History 3210: The Roman Republic (Research Term Paper)

Tribunes and the Decline oI Republican Government

Ryan Bell
November 21, 2011
Dr. Michael Proulx





1

The role Tribunes oI the plebeians played in the Roman Republic changed over time Irom
an idealistic champion oI the plebeians` rights to independent agitators and political pawns oI the
powerIul men oI Rome. The oIIice oI Tribune possessed an arsenal oI incapacitating powers
capable oI shutting down the government, exonerating the people Irom the tyranny oI
magistrates by intercession, and the distinction oI being inviolable. Ideals oI the tribunate never
came to Iruition, instead the nostalgic but erroneous image oI the past Iueled late Republican
reIormers to pursue their own radical reIorms using the powers oI the tribunate. Patrician
reaction to these events began to unravel the Iibers oI Republican values. Abuses committed by
tribunes oIten at the behest oI political allies eroded the balance oI government and allowed Ior
the destruction oI the Republican model over the course oI several decades. Having Iailed in
their intended role to protect the people Irom the excesses oI the patricians, the tribunate became
little more than a political vehicle by which enterprising political actors could either directly or
indirectly manipulate government in any way they chose
1
.
In order to more thoroughly explore how the oIIice oI tribune denigrated Irom an
ostensibly noble role to one oI political malIeasance, the original duty oI the oIIice must be
examined. The plebeians deserted Rome as a result oI patrician eIIorts to block land reIorms
with constant warIare and calls Ior the levy in wars against neighbors in the early days oI the
Republic. The Senate established the oIIice oI tribune in the midst oI great political upheaval as
a concession to the plebeians as insurance that the new tribunes may exercise powers to legally
check the excesses oI patricians on the behalI oI the plebeians. The Senate wanted the plebeians
to return so that the levy could be held and the city deIended Irom neighboring hostile tribes.
Some patricians obstinately opposed this measure, calling instead Ior the punishment oI the

1
Douglas Clapp, 'The Image oI the Tribunate in Livy (PhD diss., University oI North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
2000), 48-49.
2

mutinous plebeians, but others senators saw this compromise as the only way to rectiIy the issue
oI the levy
2
. The Roman political entity clearly reached an impasse by which the patricians
loathed the idea oI sharing power with the plebeians, but ultimately had no alternative but to
share the powers oI government. The Plebeians, on the other hand, believed that the creation oI
the Tribunate would allow them to advance popular reIorms more quickly. The reality, however,
soon demonstrated that although the tribunes oI the people could end some abuses by the
patricians towards the plebeians, political clashes between classes would not end. Livy`s
narrative invariably contrasts with the Greek Polybius` history in this regard. While Livy
underscores the ineIIectiveness and abuses oI the tribunes as detrimental to the government oI
Rome such as encouraging plebeians to boycott the levy, Polybius praises the system Ior
providing checks upon each oI the three powers oI government; the senate, the magistrates, and
the popular assembly headed by the tribunes
3
. Polybius subscribes to the theoretical mandate oI
the Republic which Iails to take into account abuses to the system made by uncompromising
individuals claiming to act Ior the betterment oI the whole. The hamstrung senate, too proud to
relinquish to the mob, hesitated to grant concessions until the enemy literally came knocking on
the gates. Even then, some patricians argued that the corrective course oI action involved
eliminating the Tribunate entirely by murderous schemes
4
. In practice, the political mechanics
oI the Republic did not Iunction as Polybius mistakenly believed. The reality oI the Republic
seldom ever lived up to the ideal. The inIlexibility oI the upper class and the paralyzing tactics
oI the lower classes placed the Republic at risk on more than one occasion. This highlights the
Iundamental problem the tribunes were supposed to rectiIy, but only made worse.

2
Titus Livius, Ab Urbe Condita, trans B.O. Foster (New York : Barnes & Noble inc., 2005), Book II par. 28 and 29.
3
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3

