trying to put into marital status in order before leaving to the US to follow her daughter, she sought a judicial declaration of nullity, having discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to marriage celebration. As proof Castro offered in evidence a certification from Pasig Civil Register that license number does not appear in the records. Cardenas failed to answer the complaint, thus was declared in default. Issue: Whether proof of absence of marriage license presented by Castro as evidence is sufficient to render marriage void. Held: Yes. 1. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value. It was then sufficiently proved that civil registrars office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. 2. The failure of Castro to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is manily due to the peculiar circumstances of the case secret marriage. 3. For his failure to answer despite notices, Cardenas was declared in default. Private respondent Castro cannot be faulted for her husbands lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. Formal Requisites\Marriage License Moreno v Moreno Facts: Marilou Moreno filed this administrative complaint against Judge Jose Bernabe for grave misconduct and ignorance of the law. On October 4, 1993. she and Marcelo Moreno were married before Judge Bernabe. She averred the Bernabe assured her that the marriage contract will be released 10 days after October 4, 1993. She found out that she could not get her marriage contract because the Office of the Local civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claimed that respondent judge connived with relaties of private respondent Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. Issue: Was the marriage valid? Was respondent judge liable? Held: The marriage was void due to the absence of a marriage license. The Court affirmed the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator which investigated on the case that respondent judge was liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license. It also said that the respondent judges claim of good intentions could never justify violation of the law. Formal Requisites\Marriage License People v Borromeo Facts: at noon of July 31, 1981 Elias killed his wife Susana with a bolo. Elias was arrested and charged with parricide. He claimed that he and Susana were not legally married and therefore the crime would not be parricide, but homicide. It is therefore relevant and important to resolve the issue on their marriage. Issue: Whether or not Elias and deceased Susana were legally married Held: Yes, they were. 1. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such marriage. In this case, Elias himself admitted in his testimony that the deceased victim Susana was his legitimate wife. 2. Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed to be in fact married, absent any counter presumption or evidence special to the case. The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. 3. The mere fact that no record

of the marriage exists in the civil registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration, all requisites for its validity are present. Formal Requisites\Marriage License Seguisabal v Cabrera Facts: Abdon Seguisabal filed a complaint against Judge Jose Cabrera for solemnizing the marriage of Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy on April 14, 1978, without the requisite marriage license pursuant to Art 53 of the CC, and for having failed to transmit a copy of the marriage contract signed by him and the parties to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar within 15 days after solemnization as mandated by law, Art 68 CC. Issue: Was the marriage valid? Was respondent judge liable? Held: The parties were not issued a marriage license for their failure to attend the required family planning seminar. Absent the license the marriage is void. Thus, despite the attestations of the respondent judge of good faith, we was fined equivalent to 3 months salary for deliberately dispensing with legal requirements. (Note: Similar issues in particular with Moreno case) Formal Requisites\Ceremony Martinez v Tan Facts: Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan appeared before the ustice of the Peace (JP) and signed a statement that they agreed to get married. They signed another document, along with the justice and 2 witnesses, stating that they appeared before the justice and ratified all the contents of the instrument. Plaintiff Martinez commenced this action for the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The plaintiff claimed that what took place before the Justice of the Peace (JP) did not constitute a legal marriage under General Orders No. 68, Sec. 6, No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife. CFI found for the defendant. Issue: Was there a marriage between Martinez and Tan? Held: Yes. 1. Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question, the JP said nothing after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and defendant said You are married. The declaration of the contracting parties does not have to be verbalized. 2. The petition signed by plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the JP to solemnize the marriage. Another document signed by the plaintiff, defendant, and JP, stated that they ratified under oath, before the JP, the contents of the petition and the witnesses of the marriage produced. A marriage took place as shown by the certification of the JP, signed by two parties, which certificate gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, unless contrary is proved. Both parties knew the contents of the documents. Therefore, what took place before the JP in this occasion amounted to legal marriage. There is no particular form of marriage ceremony required. Judgment affirmed. Formal Requisites\Ceremony Madridejo v De Leon Facts: Eulogio de Leon and Flavinia Perez (FP), man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon (DL). The wife and son survived the Eulogio who died in 1915.

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During here widowhood, Flavinia lived with Pedro Madridejo (PM), a bachelor. The registry of births in the municipality of Siniloan Laguna shows that on June 1, 1917 a child was born to FP and PM, named Melecio Madridejo. Child was christened Melecio Perez at the parish, as a son of FP but no mention of father. Flaviana, being at deaths door, married Pedro. Day after, she died. Parish priest failed to send the copy of marriage cert to municipal secretary. DL also died in 1928. Issues: 1. Was marriage valid? 2. Whether marriage legitimated Melecio, a natural child Held: 1. The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiffs natural father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and the forwarding copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites. 2. To be legitimated, by subsequent marriage, natural child born must have been acknowledged by parents either before or after marriage celebration. It was evident however that Melecio has not been acknowledged by PM and FP ether voluntary or by compulsion, before or after marriage. Thus, marriage did not legitimate him. Presumption of Marriage Trinidad v CA Facts: Petitioner Arturo Trinidad was asking for his share of the land previously owned by his father, Inocentes. The defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad claim that his father was not married to his mother, Felicidad, therefore he is illegitimate. Marriage license was destroyed in war, so defendant was unable to prove before the CA the marriage. Upon appeal his right to co-ownership of the properties would depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage of his parents. Issue: WON there was a marriage, that would prove his filiation and subsequent share in properties as heir. Held: Marriage can be proved by relevant evidence such as 1) testimony of witnesses to the marriage, 2) couples open and public cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, 3) birth and baptismal certificates of children born in such unionand 4) mention of marriage in subsequent documents. Petitioner presented witnesses to marriage, of parents cohabitation and baptismal party. Therefore, herein petitioner by presenting these relevant evidences proved sufficiently his parents marriage as well as his filiation. The proof for filiation was proved by presenting evidence of 2 family pictures, his baptismal certificate and a testimony of witness Gerardo. Although by themselves they are not conclusive evidence, yet their totality clearly preponderates over private respondents selfserving negations. Presumption of Marriage Vda de Jacob v CA Facts: Petitioner Tomasa Vda de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of the deceased Dr. Alfredo Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and Alfredo. Defendant Pedro Pilapil is legally adopted son of Dr. de Jacob.

During a proceeding of the settlement of Alfredos estate, Pedro wanted ot claim his share as Alfredos adopted son and only surviving heir. He questioned validity of Tomasa and Alfredos marriage. Tomasa cant present a marriage contract, claiming it was lost. She then presented a reconstructed Marriage Contract. No copy of the marriage contract was sent to the LCR by officer, and no copy of contract in civil registry. However, there was an affidavit, which was dated before the alleged date of marriage, attesting that both of them lived for 5 years together. Issue: Was the marriage valid? Held: Yes. Because of the affidavit, marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license. Jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Also, petitioner was also able to show that there was due execution of reconstructed marriage certificate by providing evidence that: 1. There was an original marriage certificate, 2. That the original cert was lost (proof of lost by secondary evidence, testimonial and documentary)), and 3. The reconstructed marriage contract is obtained. VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES Void Marriages\Grounds\bigamous and polygamous marriage People v Mendoza Facts: Arturo Mendoza herein appellant-defendant, married Jovita de Asis in 1936. During the subsistence of Mendozas marriage to his first wife, he contracted a second marriage with Olga Lema in 1941. Jovita de Asis died in 1943. In 1949, appellant contracted a third marriage with Carmencita Panlilio. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution and for his conviction of the crime of bigamy. The Solicitor General says that he is not exempt from criminal liability since there was no judicial annulment of the bigamous marriage. Issue: Was Mendoza guilty of bigamy? Held: No. Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy for his third marriage because he contracted this marriage after the death of his first wife, Jovita. The second marriage with Olga Lema is void because it was contracted with the subsistence of a prior marriage. It is the second marriage that is bigamous. Void Marriages\Grounds\bigamous marriage Tolentino v Paras Facts: Amado Tolentino was married to Serafia G. Tolentino on July 31, 1943. While marriage was still subsisting, he contracted another marriage with Ma. Clemente at Paombong, Bulacan on Nov. 1, 1948. He was convicted with bigamy. After serving his sentence, he continued living with Clemente until he died on July 25, 1974. Ma. Clemente was the surviving spouse indicated in his death certificate. Tolentino claims that she is the rightful surviving spouse and petitions for correction of the death certificate. Lower court dismissed petition for lack of publication. Issue: Whether Paras is the rightful surviving spouse of Tolentino? Held: Yes. 1. She needs to obtain judicial declaration from court first before she can request for the correction of the entry. Publication not necessary because all the parties involved are part of the case. Court should order the publication. 2. Conviction of Tolentino for bigamy is best proof that his second marriage is null and void thus, Paras is still his rightful spouse. No need for judicial declaration of nullity

