1

I Neurath, Sociology and the Unified Science Otto Neurath was a member of the Vienna Circle who, with the rest of the Circle, set out to, create a climate which will be free from metaphysics in order to promote scientific studies in all fields by means of logical analysis. (Neurath, pg.282) Specifically, Neurath had a vision of what he called a unified science; a single body of knowledge into which all other fields of scientific study could be reduced into. After all, Neurath declares that, the body of scientific propositions exhausts the sum of all meaningful statements. (Ibid, pg. 282) Out of a desire to go about the process of actually exhausting the aforementioned sum, Neurath believed that the only way to go about accomplishing this would be to unify all the sciences into one single science. However, when Neurath mentions the sciences, he is not merely talking about the fields of chemistry, physics, biology, etc; what are referred to as the hard sciences in common parlance. Along with those disciplines, Neurath also desired to include what are commonly called social sciences sociology, economics, anthropology, history, etc. in his vision of a unified science. In order to aggregate all the various sciences under the banner of unified sciences, it would first be necessary to develop a unified language into which the statements of various scientific disciplines could be translated. Such a language is, common to the blind and the seeing, the deaf and the hearing. It is intersensual and intersubjective. It connects what the soliloquizer asserts today with what he asserted yesterday, the statements he makes when his ears are closed with those he makes when he opens them. (Ibid, pg. 286) This language would, according to Neurath, be the language of physics because it is the only language which is precise and objective enough to state observations and formulate predictions with adequate clarify and specificity.

Within Neuraths unified science, the truth value of a particular statement is determined based on how it relates to statements already known to be true and scientific laws. In this respect, there is no verification principle to determine the truth of a claim; the truth-value of an observation is determined by it being, compared with the totality of existing statements previously coordinated. To say that a statement is correct, therefore, means that it can be incorporated into this totality. What cannot be incorporated is rejected as incorrect. (Ibid, pg. 291) Thus, the unified science is constantly evolving and changing, incorporating facts in the context of all that is known to be true. The truth, according to unified science, is therefore not some sort of eternal, unchanging entity but is dynamic, evolving, and in a constant state of flux. Neurath viewed the social sciences as a part of his unified science. But exactly how does he go about translating the observations and hypotheses of the social sciences into the language of the universal science? Neurath takes a very specific view of the world, which he calls physicalism. For Neurath, physicalism is the view that everything is operating and is a part of, the space-time system to which that of physics corresponds, and furthermore that all reality is contained within this spatio-temporal continuum, i.e. there is nothing which transcends physical reality. (Ibid, pg. 286) Given his adherence to physicalism and disdain for metaphysics, Neurath believes that there are physical laws which govern the behavior of people, just as there are laws that govern gravity and the behavior of machines. In specific, just as quantum physics is used to scientifically analyze and describe sub-atomic particles, behaviorism is used to scientifically analyze and describe the conduct of people. It is through a behaviorist analysis of humans that Neurath seeks to incorporate the social sciences into his vision of unified science. It is in this regard that, the alleged distinction between natural sciences and moral sciences, to the effect

that the former concern themselves only with arrangement, the latter with understanding as well, is non-existent. (Ibid, pg 298) In terms of the divisions within the social sciences, Neurath feels that they are illusory, and that these supposed divisions are nothing more than useful protocol sentences and laws which economics, ethnology, history and other disciplines have to offer. (Ibid, pg 309) In reality, all these divisions fall under the scope of sociology, which is the science of social behaviorism. Each social science concerns itself with humans acting in a specific context. For example, economics concerns itself with how humans behave while trying to satisfy their desires under conditions of scarcity. Anthropology studies the behavior of humans in the context of a particular culture. In each case, the topic is the behavior of humans in some specific context. Therefore, Without metaphysics, without distinctions explicable only through reference to metaphysical habits, these disciplines cannot maintain their independence. Whatever elements of genuine science are contained in them become incorporated into the structure of sociology. And sociology, in turn, is a part of the universal science. II Criticisms of Behaviorism, Sociology and the Unified Science Neuraths physicalistic interpretation of reality and positivist epistemology are not without criticism. He argued that the natural sciences and social sciences are one in the same, both a part of the Unified Science. The Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek takes a different view, however. Naomi Beck writes on Hayek: According to Hayek, the aim of the social sciences is to study the consequences of the fact that we perceive the world and each other through concepts and sensations, which are organized in a mental structure common t us all. Thus, data in the social sciences is of a different kind than in the physical sciences. The social scientist studies the ways people interpret reality, rather than reality itself. In other words, he studies the results of a classification process that takes place in the human mind, and to which he does not have direct access. (Beck, pg.574)