Despite initial Iailings, thought seemed to sway to the side oI liberal reIorm in terms oI
the empowerment oI the tribunes. As iI the Iailings oI the tribunes in this early period could be
blamed on the Senate instead oI the methods and personalities oI the tribunes themselves, some
reIormers sought to answer the problem oI domestic striIe in the Iorm oI voting more powers Ior
the tribunes. In essence these reIorms satiated immediate demands Ior domestic change in the
slightest oI terms, leaving the bulk oI many issues, such as land reIorm, unresolved. The one
sidedness oI the growth in power oI the Tribunate over other magistracies set the stage Ior later
abuse and tribune domineering oI the government through legal yet unscrupulous means. At this
early stage the Roman people had a legitimate cause to promote. Patrician abuses and political
manipulation oIten leIt soldiers without booty and caused debtors to lose Iarms. A series oI
reIorms aimed to place the tribune in a position whereby it could more actively pursue its
mandate oI protection and intercession in order to end these abuses.
The creation and rise oI the tribunate came about by patrician concessions during
political crises in the early Republic. The Senate created the oIIice to oIIer the plebeians a legal
means to seek redress. To ensure that the oIIice would continue in its intended Iorm aIter events
had died down in Rome, the Senate added a provision to make the tribune sacrosanct and
annually elected
5
. At this early stage Livy Iails to mention any speciIic intercessory powers the
tribunes may possess. Shortly aIter the announcement oI their creating, however, tribunes begin
to interpose a veto power. Either Livy`s vagueness in outlining the powers oI the tribunate mean
to encompass veto powers by the provision oI aiding the people, or the early tribunes assumed
the power oI veto by loose legal interpretations oI their legal powers. Considering the actions oI
some radical tribunes oI the late Republic, the latter option seems viable, but given the archaic

3
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nature oI the literature detailing these early tribunes it seems unlikely that the question will ever
receive a gratiIying answer. The tribunes made considerable advances in Iorcing the patricians
and the senate to consider their grievances. A Senate appointed committee Iinally compiled
Roman law in the twelve tables at the behest oI the tribunes. Pressure Irom the tribunes
compelled the Senate to act and conIorm to the peoples` wishes
6
. This development reveals the
budding authority oI the tribunate to coerce the Senate and upper class to pay attention to the
desires oI the people. The tribunes still lack the ability to bypass the Senate, but a series oI
political reIorms over the course oI the next two hundred years will place unique authority into
the oIIice and make it unlike any other in the Roman political system. Instead oI merely acting
as a negative inIluence in Roman politics by the means oI the veto, the plebeian tribune will gain
the ability to Iorm laws.
In 449 BCE the consuls aided the plebs in expanding the rights oI tribunes against
magisterial misconduct. Valerius Potius and Horatius Barbatus oIIicially recognized the rights
oI the tributes and reaIIirmed their powers oI intercession and aid. In addition, the consuls sough
to add Iurther protection to the plebeians by allowing plebiscites to be recognized as binding
laws iI also accepted by the Senate. This small step allowed tribunes the ability to propose their
own laws to the newly Iormed comitia tributa, composed oI all male citizens oI every class.
ThereIore tribunes could potentially appeal to the comitia tributa and pass measures that
otherwise might be blocked by organized opposition by patricians
7
. Previously the tribunes
could only disallow discussion oI any given topic, but now they could legislate. A second bout
oI reIorms in 287 BCE abolished the provision oI Senatorial ratiIication oI plebiscites. This
monumental victory Ior the tribunes allowed them to legislate, present, and pass laws in the

6
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3

concilium plebis, completely bypassing the patricians. This legal shortcut gave the annually
elected tribunes as much legislative power as the Senate itselI
8
. Although still the most august
body in Roman politics, the Senate now had to contend with the popular will oI the people in a
direct sense.
The evolution oI the plebeian magistracies resulted Irom political turmoil between
patricians and plebeians. As the patricians sought Iresh avenues to oppose and undermine the
tribunes, plebs sought to bolster their legal role. Aggravation on either side Irequently led to
extreme reactions. Plebeians oIten abandoned the city when patricians blocked populist
measures and patricians oIten considered ways to manipulate the tribunes, the people, or even
conspire to eliminate the problem illegally
9
. Opportunists such as Gaius Harsa sought to seize
the initiative oI Iomenting negative Ieelings towards the patricians and consuls in particular
when the consuls were away Iighting in wars. Harsa delivered a series oI speeches berating the
behavior oI the patricians as unsuitable in a Iree society. Such tyranny, he argued, had no place
in the Republic. Patrician domination oI senior magistracies and the legislative process came to
an end as more plebeians and even patricians subscribed to Harsa`s opinion. The patricians still
had a stranglehold on the economic assets oI the Republic, however, and it would take a new
generation oI tribunes to address these issues. As the Republic buckled under the weight oI
Empire, pioneering Roman politicians sought to use the tribunate to reshape the political
landscape to suit their idealistic visions oI Rome. The oIIice oI tribune, now empowered to
enIorce the will oI the people unilaterally, became a vital point oI control Ior ambitious
politicians and generals.