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for void marriages. 3. Certificate entries though presumed to be correct must yield to positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy. Void Marriages\Grounds\bigamous marriage Wiegel v Sempio-Dy Facts: Lilia Olivia Wiegel got married to Karl Heinz Wiegel on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. Karl, upon learning that Lilia had a subsisting marriage, filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Olivia contracted her first marriage with Eduardo Maxion on June 25, 1972. She claims that the first marriage is not valid because they were forced to enter the union and Maxion was married to someone else at that time. Issue: Whether Olivias first marriage is void? Held: No. Its merely voidable, her consent being vitiated by force. 1. Presence of force only makes a marriage voidable, not void. (Art 85 CC) It is valid until annulled and since there was no annulment, marriage is still valid. 2. Her second marriage with Karl was void because she contracted it while a prior marriage (with Maxion) was subsisting. Void Marriages\Grounds\bigamy, judicial declaration Art 40, FC Terre v Terre Facts: Dorothy Terre first met Jordan Terre when they were 4th year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School. She was then married to Merlito Bercenilla. Jordan courted her and this continued when they moved to Manila to pursue their education. Jordan, then a freshman law student, told Dorothy that her marriage with Bercenilla was void ab initio because they are first cousins. Believing in Jordan and with the consent of her mother and ex-in-laws, she married Jordan on June 14, 1977. Jordan wrote single as Dorothys civil status despite latters protests. Jordan said it didnt matter because marriage was void to begin with. After their marriage, Dorothy supported Jordan because he was still studying then. They had a son, Jason, who was born on June 25, 1981. Shortly after she gave birth, Jordan disappeared. She learned that he married Vilma Malicdem. Dorothy filed charges for abandonment of minor, bigamy and grossly immoral conduct. Jordan was already a member of the Bar then. Jordan claimed that he was unaware of Dorothys first marriage and that she sent her out of the house when he confronted her about it. He contracted the second marriage, believing that his marriage to Dorothy was void ab initio because of her prior subsisting marriage. Issue: Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage? Held: Yes. 1. As a law student, he should have known that even if Dorothys first marriage was void ab initio, she still needed a judicial declaration before she can contract another marriage. (Art 40, FC) Thus, Dorothys marriage to Jordan Terre is void for being bigamous. 2. Jordan has displayed a deeply flawed moral character. He demonstrated grossly immoral conduct. He should have known that a judicial declaration was essential. Jordan is disbarred. Void Marriages\Grounds\lack of marriage license Atienza v Brilliantes Facts: Lupo Atienza lived together with Yolanda de Castro with whom he has two children. He purchased a house in Bel-Air, Makati where his family stayed. He stays

there too whenever hes in Manila. In Dec., 1991, he was surprised to see Manila Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Francisco Brillantes sleeping on his bed. Their boy informed him that Brillantes had been cohabiting with de Castro. Later on, Brillantes prevented him from visiting his children. He claims that Brillantes is married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality & Appearance of Impropriety against Brillantes. Brillantes claims that his marriage to Ongkiko is not valid because of lack of marriage license. According to him, Ongkiko abandoned him 19 years ago leaving their children with him. He claims that he believed that he was single when he married de Castro because his first marriage was void. Issue: Whether Brillantes can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity? Held: 1. Art. 40 FC states that judicial declaration of nullity of previous marriage is needed before one can enter into a second marriage. Rule has retroactive effect thus applicable to Brillantes even if he got married under the Civil Code. Hence, second marriage with de Castro is void. 2. Bad faith and sinister motives of Brillantes proven by his marriage to Ongkiko. They underwent two ceremonies however he never got a license. Then, he immorally and illegally cohabited with de Castro. Not fit for the judiciary. Void Marriages\Grounds\lack of marriage license Borja-Manzano v Sanchez Facts: Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta, Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David issued an affidavit stating that they were both married however due to incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They have lived together as husband & wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez. Issue: Whether David Manzanos marriage with Payao is valid? Held: Judge Sanchez should have known that the marriage was void for being bigamous since manzano had a previous subsisting marriage. The fact they had been living apart from their respective spouses for years did not dissolve those marriage bonds. Although the law exempts individuals who have freely and voluntarily cohabited for at least five years from securing a marriage license, they must be legally capacitated to marry each other. Manzano and Payaos marriage is void for being bigamous, not because of the absence of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Judge Sanchez should have known that the marriage was void for being bigamous since Manzano has a previous subsisting marriage. Respondent judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. Void Marriages\Grounds\Psychological Incapacity Santos v Bedia-Santos Facts: Leouel Santos, then a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, got married with Julia Bedia on Sept. 20, 1986. They lived with Julias parents in La Paz, Iloilo.

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Their son, Leouel Santos, Jr. was born on July 18, 1987. They started to have problems: (1) frequent interference of Julias parents (2) when & where theyd start living independently (3) Leouels spending a few days with his parents. Julia left for the US to work as a nurse on May 18, 1988. She only called up Leouel seven months after she left with promise to return after her contract expires on July 1989. She didnt come back. Leouel had training in the US and looked for Julia but never found her. He filed a case for voiding their marriage under Art 36 of the FC (marriage contracted by either party who at the time of the marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity shall be manifest after the solemnization). Leouel claims that Julias failure to communicate with him & inform him of her whereabouts are proof that shes psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Julia denied her husbands allegations saying it was her husband who was irresponsible & incompetent. She filed a manifestation stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence. Trial court & CA dismissed the complaint. Issue: Was Julie Santos psychologically incapacitated, thus rendering the marriage void? Held: No, thus marriage still valid. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts and laws on marriage. Psychological incapacity refers to the mental incapacity of a party to the marriage to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. The facts were not enough to show psychological incapacity. What was shown was lack of willingness to comply with marital obligations. (Note: In psychological incapacity these 3 must be present and proved: a. gravity that would really render one incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties in marriage b. juridical antecedence means it should be rooted in history, existing prior to the marriage c. incurability including cure that is beyond the partys means.) Void Marriages\Grounds\Psychological Incapacity, guidelines Republic v Molina Facts: Roridel & Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church. They had a son, Andre Molina. A year after the marriage, Reynaldo started manifesting signs of immaturity and irresponsibility: (1) spent more time with his friends (2) depended on his parents for aid & assistance (3) not honest with the finances (4) relieved of his job making Roridel the breadwinner of the family. Roridel went to live with his parents and afterwards, Reynaldo abandoned her and the child. Roridel filed a case for the declaration of nullity of their marriage by virtue of her husbands psychological incapacity. Reynaldo claims that Roridels strange behavior, refusal to perform marital duties & failure to run the household & handle finances caused their quarrels. Roridel on the other hand claims that her husband is immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, chronic liar & infidel. He now lives with a mistress with whom he has a child. Issue: Was Reynaldo psychologically incapacitated, thus rendering the marriage void? Held: No. There was no psychological incapacity in the present case. What exist are mere irreconcilable differences. The court laid down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the existence of the marriage and against its nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of marriage. (4) Such incapacity must be also shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligation of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. Void Marriages\Grounds\Psychological Incapacity Apiag v Cantero Facts: Maria Apiag and Esmeraldo Cantero were married on August 11, 1947. They had two children: Teresita and Glicerio. Cantero left his family without any apparent cause and left Maria to raise the family on her own. According to Cantero, their marriage was a drama marriage set-up by their parents and that they never lived together as husband wife. Several years after, Cantero went to Hinundayan, Southern Leyte where Apiag and her children were staying. They begged for support but he ignored them. They sent him a letter demanding support which was also ignored. They learned that he was already married to Nievas Ygay with whom he has 5 children. Apiag along with her 2 children, Teresita & Glicerio, filed charge of gross misconduct for committing bigamy and falsification of public documents against Cantero. Cantero claims that he got married without any annulment or declaration of nullity of his first marriage because he believed that it was void ab initio thus nothing was to be voided. Apiag was living with another man with whom she has one child. The parties entered into a compromise agreement. Cantero agreed to give of his GSIS retirement to Teresita & Glicerio. He likewise included them as his beneficiaries, appointed them as heirs to his property inherited from his parents, authorized them to receive P4,000.00 monthly allowance on the condition that they will withdraw the charges. They started receiving the allowance but they still pushed

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through with the case. Found guilty by lower court. Cantero died while case was pending. Issues: 1. WON gross misconduct is applicable? 2. WON first marriage is valid? 3. WON judge is liable? Held: 1.) NO. Misconduct in office should include only those acts which affect ones performance of his duties as an officer, not as a private individual. Prove that it is a transgression of an established and definite rule of action. Involved here are personal acts, not official. 2.) NO. However, old law will apply to Cantero because it is more favorable for him. Ruling in Odayat v Amante will apply: No judicial decree of nullity is needed to establish the invalidity of void marriages. Thus, he was free to contract second marriage without court declaration of the nullity of first marriage. New law requires declaration of nullity before one remarries. Falsification accusation fails. 3.) YES. He will be administratively liable. Hes expected to maintain high ethical principles and free from appearance of impropriety including his personal behavior. But since this is his only wrongdoing throughout the 32 years that he has served the government and the Court saw his sincerity to repent and reform, hell be dealt with leniency. He should have been fined but since he passed away already, case will just be dismissed. Void Marriages\Grounds\Art 40, 52, 53; Judicial declaration, Bigamy Domingo v CA Facts: Delia Soledad Domingo and Roberto Domingo were married on Nov. 29, 1976. Unknown to her, he had a prior subsisting marriage with Emerlinda dela Paz. She only learned about the marriage when dela Paz sued them for bigamy. Delia has been working in Saudi since January 23, 1979. Roberto has been unemployed and dependent on her since 1983. She entrusted the administration of her real & personal properties to Roberto which cost P350,000.00. She learned that her husband was cohabiting with another woman & that he was disposing her properties without her consent. He requested that he turnover the properties but he refused. Thus she filed this petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against Roberto. Lower court & CA dismissed the case. Issue: Whether judicial declaration of void marriage is necessary only for purpose of remarriage? Held: No. Judicial declaration of nullity can be invoked for purposes other than remarriage. Separation of property is also one of the effects of a judicial declaration of nullity. (Notes: Purposes of Art 40 FC: 1. Judicial declaration of nullity was instituted to prevent just about anyone from declaring that his/her marriage was void. This judgment is reserved to the court, not the parties themselves, and 2. It is for the protection of 2 contracting parties in a subsequent marriage.) Void Marriages\Grounds\Show proof of Psychological Incapacity Choa v Choa Facts: Leni & Alfonso Choa were married on March 15, 1981. They had two children: Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. Alfonso filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Lenis psychological incapacity. He cited also that his wife was immature, inattentive to their children and lacked intention of procreative sexuality.