In other words, the natural sciences concern themselves with the study of causality, while social sciences are concerned with the study of the conscious, willful pursuit of goals based on our perception of causality. It is entirely reasonable to maintain a separation between physical sciences and social sciences based on this fact. This is a valid enough argument, but it only holds if one assumes that humans actually have some notion of free will, and that the actions of individuals are nothing more than involuntary reactions to external stimuli; that the behavior of humans is nothing more than a predictable effect of some natural cause. Neurath is of this opinion. He subscribes to a psychological school of thought known as behaviorism, which postulates that psychology is the scientific study of behaviors. These behaviors, in turn, are predictable reactions to external stimuli. In a sense, behaviorism views the human mind not as an autonomous agent exercising free will, but rather as an organism responding to its environment by exhibiting specific behaviors. Furthermore, behaviorists postulate that once can use the scientific method in order to deduce which sort of stimuli will elicit which sort of behaviors. In effect, by reducing human agency to a mere causal phenomenon, behaviorism carries with it an implicit assumption of determinism. If science shows us that the behaviors of any particular person are nothing more than causal reactions to some form of stimulus, then that is an admission that there is no free will; everything that person does is merely an involuntary, pre-determined reaction to an observable cause. Neurath offers persuasive evidence to suggest his adherence to behaviorist determinism. He writes, Just as the behavior of animals can be studied no less than that of machines, stars and stones, so can the behavior of animal groups be investigated. (Neurath, pg. 300) Clearly, he admits his belief that people are like machines, programmed to perform behavior Y when

stimulated by X. However, a problem arises from such taking behaviorist logic to its full conclusion. As discussed previously, one of the aims of Neuraths unified science was to eradicate metaphysics and discredit it as a reputable source of knowledge. However: if one eliminates from the treatment of human action the notion of conscious aiming at definite ends, one must replace it by the really metaphysical idea that some superhuman agency leads men, independently of their will, toward a predestined goal: that what put the bridge-builder into motion was the preordained plan of Geist or the material productive forces which mortal men are forced to execute. (Mises, 245) In other words, by implicitly denying the free will and agency of individuals, Neuraths behaviorism must necessarily admit the existence of a metaphysical, teleological force; a conclusion which would certainly be anathema to all Neurath stood for! Another issue which Neuraths brand of behaviorism gives rise to is its inability to explain why some people react differently to the same stimulus. By his own reasoning, Neurath admits that, the employment of physicalistic statements concerning ones own body in making physicalistic statements about anothers is completely in line with our scientific work, which throughout makes this sort of extrapolation. (Neurath, pg 298) In other words, Neurath is saying that according to his universal science, it is perfectly valid to take ones own behavioral reaction to a particular stimulus and extrapolate ones response to any other person. Clearly, this reasoning runs completely contrary to reality. One need only look at how various people react to being robbed at gun point to see why such reasoning is faulty. Some people will comply with their captors demands, while others will attempt to disarm and fight the gunman. Each person will react in a different and unpredictable way because as free agents, we all choose to exercise our individual autonomy in different ways when confronted with the same situation. But because Neurath chooses to adopt a behaviorist view of psychology, free will is not an available option to explain this difference in reactions. Neurath may very well have an answer to this