8
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6

Several prominent political characters oI the second century BCE inherited these long
Iought Ior powers and the typical plebeian attitudes. Now that the plebeians had established the
tribunes as permanent and powerIul political entities in the Roman political network, measures oI
economic and Iurther political reIorm could be pursued more meaningIully. The pieces oI
plebeian control oI government had Iallen into place, namely plebiscites carrying the Iorce oI
law and the rights and powers oI tribunes being reaIIirmed. The tribunes could now pursue
sweeping economic reIorm the patricians would be hard pressed to oppose. While maintaining a
strictly traditional view oI the purpose oI the tribunate, Gaius and Tiberius Gracchus introduced
innovative political strategies to achieve their goals. The Gracchi brothers aggressively pursued
agrarian reIorm by removing those who opposed them by nominally legal and marginally
justiIiable means: sealing the treasury, packing political oIIices with supporters, and attempting
to limit the powers oI senators. Armed with the powers three centuries oI populist reIorm had
given the oIIice oI tribune, the Gracchi brothers embarked on a journey that would initiate a slow
process oI Republican decay.
The Iirst consequential attempt at land reIorm resulted Irom a proposition made by
Tiberius Gracchus. This reIorm, although mild compared to later bills, aimed to limit the amount
oI any conquered land any single man could own, make provisions Ior land distributions to
Rome`s poor, and place limitations on slave labor on massive Iarming enterprises. Although
tactIul in construction, Tiberius obviously Iorgot to consult his Iellow tribunes. When Tiberius
attempted to introduce the legislation to the people, a tribune by the name Octavius vetoed the
measure. Perhaps Tiberius encountered opposition Irom a sector he did not Ioresee as opposition.
Tiberius, however, seemed to recognize the elasticity oI tribunician powers so much so that he
justiIied the removal oI his Iellow tribune and rival by plebiscite. This event signals three
7

important new developments in Roman politics. The tribunes disagree with one another either
about the aims or strategies oI land reIorm so much so that they interposed their vetoes on one
another. Whereas previously the image oI Roman politics has shown a clear divide between
patricians and plebeians, it now appears that the tribunes themselves disagree with one another.
Secondly, Tiberius deposing Octavius by plebiscite sets a dangerous legal precedent by which
the tribune most capable oI swaying the Ieelings oI the mob may eIIectively run the government
by simply manipulating the people to depose rivals. Lastly, it becomes obvious that tribunes
may be used to check other tribunes. While other magistrates may have problems Iinding a legal
way to overcome tribunes, tribunician powers do not limit the exercise oI the veto against other
tribunes. In the Iuture those belonging to the optimate camp will not hesitate to capitalize on this
as a way to neutralize problematic tribunes
10
.
Tiberius Gracchus` reIorm, however beneIicial, Ioretold doom Ior the traditional
Republican model. Regardless oI the contents oI the reIorm itselI, the process by which it
became law eroded the powers oI the tribunes. By eliminating rival tribunes by plebiscite,
violating their sacrosanctity, and using mobs as a way to intimidate other magistrates, Tiberius
cast the tribunician powers into a legal gray area
11
. For Tiberius, this ultimately led to his death
at the hands oI Iellow tribunes and a mob, but events oI the Iirst century CE would hauntingly
reIlect the events oI this Iirst Gracchi tribunate. Aggressively pursuing reIorm with little
consideration Ior methodological precedent and the callousness by which Tiberius achieved his
ends worked against the people and their interests in terms oI long term preservation oI the
Republican model. The tribunes and their gangs that murdered Tiberius introduced violence and

10
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physical repression as viable political options. The escalation oI these precedents in the career oI
Gaius Gracchus demonstrates that these new tactics could be used with brutal eIIiciency in
multiple contexts
12
.
Gaius Gracchus` political career conIirms the role oI violence in populist politics
and ushers in a new era oI radical tribune oIIice holders. Whereas Tiberius` proposals attempted
to reach out to prominent patricians to assuage the classic opposition party without gauging the
reactions oI constituents, Gaius took no such measures with championing his series oI reIorms.
AIter Gaius gained the support oI the plebs through impressive oratory, he sought to anchor his
newly Iound Iavor by passing measures to bar his rivals Irom holding oIIice. Gaius proposed a
law that would disqualiIy any citizen Irom running Ior an oIIice Irom which he had been
previously deposed by the people. This legislation was meant to conIound the eIIorts oI
Tiberius` old enemies Irom causing the same problems Ior Gaius
13
. Although this time more
subtle, once again the strategy oI using the plebiscite to incapacitate rivals and block them Irom
government came into use. By superIicially proposing the bill as a way to strengthen the voice
oI the people, Gaius intimidated his rivals causing several to Ilee the city just by proposing the
law. Gaius later repealed the proposal aIter some oI his enemies Iled Italy which clearly
demonstrates the underlying motives oI the bill.
Now that Gaius secured his position in government, he made radical proposals Ior reIorm
and presented them directly to the people Ior a vote. These reIorms included measures Ior public
granaries, roads, military reIorms, the establishment oI colonies, and rights Ior the Italian allies.
He placed himselI at the head oI powerIul committees that would oversee the matters. These