Issue: Was Leni psychologically incapacitated? Held: No. Alfonso presented insufficient evidence to prove Lenis incapacity. (1) Filing of case is not entirely connected to psychological incapacity. (2) Grounds of Alfonso: lack of attention to their children, immaturity, lack of intention to procreate are not sufficient to render one as psychologically incapable. Reasons should be grave, with juridical antecedence and incurable. (3) His proof only shows that they cant get along with each other but not incapable. Mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, and occasional emotional outbursts are not acceptable causes of psychological incapacity. (4) Physicians testimony: He admitted that couple is curable if only they will be subjected to family therapy. Besides, he did not examine Leni so his findings are not really reliable. He only based this on Alfonsos claims. The records of the case will not give him accurate findings. Medical examinations/findings are admissible. They just need to present sufficient evidence

Void Marriages\Grounds\Psychological Incapacity, Refusal to sex Tsoi v CA Facts: Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married on May 22, 1988. After 9 months of marriage, there has been no sexual intercourse or any attempt at it given between Chi Ming Tsoi and His wife. She claims that her husbands a homosexual who married her to maintain his residency status and to prove that he is really a man. Chi Ming claims that it is Gina who refuses to have sexual intercourse. They both underwent medical examinations but neither party was found to be impotent. The wife wanted to annul the marriage but the husband did not. So, Gina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Chi Mings psychological incapacity. Issue: Whether Chi Ming is psychologically incapable Held: Yes. Marriage is void. 1. His abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder. Chi Ming should have discussed the problem with his wife if she indeed refused to have sexual intercourse with him. Or, he could have resorted to the court if she still resisted It demonstrates utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 2. Senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Void Marriages\Grounds\Psychological Incapacity, habitual lies [Antonio v Reyes] Habitual lying as constitutive of psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligation. Applied Molina Guidelines here. Void Marriages\Effects of Declaration of Nullity Nial v Badayog Facts: Nial and Bellones were married in 1974. Nial shot Bellones in 1985, causing her death. After a year and a half, Nial contracted a second marriage with Badayog without a marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating they have cohabited for at least five years. Nial died in 1997. His children with Bellones seek a declaration of nullity of Nials marriage with Badayog.

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Issues: 1. Was the second marriage valid or void? 2. Is judicial declaration of nullity necessary? Held: 1. Nial and Badayogs marriage is void for lack of marriage license. They are not exempt from acquiring a marriage license because their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabilitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Of the five years they had cohabited, only 20 months were without any legal impediment. 2. For purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. (Note: void marriage can be attacked collaterally) Voidable Marriages\Grounds\unsound mind Katipunan v Tenorio Facts: Plaintiff Marcos Katipunan in this case seeks to annul his marriage on the ground that defendant Rita Tenorio was insane at the time of her marriage to plaintiff, unknown to the latter. There was no proof however, that defendant was insane at the time of marriage; but it was admitted that she became insane subsequently. Issue: Was Tenorio insane, so as to annul the marriage? Held: Every presumption goes in favor of the validity of a marriage. The causes alleged in support of an action for a declaration of nullity should be established clearly, unequivocally and convincingly. Under the law, insanity of one of the spouses which occurred after the celebration of the marriage cannot constitute a cause of nullity. Voidable Marriages\Grounds\Fraud, concealment of pregnancy Buccat v Mangonon de Buccat, supra Facts: Godofredo married Luida with the belief that she was a virgin. 89 days after the marriage celebration, Luida gave birth. Her husband Godofredo herein appellant filed for annulment on the ground that she concealed her non-virginity. Issue: Whether or not marriage was valid. Held: Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud, that is, when the husband at the time of the marriage knew that the wife was pregnant, the marriage cannot be annulled. Here, the child was born less than 3 months after the celebration of marriage. We refuse to annul the marriage for the reason that the woman was at an advanced age of pregnancy at the time of the marriage and such condition must have been patent to the husband. Voidable Marriages\Grounds\ Fraud, concealment of pregnancy Aquino v Delizo Facts: Fernando Aquino married Conchita Delizo on December 27, 1954. in April 1955, or about four months after the marriage, Delizo gave birth to a child. This is a complaint for annulment of marriage on ground of fraud (concealment of pregnancy) Issue: Was there fraud, so as to be a ground to annul marriage?

Held: The case of Buccat vs. Buccat is not applicable here. In this case, the wife was alleged to be only more than 4 months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a womans abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. Decision set aside; new trial is granted. Voidable Marriages\Grounds\ Fraud Facts: Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on December a, 1953. Fernando was alleged to have divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. This Fernando denied. Issue: Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment? Held: For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, it must come under Art. 85, No. 4 of CC. This fraud is limited exclusively by law to those kinds of species of fraud enumerated in Art. 86. The legislative intent on this point is clear. Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment. Voidable Mariages\Grounds\Consent vitiated by Force Ruiz v Atienza Facts: Jose Ruiz filed an annulment of his marriage to Pelagia Atienza, alleging that he was forced unto marriage since he got her pregnant. He claims that after their babys birth, Jose Atienza, the defendants father and attorney Vvillavicencio, the defendants cousin in law, came to his house and threatened him to marry Pelagia. Jose Atienza allegedly threatened him with a balisong, while the said attorney threatened to file immorality charges against him that would prevent him admission to bar if he did not marry Pelagia. Issue: WON the intimidation would warrant as a ground for annulment. Held: No. It was not sufficiently established that Jose displayed any balisong or made any threat to the life of Ruiz. The attorneys threat to obstruct his admission to the bar is not such duress as to constitute a reason for annulling the marriage. The plaintiffs claim that he was practically kidnapped by Pelagias relatives until the marriage ceremony cannot be true since he had many occasions to escape, and also, he had many companions whom he could ask for help. The evidence then does not warrant that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The provision in the marriage law which contains force and violence does not include mere intimidation, unless it amounts to force or violence. (Note: Force, intimidation and undue influence, to constitute as a ground requires 4 things: that fear is reasonable and well-founded, and that evil must be imminent and grave. Art 1335 CC)

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Voidable Mariages\Grounds\Impotence Jimenez v Canizares Facts: Plaintiff Jimenez filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to defendant Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation, and that this condition existed at the time of marriage and continued to exist. Defendant did not file an answer. Upon the direction of the court, the city attorney intervened for the State to prevent collusion. Court then ordered defendant to submit herself to a physical examination which defendant refused. The Court entered a decree annulling the marriage. The City Attorney appealed. Issue: Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife, who did not answer the complaint, was absent during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination, was and is impotent. Held: The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage, In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established. Although the wifes refusal to be examined or failure to appear in the court show indifference on her part, yet for such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise o be inferred because women in this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. A physical examination in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. Decree set aside. Voidable Mariages\Grounds\Incapacity to procreate v Impotence Sarao v Guevara Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were married on June 3, 1936. In the afternoon of the same day, plaintiff tried to have carnal knowledge of defendant, but the latter showed reluctance and begged him to wait until evening. When night came, plaintiff again approached the defendant, but through he found the orifice of her vagina sufficiently large of his organ, she complained of pains in her private parts and he noticed oozing therefrom some matter offensive to the smell. Because of this, coitus was not a success, and after the first night every attempt the plaintiffs part to have a carnal act with his wife proved a failure, because she complained of pains in her genital organs and he did not want her to suffer. Upon the advice of a physician and with the plaintiffs consent, an operation was performed in which the uterus and ovaries were removed. This rendered her incapable of procreation, but she could copulate. Plaintiff, however, since witnessing the operation, lost all desire to have access with his wife. Now, he asks for annulment. Issue: WON their marriage can be annulled based on the defendants incapacity to procreate

Held: Annulment denied. The incapacity for copulation was only temporary. The defect must be lasting to be a ground for annulment, because the test of impotence is not the capacity to reproduce, but the capacity to copulate. Voidable Mariages\Grounds\ People v Santiago, supra Facts: After the accused had consummated the crime of rape upon a girl of the age of 18, niece of his deceased wife, he procured a marriage ceremony to be celebrated on the same day between him and the girl, officiated by a Protestant minister. He was charged and convicted with rape. Issue: Was the marriage valid? Held: The offense of rape had been committed and the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse in which appellant hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of the act. The manner in which appellant dealt with the girl after marriage, as well as before, shows that he had no bona fide intention of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer. As to the consent of the girl, it was acquired by force. The marriage then, in this respect, is voidable since there is a defect in the consent. Voidable Mariages\Grounds\Isanity Suntay v Cojuangco-Suntay Facts: Emilio Aguinaldo-Suntay (Emilio) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay got married and had 3 children, one of which, was the respondent in this case, Isabel AguinaldoSuntay (Isabel). After 4 years, their marriage soured and Isabel filed a criminal case against Emilio. Emilio, in retaliation, filed for legal separation. The court then declared the marriage null and void since Emilio was proven to be schizophrenic. On June 1, 1979, Emilio predeceased her mother, the decedent Cristina AguinaldoSuntay (CAS). She is also the respondents paternal grandmother. The decedent died thereafter, and left no will. 5 years later, CAS filed a petition, praying that she be appointed as the administratix of her estate. Federico Suntay, husband of the decedent and the petitioner in this case, filed and opposition and prayed that he be appointed the administratix, since he said the he has been managing the conjugal property even while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate. 2 years after filing the opposition, he asked the court to dismiss the petition of Isabel, saying that under Art 992 CC, an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss the case. Issue: Can Isabel be appointed as administratix of her grandmothers estate even though the marriage of her parents were declared null and void? Held: Yes. The marriage is voidable. Being of unsound mind is a ground for annulment and not for declaration of nullity. Thus, children born out of voidable marriages shall have the same status rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children. Isabel is therefore a legitimate grandchild and may invoke her successional right of representation in the estate of their grandmother.