problem, but even if he does, this issue raises many questions regarding the validity of his unified science, which relies on the notion of behaviorism. III An Alternative Methodology for the Social Sciences Neuraths vision of a unified science is ultimately a failed one. Physical science and social science are of different natures, and attempting to combine them into a unified theory only leads to contradictions and epistemic quagmires. In light of this revelation, many questions are still left unanswered. What is the proper role of social science? Is there more than one kind of social science? What is the scope of the social science(s)? What sort of methodology should serve as the foundation of social sciences? Similar to Neurath, I believe that what have traditionally been considered the various branches of the social sciences history, anthropology, economics, sociology, etc. all fall under the scope of one discipline. However, with Neurath that discipline was sociology; I am of the belief that all social sciences fall under the scope of economics. With Neurath, his belief in the coherence theory of truth can be seen to influence his affinity for sociology. To Neurath, protocol sentences derive their truth values from being coherent with other protocol statements. The truth of a particular claim is contingent upon its consistency with other previously established claims. One can see a train of thought analogous to his coherence-theory present in his choice of sociology as the unifying social science. Neurath explains that, sociology does not investigate purely statistical variations in animal or, above all, human groups; it is concerned with the connections among stimuli occurring between particular individuals. (Neurath, pg. 301) In other words, sociology is concerned with the coherence of individuals reactions to stimuli, much like his theory of truth is concerned with the coherence of any given protocol sentence with other protocol sentences.

I personally subscribe to Moritz Schlicks correspondence theory of truth, which states that only protocol sentences denoting a first-person observation are truly meaningful, and that their truth is derived from their correspondence with objective reality. Whereas one can classify Neuraths correspondence theory of truth as more collectivist and relativistic in a sense, Schlicks truth theory relies on subjective and individual observations, which are compared to objective reality. This kind of reasoning is analogous to economic reasoning, which Mises defines as the science of human action. More specifically, economics studies how peoples subjective desires manifest themselves in their corresponding choice of action. This is analogous to the coherence theory of truth comparing a subjective observation to objective reality; the subjective desires are compared to objective reality through their manifestation in action. The specific methodology of the economic science is called praxeology. It is an axiomatic system of deductive reasoning whose axioms are synthetic a priori. Hans HermanHoppe and Mises write: Its statements and propositions are not derived from experience. They are, like those of logic and mathematics, a priori. They are not subject to verification and falsification on the ground of experience and facts. They are both logically and temporally antecedent to any comprehension of historical facts. They are a necessary requirement of any intellectual grasp of historical events. (Herman-Hoppe, pg. 8) The theorems attained by correct praxeological reasoning are not only perfectly certain and incontestable, like the correct mathematical theorems. They refer, moreover, with the full rigidity of their apodictic certainty and incontestability to the reality of action as it appears in life and history. Praxeology conveys exact and precise knowledge of real things. (Mises, pg. 39) Although such a methodology naturally raises some concerns and objections, I will address those in the next section. Criticism aside, one might reasonably ask what benefits are to be gained through the use of praxeology. One large benefit is that, as stated above, the theorems are perfectly certain and incontestable. Assuming one uses proper logic, a valid deduction scheme,