12
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measures won him immense popularity but raised the suspicions oI the Senate. The events oI
Tiberius` term as tribune still haunted their thoughts and they Ieared that the rise oI a new
immensely popular tribune threatened the status quo. In response to this, the Senate enlisted the
support oI a tribune by the name oI Livius
14
. Livius` employed interesting techniques to
undermine Gaius` support. In collusion with the optimates, Livius proposed even more
appealing legislation similar to the measures introduced by Gaius. Livius` laws provided Ior the
Iounding oI even more colonies than Gaius` and more reasonable terms agreeable to the Senate
and people regarding the enIranchisement oI the Italian Allies. Gaius` propositions regarding the
Italians eventually led to his downIall. Although the people expressed some support Ior the
measure, Gaius completely alienated himselI Irom the Senate and made powerIul enemies in the
process. By granting the Italians rights and even citizenship, Gaius would cement his position in
Roman politics by strengthening his base oI support. Presumably the Italian allies, indebted to
Gaius Ior his service, would elect him every year. Gaius` propensity Ior placing himselI in
positions oI power in the city struck the Senate, and even his colleagues, as a bit too kingly.
This decline culminated in an unusual decree oI the Senate. The Senate issued a last
decree, empowering all magistrates, particularly the consuls, to deIend the Republic against
tyrants by whatever means deemed necessary
15
. The decree, aimed at Gaius, empowered the
Consuls to rid the city oI anyone deemed dangerous. In no short order the Consul Opimius
arranged a large mob and began the search Ior Gaius. This search leIt several oI Gaius`
supporters dead and Gaius himselI committed suicide with the help oI a slave. The liIe oI Gaius
Gracchus illuminates three important events worth noting. For the Iirst time, Senators used a
tribune to oppose a tribune. By using Livius as a political asset, the patricians were able to

14
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undermine Gaius with the help oI a tribune they trusted and Ielt they could control. The issue oI
government control seemed paramount. The patricians were willing to see Gaius outbid in the
populist arena so long as they pulled the strings in the background. Secondly, the Senate passed
a special decree suspending normal law to rid the city oI a dangerous citizen who had gained
support and auctoritas Irom terms as a tribune. Roman law Iorbade the passing oI legislation
aimed at a single individual, so the Senate worked around the law to see their problem ended.
The Senate still held considerable power, enough to rid the state oI political agitators such as
Gaius Gracchus. Wisely waiting Ior Gaius` term as tribune to end beIore taking action against
Gaius disallowed Gaius` supporters Irom crying Ioul and blaming the Senate oI mistreatment oI
a tribune. At the onset oI his career, Gaius scolded Tiberius` murderers Ior violating the
sacrosanctity oI the oIIice. Since Gaius was not tribune when the Senate decided to act against
him, that argument could not be made. The incident oI the Gracchi brothers embodies a paradox
in Roman politics Iuture actors would also seek to exploit. The Roman ideal assumes that
magistrates will act in accordance to their roles without seeking personal gain, but in practice this
ideal seems Iarcical at best. When tribunes willingly use their power to promote themselves to
position oI power Iar exceeding the remit oI their oIIice, they abuse the system to their beneIit.
The Gracchi brothers, in doing this, set precedents Ior Iuture actors in the system
16
. The careers
oI the Gracchi brothers usher in a new era oI political manipulation in which the tribunate plays a
key role.
In spite oI the overzealousness by which the Gracchi pursued reIorm, elements oI
legitimate concern Ior the people still existed. Some years later during the Jugurthine Wars,
tribune Gaius Mamilius proposed legislation to prosecute corrupt oIIicials accepting bribes Irom