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Voidable Mariages \Marriage When One Spouse is Absent Jones v Hortiguela Facts: Marciana Escao (ME) died and a proceeding regarding her estate was commenced. Her second husband Felix Hortiguela (FH), the petitioner and daughter of her first marriage, Angelita Jones (AJ), the respondent, were appointed as the heirs. The partition of her estate was approved by the court. A year later, AJ filed a motion to declare her the only heir, since she claims that the marriage between ME and FH was null and void. She claims that in Jan 1918, MEs first husband, Arthur Jones (Arthur), went abroad and was never heard from again. In Oct. 1919, ME asked her husband to be judicially declared an absentee. On the 25 th of the said month, the court issued and order declaring that Arthur is an absentee and the declaration will not take effect until 6 months after its publication. It was then published in the succeeding months. On April 1921, the court issued another order, saying that the judicial decree has taken effect. In May 1927, FH and ME got married. AJ now contends that the decree should be understood as not having taken effect from Cct 1919, the date it was first published, but in April 1921, the date the court held that the decree has taken effect. Therefore, from that date until the time of the second marriage, only 6 yrs and 14 days has elapsed, thus, in accordance with sec 3 par 2 of GO no. 68, their marriage was void. Issue: WON the second marriage was void. Held: No. For the celebration of marriage, the law only requires that the former spouse be absent for 7 consecutive yrs at the time of the 2 nd marriage. The date that should be considered therefore, is Jan 1918, when Arthur left and was never heard from again. Therefore, when the 2nd marriage was celebrated, Arthur was already absent for more than 9 yrs. Also, the fact that their marriage doesnt appear in the register does not affect the validity of the marriage. Furthermore, the court also pointed out that ME and even AJ herself believed Arthur was dead, as evidenced by her treating FH as her step father. Voidable Mariages\Jurisdiction Tamano v Ortiz Facts: Senator Tamano married respondent Zorayda Tamano in civil rites. Sen. Tamano married petitioner Estrellita Tamano in civil rites while his marriage with Zorayda was still subsisting. Months after senator Tamano died, Zorayda filed a complaint for a declaration of nullity of marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground of bigamy. She said that Sen. Tamano never really divorced her and also, Estrellita was not single since the annulment of her previous marriage never really became final and executory. Estrellita then filed a motion to dismiss alleging that only a party to marriage can file an action for annulment. She likewise contends that the RTC doesnt have jurisdiction over the case since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married according to Muslim rites. She claims that the proper court in this case should be the Sharia courts. The RTC denied the motion, as well as Estrellitas subsequent motion for reconsideration. The CA then declared the marriage of Estrellita and Sen. Tamano null. Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case? Held: Yes. Cases would fall only under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sharia courts when the cases are filed in places where there are Sharia courts. Also, personal actions, where the RTC has jurisdiction over, can be tried where the plaintiff or

where the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Court denied Estrellitas complaint. (Obiter Dictum: Court also said that courts jurisdiction is determined over the allegations in the complaint. It was only in her motion for reconsideration that, Estrellita said that her marriage was conducted in Muslim rites; Also Note: Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, RTCs have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.) LEGAL SEPARATION Legal Separation\Grounds\adultery People v Zapata Bondoc Facts: Andres Bondoc filed a complaint for adultery against her wife, Guadalupe Zapata, and her paramour, Dalmacio Bondoc. Her wife pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four months in prison. After year, Andres again filed the same complaint against her wife and her paramour. The defendants filed a motion to quash since they were being placed in double jeopardy. The trial court granted their motion since the adulterous acts charged must constitute a continuous offense. Issue: Was the CFI was correct in sustaining the respondents motion? Held: No. 1.] For a continuous crime to exist there have to be: a) plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time b) unity of the penal provision infringed upon or violated c) unity of the criminal intent or purpose ( acts are united by one intent leading to the perpetration the same criminal purpose0. Last did not exist, since culprits perpetrated the crime in every sexual intercourse and does not need another act to consummate it. 2.] If complaint will be quashed, then male defendant, who at first crime was acquitted since he said he did not know woman was married, will be absolved from the crime even though he already knew woman was married when he committed the subsequent adulterous acts. The court then reversed the CFI decision. Legal Separation\Grounds\Attempt on the life, maltreatment Munoz v del Barrio Facts: Felicidad Munoz and Jose del Barrio were married in 1942. During their marriage they frequently had fights, wherein the husband maltreated her wife. Because Felicidad could not bear with it anymore, they unceremoniously separated in 1947. After they separated, Felicidad claimed that he still maltreated her in December 1950 or January 1951 and September of the latter year. She the filed for legal separation, since she claims her husband has made several attempts on her life. She was hit in the abdomen and face, her hair was pulled and her twisted. The trial court dismissed the petition based on lack of merit. Issue: WON they can be legally separated because of her claim that her husband was making attempts against her life. Held: No. There is no ground for legal separation. The maltreatment against her did not prove that there was intent to kill. It must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The attack against her, wherein her husband just used his bare hands, cannot constitute an intention to kill. (Note: This case was decided under the Civil Code where the only grounds were attempt on the life of the spouse and adultery or concubinage. Under the Family

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Code, the same facts would fall under a new ground of repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct.) Legal Separation\Grounds\Concubinage, support pendente lite Gandionco v Pearanda Facts: Pearanda filed a case for legal separation against Gandionco on the ground of concubinage. Months later, she also filed a criminal case against the petitioner for concubinage. Later, she applied for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite, which was granted by the trial court. The petitioner then contends that the civil action for legal separation and the application for support pendent lite should be suspended, since he is already been charged of a criminal case based on the same ground. The petitioner also argues that his conviction in the criminal case for concubinage must be secured first before the action for legal separation can proceed. Issue: WON the civil action against Gandionco should be suspended. Held: No. 1.] A civil action based on concubinage may proceed ahead or simultaneously with a criminal action since it is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. Sec 3 Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which the petitioner brought about to his defense, refers to the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. But the action for legal separation is not aimed at recovering civil liability, but on the conjugal rights of spouses and their relations to each other. 2.] On the petitioner,s argument that a conviction must be secure first, the court held that a decree for legal separation may be issued based upon the evidence presented in the action for legal separation. No criminal conviction is necessary. Legal Separation\Grounds\Habitual drunkenness defined United States vs. McMann Facts: McMann was convicted of killing Mckay, a friend and coworker of his. McMann said that the act was accidental and that he had no intention of killing him. He said that he was only drunk at that time, and therefore the court should take this into account and lessen his sentence. The court then said that he was a habitual drunk, therefore his condition could not be taken into consideration for the purpose of lessening his sentence. Issue: WON McMann was a habitual drunkard. Held: Yes. According to the testimony of one of the witnesses, he saw McMann drunk many times. The court also said that a drunkard is some one who has a fixed habit of drunkenness, even though he might be sober for days and weeks together. egal Separation\Grounds\abatement of action, also abandonment Lapuz Sy v Eufemio Facts: Carmen Lapuz Sy and Eufemio Eufemio were married on September 21, 1934 and lived together until 1943 when Eufemio abandoned her. In 1953, she prayed for a legal separation decree from the JDRC of Manila and that Eufemio be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Before the trial could be completed, Carmen died in a vehicular accident. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that Carmens death abated the action. Counsel for the deceased moved to

substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. The JDRC dismissed the case. Issue: Whether the action for legal separation is abated at the death of one spouse. Held: Yes. An action for the legal separation is purely personal. The NCC recognizes this in its Art. 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and its Art. 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself. An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved in this action because these rights are mere effects or incidental to a decree of legal separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. Judgment affirmed. Legal Separation\Grounds\Abandonment Dela Cruz v Dela Cruz Facts: Estrella Dela Cruz filed for a separation of property against her husband Severino Dela Cruz since she claimed that he had abandoned her and also, he had mismanaged their conjugal properties. She claimed that her husband has not slept in their conjugal home since 1955 and has only made short visits. Her husband also failed to disclose to her transactions regarding their business. The trial court ruled that ordered for the separation of conjugal assets. Issue: WON what her husband did constitutes as abandonment and mismanagement as to warrant a decree for separation of property Held: No. What her husband did does not constitute abandonment. Abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also financial and moral desertion. Despite her husband leaving the conjugal dwelling, he continued to support her and their children as evidenced by the allowances he gave them. As to the supposed abuse of administration, the court also answered in the negative. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and omissions prejudicial to the latter. In fact, the husband was handling their business very well, as evidenced by its continued growth.