and accepts the premises of the theorem to be true, the conclusion is undeniable. In the science of praxeology, the premise of every theorem traces back to the fundamental axiom of action: that people act. Its obvious that this is always the case; even if someone chooses not to act, they have still made a choice the choice to not act. Therefore, no matter the circumstances, it is always true that people act. Thus, the conclusions of praxeological reasoning are always irrefutably true. Certainly this is a desirable property for any theory to have! Another benefit of praxeological reasoning is that it is atemporal. The theorems and conclusions of praxeology are valid regardless of whether it is the year 20 B.C. or 20,000 A.D. Because its axioms are synthetic a priori, not only are they valid across time, but furthermore have meaning and genuine content. Because the axiom of action is synthetic, it is more than just a tautology. This gives us an invaluable tool with which not only can we analyze the past, but also predict the future. Finally, the Austrian school of economics, which makes use of the science of praxeology, is most adequate for explaining social phenomenon because it can account for agency and free will. As we saw with Neurath and his behaviorism, problems arise when one tries to deny the validity of free will in a field of study whose focus is the choices people make in their decision to act. The Austrian school, however, does not encounter this problem. As stated above, social sciences can all be traced back to economics. The reason for this is because that economics is the study of actions carried out on an individual basis. Other fields, such as sociology, concern themselves with the interactions among acting people in groups of varying size. Before one sets out to study the actions of a society as a whole, one must first have a firm grasp of human action at an individual level. Thus, all social sciences start from the study of economics. The

methodological individualism of economics serves as the building block from which all the other disciplines of the social sciences are created. IV Criticisms of the Praxeological Methodology The praxeological methodology of Austrian economics is not without its critics. In particular, there are four arguments commonly raised against the science of praxeology being a valid source of knowledge which I wish to address. The first, and most common, criticism is that praxeology is unscientific. Because of the deductive nature of praxeology, it ignores empirical and scientific evidence in favor of abstract theorems and deductions. Since its results are not based on scientific data or empirical observation, praxeology does not deserve serious consideration as an epistemological foundation of the social sciences. It is absolutely true that praxeological theorems are not based on empirical data. However, it is a straw man to somehow claim that Austrians shun empirical evidence. A quick survey of praxeological and Austrian literature will show this to not be the case. There is nothing wrong with using tangible evidence or empirical data to substantiate a claim. For example, in Austrian economist Murray Rothbards book The Mystery of Banking, Rothbard cites many historical examples, such as the era of free banking in Scotland, to serve as evidence of his claims that a free market in banking would lead to favorable results. Mises used the German hyperinflation of the early 20th century in Human Action as an example to prove that inflationary monetary policy inevitably leads to currency collapse; a conclusion he derived using his aprioristic praxeological reasoning. There is nothing wrong with using historical and empirical figures to substantiate a praxeological deduction; in fact, such evidence can often times be helpful for explaining ideas. However, what Austrians and praxeologists note is that the truthvalue of their claims is not derived from the validity of their evidence; the evidence just so

10

happens to conform to their theorems because of the synthetic a priori nature of praxeological deductions. Another objection that is raised against praxeology, related to the unscientific criticism, is that it is a degenerative theory. These objections can be traced back to the philosopher Imre Lakatos in his essay Science and Pseudoscience. Lakatos discusses the difference between progressive and degenerative theories. He makes two major claims. He states, the typical descriptive unit of great scientific achievements is not an isolated hypothesis but rather a research programme. (Lakatos, pg. 4) He also says: All the research programs I admire have one characteristic in common. They all predict novel facts, facts which had been either undreamt of, or have indeed be contradicted by previous or rival programmes. in a progressive research programme, theory leads to the discovery of hitherto unknown novel facts. In degenerating programmes, however, theories are fabricated only in order to accommodate known facts. (Lakatos, pg. 4-5) Critics claim that praxeology qualifies as a degenerate theory because praxeology does not predict novel economic facts. Adam Smith and the Classical School made many of the same free-market arguments that were deduced using the Austrians praxeology. Thus it is degenerate. However, to claim that the Austrian economists have not predicted any novel facts which had been undreamt of is absurd, and ignores some of the claims which Austrian economists have made over the years. One great example of a novel prediction nobody saw coming was the Great Depression. In 1912, almost two decades before the start of the Depression, Ludwig von Mises published his book The Theory of Money and Credit. In it, he talked about the disastrous effects that expansionary monetary policy and artificially cheap credit could have on an economy. Specifically, Mises predicted that should a central bank manipulate interest rates below the market equilibrium, a large economic boom followed by an even larger bust would ensure, and that it would have disastrous effects on the economy for many years to