16
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Jugurtha
17
. Although the patricians had mixed Ieelings about such a proposal, the plebeians
wholeheartedly supported it. From what can be gathered, unlike the legislation oI the Gracchi
which oIten put the Gracchi into positions oI power or advantage, Mamilius` proposal carries no
such strings. Some tribunes still look to IulIill the traditional role oI their oIIice, but this mindset
does not proliIerate. Only Iour decades pass beIore the role oI tribune begins to be utilized as a
way to hold the government hostage. The Catilinian conspiracy allegedly drew up a plan to use a
tribune as a way to distract the leaders oI the state so that assassinations and arson may take
place
18
. The tribune Lucius Besta was to call an assembly oI the people to protest the actions oI
Cicero as Consul. The conspirators believed that this event would draw enough attention away
Irom their actions so they could attack prominent Roman politicians and set Iires throughout the
city unnoticed. II tribunes could cause so much city-wide attention merely by calling assemblies
to discuss a matter that individuals plotting murder and arson Ielt they could elude capture while
carrying out their plots that clearly shows that the leading Iigures in Rome took tribunes
seriously. By merit oI their legal authority and unique status in Roman society at this point,
tribunes command the attention and concern oI every quarter.
The pendulum oI government domination seems to have swung to the plebeians, and
while plebeians could hold the oIIices oI Consul, Censor, Praetor, and other magistracies
traditionally dominated by patricians, patricians could not run Ior tribune. Patricians had
allowed the tribune Iar reaching powers which threatened the Iabric oI the Republic. Few
understood the situation better than Sulla. The tribune Sulpicius deprived Sulla oI command
against Mithridates, giving the command instead to Sulla`s rival, in a bloody assembly meeting
which leIt several dead, including the son oI a Consul. Sulpicius then led his band oI Iollowers,

17
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called the anti-senate, through Rome in a murderous hunt Ior Sulla. Eventually when Sulla
marched on Rome and became dictator, he passed laws limiting the power oI the tribunes so that
another like Sulpicius would no longer be able to unilaterally control the government by means
oI mob tyranny. It is not unlikely that Sulpicius` name also appeared in the proscription lists.
Interestingly enough, Sulla`s reIorm oI the tribunate did not last. It was repealed several years
later by populists who saw the potential the oIIice carried Ior the advancement oI their own
careers. Not only had violence become normal in Roman politics, but both sides spill blood with
reckless abandon
19
.
The next phase oI tribune decline reveals how the empowerment oI the oIIice led
to its corruption. The tribunate became the vehicle by which ambitious Roman politicians
manipulated and controlled the government. The marriage oI tribunician powers with wealth and
enterprising patricians willing to bend the rules Ior personal gain brought about the collapse oI
Republican government. Caesar and the Iirst triumvirate secured a loyal tribune willing to use
his powers to control Rome both within the legal scope oI the tribunate and by employing mobs
as Sulpicius had done. The tribune, Clodius, Iell out oI Iavor with the optimate group when he
involved himselI in a scandal which oIIended the honor oI Roman women, religion, and the
patrician class itselI. A tribune charged Clodius with sacrilege and Cicero delivered a series oI
speeches attacking his character. The trial ended when Clodius and his supporters bribed their
way out it, but Clodius never Iorgave those who sought to humiliate him, particularly Cicero and
Cato. This grudge would eventually lead him to ally himselI with the Iirst triumvirate,
speciIically Caesar. Seeking to rectiIy his disgrace, Clodius renounced his heritage and became
a plebeian. He used his inIluence and newly Iound popularity with the people Ior becoming one

19
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oI them to be elected tribune
20
. Once tribune, Clodius set to work using his new oIIice to
persecute his enemies. The tribunate had deteriorated so much that now it was being used as a
weapon in petty rivalries
21
. Clodius passed a law that outlawed any who had put a Roman
citizen to death without a trial. Cicero matched this description, since he had sentenced several
Catalonian conspirators to death without proper due process, and Iled to Greece. The tribunate
had become a dumping ground Ior humiliated and socially exiled members oI the patrician class
who sought revenge. So much Ior the deIenders oI the peoples` liberty. This was but the
beginning oI Clodius` reign oI terror.
Clodius consolidated power in Rome by reinstituting the grain dole and removing the ban
on the use oI collegia. The Iirst measure would win popularity with the masses while the second
would allow him to use the mobs as his personal muscle. Using the collegia, Clodius disrupted
political meeting in Rome and threatened his rivals with violence. Once Cicero had been
removed, Clodius next looked to remove his other chieI rival, Cato. With his adversaries out oI
the political scene in Rome, and with the backing oI the collegia, Clodius could essentially rule
Rome with mobs. De Cypro, a bill passed by the popular assembly sending Cato to oversee a
relatively unimportant transition oI power in Cyprus, allowed Clodius to expel the last oI his
strongest enemies Irom the city
22
. Clodius, however, grew careless as he took his enemies out oI
the city and Iound himselI making new ones. AIter threatening Pompey, Pompey began to work
against Clodius. The people had grown tired oI the violence Clodius` gangs employed in
carrying out Clodius` orders. Pompey supported two new tribunes to counterbalance Clodius.
Milo, with the support oI Pompey, in turn began to use gangs to suppress the Clodians aIter he