Legal Separation\Defenses\implied consent People v Sansano Facts: Ursula Sansano and Mariano Venture are husband and wife. Upon the birth of the child, he went to Cagayan and stayed there for 3 years. He did not write nor give support. Ursula then met Marcelo Ramos and started cohabiting with him. When Mariano came back, he charged them with adultery and they were convicted. After serving her sentence, Ursula tried to reconcile with Mariano, but he refused to pardon her, even telling her that she could do what she wants and go anywhere she wants. She went back to Marcelo but her husband did nothing to interfere. Mariano then left for Hawaii and stayed there for 7 years. He came back and charged them again with adultery, so that he could seek divorce. The trial court convicted them

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again. Ursula, in her appeal, claims that Marianos conduct constitutes consent to her adulterous act. Issue: Did Mariano consent to the adultery? Held: Yes. Ventura consented to the adulterous relations of his wife. He, after refusing to pardon his wife, and knowing that she resumed living with Ramos in 1924, did nothing to interfere to assert his right as husband constituted implied consent to the adultery. He was therefore barred from instituting a case for adultery. The sole purpose for filing the charge was to use it as a ground for legal separation. Legal Separation\Defenses\Collusion Ocampo v Florenciano Facts: Jose Ocampo and Serafina were married in 1938. Serafina allegedly committed adultery in 1951 with Jose Arcalas. Her husband then sent her to manila to study beauty culture. Again, he discovered that she was going out with several men. After Serafina finished studying, she left her husband and since then they had lived separately. In 1955, he again discovered that his wfe was having illicit relations with a Nelson Orzame. He then filed a case for legal separation, to which Serafina conformed with, provided she not be charged w adultery in a criminal action. She also confessed that she was guilty of the said acts. Issue: Whether her confession barred them from getting a decree for legal separation under Art 101 NCC? (Was there collusion?) Held: There was no collusion despite the confession made by the guilty spouse, Serafina, outside the court. What is prohibited is a decree of legal separation based solely on such confession. In the case at bar, there was other evidence to prove the adultery. Legal Separation\Defenses\Connivance and Consent Sargent v Sargent Facts: Donald Sargent charged his wife, Frances, with having committed adultery with unknown men and their driver, Charles Simmons. The wife denied the charge and alleged that her husband conspired with detectives and servants to falsely accuse her of adultery with Simmons. She said that the husband solicited Simmons to commit adultery with her, and afforded him opportunities to do so. Issue: Did the husband connive or consent to the alleged adultery of his wife? Held: Donald Sargents acts amount to consent and connivance. He had reason to suspect that his wife was inclined to commit adultery but he did nothing to prevent it. Instead, he connived with the servants and detectives to bring about the adulterous act. A man may not actually participate in a course of action leading to his wifes downfall. Legal Separation\Defenses\Recrimination and Prescription Brown v Yambao Facts: In 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the CFI of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao alleging adultery (of which he learned in 1945 upon his release from interment). Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the wife in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service summons; and directed the City Fiscal or his representative to investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, whether or not

collusion exists between the parties. During cross-examination, it elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her. Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his martial relations with Lilia Dieto, who was not his wife, Fiscal acted as counsel for the defaulting wife, when the power of the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at the bar, to intervene for the state which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendant-appellee, who is a private citizen and who is far from being the state. Issues: 1. Did the Fiscal exceed his powers? 2. Should brown be entitled to obtain a decree of legal separation? 3. Has the action prescribed? Held: 1. No. The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in the case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not be made to depend upon the parties themselves. It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not. 2. No. Browns cohabitation with a woman other than his wife bars him from claiming legal separation by express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code. Legal separation cannot be claimed where both spouses are offenders. One must come to court with clean hands. 3. Yes. The prescriptive period is over. Brown did not petition for legal separation until 10 years after he learned of his wifes adultery. Under the CC, action for legal separation should be filed within 1 year from the time the time the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause, and, within 5 years from and after the date when such cause occurred. (Note: This case was decided under CC. Under the FC, an action for legal separation shall be filed within 5 years from time of occurrence of cause.) Legal Separation\Defenses\Condonation Willan v Willan Facts: The petitioner in this case wanted to file for dissolution of marriage because he claims that his wife was frequently assaulting him, was always immensely jealous of his relations with other women, habitually used offensive and obscene language and always demanded sexual intercourse from him, obliging him to conform to her wishes by indulging in various types of violence in order to bend his will to hers. Before Willan left his wife for good, they had sexual intercourse. Issue: Whether the husbands acts constituted condonation on his part Held: The last sexual intercourse with the wife amounts to a condonation. Willan was free to submit or resist his wifes pleadings. He may have been reluctant to submit himself to his wife but this does not mean that he acted involuntarily. He could have just left or run away. (Note: What is crucial here is the sexual act itself. It was the way to stop the cruelty of the wife, but at the same time, it is an action for condonation) Legal Separation\Defenses\Condonation Ginez v Bugayong Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US, left his wife Leonila Ginez to her sisters since he needed to report back to duty. As early as uly 1951, he had received

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letters from his sisters which informed him of the alleged acts of infidelity. Her wife, in fact, admitted, through a letter, that she kissed a certain Eliong. In august 1952, the plaintiff went to search for his wife. When he found her, he brought her to his cousins house and they passed the night therein as husband and wife. The next day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth about her alleged adultery, but she wife simply packed up and left. He then filed for legal separation. The trial court denied his petition, saying that he condoned the acts charged to his wife. Issue: WON there was condonation on the part of the husband Held: Yes. Any cohabitation and sexual intercourse with the guilty party after the commission of the offense and with knowledge of the offence is evidence of condonation. In the case at bar, Ginez and Bugayong slept together as husband and wife even though the plaintiff knew of his wifes adultery. Even a single act of marital intercourse is enough to constitute condonation. (Note: refer to Contreras case and compare) Legal Separation\Defenses\Consent, Condonation, also Prescription Matubis v Praxedes Facts: Socorro Matubis and husband Zoilo Praxedes married on 1943. A year after, for failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, they agreed to live separately. On 1948, they entered into an agreement stating that 1. they relinquish their legal right over each other as husband and wife. 2. they could get any mate and live as husband and wife without interference by any of them and they cannot prosecute each other for adultery or concubinage 3. the wife is no longer entitled to support from her husband, and 4. neither of them can claim anything from each other. In 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado and they even had a child. Socorro then filed for legal separation, alleging abandonment and concubinage. The trial court dismissed the petition, saying that she condoned or consented to his acts and that she already filed outside the prescriptive period. Issue: WON wife consented to his husbands acts? Held: Yes. It was clearly expressed in their agreement. The condonation and consent are not only implied but expressed. Hence, legal separation cannot be claimed. (Note: Prescription as defense: Also, she already filed outside the prescriptive period since she knew of her husbands act in January 1955 but she only filed for legal separation in April 1956.) Legal Separation\When to File or Try Actions Ocampo v Florenciano, supra Facts: Jose Ocampo and Serafina were married in 1938. Serafina allegedly committed adultery in 1951 with Jose Arcalas. Her husband then sent her to manila to study beauty culture. Again, he discovered that she was going out with several men. After Serafina finished studying, she left her husband and since then they had lived separately. In 1955, he again discovered that his wfe was having illicit relations with a Nelson Orzame. He then filed a case for legal separation, to which Serafina conformed with, provided she not be charged w adultery in a criminal action. She also confessed that she was guilty of the said acts. Issue: Has action for adultery of wife with Jose Arcalas prescribed? Held: Yes. Plaintiff discovered wifes illicit relations with Jose Arcalas in March 1951. Having found this, he did not file for legal separation. Instead he sent wife to Manila

to study. He only filed a petition for legal separation in July 1955, that is 4 years after he had knowledge of his wifes adultery. Art. 102 CC states that An action for legal separation should be filed within 1 year from the time the time the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause, and, within 5 years from and after the date when such cause occurred. Legal Separation\When to File or Try Actions Contreras v Macaraig Facts: Elena Contreras and Eusebio Macaraig got married in 1952. In September 1962, the driver of the family car told the plaintiff that her husband has been living with Lily Ann Alcala. When he defendant came home the following October, Elena refrained from discussing the matter in her desire not to anger the defendant and drive him away. In April 1963, Elena again received rumors that her husband was seen with a woman. When the defendant came home. In may 1963, she again refrained from discussing the matter to avoid any quarrel. Elena received reports that Lily had given birth to a child. She sent her fathers employee to verify the reports. The latter saw the defendant carrying a child. The plaintiff then asked her father in law to intercede with the defendant and ask him to come home. Still, defendant didnt want to. In November 1963, the plaintiff instructed her sister in law to meet with Lily. Lily she was willing to break up with Eusebio but it was Eusebio who didnt want to leave. In December 1963, Elena finally confronted his husband, but still, her husband refused to return to his legitimate family. On December 14, 1963, she filed for legal separation. The trial court dismissed the petition since the prescriptive period had elapsed. She started hearing about her husbands infidelity in September 1962 but she instituted the action only in December 1963. Issue: WON the prescriptive period had elapsed. Held: No. Elena became truly cognizant of her husbands acts in December 1963, when she confronted her husband and her husband admitted to his acts. As a matter of fact, even with all the painful information, appellant still made brave if desperate attempts to persuade her husband to come back home, to save the marriage. (Note: Question of when knowledge was actually acquired. Compare it with Ginez case) Legal Separation\When to File or Try Actions Somosa Ramos v Vamenta Facts: Petitioner filed before respondent judge an action for legal separation against her husband Clemente Ramos on the ground of concubinage and attempt by her husband against her life. Petitioner likewise sought issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, then under the administration and the management of her husband. Respondent Ramos filed a motion to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction, which respondent judge granted. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Issue: Whatever the Art. 103 NCC prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of 6 months from the filing of the petition would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit. Held: Art. 103 NCC is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of 6 months period. The court where an action for legal separation is pending according to Art. 103 is to remain passive. Meanwhile the

