Perceived security compared to real security Perception of security may be poorly mapped to measureable objective security.

F or example, the fear of earthquakes has been reported to be more common than the fear of slipping on the bathroom floor although the latter kills many more peop le than the former.[1] Similarly, the perceived effectiveness of security measur es is sometimes different from the actual security provided by those measures. T he presence of security protections may even be taken for security itself. For e xample, two computer security programs could be interfering with each other and even cancelling each other's effect, while the owner believes s/he is getting do uble the protection. Security theater is a critical term for deployment of measures primarily aimed a t raising subjective security in a population without a genuine or commensurate concern for the effects of that measure on and possibly decreasing objective security. or example, some consider the screening of airline passengers based on static da tabases to have been Security Theater and Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreeni ng System to have created a decrease in objective security. Perception of security can also increase objective security when it affects or d eters malicious behavior, as with visual signs of security protections, such as video surveillance, alarm systems in a home, or an anti-theft system in a car su ch as a LoJack, signs. Since some intruders will decide not to attempt to break into such areas or vehi cles, there can actually be less damage to windows in addition to protection of valuable objects inside. Without such advertisement, a car-thief might, for exam ple, approach a car, break the window, and then flee in response to an alarm bei ng triggered. Either way, perhaps the car itself and the objects inside aren't s tolen, but with perceived security even the windows of the car have a lower chan ce of being damaged, increasing the financial security of its owner(s). However, the non-profit, security research group, ISECOM, has determined that su ch signs may actually increase the violence, daring, and desperation of an intru der [2] This claim shows that perceived security works mostly on the provider an d is not security at all.[3] It is important, however, for signs advertising security not to give clues as to how to subvert that security, for example in the case where a home burglar migh t be more likely to break into a certain home if he or she is able to learn befo rehand which company makes its security system. [edit]Categorising security There is an immense literature on the analysis and categorisation of security. P art of the reason for this is that, in most security systems, the "weakest link in the chain" is the most important. The situation is asymmetric since the 'defe nder' must cover all points of attack while the attacker need only identify a si ngle weak point upon which to concentrate. [edit]Types IT realm Application security Computing security Data security Information security Network security Physical realm Airport security Port security/Supply chain security Food security Home security Physical security School security Shopping centre security Infrastructure security Political

Homeland security Human security International security National security Public security Monetary Financial security