11

come. He deduced this hypothesis via praxeological reasoning. When the stock market started to crash on Black Tuesday, which flung the economy into a subsequent depression, nobody had seen it coming. However, Mises used the power of praxeology to predict this event almost 20 years before it actually happened! If that does not qualify as predicting novel facts which had been undreamt of, I dont know what does. In retrospect, many economists from all different schools of thought generally agree that one of the major causes of the Great Depression was indeed the lowering of interest rates, precisely as Mises had predicted. A final criticism, one which I have thought of on my own, regards the a priori nature of praxeology. In recent years, computer scientists have developed automatic theorem proving machines. If one feeds it an input of definitions, rules of deduction, axioms, and a theorem to try and solve, the machine will attempt to prove it within those parameters, and if it can be proved, it will print the proof out step-by-step. One example of such a machine is called Isabelle, a program developed by the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory. Since praxeology is a deductive, axiomatic science similar to logic and mathematics, in theory it is possible to somehow translate the axioms of praxeology into the language of set theory, explicitly define rules of deduction, and put it into a machine such as Isabelle. Isabelle could then prove all of the results of Austrian economics and praxeology through the use of an automated algorithm. This might seem like a lot of effort, but the implication here is twofold. One, it would strongly suggest that praxeology is not synthetic a priori as Mises claims, but rather analytic a priori. This, in turn, would imply that the Austrian schools methodology of choice is nothing more than an elaborate tautology, which would greatly damage the explanatory power and credibility of the praxeological science.

12

The second major implication this would hold in store for not just the Austrian school, but for the economics profession in general, is that a computer would be able to accurately prove and discover knowledge regarding economics, a science which studies human conduct. The implications here would be vast. Most importantly, though, it would imply that the world would no longer need economists, because computers could simply derive all the answers to our problems. I am not sure what an appropriate response to these issues would be, but they are certainly interesting questions raised by the fact that praxeology is a deductive science. V Conclusion By analyzing Otto Neuraths vision of a unified science, and how social sciences would fit into such a vision, this paper has sought to highlight the methodological and epistemological differences between the physical sciences and social sciences. Namely, the two kinds of science are incompatible because of the scope of the subject matter: the physical sciences aim to study the deterministic chains of causality that exist in nature, while the social sciences seek to ascertain a greater understanding of how people perceive the natural world, and also how they interact with one another. I also demonstrated the impossibility of a unified science, at least in the way which Neurath conceived of it. I then called the readers attention to the science of praxeology, a synthetic a priori deductive method of reasoning which is used by the Austrian School of Economics to derive atemporal conclusions regarding the nature of human action. Finally, I have defended praxeology as a methodological basis for all the social sciences from some of the more common criticisms often used against it. Although it is not without issue, the praxeological methodology is an interesting one which has the potential to offer insight into the social sciences from a viewpoint which is not often considered by mainstream academia.

13

Bibliography
Neurath, Otto. "Sociology and Physicalism." Logical Positivism. Ed. A. J. Ayer. New York City: The Free Press, 1959. 282-321. Print. Beck, Naomi. "In Search of the Proper Scientific Approach: Hayek." Science in Context. 22.4 (2009): 56785. Web. 14 Dec. 2011. <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=6559244&jid=SIC&volumeId=2 2&issueId=04&aid=6559236>. Caldwell, Bruce J. "Praxeology and its critics: an appraisal." History of Political Economy. 16.3 (1984): 36379. Print. Herman-Hoppe, Hans. Economic Science and the Austrian Method. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1995. Print. Lakatos, Imre. "Introduction: Science and Pseudoscience." The methodology of scientific research programmes. Ed. John Worrall and Ed. Gregory Currie. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-7. Print. Mises, Ludwig von. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. Scholars Ed. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. Print.