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parties must be left alone. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases of judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in Art. 104 NCC (nowArt. 61 FC). Hence, there would appear to be a recognition that the question of management from the spouses respective property need not to be unresolved even during the 6 months period. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under Art. 103 is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is all the more reason then for the petitioners insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored. This is specially so, considering that the husband whom the petitioner accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by the husband. Writ granted. Legal Separation\Effects of Filing Petition De La Vina v Villareal Facts: In an action for divorce, the plaintiff wife Narcisa Geopano alleged that since the year 1913 and up to date of the complaint, the defendant husband been sustaining illicit relations with one Ana Calog and having her as his concubine, with public scandal and in disgrace of plaintiff. Upon said allegations she prayed for (a.) a decree of divorce, (b.) the partition of the conjugal property, and (c.) alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400 per month. Subsequent to said complaint, plaintiff filed a motion, alleging that since the filing of her complaint she had personal knowledge that the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to their conjugal partnership and prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant. Petitioner contends that the CFI of Iloilo had no jurisdiction to have cognizance of the said action for divorce because the defendant therein was a resident of Province of Negros Oriental and the plaintiff, as the wife of the defendant, must also be considered a resident of the same province inasmuch as, under the law, the domicile of the husband is also the domicile of the wife; that the plaintiff could not acquire a residence in Iloilo before the marriage between her and the defendant was legally dissolved. Issues: WON the wife may obtain a preliminary writ of injuction during the pendency of the case. Did the judge exceed his jurisdiction? Held: Where the husband has given cause of divorce, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband. Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being of her husband, universal jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule in the case where the husbands conduct has been such as to furnish lawful ground for a divorce, which justified her in leaving him, and, therefore, necessarily authorizes her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate domicile. (Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (U.S., 108)). It is clear therefore, that a married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband, during the existence of the marriage, where the husband has given cause for legal separation.

In an action for divorce brought by the wife against husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of conjugal property during the pendency of the action. It follows from all of the foregoing that the respondent, Hon. Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent Narcissa Geopano, and that he did not exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction against the defendant, prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.

Legal Separation\Effects of Filing Petition Reyes v Ines-Luciano Facts: Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed in the JDRC of Quezon City a complaint against her husband, Manuel J.C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant, the petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendent elite for the ground that his wife had committed adultery with her physician. Issue: 1. WON the alleged adultery of his wife disqualifies her from alimony pendente lite. 2. WON in determining the amount of support pendent lite, it is enough that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence even by afiidavits only or other documentary evidence. Held: 1. It is true that the adultery of the wife is defense in an action for support. However, the alleged adultery of his wife must be established by competent evidence. The mere allegation that wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right to receive support pendente lite. In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite before the JDRC, petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife had committed adultery with any person. 2. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable to it justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. It is enough that the facts be satisfied by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. The private respondent has submitted documents showing that the corporations controlled by the petitioner have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways. Considering the high cost of living due inflation and the financial ability of the petitioner as shown by the documents of record, We find that the amount of P4, 000.00 a month granted by the respondent Judge as alimony pendente lite to the private respondent is not excessive. Legal Separation\Effects of Decree Baez v Baez

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Facts: In September 23, Aida and Gabrial Banez were awarded a decree for legal separation because of the latters sexual infidelity. Also included in the decree was the dissolution of their conjugal property, the forfeiture of the respondents one half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children, payment to petitioners counsel to be taken from the petitioners share in the net assets and the surrender of a vehicle and the house to the petitioner. The petitioner filed a motion to modify the decision. The decision was modified, obliging the petitioner to pay as attorneys fees the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondents ideal share in the net conjugal assets and ordering the administrator to pay her counsel. She sought for moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation expenses and an execution of motion pending appeal. Court denied her motion for damages but gave due course to the execution pending appeal. The respondent was ordered to leave the house and car to petitioner. The petitioner meanwhile has been ordered to post a bond to answer for all the damages the respondent may suffer. The order was appealed by Gabriel, and it was set aside by the CA. Aida filed a MFR but it was denied. In the meantime, Gabriel,s notice of appeal was elevated to the CA. Aida filed a motion to dismiss but the court denied it sine she wasnt able to pay the docket fee. Issues: 1. WON the execution of judgment pending appeal is justified. 2. WON an action for legal is one where multiple appeals is allowed Held: 1. No. There was no superior or urgent circumstance. 2. No. Multiple appeals are only allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, n actions for partition of property, special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale for multiple appeals in one case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and is to be held final. In this case, the 2 appeals came from the same issue the legal separation. The effects of legal separation are not separate matters, and they are final when the decree for it has been granted. They are mere incidents of the decree Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Dissolution ACP CPG La Rue v La Rue Facts: The parties were married in 1950. Their marriage was a traditional one as Mr. La Rue handled the familys financial affairs and Mrs La Rue was mainly a housewife. They then filed for divorce in March 1980, based on irreconcilable differences. The court found inequitable conduct on both sides, but concluded that mr La Rues abusive conduct far outweighed his wifes. When the divorce was awarded, Mrs La Rue only got alimony and allowance for health insurance. However, the divorce order did not provide for any distribution of marital assets. c then petitioned the court to award her one half of the all personal property and one half of the real estate owned by Mr. La Rue. Her petition was denied since she failed to carry the burden of proving that either a contract existed that marital assets were equally owned or that her earnings were invested in any property owned titled to Mr. La Rues name. Issue: WON a homemaker is entitled to an equitable share of the property Held: Yes. Homemaker services are economic contributions. Where a spouse who has made material contributions of industry and labor during the marriage to the acquisition of property, a special equity or equitable interest can be found. Also, right to claim equitable relief is not barred because a party seeking them may be found at fault in the divorce action. Economic contributions are also similar to property

interests. In determining the appropriate amount for equitable distribution in this case, we should consider 2 things: Mrs La Rues contribution at the start of marriage ($51000) and her homemaker services. As for Mrs La Rue wanting to obtain one half interest of the home property (court denied it also), res judicata does not foreclose this asset from being valued as part of the net assets. Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Custody\Tender Years Ex Parte Devine Facts: Mr Devine was a school teacher, while Mrs Devine was employed with the US Army at Fort McClellan. 2 children were born out of their marriage, both in their tender years (7 and 4). When Mr and Mrs Devine were divorced, the court awarded the children to Mrs Devine, according to the tender years presumption (if both parents are fit, and children are at their tender years, under 7 years, mother will take care of them, based on instinctive role of the mother). Mr Devine now challenges the constitutionality of the tender years presumption and claiming that it is violative of the14th amendment (equal protection) Issue: WON the trial courts reliance on tender years presumption deprived the father of his constitutional entitlement to the equal protection of the law Held: Yes. The tender years presumption represents an unconstitutional genderbased classification which discriminates between fathers and mothers in child custody proceedings solely on the basis of sex. It creates a presumption of fitness and suitability of one parent without consideration of the actual capabilities of both parties. It also imposes unnecessary legal burden on the father. (Note: The burden of proof: that the mother is unfit. Thus, the male can only gain custody IF the female is unfit even if the father is fit. This violates the equal protection clause.) Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Custody\Tender Years Cervantes v Fajardo Facts: Angelie Anne Cervantes was born to Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common law husband and wife. The couple offered angelie for adoption to her sister and brother in law, Zenaida Carreon Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, the petitioners in this case. Gina executed an affidavit of consent and an appropriate petition for adoption was filed by herein petitioners. The petition was granted. Sometime in march 1987, the petitioners received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid 150,000, or else, they would get back their child. The petitioners refused. On September 11, 1987, Gina took the child from their yaya at the petitioners residence. Petitioners asked for the child but respondent refused, saying that she had no desire to give up the child in the first place and the affidavit that she executed wasnt explained fully to her. The petitioners herein filed a writ of habeas corpus. Issue: WON Gina has rights to the child Held: No. the provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 years will not apply when the court finds compelling reasons to do otherwise. In this case, Gina wouldnt be able to provide a desirable environment for her child. Conrado is married to another woman, and also, Gina has another child by another married man. Angelie Anne was also legally adopted and it dissolves the authority of the natural parents to the child.

