1

Absolving the Guilt

German Diagama
1) Mathematical statements imply the existence of mathematical properties. 2) Mathematical properties are weird. 3) If something is weird, it doesnt exist. 4) Mathematical properties dont exist (2,3) 5) Mathematical statements are false. (1,4) It is crucual to note that the uniform substitution may have heavily modied the meaning of the unmodied parts of our original rst premise. However, the gist remains the same. Not all instances of substitution will run this smoothly, and in fact uniform substitution will often be impossible in constructing a reductio of the original argument without making the argument incoherent. I only use this unusually effective example because it makes the spirit of this substitution method very clear. That is, make the substitute argument as analogous to the original as possible, so that the interlocutor is forced to either reject their own original premises, or accept the conclusion of the substitute argument. II. ACCUSING THE S USPECT So, can an argument against moral realism be constructed that does not fall victim to the substitution method? Before this is known, the criteria for victimhood at the hands of the method are required: Denition 1 (Victimhood). A is a victim of the substitution method if and only if there exists an argument with the conclusion C which A has made and there exists a rough substitution of whose conclusion entails the falsehood of some belief B where B N and N is As noetic structure (the structure which contains the set of As beliefs and their relations to each other) and P (B) > P (C) where P (x) is the epistemic probability of x given x N . So whats going to really matter here is what counts as a rough substitution. Lets be very generous then and assume any argument can count as a rough substitution of as long as it does not make any statements which are not allowed in the language or semantics which employs (or does not involve them at all). A. subsection B. another subsection III. M ETHODOLOGY Lemma 2. Any anti-realist argument can, by uniform substitution, be turned into an anti-epistemic realism argument. Theorem 3. For a named theorem or theorem-like environment you need to insert the name through Insert Short Title, as done here.

AbstractDefenders of moral realism have often appealed to its analogousness to other metaphysical and epistemological theses in an attempt to make objections seem irrational. One method of doing this that has arisen recently, which I shall call the substitution method, is to take any positive argument against moral realism and turn it into an argument against something similar to it, which the interlocutor probably endorses (such as mathematical realism, metaphysical realism, non-naturalist epistemology etc.) Herein I argue that this method cannot save moral realism from certain sorts of arguments. I also explore other, general problems with the method, and the usefulness of these arguments from analogy for moral realism. Index TermsMoral Realism, Deontic Logic, David Lewis, Normativity

I. PARTNERS IN C RIME It used to be that philosophers would make direct arguments for their positions. They would start with some rather plausible premises and get you, reader, to endorse a conclusion that was not so obvious.1 This has largely fallen out of favor as all the low hanging fruit has been picked, and it is now far too challenging to actually acquire direct evidence for a thesis. A fashionable alternative many contemporary philosophers have opted for is making any objector to their thesis confuse herself by taking her objection and turning it into an objection against something she already believes in. For instance, suppose Jones is a modal realist and an alethic nihilist, and Smith isnt. Jones might start a dialectic with Smith by saying that nominalism about modality is incoherent, because semantics about objects require the existence of possible worlds (as non-abstract entities). Smith might turn this around and say that semantics about semantics about objects would require the existence of true or false propositions, thus refuting Jones nihilism! A similar strategy has been endorsed by some with respect to moral realism.2 The way this strategy unfolds morally is generally as follows. The anti-realist will rst raise some argument; well use the argument from weirdness here for its simplicity3 : 1) Moral statements imply the existence of moral properties. 2) Moral properties are weird. 3) If something is weird, it doesnt exist. 4) Moral properties dont exist (2,3) 5) Moral statements are false. (1,4) Then uniform substitution on the argument will be done, replacing moral properties with more plausible properties, like mathematical properties, however, the conclusion shall be absurd:
Second Name is with the Department of ..., ... Institute of ..., City, Country, e-mail: xxx@xxx.xxx. Third Name is with the Department of ..., ... Institute of ..., City, Country, e-mail: xxx@xxx.xxx.

Lemma 4. If you dont want a theorem or lemma name dont add one. Proof: And heres the proof! IV. R ESULTS A single column gure goes here
Figure 1. Captions go under the gure

Table I TABLE CAPTIONS GO above THE TABLE delete example this table

V. C ONCLUSIONS bla bla A PPENDIX A F IRST APPENDIX Citation[1] A PPENDIX B S ECOND APPENDIX ACKNOWLEGMENT bla bla R EFERENCES
[1] S. Zhang, C. Zhu, J. K. O. Sin, and P. K. T. Mok, A novel ultrathin elevated channel low-temperature poly-Si TFT, IEEE Electron Device Lett., vol. 20, pp. 569571, Nov. 1999.

Your Name All about you and the what your interests are.

../../../examples/CV-image.png

Coauthor Same again for the co-author, but without photo