20
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was elected tribune in 57 BCE
23
. This sort oI sectarian violence persisted until Milo`s gangs oI
supporters killed Clodius in 52 BCE. Clodius` career would have been impossible iI not Ior the
intervention oI the Iirst triumvirate. Initial cooperation Iollowed by prolonged clashes reaIIirms
the impossible situation oI a tribune pursuing only selI interest. Clodius` attempts to assert his
independence Irom Pompey and Caesar eventually led to his demise as the triumvirate simply
employed tactics tested by others Ior the successIul removal oI troublesome tribunes. The
clashes between Milo and Clodius littered the streets oI Rome with corpses over an issue that
should not concern tribunes. The oIIice at this point was used as a way to avoid prosecution,
assert control over events in Rome, manipulate politics on behalI oI a political ally, and exact
revenge.
The design oI the tribunate had deteriorated considerably by the time Caesar crossed the
Rubicon. The Iact that Caesar claimed that two oI his reasons Ior attacking Rome and the Senate
was to reassert the liberty oI the people and the power oI the tribunes, only to have himselI made
dictator Ior liIe, illustrates that the tradition oI the tribunate never recovered aIter the Gracchi
brothers introduced radical tactics in Ilagrant disregard to the os aiorum
24
. While the ideal
the tribunes represented acted as a just casus belli, Caesar`s behavior towards tribunes denotes
certain apathy towards them. Caesar viewed tribunes merely as a means to an end. Once Caesar
lost an ally in Clodius, he had his Iriend Marcus Antonius elected and courted the tribune Curio.
He won Curio`s support by paying oII his debts. Once Curio became his client, he owed Caesar
Iavors in return, which he paid in the Iorm oI delaying tactics in Rome as Caesar sought to strike
a deal with Pompey and the Senate. Roman politicians reduced tribunes to pawns in their game
oI politics. Whereas during the days oI the early Republic tribunes and those championing the

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13

peoples` rights worked slowly over centuries to ease the Roman political institution into the idea
oI change, radical tribunes oI the late second and Iirst centuries BCE pursued sweeping reIorms
Iar too quickly. They lacked the tact oI their predecessors.
The role oI the Roman tribunate as established by early visionaries such as Barbatus and
Horatius eroded over time to become vehicles oI political manipulation. By ostensibly working
towards expanding the peoples` liberty, the Gracchi tested the limits oI tribunician powers and
discovered that conservative elements in the Senate and even among their Iellow tribunes would
not allow Ior radical reIorm and personal advancement. Lessons learned Irom the Gracchi aIIair
inIluenced Sulpicius and his manipulation oI political aIIairs by organizing his own group oI
armed supporters and acting on behalI oI Marius. Sulla`s Iailed reIorms oI the tribunate then
caused the problems oI the oIIice to maniIest themselves more Iully in the Iorm oI Milo and
Clodius. As powerIul military actors such as Caesar and Pompey began to use these individuals
as a method to assert their own dominance, Clodius` attempts to escape Irom the yoke oI his
master served him poorly. Caesar`s appeal to traditional tribunes rights such as sacrosanctity on
the eve oI his march on Rome and then his Iailure to honor the Iorm oI government he claimed to
be saving illustrated that the ideal oI the tribunate, oI the Republic in general, was little more
than a sham. The idea oI the Republic had Iailed, the tribunate had Iailed, but the Iinal death
throes allowed those individuals most adept at manipulating the system to burst Iorth Irom it and
advance a new Iorm oI government, perhaps a less ruthless government. Although this vision
too would eventually Iail, the position oI the tribune as a viable political oIIice Iinally collapsed
with Caesar`s disregard Ior it aIter almost a century oI weathering.

16

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