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guardian does not mean that the guardian will always assume and discharge the duties of the office or position. Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Custody\Tender Years Espiritu v CA Facts: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met at Iligan City in 1976. In 1984, they again met in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and began to maintain a common law relationship as husband and wife. 2 years later, Rosalind was born. They then got married in 1987 and later had a son, Reginald. Their relationship deteriorated and they separated in 1990. Teresita then left the children and Reynaldo and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children to the Philippines and left them to her sister. Teresita then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the petitioners. The trial court denied the writ, but the CA granted the petition, applying Art 363 CC which states that a child below 7 yrs old shall not be separated from the mother. Issue: WON Teresita is fit to be granted custody of the children Held: No. 1. The prime consideration is the childs best interest. The tender Years Presumption provides that if the child is under seven years of age, the mother is the best custodian. However, the presumption is not absolute and may be overcome by compelling reasons. When a child is over seven, his or her choice of parent is paramount. 2. The testimonies of the psychologist and social worker showed that the children disliked their mother. Their testimonies were given weight by the court since the interview and the examination were done for foreign travel and school purposes respectively, not for the advancement of the litigation case. 3. Also, her illicit affair with Reynaldos coworker seemed to have caused emotional disturbances to Rosalind. There is also nothing in the records which show that Reynaldo was unfit. His assignment in the states is just temporary, and he will be coming back home to the Philippines permanently. Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Custody\Tender Years Celis v Cafuir Facts: When Ileana Celis gave birth to a boy, Joel, she entrusted him to Soledad Cafuir because of her fathers displeasure of the disgrace Ileana brought to the family for having illicit relations with a man whom she is not married with and because of her fathers objection of having her son stay in the paternal home. As such, Ileana two documents. The first says that she entrusts Soledad her child and only Soledad can adopt the child. The second appoints Soledad as the childs guardian. Thereafter, Ileana only came to visit the boy every Saturday and provided some milk, food and a little money. In September 1948, she married co petitioner Agustin Rivera. They then decided to get the boy back, but Soledad refused. Ileana then filed for a writ of habeas corpus. Soledad, in her defense, claims that the two documents enacted by Ileana renounced her custody of and patria potestas over her child. Issue: WON Ileana had renounced her custody of the child in favor of Soledad. Held: No. The first document merely entrusted her son to soledad. Entrusted cannot convey the idea of permanent renunciation. Also, the clause that says No one has the right to claim for adoption except Soledad merely provides an option for Soledad, which she didnt take. The second document, on the other hand, merely designated Soledad as the guardian of the child. The designation of one as the Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Custody\Parental Unfitness Feldman v Feldman Facts: Mady Feldman filed for divorce against her husband, Philip, based upon cruel and inhuman treatment. Pursuant to their separation agreement, she was awarded the custody of their 2 children. After the divorce, the former wife began dating a married man. In one visit of the former husband at her former wifes house, he found a copy of Screw Magazine and some letters with explicit photographs on the dining room and kitchen tables. The letters were in response to the ads placed by the former wife and her male companion regarding fun and games with other couples or groups. The former husband then filed a petition for the custody of the two children. The trial court found that the wife was living sexually liberated lifestyle. Based on this, the trial court granted the custody of the two children to the former husband. Issue: WON custody of children should be awarded to husband, Philip Feldman Held: No. Her peculiar sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody. It was found that she had supported her children well and has given them a great atmosphere at home. The unusual practices by the mother did not, in any way, affect the children. There is no evidence also, that the publications or pictures were ever seen by the children. (Note: the right of a divorced woman to engage in private sexual activities, which no way affect her minor children, is within the penumbra of privacy mandated by the Bill of Rights) Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Custody\Parental Unfitness Santos Sr v CA Facts: Leouel and Julia had placed their child into the care of the latters parents ever since the child was born. The grandparents were the ones who provided support for the child, since Leouel cannot afford to do so. Julia then left for the states to work. The grandparents claim that Julia has been sending financial support to her son. On September 1990, Leouel abducted the child from his grandparents. The grandparents then filed for custody of the boy, which the trial court granted. Leouel then appealed, stating that the respondents have failed to show the he is unfit to be the father and that the substitute parental authority granted to the boys grandparents was inappropriate. The respondents, on the other hand, claim that they are financially well-off to take care of the son, while Leouel is not. Also, Julia has entrusted the boy to them. Leouels use of trickery to abduct the child also is a sign of his unfitness. They likewise claim that they are in the best position to take care of the child, and this should be the primary consideration of the court. Issue: WON Leouel should be awarded proper custody Held: Yes. The father, Leouel was not shown to be an unfit parent. The fact that he kidnapped his son from the latters maternal grand[parents does not render him unfit. Only in cases of death, absence or unsuitability of parents may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparents. Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Custody\Childs Preference David v. CA Facts: Petitioner Daisie David is a secretary to respondent Ramon Villar. A relationship between them developed, and as such, a child was born to them,

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Christopher J (6 years old at the time case was pending). It was followed by 2 more girls. The relationship became known to the respondents wife when Daisie took Christopher J to the respondents house and was introduced Villars legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house and was treated as legal family. One summer, Villar asked permission from Daisie to take Christopher J to Boracay. Daisie agreed. After the trip, Villar refused to return the child. Daisie then filed for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court granted her petition and custody of the child was awarded to her. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling, stating that the custody of the child may be decided in a habeas corpus case where the parents are legally married to each other but are separated. But the same does not hold true in an adulterous relationship. Ramon Villar, being financially well-off was given temporary custody of the child. Issue: WON Daisie should be given custody of the child Held: Yes. Custody of a child in an adulterous relationship can be settled in a habeas corpus case. As such, under Art 176 FC, Christopher J is under the parental authority of the mother. The fact that the respondent is well-off does not deprive the petitioner custody of her children, since she has proven that she has been able to support them. Also even now that Christopher J is over 7 years of age, the mothers custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Custody\Childs Preference [Pizarro v Vasquez] Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Custody\Childs Preference Goldstein v Goldstein Facts: Edward Goldstein was awarded custody of a child, Ann Robin, after a decree by the court. As such, the child and her father lived in Israel, while the mother, Claire, stayed in the States. The wife then initiated a series of proceedings to reclaim rights over the child and she finally succeeded in part, when her husband and child returned to the States and appeared in court. The trial judge found it advisable to place the child under the mothers custody pending the hearing. At the hearing, both were found to be fit. Ann was found to be very intelligent and suffers no emotional damage. The wife requested for the judge to take notice of the threat of war in Israel, while the husband argued that the states had more violence and engaged in much more wars. The judge and Ann Robin then talked, and from their conversation, Ann said that she loved her father more than her mother and that she had no desire to visit with her mother but agreed if she was allowed to live with her father if she visited her mother for 4 weeks during the summer. The judge, taking into consideration the childs best interests, granted custody to the father. The wife argued that the judge failed to consider all circumstances and allowed the childs choice to control his decision. Issue: WON the judges reliance on the childs preference was justifiable Held: Yes. The factors in awarding custody to one or the other of the parents were equally balanced as to make it difficult for the judge to decide between them. That being so, it does not seem that he abused his discretion when he gave great weight to the childs preference. Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Custody\Childs Preference

Laxamana v Laxamana Facts: Respondent Lourdes Laxamana and her children abandoned the petitioner, Reymond Laxamana, because of the latters drug dependence which led to his being violent towards them. August 1999, Reymond then filed a petition for habeas corpus, praying for the custody of the 3 children, Lourdes opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of the petitioner. She then filed for an annulment of their marriage on September 24, 1999. On September 27, 199, Reymond filed in the habeas corpus case a motion seeking visitation rights over his children. On December 1999, after the parties reached an agreement, the court granted the visitation rights and ordered the parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination. In January 2000, the results of the psychiatric evaluation were presented to the court. The exam states that the children were affected psychologically by the fathers drugrelated behavior, and also the psychiatrist found that Reymond is still not completely cured of the drug addiction. However, the psychiatrist did not detect any evidence that the paternal visits would be harmful to the children. Based on this, the court granted custody to Lourdes and visitation rights to Reymond. Issue: WON the court properly resolved the issue of custody Held: No. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of the children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. While Reymond may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social wellbeing. Although he is not completely cured of his drug dependence, there is no evidence showing that he is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education and moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they wanted to live. Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Custody\Primary Caretaker Garska v McCoy Facts: Michael Garska, the appellee and Gwendolyn McCoy, the appellant, met at north Carolina. Michael got Gwen pregnant and thus, Gwen moved back to her grandparents. During her pregnancy, she received no support from Michael, but after she gave birth, Michael sent a package of food and diapers. In the subsequent months, the baby had many complications, and to pay for the medical bills, Gwens grandfather attempted to use his medical insurance provided by the united mine workers. But he has been informed that they would have to adopt the baby so they can avail of the said insurance. Gwen then signed a consent in which she agreed that her baby will be adopted by her grandparents. Michael, upon learning this, visited the baby for the 1st time and sent money weekly. Gwens grandfather then filed a petition for adoption. Consequently, Michael filed a petition for write of habeas corpus to secure custody of his son. The court denied the petition for adoption, since the baby had not resided with them for the requisite 6 months. The court also awarded custody to Michael for reasons that he: is natural father, was better educated, more intelligent, able to provide better financial support, among others. Issue: WON Michael should be awarded custody Held: No. the court set forth the rule regarding the presumption of primary caretaker. The court held that the primary caretaker is one who performs the following caring and nurturing duties of the parent: 1. preparing and planning of

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meals 2. Bathing and grooming and dressing, 3. purchasing, cleaning and care of clothes, 4. medical care, 5. arranging for social interaction among peers after school, 6. arranging alternative care, 7. putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the morning, 8. disciplining, 9. educating, and, 10. teaching elementary skills. Once the primary caretake is identified, all that need to be determined is whether the parent is unfit or not. In this case, it is obvious that Gwen is the primary caretaker. There is no finding which points that Gwen is unfit. In fact, all of the evidence indicates that she mobilized all of the resources at her command, namely the solicitous regard of her grandparents, in the interest of this child and that she went to extraordinary lengths to provide for him adequate medical attention and financial support. Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Other Effects Matute v Macadalo Facts: Armando Medel filed for legal separation against Rosario Matute on the ground of adultery with Armandos brother, Ernesto. The court granted the decree and also awarded their 4 children to Armandos custody. Thereafter, Armando left for the States and left the children with his sister, in whose house Rosario also lived in order to be with her children. After 2 years, Armando came back home and the children joined him. On 1955, Rosario asked permission from Armando to bring the children to manila for her fathers funeral. Armando agreed on the condition that she will return them after 2 weeks. But Rosario did not. Later, Rosario filed a civil case for the custody of the children and support thereof. She claims that the children did not want to go back to their father since they claim he was living with another woman other than their mother. The court denied her custody and ordered her to return the children to Armando. Rosario then instituted against Armando and the judge the present action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. Issues: 1. Whether the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, 2. Whether the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion Held: No. 1. The court had jurisdiction over the case. Whatever mistakes the court had committed would be merely errors of judgment, and is reviewable by appeal. 2. No. Unless the custody has been reviewed or modified, the custody of the children under Armando was stand. The judge was only performing his duty to implement such award. (Note: Physical Custody wife vs. Legal Custody husband. This is a procedural case; solution is not kidnapping the children but filing the proper custody case in court.) Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Other Effects\Use of Surname Laperal v Republic Facts: On March 24, 1939, Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria, thereafter using the name Elisea L. Santamaria. In 1958, a decree of legal separation was entered between them by CFI Baguio. Elisea Laperal ceased to live with Enrique Santamaria since then. On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in CFI Baguio a petition praying that she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. Issue: Is Elisea allowed to use her maiden name? Held: 1. A womans married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation, there being no severance of the vinculum, and under the mandatory provisions of Art. 372 NCC, she shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. There is no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings,

the procedure prescribed in Rule 103 RRC on change of name has been observed. But from the petition, the only reason relied upon for change of name is the fact that Elisea Laperal is legally separated from Enrique Santamaria and has in fact, ceased to live with him. It is doubtful whether Rule 103 may prevail over Art. 372 with regard to a married woman legally separated from her husband. However, even applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation, the only basis for petition, is not sufficient ground to justify the change, for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of said Art. 372. 2. It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that a petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued use of Enrique Santamarias surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of conjugal asset. This finding is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, he conjugal partnership between Elisea Laperal and Enrique Santamaria had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Consequently, there could be no more occasions for an eventual liquidation of conjugal assets. Order set aside; petition dismissed. Divorces\Foreign Divorces Van Dorn v Romillo Facts: Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States; they were married in Hongkong in 1972; after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children; the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and petitioner has remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. On June 8, 1983, Upton filed a suit against petitioner in the RTC of Pasay City, stating that petitioners business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop), is conjugal property and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Upton be declared as having the right to manage the conjugal property. Issue: The effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines. Held: The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before it. It also obtained jurisdiction over Upton who authorized his attorneys to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorced in any States of the United States. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. For instance, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction the same being contrary to local law and public policy. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

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In this case, the divorce in Nevada, released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain, as Upton does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to him and still subject to a wifes obligations under Article 109, et. Seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends are to be served. Divorces\Foreign Divorces\Basis is Art 15, CC Quita v Dandan Facts: Petitioner Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were married on 1941.Sometime later, their relationship soured, thus, they filed for divorce in San Francisco USA. (Note: Marriage between Blandina and Arturo was in 1947). In 1954, they obtained decree of divorce. Fe had two other marriages later. In 1972, Arturo died, leaving no will. A certain Lino Inciong filed a petition praying for the issuance of letters of administration of Arturos estate. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo and the latters alleged children with her opposed the petition and asked the court the appointment instead of Atty. Cabasal. Later, oppositors filed final judgment of divorce between the petitioner and Arturo. Arturos brother Ruperto also intervened. In 1987, the petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of the heirs of Arturo. The court required Blandina and her children to submit documents to support their claim, but the latter failed to do so. The trial court then held that the divorce obtained by the petitioner is void, thus, their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo. Fe and Ruperto were then declared heirs. Blandina and the Padlan children later filed a MFR and submitted the necessary documents earlier on demanded by the court. The court then declared the Padlan children heirs, but not Blandina, since her marriage was void as she contracted the marriage when Arturo had a subsisting marriage. Blandina then appealed, citing sec 1 rule 90 of the rules of court and said that the present case should be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. The CA agreed and declared the trial courts decision to be null and void and directed the remand of the case to the trial court. Issue: WON the case should be remanded. Held: Yes. There is a need to determine the factual issues of the case, mainly the issue on the citizenship of the petitioner when she acquired the divorce. (Note: 2 contracting or confusing facts: a.] time of Fes naturalization, and b.] time of divorce between Fe and Arturo, both happened in 1954) It will determine whether the divorce will have legal effect in the Philippines. Once proved that Fe was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and Fe could very well lose here right to inherit from Arturo. The case was then remanded, but the trial court should only look upon the petitioners right to inherit.

Divorces\Foreign Divorces\Art 15, CC Llorente v CA Facts: Lorenzo Llorente and Paula Llorente were married in Camarines Sur. Lorenzo, a serviceman of the US navy, departed to the US when the Pacific war broke out, leaving Paula in the Philippines. While in the US, Lorenzo was able to obtain US citizenship. Thereafter, he discovered that her wife was having illicit relations with his brother Ceferino Llorente and was even pregnant with him. Lorenzo then filed for divorce in California, which the court granted. A few years later, Lorenzo came back to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente, whom he had three children. Ii 1981, Lorenzo executed a last will and testament, which says that Alicia and their children will be declared heirs of his estate. He then filed a petition for probate and allowance of his will before the trial court, but was denied since he was still alive. Later, the court, finding it was duly executed, admitted it. But before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula then filed a petition for letters of administration of Lorenzos estate. Alicia likewise filed the same. The trial court granted Paulas petition, saying that the divorce decree was null and void, thus Paula and Lorenzos marriage was still subsisting at the time of the latters death. Also, the will is intrinsically void, Alicia being just a paramour of Lorenzo. The court then declared Paula and Lorenzos allegedly illegitimate children as heirs. Alicia filed a MFR, but the trial court denied the motion and further modified the decision, declaring only one of the children as heir instead of all three. She then filed an appeal before the CA. the CA affirmed the decision but modified it to include Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during their relationship. Issue: Whether Alicia is entitled to Lorenzos estate Held: Yes. The court upheld the validity of the divorce decree, since Lorenzo was already an American citizen at that time. As for the validity of the will, the court said that it is governed by the laws of Lorenzos nationality. Therefore the case was remanded to the trial court to see if the will was executed in accordance with the laws of Lorenzos nationality. Divorces\Foreign Divorces\proof of foreign divorce Garcia a.k.a. Recio v Recio Facts: Rederick Recio was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen in Malabon, Rizal. When their marriage soured, they applied for a decree of divorce in the Australian family courts, which was later granted. Rederick then became an Australian citizen. He remarried with a Filipina, Grace Garcia, herein petitioner. Their marriage also soured, and they began to live separately and their conjugal assets were divided. Grace then learned of Redericks previous divorce, and subsequently filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage, there being no legal capacity to marry on the part of Rederick. He claims however that his first marriage was validly dissolved, thus he was legally capacitated to marry. When the case filed by Grace was pending, Rederick was able to secure a divorce decree from Australia. He then prayed that the pending case be dismissed, on the ground that it stated no cause of action. The trial court then declared that the divorce had ended the marriage, thus there was no marital union to nullify. Issues: 1. WON the divorce decree of the respondents first marriage was proven 2. WON respondent was proven to be legally capacitated. Held: 1. No. For a foreign divorce to be recognized by the court, the party pleading it must prove divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law

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allowing it. Though the divorce was proven as fact since the divorce decree was submitted as evidence, the respondent wasnt able to prove that it was made in accordance with Australian laws. He has the burden of proving it since he raised his previous divorce as a defense. 2. No. The court cannot conclude that the respondent had legal capacity to marry. There is a question which type of divorce he applied for, whether absolute or limited. The respondent just showed an interlocutory decree, a provisional judgment of divorce, which is similar to a separation from bed and board although absolute divorce may follow. Also, even if divorce was absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict marriage. There is also an Australian law which says that a party who marries before divorce becomes absolute commits bigamy, thus bolstering the courts contention that the divorce acquired by the respondent was restricted. The court then remanded the case to receive evidence to show the respondents capacity to marry. Divorces\Muslim Divorces Yasin v Sharia District Facts: Hatima Yasin filed a petition to resume the use of her maiden name. She claims that she was divorced under the code of Muslim laws and that her former husband has now contracted another marriage. The court denied the petition, it being insufficient in form and substance and it asked the petitioner to make the necessary amendments. Yasin then filed a MFR, stating that it is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to use her maiden name after the divorce. The motion was denied on the ground that the petition was substantially a change of name and there should be compliance to Rule 103. Issue: Whether a petition for resumption of maiden name should be granted Held: Yes. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is for used for a change of the real name, which is the name recorded in the civil registry. The petitioner on the other hand, does not seek a change of her registered name, but only to resume it by virtue of the decree of divorce. The change in name will just reflect the change of status of the woman. Also, there is no need for judicial confirmation for this as the use of her former husbands name is optional and not obligatory for her. De Facto Separation Perez v CA Facts: Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu, while his wife Nerissa is a nurse. After 6 miscarriages, 2 operations and a high risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to a child, Ray Perez II. Nerissa began working in the US in 1988 and became a resident alien in 1992. ray stayed with her in the US, but only had a tourist visa and was not employed. On Jan 1993, they returned to Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa came back. She claims that they only came for a vacation, and that ray stayed behind for his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. Ray claims that they agreed to reside in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in NY, she changed her mind and continued working. When Nerissa came home fro her sons birthday, the couple were no longer in good terms. She didnt want to live with her in-laws, while ray wanted to stay in the Philippines. She wanted the child to come with her, but Ray kept her away. In July 1993, Nerissa filed a petition for habeas corpus, asking ray to surrender to her their son. The trial court granted the petition, based on Art 213 FC stating that no child under 7 shall be separated from the

mother. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision, saying there are enough reasons to deny Nerissa custody, such as her work schedule. Issue: Whether custody should be awarded to Nerissa Held: Yes. 1. Art 213 FC does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation. Where the law does not make a distinction, neither should we. Thus, it is applicable to the case at bar. The child then cannot be separated from his mother since he is below 7 years old. 2. Also, there are no signs which render the mother unfit. A.) her work schedule doesnt appear unmanageable, so as not to able to take care of their children. B. should her time be unmanageable, a lot of options are open to her, such as inviting a relative to care of the child, to take a leave, or to put the child in a day care center. C.) fact that Ray lives with his parents is not crucial D. petitioners work schedule is not necessarily permanent, and E. it also does not follow that petitioner values her career more than her family since she chose to work in the US.

: PFR Reviewer prepared by rean

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